AUM

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence*

THE ARYAN PATH

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"A LOVELIER WORLD"

We live in an atmosphere of gloom and despair, but this is because our eyes are downcast and rivetted to the earth, with all its physical and grossly material manifestations. If, instead of that, man proceeding on his life-journey looked—not heavenward, which is but a figure of speech—but *within himself* and centred his point of observation on the *inner* man, he would soon escape from the coils of the great serpent of illusion. From the cradle to the grave, his life would then become supportable and worth living, even in its worst phases.—H. P. BLAVATSKY.

Every one agrees that at the moment our world is a very ugly one. Perhaps its ugliest feature is the rise of autocracy blatant and unashamed. As our world, especially in the West, has received in full the blessings of education, materialistic, mechanistic and soulless, the tyranny of one mind over another mind is practised. The autocrat of to-day knows the value of mind, hence publicity departments are not only organized but also officialized. Thus the menace of mass-thinking is growing. This is the theme of the article we print below; it is by our esteemed friend, Mr. Leslie J. Belton, the well-known Editor of *The Inquirer*, the weekly organ of the Unitarians of England.

With his views we find ourselves in full agreement: men will succeed in building a lovelier world only when they have learnt "to find in themselves the only saviour."

We should however like to point out that the birth of dictatorships in Italy and Germany which Mr. Belton deplores is but an effect. In the general discussion about the new post-war world the truth that it is the legitimate child of the pre-war years is forgotten. The western world was only outwardly democratic; autocracy was energetic behind the scenes. Further, that western world practised autocracy openly in Asia and Africa under the guise of superior peoples civilizing backward races. In State as in Church,

democracy in name but autocracy *in actu* flourished.

Great Britain, to which Mr. Belton refers, has been in some respects the greatest culprit. In India, for example, the British held the opinion, referred to by Mr. Belton, that "the masses must be trained in the art of submission and tradition."

All patriotic Indians resent the flourishing existence of autocracy—mind-killing and soul-killing. Since, however, it is but an effect, this autocracy has to be traced to its cause. Degrading autocracy, religious and social, has been corrupting and debasing and enslaving the millions in this land for a long time. Even to-day side by side with the political dominance of the ruler over the ruled thrives religious and social, caste and class tyranny.

Mr. Belton does not name what the root of autocracy is. People will not learn the real nature of its evil until they learn of that root. It is the rejection of the existence of Divinity presiding in the heart of every human being. When a man rejects the divinity of his own being, he is ready to enslave and to be enslaved. He loses his integrity by such a denial, and, true faith abandoned, he falls prey to several beliefs blindly held.

A man's real religion is rarely that of his parents. It is not the one into which he is born. There are few Christians in Christendom. How many Parsis can be called Mazdiasnans, the practitioners of that Wisdom the basis of which is the triad of Good Thoughts, Good Words, Good Deeds? India is devoid of Brahmanas, if to modern cooks or lawyers born in that caste has to be applied the test of the qualities which form the caste-mark according the *Gita.* Everywhere the religion of the man is different from the religion he publicly professes. Even in the fold of Materialism —how many are thoroughgoing materialists? Nor is the Rationalist Society free from irrationality any more than the Spiritualistic Movement is free from crass and unphilosophical materialism. Among those who call themselves Theosophists there are the blind believers, there are the mentally lazy and there are the sectarians. Everywhere there is confusion of caste, the natural mark of the age which in Brahmanical chronology is named Dark, *Kali Yuga.*

This distinction between the true and inner religion of a person and the outer one which he professes is not fully recognized. Consequently a great deal of hypocrisy envelops modern society—every stratum of it; perhaps a greater hypocrisy prevails mong the "cultured" and the "rich" than among the "illiterate" and the "poor." And what is most objectionable and alarming is that this hypocrisy prevails among the leaders, especially the political leaders, to whom the masses look for guidance. At present Nationalism is the religion of large numbers in every country. Its priests are the political leaders who exploit the psychical nature of their followers as their forbears once did (and even now do) in the sphere of religions.

This phenomenon is disintegrating—and to a greater extent than

would be generally conceded. Those individuals who have freed themselves from religious orthodoxy are to that extent the better off. For having discarded that fecund source of hypocrisy, they are learning more and more to think for themselves and to live by the religion of their own conscience. The individual in countries like England is really clean and sound at heart (perhaps also in Italy and Germany, even with their dictators) in spite of dangerous false knowledge which is spread under the names of science and social reform. But in several respects he is blinded by his loyalties--to leaders, political parties, caucuses. The Britisher in the street is not so much bothered by the creed of the Church as by that of the State. In political idealism he is in advance of his Parliament, but he is outwitted by it. For example, he wants to abolish war; his political leaders in Parliament spend their time talking about it; while *he* is sincere, are the leaders as sincere and doing everything possible to attain the goal?

In the last century the politician spoke of educating his masters—the voters. In this century it is the man in the street who has to educate his bosses in Downing street and the Quai d'Orsay. The first step is for the educator to free himself from his own autocracy born of his doubt in his own divinity. Then only can he fight organized autocracy, which is maintained by hypocrisy.

Modern political philosophy lacks the spiritual element. It looks upon the citizen as a social animal. It should look upon him as a human divinity unfolding its powers to master nature through self-control, to serve nature by soul-intelligence.

THE MENACE OF MASS-THINKING

The rise in Europe of tyrannical governments raises some disturbing questions. No sane and enlightened person can have any doubt about the worst features of these dictatorships; he condemns them as organised barbarisms sustained by an irrational, emotional "drive"; he perceives in the apotheosis of nationhood and race, and the practices to which it gives rise (anti-Semitism, persecution, secret trials and the like), a betrayal of man's noblest achievements, and a reversion to tribalism which is the more dangerous because it is mechanised tribalism replete with every weapon of destruction man's ingenuity has yet devised. Justice, Liberty and Mercy are become of no account, and humanitarian culture is rejected and despised. All is subordinate to the doctrine of Might, enforced by an overweening pride of Race; and who can doubt that this doctrine will encompass the downfall of Western civilisation unless sanity returns and men learn how to find in themselves the only saviour with power to save and to build a lovelier world?

Against the worst iniquities of dictatorships humane thinkers of our

time have not ceased to protest—and there is hope in that. But against the less spectacular and more widespread evil of mass-thinking and subjection of the human spirit, the voice of protest is too seldom heard.

In the original edition of Herr Hitler's autobiography, *Mein Kampf*, there stood a revealing sentence (expunged from later editions):—

> The German has not the slightest notion how a people must be misled if the adherence of the masses is sought.

Such words reveal the avowed and necessary policy of autocratic government in modern times; but more than that, they reveal the utter degradation to which the human mind is subject under any political or religious system which exalts an institutionalised authority over the human soul. Whether that institution be the State or the Church the same principle is involved, and in the end the same abject submission of the individual conscience and reason is required. The pursuit of truth for its own sake becomes, instead of a virtue, a vice. Mass-thinking becomes the order of the day. Emotionalised mass-thinking is one of the most insidious dangers of our time. To foster independence of judgment—the ability to think clearly and dispassionately regardless of propaganda or the "pull" of tradition—should be, though it is not, a primary aim of education in every civilised community. In some countries this classic ideal has been all but forgotten, while in others it is openly despised as savouring of a "soft," impractical Liberalism. The school child is regarded not as a being who, under proper guidance, should be allowed to develop spontaneously, but as a piece of malleable clay to be wrought upon and duly forced into the body politic. The masses must be trained in the art of submission and tradition; propaganda and high command combine to crush any manifestation of uniqueness or wayward desire to rebel against the system of rigid taboo.

How this system works on a small scale is shown in *Ariel*, André Maurois's romantic biography of the English poet, Percy Bysshe Shelley. The author describes the disastrous effect of the harsh educational system then prevailing at Eton upon this young and sensitive poet. The headmaster's aim was—

> to form "hard faced men," all run in the same mould . . . . . . any originality of thought, of dress, or of language, was the most heinous of crimes. To betray the smallest interest in ideas or books was a bit of disgusting affectation to be forcibly pulled up by the roots.

In religion "doubt was held to be a crime," and by religion was meant, of course, Christianity according to the Church of England. The method worked—just as Prussianism worked, but it drove to despair the Schillers and, still more, the Shelleys whose misfortune it was to become victims of this depressive system. Boys must be disciplined and hardened, drilled into uniformity, and such scarcely respectable idiosyncrasies as an artistic or a mystic temperament must take their chance of surviving the hideous process. That is a picture of an educational ideal which recent decades

have considerably modified. But it is a system which lingers still in certain schools and, what is more menacing, is being revived on a larger scale and with all the false glory of militarism in Germany and Italy to-day.

But not in the schools alone does this practice of subjecting the human mind to authority still obtain. It is a common practice hallowed by the custom of centuries. Wherever it is in force it gives rise to traditionalism, mass-prejudice, collectivism, the crowd-mind, name it how we will. And everywhere it induces servility of mind at the cost of personal uniqueness and freedom of thought. In social life it leads to class-consciousness, to subservience to artificial conventions and the maintenance of rigid, meaningless taboos. (Such and such a thing "is not done"!) In religion it leads sometimes to subjection to a priestly caste, invariably to sectarianism and bigotry. "A sect or party is an elegant incognito devised to save a man from the vexation of thinking," said Emerson in one of his journals.

Groups and societies have—probably they always will have—a rightful place in social life; but as soon as groups, churches or societies arrogate to themselves authority and power over the human mind they have ceased to serve any useful end. They then become substitutes for personal effort—ends in themselves instead of a means of stimulating the personal effort and fostering the welfare of the members composing them. Once a society or a church has hardened into a traditional mould, it is time for the rebel or the prophet to arise, to smash the idols which men's minds or hands have made. Tradition is made for man, not man for tradition. A religion of tradition which exists on the intellectual submission of its followers is better swept away because it holds man's mind in thrall to a rule and a creed; it perpetuates frozen thoughts and stultifies personal effort.

Its effect can be shown by an analogy. If you bring up a child to be dependent on you for his every want, and that child, on reaching manhood, is still dependent on you and submissive to your will, have you succeeded in your duty as a parent? Clearly you have failed. It is your parental duty to teach your child self-reliance and responsibility. So it is in the larger world. Any organisation which treats men and women as minors and requires their submission to authority is undermining the foundations of selfhood and usurping a responsibility which should belong to the individual man alone. The end of true education is not conformity but emancipation. That does not mean that the emancipated man will be so foolish as to imagine that he will be able to stand alone, like a Robinson Crusoe on an island of his own making, uninfluenced by the thoughts of other men, unaided by master-minds. He will gladly acknowledge his debt to countless thinkers and exemplars of the past and of his own time, and some among them may become his beloved teachers. But he will guard himself against too readily assimi-

lating the thought-habits of the people around him and likewise against uncritically adopting any system of thought which comes to him ready-made. And finally he will repay his debt, not by reliance upon any external help but by learning to walk without "crutches" as becomes a man of discernment and poise.

Is this egoism? Then egoism let it be. One must *be* oneself in order to *give* oneself. But one truly becomes oneself in giving oneself. The "spiritual" miser shrivels up and dies in a paradise-prison of his own, whereas the emancipated man discovers himself, far beyond the bounds of personality, in unutterable sympathy with all that lives.

> All are one brotherhood;
> I and all creatures, plants and trees,
> The living limbs of God.

He finds salvation not as a misanthrope in isolation but as one who loves and serves mankind.

For inspiration he can draw upon every fount of wisdom accessible to him. He can discover pearls of great price in the spiritual heritage of every age and race. In this sense he may avow himself an eclectic. But his eclecticism is no new "system," which others may take from him and adopt as their own. It is a philosophy of life and of action; but a philosophy capable of ceaseless enrichment as insight grows and knowledge expands. It is a discoverer's philosophy and, because it is that, he will never seek to impose on others the truth he has won. Not everybody will follow this path. But every seeker for truth, whichever path he takes, has some time to learn that knowledge is the reward of the striving mind, not of submission to a system.

In conclusion, we suggest that to foster independence of judgment, to guard against mass-thinking and the servile mind, is one of the noblest tasks to which educationists, writers, speakers, religious leaders and, dare we add, statesmen, can devote their talents in these days of need. To render the masses immune to mass-suggestion is a primary educational aim, and never was the need greater than it is today.

LESLIE J. BELTON

THE WORLD IS ONE

THE BOND OF LETTERS

[**Clifford Bax** is distinguished as a writer of prose, of poetry and of plays. As early as 1910 he published a delightful little volume, *Twenty-five Chinese Poems*, and his first play to be produced in the commercial theatre was *The Poetasters of Ispahan*, in 1912.—Eds.]

If civilisation is not to collapse, the nations of the world will need to pull together. "Patriotism," though good, "is not enough," and if we foment a mere spirit of "my country, right or wrong," we may plunge our descendants into a Dark Age. Ploss and Bartels, in their monumental work on "Woman," affirm that "primitive instinct is to kill the stranger"; and a contempt or hatred of all foreigners was common everywhere until two or three generations ago. Then, little by little, we began to perceive that our national neighbours were very much like ourselves,—in spite of their regrettable taste for garlic, frogs, vodka, goat-cheese or sauerkraut. We began, even, to appreciate some of their accomplishments—their science, their painting, their music and, perhaps above all, their literature. This "peaceful penetration" might have steadily civilised the world had we not been unduly hurried by certain scientific and mechanical discoveries.

Aeroplanes and wireless, for example, have telescoped geography. Nations have been too quickly thrown together, like a crowd of strangers trying to get into a football-ground; and because they do not know each other well enough, they revert to the old instinct of alarm, of self-assertion, of "kill the stranger." Aeroplanes and wireless may very well prove in the end, if we give them time, more effective internationalisers than any other human forces: but they have taken us unawares, have come into our possession while we are still emerging from the mentality of the nineteenth century, and therefore are not at present benefiting the world so much as they could and probably will. The greatest of the other internationalising forces in society is slow, sure and devoid of all dangers: that other force is what Matthew Arnold termed "culture."

