



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,  
and lost among the host—as does the evening  
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

# THE ARYAN PATH

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## A MODERN PROPHET

"All that we are, is the result of what we have thought." This Buddhist axiom forms the basis of Aldous Huxley's remarkable book, *Ends and Means*. Conviction of this psychological truth has shown him not only why humanity's course has been so erratic and ugly, but also what is needed to straighten it. He examines Christendom and the Occident but numerous ideas which he presents will be of priceless value to Asia as well. He reproduces the pattern of life which the *Gita*, the *Dhammapada*, and *The Voice of the Silence* drew ages ago.

A fearless and an honest survey of the prevailing religious, political and social creeds has convinced Mr. Huxley that the moral order of the Occident is neither moral nor orderly; and that the illness of modern civilization is due to false concepts of the universe, of man and of their interdependence.

Men live in accordance with their philosophy of life, their conception of the

world. This is true even of the most thoughtless. It is impossible to live without a metaphysic. The choice that is given us is not between some kind of metaphysic and no metaphysic; it is always between a good metaphysic and a bad metaphysic.

The cure, therefore, is to turn to a good metaphysic and with its aid to change the mind of the race. Mr. Huxley is in dead earnest. His "enquiry into the nature of ideals and into the methods employed for their realization" is a challenge to every champion of the materialistic civilization of our day and a rallying cry to every sincere man who desires to contribute his share to the ushering in of "an age of liberty, peace, justice and brotherly love".

The first duty of the would-be reformer is "seeking an alternative philosophy that shall be true and therefore fruitful of good", and then testing in the light of that philosophy every theory and every action. The notion that the ideal goal can be reached by following means diametri-



cally opposed to the end in view is sophistry, both foolish and dangerous. Our civilization suffers not only from plans devised and carried out by men who do not believe in peace and brotherhood, but also from those chosen by men who do accept in theory such ideal ends, but imagine that they can be achieved by war and injustice.

If your goal is liberty and democracy, then you must teach people the arts of being free and governing themselves. If you teach them instead the arts of bullying and passive obedience, then you will not achieve the liberty and democracy at which you are aiming.

Reforms by legislative enactment are indeed necessary, but they will not bring about universal peace unless they are preceded and accompanied by a change in the moral perception of individuals.

Once a man is convinced of the unity of all beings he must, if at all logical, become in his own daily life a practitioner of non-violence. This demands constant and unremitting self-discipline.

Those who would use non-violence must practise self-control, must learn moral as well as physical courage, must pit against anger and malice a steady good will and a patient determination to understand and to sympathize.

The most powerful factor for the ultimate establishment of world peace is, therefore, the training of the individual as a non-violent resister of evil and injustice. "Resisters acting alone or in association have a very important part to play in the immediate future." Only the advocates of peace who are also its practitioners will create that enlightened faith which alone can

furnish the solid basis for all external reforms. The first task of such devoted individuals is—

The establishment of peace through the doing and teaching of those things which make for peace. Their other task is to cure themselves and the world of the prevailing obsession with money and power.

Both alone and in association with others the individual can work at formulating the ideal of reform and then at popularizing that ideal among the masses. As an individual each can be either a writer or a public speaker or both. But "the work of the solitary individual is mainly preliminary to the work of the individuals in association". Mr. Huxley recommends, therefore, that like-minded individuals form groups which will provide training-fields for putting into practice the principles adopted. Such groups will serve as a living demonstration that the ideas put forward can be applied and that they *do* work, thus powerfully reinforcing precept by example. Success as a group is naturally more difficult to attain, but the means thereto, as some students of pure Theosophy have found, lies in similarity of aim, purpose and teaching. This Mr. Huxley confirms :—

The first condition of success is that all the members of such associations should accept the same philosophy of life and should be whole-heartedly determined to take their full share in the work for whose accomplishment the association was founded.

Next arises the important question : Where is the right philosophy with its metaphysics and its ethics to be found ? Mr. Huxley perceives the common basis of the teachings of all great prophets and found-



ers of religions. They have all described the ideal individual as the non-attached man, and have pointed to the underlying identity of humanity as the basis for true ethics. "Good is that which makes for unity ; Evil is that which makes for separateness." This ethical principle, correlated with a "scientific mystical" conception of the universe, alone can satisfy the mind and the heart of man. It is to this universal philosophy that Mr. Huxley bids us turn ; and it is precisely such a philosophy of true mysticism that many have found in the Theosophy of H. P. Blavatsky. (Parenthetically we must once again call attention to the wide gulf that lies between the grand philosophy of Theosophy as put forward by the founders of the modern Theosophical Movement—H. P. Blavatsky and William Q. Judge—and the pseudo-theosophy of unreliable psychics and their dupes, who have corrupted the pure teachings.)

Mr. Huxley quotes freely from different systems of the past, especially from Buddhism, which appears to be the main force behind his own inner conversion, but nowhere does he mention Madame Blavatsky's synthetic and faithful restatement of those ancient truths. Yet she started the Theosophical Movement with precisely the same aim as Mr. Huxley's own—to change the mind of the race by drawing attention away from religious intolerance and fanaticism, away from scientific materialism and dogmatism, back to the acceptance of the cosmology of all true mystics and prophets. We must as-

sume that Mr. Huxley has not directly studied the philosophy of Theosophy. All the more interesting is it, therefore, that through independent thought he has reached the Theosophical conclusions on so many vital points.

The greatest value of his book, however, is that it presents to the English-speaking world—and doubtless it will be translated into several European tongues—ideas which can be immediately put into practice to stem the rising tide of war. If the European public not only read and reflect upon the contents of the volume but also make proper applications of the doctrine of Non-Violence, which as a political instrument has succeeded to a great extent in India, immediate beneficial results will accrue. The principles of Boycott applied in social circles by strong-hearted individuals and in the political sphere by organized masses, would raise the standard of morals in the home as in international life.

Finally, we may well describe this volume as filling the gap to which Professor Brown refers in the article which follows. He shows discernment in the scheme he offers for consideration, a scheme which, we hope, will attract widespread attention. There is some truth in Professor Brown's contention that books which faithfully and ably describe the doctrines of Eastern Philosophy are few ; here is one, at any rate, and it is most timely and fraught with great benefit for all. Many will read *Ends and Means*, but how many will practise its teachings ?



# THE WEST MUST LEARN ABOUT INDIA

[Professor William Norman Brown, Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, U. S. A., is the author of *The Panchatantra in Modern Indian Folklore*, *The Indian and Christian Miracles of Walking on the Water* and *The Story of Kalaka*. In the following article he makes a sincere appeal to all Westerners for a real understanding of the mind and heart of India. He outlines a scheme which would result in this better understanding and to which we draw the attention of all our readers, but especially of those who desire to see a real and unbreakable friendship between India and the western hemisphere.—EDS.]

Fifty years ago, India was an economic prize to supply an industrial western country with raw materials and consume its manufactured products, while the will of her people was of no consequence outside her own borders, if a will even existed. During the twentieth century her status has changed. She still is an economic asset to the West, but she has cultivated so much of political nationalism and asserted herself so effectively toward nationhood that her opinions and desires begin to affect the outside world. When another fifty years will have passed, her expanding industry, her growing trade with its wider diffusion among the nations, her more vigorous and modernly motivated intellectual life, all heightened in importance by the great numbers of her population, will compel the rest of the world to listen to her voice and reckon with her aims and actions, and she will herself have become a power.

With this increase of India's potency, the West will need the same sort of knowledge about India that India has long been seeking about the West. While India has been weak, she has had to study western economic organization, western social and political philosophy and development,

western history that she may understand how the West became so strong and so may live with the West on the best possible terms. This study she has been pursuing for a century, and must continue to pursue. But now that she has a prospect of competing some day on an equality with western nations, and western domination must therefore yield to conciliation, the West in its turn must seriously search to understand the ideals that motivate India's conduct and determine her policies. Only if each knows the other can they meet without unprofitable disagreement and mistrust and co-operate to build a better and a peaceful world. The problem, then, for a western nation is to ascertain just what it needs to know of India to understand that country in its world relationships, and to develop a method of getting that knowledge to enough of its leaders to guide its national policy toward India. It may be that all the western nations, including particularly the United States and Britain, have failed in the case of the Far East and waited too long to understand Japan and China; but prompt action may still save the future with respect to India.

The focus of western utilitarian interest in India will clearly be on



the modern, but that fact does not mean that a western country can understand India's present and reach an adjustment with her merely from observing contemporary phenomena. It could not do so in the case of another western nation, which has relatively small cultural differences from its own ; still less could it do so with India, whose dissimilarities are very great. The present must always be viewed in historical perspective, and statesmen will have to utilize the work of scholars. We can see that this is true even of political and economic contacts, which are the first phases of clash between two nations. The West will want to know—should be trying to learn right now—how strong the desire is in India for independence, if the final demand will be for separate statehood or if home rule within the British Empire will be satisfactory. Again, what form of government will India adopt—democratic, fascist, communist—what will her foreign policy be ? And will she develop industry within her own borders, using her abundance of raw materials and labour and marketing her products at home, with exportation of her surplus to other countries, and so enter into competition with western industrial nations, or will she remain primarily agricultural, and a consumer of imported products ? What are the chances that Britain can hold her preferred position in India, and what the chances of Japan for economic and perhaps also political domination ? What is the substance of India's will to assert and develop herself : will it grow stronger or is it only an illusion ?

Even such immediate questions as

these lead at once to the study of India's past. This is not a novel idea to Indians but we of the West hardly seem to have grasped it. We must examine the development of her political institutions during the millennia of which we have records, if we are to estimate the significance and strength of the current demands for representative responsible government. The temper of India's mind as revealed in her literature and previous dealings with governmental problems give shape to her present political thinking, and will affect that of the future. And, further, it is not enough to search only the literature of her political science and her political history ; for the temper of her people is a part of her whole life, which we can appraise only in view of its other manifestations, in the social order, fine-arts, religion, philosophy. Here another complication arises from the divergent cultures existing in the land—the Hindu and the Mohammedan—and the separate ethnic strains in the population. With only such brief suggestion before us, and none of the elaboration that any informed and thoughtful person can supply for himself, we can see that the answers to the political problems we have posed are too difficult for the statesman alone to reach ; he needs the assistance of the ethnologist, the linguist, the student of literature, of philosophy, of religion—in short, of every specialist in the diverse field of Indology.

The economic questions we have raised require the same sort of treatment. The economic present of the country and its probable future must be viewed in the light of the economic



history we can reconstruct from records of the past ; and the economist, like the political scientist, must have the aid of the historian and the linguist, even of the archæologist.

If politics and economics must be studied and interpreted in the light of general Indic culture, still more obviously must social phenomena. It is of profound importance to the world at large that it should understand the social organization of a country containing over three hundred and fifty millions of inhabitants. What is happening among so many people is important in itself ; to outsiders it is additionally important because of the effect, in this narrowing world, which their social developments will have upon the rest of us. The institution of caste alone is sufficient to illustrate the point. The effect it has upon life in India and upon the relation of India to the world at large, the changes it is now experiencing, its probable future, the character it will give to the India with which the West will have to deal—these are so weighty as to demand that we study it intensively. A puzzling and complicated phenomenon, of universal direct significance to all the Hindu portion of India's population and of marked, though indirect, influence upon the rest, its present is linked to its past and so too is its future. And it affects, and is in turn affected by, every other social aspect of India—the relations between groups and those between individuals, the process of education, the maintenance of public health, the character of religion. The observer of the present must collaborate with the student of the past to understand this institu-

tion, foresee the effect when it is confronted with the social dislocations brought about in a future India by expanding industry. And, again, the sociologist, like the statesman and the economist, must have the assistance of the Indologist when he seeks the answers to the problems which the world will expect him to solve.

It takes but little imagination to see that the same sort of situation exists with respect to the arts. Indian painting, sculpture, and architecture—some of whose characteristic features appear as early as in the Indus civilization of the third millennium B.C.—so different in their fundamental motivation from the Greek that dominates the western tradition, so profound in their intellectual content, so rich and varied in their form, so powerful in their hold upon the people, these we must know from the Indian point of view, if we are to make any adequate appraisal of Indian civilization, while from them western artists may themselves derive ideas of value in their own creative work, as indeed some have already. In *belles lettres* and theories of æsthetic criticism and literary expression, the same remark applies. We shall ourselves benefit if in connection with our artistic creation we come to comprehend what India has done and learned, as well as what lies within our own tradition, and we shall so better take our own place in the larger and more closely knit world that is coming to be.

Need we dwell on the message of Indian ethics, the emphasis unequalled elsewhere which it puts upon the doctrine of *ahimsā* ("non-violence"), a doctrine which it and the world



must join in applying to group action instead of individual, as has traditionally been its use in India? Or, again, should we speak of thought in its purest sense? Indian philosophy, almost completely ignored by the West in its educational institutions, is at once the chief expression of India's mentality and the most powerful force in shaping her future character, and joined with western thought and science it should move into new creative effort that will contribute to our highest intellectual life.

Conceding all that has been said above and much that could easily be added, we may ask ourselves what are the practical means of bringing the West to learn about India. It is not enough to point out the needs and advantages of acquiring such knowledge and then to leave it to chance or the unassisted efforts of our public or our leaders to find the necessary and valuable information. Those who are interested in seeing India and the West understand each other, and who have some measure of specialized information about India, should try to think out a programme of specific and definite means for accomplishing that end. Scholars, for example, have recently presented books of interpretation, such as the volumes on *Ancient India* (by Masson-Oursel and others), the *Legacy of India* (published by the Oxford Press), the *Cultural Heritage of India* (published by the Ramakrishna Centenary Committee); and these in our generation succeed the writings of Max Müller, who spread abroad knowledge of India half a century ago. Such books reach a few; but *India has no gifted interpreters of commanding literary*

*power to carry their words to the world at large.* Lacking such spokesmen, we must still continue to write the kind of works we can and to place articles in popular and learned periodicals which endeavour to purvey reliable information. We must promote the visits of thoughtful Indians to Europe and America and of thoughtful Westerners to India. Such means as these cannot well be organized or planned in any large and detailed way; they are likely to come about rather informally and spontaneously.

Within our educational system we may be able to work more systematically. In America, for example—and America is no worse off than any European country to-day—we need in our universities more chairs specifically devoted to Indic studies. This means training more of our scholars to become Indianists; for them training consists of study in our own institutions and further study in India. The scientific investigation of Indian civilization, resulting in publication, must be continued by these scholars in every phase of Indic culture from the most remote periods to the present. These chairs, both the existing ones and the ones still to be created, will have to be the centres of the movement to inform America of India, and their occupants should be the leaders and planners.

To reach a wider audience the Indic scholars will need to operate indirectly through other disciplines of learning besides their own. Doubtless they can do a work of usefulness by each offering a general course on Indic civilization to advanced undergraduate students who have no Sanskrit



and never expect to take any. Possibly they could offer non-Indological work in a lecture course to graduate students. Most Sanskrit professors do offer some such work ; they will perhaps find it worthwhile to draw in more of these " general " students. More effective, if it can be worked out, would be a programme of co-operation with other departments in those universities where Indic departments exist to train jointly with them selected students. For example, a philosophy department, recognizing the importance of Indian philosophy and desiring to present work in it, might have one of its graduate students study in the Sanskrit department, and write his thesis on some phase of Indian philosophy under the joint guidance of the two departments. After receiving his doctorate, this student could continue his Sanskrit studies in India for a couple of years. He would to all the intents and purposes of the West be an Indologist—in India he would, more precisely, be considered a student of Indian philosophy—but he would be employed in a department of philosophy in an American university, and there he would offer not only such routine courses as his department might require but also specialized work in Indian philosophy. The same sort of procedure would apply for the fine arts, history, anthropology, political science, and a number of other disciplines. These men, trained in the Indian aspects of their fields, would present India to the students in our colleges and universities in a far more widely reach-

ing manner than is possible for the present few professors of Sanskrit. Expensive as it would be to finance the training of these students, it is not impossible that interested agencies might co-operate to supply the funds, if university departments handling the various disciplines involved can make an initial guarantee to engage the student once he has been trained.

