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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly, and lost among the host—as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—The Voice of the Silence

VOL. XXII APRIL 1951 No. 4

"THUS HAVE I HEARD"—

The modern state, totalitarian or democratic, large or small, is patterned on the business corporation. Marshal Stalin heads the Board of Directors of the capitalistic corporation known as Russia; President Truman heads the Board in that known as the U.S.A. To be sure, the latter Board is duly elected by the shareholders; the former is not. Through his vote the American citizen has, like the ordinary shareholder, some say-so as to how the business shall be run; and, if denied his rights can take his grievance to the highest court in the land. The Russian subject is not free even to protest, to say nothing of having no influence on policy; he has no rights; he can only take what he is given and do as he is told. The war of ideologies of which we hear so much is, from this point of view, primarily a war between the advocates of radically different methods of seeking the same professed ends —the economic well-being of the citizen and the political security of the state.

The primacy of these ends is commonly taken for granted. The economic "standard of living" receives more attention than the "standard of life," with its implication of moral values. There is no question that outer conditions of life in the United States—abundance of food, educational and employment opportunities, sanitation, etc., present a standard for other countries to emulate. But many problems remain unsolved in spite of economic prosperity. Wide-spread neurosis, juvenile delinquency, prostitution, venereal disease, alcohol, racial and creedal prejudice persist in the Democracies and no doubt also behind the Russian purdah, though to what extent and how dealt with are matters of speculation.

The fundamental reason for the failure of all modern nations to achieve the goal of an enlightened and responsible as well as prosperous body of citizens is to be found in the almost universal failure to put first things first. Neither totalitarian Russia nor democratic America will save themselves, to say nothing of saving the world, until their policy is changed and moral principles, moral values, receive the place in their consideration that politics and economics have long usurped.

It would not be a new experiment. Three centuries B.C., in the great Empire of Asoka, the primacy of moral values was recognized in principle and practice. Is it not time to consider some of the fundamental teachings found in Asoka's Edicts and to call the great Buddhist Emperor of ancient India in consultation for the erection of the new World State? For it can never stand if built on the competitive increase of armaments, which must inevitably lead to war. It can rest firmly only on the rock of tried and tested moral principles.

Asoka's chief concern was to promote Dharma, duty or the moral law, among his people. His Rock and Pillar Edicts set forth, in different languages of his time, the requirements of moral conduct in injunctions as valid today as when they were inscribed.

Good is Dharma. But what does Dharma include? (It includes) freedom from self-indulgence, abundance of good deeds, kindness, liberality, truthfulness, and purity. [1]

Asoka was a model king, even by modern material standards, in his solicitude for his people's physical well-being and comfort, causing shade-trees to be planted along the high-roads, having orchards planted, wells dug, rest-houses built; but after enumerating these benefactions he explains:—

...that the people might strictly follow the path laid down by Dharma was this thus done by me.

Officers enforced the law, "being in a position to recall to duty the fickle-minded," but Asoka held outer conformity to the regulations to be less important for the advance of the people in Dharma than "inner meditation," which led them to applications beyond the requirements of the law. He sought to implant in his people regard and love for the moral law, by example as well as by precept:—

Whatever good deeds have been done by me, these the people have followed and these they will imitate and thereby they have been made to progress, and will be made to progress.

By the breadth of his religious tolerance no less than by the universality of his sympathies is Asoka fitted to be chosen as one of the architects of the new World State. "Concord alone," he declares, "is commendable, in this sense, that all should listen and be willing to listen to the doctrines professed by others."

The breadth of his sympathies is proved by benefactions to neighbouring countries, in which as well as at home, he was responsible for instituting medical and veterinary treatment. The missions which he sent abroad to spread the ennobling teachings of the Buddha are well known and have had a potent influence on world thought. The spirit which animated his efforts is reflected in his Rock and Pillar Edicts, which breathe a universality as much needed by the modern world as are his abjuring of war and his preaching of non-violence towards living beings. For Asoka declares:—

All men are as my children; as, on behalf of my own children, I desire that they may be provided with complete welfare and happiness both in this world and the next, the same I desire also for all men....

My highest duty is, indeed, the promotion of the good of all....There is no higher work than the promotion of the commonweal.

SHRAVAKA

[1] Citations are from *Asoka*, by DR. RADHAKUMUD MOOKERJI. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London.)

WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?

[**George Godwin** needs no introduction to our readers. In this frank expression on Democratic and Welfare States there are some thought-provoking statements. The subject is vitally important and needs to be discussed further.—ED.]