"The Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World" is a mighty conception which only foolish idealists can suppose will be realised before many generations have lived and died. If France and Germany, old neighbours, cannot accommodate their differences, we should not expect the Mexicans and the Cochin-Chinese to make common cause for a very long time to come. The extent, however, to which we have already outgrown the instinct of killing a stranger is mostly due to culture. And what do we mean by this word? We mean, I suggest, an interest in art, science and history; using the word "art," of course, in a sense that includes drama, literature and music. Now these are interests which inevitably

expand. To love the literature of our own country is to become curious concerning the literature of other countries; and if a man is able to appreciate the best work of his home writers he will assuredly find that he can appreciate the best work of most foreigners. What, then, is the result? Not only a richer life but also a widening knowledge of humanity and a widening admiration for the achievements of other people.

Suppose that an Englishman becomes acquainted with the work of, among many others, Lenormand, Couperus, Maeterlinck, Dehmel, Pirandello, Sierra, Hamsun and Sinclair Lewis,—he will not believe any longer that he could never associate happily with a Frenchman, a Dutchman, a Belgian, a German, an Italian, a Spaniard, a Norwegian or an American. And suppose, furthermore, that, deriving pleasure from the literary work of all these countries, he should decide, like a venturesome traveller, to find out what the Orient has written. I know very well that—thanks largely to Mr. Arthur Waley—he would quickly discover that there is for him yet another beauty to be savoured in the literature of Japan and that it is doubtful whether any poetry, the world over, is more civilised and finer than the lyrics of the old Chinese poets. How could such a man retain intact the primitive instinct of killing a stranger? Why, he will wonder, and justly, whether any man of any nation would prove to be wholly a stranger for very long: and he will know that if he should meet with a foreigner whose reading had been equally various he would actually have found a new friend.

I doubt if I could hobnob with a Chicago gangster—though even this might be possible if the gangster and I were wrecked upon the proverbial desert-island; but I am confident that men who love literature, no matter from what countries they might come, would soon find it difficult to be enemies. Think only of the friendship that sprang up, in an age more nationally suspicious than our own, between Sir Thomas More and Erasmus, two humanists who, transcending geography, were linked by their common aspirations and their culture. The truth is, I suspect, that any two men who do the same work or who like the same things will more easily become friends than many a pair who have merely been born in the same country. Everybody remembers how some of the British and German soldiers began to fraternise (over a game of football, I think) during the first Christmas of the Great War, and how, in the cause of politics, their mutual liking had to be firmly suppressed. Everybody knows, again, how willingly the seamen of any nation will go to the rescue of seamen who belong to another nation; and how, twenty years ago, there was a spirit of chivalry at least among the aviators. I would wager a good sum that if an Italian and an Abyssinian, both of them being carpenters, were allowed to consort together for three or four days, neither would remain eager to kill the other.

It is not easy to work up a war-

like spirit among people of any culture. Culture will have partially denationalised them. They know too much that is good about the nation which their newspapers and their politicians have declared to be an enemy: and though many of our writers enlisted in 1914, I doubt if one of them forgot the magnificence of German literature. I am quite certain that not one of them would willingly have sent a bullet through the heart of Otto Braun: and to imagine Otto Braun and Rupert Brooke attempting to snipe one another is to see instantly that war is a tragic anachronism and that men of culture in any country must do their utmost to prevent economic rivalries from setting them against each other.

Translators are an ill-paid clan, but they are the best ambassadors in the world. Unlike their more magnificent colleagues, they can make no blunders. Unless we are Russians we cannot learn all languages; and most of us have to be content with reading in three or four. If we wish, as everyone should, to become world-conscious we must rely upon translators. How much would most of us, in England, know about Russian literature had it not been for the enthusiasm and industry of Mrs. Constance Garnett and Mr. Aylmer Maude? But to read the novels of Turgeniev, Tolstoy and Dostoievski is to realise that the novelists of America and of the rest of Europe, whatever their merits, cannot hold a candle to these three Russians: and once a man is familiar with their works, he will not readily be induced to hate their country or their countrymen. Dictators, whether Fascist or Communist, should discourage all culture. It does not cultivate a truculent spirit toward other nations.

Those of us who have loved literature from boyhood can hardly imagine a life without books; nor am I the only man on the earth who, if he looked honestly at his experience, would say that a delight in literature has been the most important part of it. For myself, I feel that to have cared nothing for books would have changed me more profoundly than if I had been born blind. A man may be a good citizen truly—he may even be a philanthropist, a lover of mankind—though he reads nothing but newspapers or even those literary fungi, detective-stories. It is, indeed, possible that Jesus himself was not able to read at all. Nevertheless, the heaviest drag upon the cause of humanity is ignorance—*avidya:* and a good reader (for there are good and bad readers just as there are good and bad writers) is more likely than anyone else to develop a permanent feeling that this complex world, with all its races and all its nations, is merely one little planet. An astronomer should feel that,—and who, if not he! But most astronomers are interested only in doing difficult sums, and few of their tribe inject themselves or us with a salutary sense of the Milky Way. If we wish to become bigger-minded there is no surer means than a taste for good reading. The mind of a nation is not constant in detail, I know—it changes like the limited patterns in a kaleidoscope—but

there must be still in India something of the beauty achieved by Kalidasa, just as in England there is still something of the Shakespearian spirit. Of what use, you may say, to read Plato or Dante? Modern Greeks and Italians have little affinity, you continue, with the ideas of these two great men. It may be so, but their work, flowing through thousands of cultured minds for many hundreds of years, has exercised an incalculable influence upon Europe. The most astonishing quality in Plato is precisely that, though he lived in so small a State and so long ago, his intellect and intuition were so powerful that for the most part he might be writing for us to-day from an apartment in New York City: but there it is—the ancient Athenians, possibly inspired for a few centuries from a super-terrestrial source, constructed the ground-plan of all Western civilisation, and to ignore their work is like ignoring the influence of heredity. All Europeans inherit the thoughts of Plato.

The "intellectuals," among whom I have passed so much of my time, have often many defects. They are prone, for instance, to an intellectual vanity which leads them to extol good work while it is unpopular and to decry it when other people have come to like it: they tend to be priggish—to regard themselves as the only clear-seeing persons in the community: they detest jingoism so heartily that they frequently find good in every country except their own: and they are as subject to intellectual fashions as the crowd, whom they despise, is subject to the fashions of the crowd: but there is one defect which you will not find among them—you will not find that they have any "instinct to kill the stranger."

You may now say to me, "But culture—of which an appreciation of literature is a large part—can be only the possession of the privileged few." So it had to be until very recent days; but there is now no excuse for most people if they do not read or if they prefer to fill their minds with rubbish. Why, a few weeks ago I read that unemployment had caused many Welsh miners to discover in themselves a delight in poetry; and everyone knows that the typical Scot has never been held back by any obstructions. Moreover, so many authorities have told us of late that we are entering upon the Age of Leisure; that the good use of leisure will become a primal concern of any far-seeing statesman; and (like Professor Soddy in the January number of this review) that the world is now a world of plenty and that all should be well if we had the courage and the energy to reform our banking system. The more you read, the more of humanity will you understand; the more you read, the less will you hate; and although the time may be very distant, there will come a time, I am confident, when even the Occident and the Orient will not be hostile to one another. I at least can say already that one of my most valued friends is a Hindu doctor of philosophy, and I know too that to him I do not seem utterly alien.

CLIFFORD BAX

THE NECESSITY OF MYSTICISM

[**Professor Radhakamal Mukerjee,** head of the Department of Economics and Sociology, Lucknow University, is shortly publishing a book on *The Theory and Art of Mysticism* from which the following is an extract.—EDS.]

Mysticism is the art of finding a harmonious relationship to the whole of reality which man envisages. Humanly speaking, man seeks to find peace with self and his universe. Mystical intuition establishes a perfect harmony of being and certainty of the universe. It deepens man's sense of order in the self and expands it into the universe. Thus even in intense action, a calm aloofness becomes possible. Mysticism combines a strenuous moral life with a profound peace of mind and a delicate sense of beauty or order. An intellectual detachment and æsthetic refinement thus become expressions of the poise and balance which the self derives from the heart of the universe. The gulf between man's intrinsic and instrumental ends disappears, and neither the ordinary routine of individual life nor social effort exhibits any longer contradictory motives facing each other in segregated worlds of experience. These are resolved into a harmony that is but the projection of spiritual illumination into the world of human relationships and values.

Mysticism deliberately bases Reality on value, and makes God enter into natural and social experience. Thus mysticism involves a dual movement, first, the development of personality by the integration of the finalities of life and the forces of the universe into a unitary whole, and second, the descent of these finalities of life into the expansive valleys of human values and practice. In true religious experimentation such as that of the mystic, the two processes are recurrent, forming phases of a profound unity and harmony of experience. The course of the mystic's life indeed falls into a normal alternation between what Hocking calls a "world-flight" in which, by way of his negations, the mystic reaches the absolute real and good, and an activism in which he seeks these in human and social intercourse. Among some mystics, at any rate, such alternation of fight and flight, action and communion, is the rhythm of the very breath of life, the ebb and flow of their normal consciousness. Mysticism reconciles the opposition between idealism and pragmatism, between transcendentalism and naturalism, and makes the sense of the unity of all things as realised in the self the basis of all vision and effort. The mystic denies the biological boundaries which separate thing from thing, person from person, subject from self, the outer world from the inner reality.

Modern science and philosophy are gradually setting themselves free from the pernicious habit of seeing an antithesis between things which can be conceived as distinct. The mechanical idea is fading from the realm of science as physics and chemistry come nearer to biology and a similarity between plant and

animal life is established by demonstrating the unity of physiological mechanism in all life. According to J. S. Haldane, "the fundamentally different conceptions which seem to separate biology and physics are being found unnecessary." Jagadish Chander Bose, who is responsible for breaking down many conventional barriers in the sciences, finds that the throb of life, the pulse of growth, the impulse coursing through the nerve and its resulting sensation, thought and emotion—all these are a continuation infinitely evolved, of the thrill in matter.

The difference between the modern scientific and Eastern religious conviction is this—that in the East the ground or essence of life, mind and matter is not neutral, as in the West, but is impregnated with eternal values. Here it is the original Life and Mind Itself, the medium for the intercourse of the mind with itself and with the universe. The Hindu mystical consciousness also conceived this unity which underlies matter, life and mind, and the message proclaimed centuries ago was clear and outspoken. "They who see but one in all the changing manifoldness of the universe, unto them belongs Eternal Truth—unto none else, unto none else!"

The conception which modern science has given, that the world is a hierarchy of existences, easily leads up to Eastern mysticism which fuses all levels, distinctions and relations in the Absolute, the pure and passionless Being which transcends the restless toil of the cosmic life.

In the most living Christianity in Europe we find to-day a sense of mystery and awe and self-abasement before the unsearchable Divine majesty which stands out in sharp relief from the facile anthropomorphism of official Christianity. In Barth, Otto and Brunner alike we find the emphasis of this new note which is bound to raise Christianity from the human and gregarious level to which it has nearly lapsed. For many minds dwelling upon "something in nature beyond what is already known in nature" to which science points, the Infinite and the Inscrutable has and will increasingly have its supreme appeal. Thus the more philosophical schools of Hinduism and Buddhism with their cosmic sweep and inclusiveness, their intense sense of the Transcendent and the manifold variety of their doctrines and symbols, offer a sure guidance to the Real and a source of poise amid the bewildering complexities of modern life and experience.

The mystic's discovery of Reality in this world of many changing things, his reconciliation of the monistic and pluralistic traditions, of immanence, incarnation and transcendence, can alone show the way towards the mutual participation and interpenetration of religion, metaphysics and science. We need an infinite enlargement of the Universe rather than the Finite Universe as presented by Bertrand Russell or Jeans, which hampers our cosmic sense. God transcends the Universe though immanent in it, and we may conceive the beginning, development and ending of the latter like any other series of events as taking place in the order

of spatio-temporal relations; yet the Universe itself stands in its altogetherness an eternal fact in the Divine and other minds which share the knowledge of eternity. Eastern mysticism is something more than anthropomorphic systematisation. It alone can rescue metaphysics from the crippling effects of the invasion of physical science, and save human souls from the laws governing the motion of electrons and protons or the ceaseless flux of the evolutionary process.

The mystic's imagination, freed as it is from all quantitative and relative ideas, soars into heights inaccessible to the ordinary run of mankind who in their concentration on the flux of natural events often lose the inherent value of the world. Above all, the mystic stands for the infinite and intrinsic worth of life. In his profound and persistent absorption with the Real, the mystic easily and unerringly distinguishes between truth and falsehood and his inner certainty endows him with a courage, sense of honour and determination that can rise superior to any bafflement and suffering. Yet though his mind, concentrated on the truth, is as "unyielding as the thunderbolt," his heart is as tender as the "flower-bud." That the mystic has often been an ethical pioneer, a religious reformer, an innovator in every sense of the word, is due not only to his direct apprehension of the Real, his emancipation from the blandishments of sense, and the allurements of social recognition, but also to his strong sense of human brotherhood.

The Mahayana established the ideal of the Buddha in the heart of the work-a-day world, preaching the ideal of the pious and efficient layman, always at the service of others. Not only in the Vedanta and Mahayana Buddhism but also in the Bhakta schools, the central principle of metaphysics and religion is brought into intimate relation with the social process.

There is hardly any religion in the world which has ardently sought the Divinity directly in Man, the most Real, and discovered Him ever-new in the world of human forms and relationships. That discovery is none else but the eternal search for the Essential Man by man in the Paradise of his heart.

The social principle is an aspect of the mystical. The mystic rehabilitates the principle of harmony in all things, in the society in which he lives and moves.

The actual world is reconstructed on the basis of the participation by the entire community in the eternal values of the individual's spiritual life. Thus the realisation of each person in all, and all in each, in the widest and deepest sense of the phrase, becomes the goal of society and religion alike. The mystical justifies the moral and the social and endows them with a new strength and a new assurance.

Between religion and society there is a reciprocity which has no end. The mystic vision eternally sheds its rays upon our life and experience, and the radiation of our love and thought eternally renews with ever-growing brightness the vital flame of vision.

RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE

MORALITY AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

[**H. N. Brailsford** is very well known as an experienced writer of much distinction. He was at one time Editor of *The New Leader*. In this article may be perceived the idealism he has inherited from Shelley and Voltaire, about whom he has written penetrating studies.—EDS.]

THE ARYAN PATH invites discussion of a thesis which many teachers of religion and morals have maintained in every phase of human history. The thesis, to put it in its broadest and simplest form, is that our existing society can be made tolerable and even happy, without any fundamental change in its structure, if all of us, but more especially the privileged classes, can be induced to follow a high standard of morality in our dealings with our fellows. This was always the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church, though it used to forbid usury, and is still critical of high finance. Mr. Gandhi has preached impressive sermons on these lines to landlords (especially in the United Provinces) and to industrial capitalists. President Roosevelt has put the same idea in a rather naïve way, though he does not rely solely on persuasion. He supports the existing capitalist framework in the United States, but he believes that about ten per cent of American capitalists are evil men, who bring the system into disrepute. These exceptional persons he tried to restrain by the Codes of Fair Competition set up under the National Recovery Act. He applied this same ethical outlook to international affairs in his last Message to Congress. Civilization is in peril, because about ten or possibly fifteen per cent of the world's population is under dictatorships, turning deliberately to aggression. One may pursue this idea indefinitely, and it has even been suggested that a higher standard of personal morality among the heads of armament firms would go far to solve our problems of peace and war.

A socialist is bound to find himself in total opposition to this way of thinking. He can, of course, respect members of a privileged class, be they landlords or industrialists, who try to realise a high social ideal in their daily life. Without such men the world would be an uglier place than it is. But he holds, none the less, that the preacher who relies on an attempt to turn the members of privileged classes into better men, wastes his strength, and hugs an illusion. What is wrong, morally, socially, and in the realm of economics, is not the personal character of these men, but their function, their entire relationship to their fellows. There can be better or worse capitalists or landlords, but a good capitalist or landlord there cannot be. The private ownership of land or industrial capital is fatal to freedom, to morals, to social order and peace. The best of men cannot be moral in a wrong relationship to his fellows.

Let us look first at the simplest of these cases—the landowner. History is clear about the original system under which land was held in most early communities. Ownership was

vested in the whole community, usually the village. Among the European Aryans, the cultivated land was re-distributed periodically, so that each family had its fair share of the better and the poorer soil: some pastures and woods were kept for common use: provision was made for widows and orphans. Again, to this day in Africa the theory and practice of tribal ownership is all but universal—the peasant family enjoys the use of land, but may not alienate it. Broadly one may say that men in this state of society are barely able to understand the idea of privately owned land: when they do grasp it, they think it incredibly wicked. The system had its grave economic defects which certainly called for reform. But it attained some ends of inestimable value for human well-being and dignity. No man, not even the orphan, could be homeless or resourceless. Even if he went off to sea or to the wars, his part in the common heritage awaited him. His share in Nature's resources was guaranteed: he could always gain his bread as a free man with his plough. In other words, he was not a "proletarian," compelled to sell his labour power in order to live. If he did go out to sell his labour to a capitalist, he bargained over wages and conditions with the knowledge that the alternative to a servile existence in a mill was not starvation. He could always go home and till his strips of the common land among his kinsmen.

Space fails me to draw from history the long and intricate tale of the triumph of the idea of property over this early communism in land. Usually it began with violence and conquest. By mere force the land was snatched by a better armed or better drilled group of men, who made themselves a privileged class, and based right on might. Norman Kings and Mogul Emperors behaved in much the same way. More important, perhaps, for our day are the subtler methods by which capitalist societies have broken down the reserves and resources of the peasantry to turn them into proletarians. In Africa the chief device is an oppressive hut tax which forces the natives to quit their reserves to labour for the white man. In England, through the latter part of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the common lands were simply enclosed for the benefit of the gentry by Acts of a wholly unrepresentative Parliament. Unless the peasants had first been deprived of their land, they would not have endured the slums, the starvation wages and the incredible hours of labour of the early industrial age.

Take such a case as the zemindars of the United Provinces. They were originally the agents of a conqueror, whose whole claim rested on force. I know their villages. The zemindar contributes literally nothing to their economic life. He neither built the insanitary huts, nor made the dirt roads, nor sunk the unscientific wells. Yet he gathers for himself an unearned tribute of half the peasant's land-tax, which is really a rent. To me it seems meaningless to tell this man to be good. His entire claim, every anna of it, is an offence

against morals and society; its origin rests on force and its effect is to keep this whole population in helpless, sub-human misery. To draw tribute for no service cannot be reconciled with any conceivable code of ethics.

The English aristocrat who draws his royalties on every ton of coal, got in hardship and peril by the miners, is in the same case. He too contributes nothing, neither the labour nor the science nor the machines that extract the coal. He draws a tribute for no service, because some ancestor "came over with the Conqueror." One may go on indefinitely. Property raising its rents because others have built a railway or a road: ground landlords whose values rise in proportion as others toil and build and trade in the heart of a great city: they are merely conspicuous members of a vast privileged class, which lives by the co-operative work of the rest of the community. Not only can it live in idleness, and refuse its contribution to the common work; its claim to do what it will with its own frustrates any orderly planning of our economic life. Society no longer owning the land, cannot (unless it buys out the parasites) decide to what social uses it should be put. Private property in land is not merely robbery but anarchy. You cannot make it moral. All that the preacher can do is to induce the landlord to give back, as a humiliating and enslaving charity, some fraction of an income derived from ancestral theft.

It is a consequence of this system by which the few own all the means of life—the land, the minerals and the machines—that freedom is denied to the mass of their neighbours. If, in order to live, I must first secure the possibility of work from a land-owner or a mill-owner, I am not free; I cannot determine the basic conditions of my own existence. He with his machine and the law behind him, refuses me work till I accept his terms: without land or mechanical tools I am a weak bargainer, for I shall starve, if I am stubborn. Arrived in his workshop I must make what he commands and as he chooses, even if it be a shoddy or harmful thing that offends my craftsman's conscience. Even outside the daily round of the estate or the workshop, my master, partly because he is wealthy, but chiefly because he can deny me the chance to work, still in great measure controls my life, for he can dismiss me at will. Only if I have first built up, in spite of my poverty and my fears, a powerful trade union, will I dare at an election to vote against him. His class, moreover, owns the press and can hire propagandists. Thus is the promise of democracy frustrated. There can be no true freedom, social, economic or even political, where one man can by this leverage of ownership deny to hundreds of his fellows the chance to work and live.

"But," the reader may say, "the owner may be a just man, who will pay fair wages, and concern himself with the welfare of his workers." To a certain extent such a policy "pays": to that extent it will be followed. Let us look at the realities. The capitalist system aims at

profit: everything else is secondary, from the soundness of the articles it turns out, to the welfare of the workers. The managing director is responsible to shareholders, who judge him solely by the dividends his management yields. The shares of every company are priced solely on this basis: as the expectation of profit rises or falls, so does the prestige of a company fluctuate, and the esteem in which its chiefs are held by the world of business. Now from this standpoint labour is merely one of the costs of production. It is the manager's duty to his shareholders to buy it as cheap as he can, precisely as he buys his fuel, his lubricants and his raw materials. Thus the whole tendency of the system is towards social inequality.

The gross inequality is a great evil, but there is another. Labour, which the manager is bound to regard simply as one of his costs of production, also furnishes his market. It ought to grow as manufacture expands, so that mass-consumption may keep pace with mass production. It never does. Always the pressure of the profit-making system to keep wages low as a cost of production causes a lack of equilibrium between the power of the machines to produce and the power of the masses to buy. Too little has been paid out in wages, too much accumulated in a few hands, which cannot spend it all. So the process of exchange gets blocked, and the capitalist system suffers from the recurrent slumps that come near to ruining us all.

It then tries to save itself in one of two ways. It restricts output; it actually as in America puts hundreds of millions of acres out of cultivation. It makes a scarcity and calls it recovery. Thus it fails and must fail to realise the plenty that science promises. Its other device is Imperialism. Because it has starved its own market at home—the wage-earning masses—it must needs go out and conquer markets abroad. Thus by another road it rushes to ruin, for now it must arm, both to subdue the inhabitants of its conquered dependencies and to fend off rivals. Always this system of the private ownership of the means of life makes for scarcity, inequality and servitude, and always it begins with force and ends in war.

As for the maker of armaments he is bound by the same rule of profit. An honest merchant of death will sell shells that really will burst, and gas that really will poison our lungs. What more will you ask of him? That he should sell arms only to those whose cause is just? Who is he to judge of that? Born a capitalist and an imperialist, will you trust him to judge the cause of revolted workers or rebel "natives"? If the world must have arms, then it is for the organised society of nations to judge to what use they shall be put.

In a society built on wrong relationships the individual cannot be moral. There can be no such thing as morality in a society whose structure, based on the private monopoly of the means of life, denies to the masses freedom, equality and the opportunity to grow to their full mental stature as human beings.

H. N. Brailsford

A COMPARISON OF THE HINDU AND THE SOVIET SYSTEMS OF THE DRAMA

[**Huntly Carter** wrote in our first volume on "Drama the Organic Part of Human Life." He is especially interested, since the War, in reconstruction and recovery movements in Europe and Russia. He is one of those who believe in the theatre as a means of "the redemption of man from evil and the attainment of the ultimate good." His comparison of the Hindu and Soviet systems of Drama is very suggestive.—EDS.]

To the majority of cultured visitors to Russia the Soviet Theatre and its form of drama appear so entirely novel as to defy identification with ancient systems. A few visitors including Indian students have, however, pointed out to me resemblances to the Hindu system of the drama, thus verifying my own observations of the Soviet theatre over a period of fifteen years. As a Soviet system of the drama has now positively emerged and is developing—a system that both resembles and differs from the Hindus'—a comparison of the two may be of interest to the very large number of persons who are watching the Soviet theatre.

The sameness and the essential differences are enough to confirm the theory that great forms of drama of different periods of the world's history have sprung from a common source, and that their key words and terms have common meanings. Definition can bring out some of the similarities and the essential differences. To begin with, Drama has a mystical and metaphysical meaning; it has an absolute nature. It speaks through highly sensitised instruments as in the Bible which, like the *Mahabharata*, is a Divine Comedy. And it truly manifests itself in initiation and unfolding. The drama is the form taken by Drama. There are species of the drama. It has a five-fold unfolding motive—the unfolding of the individual or collective Man at the touch of a supernormal or natural experience. Unfolding takes place in five stages of material birth, fall, struggle, death and resurrection. This is the Biblical order. The terms to denote the stages differ according to the subject-matter. For instance, in social, socialist and sociological plays, such as the Soviet's, the stages of the cycle are described as birth, growth, development, decay, death. But implicit in death is resurrection, as in Ibsen's latest plays where death is associated with disillusion, the death of the Lie and the attainment of the higher level of Truth. In ancient Japanese dramatic writings resurrection is synonymous with transformation. The five-fold birth-resurrection action may be traced in Great Lives, and connecting true dramatic literatures from Hindu to Soviet, in subjects as wide apart as *The Book of Job*, the *Divine Comedy* of Dante, the Life of Jesus the Nazarene, the plays of Kalidasa, especially *Sakuntala*; in the mystical

unfolding motive of the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*; in the human and romantic plays of Shakespeare, especially the high tragedies, like *Lear* and *Hamlet*; in the plays of Ibsen, where it is associated with initiation into Truth; and in the plays of the Soviet, especially those that nowadays apply the great laws and principles of society and citizen-making. In Soviet plays it is associated with revelation, initiation and conversion. The purpose of the early Red and White or Interventionist plays was conversion to the truth of the Soviet cause. The proletarians were shown unfolding at the touch of a revolutionary and militant experience. To-day they are seen unfolding at the touch of the war with nature, or of great construction effort. This latter unfolding may be associated with evolution and transformation. With more settled conditions and a sense of security has come the spirit of "joy," to quote a word recently used by Stalin.

Likewise, similarity may be traced in definition and comparison of System and Idea, and its actuality in Content, Dramaturgy, Form and Staging. The dramatic writings of each momentous period of history tend to come together in a system. This may be described as the concentration, in a relatively small space (the stage) and for a spiritual, social, socialist or sociological purpose, of the dispersive elements of a vast historical or contemporary subject such as the rebirth of Russia or the making of a new civilization. There are many evidences of this system both established and in the making (Soviet).

From this it may be gathered that the Idea systematised is, in its turn, a system of the Life of the Spirit, or of the Life of Man, or a combination of the two. For instance, in the Buddhist world we find "an absorption of all castes into an aristo-democracy of culture, its high moral organisation of life upon a directly human basis, without recourse to supernatural sanctions, and all the other features of the vast historic system." Here is a system of the Life of Man, the great events of which may be systematised for dramatisation. With a few changes it resembles the Soviet system now in course of dramatisation. Let caste and aristo-democracy of culture be replaced by collectivism and egalitarian democracy of culture. Then we have the Soviet world absorbing all classes and all nationalities within the Union into a proletarian democracy shaped by Soviet ideology and cultural education. There is a moral organisation of society upon a directly natural and human basis without recourse to supernatural sanctions. And there is a systematic concentration of the elements of this system for dramatic purpose.