Perhaps, being in academic life, I see in education the most feasible and systematic means of helping the West to learn about India. Publicists and diplomats may in their turn have definite and practicable suggestions. But, in every case, the first requisite is that our attitude should remain objective : for, *just as it is indefensible to try to make Indians think and behave like us, so too we should not aim to make Occidentals believe and act like Indians*. A humility and respect for each other, too often lacking in India as well as in America, must especially mark those who endeavour to interpret the one to the other. The aim is understanding, not proselytism ; so will success follow.

The issues between us in Europe and America and our kinsmen in the sub-continent of India, now risen above the horizon, will blaze in noon-tide heat within a half dozen decades, it may well be within only a couple. We must be ready to use that heat so that it may not scorch the fields of international relationship, but may warm to life seeds of knowledge and produce understanding, tolerance, and co-operation.

W. NORMAN BROWN



# THE VISION OF JOHN KEATS

## I.—KEATS, THE POET

[Dorothy Hewlett is a playwright of some distinction who has had several of her plays, including "Bright Star", the love-story of Keats and Fanny Brawne, successfully produced in London. Under the title of *Adonais*, she has recently published a new life of the poet.—EDS.]

A Man's life of any worth is a continual allegory—and very few eyes can see the Mystery of his life—a life like the scriptures, figurative... Shakespeare led a life of Allegory : his works are the comments on it.—*John Keats*.

Mr. Buxton Forman opens his preface to *The Letters of John Keats* by, "What manner of man was John Keats, and how did he live the life poetic? The answer to these questions lies, it seems to me, within the pages of this volume."

There are three hundred and forty-four of the letters (three new ones have come to light since the last edition of 1935) and many of them are long, intimate and, without a trace of egotism, self-revelatory to an extraordinary degree. We can add to the knowledge of himself and his movements by the documents of close friends and others who met him. Of Shakespeare's life and intimate thoughts the direct evidence is of the scantiest ; his utterance was largely dramatic and nearly always "in character". Even the sonnets have been considered by one great Shakespearean scholar to be, in the main, conventional in plan and subject-matter. Yet Keats, a great thinker and in the closest sympathy with him, could say of Shakespeare that he "led a life of Allegory : his works are the comments on it". Of Burns too, the personal tragedy of whom he felt deeply, he wrote, "We can see horribly clear in the works of such a Man his whole life, as if we were

God's spies."

If we had as little evidence of Keats as we have of Shakespeare how much could we deduce from his work of his great aspirations, his philosophy of life? In a short article it is only possible to indicate certain lines on which readers may look for "the comments on" the allegory of Keats's life.

Of his poetic aim we could be certain : it is a commonplace that "Sleep and Poetry", printed at the end of his first published volume, is a statement of his creed, the creed to which he adhered closely throughout his brief existence here. A communion with nature, letting his young imagination have play in the realm of "Flora and old Pan", was to prepare him for "the nobler life", an interpretation of "the agonies, the strife of human hearts". His attitude to poetry is defined, and much has been written about it, but there is perhaps a little more to be said.

A drainless shower  
Of light is poesy ; 'tis the supreme of power ;  
'Tis might half slumb'ring on its own right arm.

The last line has been discussed, but his concept of poetry as "a drainless shower of light" has not, I think, been fully stressed.

In the beautiful Church of England service we pray God : "Lighten our darkness, we beseech thee, O Lord,"



—but, by dint of repetition, it is often mere lip-work. But to many of us poetry and beauty, as almost interchangeable terms, have become a religion, and to most creative artists there is given, perhaps only once in a lifetime, a revelation that vivifies this familiar plea. It is an experience difficult to put into words, but the concept is “light”. The contemplation of a beautiful scene, the fluttering wings of a bird, the impact on the mind of a great work of art will bring for a moment to the mind a brilliant whiteness, diamond-clear, or a rich inner glow. This may be a mystical experience, but of that, since I have no gift for mysticism, I cannot be certain. To the lesser creative mind this flash, this illumination may come but rarely and bring with it some measure of terror: to the makers of beauty, the great interpreters to lesser mankind of the life-force, it may be a familiar state of mind. “A drainless shower of light is poesy.”

This definition affords a vital clue to the poetry of Keats and can best, I believe, be linked to the word “star”. The moon was an emblem of beauty to him; he walked, bathed in her light, but this is common to many of the great romantics. The moon governed the restless tides of their minds. The sun, both as a physical life-giving force and as Apollo, the god of poetry, was so vivid a concept that he projected a long poem on Hyperion and his overthrow, but the stars guided him and they serve both as emblems of strength and wisdom. When Hyperion, haunted by “Phantoms pale”, dire omens of his fall, “upon the boundaries of day and

night . . . stretch’d himself in grief and radiance faint”,

There as he lay, the Heaven with its stars  
Look’d down on him with pity.

At the counsel of old Cœlus,

Hyperion arose, and on the stars  
Lifted his curved lids, and kept them wide  
Until it ceased; and still he kept them wide:  
And still they were the same bright, patient stars.

Saturn seeks for guidance in an  
“old spirit-leaved book”

Which starry Uranus with finger bright  
Sav’d from the shores of darkness.

Apollo, awaiting his high destiny,  
cries out,

What are the stars? There is the sun, the sun!  
And the most patient brilliance of the moon!  
And stars by thousands! Point me out the way  
To any one particular beauteous star,  
And I will flit into it with my lyre,  
And make its silvery splendour pant with bliss.

There is more than one indication in the letters that the stars were to Keats the symbols of that wisdom which is poetry. Exalted by the beauty of Lake Windermere he wrote, in a moment of high vision, to one of the loved brothers far away from him:—

The two views we have had of it are of the most noble tenderness—they can never fade away—they make one forget the divisions of life; age, youth, poverty and riches; and refine one’s sensual vision into a sort of north star which can never cease to be open lidded and steadfast over the wonders of the great Power.

The word “steadfast” he again linked to a star in the love-poem which, although not the last to be composed, was the last to be written down by him before he left England to die:—

Bright star, would I were steadfast as thou art—  
Not in lone splendour, hung aloft the night  
And watching with eternal lids apart,  
Like nature’s patient sleepless eremite,  
The moving waters at their priestlike task  
Of pure ablution round earth’s human shores.

In attempting to classify the reality of “Ethereal things” into “things real—things semireal—and no things” he put under the first



heading "existences of Sun, Moon & Stars and passages of Shakespeare". Love he placed, with clouds, under "things semireal", "which require a greeting of the Spirit to make them wholly exist". Later when his passion for Fanny Brawne made love a reality, we find him in a love-letter calling her "fair Star".

In his school days, he tells us, woman was to him a pure goddess and his mind "a soft nest in which some one of them slept". In the early poems starry epithets are often given to women. In "Specimen of an Induction to a Poem", an immature work, from among vague images of chivalry there stands out this lucid, lovely passage,

Light-footed damsels move with gentle paces  
Round the wide hall, and show their happy faces ;  
Or stand in courtly talk by fives and sevens :  
Like those fair stars that twinkle in the heavens.

Stars are used to heighten beauty in many an accomplished line. I give but two examples :—

And here is manna—picked from Syrian trees  
In starlight, by the three Hesperides.

Those green-rob'd senators of mighty woods,  
Tall oaks, branch-charmed by the earnest stars.

The early indications of a looking upward towards the stars as the emblems of wisdom, beauty and poetry are many. At Margate in the summer of 1816, released from the profitless task of healing sick bodies—profitless to him and to the world in his individual case because he was a poet—he was yet uncertain of his high destiny ; whether it lay in his power to "pry 'mong the stars, to strive to think divinely". In "I stood tip-toe", finished in late 1816 or early 1817, he speaks of the clouds as

Full in the speculation of the stars.

In the rimed epistle written to his brother George from Margate, and

quoted from above, there is an early example of his many references to the music of the spheres. He hoped when "prying 'mong the stars" to "catch soft floatings from a faint-heard hymning" and "To see the laurel wreath, on high suspended". The last line clarifies a curious image in the early sonnet "To my Brother George",

Who from the feathery gold of evening lean, <sup>the laurell'd peers</sup>

The "laurell'd peers" are the poets in Heaven. The poets are linked with the stars ; they sit on "spherey thrones". Chatterton, much admired by Keats, is "among the stars of highest Heaven". Shakespeare stands highest, and apart. Of him Keats wrote,

The genius of Shakespeare was an innate universality—wherefore he had the utmost achievement of human intellect prostrate beneath his indolent and kingly gaze.

Shakespeare looks down from his "sphered throne" on humanity like a "stedfast" planet. So closely did Keats link Shakespeare and the dead poets with the stars that he even, with characteristic humour, imagined the signboard of the old Mermaid Tavern, that haunt of Elizabethan poets, as flying away to Elysium, so that the poets dead and gone might sit .

Underneath a new old sign  
Sipping beverage divine,  
And pledging with contented smack  
The Mermaid in the Zodiac.

The detached gaze, steadfast as a star, the ideal of the poet in his wisdom, was the philosophic height Keats laboured to attain to, and did attain before illness broke him down and poisoned his mind with agonised



doubts and misgivings. In the midst of the torture and grief of seeing his beloved younger brother, "with an exquisite love of life", die slowly before his eyes, he could write :—

Now comes the pain of truth, to whom 'tis pain ;  
O folly ! for to bear all naked truths,  
And to envisage circumstance, all calm,  
That is the top of sovereignty.

"Beauty is truth", naked truth, beautiful as a part of an ordered universe, however difficult it may be to realise in the midst of human strife and stupidity. The Grecian urn does not represent a withdrawal from life, "here, where we sit and see each other groan",\* but is "a powerful lens through which there stands revealed a miniature pageant of the past merging into the present of all time...a tiny portion of the verities of the ages", as Professor Clarence D. Thorpe puts it so admirably in *The Mind of John Keats*.

At "the top of sovereignty" the poet looks at the world, not in it but above it, but he is also *of* it in his peculiar power of "disinterestedness". Keats employs this word sparingly for a selfless, understanding love. He considered that only Socrates and Christ possessed it in full measure, but he found it in his young sister-in-law, Georgiana. And, before the poison of tuberculosis distorted and enlarged the natural jealousy of the male, he wrote in a love-letter of Fanny Brawne's "disinterestedness towards" him. The perception of beauty and truth must come from a large, detached view but no one stressed more than Keats "the holiness of the heart's affections". He had a universal mind, but he had also that power to live in others, to

understand. His imagination could penetrate not only into the hearts of men of his time, but into those of past ages. "I do not live in this world alone", he said, "according to my state of mind I am with Achilles shouting in the Trenches, or with Theocritus in the Vales of Sicily". It is hardly necessary to amplify this statement by examples from his work : the poet who could create the splendid, fiery vision of Hyperion "full of wrath" or fix for all time the tiny human scenes on that enchanted urn needs no advocate to urge for him a sympathy of the widest scope.

But Keats's clear vision of life was not attained without travail. Suffering was his lot from boyhood. The family affections were strong : he lost father, mother, grandmother, brothers, and his only sister was kept from him by stupid guardians. Although he was blessed with the love of friends, the love of a woman in complete consummation was not for him. Nor was this travail only of the spirit. He early knew that intuitive genius was not enough and he worked so hard, reading, learning languages, "chastising his thoughts" with earnestness, that this labour alone, combined with the strain of creation, was enough to kill a strong man. "Pangs are in vain", he wrote,

until I grow high-rife  
With old Philosophy.

But what of the allegory of his life ? We can see him walking, sometimes with friends or brothers, bathed in the light of sun and moon, star-led, through English meadows, by running water, by the sea and ever

\* "Ode to a Nightingale."



haunted by its "eternal whisperings". He climbed the stern heights, fortifying a mind which could range abroad over space and time with the wisdom of the ages. He gave himself freely in creation, in friendship and in a great love. He rose to the lonely heights of human genius. When the cruel disease had crept like a

fungus over the greatness of mind and soul, he had ceased to write, though, happily, we learn from the devoted Severn that the sweetness of nature which was a birthright, the fundamental "disinterestedness", was never wholly obscured. On a painful death-bed his last thought was for the safety and welfare of his friend.

DOROTHY HEWLETT

## II.—KEATS, THE PHILOSOPHER

[Ram Bilas Sharma is a graduate of Lucknow University who has been engaged in research work on Keats and the Pre-Raphaelites. He has written some poems in Hindi, and a novel from his pen has recently been published in Allahabad. —Eds.]

While recognising transcendentalism as one of the characteristics of Romantic poetry, Keats has presented some difficulty to those who make a psychological study of literary movements. At one time, the tendency had been to rate him as a sensualist content to dream of the sweetnesses of the world and an escapist who like many another romantic sought refuge in dream from the miseries of the world. The modern tendency has been to take him more seriously as a thinker, and critics have tried to analyse his ideas about the fundamentals of life as expressed in his poems and letters. A study of Keats from this single standpoint has been carried out by Mr. Middleton Murry in his two books on Keats. Mr. Murry has been handicapped from the beginning by a preconceived idea of proving Keats as of the tribe of Shakespeare. His study, as pointed out by Sélincourt and others, has not been catholic enough to embrace the

various aspects of Keats's thought. When Keats asserts his supreme faith in imagination, when he denies a poet his personality, when he says that both the good things of the world and the evil ones end in speculation, we are not to take such statements at their face value but have to read their meaning and relative importance in the wider context of his work as a whole. While Keats, on the one hand, demands only a passive experience on the part of the poet and its expression in poetry he, on the other hand, does not leave the experience to be expressed in verse as it is, but tries to analyse it, reason about it and express the truth of it, to which it ultimately leads him, in his poetry. This is the fundamental difference between Shakespeare and Keats, that while the one is content to present in dramatic form his experience of man and the world, the other does not only objectify this experience but also expresses in so many words the result



attained after a sifting of his experience. In his letters Keats has been prone to emphasise the importance of unbiassed experience of life and its expression in verse but despite his assertions against the didactic poetry of Wordsworth, he has stated his own axioms in poetry only too clearly and they are like anything but Shakespeare. He was too much of his age not to join in the search for truth and express his findings in his poetry.

In "Sleep and Poetry", he has been thinking of his future progress as a poet, his experience of happiness and of misery, but as yet he has little of the stuff of experience itself to be able to either depict it or draw conclusions from it. His first and perhaps most ambitious poem—for judging by his letters, his ambition to be a poet seems never to have been higher than at this time—is "Endymion", a work which contains the germ of all the future thought of Keats. While recognising the manifold character of his genius and the lack of a system in his thought, we shall take count here of such ideas as show him, at least at times, to have been on the way to the realisation of the Advaita. In "Endymion", the hero wanders through earth, sea, air and heaven, gathering into his consciousness an amazing variety of experience until in the end he is united with the object of his search, the goddess of the moon. Keats the lover of sensations revels in the luxury of this multifarious experience until, it would seem, from sheer exhaustion, he unites his hero with his beloved. But when the wanderings of Endymion had come to an end Keats stated the resultant truth

in a passage that he added while revising his manuscript.\* He emphasised its importance in his letter to Taylor and said that it was a regular stepping of the imagination. His statement shows that imagination too worked by some process akin to that of consecutive reasoning which he condemned. If anything of Keats can be taken literally, it is the saying that they are very shallow people who take everything literally. His faith in imagination is one of such things that is not to be taken literally. Keats does not leave the imaginative experience from undergoing a rational sifting and it is this close activity of imagination and intellect which is connoted by the ambiguous term, the regular stepping of the imagination. The passage is as follows :—

Wherein lies happiness? In that which  
becks  
Our ready minds to fellowship divine,  
A fellowship with essence ; till we shine,  
Full alchemised, and free of space.

Happiness consists in becoming one with essence. We become free from space and shine in this eternal presence. This is the state of *Ānanda* which is to be the highest achievement of the soul. Keats describes various grades of human experience and the higher ones are those of love and friendship which are more self-annihilating. By annihilation of the self, Keats does not mean the destruction of the *Ātman* but that of the *samskaras* which are formed as a result of man's experience of the world. But the finer the experience of the soul, the lesser the number of the *samskaras* and they are gradually destroyed by this process of refinement. In the end, there is one final experience

\* See Sélincourt (1926), pp. 427-28 ; M. B. Forman, Letters (1935), p. 91.



of the essence which merges the self into the One Universal Self and the individual soul is turned into the *Sacchidananda*. This is the secret of happiness, the realisation of the Advaita and becoming one with it.