Two political terms, Democracy and Communism, now designate the two rival political systems which divide all mankind into two great camps. Communism has been very clearly defined, both in the works of Marx and in Communist Manifestos and expositions of later writers. We consequently have a very clear and precise idea of what Communism is as a political philosophy. We also know by experience during the post-war years by what methods its exponents seek to impose their philosophy upon the world.

The Communist sees human society as an antithesis in which the wicked Capitalist oppresses the victimized wage-slave, a description once true, but, in the main, no longer so. The object of Communism is the capture of political power by the proletariat, the abolition of private property, and the complete subjection of the individual, as individual, to the State.

The question is: What do we mean when we use the term Democracy?

Unlike Communism, Democracy is not a closely-reasoned political philosophy, with a single prophet and a holy book. Democracy has no Karl Marx, no *Das Kapital*. It is a general conception of the relation of the individual to the State. It is amorphous and in perpetual flux, changing with historical changes, meaning one thing today, another yesterday. And since we oppose this way of life to that sponsored by Communism, using the term continuously, uncritically and often, perhaps, with little understanding of its meaning, the need for understanding and definition is now of vital importance.

In general terms, Democracy has always meant some system in which power rests with the body of the people, as opposed to the rule of one, or of an oligarchy of the superior few. In antiquity it worked successfully in the form of the city state, but under conditions which would be held today to invalidate it. For Athens and other Greek City States tolerated the institution of slavery. Moreover, the classic form of Democracy was never subjected to the test of quantity, being designed for a comparatively insignificant social and political unit —the city. The characteristic of this form of Democracy was the ever-present liability—or, if you prefer it, the right—of every citizen to share personally in the government of the city.

A repeat pattern is discernible in

all subsequent forms of Democracy from that of Rome to the emergent cities of Flanders and Germany in the Middle Ages. As cities became absorbed into states, democratic ideas were subjected to new tests, for what may be suitable for a small political unit may be unsuitable for a large one. One cardinal change which came with the growth of nations was the substitution of indirect for direct representation. The citizen no longer expressed himself in person, but through his nominee. The nearest thing to the old system of democratic political function is to be found today in Switzerland. There, though the cantonal system of elected representatives converges on a central legislature in Berne, every commune, even the smallest village community, has its parliament and every villager *the right to initiate legislation.*

The central ideal of modern Democracy, theoretically, at least, is the widest possible degree of personal freedom for the individual, equality before the law, and political power, that is, the right to vote.

The citizen who possess the vote derives from it a sense of political effectiveness. He feels that he can bring to bear personal pressure, that he can function to make or unmake governments. In a true Democracy this would, indeed, be the case. But with delegation has passed control, for the voting of any one political party into power is in a real sense the surrender of political power by those who voted it in. A government, under a Democracy such as the English, can retain power for considerable periods after it has lost the confidence of the majority which returned it to power. The development of Gallup Polls and similar methods of sampling public opinion have made possible very close estimates of public opinion at any given time when the government in power has been in little danger of losing office by vote of censure in the House of Commons or other constitutional processes.

The truth would appear to be that the sense of political power conferred by the vote is largely illusory and that the endowment of a political party with a mandate to govern is, in fact, a surrender to a small group of supreme power, within that party. Sorel said many years ago :—

> The modern State is a body of intellectuals which is invested with privileges, and which possesses means of the kind called political for defending itself against the attacks made on it by groups of intellectuals eager to possess the profits of political employment.

Bertrand Russell has also suggested the illusory nature of the vote as an instrument of political function. The truth would appear to be that the possession of political power, whether wielded with absolute one-man authority, as in the case of Hitler, Stalin and Franco, or by a cabinet on the British pattern, engenders power appetite and propensities in individuals thus invested which were not apparent before their accession to power. It would there-

fore appear to be the case that beneath democratic forms may exist autocratic, or quasi-autocratic power, the State, as represented by the Cabinet, or central committee of the party in power, taking to itself, little by little, more and more of the liberty of the subject, drifting by force of innate psychological trends towards the dictator or autocratic mentality. Bertrand Russell said :—

> It has become increasingly difficult to put trust in the State as a means to liberty, or in political parties as instruments sufficiently powerful to force the State into the service of the people.