The Idea of a system of thought and action to be dramatised provides the key to dramatic Content. Under sameness of content lie essential differences of ideological content and its æsthetic representation. Thus the Hindu ideological content is one of caste with its four main groups or, simply, a social system built on theism, or a system of divine overlordship, and so on. It

has to do with the experiences, ideas, words and deeds of great gods, saints, heroes, leaders, exalted personages. The Soviet content is one of an economico-industrial-social system bound up with the remaking of society and the remaking of Man upon a basis of Soviet communism, a term that implies a new form of civilisation. The ideological content is materialistic. It embodies the ideas in mental and moral sciences, natural and social sciences, mechanical science (in particular, the Machine), the science of government and so on, that are reshaping Russian society. This content is directly opposite to the old Tsarist content. The Soviet content has to do with the experiences, ideas, words and deeds of "gods," heroes, leaders and other outstanding figures who, although to all appearances new types evolved by new ideas and processes, actually parallel those of the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*. In these the old gods have become anthropomorphised and mythological. In Soviet Russia the ancient gods are revived in human beings having special communal duties and quarters. They appear as administrators, guardians of, and co-workers with the common people. The Soviet "gods" who have passed away are fast becoming legendary and in this form are being dramatised. Lately appeared a remarkable motion picture, "Three Songs On Lenin," drawn from new folk-songs upon his "fabulous" ideas, words and deeds, and having the five-fold motive of the chief events in the life of a great man—birth to resurrection—in actuality, the realisation of his constructive ideas—in the case of Lenin, the liberation of women in the East; electrification and education and enlightenment—the projection of the Will of the People, the Will to liberation.

The Soviet form and its varieties as determined by Soviet content resemble some ancient forms; in particular, the saga, the dramatisation of national life, the heroic, high tragedy, and high and moderate dramatic forms. Both high tragedy and the heroic belong to the militant-play period. Heroism is in fashion to-day, but its plays are peculiar to the present industrial-social or creative-construction period of national unfolding.

Dramaturgy or the organic construction of plays is strongly determined by the element of conflict. This element distinguishes the content of several great dramatic literatures of the past—epics, sagas, high-heroic and high-tragic compositions. In this respect Soviet dramaturgy has much in common with and much that differs from past dramatic literature. Conflict largely determines the choice of classics for the Soviet stage. It is recognised that the great classics are necessary to the dramatic building up of a proletarian culture. This new culture invites a careful study of conflicting past cultures, classes and emotions, as reflected by the classics, in particular the plays of Shakespeare. The struggles are of different kinds according to their different objects and the forms of civilization. The *Mahabharata* is the story of a colossal

battle that took place many centuries B. C. at a critical moment in the history of the Hindus. It furnished material for creative bards for centuries. Some day the Soviet saga will appear as the record of the struggle to build a civilisation. Characterisation varies. The conflicts are concerned mainly with the deeds of heroes, not of the mass of fighting men. Exalted saints, mighty warriors, perfect knights move across the vast canvasses of the ancient Hindu dramatic poems. Heroic leaders appear also in the Soviet forms of drama. But they are mass heroes, images symbolising the heroism of the masses. This conception of mass character differs from the old conception of aristocratic character—the King or Prince or Divine Leader and Ruler of men. But there are fundamental features common to all dramatic characters.

A summary can best be made by a brief comparison between the dramaturgy and stage treatment of the Soviet and of the Hindus. *

There are two classes of Hindu dramatic writings, the principal with ten species, and the minor with eighteen species. The *Nataka*, the first of the principal plays, has the main features of the Hindu plays. The story or plot is of importance. The characters are heroes, divinities (Krishna), demi-gods (Rama), monarchs (Dushyanta), knights and mighty warriors. There are four mental types of heroes—all firm and in addition respectively: (1) high-spirited, (2) haughty, (3) gay, and (4) mild. The plot has five stages: (1) opening, (2) first development (3) actual development and growth of plot, (4) obstacle to be overcome, (5) conclusion (or denouement?). It is simple and consistent. With regard to the unities, those of time and action are preserved; that of place is left to the imagination. In Sanskrit drama forms there is no distinction between tragedy and comedy. Unlike the Greek and Shakespearean plays, Sanskrit plays do not end on a great catastrophe. They appeal to a wide range of emotions, including terror and pity, exhibit utmost emotional confusion and disorder, and end in harmony and order, leaving the mind of the spectator soothed, purified and tranquil. The dramatic arrangement is of the epic order—a narrative of events, story, characters, scenery, etc. The manager or author appears in person, sets the scene and accessories, introduces the actors, and describes the events. The opening is an invocation of a deity in behalf of the audience, and a description of the author's genealogy and attainments. There are one or two other distinguishing features, but, briefly, the arrangement is, a first act introducing the play, the ensuing acts, and a final prayer for plenty and happiness.

The Soviet dramas have neither introduction nor final benediction. Dramatic construction has resemblances to the *Nataka*, but on the whole it follows latter-day European

* The Hindu dramaturgy is a digest of descriptive matter sent to me for Press purposes by a London Indian Drama group before the war. I have never used it, the group has disappeared and I have no particulars of it. So this is the only acknowledgment I can make.

traditions. Plays have a beginning, a middle and an end. The themes are analyses and interpretations of a vast theme—the new organic life of the people. The characters are the new heroes and "reactionary devils" or Reds and Whites. And in later plays there are more of the new social types moved by joy and sorrow, happiness and misery, that is, tragi-comic images that reflect the Soviet concepts of good and evil, right and wrong, truth and falsehood. Tragedy and the high form of drama have an ending in common with the Hindu plays. If there is a catastrophe it is designed to create encouragement, not fear. The principal character is reborn as an exalted hero. The new national mass heroes by their words and deeds make specific contributions to the building of a new country and a new form of civilisation. And each represents the audience's collective capacity for heroism, for each is in fact an aspect of heroism of a social, socialist or sociological order.

The two systems of the drama differ most widely in the matter of stage treatment. The Hindu system follows the natural and premechanical method of representation. The Soviet, which has not yet become highly specialised, is a mixture of the ancient tradition (Japanese), of the modern (since Shakespeare), of formalism and of experiment and innovations (cinematography). Since the beginning of the century there have been two schools of staging: One believes that all within the walls of the conventional theatre should form a whole (Meierhold). The other believes that the stage alone and all it contains should form a world (Stanistavski, Tairov). Both have produced new theatrical systems, systems of training the actor, such as biometrics, and novel forms of setting, such as constructivism designed to give full scope to the movements of the highly physically trained actor. Collectivism has led to the actor being trained as a citizen, and realism, to his expressing the actual sentiments, emotions and thoughts of his unfolding fellow-citizens so as to provoke a feeling in them that they are the figures on the stage. But this kind of intimacy does not arise in the theatre in which the stage is separated from the auditorium, a separate world. Such are the main elements that differentiate the Soviet system of staging from the Hindus'.

I do not intend this article to suggest that the Soviet system of the drama is slavishly imitating the Hindu system in any respect. It is, on the contrary, seeking a spirit, a substance and a style of its own. But there are eternal laws and principles that underlie and bind together the many dramatic systems, and owing to these laws and principles, parallels are inevitable.

HUNTLY CARTER

THE UNCERTAINTY OF SCIENCE

[**J. W. N. Sullivan** is known to our readers—and others—as one of the most lucid exponents in a simple form of the complex theories and discoveries of modern science.—EDS.]

Philosophically regarded, the most important thing that has happened to science of recent times is that it has developed self-consciousness. Science is no longer naïve. It is aware, as never before, of its aims and limitations. It used to believe that its object was to reveal to us the nature of objective reality. The scientific position was that there exists an independent, external world from which divers messages are conveyed to our minds by our senses. These messages, in most cases, require interpretation. Taken literally they are misleading, for in their composition our minds, as well as the external world, have played a part. Science endeavours to distinguish between these elements, the objective and the subjective, and to explore and co-ordinate the objective elements. It is now realised that, whether or not this be the aim that science ought to pursue, it has not, in fact, pursued it. Indeed, it is very gravely doubted whether such an aim can ever be successfully pursued—by science, at any rate.

The aim of science is dictated by the nature of its essential limitations, and it is now realised that scientific knowledge of the physical world is limited to knowledge of its *structure*. This structure, owing to the technique that science has hitherto adopted, is mathematical structure. Although this realisation is the realisation of a limitation, it has also had a great liberating effect. For all that is required of a mathematical representation is that it shall be logically consistent. In the old days a scientific description had to be a good deal more than logically consistent. It had to be a description in terms of concepts made familiar to us by ordinary experience. Lord Kelvin said that he could understand no scientific description of which he could not make a mechanical model. This seems to us now-a-days a singularly arbitrary criterion. Nevertheless, it was very generally accepted, and was responsible for an immense amount of ingenious and fruitless work.

The reaction has gone far. In fact, the mechanical outlook on nature has been completely abolished. And not only the mechanical explanation, but any explanation in familiar terms, has been abandoned. It is realised that knowledge of that degree of intimacy is inaccessible to us. The nature of the ultimate entities dealt with by science is unknown and, so far as scientific methods are concerned, unknowable. All that we know about them is their mathematical specification. And this, in truth, is all that science has ever

known. The more intimate knowledge that seemed to be offered by the old mechanical explanation was quite illusory. The old mechanical terms, mass, force, etc., were never known to science except by their mathematical specifications. We knew nothing about their nature. The old entities and the new, so far as the intimacy of our knowledge is concerned, are on exactly the same footing. It is the realisation of this fact which is one of the great signs that science has reached the stage of self-consciousness. If a scientific man is now asked what *are* his ultimate entities, photons, electrons, protons, etc., he has to say that they are groups of mathematical symbols.

But however abstract and symbolical the scientific description of nature may be, it obviously cannot claim to be knowledge at all unless it be consistent. It must not contain contradictions. It must not violate "necessities of thought." Unfortunately not all men are agreed as to what constitutes a necessity of thought. For something like two thousand years European philosophers regarded the axioms of Euclid's geometry as being necessities of thought. It is now known that they are nothing of the kind, and the result of this discovery has been the creation, during the last hundred years, of the great wealth of non-Euclidean geometries. At the present day there is controversy as to the logical position of the Principle of Causality. Is it a necessity of thought that every event should have a cause, or can there be uncaused happenings? The scientific world is, at the present time, immensely interested in this question. The question has been made acute by the recent scientific discovery that we cannot observe nature without disturbing it. No measurements can be effected without disturbing the objects we are measuring. Usually this disturbance is altogether inappreciable, as when we measure the distance apart of two walls by a tape measure. The two ends of the tape measure, by making contact with the walls, slightly press against them, and therefore disturb them. When we come to bodies as small and light as electrons the matter becomes important, for here the error introduced is of the same order of magnitude as the quantity to be measured. Energy, like matter, exists in atomic form, and in no conceivable measurement can we use less than one atom of energy. When we come to deal with the ultimate constituents of the physical universe, such bodies as electrons, it is impossible, even theoretically, to obtain that precise knowledge about them that is necessary for exact prediction. But the law of causality, strict cause and effect, can only be confirmed if such knowledge can be obtained. Otherwise it is an unverifiable principle. And an unverifiable principle has no place in science. Nevertheless, is the principle a necessity of thought? Science does not, in practice, use it. Must it nevertheless assume it? There is here a great difference of opinion amongst scientific men. Thus the layman must regard the precise

status of the new Principle of Indeterminacy as itself indeterminate. We are left with a doubt as to whether the present scheme of physical science is yet wholly self-consistent.

Another question which throws doubt on the consistency of the present scientific scheme arises out of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. This law, which is one of the best-attested laws in the whole of science, states briefly, that the energy of the universe is running down. The energy is not becoming less in amount; it is becoming less available. Another way of putting it is to say that the energy of the universe is becoming less highly organized. This process will go on until the energy of the Universe reaches the state of least availability or maximum disorganization. No energy interchanges will then be possible, and all forms of life will have long since perished. Such a state will represent, in fact, the final death of the physical universe. This conclusion, as has been said, rests on one of the best attested laws in the whole of science. Nevertheless, the conclusion is not absolutely certain. The law on which the conclusion rests is a statistical law. We are dealing with probabilities, not certainties. But the probability concerned is so overwhelming that the difference between it and certitude is negligible, and does nothing to subtract from our confidence in the conclusion. The second law of thermodynamics and the conclusion it entails must be accepted as an integral part of the present scheme of physics.

And yet there is another consideration which makes it very difficult to accept this law. For if the universe is becoming steadily less organized, it follows that it was more highly organized yesterday than it is to-day. And the farther back we go the more highly organized must the universe have been. There is a limit to this process. Organization cannot mount up and up without limit. There is a definite maximum, and this maximum must have been in existence a finite time ago. This maximum could not have endured indefinitely, nor could it have been worked up to from an inferior state. It follows that the universe, in a perfectly organized form, must have sprung suddenly into existence a finite time ago. The universe originated as a result of a definite act of creation and has been becoming steadily more degraded ever since. This conclusion seems to be incredible; it also seems to be inescapable. It presents itself as a necessary result of the present scheme of physical science. Are we to regard this, then, as testifying to a certain inconsistency in the scientific scheme? If so, the inconsistency is very deep-rooted, since nothing less than the second law of thermodynamics is involved. This is, on the whole, the attitude taken by scientific men. It points, they think, to the fact that the scientific scheme is radically incomplete. Whitehead suggests that some immensely important counter-agency has been omitted in the scientific analysis. Another suggestion is that the notion of Time, as it occurs in science, is as yet too

thin an abstraction. But whatever the cause may be, there can be little doubt that we are here in the presence of a breakdown in the scientific scheme.

The fact that the concepts of physical science are not yet adequate to their own field lends additional force to the assertion that they are inadequate to the sciences of life and mind. The old form of materialism has long been given up, of course. It is not now used even in physics itself. But it is still held by many that the entities and laws of physics will prove adequate to the phenomena of life and mind. It is maintained, on the other hand, that these sciences necessitate entirely different concepts, bearing no relation to those of physics. If this be so, the dream of a universal science, embracing matter, life and mind in one great unity, must be given up. But we are not forced to reduce everything to physics in order to preserve this unity. The ultimate entities concerned in material, living and mental phenomena may be the same, but we need not suppose that the investigation of matter will reveal all their properties. As the phenomena in which they are concerned grow more complex, so they reveal themselves more fully. We have examples of this in the case of physics itself. The "atom" which accounted for the properties of gases was altogether too simple and arid a concept to explain the phenomena of spectra. It was "discovered," therefore, that the atom was a far more complex thing than it had been assumed to be. Compared with the atom of early theory the modern atom is a very richly endowed entity indeed. If it is to explain the phenomena of life we may be confident that it will become still more richly endowed. But, in the process, it will become something very different, just as in its earlier metamorphosis it has changed from an enduring substance to a string of evanescent point-events. But the enrichment we are contemplating will be a more profound thing than this. For when we say that the atom of physics has grown in complexity we mean, essentially, that its mathematical specification has become more elaborate. Physics, as we have seen, is confined to the investigation of the mathematical structure of the entities it talks about. But we may be very doubtful whether this methodology is appropriate to the sciences of life and mind. It is probable that new conceptions, of a kind that are not mathematical at all, will have to be introduced. It is probable that the entities of physics will have to be enriched, not by further mathematical elaboration, but by the importation of non-mathematical elements. We might even hint that some of the present apparent inconsistencies of physics itself are due to its too rigid standard of abstraction.