Keats's experience had led him to this truth at the end of the writing of "Endymion". The rejected readings of the above passage show his difficulty in finding proper communication for his thought. But he understood what he was about even while he was writing the poem for the first time. When Endymion reaches Glaucus under the ocean, the latter reads to him a passage from his magic book which in the poem as it finally stands is anticipated in Endymion's speech to Peona. The secret of immortality is thus stated in the book of Glaucus :—

If he explores all forms and substances  
Straight homeward to their symbol-  
essences ;  
He shall not die.

The lines furnish a clue to the story of Endymion's own wanderings, his search for truth through the four elements of earth, fire, water and air, which the four books symbolise. His consciousness has contacted various phases of human experience while it has also been explorative of the underlying essence behind the sensuous texture of this experience. Passing from more concrete experience to a finer one, he has analysed as it were, the four elements of which the material world is constituted and has seen that the essence behind all is the same. This is the secret of immortality which Glaucus reads of in his book and which Endymion discovers by his wanderings. These two pas-

sages explain the meaning of the poem and the significance of the prolonged wanderings of Endymion. It should be remembered that Endymion himself before his final union with Phoebe passes through a process of self-annihilation, such as is described earlier in the poem. At the end of his multifarious experience, he is saddened at the futility of it all and prepares to die.

Night will strew  
On the damp grass myriads of lingering leaves,  
And with them shall I die ; nor much it grieves  
To die, when summer dies on the cold sward.

In this mood of death, laughing at the "holy countenance" of nature and realising the fruitlessness of all sensuous experience, he begins thinking of things "for which no wording can be found". His state is reaching that which we call *Anirvachniya*. In his own self, he sinks deeper and deeper, until he becomes quite unconscious of his surroundings, the music of Cynthia's choir, and even of the presence of his sister and the Indian Maiden. In this state of trance when he seems unable to have control over his fate, the Indian Maiden is metamorphosed into the shining lady of the moon and with her he is united. The process of self-annihilation according to Keats is thus complete. Endymion has attained the state of beatitude.

An example of Keats's confused reasoning is found in his journal letter to George and Georgiana Keats of February-April, 1817. Too much importance has been of late attached to it without a proper analysis of its contents. The emphasis on Identity has even been mentioned in the same breath with passages where he dwells on a poet's lack of identity and his



negative capability for gathering experience and they have been supposed to belong to one single chain of systematic thought. Keats's position here is the reverse of that in "Endymion"; he is not passing from an experience of the world to the realisation of Truth but makes the soul come from a primeval state of simplicity and Godhood and pass its days in the world to enrich its consciousness by experience and acquire an individuality. This is going from freedom to chains, from essence to form, from happiness to a state of misery. Three things are requisite, according to Keats, for the formation of human identity, the intelligence, the human heart and the world. The world is the field of experience; the heart gathers experience; and the intelligence sifts it and assimilates the result.

As various as the Lives of Men are—so various become their Souls, and thus does God make individual beings, Souls, Identical Souls of the sparks of his own essence.

Circumstances by their great variety evolve a singular experience for the human soul from which it takes its individuality. This he calls a system of salvation without waiting, however, to explain how salvation is made possible by the formation of these identities. Are not Souls, in their primeval state when issuing as sparks from Deity pure and innocent and nearer to It than when they have been defiled by experience! Keats does not see here the souls moving in a cycle of creation, gathering experience in their various lives and in the end being merged in the One from which they once proceeded.

Salvation lies in the very lack of identity, the extinction of all kinds of experience, of *samskaras*, and the union of the soul in its primeval state with Deity. That children by Keats's system would gain salvation because they had had no time for the evolution of their identity is childish. No child is like another and biologically, there are no children as innocent sparks from God, pure and undefiled. Keats, no doubt, when he wrote it, had Wordsworth's Ode on Immortality in his mind. His talk about Vishnu is equally erroneous. He takes him as a mediator like Christ between God and man and not as He is represented in the Hindu Shastras, the personification of one of the three Cosmic powers. In this letter, he is trying to justify human experience for quite other reasons than those in "Endymion". In the latter, it finally leads him to happiness; in the former, it makes a man, the individual man, only the clearer defined in his dimensions.

But Keats resumed the chain of his earlier thought in "Hyperion". He sees humanity in a cycle of progressive movement, and old orders fall and new ones take their place, and only those are happy who realise the reality that underlies this progress. Of these is Apollo, who realises truth and becomes a god. Before his transformation, he had been feeling miserable like Endymion, but at the height of his misery he looks at the face of Mnemosyne and attains to godhood. There was something sudden and unexpected in this vision of beatitude, for the drama of the fall of the Titans had been enacted as it were somewhere apart from Apollo. The main



action had hardly touched him though he embodied in himself its final teaching and this shortcoming led Keats to revise the poem. In the Fall of Hyperion, he creates a character who has sight of the whole drama of the fall of the Titans and instead of a god, gains godhood himself. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that as the poet himself had been transformed into a god, little remained to do for Apollo, and as another such transformation was impossible, he had to drop the poem. His conception of the architectural part of the poem was defective. But for all this, Keats's meaning is clear. He makes merry in the garden, then falls asleep, on waking sees a temple, he tries to reach the steps, but finds life ebbing out of him, when he touches a step and new life is infused in his veins. This dying before attaining a new life, is a favourite device of Keats, as we have seen in "Endymion"; it symbolises the extinction of human consciousness or identity, the life of *samskaras* which are the result of past experience and the passing of the soul into the realisation of a higher reality. The poet then ascends the steps. He is gradually advancing towards Truth. He faces Moneta, the symbol of universal human experience. She has seen the fall of Saturn and his peers and this drama she would show even to Keats. When the power of vision is granted to him, he can see things as a god

indeed. What is more, he can penetrate to the essence of things and not remain bound to the knowledge of external forms :

...there grew  
A power within me of enormous ken  
To see as a god sees, and take the depth  
Of things as nimbly as the outward eye  
Can size and shape pervade.

This communion with the essence of things had been the secret of immortality in "Endymion" and this the poet has realised in the Fall of Hyperion. In the poem as it is, he sees only the drama of suffering; it is not continued to allow him, with the acquisition of his new power, to have also the vision of final beatitude. But the trend of Keats's thought is clear; he is communing with the essence of things as in "Endymion" and reaching the ultimate reality behind material substances. Experience here is not conducive to the formation of man's identity but it leads him to the Unity of life, to Truth and to Happiness. Keats was admitted to the temple because he had dreamt of misery and made his days miserable in the world. Now, from Moneta, he was to have the vision of true happiness. In this respect, he is more with Dante than with Shakespeare. He was certainly on his way to the Advaita although he did not live long enough fully and finally to realise and express it in his poetry.

RAM BILAS SHARMA



# A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

[Mr. Alban G. Widgery, at present Professor of Philosophy at the Duke University (U. S. A.) was formerly Professor of Philosophy and Comparative Religion at Baroda, India, and later was Stanton Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Cambridge. He delivered the Upton Lectures in Oxford last November ; special arrangements made with him enable the publication of the six lectures in condensed form as six articles, the third of which we give below.

The series considers certain religious principles from an unsectarian point of view ; the discourses were penned to suit the requirements of the Upton Lectures Foundation ; but their background is more universal than Christian.

In this third lecture the much discussed subject of God is presented. The use of the very term "God" tends to obscure the thoughts which this reasoned paper tries to set forth. "God" has come to mean for most people, especially in Christendom, a person of the masculine gender possessing human emotions and among them the sense of might and power which may manifest as wrath and of right which can be made to manifest itself as love through petitionary prayers and propitiatory rites.

In the articles which follow this, "god" is described as "but an illusion" and as "the most tottering of all fictions". The philosopher has ever rejected this debasing caricature of the Divine Impersonal Omnipresent Spirit which wisely and sweetly ordereth all things.—Eds.]

## III.—THE REALITY OF GOD

In the previous article it was shown that according to the great religions the destiny of man involves something more than his relations with the physical world and with his fellow-men. In religion there have been revealed to man fundamental needs of his being, that physical nature and his human environment fail to satisfy. Yet religions have never been merely phases of human striving ; they have also been in part experiences of actual achievement. And that attainment has depended not merely on the subjective effort but also on relation with somewhat apprehended as other than nature and society. In order in so brief an article to simplify the phraseology I shall refer to this as God. Is God real ? If so, what is His nature ?

In the first article I represented revelation as a characteristic of all knowledge whatsoever, implying

thereby that besides the functions of knowing (apprehension and reason) some object is involved presenting or revealing itself to the subject. In religion it is God who is revealed, presenting Himself as object to be known by the subject by means of his forms of apprehension and reason. It may be said that in order rationally to hold that God reveals Himself, one must know that He is. Yet, on the other hand, for one to know that He is, He must reveal Himself. A philosophy of religion has here to recognise one of the ultimates it is one of its purposes to specify. *The fact of God's reality and the fact of His presenting Himself for human knowledge are alike apprehended in one and the same experience.*

What could be meant by those who might deny that God is real ? Generally this : that the term represents no



more than an idea which is a merely fictional construction of the human mind. It is quite clear that there are such fictional ideas, conceptions formed no doubt on the basis of some experience but not apparently as such representing an actual being. I shall not at this point discuss the other contention that there can be nothing known as real except ideas, for the rejection of this position will be implied in later parts of this article.

A type of philosophical exposition often met with is in marked contrast with the kind of philosophy of religion I am endeavouring to formulate. That exposition tries to show that the idea of God is compatible with what man knows of the mundane. Put briefly, the idea of God is presented as a hypothesis used with reference to reflection on characteristics of the physical and the social. But there is no evidence that mankind in general, or individual men, have first arrived by reflection at an idea of God, have then accepted that as an hypothesis and around it formed their religion. An examination of religion seems to justify the contention that though forms of intellectual expression of the nature of God have been attained gradually by the exercise of thought, the being of God, somehow apprehended by man, has been the actual basis with reference to which such developments of expression have had significance. The idea of God has arisen in the relation of the mind with something other than itself, just as definitely as the idea of the physical world has. When thinkers have taken over the idea of God and introduced it into their philosophies, even hypothetically, to give

something to their general view which is otherwise lacking, it is because the idea of God has some needed reference beyond that upon which they have centred their attention. If anything is gaining by thus taking over the idea of God, it is because of such implications. These can be understood and accepted only if it is admitted that the idea of God has arisen in religious experience as *a form of expression* of what is not apprehended in the physical and social worlds. In short : religion implicates God as real and cannot be correctly described in terms of the acceptance of a hypothetical idea of God.

Some modern writers who accept the view that for religion God is real, proceed to say that this reality is the actual complex of forces of integration of which we learn in the scientific study of physical nature and of social organisation and development. Taking nature in a wide sense, and emphasising its integrating processes, these thinkers wish to have this exposition regarded as an expression of the real God of religion. This is supposed to implicate no reality other than that which the physical sciences, psychology and sociology are concerned with.

The most general objection to this type of exposition is that it does not implicate what religion as it has appeared among men has involved. Its account of God seems plausible only because it surreptitiously brings in what has not been derived from the data admitted and omits something that is to be found in those data. There is a sense in which religion is concerned with "all that is real". But religions have never implied that



all that is real is human society and the realm of physical nature studied in the physical sciences. On the one hand, when the processes of integration in the physical world and human society are presented as God, there is always an idealisation, generally more or less vague but an idealisation nevertheless. The processes are viewed as tending to values not yet achieved as they are to be achieved, and thus not yet "real" in the sense that is admitted, but nevertheless conceived or in some manner apprehended "ideally"—without any admission of the basis for such, nor for the implication that the processes eventually at least get nearer and nearer to their realisation, if not entirely attain it. On the other hand, these expositions entirely ignore or fail to give adequate attention to the aspects of disintegration. A very slight investigation of what religion has been and is suffices to show that in it physical and social reality is at least subordinate to something other than that reality. Even those forms of expression which have identified the reality of God and the reality of the Whole have more often than not described the physical and social worlds as illusory, as not truly real. From the point of view of actual religion, nature and human society have aroused much repulsion, and this because of some contrast with that with which in religion man is otherwise in contact. The view here criticised takes over from religion in its ordinary sense the characteristics of optimism and fails to face the pessimistic characteristics of religion which in part have led mankind in general to avoid the identification

of God with the physical and the social, whether viewed simply as processes or as involved in process. Such a form of exposition of the reality of God can only make its appeal by fundamental transcendence of the alleged empirical facts upon which it is supposed entirely to rest.

Religion implicates God as real, whatever may be the diverse forms of expression developed by thought with the aid of language with reference to Him. God as reality is not the same as an idea of God. If a man truly says he has a hundred dollars, it is because he has a visible apprehension of a certain quantity of actual coin, or of paper accredited for public purposes as equivalent to that coin, or some inscription in his bank deposit book, or in some other manner indicating that coin. In other words, he treats the hundred dollars as real because of the evidence supplied by some form of apprehension other than his possession of the idea of a hundred dollars. Something analogous with this is involved with regard to the affirmation of whatever kind of reality. There is no theoretical "proof" of reality. *No amount of rational reflection on an idea can enable one to pass to a reality signified by that idea.*

The question then is as to the application of the term "real". In being aware of the hundred dollars as real, a man need make no affirmation either that they always existed or always will exist. There is no ground in experience or reason justifying the affirmation that the physical has always existed and will always exist. The individual apprehends himself as functioning, and does not consider



that he is only an idea with an idea of functioning. This is because of certain specific forms of apprehension involved in what has been called self-consciousness. Through these he apprehends himself as a reality which may be signified by his idea of himself. In so knowing himself he is not aware of himself as "more real" than the physical objects he apprehends. There is no criterion which he could apply by which he could judge one more and the other less real. Each is real in its own kind, and each is known through specific forms of apprehension. Similarly, God as real, as other than the idea that signifies Him, must be apprehended as such, with specific forms of apprehension. The ideas that have been conceived to signify God indicate that we have not to do here simply with a manipulation by reason of what has been apprehended as physically real and as finite self-consciousness.

In contrast with the view which presents man as the highest form of being, in religion man apprehends God as so utterly transcendent that in comparison he appears to himself insignificant. It is thus that Hinduism has at times regarded God as beyond description in terms of human language; and every religion in its higher forms has insisted on the inadequacy of its expressions. Nevertheless religion has definite implications as to the nature of God. God is not apprehended as having the characteristics of the physical. God is spirit, like and yet unlike what man knows himself to be. Terms

have been coined to refer to God that man does not apply to himself as he finds himself on earth and as a member of human society. Thus God is "infinite", "eternal". However impossible it is to define these terms they are for religion modes of reference to positive characteristics. They certainly do not represent negatives arrived at by processes of theoretical reflection. God has aroused mankind to various forms of response, trust and fear, awe, reverence and worship, and thereby to the use of a multiplicity of terms such as majesty and glory, wisdom, righteousness and holiness. Apprehending the reality of God, man has looked upon the realm of nature as something subordinate, even at times as though in part hostile. Knowing God, himself, and nature, he has been aware of himself as more akin to God than to physical nature. Consequently he has learned in religion that the satisfaction of his deepest needs is to be sought more in his relation to God than to nature. His knowledge of God has made him aware of qualities and attitudes which, when achieved in his own personality and conduct are accompanied by peace and satisfaction and a sense of harmony. These qualities he has summed up in the terms, the goodness and the righteousness of God. The character of God is recognised as the objective ground of his moral judgments. And it is thus that the moral has been allied with a sense of authority based on what transcends the individual and human society.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY



# FALSE GODS AND THE TRUE GOD

## I.—PISGAH VIEW

[George Godwin, writing about the failure of the churches and the growing influence of psycho-analysis, fears that the God of Freud also is an illusionary phantom.—EDS.]

And Moses went up from the plains of Moab unto mount Nebo ; to the top of Pisgah, that is over against Jericho. . . And the Lord said unto him, This is the land which I swear unto Abraham, unto Isaac and unto Jacob, saying, I will give it unto thy seed : I have caused thee to see it with thine own eyes, but thou shalt not go over thither. . .