The above observation was made a number of years ago. Since then the tremendous increase in the power of the State in Britain has given new point to it. The present-day trend in countries vocal in their adherence to Democracy, in particular Britain and the United States, is towards the infringement of the rights of the individual and the enthronement of the State at his expense. To believe that this trend is peculiar to Communism is to be deceived by appearances. The price of the planned State is the freedom of the individual. It involves also the creation of a new caste system, one based, not on wealth, but on that privilege which belongs to the official who is armed with State authority. In Britain, the first years of State planning have radically transformed former fixed ideas of the rights of the individual as against the State. A vast body of bureaucrats has been created, armed with powers greater than the civil service has ever before aspired to, in particular with the power to make law by process of delegation. These are trends, not towards a political condition in which the State assumes less and less authority, but towards a forceable authoritarianism which is the negation of Democracy.

We have to ask another question concerning Democracy as it tends today towards the so-called Welfare State. It is this : Can the Welfare State, with its perpetual preoccupation with material goods, over estimate their importance at the expense of the things of the spirit ? Is poverty, divorced from actual want, a great evil ? If so, the teaching of the sages of all time has been grievously wrong. May it not be that poverty, divorced from actual lack of the necessities of life and redeemed from the fear of war, provides a better soil for the flowering of the human spirit ? And is it not significant that mankind's greatest teachers have been those who renounced material possessions, from Christ to Gandhi ?

Can there be any true Democracy without freedom of conscience ? Until the turn of the century wars were fought by small professional armies supplemented by hired mercenaries. They were small in scale, fought on well-defined battlefields, and were felt by populations only through the imposition of taxes to pay for them. Modern warfare has introduced a new ethical problem, namely, the right of the State to

force a man or woman to take part in total warfare, either as combatant or otherwise. In nothing else is the issue of State *vs.* Individual brought so sharply before the tribunal of men's consciences.

Conscription, hated but endured, by European peoples, was considered, even in the lifetime of this writer, as something alien to the British democratic way of life. A man fought when he wanted to and as a volunteer. The issue was seen as one for his own conscience and the State brought upon him no duress to go against his inner voice in this matter. Today we have conscription in the two western democracies of Britain and the United States, so that throughout the West the so-called Democratic states have assumed this power over their subjects, overriding the protests of those who have pleaded conscientious objections to all forms of life taking in the name (and this may well seem strange) of the State religion. Their fault is that they accept the Christian commandment: "Thou shalt not kill," literally.

Yes, the reader may interject at this point, but you excuse those who can prove a genuine and sincere objection. Here again there exists a wide gulf between the truth and general belief. It is true that the State recognizes this principle; true that tribunals were set up with the curious task of finding out the conditions of men's souls. But it is also true that these tribunals were sometimes little better than the court of Pilate, that men bitterly opposed to war were often forced into the fighting forces. Nor is that the last word here. Many conscientious objectors were kicked, beaten-up and treated with every sort of cruelty for refusal to take any part in the war.

The whole horrible story of this overriding of the individual by the democratic State has been told by Denis Hayes in, *Challenge of Conscience*, a fully-documented presentation of the facts. This is a book that reveals how far Britain has travelled towards the methods she condemns in the Totalitarian States.

Below the surface goods of many of the State's activities in the modern Democracies are evils similar to those execrated in the Communist lands. Democracy, like the British Constitution, is an unwritten instrument, in which it differs fundamentally from the theory of Communism, founded, like Papal authority, on the dogma of infallibility. It is in a state of perpetual flux, and has been, since the days when Socrates stood his trial before an Athenian court. Today, those who use this term should consider what they mean by it, and we who hope for the liberation of the common people of all lands from all idealogies and national hatreds and rivalries, should have a care just now and consider whether Democracy is indeed drifting towards a masked form of Totalitarianism—and take thought, too, as to what we can do about it.

GEORGE GODWIN

CAN A BUDDHIST BE A COMMUNIST ?

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY AND MARXISM

[The Editor of the English Buddhist journal, *The Middle Way*, **Mr. Cyril Moore,** writes here of the fundamental antithesis between the ideology of the Buddha and Dialectical Materialism, the recognition of which antithesis would be the best bulwark of Buddhist countries against Communist infiltration.—Ed.]

Buddhism, as shown in the remembered and recorded words of Gotama, has some points in common with Marxism. They both reject dogma, *a priori* principles and formal logic, and they both view nature, not as something static, but as a process of continuous change, of becoming, in an evolutionary sense, in which all things are interconnected. Buddhism, that is to say, agrees with the dialectic of Dialectical Materialism. But it does not agree with its materialism ; and their similar attitude to life only serves to make more clear their differences.