J. W. N. SULLIVAN

RESIST NOT EVIL

[**Hugh I'A. Fausset** writes from a new point of view on an old theme.—EDS.]

"Resist not evil" is one of those absolute commandments which carries conviction to the depths of our being, but provokes much perplexity on the surface. It may be well, therefore, to remember the context in which the phrase, as spoken by Jesus, occurred. It is not an isolated injunction, but is followed by a series of extremely positive commands. The last thing the passage in Matthew's Gospel which records Jesus's sayings on the way to meet evil suggests is mere passivity or acquiescence. Instead of resisting hate and ill-usage we are required to affirm love to a heroic degree. It is important to emphasise this for it is fundamental to a true understanding of what non-resistance implies.

Merely to recoil from evil with a cowardly distaste or a proud indifference has always been rightly condemned by the fighters of the world. They themselves may be too blindly involved in the conflict to do anything but perpetuate it in different forms. But at least they have accepted the challenge of life and have formed a vital, if destructive, relationship with the power they oppose. And if non-resistance is to satisfy the heroic impulse in man, without which it can never wean him from violence, it must represent an attitude to evil which is even more vital, because it is creative.

How then are we to deal creatively with evil instead of destructively? This is the problem behind all forms of Pacificism and it cannot be solved by evading either the stark fact of conflict in human life or the hard discipline involved in acquiring the spiritual power and poise which can resolve discord into harmony. Yet a creative approach to evil is at least in accordance with the deepest will of life. To love our enemies, it is generally complained, is asking too much of human nature and runs counter to natural law. That it does demand a transformation of human nature, as we know it now, is undeniable. Nor can such a transformation come about without our intensively working for it. But only the limited and perverse view of human nature in which we have become imprisoned prevents us from recognising that such a transformation is not contrary to the law of our being but fulfils it. And our view of natural law is similarly distorted, although there are encouraging signs that we are beginning to get it into a truer focus. The whole theory, indeed, of the life of Nature as resting on violence and ruthless competition has been so effectively riddled of late years and notably by Mr. Gerald Heard in his recently published *The Source of Civilization,* that it is unnecessary to point out here how much man's picture of Nature has been a portrait of himself. As such, however, it has borne a lamentable likeness to what

he has become, and while we can believe that to love our enemies is to obey on the highest human level the same creative imperative which rules the unconscious depths of natural life, we have to face the fact that man has transgressed that imperative and that the evil which we are bid not to resist, but to redeem is the result of that transgression.

Evil is the consequence of a fall from the polarity inherent in creative being, into a destructive dualism. The harmonious interaction of the positive and negative principles upon which the divine order of the universe depends has been so disturbed and dislocated in man that, instead of balancing each other and interblending, the positive has degenerated into violence, the negative into stagnation, and human life has become a tormented oscillation between one diseased extreme and the other. All the fiendish cruelties that tortured the imagination of Ivan Karamazov sprang and spring from this disease in the soul of man. The temptation to oppose cruelty with cruelty, and violence with violence, in the name of justice or morality or humanity is very great. And hitherto man has generally yielded to it, although to resist evil thus is at best merely to correct temporarily the swing of a vicious oscillation or to readjust the play of hostile forces. Yet so long as man is spiritually incapacitated by being at war in himself the only alternative for him to thus meeting evil with evil is a defeated impotence. And to do evil in the belief that some measure of good may come is perhaps preferable to doing nothing in the selfish hope that evil may pass by on the other side.

This grim alternative, however, is ceasing to be valid to-day. For consciousness has grown through the conflict which it has precipitated. Men fight each other less to-day with their bodies than with their minds. But the mind is only combative in so far as it is dominated by selfish instincts. In itself it is impartial and is intended to be the organ of disinterested spirit. Those in whom it becomes such an organ develop a power which is more effective in meeting evil than violence, however disguised, because it is a power of creative understanding. Instead of perpetuating a dualistic tension by taking sides, they seek in every conflict to restore the creative polarity which has been lost, but of which they hold the secret themselves.

This is the power of the spirit and we only question its power to redeem evil because so few of us at present possess it or are possessed by it with any intensity. Nevertheless it is only by trying to exercise it that it can grow within us. And in the first place we should cease to harden ourselves against what we consider to be evil. For to steel the self against evil is to intensify the conflict which it is our purpose to resolve and to provide the destructive force with the very resistant without which it would collapse.

Our aim on the contrary should be to accept evil, for until we have accepted it, whether in ourselves or in others (and this in reality is a distinction without a difference), we

cannot transmute it. This may seem a hard saying, as if to accept evil were to comply with it. But the exact reverse is the truth, as one of Jung's patients testified when she wrote, "I always thought that, when we accept things, they overpower us in one way or another. Now this is not true at all, and it is only by accepting them that we can define an attitude towards them." Only in short by accepting the evil a man does as well as the good can we come into a creative relationship with him. Only by thus identifying ourselves with him and seeing his error as our own can we work with him to eliminate it. Psychologists have, of course, proved the truth of this again and again in their practice. Until resistance is loosened, nothing can be done. And a sympathy, at once profound and intelligent, is the only power that can dissolve resistance. It does so by not resisting, but receiving. Violence is action which has lost touch with inaction. To suffer it, not impotently, still less resentfully, but creatively, is to help the aggressor to recover the true polarity which he has lost. It is to impersonate for him temporarily the inactive principle of enlightenment which he needs to enable him to come to his senses.

That a capacity for such suffering implies a high degree of spiritual attainment cannot of course be denied. Nor will it be tested in the comparative safety of a psychologist's consulting-room. Evil, when it is let loose, as recent events are again demonstrating, degenerates rapidly into a savage frenzy. And although it is resistance to it which inevitably provokes the frenzy, the non-resister must be prepared, if necessary, to suffer evil to the point of physical death. Even the creative power of Jesus could not soften the hearts or enlighten the minds of his accusers. But in his death no less than in his life he suffered evil creatively. And the transforming power of such suffering is certain. *We, however, whose spiritual attainment is so small may not be called upon to suffer evil to the death. Yet it is not too much to say that we should die for it every day, in the sense that we must die to the anger, hate, fear and self-righteousness of the unregenerate ego.* For it is not only in time of war or as participants in some crusade for social justice but in the stress of daily life that the truth of non-resistance can and must be tested. In the school of personal relationships we can prepare ourselves for practising non-resistance, if the call comes, on the wider scale upon which Gandhi has so impressively experimented and of which his disciple, Mr. Gregg, has so persuasively expounded the meaning and the method in his book, *The Power of Non-Violence.* All the examples which Mr. Gregg gives to prove the successful practising of non-resistance by the oppressed towards their oppressors, prove also that this new way of shutting the mouths of lions involves both as deliberate and conscious a technique as the old way of war and an intenser devotion and discipline. Love, if it is to be effective, has to be organised no less than hate. And the organisation has to begin at

home in the heart and mind of the individual. For until we have found our true selves and are consequently no longer entangled in separateness, we cannot help resisting as evil whatever seems to threaten our interests. And our opponents are in the same unhappy state. But when we have so profoundly submitted ourselves to life that the evil of other men is our evil and their good our good, the impulse to do violence towards them or to penalise them dies in us for want of an object. The evil we meet is experienced as our own, as being only an extension of the evil we ourselves have felt and done. We have learnt to accept it, in ourselves, that so we may outgrow it and possess our true selves in peace, and all our efforts are directed towards helping others to do the same. The disinterestedness, therefore, of true non-resistance is not that of an enlightened spectator but of a devoted participator. We have to identify ourselves with the evil-doer whose mind and heart we would change by persuasion and, if necessary, we must be prepared to be his victims. For by relieving him thus of some of his destructive energy we can aid him to recover his true self. The evil-doer, despite all appearances, is craving for unity out of a morbid sense of disunity and unless we utterly forgive him, he cannot forgive himself. Such forgiveness not only casts out the fear which dictates all violence, but it makes at-one-ment possible. And without the at-one-ment whereby the truth is at last freely recognised and accepted by both parties to a dispute, no conflict is really resolved. This is the aim of the man who would redeem evil instead of resisting it. He prefers even a creative defeat to a barren victory. He seeks to convert his opponent, not to cripple him. He knows that to oppose evil, manifesting as destructive force, with evil is to oppose the unreal with the unreal, just as to recoil from it negatively, in fear or disgust, is to credit it with a reality which it does not possess. But to affirm the love, which is creative power, in the face of apparent evil, is to bring to bear upon it a potent transforming force, which can actually change evil into good by quickening the heart of real goodness within it. Instead of perpetuating evil in another form, the evil is redeemed. The light breaks out from the darkness which it has dissipated and life has triumphed at one point at least in its age-long conflict with death.

The way of such active non-resistance is no easy way. And he who would tread it needs to be as resolute for truth as he is devoid of all sense of moral superiority. But it is the only way which can lead to that victory, shared by all, which is the hope of a distracted world.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

THE SONG OF THE HIGHER LIFE

VII.—THE YOGA OF MEDITATION

[Below we publish the seventh of a series of essays founded on the great text-book of Practical Occultism, the *Bhagavad-Gita*. Each of these will discuss a title of one of the eighteen chapters of the Song Celestial. The writer calls them "Notes on the Chapter Titles of the Gita"—but they are more than notes. They bring a practical message born of study and experience.

This particular study is on the sixth chapter, entitled Dhyāna Yoga.

Sri Krishna Prem is the name taken in the old traditional manner prevailing in India by a young English gentleman when he resolved to enter the Path of Vairagya, renouncing his all, including the name given to him at birth. He took his tripos at Cambridge in Mental and Moral Sciences and is a deep student of Indian Philosophy. Away from the world but serving it with faith he lives in the Himalayas, and is esteemed highly for his sincerity, earnestness and devotion—EDS.]

By some mystics the Path has been divided into three stages called, respectively, the Way of Purification, the Way of Illumination and the Way of Unity. The first six chapters of the *Gita* correspond to some extent with the Way of Purification. This sixth chapter marks the transition to the Way of Illumination, for, as was mentioned in the last, it sets forth the technique of a mental discipline which is meant to transfer the consciousness unbrokenly from its ordinary waking condition to those higher levels which, up to this point, have been working, as it were, behind the scenes, glimpsed perhaps in occasional flashes of inspiration, but always as something beyond, something outside the dominion of the will, coming and going with the apparent caprice that veils an unknown law.

This technique is called "Dhyāna Yoga," the yoga by meditation, and it corresponds, more or less, with the method systematised by Patañjali in his *Yoga Sūtras*. But, at the very outset, it should be clearly understood for whom this practice will give results and for whom it will not. This is vitally important since there are many who consider the practice of meditation as the *yoga par excellence* and eagerly seek to practise it without having trodden the all-important earlier stages. As stated before, nothing but dangerous mediumistic psychisms or neurotic dissociations of personality can result from the practice of meditation without the qualifications mentioned at the end of the last chapter.* It is not he who gives up the fire and the rites that symbolise his social duties in order to plunge into meditation in

* This warning against the premature practice of meditation refers only to the deliberate attempt to scale the Ladder of the Soul by a meditative technique. Meditation on the symbols of the Supreme or on the figure of the Teacher, reflection on the eternal truth about the Soul and the world and the calm analysis of one's character are practices which are useful and desirable at all stages of the Path.

some Himālayan cave who is the true *yogi* or sannyāsi, but he who performs such actions as are enjoined by duty without any selfish desire for fruit.

It is not work which has to be renounced but the "*sankalpa*," the formative will which seeks its own aims, an attitude that is found in too many would-be yogis who seek in *yoga*, not the *Atman*, but an enhanced power of moulding the environment to a pattern more pleasing to the personal self.

For, in truth, it is in action, disinterested selfless action, that the way to *yoga* lies (verse 3). Forcible opening of a bud will not produce a blossom, and it is only when the disciple is "*yogārūrha*," is firmly established in the Path, that the serenity of meditation can be a means of further advance.

It is easy and common to fancy oneself already at this point, but, in truth, the stage is a very high one. Only he may be said to be established in the Path (verse 4) who feels no more attachment to the objects of the senses nor to self-seeking activity, and who has thoroughly renounced the above-mentioned desire to impose his own formative will upon the course of events.

Before the practice of meditation can be available to flash the consciousness, now centred in the lower or personal self, across the gulf which separates it from the *Atman* or Higher Self, it is essential that there shall be a harmony between the two. If the self is in harmony with the Self, if it ceases to exert its personal will, if its impulses are under control and it is able to offer itself as an instrument through which the Self can work, then the *Atman* is its friend, a source of inspiration and guidance, the Inner Teacher of whom mention has previously been made. But if the self is allowed to sink down in inert depression, if it pursues its own aims and stands proudly upon its own individual uniqueness, then indeed, the *Atman* is felt as something hostile. No more a source of inspiration, It makes itself known as the mysterious source of misfortunes and sicknesses, of those "blows of Fate," in short, which are the teachers of the Law that all life is one.*

In order that the disciple may know whether he has truly arrived at this stage or not, certain signs are given in the text and, impartially scrutinising his own mind, he must see whether they are present or not before he ventures further. If the self is really controlled and harmonious, then the Higher Self (verse 7) will be felt always as a calm background to all the activities of the mind. The "pairs of opposites" that torment other men will have no power to disturb that inner serenity. The gratifications of honour and the death-like sting of dishonour, those infallible testers of claimants to the yogi's title, can have no effect on him whose only honour is the approval of his Teacher, whose only dishonour is

* It was perhaps some realisation of this truth (though from a different angle of vision) that prompted the words of Jung: "Only when in disharmony . . . . do we discover the Psyche; we come upon something that thwarts our will, which is strange and even hostile to us."

the shame of having subordinated Self to self. Wealth is nothing to him who feels within him the living water of the sacred wisdom, and the distinctions that mean so much to others are absurd in the eyes that have caught a glimpse of the One Life which is in all.