*Deuteronomy*, xxxiv, 1 & 4.

Does modern psychology offer a satisfactory and satisfying alternative to the creeds of those great corporations, the churches ? Will this probing of man's mind reveal the many forms and expressions of his creeds as wish-fulfilment fantasies and nothing more ?

Anybody who reads psychology must have put such questions to himself : they are inevitable. Whether we admire or abhor the teaching of such men as Freud, we are unable to ignore them or to dismiss their theories as of small importance. To belittle the significance of Freud's central theory would be foolish, for he stands high in that hierarchy of minds whose contributions to knowledge have involved the unwilling surrender of long-cherished ideas.

Nature assigns to all innovators the rôle of iconoclast. For the acceptance of the new involves the destruction of what was formerly held as true and immutable.

The justification of man's faith in a loving heavenly father, and the promise of eternal life, are no longer as easily accepted as the rising and setting of the sun, though they were by our forefathers. Modern psychology has not only cast doubt upon the

goodness of God, but hints at his non-existence.

To make the mental and emotional readjustment called for by this tremendous heresy is the problem now facing great numbers of people who formerly rested quietly on the unexamined rock-bed of an unquestioned faith.

The story of the progress of knowledge is the history of jettisoned ideas and abandoned creeds. The earth was flat by ocular demonstration until the mathematician revealed it as a sphere. The sun, as obviously, went round the earth until Galileo revealed the actual behind the obvious. Man was accepted as a special creation until Darwin propounded his theory of natural selection and set the reactionary prelates by the ear. It remained for Freud to question the all-loving heavenly father and to suggest that the intangible Prime Mover may be but the projection by man of the father imago and its apotheosis.

It is not easy to be at once a Christian and a disciple of Freud, though there are many in the camp of the orthodox who are working overtime to-day to make the best of these two mutually destructive worlds. Freud, in a word, has cast doubts on things formerly held as



sacrosanct, revealing to us ruthlessly the mainspring of our actions and the source of our dreams, those dreams of which our religion is but the waking expression. Freud gives the law to-day as Moses gave it yesterday. But unlike the high priest he offers neither promise nor hope of a fabled Land of Promise. These he has taken away. Psychology has taken our heaven away (or at least the sustaining illusion of it). And in its place? In its place we are offered an elaborate explanation of the human machine as a complex of instinctual urges and primeval drives. Is it enough?

While the learned doctors argue and dispute, the ordinary man must either swallow whole traditional faith and clerical authority or do as the writer has done, submit to the intellectual operation of excising them to work out anew some more satisfactory creed.

Psychology, because it seemed, at first glance, to offer something clear-cut and demonstrable, lured the enquirer on. But very soon a difficulty presented itself. For just as the convert to Christianity is faced with the almost hopeless task of choosing from the many sects, each one claiming the truth, so the enquirer into psychology finds, not an established scientific doctrine, such as Newton's Law, but large numbers of schismatic schools, rival systems and, among the leading exponents, open hostility. Psychology not only has its heretics, but at times the mood to burn them. The quarrels of these men of science is one of the most distressing things the man seeking guidance at their hands has to contend with. Yet sooner or later

psychology must inevitably play a vast part in our lives and in determining our attitude towards the unseen world.

The concept of a loving God, the Divine Father, may be but the greatest and grandest of all the wish-fulfilment dreams of humanity, yet the need which produced it remains to be satisfied. Nothing is more real than man's need of God, or, if you prefer it, for the idea of godhead. Does modern psychology involve us in the sacrifice of this? And, if so, is this surrender merely one more growing pain essential to man's progress along the evolutionary path?

Yesterday we cast out devils: to-day we analyse neuroses and re-educate the victims of them. And where yesterday we venerated the saints we re-read our hagiological literature with new eyes to discover in these holy ones of the Christian calendar a collection of psychopaths exhibiting all the symptoms of well-defined psychological abnormalities. And as Christianity dies by inches in that western civilization which Havelock Ellis has likened to an aberration, psychology gains ground.

What is to take its place?

Nationalism in its extreme form? High ethical codes adopted and adhered to without hope of reward hereafter? A revival of the old, forgotten gods?

There are plenty of signs that these alternatives are being tried out in the western world to-day. But that they will last one may doubt, for the truth is that man cannot do without some satisfying faith involving his relationship with the deity.

By undermining and exposing what



is false in revealed religion, Freud has performed a service of the first magnitude to humanity. He has struck at the priest so subtle a blow that their fate is inescapable. He has invited us to have the courage to contemplate facts which humble us ; he has challenged us to pursue truth, foot by foot, slow, painful mile by mile.

And now, far along the unac-

customed road with this new Moses, we enquire of him : Whither ?

Is this but a longer road to a greater truth ? Is the Promised Land to be the ultimate reward—or are we from the height of Pisgah merely to view a blessedness forever denied to us by a God who is but an illusion, the mirage of our lonely and questing hearts ?

GEORGE GODWIN

## II.—STATE VERSUS GOD

[In this article Claude Houghton shows how the false Personal God-Idea is sought to be perpetuated in nationalistic religions whose popes are dictators. Many are the false gods daily created by human fancy but Mr. Houghton points the way to the Deity which is Truth. H. P. Blavatsky once wrote : “ If man proceeding on his life journey looked—not heavenward, which is but a figure of speech—but within himself, and centred his point of observation on the inner man, he would soon escape from the coils of the great serpent of illusion.”—Eds.]

An interesting, if disturbing, aspect of life to-day is the number of fictions which humanity is expected to accept as realities. Not long ago an American journalist gave an interesting selection, instancing the Non-Intervention Committee ; the League of Nations ; the autonomy of Abyssinia ; the British “ National ” Government ; the official quotations on Wall Street—contrasting these with the “ bid-and-offered ” prices then ruling—and so on. It would be possible to extend the list almost indefinitely, and many would give “ God ” pride of place at the head of it. To an increasing number of people, God has become the most tottering of all fictions—a phantasy created by fear, superstition, or self-interest.

So true is this that, in many countries, State fanaticism is ousting

organised religion. Actually, these fanaticisms are inverted creeds. They may claim to be “ materialistic ”, “ atheistic ”, “ utilitarian ”, “ logical ” and so on but, in fact, they are creeds and, true to type, they permit no rivals and countenance no criticism. Also, as ever, they proclaim their world-wide mission with Messianic fervour.

Each of these modern creeds has its Bible or prophet, its martyrs, heretics, apostles, dogmas, and its Inquisition. And every one of them trains Youth to die for the faith. Nothing new, therefore, has been invented in the way of “ technique ”. Instead of a Pope, there is a Dictator. Instead of cathedrals, there are barracks. Instead of Eternity, there is a series of Five Year Plans.

One thing is new in these modern



creeds and one only :—they are concerned wholly with this world. The Tower of Babel is to be rebuilt but, this time—with modern machinery and mechanised humanity—we are going to make an efficient job of it. Recently one Dictator affirmed that “the ideal is mechanisation from the cradle to the grave”. Another exclaimed how splendid it was that we all thought and felt exactly the same about everything. And a third announced that he spat whenever he heard the word “spiritual”.

Now, men react most violently when they believe they have been cheated. It is the reason why they go to extremity. If This is false then That—its opposite—*must* be true. For centuries we have heard plenty preached about the Kingdom of God—and have seen precious little of it—so we had better try to make a job of this world by our own unaided efforts. That is the reasoning, conscious or unconscious, of millions to-day—and it is the actual creed of many who profess another one.

Organised religion no longer creates hope in men's hearts, or opens a vista in their minds. For many, the church is merely the accomplice of the State. Professed ideals count for very little nowadays. Every cause pays lip-service to the most elevated ideals—it is common form—but only acts convince and inspire. Men are bored by a Christianity that seeks to sanctify in Christ's name practically everything on which he turned his back—that “consecrates every successful massacre with a Te Deum”. And men are bored, terribly bored, by the dogmas of theology—by attempts to render static the dynamic God of

the living. If the crown of the spirit is joy, there is none in this type of Christianity. And so men are leaving their temples and are returning to the desert, seeking a new vision of reality.

One by one our gods have failed us. Science, which many believed would lead us into a land flowing with milk and honey, now proffers benefits with one hand and threatens extinction with the other. Art has become a chaos of conflicting theories—an internecine war of petty cults—for, possessing no common vision, what can artists give us but an “ape-like mimicry of the obvious”, or a glimpse of a private heaven or hell? Directly man ceases to be an organism—directly there are no unanimous ideas about the value of life—a multiplicity of gods is inevitable, for every one has an isolated conception of the nature of truth. A result is that men have discovered their loneliness—and therefore unite under any banner rather than remain alone under none.

It has been said that men get the government they deserve. It is equally true that they get the god they deserve. They get the god they desire. We *will* that which we desire and, often, there is no correspondence between the desire of the heart and the prayer uttered by the lips. *If false gods have brought us to the brink of ruin, it is the quality of our desire that invoked them and gave them power.* Sooner or later we discover the nature of the god we have served.

It follows that the only chance of discovering the true God is to desire It simply and solely because It is the truth. When we desire It—ardently, exclusively—no matter what effect Its coming may have on our in-



terest, prejudices, traditions, prestige, and all the rest of it, then we may find that a long-locked door is slowly opening. Desire will be Its herald, and a new consciousness the sign that It has come.

But one thing is certain. The self-consciousness of this dispensation is sick unto death. Everything is based on the illusion of "separateness"—of the individual isolated "I". We may believe that all souls, or selves, are one, but this belief belongs to the brain, not to the blood. We dare not admit the unity of the spirit of life: that what happens to another happens to us; that we are ourselves—and every one else. We remain ego-centric because we dare not even desire to become cosmic-centric. And, if many aspects of life to-day are a nightmare, on balance we prefer a nightmare to the New.

It may be that the coming religion will have no formal creed, no temples, no ritual, no saints or martyrs. If these could have delivered us, we should have been delivered long since. It may be that a race with a consciousness other than ours will come into being—a race of men and women, whole, free, fearless, who will not proclaim a new message but, in themselves, will be the new Word.

A race which will live, move, and have its permanent being in that realm which is glimpsed by us only in isolated flashes of vision. A race to which harmony will not be "an arrow of longing", but an inheritance. A race that will realise its organic relationship with every level of life—realise it not as a mental concept but in the throb of the pulse. A race wondrously alive, responsive to intimations from levels more profound than any sounded by plummet of ours. A race which, initiated into the mystery of Being, will hold all things holy.

If this is a dream, all that for which men have yearned and struggled in the age-old darkness is a dream. But dream or not, the hope of the kingdom—the longing for wholeness, and, simultaneously, the fear of it—is the deepest desire of man. So deep that, to-day, in desperation, he creates a nightmare travesty of this desire rather than abandon his vision of unity in a mighty synthesis.

And so, despite the fears that darken the horizon, in the depths of us—if we dare to listen—we may hear an echo of Carpenter's cry:—

Out of the litter and muck of a decaying world,  
Lo! even so  
I see new life arise.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON



# DHARMA RAJYA

## SOCIAL WELFARE

[This month H. Krishna Rao of Mysore University continues his studies describing some of the social welfare work which was done in old India.—EDS.]

Protection of subjects is the paramount duty of the king. Establishing all his subjects in the observance of their duties, he should cause all of them to do everything according to the dictates of righteousness.\* Whether the king does or does not do any other act, if only he protects his subjects, he is considered to have accomplished all religious acts. All duties have kingly duties for their basis, for all orders are protected by the king.†

The term protection is comprehensive and includes :—

(a) Protection of the people from oppression by artisans, musicians, beggars and buffoons.

(b) Fixing the profit of merchants, the charges for the processing of commodities, and wages. Wages are to be so fixed that the worker can maintain those who are his compulsory charges. Low wages are those by which the worker can maintain himself alone.

(c) Providing relief in cases of material calamities like fire, floods, famine, etc.

(d) Suppression of the wicked who live by such foul means as adulteration of food-stuffs, using false weights and measures, counterfeiting coins, administering poison to others, and bearing false witness.

(e) Seizing of criminals on suspicion or in the very act.

(f) Protecting people from the tyranny of Government servants.‡

Preservation of good order is preferable to a seeming increase of prosperity, for when all order is lost, then prosperity, though present, is of no use.§

Life and property of the people are considered too sacred to be encroached upon by any one. The law provides protection to the people against robbery, defamation, assault, gambling, betting. One should not give up even an inch of land so as to part with his rights to it. The king shall protect agriculture from molestation, from oppressive fines and taxes, and herds of cattle against thieves and cattle diseases.\*\* Citizens are prohibited from giving shelter to men of wicked habits and activities.†† When violence is committed by any one the aggressor must be caught by the people and handed over to the State. Without the permission of the king, the subjects may not gamble, drink, hunt or use weapons, nor may they without his permission either sell or purchase useful animals, immovable property, intoxicants, poisons, etc. All subjects should try to qualify themselves for the performance of meritorious activities.

Political efficiency is realised where there is an honest supply of information to the Government. Nothing can

\* *Mahabharata*.

† *Sukra Nitisara*.

‡ Kautilya.

§ Kautilya.

\*\* *Sukra Nitisara*.

†† Brihaspathi.



secure this object more effectively than an intimate connection between the ruler and the ruled. Sukra instructs the king to go round his capital on an elephant and to inspect the villages, cities and districts every year in order to know whether the people are pleased with the Government or oppressed by its officers. The king is advised to take the side not of the officers but of the people, and to dismiss any officer who is accused by one hundred persons.

A sound system of Government should necessarily provide for the conservation and development of natural resources and of the national traditions and culture. The Indian political thinkers earmark large sums of money for charitable purposes and items of social welfare. With a view to providing bodily comforts for government servants and infusing in them the spirit of enthusiasm for work, political thinkers recommend not only a fairly high salary but also provide for them leave with allowance, pensions and other such amenities.\* Their salaries range from 60 to 48,000 *panas* per annum. (Kautilya.) Three months' pay for one who has served for five years, six months' pay for one who has been ill for a long time, full pay for the one ill for fifteen days, fifteen days' leave a year to all, and half the salary as pension to one who has put in forty years of work are some of the privileges of service.† The king shall not only maintain his servants but also increase their subsistence and wages

in accordance with their learning and their work.‡ Sukra remarks that those who get low wages are enemies by nature and are plunderers of the people.§

The king shall not only keep in good condition the timber and elephant forests, the building, and the mines created in the past but also set up new ones.\*\*

He should have domestic plants cultivated in villages. He should make canals, wells and tanks accessible to the people. Bridges are to be constructed over rivers. The king should have temples built in the squares of the capital and in the centre of villages and should arrange for festivals in honour of the deities. He should train officers in the cultivation of arts and sciences and appoint them in their special fields. He should honour those every year who are distinguished in the arts and sciences.††

Aided by ministers the king should examine the hearts and the acts of all. He shall ever be wakeful. In Court he shall never cause his petitioner to wait at his doors, for when a king makes himself inaccessible to his people and entrusts his work to his immediate officers he may be sure of engendering confusion in business, causing thereby public disaffection and rendering himself a prey to his enemies.‡‡ The king whose subjects are devoted and who is devoted to the protection of his subjects and has disciplined himself enjoys great prosperity. It is better to lay down life itself in the observance of righteousness than to win victory by sinful means.§§

H. KRISHNA RAO

\* Kautilya.

† Sukra Nitisaara.

‡ Kautilya.

§ Sukra Nitisaara.

\*\* Kautilya.

†† Sukra Nitisaara.

‡‡ Sukra Nitisaara.

§§ Brihaspathi.



# SPIRIT OF PEACE IN SOVIET THEATRE

[Huntly Carter is already known to our readers by previous contributions on the Drama. He is one of the leading men who believe in the Theatre as a means "of the redemption of man from evil and the attainment of the ultimate good of society". This may be a possibility for Drama *per se*, but what about the actors themselves to-day? Mr. Aldous Huxley in *Ends and Means* tells us that "modern dramas (even the best of them) are essentially secular", and that "acting is one of the most dangerous of trades".