Karl Marx, it will be remembered, basing his conclusions upon a study of history, economics and philosophy, explained the consciousness of man as the product of his environment.

> All the ideas, and all the various tendencies, without exception, have their roots in the condition of the material forces of production.
>
> It is not the consciousness of men which determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence which determines their consciousness.

Consciousness is limited by the technology of production ; knowledge is limited to sense data which come within the capacities of existing instruments such as the micrometer and the microscope. Metaphysics he contemptuously labelled, " intoxicated speculation. "

Buddhist philosophy recognizes no such limitations either in the range of experience or in the nature of consciousness. It is based upon a radical and complete analysis of human nature in accordance with the law of cause and effect. Indeed, one of his followers epitomized the teaching of the Buddha thus : " Whatsoever things are produced by causes, of these the Buddha has revealed the cause. And likewise how they cease to be, this the great Master has expounded. " On hearing this, Sariputta, one of the most learned philosophers in India at the time of Gotama, at once attained a clear perception of the truth. There is no more scientific philosophy or religion than Buddhism. Instead of setting up boundaries to truth, it affirms that, as long as any barriers continue to exist in the mind, the understanding of truth is impossible.

Technologies are, after all, a matter of fashion ; they are based upon partial truths, since we can never, in

ordinary experience, know any more than a fraction of reality or a small part of the factors involved in any situation. The world we see, as Professor Young said in the Reith Lectures (1950), is a construct of the human mind. The ecclesiastical philosophers of the Middle Ages saw the world in theological terms; the modern scientist sees it in terms of relativity and mathematics; the Marxist in terms of economics and the technology of production. The Buddhist sees life in terms of human nature. Ignoring the boundaries of materialism he carries his dialectic beyond the world of the five senses into worlds of matter finer than air and energies more subtle than gamma rays. For, just as there are, beyond the million-starred galaxy of the Milky Way, others and larger galaxies which no telescope has yet seen, so, beyond the material world, there are others which can only be perceived by extra-sensory perception, by introspection, by intuition or by the direct experience of the mystic. It is unscientific to deny these facts, which have been experienced by hundreds of thousands of people, just because those people cannot adequately describe their experiences to the others. The colour yellow cannot be adequately described to a man blind from birth. About matters which are beyond comprehension the Buddha advised his followers not to waste time in useless speculation, but to keep an open mind. Any other attitude, except a critical one, is unscientific.

But the experience of those worlds which the materialists call illusion, because they cannot be measured by mechanical instruments, is the crowning achievement of the Buddhist way of life, the gateway to higher wisdom. It has nothing to do with magic or superstition and is free and open to anybody provided he prepares the instruments (his own psycho-physical organism) in the right way, for which detailed instructions are given in certain *sutras*.

Contrary to the Marxist belief that the forcible changing of conditions will produce a new kind of individual, the Buddha asserts that it is only by change in individuals that conditions can be altered. The most popular Buddhist scripture, *The Dhammapada*, brings out the point in its opening verse:

> All that we are is the result of what we have thought. It is founded upon our thoughts. It is made up of our thoughts.

This is no more than a saying, a collection of words, until the individual has, by self-knowledge and searching analysis, seen how his character, body, circumstances and his appearance in other people's minds all, without exception, result from causes not outside but within himself. Then only can he, if he wishes, set in operation the causes which will affect his final enlightenment. The process is summed up in the Eightfold Path. There is for the sincere Buddhist no escape from a scientific understanding and

application of the laws of his own being.

From the Marxist point of view the Soviet Union has been true to its doctrine in imposing rigid control over the material and mental conditions of its subjects in order to mould them as instruments of production or of state power. To deny freedom of thought and speech and compel uncritical acceptance of Marxist ideas was quite logical. Similarly, for those who imagine that mental and moral forces are outside the laws of cause and effect, it would be quixotic to think of kindness or to hesitate to use the forces of fear and misrepresentation if they appeared to offer a short cut to Utopia.

The Marxist, however, is not concerned with each individual, he is concerned with the state. Both Marx and Engels denied that the main function of the state was to organize, co-ordinate and control the activities of the nation for the benefit of its rulers (whether they were a minority or the majority, represented by an elected government). The state to them was the product of the irreconcilability of class antagonism. Their minds were obsessed with the functions of the police, the prisons and the armed forces. When one considers it, it was quite natural that this aspect should absorb the attention of men who conceived their mission to be the appropriation of property and the means of production and the deposing of governments by bloody revolution. Compare this with the views of historians like Prof. G. M. Trevelyan and one sees how thoroughly the individual mind influences the interpretation of facts. Marx prophesied that the effects of their schemes would make it possible to create a nation of beings of a new type who would not need to be controlled, and so would render the state unnecessary; his assertion was: "The state will wither away." But even Marx admitted that there was no historical evidence to prove that these effects would follow from such causes.