Now comes the time for the practice of meditative yoga and, accordingly, the *Gita* proceeds to give some teachings about the technique to be pursued. Essentially the method consists of gaining such control over the mind processes that they can be stilled at will, thus enabling the consciousness to perceive the Truth like a calm lake reflecting the eternal stars above.

Only brief indications are given in the text because the full process cannot be set forth in writing. It varies for each disciple and must be learnt from the Guru who, as explained before, is always available at this stage. *It is true that there are books which apparently give full instructions about the practice, but their apparent fullness is misleading.* It is easier to become an artist by the study of a manual of oil painting than to become a yogi by the study of books on meditation, whether those books were written yesterday or whether they were written five thousand years ago.

Two absolute essentials are *Brahmacharya*, or control of the sex impulse, and utter purity of aspiration. *Brahmacharya* must not be confused with mere ascetic celibacy. It is the *control* of the sex impulse that is meant, and not its mere inhibition, a control that will take varying forms under differing circumstances. There is no merit in the sexlessness of the eunuch, whether his castration be a physical or a mental one, and Hindu tradition is right in affirming that the householder whose sex life is controlled is as truly a *Brahmachari* as the ascetic who observes the vow of total sex abstinence. In any case it must be borne in mind that the inner world of sex phantasy is as important as the outer one of procreation. Without control of sex in both its inner and its outer manifestations, it is safer to play with dynamite than to practise the yoga of meditation.

Turning now to the other essential, the aspiration must be purely directed towards the One Self, as, under any other circumstances, the practice of meditation will give rise to visions and hallucinations which will mislead the disciple and plunge him into a whirlpool of psychic illusions that may even delude him into fancying himself an *Avatāra* or other great personage.

Purity of aspiration and the proximity of a *wise* Guru are the only safeguards against such delusions. It must never be forgotten that visions and other psychic experiences prove absolutely nothing whatever. True knowledge is possessed by the *Atman* alone, and no dualistic knowing can be relied on, whether the senses which mediate it be the outer or the inner ones. It is the grossest folly to suppose that a vision, say, of the crucifixion of Jesus, or the birth of Krishna is, as such, any testimony to the historicity of those events. Even if it were, it could prove nothing of importance as it

could no more reveal the inner significance of those events than could the physical vision of those who witnessed them with their bodily eyes. In all events it is the *Atman* that is of importance and it is the knowledge of the *Atman* alone that is the true knowledge. Therefore is it said that he alone is safe "who sees Me, the *Atman*, in all beings and all beings in Me."

Hence all the emphasis on the Self, the *Atman*. The yogi must be united with the *Atman*, with thought fixed on the *Atman*, absorbed in the *yoga* of the *Atman*, seeing the *Atman* by the *Atman*. It cannot be too emphatically stated that no true *yoga* is possible by the unaided personal will. Thought may be stilled to the point of trance, but unless the self is surrendered to the *Atman* there can be no *yoga* in the true sense of the word. True, the preliminary effort at concentration is made from the lower level, but the complete stilling of the mind by sheer will is like balancing a pyramid upon its apex, a feat of balance, which, even if accomplished, is so precarious that no useful result can be achieved.

The true concentration comes when the disciple is able to surrender himself to, and identify himself with, the *Atman*, that Self which is present as the unchanging Witness of every thought and of every sensation. It is only when this is achieved that the mind of the Yogi becomes steady "like a lamp in a windless place," a state which, to any one who has seriously tried to concentrate from the lower level alone, will always seem an almost fantastically difficult feat of mental acrobatics. The true process is certainly hard enough but it is infinitely easier than the lower one, failure to achieve which is a source of depression to so many.

It is because of this impossibility of achieving success in meditation without some perception of the Higher Self that it is only in this sixth chapter that instructions for its practice are given. Up to this point "action is called the means," that is to say, the means of getting a preliminary perception of the higher level of consciousness, the *buddhi*, by which the yoga is to be achieved.*

"Little by little let him gain tranquillity by means of the *buddhi*, firmly adhered to," and thus, securely seated in the *Atman*, to which the *buddhi* is a bridge, it will be possible for him to bring all thoughts to a standstill and yet remain in a stable state of serenely blissful consciousness, "which having attained, he thinketh that there is no greater gain possible," and which all the assaults of pain and sorrow can never shake.

"That should be known as yoga, this disconnection from the union with pain." Profound words, which gain an added profundity when we remember the teaching of the Buddha that *all* experience is (in itself) *dukha*, painful by reason of its finite and transitory nature. This "disconnection" from union with all finite experience is the secret of successful *yoga*, or rather, it is half the secret, the other half being the "*ātma sansthā*," the abiding in the

* See the third article in this series.

Atman. The two processes, negative and positive, go on side by side, as a man, climbing a ladder, loosens his hold on one rung while simultaneously attaching himself to the next.

These two processes are the "detachment and practice" referred to in verse 35. Without their aid there is no possibility of stilling the restless and fickle mind and of climbing up the ladder. For countless ages the mind has been turned outwards and has been given a free rein to attach itself to objects of desire, and it is not to be expected that it will be possible to wrench it away from them at once. A bamboo that has long borne a weight will not be straightened merely by its removal; strenuous effort will also be required to neutralise the acquired bend. So with the mind; long bent by the forces of desire, it must first be detached from them and then, by constant practice, united with that which is higher than itself.

This practice is not a matter of an hour or even of several hours of daily meditation. Throughout the day (and even, in a sense, throughout the hours of sleep as well) constant effort must be made to retain in the consciousness as much as possible of the detachment and insight that were achieved during the meditation period. Throughout the day the disciple must hold on grimly to whatever degree of realisation he was able to gain in those calm hours, for a short period of uncontrolled thought, an hour of despondency, or even five minutes of anger, will undo all that he has accomplished, and, like the web of Penelope, what was woven in the morning will be unravelled by next day.

It is a long and up-hill struggle and one which, to the disciple, will often seem hopeless. Progress is slow and attainment looms far away. The night of Death may come before the haven is reached, but he must not despair for the Path is one that must be trodden through many lives (verse 45), and he may repose serenely in the arms of the Good Law, knowing that not the slightest effort is ever wasted, and that, like a man completing on the morrow the unfinished task of to-day, he will be able to begin in his next life at the point where he left off in this.

If the effort is only steady, his ultimate triumph is secure, and, at last, like a tree long bound by winter frosts, bursting suddenly into glorious bloom, the arduous struggles of many lives will bear fruit and he will burst into the Light and attain the *Brahma-sansparsha,* the contact with the Eternal, no longer sensed as a vague background, no longer even glimpsed fitfully through the inner door, but felt in actual contact, contact that will drench the soul in bliss.

Gone is the sense of a separate finite self with its individual gains and losses, its personal hopes and fears, and in its place comes the experience of the One *Atman* abiding in all beings, of all beings as eddies in that all-pervading ocean of Bliss.

This stage may be reckoned as the third great landmark on the

Path. The first was the Entry on the Path, the second, the consciousness of the Divine Birth in the heart and, now, with the overwhelming perception of the unity of all life in the One Self, the third, termed in some traditions the Mystic Marriage, may be said to have been accomplished. It is the sixth or *Dhyāna Pāramitā* of the Buddhists, after which the shining path of *Prajñā* lies open before the disciple's feet. Thrice Great is he who has travelled thus far. The bridge which separated self from Self has been crossed and now no obstacle remains to prevent the Divine Light from irradiating the personality with its wondrous rays.

Wherever he may be and whatever he may be doing, the Yogi is now established in the ever-living Divine Unity. The touch of the Eternal Krishna has awakened the flame of love in his heart, love the great liberator, the breaker down of all barriers. Borne out of himself on its rushing wave, he sees no more himself or others but everywhere and in all things the blue form of Krishna flashes forth. Beneath the frowning brows of his foe no less than within the smiling glances of his friend he perceives the gleaming eyes of his Divine Lover and he pours himself forth in utter worship of the Unchanging One, seated within the hearts of all.

Worship is a word which conjures up before us ideas of hymns and formal offerings, of churches and temples and of rewards in heaven; but the worship which the disciple now offers is something quite different. It is the worship which gives itself because it can do no less, the worship of self-forgetful service compelled by the sovereign power of love.

What need has he of temples when every form enshrines his Lord, and how shall he withhold his service when he sees the Divine Beauty distorted by the gloomy ugliness of the world, the Divine Bliss masked by the myriad sorrows of men?

Great is the *tapaswi*, the ascetic who disciplines himself; great the *jnāni* standing firm in the calm knowledge of Reality; great, too, is the man of action, for he is the instrument, albeit unconscious, of the unresting cosmic tides. But greater than all is the *Yogi* for he combines in himself all three. United with the Divine Lover in his heart, he sees Him as the One Self in all and, offering his disciplined personality on the altar of self-sacrifice, he serves unrestingly the Wisdom-Love that ever plans the welfare of the worlds.

"*Sa me yuktatamo matah*"

"He in my opinion is the greatest *Yogi* of all."

SRI KRISHNA PREM

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

SOLOVYEV AND PLATO*

The appearance of this translation of Vladimir Solovyev's essay on Plato, following English versions of other books of his, is evidence that this mystical Russian philosopher is attracting more and more attention in our country. The value of the translation of the "Plato" is very much enhanced by Mr. Janko Lavrin's admirable introductory essay (it is more than a "Note") on Solovyev's life and thought, which throws much light on his rather baffling personality.

The profound spirituality of the Russian mind (which it will be difficult for any inculcation of "historic materialism" to exorcize) has been shown in the course of the last 150 years not merely by such independent interpretations of the significance of human life as have been given by Tolstoi, Dostoevsky and Gorki, but by the repeated emergence within the rigorously conservative Orthodox Church of philosophies that give to the traditional dogmas of Greek-Catholicism a freer and less material meaning. The writings of Khomiakov on the nature of the Church and its unity are a case in point. With Solovyev we reach a much deeper mind and a philosophy of far wider range, although we understand it to be the case that he actually transferred his ecclesiastical allegiance from the Orthodox to the Roman Communion with its even stricter conception of authority and dogmatic immutability. His passionate desire to see the re-union of the Greek-Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches proceeded, no doubt, from his root-conception of the spiritual unity of redeemed mankind, which Mr. Lavrin admirably summarizes:—

> In his opinion, the chief aim of history is to transform the "natural" organization of mankind (which involves continuous strife and struggle) into a spiritual organization based upon the values of the absolute good. And the "description of this moral organization, or of the totality of the moral conditions which justify the good in the world, must be the coping-stone of moral philosophy." We must become voluntary helpers of God, and the only criterion of our actions should be Christ, or the absolute good as embodied in Christ.

No European philosopher claiming to base his beliefs on "the values of the absolute good" could afford to ignore the work of Plato, whose philosophy, filtered through partly distorting channels, has passed into the very foundations of Christian and Catholic theology. It is evident that Solovyev pondered long and deeply the philosophy of the Academy. The brilliant study of Plato's mind which he presents in the essay before us could only have been written by one who had studied the master of Greek thought with the intimacy almost of a personal disciple. By a process of

***Plato.* By VLADIMIR SOLOVYEV. Translated from the Russian by RICHARD GILL, with a note on Solovyev by JANKO LAVRIN. (Stanley Nott, London. 5s.)

sympathetic divination he seems to discern the spiritual struggles within Plato's own soul that drive him to the formulation of his doctrines, and is thus enabled to bring him before us more as the character of a great drama than as the bare speculator on ultimate issues.

For Solovyev the tragedy of Plato (for so he reckons it) turns on the catastrophe of the death of his Master Socrates. In an age when the adventurous and seafaring life of the Athenian Greeks had led them to perceive the relativity of their traditional religion and moral usages, and had thus produced among many of the Sophists (the "highbrows" as modern vernacular would call them) a sheer scepticism about any standards of truth and untruth, right and wrong, Socrates had stood unflinchingly for the cause of the Good and the True. Only he had insisted that Truth and Goodness must be established by the light of the unfettered reason and not by mere adherence to traditional beliefs just because they had been handed down by the authorities of the City-State to which he belonged. He honoured the gods of Athens "not because they were acknowledged by the city, but only because, or so far as there truly was, or might be, in them something of the divine". For this preference of reason to authority he was adjudged to die as an impious criminal; and to his passionately devoted disciple Plato it necessarily seemed as if the visible order of the world utterly rejected in the person of Socrates the principles of Goodness and Truth which were all that made life worth living. Solovyev proceeds to a penetrating comparison between the tragic situation of Plato at this moment and those of Hamlet and Orestes. For all three it was a case of:—

> The time is out of joint—O cursed spite!
> That ever I was born to set it right!

A burden was laid on them all to perform a higher duty than conformity to the accepted morals and order of the world in which they moved; but in Solovyev's view the problem confronting Plato was at once higher and deeper than the merely personal dilemma of either Hamlet or Orestes. It was no personal or family wrong that he had to redress. "The tragedy lay in the fact that the best community to be found at that time in all humanity—Athens—could not endure the simple naked truth." We may say that, like another of Shakespeare's heroes, Coriolanus, he had to tell his fellow-countrymen, "There is a world elsewhere!" but that world was not upon the visible globe. The philosophy that Plato worked out as the solution to his problem was a sheer dualism; it maintained the antithesis of the world of sense and the spiritual world of the absolute Ideas, where alone pure virtue and truth were laid up as patterns in heaven.