Acting inflames the ego in a way which few other professions do. For the sake of enjoying regular emotional self-abuse, our societies condemn a considerable class of men and women to a perpetual inability to achieve non-attachment.

Mr. St. John Ervine, the well-known playwright and dramatic critic, is very much displeased with Mr. Huxley. An actor, writing in *THE ARYAN PATH* for October 1932, on "The Soul on the Stage" warns us of its dangers and of their minimization by a study of Theosophy. The dangers that lie along the way of acting, he tells us, are "vanity, ambition, conceit, pride, the sense of personal egotism, the illusion of greatness,"—all leading obviously in an opposite direction to non-attachment.

Mr. Huxley would agree, we think, that the application of his philosophical theories would have a transforming effect on both playwrights and plays. Mr. Carter is more hopeful about the drama of to-day, but again, he views it from an angle different from Mr. Huxley's.—EDS.]

The vital question of peace occupies the attention of all humane and cultivated minds to-day. And it is not surprising that the long continued quest by the Soviet Union for peace as shown in decrees, policies, diplomats' speeches, and in other ways, and the close association of the Soviet theatre with Government policy and the internal and external situations which it has produced, have given rise outside Russia to the very important question: Is the Soviet theatre concerned with peace and if so, why and how? The purpose of this article is to answer the question.

Owing to this unity of the theatre and national life it may be assumed that there is a peace spirit in the Soviet theatre and that one of its sources is Government peace policy. It is in fact one of the theatrical consequences of that policy. In Maxim

Gorki's play, "Dostigaev and Others", one of an unfinished trilogy reflecting the social situation produced by political policy during March to November 1917, we have a red soldier saying to a representative of the fallen merchant class, "There won't be any uniforms in future. We have finished with war. One of our first jobs is to convince the world that war is useless. We [Bolshevists] shall see the beginnings of a world peace."

But though political policy has done much to influence the peace idea and spirit in the Soviet theatre it is not the sole influence. Considered as a whole, the structure and work of this theatre is the logical result of that organic unity of the Soviet theatre and the humanized life of the Soviet Union which I have considered in two articles contributed to *THE ARYAN PATH*. ("Drama: The



Organic Part of Human Life"—December 1930 and "A Comparison of the Hindu and the Soviet Systems of the Drama"—April 1936.)

In the first I dealt with the Eastern concept of Drama as an organic part of human life and with the appearance of a similar concept in Russia in 1917 when the theatre and its content were conceived of as an integral part of the new life of the entire community, and the drama within the theatre as a reflection of the mighty politico-economic and social dramatic spectacle without the theatre. In the second I traced the logical result of this unity in the beginning of a great Soviet system of the drama having marked resemblances to the few great historical systems of the drama, Hindu, Shakespearean and other. I explained that it was a system of the epitomisation by outstanding contemporary writers and other dramatic agents, of the high events of a transitional and heroic period of social history for dramatisation within the limits of the contemporary theatre. The theatre itself varied in structure and method according to the period in which it was placed. Thus the Soviet theatre is determined by the revolutionary events of the culminating period of the four hundred year old Secular Age, and by its socialist collective purpose. Its method is the outcome of an expression called "socialist realism". The latter is best understood if we speak of the pre-revolution realism (for instance, the Moscow Art Theatre photographic realism) as static, and socialist realism as dynamic. The Soviet conception of realism is the realism of an entire country

and community, that is, Russia seen unfolding as a whole; the pre-war conception was little pictures of slices of real life, such as we find in Mr. Bernard Shaw's plays. The Soviet definition of the drama can be best explained by reference to its great period plays. For instance, there is "Aristocrats", one of the big constructive-effort period plays which deals with the vast subject of the building of the White Sea-Baltic canal by criminals. It is a dramatic illustration of the immense present-day politico-ethical problem and its Soviet solution of the redemption of man from evil (that is, crime) by his labour, and the attainment of a big step forward in the salvation of society. Here is the theatre serving a great moral and social purpose.

The epitomisation system has its peace basis. So far as Russia is concerned, we have the mass amateurs, the nationalities within the Union and individual Soviet writers creatively condensing for dramatic representation the principal periods and events of the unfolding life of a new country and a new community. In particular, there are the periods of the Revolution, Civil War, New Economic Policy, and of the Five Years' Plan with its four colossal and comparatively peaceful revolutions—agrarian, industrial, cultural and constitutional (1937).

Much could be written about the many and varied peace elements and influences contained in the gigantic synthetical process of bringing together all the new forces of a sixth part of the earth's surface in one great collective theatrical effort—the dramatic interpretation and repre-



sentation of their own unfolding life—unfolding from a level of backwardness and illiteracy to a higher level of social efficiency, cultural enlightenment and taste.

From a spiritual and pacifist point of view there are, in particular, three influences that have operated on and through the theatre, mystical and metaphysical, religious, and democratic. During 1918-19 there was a big wave of mystical expression in poetry and literature. Poets hailed the Revolution as a miraculous act of liberation intended to set them free in their ivory tower for the attainment of the fulness and richness of poetical idealism. They made the mistake of accepting a revolutionary movement for an evolutionary one. The result was that for a time they continued their old existence in spite of the new and opposing situation, till finally the hard and real politico-economic conditions compelled some to cast aside idealism and accept the practical policy of revolution, and others to go abroad.

The mystical and metaphysical tendency was also strongly marked in some of the plays staged by the pre-revolution theatrical specialists and reformers who accepted the new revolutionary régime, but for a time continued along the old evolutionary line of the Russian theatre. This meant the continued expression of the many Western European influences, philosophical, mystical, metaphysical, literary, æsthetic, technical, and other under which the pre-war "insurgent" theatres fell, and the interpretation of ideologies forming the content of plays in the repertoires of such theatres. Thus several plays were

staged that lay a stress on thought and action, and delivered messages to the masses, that were at variance with current thought and ideology. For instance, at the Kamerny theatre there was Claudel's essay in modern mysticism, "The Announcement Made to Mary". And there were new productions also touched with mysticism, such as Vaeheren's "Dawn" at the revolutionary Zon theatre.

In the domain of religion there was much in the plays of the first decade of the theatre to interest the pacifist sociologist. In some of the plays at one of the Children's theatres under the direction of A. B. Lunacharski, Peoples Commissar of Education, he would have found a variety of religious, mystic, domestic, annunciation, birth, death and life subjects. At the Kamerny theatre he would have found religious manifestations in Kalidasa's "Sakuntala", Claudel's play, and others. In the two Jewish theatres, the famous "Habima" and the State Jewish theatre under A. Granovski, there were expressions of Jewish nationalism and religion. For instance, in the mystical "Dybbuk", and "The Wandering Jew", both of which have been seen in London. Then too, in the region of mechanical philosophy and religion there were things to claim his attention. In the early Meyerhold theatre there were many evidences, in representation, of the religion (or better still, faith) of science, according to Mr. J. M. Keynes a commendable new religion inaugurated by the bolshevists. They appeared in machines and tools as dramatic symbols of the liberation of the mechanic to the human mastery of his tools, and in other



mechanical liberations. In more than one of the Meyerhold productions there was a religious attitude in the reconciliation of the peasant and the mechanic.

But the most decided peace influence in the Soviet theatre, one calculated to promote and preserve peace, was, and has been till to-day, the great mass or democratic movement, which has served to bring the entire vast community into the theatre, to unify its systems of the drama and staging and to keep its attention fixed on one central idea, the theatre, as a spirit of service to itself and to its betterment, as a community of human and social beings, and to its attainment of a true democratic system of life. Implicit in this movement is a definition of peace as harmonious unfolding at the touch of spiritually creative experience. Here "spiritually creative" means the creation of souls (the soul of a nation) not the creation of "arms". But it must be said that though Russia's sole object is to preserve peace, its Government is obliged to adopt the prevalent attitude of an "armed Peace"; still, the cultivation of "unarmed" peace is evident.

Evidence of the mass idea and its purpose, that is "spiritual creation", by the people itself aiming to unfold to a higher order, appears at an early period of the Soviet theatre's history. The organisation and work of the Proletcult theatre are instructive. The executive "chiefs" led by Pletnev, a working man, were proletarians. The "expressionals" were artists, painters, sculptors, architects, draughtsmen, art and craft workers. The "interpreters" were working-class

actors. The structure was gorgeous, a millionaire's palace still containing many of the late owner's rare works of art of a cultural-educational value. The stage was a circus arena; the "scenery" circus apparatus; the plays mostly improvised satires, embodying the new social ideas, and the workers' memory and aspiration. The whole thing was a remarkable blend of the religion of science and a formative ethical cultural system. The theatre was actually a gymnasium and community centre. The untrained and unpaid worker-actors turned to it for formative recreation in hours of leisure. The plays and settings lent themselves to acrobatic displays, exhibition of the power of improvisation, of art processes and stage craft proceeding spontaneously and freely from the collective theatre workers.

So came the Popular theatre with its spirit of service, and implicit in it a spirit of peace and a theatrical democratic system, together with the incentive to the spread of that theatrical movement which in twenty years has made all the Soviet Union a stage on which the entire population is the actor chiefly concerned with the interpretation of the "soul" of the nation.

The story of the Soviet theatre since 1922 is the story of the emergence of the All-Union united theatrical forces "playing" with the great central idea of a new era of humanity, with the constructive processes of a new order arising out of cataclysm, using the theatre to demonstrate how mankind can enter upon a rightful creative path. Figures might serve to indicate the immense actuality of the demo-



cratic theatre with its high quest, but statistics alone cannot explain the extraordinary phases and novelties of the great cultural revolution beginning in 1928, the year which saw the opening stage of the gigantic mass theatre movement towards unification and universalism.

The first phase of the revolution was the organisation in 1928 of Olympiads with their wonderful display of the dramatic and art expression of the masses. National working-class groups met in friendly rivalry, and then came international ones. The second phase of this mass development was the organisation of ten-day theatrical recitals in Moscow and Leningrad of the National theatres, Ukranian, Georgian, Kazakh, Uzbek, and others. This served to strengthen the bond of unity between the Russian and non-Russian Soviet peoples ; to reveal that the 150 nationalities had risen from Tsarist theatrical repression and obscurity to Soviet full theatrical rights and heights ; and to show that their contribution to the new folk basis of the theatre, opera, ballet and the drama was a very rich one indeed. The third phase was the merging of the old theatrical intellectuals and the masses and nationalities on a common theatrical ground, the removal of those defects

which had separated them, and the acceptance by the intellectuals of the common theatrical task of the building of a new system of life. Finally came the establishment of a Committee of Arts to co-ordinate and control an All-Union theatrical force with its 693 theatres, 446 Russian, and 247 national republics distributed among 150 nationalities, and its 46 languages, and in addition, over 100,000 non-professional circles in factory, field and mining district, exclusive of the hundreds in city and town.

Of peace value is the network of 104 Children's theatres all engaged in the task of making new citizens and encouraging these young citizens to build the new life, by means of Soviet plays, classics, and fairy tales by the great masters. And account must be taken of the big annual Theatre Festivals with their international implications. And now supporting this vast Popular Theatre Emergent with its incipient mighty system of the drama, are the vaster cultural promises held out by the Stalin Constitution. They point to the continued development of a united theatre more concerned with the building of the national soul than with promoting the international clash of arms.

HUNTLY CARTER



## PSYCHICAL RESEARCH OR PARAPSYCHOLOGY DURING 1937

[Dr. J. B. Rhine is Professor of Psychology at Duke University (U.S.A.) and is directing the research work of the Parapsychological Laboratory. He is known all over the world by his investigations in telepathy and clairvoyance which he names Extra Sensory Perception, or in short ESP. Recently he has published *New Frontiers of the Mind*, a review of which will appear in a later issue.—EDS.]

The problem of the nature and extent of exceptional and unexplainable phenomena has concerned men since ancient times. The systematic effort to investigate those unusual mental oddities generally recognized under the name of psychical research is now in its seventh decade. Yet it might fairly be said that the accomplishments during the year 1937 have been more important for psychical research than those of any other year of its scientific era:

Heretofore, psychical research has been confined largely to private societies devoted to this end, but there has been during 1937 a general movement on the part of university and college laboratories to take up certain of its problems. Up through 1936 the number of experimental studies reported from universities numbered only seven.\* During the single past year, reports of experiments coming under this heading were issued from ten different universities and colleges.†

The increase in academic interest has not been accidental. Recent experiments on the problems of telepathy and clairvoyance have led to the development of generally applicable experimental techniques. Criti-

cism and refinement of these methods has allowed the problem to become more and more the concern of university investigators.

This rapid progress led to the establishment in 1937 of the *Journal of Parapsychology*. In its "Editorial Introduction" the purposes of the publication were set forth :—

...The title of this journal requires a few words of explanation as to how we conceive the relation of parapsychology to psychical research. Parapsychology is a word that...may well be adopted into the English language to designate the more strictly experimental part of the whole field implied by psychical research as now pretty generally understood. It is these strictly laboratory studies which most need the atmosphere and conditions to be found only in the universities ; and it is these which the universities can most properly promote.

It is convenient to follow the usage here laid down and restrict this review of the past year's work mainly to those more strictly laboratory and quantitative studies which fall within the bounds of parapsychology.

Two important studies of mediumship have appeared during the year. Although they differ widely in approach, they agree in the important respect of emphasizing the need for an objective quantitative procedure.

\* These include studies made at Stanford (1917), Groningen (1923), Harvard (1927), Duke (1934), Bonn (1935), Princeton (1935), and Clark (1935).

† These, confined to America, include six universities (Columbia, Colorado, Duke, Minnesota, New York and Fordham) and four colleges (Bard, Guilford, Hunter and Tarkio).



The work of Dr. John F. Thomas\* follows the more conventional methods. Upon noting that communications received in sittings with psychic sensitives ("Mediums") appeared to contain much more personal information than the sensitive might reasonably be expected to have available normally, he launched an extensive investigation to test this observation. By concealing his identity during personal visits, again by sending a proxy sitter, and finally by holding some sittings with only a stenographer present with the sensitive, he ruled out explanations in terms of fraud, accidental guesses, shrewd inference, and the like. The stenographic records were studied to see if the statements were so general as to be equally applicable to others than Dr. Thomas. By analysing the records into topics which permitted scoring in terms of right and wrong statements, he found that they were right for him in 90 per cent of the topics. When other people scored the material the points were applicable in only about 16 per cent of the topics. Dr. Thomas concludes that the sensitives which he studied showed knowledge "beyond normal cognition".

A second mediumistic study is that reported by Mr. Whately Carington in the *Proceedings* of the Society for Psychical Research. By giving word-association tests to the trance personalities which appear in mediumistic séances he is able to measure whether the reactions of the various personalities are notably "similar"

or "different". The measurement is accomplished by a mathematical analysis of the time of reaction to each word as it is presented.

Mr. Carington's first problem, that of finding a quantitative method for studying trance personalities, appears to have been met in his study. He finds (in at least one case) that the "control" personalities are so significantly different from the medium's waking personality as to suggest that they are repressed secondary personalities. From purportedly "communicating" personalities appearing in the trance states of two different mediums he claims to find significant similarities such as to suggest an individual "communicator". This latter finding has been challenged by Professor R. H. Thouless. The work, however, is yet incomplete; and further results may be of importance for an understanding of the psychology of trance states.

In the field of experimental studies of telepathy and clairvoyance, the reports have added, with one exception, to the growing body of evidence for the frequent occurrence of extra-sensory perception as a normal mental activity.† These reports were all based upon tests in which subjects attempted to identify, with various degrees of extra-chance success, randomly selected and concealed cards. In most instances, the subjects were tested with the so-called ESP cards developed in the Parapsychology Laboratory at Duke University. These cards, each bearing one of five simple designs, are used in packs of

\* *Beyond Normal Cognition*. Boston: Bruce Humphries, 1937.