The Bolsheviks, it is well known, followed the Marxist plan to the letter. That was over 30 years ago, too soon, by a thousand years or more, to expect a whole nation of new-type beings to emerge. But are there any indications that state repression is becoming less necessary in Russia? Has the state even started to wither? On the contrary, there has arisen a monster of the very pattern Karl Marx feared. No modern state, except perhaps Germany under Hitler, so completely fits the definition of a "repressive force for the suppression of the oppressed classes." Russia's tremendous police force, backed by a network of secret agents, her colossal army, the suppression of freedom of speech, of the press, of elections, the prisons and prison camps, the devilish methods of psychological torture and the attempt to segregate the nation behind an iron curtain, all these show how large, wide-spread

and strong are the oppressed and how great is the fear of the oppressors. The history of similar dictatorships, accompanied by a reign of terror, goes to show that the forces of hatred, cruelty and oppression which have been engendered eventually bring about the destruction of the oppressors. The means condition the end; the law of karma is ineluctable.

Marxists in Buddhist countries are trying to make people believe that Buddhism is compatible with Communism, just as in Christian countries they attempt to prove that it is practical Christianity. Lenin himself severely and contemptuously denounced such people as pretend that bloodshed can be avoided and who try to soften the doctrine. In *State and Revolution,* after condemning all such pretence, he wrote "The substitution of the proletarian state for the bourgeois state is impossible without a violent revolution" and "The necessity for systematically imbuing the masses with *this* and precisely this view of violent revolution lies at the root of the *whole* of Marx's and Engels' doctrine."

The Buddha left no possible ground for compromise upon this point when he said, "There are two things in the world which are immutably fixed, that good actions bring happiness and bad actions result in misery." How can a sincere Marxist, who is convinced that the class struggle is the actual motive force of events and believes in a mission of hatred, murder and appropriation, follow the Buddhist teaching to cultivate a mind of loving kindness towards all the world? The Buddhist way is diametrically opposite to the Marxist way. For each day the devout Buddhist

> lets his mind pervade one quarter of the world with thoughts of love, so the second and so the third and the fourth. And thus the world above, below, around and everywhere, does he continue to pervade with a heart of love, far-reaching and beyond measure. *(Tevijja Sutta).*

It must follow, of course, that any so-called Buddhist who does not do everything within his power to amend social injustice and to ensure the welfare of all, is merely a hypocrite. "Inaction in a deed of mercy" becomes, to the virtuous, "an action in a deadly sin." Each man and woman must choose between the two philosophies and must suffer the consequences of that choice either in this life or another.

It would be unfair to deny that the ideal adopted by Marx was a good one as far as it went: "From everybody according to his capacity; to everybody according to his needs." This is the heaven Marx promised to his followers—only to be realized, however, after the elimination of the state and the creation of a nation of beings of the new type. As the inspiration for a religion of social justice it is a powerful force today, for Marx knew that men habitually act contrary to their personal interests when they are convinced that the end is good. One must not confuse

the passionate self-sacrifice of Communist idealists with the power lust of the thugs who cynically use that idealism to achieve their own designs and then invariably liquidate the idealists. The Communist ideal is powerful enough to compel intelligent men, brilliant men like Dr. Fuchs, to betray secrets which they know will be used to conquer the country which fosters them. These traitors imagine themselves to be crusaders of liberation. They become as fanatical as the religious maniacs of the Middle Ages who handed over their own families to the fiendish tortures of the holy murderers.

What, to the Buddhist, appears to be the greatest delusion of Marxist thinkers is the belief that a nation, or a group of nations, composed of dominated, intellectually enslaved individuals, living in fear of liquidation if they criticize the official dogmas in science, art or politics, can ever become a new and better type of being or even a really great nation. If men are not free to make mistakes how can they learn, how can they evolve ? Buddhism logically carries its scientific attitude to a point where the Marxist dare not follow—that of individual choice of belief and action. The individual is exhorted to rely upon no other light except his own intelligence. Many times in the *sutras* appears a warning which may be paraphrased as follows :—

> Do not give credence to anything merely upon hearsay. Put not your faith in traditions merely because they are old. Do not believe anything merely upon the ground of common report or long usage, or merely because of probability. Believe nothing merely upon the authority of teachers or priests.
>
> But whatsoever, after personal experience and investigation, is found to agree with reason and tends to serve your own well-being and the well-being of others—that cleave to as truth and shape your life in accordance with it.