Yet so rich a nature as Plato's could not permanently maintain this ascetic attitude, this sheer renunciation of the world of human affairs. Perhaps, Solovyev suggests, in consequence of some emotional crisis in the middle of his life, Plato was led to meditate upon the character and meaning of Love and to write his dialogues the "Phaedrus" and

the "Symposium". In the force of Eros or Love he discerned the power that could bridge the two worlds, bring the spirit into communion with the body and idealize the flesh. Nevertheless in the view of his Russian commentator, Plato with all his subtle theorizings about the nature of love, his endeavours to distinguish a higher or heavenly love from a corporeal or animal one, never succeeded in showing how Eros could effectively confer ideal and eternal value upon the world of matter and appearance which the philosopher had already condemned as given over to mere illusion. (And no doubt Solovyev here is implicitly referring us to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation which offers such a bridge between the two worlds, matter and spirit, corruption and immortality.) Yet at least his renewed interest in the everyday world of human beings led Plato back from the semi-monastic retirement into which the death of Socrates had driven him. He began to busy himself with "the model of a better society". Solovyev holds that the bulk of his "Republic" belongs to this period, together with his experiments in guiding Dionysus the Dictator of Syracuse in Sicily and writing laws for the island of Crete.

But that last treatise, the "Laws" (a translation of which we lately reviewed here*) marks in Solovyev's opinion the bankruptcy of Plato's thought. For to the Russian it seems that here Plato definitely abandoned the Socratic principles of liberty of thought and the right of criticism as a practical programme, and placed mankind again under the dead authority of traditional religion, establishing something like an anticipation of the Inquisition. "What a profound and tragic catastrophe!" he exclaims, "how complete the moral fall!" Our criticism of Solovyev at this point would be that he overestimates the extent to which Plato from the first was genuinely a disciple of the Socratic method of free debate—supposing that the historic Socrates is rightly identified with that principle. For the legitimacy of free discussion of fundamentals depends ultimately upon the assumption that all human knowledge is progressive, a slow growing into Absolute Truth, it may be, but never such a full and final apprehension of it as precludes further enquiry, fuller research and correction of error. This idea was ever abhorrent to Plato, as to most of the Greeks, as to Hegel and most modern Absolutists with the exception of Croce. The Absolute Truth was a static perfection which might be attained once and for all by some process of rigorous dialectic. Assuming it to be the possession of the Ideal City it would obviously be insanity to allow the citizens to tamper with it. It is no reproach to Plato that he did not achieve an evolutionary view of the universe. Despite the intuition of Heracleitus "Everything flows!"—the Greek world could not accept it. Nor, as Solovyev must have known, has it proved altogether easy for the intellectual heirs of Christianity.

D. L. MURRAY

* THE ARYAN PATH, Vol. V, August 1934.

Blake and Milton. By DENIS SAURAT (Stanley Nott, London. 5s.)

There was every justification for a book on Blake and Milton; but I think that, even after Professor Saurat's treatise on the subject, the book remains to be written. He seems to me to have succumbed overmuch to the temptation to treat the two men as complementary and antithetical. There was a difference in kind between them. Milton's genius was static, Blake's dynamic; Blake never ceased to experience and to grow; Milton did. By that statement I do not mean to claim any inherent superiority for Blake: for, against this dynamic quality is to be set his fearful waywardness, his real contempt of comprehensibility, and his tremendous intolerance (which was not, however, so formidable as Milton's). But that there was a difference in kind between the natures of the two men is indubitable.

This difference in kind is expressed most clearly in Blake's *Milton.* In that "prophetic book"—to me, a very marvellous work indeed—Blake becomes the instrument of Milton's regeneration. What Milton could not achieve in his actual life, he achieves in the new existence which he enters in Blake's Imagination—he learns the secret of Forgiveness, which is the Law of Eternity. It is no accident that Milton, as understood by Blake, plays a crucial part in two of the most decisive moments of Blake's evolution. The revolutionary thought of *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell* had found perhaps its simplest expression in the bold transvaluation of Milton's conscious values. Milton's Satan, says Blake, is the real Messiah, and Milton's God the Father, the real Devil. But by the time he wrote *Milton,* he had discovered, through bitter experience, that this simple reversal of the Miltonic values was not enough. The fundamental defect of Professor Saurat's book is that it represents Blake as having stopped at the position taken in *The Marriage.* At that point, indeed, Blake could fairly be represented as antithetical and complementary to Milton—the conscious champion (as he felt himself to be) of the values which Milton unconsciously suppressed.

But to stop at that point is arbitrary and impossible. The evil victory of Reason over Energy which Milton celebrated could not be righted simply by making Energy predominant over Reason. It had—Blake discovered—to be transcended by fuller understanding: by the only full understanding, of Imagination and Love. In the next phase of Blake's thought and experience, the internecine struggle between Reason and Energy, symbolised in his work as the unending effort of Urizen and Luvah-Orc to annihilate one another, is itself the real Satan: the "hermaphroditic" Satan. The essential argument of Blake's *Milton* is that Milton, inspired by Blake's prophetic wisdom, recognises that the internecine struggle between Reason and Energy in himself, in which he had been on earth so totally involved, is the real Satan. He cries:

> I in my Selfhood am that Satan.
> I am that Evil One.
> He is my Spectre: in my obedience to
> loose him from my Hells,
> To claim the Hells, my Furnaces,
> I go to Eternal Death.

That journey from Eternity to Eternal Death, and back again in an Eternal Moment, is the theme of Blake's *Milton.*

It cannot be expounded in the space of a brief review; but perhaps enough has been said to make it evident that a book on Blake and Milton which practically ignores this second revolution in Blake's thought concerning Milton can hardly be adequate. Even if Blake's *Milton* is regarded as incomprehensible (which it is not), the bare fact remains that it is a poem all about Milton. So long as it remained incomprehensible, would it not have been more becoming to postpone writing about Milton and Blake? If the effect of trying to understand it was felt to be excessive (as it well might be), the better part would seem to have been not to vex the shade of the man who wrote at the beginning of *Milton*:

> I will not cease from Mental Fight,
> Nor shall my Sword sleep in my hand ....

JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

Eastern Lights. By MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR. (Arya Publishing House, Calcutta.)

This is an able and interesting work. But it is a pity that it is written in such a peculiar form of English. The publishers claim on the dust-cover that the author possesses "an elegant and forceful style." Actually he uses English as an intelligent, but unskilled foreigner, making mistakes on nearly every page, although his meaning is always clear, and he is capable of considerable eloquence.

But this is in any case a small point. What is important is that he offers us in these pages an illuminating presentation of the attitude of the cultivated Hindu thinker to the problems of religion and life, as exemplified in the more important schools of thought and the work of the great Indian reformers.

The many interesting problems which the book raises for the Western reader cannot be indicated in this brief notice. Perhaps the most important is the question of what we are to understand by Hindu Modernism. The "hospitality of the Hindu mind" is notorious; its note is catholicity, universality, comprehensiveness, the capacity for preserving a delicate equilibrium between a wide range of complementary points of view. And this spirit finds a notable expression in the present study. But the obvious difficulty arises that extreme inclusiveness obliterates individuality. The Hindu thinker who no longer consents to be differentiated from other religionists by local peculiarities of cult and worship, and who instead creates for himself a synthetic philosophy which embodies the more valuable features of other religions, finds himself very soon in the same situation as the Western or the Chinese philosopher who follows the same procedure; they unite in their acceptance of a liberal, universal faith.

Professor Sircar would urge that the Hindu attitude is individualised by the fact that its foundation remains always the Upanisads. But their teaching is after all fundamentally the same as that of all the great Scriptures of the world—provided, that is to say, that they are studied from a sufficiently interior standpoint. So what is really left is little more than a sort of racial emphasis, which finds expression most notably in an extraordinary subtlety and refinement of mind, fascinating to the Western reader, but leaving him nevertheless with the impression that insufficient justice has somehow been done to the possibilities of the world of manifestation. Not insufficient *intellectual* justice; the Indian mind is here supreme. It is more a question of emotional inadequacy; matter in the hands of this type of thinker never seems to offer sufficient resistance to thought to render its ultimate spiritualization fully significant.

But this for us in the West is not the important point. Our own problem is that of realizing the reality of the Unmanifested. And in this enterprise nothing can be more salutary for us than the study of Oriental philosophy which, instead of beginning by assuming the reality of the world of the senses and only admitting the existence of the transcendental when the conceptions of sense have been broken down by analysis, takes its departure from a supreme intuition—the reality of Brahman—and moves from that centre outwards into the world of manifestation. Then, and then only, everything falls into its proper place. But it will be long before any but a minority of mystically-minded thinkers in the West will appreciate the full significance of this approach. Meanwhile the more we can become acquainted with such treatises as that of Professor Sircar, the more quickly will this new orientation be achieved.

LAWRENCE HYDE

Reason and Emotion. By JOHN MACMURRAY. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Professor Macmurray is refreshingly different from most academic philosophers both in his choice of subjects for discussion and in his method of treatment. His present work is a collection of lectures which aim at elucidating certain important points in his broadcast talks published in *Freedom in the Modern World*. Although it is thus a kind of sequel to that work, it is quite intelligible by itself, and in it we have illuminating treatments of such topics as Reason in the Emotional Life, Art and the Future, Science and Religion, The Conservation of Personality, etc.

While most people would understand reason in intellectual terms and would regard science as the best type of knowledge we can have of reality, Professor Macmurray denies both that reason is merely, or even primarily, intellectual and that science is any knowledge of reality. He takes rationality to be the *differentia* of humanity and contends that "whatever is a decisive and determining characteristic of human nature and belongs to human nature alone is, by definition, an expression of rationality" (p. 200). Art and religion are as distinctive expressions of the nature of humanity as are philosophy and science. Art and religion, then, are as good expressions of reason as science. Indeed he shows that art and religion are better expressions of reason than science. Now "art and religion are peculiarly bound up with the emotional side of human life." Reason therefore should not be contrasted with emotion but should be understood as inclusive of it. Like our thoughts, our feelings may also be rational or irrational, according as they correspond or fail to correspond with the real situation.

Rationality is objective consciousness, *i. e.*, consciousness of what is not ourselves. There are three fields to which we stand in objective relation—the fields of matter, life and personality.

It is this threefold character of the objective world which determines the threefold expression of rationality. Science grows out of our rationality in relation to material things. Art grows out of our relation to living beings. Religion grows out of our relation to persons. (p. 196)

Religion is a fuller expression of rationality than science or art, not only because a person is also a living organism and a material body, but also because rationality as the defining characteristic of persons can express its own nature completely only "in the full relation of one rational being to another." Religion thus being an expression of our rational nature in relation to persons is something inherent in our human state, and cannot be denied without denying our rationality.

What about God? The idea of God has no fixed connotation, and whenever it is associated with a meaning that is false, the affirmation or denial of the existence of God would be the affirmation or denial of a falsehood. There is, however, a sense in which the existence of God cannot be rationally denied. Just as infinite matter is the underlying ground of all material phenomena, "God is the infinite ground of all finite phenomena in the personal field—and, therefore, ultimately of all phenomena whatever" (p. 209). Just as at the material level, we apprehend all material objects as finite and dependent upon the material infinite, in the personal field too, our apprehension of ourselves as persons is an apprehension of our dependence upon infinite personality. "God as infinite personality is the primary natural experience of all persons. One might almost say . . . . that God is the first perception." (p. 228)

The author shows quite easily how science does not satisfy the ideal of knowledge. Science is abstract and knows things in their generalised aspects, and ignores all the specific differences which mark their individuality. This means "that science, though it may know everything in general, can know nothing in particular, and reality is always something in particular. It follows that science is not knowledge of reality" (p. 187).

When he finds the highest knowledge in the religious field, Professor Mac-

murray is in line with the ancient Indian thinkers for whom, too, spiritual knowledge was the highest kind of knowledge (*parā vidyā*) in comparison with which scientific, including ordinary, knowledge (*aparā vidyā*) was no better than ignorance. In making infinite personality the primary experience of all persons, he approaches the Vedantic view that it is the Absolute (*Brahman*) which is perceived as the substratum (*adhi-ṣthāna*) of all objects. What however we do not understand is his insistence that " the knowledge of God is possible only through empirical phenomena of personal relationship," as well as his view that " the primary religious assertion is that all men are equal.". To a religious man all men would be equal, and a person who has realised Atman will be conscious of Its presence in all his personal relationships. But when we merely know that all men are equal and are conversant with all kinds of personal relationships, we do not, it seems, necessarily achieve any religion or religious knowledge. In a sense, in knowing anything, we know God ; because everything is in God. But the characteristic insight which reveals Deity may not come merely from the knowledge of things and events, personal or impersonal, which constitute our world. If it is true that Deity is the ground of our being, it seems more likely that we should know It by turning our view inward, and through inner illumination, than by an examination of empirical phenomena of personal life.

We also do not understand how the underlying ground of all personal phenomena can itself be conceived of as personal. The mutuality of relationship, in which the other is one's equal, is recognised by Prof. Macmurray to be essential to personality. But the so-called infinite personality can obviously have no other which is its equal and with which it can be in mutual relationship.

In spite of these difficulties, we have to say of Professor Macmurray, as he says of Whitehead, that " he is, unlike many philosophers, moving in the right universe of discourse."