† Baker, K. H., "Report of a Minor Investigation in Extra-Sensory Perception", *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1937, XXI, 120-125.



twenty-five (five cards of each of the five symbols) and have a well-established mathematical basis for estimating the probability that any score or average is a mere chance occurrence. An instance of the success with which the Duke experiments\* have been independently verified is the investigation conducted at Tarkio College in Missouri. George and MacFarland had subjects attempt to reproduce the order of cards as they lay untouched in a shuffled pack of 25 cards, completely screened from the subject's sight. The total score for all trials of 13 subjects (20,450 indications of single cards) so far exceeded the most probable number of chance successes that it could be expected by pure luck alone once in about  $10^{197}$  times.

Almost all the experiments performed during the past year have, however, been conducted with the further design of getting at an understanding of ESP. If the occurrence of the phenomenon be fully established, its explanation is, of course, the real objective of further experiment.

Some experiments have been concerned with what sort of test situation is most favourable to this unusual mental function. Woodruff and George, and Gibson particularly carried out comparisons between a number of tests involving motor and vocal indications of the chosen card. They found differences in results for different subjects, but all indications point to the origin of these in the subject's attitude. For example, Gibson's subjects failed entirely at a screened matching procedure which

was very successfully mastered by the subjects of MacFarland and George.

New evidence was found by Pegram that a subject with ESP ability can direct his scoring within the relatively narrow range of success possible either above or below the level of pure chance. That is to say, the subject can, if he wishes, identify the card by saying what it is *not*, proof complete that ESP is under the subject's voluntary control.

The past year has been marked also by studies dealing with the rôle of the stimulus object in ESP. No limitations upon ESP have yet been found, though the changes in the stimulus object have already been considerable in extent. L. E. Rhine found that her child subjects scored equally well with microscopic and very large symbols. Also she found that a single symbol and many symbols upon the face of a card give equal success. In the study of MacFarland and George it made no difference whether the symbols were symmetrical or distorted in outline. Carpenter and Phalen's subjects called colours and symbols equally well. These discoveries suggest that the physical characteristics of the objects perceived are not important to ESP.

A much wider variety of subjects were successfully tested for this ability during 1937 than ever before. Children as young as five years were able to score significantly under good testing conditions in the experiment of L. E. Rhine. On the other hand, the age range of good subjects was extended upward to at least 60 by Dr. C. H. Rice. Retarded school children in

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\* *Extra-Sensory Perception*, Boston : Bruce Humphries, 1935.



the third grade proved in an experiment by Bond to be able to work well in a group with the teacher as experimenter. Finally, Pegram and Price found that even the blind were able to demonstrate ESP.

The increased activity within academic circles has brought an increased critical attention. The mathematical basis, so essential to experimental work, has weathered several attacks, the occurrence of which have initiated several contributions to the technical background of the research. Greenwood and Stuart and Huntington have presented mathematical studies firmly establishing the extra-chance conclusions of previous research. These received the following editorial comment in the December number of the *Journal of Parapsychology* :—

....whereas minor changes in method are advisable, the mass of [mathematical] criticism has been directed at points which are experimentally trivial.

Other criticisms of experimental details have called out effective response in the *Journal of Parapsychology*. Warner, in a doubly-observed distance experiment with exceptionally guarded conditions, had his subject call cards one at a time from a complete, freshly-shuffled pack; she averaged 9.3 per 25 calls for 250 consecutive trials (all that were made), a highly significant result. In

the December number of the *Journal of Parapsychology*, a survey was made of all the work done under conditions in which sensory cues could conceivably have played no part in the scoring even had the cards been marked or even transparent. These results, numbering over 140,000 trials and representing complete records of special experiments, must be explained by the critic if further discussion of the subject of sensory cues is to be profitable.

The proper conclusion for a review of a research that is just beginning would include a forward glance. A recent survey of new and old evidence seems to prove conclusively that ESP is not affected by space—as are all forms of mechanical causation about which anything is known. And if not space, then why time? Here is another problem in parapsychology—one to be solved, if at all, by the careful and patient methods of science. Already the editors of the *Journal of Parapsychology* indicate that the 1938 volume will take up in its initial number the subject of experiments dealing with the delicate question of precognition. The battle with the critics is perhaps only just begun. Work along many lines is under way in many places. This year promises to surpass 1937 in its yield of interesting discoveries in parapsychology.

J. B. RHINE



# NEW BOOKS AND OLD

## THE MIRROR OF LITERATURE\*

This is an extraordinarily timely and valuable book. Those who read it with the care it demands and deserves will be enriched by a deeper understanding of Germany, of England, and the whole problem of social change. And the temper of the book is admirable: it is passionately dispassionate to a degree that I appreciate and envy. Indeed, I feel that, if I could have read Dr. Kohn-Bramstedt's book let us say ten years ago, I should have been spared a good deal of illusion and disillusion. I console myself with the thought that perhaps the author could not have written his book ten years ago.

The central question with which the book is concerned is, on the abstract level, the relation between an "estate" (*Stand, état*) and a "class". No small part of the optimistic confusion of our English social, sociological, and socialist thinking is due to the fact that we have no two words which enable us to make the distinction; and that in turn is due to the fact that we have had no practical or political need to make it. Our peculiar political evolution, our early and evolutionary challenge to the monarchical absolutism based on the divine right of kings, the development of a curiously elastic system of aristocratic parliamentarism during the eighteenth century, and perhaps, above all, the custom by which only the eldest sons of the English nobility retained their noble rank, created in England a condition of fluidity in which there was never the clear line of demarcation between privileged and unprivileged "estates" which is necessary if a society is to be aware of itself as a society of "estates".

Thus, in the mere attempt of an Englishman to define, on the abstract level, the question with which Dr. Kohn-Bram-

stedt's book is concerned, we pass inevitably to the historical level. In France the "estate" society was virtually eradicated by the French Revolution; in Germany, despite an appearance of what Dr. Kohn-Bramstedt grimly and truly calls "pseudo-democracy", the "estate" society endured (even in an overt political form in the Prussian Diet) until the end of the war of 1914-1918; but in England there was a continuous process of ascent and descent to and from the aristocracy, which has blurred the sense of the real distinction between a society based on status, and a class-society in the purely economic or Marxian meaning. Since the emphases of Marxist thinking were directly derived from German experience, for which the distinction was real, an important effect has been that analyses and predictions concerning a class-society (which nowhere exists) have been applied to actual societies which are more or less subtle combinations of a class-society and a society based on status and a society based on function. Two conspicuous results of this mistaken application have been the bewilderment of Socialist thought when confronted by the emergence of Fascism, and (in England particularly) a naïve assumption that the "classless society", postulated as the ideal aim and inevitable consequence of Socialism, means a society without class-distinction, in the common English sense of the word. Class distinction in the English sense, is a unique combination of distinction by status (peer and commoner), of distinction by social prestige (accruing largely to function, *e. g.*, the doctor, the barrister, the clergyman), but above all of distinction by our differential education (the public school and university education of the "gentleman"). Since the

\* *Aristocracy and the Middle-Classes in Germany: Social Types in German Literature, 1830-1900.* By ERNST KOHN BRAMSTEDT. (P. S. King and Son, London. 15s.)



great social struggle in English society is to secure for one's sons the education of a gentleman, and it is relatively costly, underlying this class-distinction is an economic class-distinction in the strict Marxist sense. But it by no means corresponds to the distinction between capitalist and working-class.

Fortunately perhaps for himself, Dr. Kohn-Bramstedt has not to analyse this complex English system of social prestige which "just grewed". He deals with the *relatively* simple German system, the relative simplicity of which is due to the failure or incapacity of the Germans to "politicise" themselves, as first the English and then the French people had done : that is, themselves to exert a positive influence on the shaping of society. In the main the economic upsurge of the new capitalist and industrial middle-class in Germany was controlled by the decisive will of a single man, namely Bismarck.

It was only due to the superior tactics of Bismarck that the Junkers could maintain their political and social hegemony in alliance with the army and the bureaucracy. After this decisive re-establishment of the threatened conservative feudal stratum in Prussia (which was a result of the victories in 1866 and 1870-1) a division (more or less) of functions took place between political power (aristocracy and ennobled bureaucracy) and economic power (bourgeoisie) . . . . Aristocratic prestige was at first threatened by the economic and political rise of the middle-class, but was later made secure by the political impotence and failure of the bourgeoisie.

In other words, the middle-class submitted to making the money and let the aristocracy go on with governing ; it allowed itself to be convinced by Bismarck's conviction that it was incompetent really to participate in the work of government. Behind this powerfully guided evolution, which seems singular to an Englishman, lay the unchallenged acceptance of absolute monarchy.

Against this background, all political terms change their meaning. Thus the "conservative" feudal stratum in Prussia has a radically different meaning from a "conservative" feudal stratum in England. Very few "conserva-

tives" in England can fairly be called "reactionary" in regard to domestic politics. They resist change ; but the change they resist is change of a system which admits profound change. Fontane observed the contrast forty-five years ago. Dr. Kohn-Bramstedt quotes this subtle observer writing in 1892 :

Unfortunately, an imitation of the English Tories, in which aristocrats and bourgeois notabilities co-operate, miscarries in Germany through the intolerant character of the Junkers, through the naïve conviction of their exclusive right and capability to rule. The pseudo-conservatism of our aristocracy, which in the long run is based only on egoism and all that is subservient to it, embarrasses the conservative middle-class notabilities considerably and makes them feel extremely desperate.

But their desperation effected nothing ; they were not prepared effectively to combine with either the petty-bourgeois or the working-class to challenge the political ascendancy of the Junkers, so that in a sense the Junker intolerance and contempt of the bourgeoisie was justified.

Dr. Kohn-Bramstedt's brilliant depiction of the social psychology of Germany during the nineteenth century is based on a careful examination of the evidence of literature ; and the relative weight of this evidence in turn is scrupulously estimated. It is the first book we have read in which the all-important imponderables during a crucial period of modern history are sensitively and systematically assessed. Perhaps Dr. Kohn-Bramstedt has predecessors in this method of investigation ; if so, their works have not come my way. For me, he is a man who has systematised a singularly subtle and original kind of sociological inquiry. His book is one to set me thinking "all over again". The questions it suggests are innumerable. I will do myself the justice of saying that they are none of them entirely new to me ; but his inquiry bestows a new solidity on my scepticism of current social Utopianism. It gives, for example, new substance to my suspicion that the central doctrine of Marxist Socialism is derived from Marx's unconscious eagerness to find a dynamic source of desirable social



change outside the realm of "politics" altogether, and that in making economics *the* determinant in history he was seeking to avoid the despair into which he was driven by his sense of German political incapacity. From this angle, Marxist "realism" is essentially a Jewish compensation for German political "unrealism". Further, and deeper, how far is it possible realistically to conceive any mass-society in which effective political power is not concentrated in the hands of a relatively small élite? And since we may take as proven Lord Acton's dictum that "power always corrupts", where shall we find any safeguard against the abuse of political power save in some such resolute decentralisation of mass-society as Rousseau declared to be necessary if modern society was not to degenerate into a repulsive tyranny? In this connection it is note-

worthy how remarkably small a part organized religion occupies in Dr. Kohn-Bramstedt's picture of nineteenth-century Germany. The peculiarity is explained in the one brief but suggestive paragraph in the matter, *à propos* the novelist Raabe.

He is dominated by the old Lutheran antithesis between religious subjectivity and passive obedience to the secular ruler, between emotional irrationalism and rejection of the "harlot reason", between belief in the value of genuine emotion and pessimism as regards the way of the world. The sociological basis of this old, conservative German attitude is determined by the pluralism of German territorial states as well as by the political weakness of the German middle-class.

But is this "sociological basis" cause or effect? Is not the peculiar emphasis of Lutheran pietism largely the cause, at any rate, of the political weakness of the German middle-class?

J. MIDDLETON MURRY

## TOWARDS A NEW ORDER

### I \*

In a letter to *The Times* last year Dr. Jacks wrote, "Is the League of Nations to reproduce the structure of the armed political state prepared for fighting and with fighting forces trained for battle, or is it to be a community of another type?" And this book is a clear and cogent enlargement of that question. That it is apposite no one can doubt. For the League at the moment has apparently failed, to the rhetorical delight of those whom it has failed to curb. But even those who still believe with Dr. Jacks that it is potentially the world's most valuable institution may not regret that it has failed in the way it has. There are certain failures which are of more ultimate good to man than successes. The authors of the Covenant unwittingly placed peace under the guardianship of war. They invoked Satan to cast out Satan. Their plan, to quote Dr. Jacks, "reduced to its lowest terms, was to put

an end to aggressive war-making by an overpowering combination of war-making forces". Need we then regret that the plan failed at the first test? Dr. Jacks shows how inevitably it failed and how false has been the analogy, so generally drawn, between the conditions under which the rule of law is maintained within the state and those which obtain in its external relations with other states. Sovereign States are neither historically nor actually what individual citizens are, and the current contention that a League of them is simply a natural development of the evolutionary process by which they have severally grown into the unities they now are, he believes to be untrue. The mistake, in fact, of the authors of the Covenant was not only to impose upon sovereign states a system of coercion which their nature as sovereign forbids them to tolerate, but to invite them to co-operate self-right-

\* *Co-operation or Coercion? The League at the Crossways.* By L. P. JACKS. (William Heinemann Ltd, London. 8s. 6d.)



cously in the work of the devil. As Dr. Jacks writes :—

Of all the methods that might be chosen of developing the co-operative spirit and habit, co-operative fighting, no matter in what cause or against whom directed, is positively the worst.

And if the League is to be the organ of a new life and hope for mankind its mission must be "to create for the nations a new model of community life in which fighting force plays no part whatsoever". Gradually, he believes, under the growth of common interests among the nations, the fighting function will die a natural death. And it is on furthering these common interests, particularly in the economic field, that the League should concentrate. In the constructive suggestions he makes he owes something to the American philosopher, Josiah Royce, who conceived "the Hope of the Great Community" on the basis of Mutual Insurance. The transference

of the wealth and energy of nations from the service of the war-machine to that of constructive peace can, he realizes, only gradually occur as habits of good faith and mutual collaboration develop. But only a League which has renounced war as an instrument of its own policy can foster such habits and convert the nations by effective practical example to the ideal of co-operation which it embodies.

The constructive side of Dr. Jacks's thesis is inevitably not worked out in such detail as his destructive analysis of the fallacy of the existing League system. But all who are inclined to lose heart for the future of the League or who are still tied to a negative conception of "Collective security" should read his book. They may then come to realize that the failure of the League as a war-machine was a blessing in disguise.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

## II \*

Mr. Lippman rides the lists throughout this lengthy work as a champion of Liberalism, but on how much profounder a level than that of mere party politics we realise long before we arrive at his final conclusion that "it is here, on the nature of man, between those who would respect him as an autonomous person and those who would degrade him to a living instrument, that the issue is joined". Liberalism is to him much more than politics or economics; it is a way of life—he would say the only proper way for all who accept the spiritual inviolability of the human individual, and are bound accordingly to set religion above politics. To-day, it would seem, more are against Liberalism than are for it, preferring, and not only in the openly fascist and communist countries, the development of collectivism—of social and economic control by coercive centralized authority—to freer and more individualistic methods.

This tendency Mr. Lippman strives

here to counter in two ways: first, by a detailed criticism of collectivism on practical grounds, a denial that human evolution can be consciously controlled in any case by a minority of arbitrarily selected human beings; and second, by a frank admission of the fatal shortcomings of what in the nineteenth century passed for Liberalism, and an attempt to restate Liberalism in new and more adequate terms.

The old *laissez-faire* Liberalism left the world's markets, the entire complex of supply and demand, to find its own so-called "natural" balance. Collectivism goes to the far extreme of controlling the market in favour of the producer or of some fixed plan. Mr. Lippman certainly believes in control—of natural resources, quality of products, working conditions, currency, incomes, and the like—but directed always towards genuinely freeing trade, and exercised not by the coercion of dictators or even of electoral majorities but by a com-

\* *The Good Society*. By WALTER LIPPMAN. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 10s. 6d.)



*mon law before which all men, of whatever kind and rank, would be free and equal.*

It is an attractive scheme, not in its essence impracticable, and very persuasively and sometimes movingly set forth by the author in great and wide-ranging but always relevant detail. It might be criticised as underrating the aggressive nature of Capitalism, and the power

of wealth and prejudice to suborn justice (as notoriously in America), but that only brings one back to the consideration that any scheme depends most on the quality of the men directing it.