Here individual judgment and experience are supreme. On this basis Marxism and Communism, as we know them, could not exist.

CYRIL MOORE

THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN

A SPIRITUAL VIEW

[We publish here in somewhat condensed form the synopsis prepared by **Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao** of the Gujarat College, Ahmedabad, of his two lectures delivered at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on April 15th and 17th, 1950, on "The Nature of Man" and "The Destiny of Man," respectively.—ED.]

What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form, in moving, how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals!

Hamlet, Act II, Scene II.

Man's reflections on his essential nature and destiny have produced the spiritual and the secular views. The spiritual and the Humanist views regard man as the unique product of evolution and as having a consciously formulated destiny.

At the human level evolution took a distinct turn. Its pace is enormously accelerated. The discontinuity is significant and striking. Man is the trustee of his progress, and evolution is no longer blind and automatic. It is self-conscious and Man can choose to seek his destiny or to sink into savagery. In the words of the *Aitareyaranyaka*,

The animals live from moment to moment; among living beings, it is man alone that says what he has known, that sees what he has known. He knows the future, this world and the next; and desires to attain the immortal through the mortal. Thus he is endowed, while other creatures are aware of only hunger and thirst.

Man's interests outrun his biological needs. The animals, Walt Whitman wrote, "do not sweat and whine about their condition. They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins." It is man that keeps diaries, uses mirrors, writes histories, propounds mathematical theorems in beleagured cities, conducts and composes metaphysical arguments in condemned cells. Or, as Dr. Julian Huxley in our day has written:—

With the evolution of man the character of progress is altered. With human consciousness, values and ideals appeared on earth for the first time. The criterion of further progress must include the degree to which those ideal values are satisfied. The quest for truth and knowledge, virtue, beauty and æsthetic expression, and its satisfaction through the channels of science and philosophy, mysticism and morality, literature and arts, becomes one of the modes and avenues of evolutionary progress.

The distinct characteristic of man according to the Humanists is Reason. According to the religionists

man's distinct characteristic is a supersensuous, immortal entity called Soul. Both regard man as capable of self-criticism and of conscious planning. Man stands at the crossroads of evolution with an animal heritage and a rational ideal, between which there is a perpetual conflict. The human predicament is well described by Fulke Greville :—

Oh wearisome condition of Humanity,
Born under one Law to another bound,
Vainly begot and yet forbidden vanity,
Created sick and commanded to be sound.
What meaneth Nature by these diverse Laws ?
Passion and Reason, self-division's cause.

Man according to the Humanist, can overcome the split in his personality by reason and thought. He is capable of self-examination. "To be ignorant is not the special prerogative of man, to know that he is ignorant is his special privilege," Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has observed.

Man has immense possibilities for good and ill. He is the architect of his own fortune or misfortune. With his powers of conceptual thought and speech and his capacity for action, he has glutted the modern world with scientific inventions and filled the art galleries with his creations. He has but to pursue the proper ends and adopt the right means to be able to build a paradise on earth.

The uniqueness of man and his importance are not accepted by certain scientists who regard man as just like any other natural product. Copernicus, by declaring that our earth was not the centre of the universe but only a tiny speck in the world system, abolished the primacy of man's planet in the universe. Darwin in his turn abolished the primacy of man on the planet by robbing him of his majesty and relegating him to Simian stock and ape-like instincts. Mechanistic and deterministic psychologies have abolished the primacy of mind in man by obliterating the difference between mind and body.

Since the days of Descartes men have accepted the "ghost in the machine" called mind or soul. In *The Concept of Mind* Prof. Gilbert Ryle attempts to exorcize this ghost, asserting that it does not exist. There is no distinction, he claims, between mind and body and to erect the mind as essentially having, for its attribute, thought is the sort of mistake we make, if, after seeing all the colleges that compose a university, we ask to see the university itself.

Apart from this denial of any distinction between mind and matter, Freud dealt the severest blow to man's craving for grandiosity. He declared the freedom of man to be a myth, and that every man was a plaything, a puppet governed by the unconscious in him. We do not choose things, he maintained, but things are chosen for us. Thus in different ways the successive savants of secular thought challenged man's uniqueness.