RASVIHARI DAS

The Untouchable Classes of Maharashtra, By M. G. BHAGAT, M. A. (University of Bombay. Re. 1)

This is a summary of a thesis submitted by the author for the M. A. degree of the Bombay University in the year 1935. It deals with the economic and social condition of the Harijans (as " Untouchables " are now called) in the Marathi-speaking districts of the Bombay Presidency. It is the result of first-hand information obtained mostly from the lips of the people concerned, and the author's desire to make his presentation as objective as possible leads him to confine himself to recording only such remedies for their present grievances as they themselves suggest. The brochure is full of statistics. There are as many as 31 tables of statistics within its 45 pages, showing the amount of work that has gone into its writing. A striking characteristic of the book is its avoidance of all reference to the work of the " Harijan Sevak Sangh." Whether this is due to the fact that any work associated with Gandhiji is taboo, it is not possible to say. But when the author ends up by suggesting that there should be a central organisation to fight Untouchability with a network of provincial and smaller committees all over the country, it is a little surprising that the one Association which is run exactly on these lines should find no mention.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

Popular Hinduism: The Religion of the Masses. By L. S. S. O'MALLEY. (Cambridge University Press, 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Indian Gods and Kings: The Story of a Living Past. By EMMA HAWKRIDGE. (Rich and Cowan, Ltd., London. 15*s.*)

Hinduism has been exciting of late a considerable amount of attention on the part of writers and readers in the West. Not all of this interest is attributable to conscious effort to save the "heathen" from Hinduism by depicting its worst side to horrified readers in the West. Partly it is due to the current ferment in India which promises either to dissolve the existing relationship between India and the West or to transmute it into something better. Mainly, of course, it is, unhappily, due to a thirst evident in an extraordinary degree in our age, for sensational things, horrors and ignoble forms of excitement. Accounts of religious crudities, secret cults and social anachronisms are almost as popular as gangster stories or the old-time shilling shockers. The more sensationally the horrors are stated, the better; also the more there are of them, the more interesting the book and the larger the sales.

The apparently unbridgeable gulf between popular Hinduism and the higher philosophical approach to religious problems, which has been evolving in the Hindu world for centuries, affords material both for sensation-mongering and for scientific study. The infinite variety of popular Hinduism with its colourful complex tangle of ritual, custom and belief, image-worship and fetishism seldom, however, has been treated with even the degree of scientific curiosity—such as it is—that is discernible in Mr. O'Malley's book on *Popular Hinduism.* It professedly treats of the religion of the masses. It is therefore bound to be a partial, an inadequate and, to a considerable extent, a misleading account, for the reason that the gulf which the author imagines to exist is largely a mirage. One cannot deny that fetishism and contradictory—even undesirable—practices are common in the complex religious technique of some sections included in the Hindu fold. But except in the least evolved of these, the comparative prevalence of ritual and image worship in preference to contemplation of the Absolute and mystic communion with the spirit of the universe is explicable in terms of the doctrine of *adhikara.*

Hinduism has graded and stratified its religious approach—not too rigidly but still discernibly. It recognizes differences in the spiritual and moral development of individuals and communities and provides for them. But—and this is the more important point to note—its final emphasis is on the ultimates of all true spiritual life. While this is dear to all but the completely uninstructed Hindu, there is a frank recognition of individual limitations and provision for individual needs. These individual differences generally define the place the sections occupy in the Hindu religious scale, but Hindu India nevertheless has sat at the feet of its untouchable saints with as complete a devotional surrender as it has ever shown to the Maharishis whose intuitions are the core of the *Upanishads.*

Miss Hawkridge's volume shows genuine sympathy with India but inadequate understanding of the philosophical background of her religions. Part I, "The Way of the Gods," is unsatisfactory. The merely intellectual approach can never lead to a due appreciation of spiritual truths, but the rudiments of universal symbology would have made impossible such a slip, for example, as putting the face-value interpretation on the Dance of the Gopis. The confusion between Raja-Yoga and Hatha-Yoga springs from the same superficiality that concludes that the Buddha "did not believe in souls"; that appears in the easy assumption that "of course no one comes back" from the final stage of Yoga realization; and that brands as "the fatal thought that was choking essential Buddhism" the teaching that "Gautama was only one of many Buddhas, many wise men who had attained arhatship, past and to come." The fathomless profundity of the *Gita* is plumbed in sixteen lines!

But despite the philosophical deficiencies of *Indian Gods and Kings*, its second part, "The Way of Kings," makes it the *living* story of a living past. Miss Hawkridge is historian and *raconteuse* to the finger tips; ancient and medieval India pass before our eyes in fascinating pageantry. The value of the book is enhanced by the chronological table which places in parallel columns for each age or reign its art and architectural remains and the contemporary literary and historical sources, but the more ancient entries reflect and suffer from the foreshortening common to Western Orientalists.

P. NAGA RAJA RAO

Kierkegaard : His Life and Thought. By E. L. ALLEN, PH. D. (Stanley Nott, Ltd., London. 6s.)

Of the writers who have been influenced by some great moral conflict in their lives, Kierkegaard is one of the most interesting. He had a secret in his life, which he zealously and successfully concealed; perhaps impotence, as Dr. Allen thinks, or a hereditary disease which was equivalent to it in results, and which obliged him to break off with Regine to whom he did not like to reveal it, though he had won her love. Hence arises a great moral conflict in his mind which lights up the spark of his genius, and is at the root of his philosophy of life, which he divides into three spheres—the æsthetic, the ethical, and the religious. This conflict requires decision, moral strength to overcome it. His ethical views are based on this need which he felt. But the doubt whether finite man can have that infinite strength leads him to the sphere of religion, in which the perplexities of the ethical stage dwindle into nothing through our perception that in our innermost being we are at one with the Infinite. But with this kind of religion, which Kierkegaard calls Religion A, he is not satisfied. He carries with him a sense of guilt which prevents him from feeling his oneness with God. Here he finds the need of Christianity, the religion of revelation, which by exercising on man an overmastering influence from outside enables him to leap as it were from his sinful life to the higher.

There are other influences on Kierkegaard's thought, and many interesting details of his philosophy, with which it is not possible to deal in a short review. But as we read his life, we are provoked to think, imagine and guess. And we are grateful to Dr. Allen for acquainting us with so interesting a philosopher. In the end, we cannot but think that the abnormality of Kierkegaard's life has made certain of his views one-sided. For example, compare the view that woman, when once won, becomes dull, and that love ends in *ennui*, with Bhavabhuti's opinion on the subject in *Uttararamacharita* (Act I, Stanza 39) where he says that the ardour of love is not mitigated by age, but develops into the mature core of affection as the limitations drop off. Again, even a man like Sankara, who was practically a born sannyasin, had to learn the secrets of sex-life before his teachings could be accepted by Mandana Misra and his wife. That story, whether true or not, shows that the teachings of only a fully developed personality, teachings upon which is brought to bear the wealth of a many-sided human experience, should be accepted. But we are left with a doubt whether Kierkegaard, in spite of being a genius, is such an one. However, he is exciting interest in England, for since the book at present under review, another volume on his life and teachings by Dr. John A. Bain, has been published.

P. T. RAJU

Heredity and Evolution. By ARTHUR ERNEST WATKINS, M. A. (John Murray, London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

This book implies that the life of individuals and nations with their ambitions, aspirations, and achievements is after all a comedy of cells and chromosomes. Mr. Watkins holds that modern investigations in cytology and genetics have necessitated restatement, reinterpretation or reconstruction of Darwin's doctrine of Evolution, and of the Mendelian theory of Segregation. Lamarck's theory of acquired characteristics or acquired efficiency by conscious effort and of transmission of the characteristics to future generations or to new species is rejected. Darwin's natural selection is also found unsatisfactory. The Mutation Theory of Vries is shown to be the most adequate in the light of the data collected. "Constant hereditary units," "their location in chromosomes," and "the pairing of homologous particles" are the three fundamental principles claimed to have been definitely demonstrated (p. 227).

The scientific assurance and guarantee of definite knowledge of the principles of heredity and evolution are, however, modified by such confessions as "*Nothing is known* [italics mine] about the origin of the zygote's potentiality for developing into either of two highly specialized and very different organisms—the male and the female" (p. 99).

"Mutation is a rather rare event, and *little is known* [italics mine] about the circumstances that bring it about." (p. 151) "Much about the mechanism of evolution is still imperfectly understood." (p. 227)

The one supreme problem, whether mankind as a whole is evolving towards a higher and a nobler spiritual destiny or is the victim of the cosmic comedy of cells and chromosomes is left unsolved by modern research in heredity.

Sanskrit sources embody striking evidence to show that the problems of heredity and evolution were thought of seriously by those who had not the benefit of modern laboratory appliances. The *Garbhopanishad* describes the embryological evolution in detail, illustrating that ontogeny is a recapitulation of phylogeny. The Upanishadic text—*Sukradvaividhyat . . . . . . Yugmah-prajayante* (Twins are born on account of ova-sperm splitting into two)—undoubtedly indicates the conditions under which "identical twins" are born, when the fertilised egg-cell separates into two halves, each of which develops into a complete embryo (p. 23). I do not mean to suggest that thinkers of the Upanishadic Age actually explained heredity and evolution in terms of the 48 chromosomes possessed by man (p. 71), but they had achieved a balanced ethical and spiritual outlook on life, on account of the mysteries of evolution.

The entire difficulty about the theory of Mutations centres round the origin of new forms and around the phenomenon of selection. "Creative Evolution," "Emergent Evolution," "Expanding Universe," are picturesque expressions, and notwithstanding the constant units of heredity transmitted from generation to generation, radical divergences in traits and temperaments are yet unexplained by the theory of cells and chromosomes. Different neuro-muscular mechanisms of beings adapted to existence on land, in water and in air, revealing divergent characteristics in behaviour, must suggest progress from one form to a new one, in the sense of increased efficiency in adaptive behaviour. The work of Mr. Watkins does not suggest that Mutation has been or even could be investigated under controlled conditions.

While the Upanishadic thinkers seriously considered the potentialities of zygote in the determination of sex, (*Retotireka*) they considered that hereditary endowments of a high order should not intoxicate individuals, nor hereditary disabilities dishearten them. Herr Hitler's palaver about Aryan purity is before the public, but if eugenically or politically controlled mating and the origin of a new species of supermen should but subserve a programme of commercial exploitation and territorial expansion, one might justifiably despair of evolution ! !

The theory of cells and chromosomes is bound to be popularised. It may engender the conviction that certain civilised races and communities are eternally bound to hold supreme sway, while others, because of a different alignment of chromosomes, are eternally bound to remain hewers of wood and drawers of water. Or, again, it may engender the conviction that behind the game of chromosomes there are countless spiritual entities whose destinies are governed by a Supreme Power. If life is evaluated as a cosmic comedy of cells and chromosomes, moral and spiritual values are bound to disappear in the fierce struggle for existence. If, on the contrary, conduct is regulated in the light of the conviction that life is not a fortuitous play of chromosomes but a purposeful evolution determined by Divine Will and Karmic dispensation, sacrifice, service and sympathy to fellow men will be justified.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

The Prediction of the Future: A New Experimental Theory. By PIERRE-EMILE CORNILLIER ; trs. from the French by L. E. Eeman (Author-Partner Press, Ltd., London. 5*s.*)

It is well established that mediums and sensitives sometimes catch fleeting glimpses of future events. This record of trance experiments is like a hundred others but for the theories whereby the author seeks to reconcile the frequent fact of failure with the possibility of occasional success. He holds that whether any prediction will be realized completely, partially or not at all is indeterminable at the time it is made. *Cui bono,* then ? How are such predictions of the slightest value if the whole gamut of possibilities for their fulfilment is always open ? Elaborating his theory, M. Cornillier explains :—

> Future events pre-exist only as projects. Forecasts and predictions other than prognostications based on observed facts reveal only plans conceived by astral intelligences with the immutable aim of determining the spiritual evolution of human societies. (p. 16)

By the exercise of free will human beings may frustrate these "plans." The "Governing Spirits" are declared to decide

> the main lines and essential character of a proposed reincarnation (conditions of birth, sex, part to be played, trials to be borne, circumstances and time of death, etc.) . . . The plan is so conceived that the soul concerned may gain by its new earthly life the maximum evolution compatible with its state. (p. 73)

This a sorry substitute for the majestic sweep of impersonal Karmic Law, as presented in Esoteric Philosophy.

The predictions of the ordinary sensitive or medium are generally based on fragmentary glimpses in the Astral Light, the superphysical atmosphere which surrounds the earth and holds the pictures of events to come for which the causes are sufficiently well marked, as well as all the pictures of the past. The fulfilled predictions in the annals of Eastern psychology, however, do not all depend even upon the clear perception of such pictures by trained seers. Many are based upon accurate understanding of cyclic law.

M. Cornillier records that one young sensitive who collaborated selflessly in these investigations died by her mediumship " of her own free-will, with a clear and noble conscience " (p. xv). We do not question that pure zeal for knowledge may have inspired also M. Cornillier and perhaps his other mediums as well, but are the conclusions he has come to worth the cost ?

PH. D.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"___________ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

During this month falls the greatest of the Christian festivals—Easter. We wonder how many Christians nowadays take the Gospel story literally and believe that Jesus after his death, in the words of the Creed, "rose again, according to the scriptures" on the third day. Perhaps more people do than one would imagine, for in matters of belief many are content to remain ignorant of information which points clearly to the truth that the Resurrection of Jesus was an allegorical expression of a fact in soul-life, as well as a fact in universal nature—not a miraculous physical occurrence in an individual life. Jesus has been, and rightly, regarded as one of the Saviours of mankind, but wrongly as the *only* Saviour. Others have attained and have become Masters of Matter and Lords of Spirit.

The time of resurrection, in the stories of all lands, coincides with the 21st of March—the vernal Equinox.

The word Easter comes from Ostara or Eastre the goddess of Spring. She was the symbol of the resurrection of all nature and was worshipped in the early spring. It was then a custom to exchange coloured eggs called the eggs of Ostara, which have now become Easter-Eggs. As expressed in *Asgard and the Gods:* "Christianity put another meaning on the old custom, by connecting it with the feast of the Resurrection of the Saviour, who, like the hidden life in the egg, slept in the grave for three days before he awakened to new life." This was the more natural since Christ was identified with that same Spring Sun which awakens in all his glory after the dreary and long death of winter.

The egg has always been a universal symbol. There was the "Mundane Egg," with Hindus the *Hiranya-Garbba,* and that of the Egyptians, which proceeds from the mouth of the "unmade and eternal deity," Kneph, and which is the emblem of generative power. Then the sacred Goddess Ishtar was hatched out of the egg of Babylon, and was said to have fallen from heaven into the Euphrates. Coloured eggs were also exchanged in Egypt as sacred symbols in the spring-time and were hung up in Egyptian temples.

Christians do not use the Egg as a symbol in their churches to-day, but almost side by side with Hot Cross Buns, they will adorn the shop windows of many towns in Christendom.