The book is more than good, it is timely and important, offering a focus for political aims which will not deny spiritual intuitions.

GEOFFREY WEST

### III \*

Mr. Aldous Huxley describes M. de Lig's book, here not very smoothly translated from the French translation of the original Dutch, as "a text-book of applied pacifism, in which the techniques of non-violent activity are described with a sober precision of language", and if it fulfils that definition less adequately because less completely than Mr. Richard B. Gregg's *The Power of Non-Violence*, it is still a work of value on a topic of prime importance in these difficult days.

The position of the author, as a "revolutionary" socialist calling in effect upon the proletariat to overcome the wicked bourgeoisie, may repel some of those readers who are affected more easily by labels than by realities, but even they should not have to read far into his pages to discover his socialism to be truly that of human brotherhood, and his revolution only that which all genuine religion demands (however seldom the response) from its adherents—a setting of love before self-interest, and a recognition that all men are one's brothers, across whatever geographical or racial frontier they may chance to be born. If violence is not, against M. de Lig's—and my own—belief, inherent in the very nature of capitalism, it has assuredly been widely present in its competitive practice. In any case, violence it is which, even before capitalism, is his prime enemy.

He sees to-day, as we all do, violence seizing the world in thrall; even one-

time pacifists like Romain Rolland, Einstein, and Emil Ludwig, succumb to it in their fear of Fascism. Still he stands firm, assured that violence will not and cannot bring about that individual and social liberation he desires, and that even Russia and Spain visibly defeat their own socialist or communist purpose by going to war to defend it; believing, on the other hand, that in non-violent-resistance there exists an effective weapon and the only practicable one for the great masses of "the people" to exercise against governments armed with the specialised and powerful modern armaments.

With disconcerting completeness he riddles the pretences of what he calls "bourgeois pacifism", as no more than the desire of the relatively satisfied capitalist imperialisms to keep what they have got without further trouble, and a later chapter turns the similar shams of the League, the Kellogg Pact, and partial sanctions inside out to show their hollowness.

But the most valuable part of his book is that in which, more fully than Mr. Gregg in his work, he sets forth any number of actual cases in which the exercise of non-violent resistance has proved its power. Some of the outstanding instances are drawn from India, but no part of the world is without its examples, showing that here is a weapon, unaggressive yet effective, which can be utilised by men and women of all kinds and creeds. Clearly, though, it is not

\* *The Conquest of Violence : An Essay on War and Revolution.* By BART DE LIGT. Translated by HONOR TRACY. Introduction by ALDOUS HUXLEY. (George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)



easy in its use, and the main lack of M. de Ligt's volume is that of any attempt to deal with the "physical, intellectual and moral growth of human personality" which he sees as necessary.

For one thing is certain : if our forces do not rise from a deeper source, if our horizons are not wider, if our goals are not nobler than those of all the imperialisms in the world, our enterprise is foredoomed to failure.

Still, the clear importance of the book remains. The upholders of violence, of whatever party, dwell in a vicious circle rapidly growing to a deadly whirlpool. The principle of non-violent resistance offers the one practical means of breaking out of it, the only means possible to moral and religious men. Whether the world is yet sufficiently spiritually mature to practise it remains to be seen.

GEOFFREY WEST

*The Spanish Inquisition.* By CECIL ROTH. (Robert Hale, London. 12s. 6d.)

The difficulty about writing a book on the Spanish Inquisition is that there are already multitudes of works on the same subject, and therefore it is almost impossible to say anything new about it. Dr. Roth does not pretend to say anything new ; but his book nevertheless is timely and useful. It is timely not only because the tragic war in Spain makes anything about that country interesting, but also because the rise of dictatorships in various countries has familiarised us in our own times with that very spirit and practice of inquisitorial repression which, before 1914-1918, we thought dead. Dr. Roth's book, moreover, escapes the defect of violent partisanship which spoils most books on the Inquisition. It is balanced and just : understanding even the motives of the Inquisitors themselves as having been largely honest and conscientious. For of course nothing can be farther from the truth than what Dr. Roth calls "the Protestant legend" that the Inquisition was merely an engine of wanton cruelty and oppression. Its origin was in the urgent problem, after the final expulsion of Moorish power, for the Spanish Government to safeguard the unity of the country. Innumerable Jews had become nominally Catholics, but secretly adhered to the old beliefs and rites.

They made their way into all the professions : even into bishoprics of the Church. The Inquisition was founded primarily to deal with this problem and the similar one of "converted Moors".

Not, of course, that this was the sole object of the institution. The peculiar severity of the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal (Dr. Roth deals with both countries) certainly arose from those Jewish and Moorish problems : but there would have been an Inquisition in any case. The Roman Church regarded wilful desertion of its faith (heresy) as the worst of crimes, and required the civil power to repress it. Thus the Inquisition busied itself with all forms of heresy. Dr. Roth grimly describes the cruelties (torture, burnings, life-imprisonments, confiscations, etc.) which resulted from this policy ; but he points out that the numbers of those who submitted to the Church enormously exceeded those whose persistence entailed punishment. Thus the Inquisition in the main succeeded, for generations, in enforcing unity : but at the price of what misery and eventual national decay ! Its whole theory, in fact, was false. By free, healthy intellectual development alone is progress possible or genuine. Attempts to force a nation into one mould only vitiate its life.

J. W. POYNTER

*The Magic Plant : The Growth of Shelley's Thought.* By CARL GRABO. (The University of North Carolina Press. \$ 4.00)

*The Living Torch.* By A. E. Edited by MONK GIBBON (Macmillan and Co.,

London. 12s. 6d.)

The spirit that refuses to abdicate before the beast in man and in nature is the sovereign reagent which brings out the great poet. Has any other English poet possessed this to such a degree as



Shelley? Rebel and reformer, philosopher and poet, Shelley passed through many phases in his all too brief life—as deist, atheist, agnostic, realist, pantheist, Platonist; in the imperial noon of his incarnation he blazed gloriously, radiating the power of mystical philosophy. He was not the *Ariel* of M. André Maurois, a filigrain character. He who knows his Shelley well is certain to take umbrage at such a misrepresentation.

Professor Grabo brings the ardour and the endurance of a research scholar to his biographical and critical study of Shelley and his mental evolution. He brings out the powerful and persistent attraction which the occult exercised upon Shelley from his early years, “the evident attraction for him of neo-Platonism and Theosophy,” and his “mystical intuition of the ultimate unity of the universe”. It is known that he read Paracelsus at Eton and he writes of having, presumably in that period, perused “ancient books of chemistry and magic . . . with an enthusiasm and wonder, almost amounting to belief”.

Shelley, by his unfailing allegiance to the intellect, by his fight against unreason and hostility, by his passion to deliver the human race from the darkness of evil and to illumine it with the light of freedom, attained freedom of mind and caught the light of the spirit.

To Shelley this seemingly solid world of things is in itself only a symbol, a shadow of the divine world of ideas. It is evanescent and imperfect. The discerning mind sees in it intimations of the reality which dwells behind it. Poetry is the revelation of this divine reality.

Professor Grabo traces Shelley's mental history from materialistic rationalism to mysticism, and the acceptance, at least tentatively, of the neo-Platonic belief that intuition and imagination are higher faculties than reason. We may concede to Professor Grabo that “to understand Shelley it is best to believe that in his thirty years he lived longer, both emotionally and intellectually, than most men live in eighty,” but we cannot doubt that but for the accident

that cut short his career he would have won through to greater conviction if not to greater depth of insight. His unfinished poem, “The Triumph of Life”, ends abruptly on the note: “Then, what is life? I cried.”

Through psycho-mental perception he was able to sing of

Peace within and calm around  
And that content, surpassing wealth,  
The Sage in meditation found,  
And walk'd with inward glory crown'd.

But the sceptic and the seer oftentimes warred within Shelley, and although he made use of myth which helped him to a proper discipline of his moral perception, he did not realize his own Atman.

What Shelley conceived but did not realize, that A.E., inheriting Shelley's fire and mellowing it with a maturer wisdom and the experience of age, did. The passions which circulate in the blood A.E. sublimated by his self-chosen discipline. A. E.'s relation to Theosophy and to the great Theosophist, W. Q. Judge, enabled him to chasten and to elevate his Psyche. His contacts, which are as wide as life and which Mr. Monk Gibbon has gathered so well, build a beautiful Parthenon of meditative philosophy. Writes A. E. :—

There can be no profound spiritual certitude except for those who have consciously chosen between the dark and the light.

And to probe that dark he, like Shelley, made use of myth and with the clairvoyance that it gave him perceived a world above man's, over the shadowy tumult of the sensuous universe, and he invested the physical with the light of the spiritual he saw.

To Shelley this world was Heaven's shadow, whose darkness had to be endured; to A. E., the Light of Heaven was on earth and gave to every object its glow. With the aid of the glow within him he saw the glow everywhere. A. E. realized within himself the wisdom of the Upanishads: “That which is the subtle essence in each one that exists is its Self. It is the True. That Self thou art.”

MANJERI S. ISVARAN



*The History of Great Light : Book I. Original Instructions in Tao.* By HUAI-NAN-TSZE. (The Shrine of Wisdom, London, Manual No. 17)

The Taoist of royal lineage, sometimes called Lew Gan, who wrote this, the first of twenty-one treatises making up his *History of Great Light*, and who is said to have died in 122 B. C., was thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Lao-Tze. Much of this valuable little book, in fact, is a development of the latter's thesis that "by the practice of Inner Life stillness we can continually conquer all things". It can hardly be read without the reader's glimpsing, however fleetingly, the "tranquillization of the interior life" which, once attained, is unaffected by outside events. "Hidden purity and repose", the writer declares, "are the quintessence of virtue", and serenity and spontaneity are the characteristics of the Sage, who, when he has no definite task,

takes his ease ; "when pressed, he exerts himself...as promptly as an arrow flies from a bow" ; "pliable yet invincible", long in making up his mind but strong when he comes to act.

"What I call a ruler", writes Huai-Nan-Tsze, "is one who is master of himself—that is all". He cites the ancient Emperor Shun who, without uttering a word of admonition or lifting a hand to correct his people, "simply held the principle of virtue firmly in his heart, and the reformation of the people was spiritually achieved".

This book will not find favour with advocates of "preparedness", for the writer declares : "If armour be strong, the weapons brought against it will be sharp ; when the city wall is completed, battering engines will be prepared".

The Editors are to be congratulated on making this little gem available as a separate text, for the first time.

PH. D.

*The Poetry of the Invisible.* An Interpretation of the Major English Poets from Keats to Bridges. By SYED MEHDI IMAM. With a Preface by C. F. Andrews. (Allen and Unwin, London. 8s. 6d.)

To Mr. Imam the poet is "a psychic sensitive of a rare order" and in this book he has sought to illustrate from the works of ten English poets some of the theories of psychic science. His method is to quote at length from the poets of his choice and to explain each quotation in the light of psychic theory. For example we are told that the "moony vapour" which Tennyson described as rolling round King Arthur as he moved ghostlike to his doom "refers to the white etheric substance, known as ectoplasm, which usually rolls out of the medium's mouth as thin glistening drapery" ; that a passage from a poem by Lascelles Abercrombie expressing the conflict in an individual of "two kinds of Being" describes "the two subtle bodies in different grades of matter struggling to escape from the mortal coil" ; while the sense of past passions haunting the present, so frequent in Hardy's

poems, is neatly docketed as "impressions of the Past which are preserved in etheric substance—the Akashic records—recovered by the seer". The danger of going to poetry merely to confirm preconceived theory, will be suggested even by these few quotations. Mr. Imam's explanations of the intuitive imagery of Keats, Shelley, Byron, Tennyson, Browning, Swinburne, Abercrombie, Hardy, Charles Williams and Bridges in terms of "interpenetrating planes" or "subtle bodies" are monotonously uniform. But his appreciation is not concerned merely with psychic mechanism, but with the mystical perception with which the poet discerns the subtler and higher conditions of spirit, whether it be Browning divining the real Self of man in the Over-Soul, or Shelley singing of the ascent of spirit through "the gradual paths of an aspiring change". He does well, too, to emphasise that for the poet as for the seer, the spiritual kingdom is not a haze, but a world of matter with breathing presences in it. And despite his tendency to reduce this world to the terms of a particular science, he has retained his sense of its



wonder and beauty. Indeed occasionally, as in the opening passage of the chapter on Tennyson, much of which is unintentionally in the rhythm of verse,

*700 Chinese Proverbs.* Translated by HENRY H. HART. (The Stanford University Press, Los Angeles, Calif. \$ 2.00)

That the proverbs of a nation reveal its soul is itself an old observation fit to be classed as a proverb. This book reveals in a crystallized form the great cultural inheritance of China, her magnificent code of ethics which has defied time for close on three thousand years, the mellow philosophy of the Chinese people and their capacity for suffering which has been largely responsible for their survival as a people.

There is hardly a country in the world which possesses such a wealth of proverbs as China. A modest estimate places the total number there current at 20,000. The Chinese love proverbs. They have a proverb for everything and for every occasion. Not only do the Chinese put their philosophy into their proverbs but these proverbs also display a literary quality, a terseness often combined with a laconic wit, which leaves us wondering whether to admire more the profound truth embodied in the proverb or the manner in which it has been stated.

Consider the following proverb: "To open a shop is easy; the difficult thing is keeping it open." Here is another example: "The only way to prevent people knowing it is not to do it." Both these proverbs not only state metaphysical facts but, what is more important and especially characteristic of Chinese proverbs, they contain the maximum amount of thought in the minimum amount of words. Even if we disregard the metaphysical aspects of these proverbs we can still admire the economy of words, and the play of wit which is only faintly suggested.

Most proverbs, because they represent the accumulated experience of the ages, have something in common. Often we find the same proverbs only slightly

his style is too ornate. But his conception of poetry, as the mirror of the invisible, is interesting.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

varied—to suit local conditions—reiterated in various languages. "Like master, like man" has probably an equivalent in every language. In the Chinese version it is "Like mistress, like maid". There is a Sanskrit version: "Like rajah, like subjects." Other proverbs picked at random which have equivalents both in English and in Indian languages are: "Too many pilots wreck the ship." (Too many cooks spoil the broth.) "In haste there is error." (Haste makes waste.) "Better be kind at home, than burn incense in a far place." (Charity begins at home.)

The result of years of despotism by autocratic monarchs has made a deep impression on Chinese character. "To attend an emperor is like sleeping with a tiger," sums up the experience of a people who have suffered from the tyranny of despots. Wolsey's great indictment of Henry VIII, "Had I but serv'd my God with half the zeal with which I serv'd my king, he would not in mine age have left me naked to mine enemies", is summed up with magnificent terseness and with the characteristic wit of the Chinese in the following proverb: "When a Prince wants a minister to die, he dies."

The tolerance, the rich humanity of the Chinese, in fact of the whole East, is brought out in this exquisite proverb: "He who rides in a chair is a man; he who carries the chair is also a man." A proverb such as this, which comes from the same East that has often been accused by second-rate European writers of possessing no "humanity worth speaking of," is more than revealing; by contrast it makes European proverbs seem both insipid and casual.

It is impossible in a brief account such as this to do justice to the great wealth of proverbs that are contained in this book and that reveal almost every aspect of Chinese character.

ENVER KUREISHI



*The Realm of Truth.* By GEORGE SANTAYANA. (Constable and Company Ltd., London. 10s.)

The notion of truth developed in this book is supposed by its author to be based on common sense. According to common sense, there are real things and events. They constitute the realm of existence. This realm is to be distinguished from the realm of truth. For truth does not exist. It is something ideal. It is generated by existence. It is only when something exists that we can speak of a truth about it. Thus truth does not exist, but it has a necessary relation to existence.

This truth is also to be distinguished from opinions.

Opinions are true or false by repeating or contradicting some part of the truth about the facts which they envisage ; and this truth about the facts is the standard comprehensive description of them. (Preface, p. vii).

The terms of this description are ideal terms. They are called by Santayana "essences". These essences constitute, so to say, a realm of pure being. They do not exist side by side with things. They have a logical being only. They are infinite in number and variety, and constitute the only language in which existence can be described.