It is pointed out that man does not differ from animals in his physical and chemical constitution.

The working of man's mind obeys also, it is claimed, the same laws of physics and chemistry as a piece of matter. His instincts are his prime movers. A strictly mechanistic interpretation of the most complicated activities of man is given by Watson's Behaviourist school, which explains all human behaviour in a stimulus-and-response formula. Man is a huge, complicated, organic machine assembled and ready to run. Consciousness is merely an epi-phenomenon. The mechanist hypothesis is fast going out of fashion, even in scientific circles, though the infant science of endocrinology makes us the victims of our ductless glands, which are claimed to determine not only our stature but also our mental powers. A wise conditioning and good glands, we are told, can make angels of us. The supply of iodine to the thyroid sets right many defects.

The popular theological view of man is not materialistic but it also is unsatisfactory. It posits a soul but this soul, according to the fundamentalists of the various theologies, is a fallen creature, born in sin and under the dominion of Satan, from which he can be delivered only by the grace of the Lord, mediated through a particular Prophet. Every denominational religion promises salvation to followers of its own creed. Such rigid dogmatizing necessarily leads to the condemnation of other sects as heretical. The results are religious wars, crusades, and all that is associated with fanaticism. We have rival sects and constant ill-will. This is what Swift meant when he said, "We have enough religion to make us hate one another."

We need not, however, despair. Neither the purely scientific nor the purely rationalistic view of the nature of man makes it possible to reconcile his destiny and the ideals he has pursued. The various naturalistic and Rationalist theories, moreover, are themselves the products of man's speculations, and they do not cover his entire nature. The late Prof. A. S. Eddington concluded his work, *Space, Time and Gravitation*, with this verdict:—

> We have found that where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind has put into nature. We have found a strange footprint on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after another, to account for its origin. At last, we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the footprint. And lo! it is our own.

Nor need the theological view of man make us despair. In the history of human thought there is a *spiritual view* of man coming to us down the ages. It has the largest intellectual ancestry. It is variously called the perennial philosophy, the Eternal Gospel, the *Sanatana Dharma*, Theosophy. This view states that the essence of man is spiritual consciousness, which is at once Bliss, Knowledge and Reality (*Sat*, *Cit* and *Ananda*). Man is a many-levelled being and at his core

he is Spirit. This Spirit is called in the Upanishads: Brahman and Atman. There is no plural for Atman. It is one undivided consciousness functioning in all. Man's ignorance and his unregenerate nature cover over thickly the Reality in him and because of this men feel that they are competing individuals, the good of each being opposed to that of the other. The spiritual experience of the fundamental oneness of Reality alone can make us realize the fellowship among men.

The spiritual view declares that the nature of man is not his observable personality, his vital principle, his mental states, or his intelligence. In the language of the Upanishads these are in him, the *annamaya*, *pranamaya*, *manomaya* and *vigñānamaya koṣās*. At the back of them all is his real nature which is described as the state of bliss, the *ananda maya koṣā*. The moment man realizes this state he sheds his limitations and becomes godlike in his apprehension and his sympathies. The call of spiritual religion is the exhortation to seek, not the brief satisfactions, but the lasting purpose of life, not pleasant existence but creative spiritual life. The spiritual consciousness is the centre. Browning called it the "imprisoned splendour." The great novelist, Charles Morgan, put it thus:—

> For years you may not ask "Who am I?" Men go all there lives without asking a question about the circulation of their blood. But their is never a time, walking or sleeping, in which the idea "I am" is not alive in you, unaffected by time, deeper than thought, deeper than feeling, the very spring of instinct and intuition, the original, the unsilenceable whisper of the Soul.

With one voice the great spiritual Masters of the world have asked us to seek the experience which is man's manifest destiny, as indicated by the "master-word" of Indian Philosophy, which is *mokṣa*.

P. Nagaraja Rao

MISSIONARY PHILOLOGICAL ERRORS

[Some interesting points are brought out in this article by **M. D. W. Jeffreys, M.A. (Oxon.) PH.D. (London)**, based in part on his own observations as an official in West Africa. His essay provokes thought upon issues besides the one he raises. Perhaps linguistic confusion is the symbol of the confusion of ideas which proselytism inevitably introduces by attempting to superimpose one set of dogmas on another. The level of African thought and expression would have to be incredibly low for the travesty of Christianity in the children's book quoted to represent a cultural advance !—ED.]