This view, although it may appear to be based on common sense, is really novel. In common sense, we do not interpose a realm of truth between existence and our knowledge of existence. Truth is a quality of knowledge only. A piece of knowledge is true when it conforms to facts. The comprehensive standard description of all reality, which is the absolute truth, is, however, not anybody's knowledge. In fact, Santayana gives away his whole case when he admits that all description of existence is partial.

Existence is once for all irrational and cannot be wholly elucidated in terms of essence. And since it is only in terms of essence that facts can be described, partiality and instability beset all description. (p. 23)

Thus the partiality of knowledge is quietly transferred to the so-called realm of truth ; for no description of existence

can be adequate to existence. We do not need to postulate a realm of truth as distinct from the realm of existence.

Let us grant the possibility of a realm of truth. We shall now naturally suppose that truth about events that occur in time cannot be eternal. Things past and present have generated the truth about them. But the truth of the future is not yet. Truth is thus a growing quantity. This would also seem to follow from Santayana's view that truth is ontologically something secondary. It is the moving object that lends truth and definition to the truth itself, and that is substantial and fundamental in the universe. But Santayana holds all truth, including the truth of the future, to be eternal.

The truth of the future, like all truth, is eternal, and exactly as definite and complete as what, at any date, is the truth of the past.

This would be so, if we could take our stand outside time, and review the whole series of events in time. But this is, in the very nature of the case, impossible. For time does not stand still, and the events in it cannot have an accomplished character. And then will not the survey itself be in time ? Truth would be eternal if it were prior to existence and determined existence ; or if existence itself had any intelligent plan or purpose in it, so that omniscience at least could reconstruct the whole. But for Santayana, "every particular fact is contingent, arbitrary, and logically unnecessary, since infinite alternatives were open to existence, if existence had chosen to take a different form". Such truth cannot be eternal.

We might agree with the author when he says :—

To see things under the form of eternity is to see them in their historic and moral truth, not as they seemed as they passed but as they remain when they are over... In the infinite mosaic of history that bit has its unfading colour and its perpetual function and effect.

But historic truth implies a historic perspective. The historian interprets truth and not merely records it. And this interpretation is necessarily subjective.



The longer and more comprehensive the view one takes, the better will one see the meaning of a particular fact. But then can there be any fixity about such meaning, when new events are ever occurring and providing newer perspectives? We need to come to the end of history in order to know the full historic truth. This again is in the nature of the case, impossible. Historic truth cannot be eternal. And so far as moral truth is concerned, Santayana does it scant justice. He explains it away. He reduces it to individual preference. "The root of morality is animal bias." Moral truth is not the same for all. "The most contrary goods are beyond mutual censure if pursued at different times or by different spirits."

Santayana enters a protest against all forms of moral and religious mysticism. According to him, simple and naked truth is unpleasant. People hate it. They accordingly build the imaginary

world of mythology and of religion. That might be so. But we should still need to know the naked truth. Santayana does not think that to be possible. Truth for him has a superhuman status. He is a subjectivist in knowledge. He fails to see the connection between the philosophical demand to know *the* truth and the mystic's beatific vision. He is an empiricist who despairs of any higher philosophical truth than that which is vouchsafed to common sense.

The book is written in a style more literary than philosophical. The author is in general agreement with the empirical and positivistic tendencies in contemporary philosophy. But his notion of truth is based neither on common sense nor on sound reasoning. It is a mere dogma. The ultimate truth would seem to be that the truth cannot be known. We must merely believe. That is not good philosophy.

G. R. MALKANI

*Bramarshi Venkataratnam's Sermons and Discourses.* (Routhu Book Depot, Rajahmundry.)

*Vedic Religion and Philosophy.* By SWAMI PRABHAVANANDA. (Sri Ramakrishna Math, Madras. Rs. 1-4.)

*Aryanism.* By SHIV KRISHNA KAUL. (To be had from the Author, 29 Lawrence Road, Lahore Rs. 2-8.)

Sir R. Venkataratnam is a leading figure of the Brahmo-Samaj movement in the Andhra Desa. On his seventy-fifth birthday was issued this book, containing epitomizations from his sermons and discourses. The volume will appeal to all interested in the theory and practice of the Brahmo-Samaj, being selections from what are "considered to be some of his masterpieces". But it would be utterly impossible to agree with the too facile synthesis between "monism and dualism" suggested by Sir R. Venkataratnam, namely, that "Jeeva and Siva" are "conceptually not one" but "essentially one", as if all the sins of duality, dualism and difference between God and Man could conveniently be thrown on

"Conception". No problem of philosophy can be solved on the basis of this distinction between "conception" and "essence".

Swami Prabhavananda has attempted a fine exposition of the Advaita of Sankara in reference to the *Upanishads* and the *Gita*. He refers to some ill-informed criticisms of Indian philosophy prevalent in the West, and approvingly quotes from Sri Aurobindo Ghose and Sir S. Radhakrishnan. But his *obiter dictum* that the "Upanishads, on the whole, support the philosophy of Samkara" and his observation that Ramanuja "propounded the doctrine of Parinama-vaada" cannot be assented to. In his *Janmadhi-Adhikarana-Bhashya*, Ramanuja definitely held Brahman to be the Creator, and Swamiji cannot be unaware of the claim that all three schools—Dvaita, Advaita, and Visishtadvaita—stand grounded on the three textual totalities (*Prasthanas*) of the *Upanishads*, the *Gita* and the *Vedanta-Sutras*. Swamiji must know that the *Abhinna-nimittopadana* of Ramanuja is not the same as *Parinama-vaada*.

Mr. Kaul does not like the term



"Hinduism", which in his view is a misnomer; he advocates a mass-religion to be named "Aryanism". Few will agree with Mr. Kaul that Religion "should teach the way to obtain the greatest degree of harmonious *physical pleasure*" (italics mine), and fewer still with his "Aryanism" grounded on the abolition of castes, on equal rights for women and on mass-religion and mass-worship. I do not know if Mr. Kaul will succeed in prevailing upon Congress Governments in different Provinces to legislate for the introduction of uniform mass-religion and mass-worship, but I cannot tolerate such outrageous misprints of

Sanskrit as appear on pp. 21 and 27. I admire every patriotic Indian who desires to see the spiritual conquest of the whole world by Indian philosophy and culture, but whether the type of mass-religion christened "Aryanism" by Mr. Kaul will convert this world of sin, sorrow and suffering into a Paradise, is a question on which opinions are bound radically to differ.

These three books under review have the common object of bringing life and religion into the closest possible intimacy. On this their authors deserve to be felicitated.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

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*Jesus and His Sacrifice, A Study of the Passion Sayings in the Gospels.* By VINCENT TAYLOR, Ph.D., D.D. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

This book embodies the results of the research and the thought of one who has devoted about twenty-five years to the study of the problems of literary and historical criticism of the Gospels.

His conclusions in regard to how Jesus interpreted His own sufferings and death are accordingly based on a very careful and exhaustive study of the relevant passages. In our modern craze for specialisation, it is not often that a New Testament critic turns theologian and gives us the theological implications of his literary findings. And yet it is obvious that Christian theology, to be sound, needs as a prerequisite a historical and critical study of the life and sayings of Jesus.

This book is a needed corrective against the very superficial tendency prevalent to-day to find in Jesus's Life and Teachings whatever meets one's fancy and to eschew the rest as either a gloss or a later interpolation. As against this, the author makes a very comprehensive survey of all the relevant texts as well as of the interpretations put on them by scholars, whether they be in consonance with his own theory or not. The result is a very authoritative work which can-

not be overlooked by those interested in this topic.

Part I is devoted to a consideration of important Old Testament concepts such as the Kingdom of God, the Messiah, the Son of Man, the Son, the Suffering Servant of Yahweh, and Sacrifice, all of which formed the intellectual heritage of Jesus and determined His attitude towards His work and mission. Part II concerns itself with a critical investigation of the sayings of Jesus bearing on this topic as found in the Gospels, and in Part III an attempt is made to outline a theory of Atonement most in accord with these conclusions and hence presumably with the mind and thought of Jesus.

The thesis developed is that Jesus looked upon His sufferings and His death as part of a divine purpose with which He was in complete agreement. He did not regard them as intended to propitiate an angry god, but as representative and vicarious in that they involved His participation in the consequences of human sin. So far was He from thinking of His work as crudely substitutionary, automatic and self-acting in its results that He provided a rite (the Eucharist) whereby men should be able to share in the power of His surrendered life and make ever increasingly His offering their own. There is a penal element in the



suffering and the death of Jesus, not in the sense of something legal and vindictive whereby the suffering of one is taken to cancel the evil doing of another, but in the sense of Jesus taking upon Himself by virtue of His love the consequences of the sin of the loved ones, even as a mother may in love suffer the shame and the degradation brought on himself by an erring son. All these accordingly

are part of the significance of the sacrifice of Himself which Jesus offered.

The author has spent most of his life teaching in a theological college. While therefore he is thoroughly well acquainted with the sources he is using, his attitude throughout is that of one who must find support for the best traditions of the Church. This constitutes both the merit and the demerit of the book.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

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*Inside India.* By HALIDE EDIB. (George Allen and Unwin, London. 10s. 6d.)

Madame Edib was invited to deliver extension lectures in the Muslim University in Delhi in 1935. Having taken part in the struggle for freedom in her own country and feeling grateful to the Indian Muslims who had helped Turkey at that time, she came to India with doubled sympathy. Her early affection for the English and her recent friendships with Indians make her tolerant of both.

The book is in three parts. The first gives vivid life-like sketches of a number of people whom she met in Delhi : Sarojini Naidu, Lord Willingdon, Mahatma Gandhi, and a few other well-known men and women, mostly belonging to the Congress. The second part is devoted to the cities she visited. Some noteworthy feature or past event connected with each is brought in, like the Brahmo Samaj in Calcutta, or the house in Lucknow "called Dolly's Garden after some fair Englishwoman of bygone days", recalling the time of the "Mutiny" and the "siege of Lucknow", or the Afridi child in the Khyber Pass who got her Greek beauty from "a handsome ancestor in

the army of Alexander the Great". The third part, "India in the Melting Pot", deals with current ideas and movements and discusses whether Mahatma Gandhi and men like Abdul Gaffar Khan will symphonize the Hindu-Muslim discord, and what will be the position of the British in the India of to-morrow.

The writer is widely read and widely travelled and handles the English language almost like a native. There is no apparent aiming at effect ; the book reads easily and smoothly and moves naturally from one topic to another like the plot in a drama. And the writer sees the Indian scene as actual human drama in the making, with whole races and religions as actors. It is all noted and explained with sympathy and understanding ; the solution for all problems being the brotherhood of man, and the only way of getting up from "the bottom of the pit" to the "throne above" for all to go up together.

But the book lacks completeness by reason of the fact that the southern part and peoples of India are completely out of the picture.

S. V. KUMARAPPA



## ENDS AND SAYINGS

A subject which is rarely brought to public notice is that of premature interment. It is, however, a very present danger, and it is well that such should be the theme of a book recently written by Dr. Georges C. Murols, entitled *Ne M'enterrez Pas Vivant, Les Signes de la Mort Réelle* (Éditions Médicis, Paris). A review of this book under the signature of "Occultus", as well as a newspaper cutting sent to us some time ago, show that the advance of science has not fathomed the mysteries of physical death and that the danger of being buried alive is quite a possibility. Therefore, something should be done about the matter. "Occultus" writes :—

In Madame Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled*, (1877) she relates numerous cases where the "dead" were not really dead, but only appeared so, and warns against disposing of seemingly dead bodies too soon. She explains that it is most difficult to ascertain *real* death and adds, quoting Dr. Todd Thomson, a prominent London physician, that

The immobility of the body, even its cadaverous aspect, the coldness of surface, the absence of respiration and pulsation, and the sunken state of the eye, are no unequivocal evidences that life is wholly extinct.

This accounts for the not infrequent stories of persons who are pronounced dead but who amaze their relatives and friends by returning to life just before their bodies are buried ! This also explains the fear so many people have of being buried alive. This dreadful possibility of taking for actual death what is only a state of suspended animation is dealt with medically in the volume under review. The introduction by the publishers sets forth the necessity for such a book and explains its purpose, namely to prevent, as far as it is humanly possible, the repetition of such tragic mis-

takes. The author traces the history of well-known instances where the "dead" were not really dead. This awakens the reader to the thought that the danger is not a fanciful one, and that it is time that something practical be done to avoid it.

Dr. Murols explains some of the causes which produce all the signs of "death," as far as appearance or outer evidence goes ; and he concludes with an analysis of the signs of real death, indicating the various tests which should be made before pronouncing a man "dead".

He earnestly appeals to every family to take precautions and not to pronounce a man dead until it is proven that he really is so. The writer gives at the end of the book two tabulated diagrams, one an "*aide mémoire*" of the real signs of death and the tests which can verify them ; and the other an "*aide-mémoire*" of the classical methods of reanimating the seeming "dead". The first diagram ends with the quotation in bold type :—

*"It is better to treat a dead man as if he were alive, than to risk treating a living person as if he were dead."*

The second concludes with the following instruction :—

*"One has no right to despair before having tried these methods for several hours."*

And after a few instances showing how long it has sometimes been necessary to work upon a person before reanimating the body—he says : PERSEVERE !

It is advisable that people not only read but also keep Dr. Murols's book for ready reference.

From *The Daily Mirror* of November 25th, 1937, we take the following thrilling presentment of a still more thrilling incident :—

All the police and military were out controlling the crowds which packed the streets of Missolonghi, Greece, for the funeral of General Larnakutis, who was



placed in an ornate coffin, which was not screwed down, put on a hearse, and drawn through the streets.

Suddenly the lid of the coffin rose. The bewildered face of the "dead" General appeared. Women screamed and fainted at the "spectre". Hundreds cried, "It is a miracle."

The General, apparently, did not care whether it was a miracle or not. Exasperated, he seized his sword, which with other military regalia had been placed in the coffin, and charged at a section of the crowd.

He was overpowered before anyone was injured, but indignantly demanded why he should be presumed dead just because he had fallen into a deep sleep.

"Occultus" referred in his review to Madame Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled*. This book was written in 1877, but even after sixty years her remarks hold good. She cites many instances of suspended animation, and then defines what she terms "absolute" death in a most interesting paragraph:—

But, in the case of what physiologists would call "real death", but which is not actually so, the astral body was withdrawn; perhaps local decomposition has set in. How shall the man be brought to life again? The answer is, the interior body must be forced back into the exterior one, and vitality reawakened in the latter. The clock has run down, it must be wound. If death is absolute; if the organs have not only ceased to act, but have lost the susceptibility of renewed action, then the whole universe would have to be thrown into chaos to resuscitate the corpse—a miracle would be demanded. But, as we said before, the man is not dead when he is cold, stiff, pulseless, breathless, and even showing signs of decomposition; he is not dead when buried, nor afterward, until a certain point is reached. That point is, *when*

*the vital organs have become so decomposed, that if reënimated, they could not perform their customary functions; when the mainspring and cogs of the machine, so to speak, are so eaten away by rust, that they would snap upon the turning of the key. Until that point is reached, the astral body may be caused, without miracle, to reënter its former tabernacle, either by an effort of its own will, or under the resistless impulse of the will of one who knows the potencies of nature and how to direct them. The spark is not extinguished, but only latent—latent as the fire in the flint, or the heat in the cold iron.*

While on the subject of bodily death, we must make mention of the great popularity that Cremation—undoubtedly the most hygienic method of disposing of corpses—is achieving in Europe and in America. In 1876, the Theosophists, led by H. P. Blavatsky, gave wide publicity to the event—for it was then quite an event—of the cremation of Baron de Palm in New York, and drew upon their devoted heads religious wrath and social ridicule. Since then Cremation has been making steady progress, latterly even rapid progress, many eminent persons having chosen it in preference to burial. Hundreds of Crematoria are now in existence, to meet the increasing demand for cremation. Cremation is the cleanest way of disposition of the body, not only from the point of view of the living but also in respect to the dead. Occultism has other reasons also for favouring Cremation, but it opposes the embalming of the corpse before it is burnt.