An ounce of scientific training is worth a ton of amateurish enthusiasm. This truism may be illustrated by a remark, attributed to an army surgeon whose hospital at the outset of the South African war was staffed with " born nurses " brimming over with enthusiasm. He shipped them home with a request for a few trained ones. In the mission field the same need holds good.

For many years recruits have conformed with the above type of enthusiastic amateur. A burning zeal and a complete ignorance of the culture and of the basic principles of the language spoken by the heathen among whom they are to work, have been in the past sufficient qualifications to win many a martyr's crown and yet leave unleavened the heathen masses. Such was the picture that I met when, more than 35 years ago, I began life as an Assistant District Officer on the mud flats of the Niger.

A good instance of such misguided enthusiasm coupled with ignorance of the cultural and linguistic background of a Pagan African people is the following :—

At least one heresy, splitting the church asunder, can be traced to an erroneous translation of a word in the Bible. The translator came to the text: "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." Not knowing and not taking pains to enquire as to the African's belief in witchcraft, he translated " witch " by *musawo*, which means the " witch finder, " the " doctor. " " Thou shalt not suffer a doctor to live "—was offered to the people as the authentic word of God. Basing their doctrine upon that text, a sect arose which refused to call in a physician or use medicine.[1]

Today much is changed, schools and colleges for training the neophyte exist and he no longer plunges into an uncharted sea, untaught in the art of keeping his head above water. Training today specializes in the linguistic principles of the languages where the future missionary's activities will lie. Thus, in Africa, thanks to the School of Oriental Studies in London and the linguistic work of Drs. Ida Ward and Westermann,

[1] *Knowing the African*. By E. W. SMITH. 1946. p. 44.

it is at last recognized that most Sudanic and Bantu tongues are tone languages. Yet this discovery was announced nearly 60 years ago. Sir Alfred Moloney, then Governor of Lagos wrote :—

A Yoruba goes so far as to consider that his language is sufficiently musical to be easily imitated instrumentally, and accordingly to allow a player, through his instrument, to convey his thought without having recourse to words. Such a practice is often referred to as the drum language; *viz.*, the imitation of the human voice by the drums; and to understand it, one has to know the accent of pronunciation in the vernacular and to be capable of recognizing the different and corresponding notes of the drummer.[1]

Nearly 40 years prior to Governor Moloney's statement, Bishop Crowther[2] had made this point clear. Thus, years ago, a few persons had the wisdom to realize that many African languages depended upon music for their understanding, yet in spite of such wisdom existing in some missionary societies, one found the zeal of the ignorant over-riding it and the translation of European hymns into a tone language, to be sung to the European hymn tunes, occurred on a grand scale. For the unreflecting zealot it was possible to say, as the sun set on a life's endeavour: "Something attempted, something done."

Yet the results, the tune translations, were a chaos of unintelligible sounds with a consequent complete loss of sense, because the words were strange. "In such a language the tone or pitch of the voice may serve two purposes; it may be a bearer of meaning in that it, and it alone, distinguishes one word from another (semantic tones), and it may be used to show grammatical relationships (grammatical tones)."[3]

Because musical sounds (tones) can convey a correct idea of words in speech, it follows that to alter the musical sounds (tones) will result in altering the meaning of the words in speech. For singing in Ibibio, it is necessary to reverse Lewis Carroll's advice, and say instead :—"Take care of the sounds and the sense will take care of itself."[4]

Captain Rattray had clearly drawn attention to this linguistic feature :

...it would appear that when we set a *librette* in Ashanti to a European score we must jumble the whole sense of the words and render them either meaningless or ridiculous. I have been informed by Africans that this is really the case, and that when children sing songs in schools in their own language set to our music, the whole thing is unintelligible to the outsider and is often to the singers themselves ridiculous.[5]

[1] Royal Geographical Society. *Proceedings*, Vol. 12, p. 609.

[2] *Grammar and Vocabulary of the Nupe Language*. By S. Crowther. 1864. p. iii.

[3] *The Phonetic and Tonal Structure of Ejik*. By I. Ward. 1933. p. 30.

[4] *Old Calabar and Some Notes on the Ibibio Language*. By M. D. W. Jeffreys. 1935. p. 92.

[5] *Ashanti*. By R. S. Rattray. p. 247.

The recognition of the part that semantic tones play in the philology of a language is having its effect. The translation of European hymns into native languages sung to European tunes is ceasing. Philological errors based on this ignorance of the part played by semantic tones in a language are not likely to be repeated on a large scale in future, and many of the present, translated hymns and tunes will be dropped as more appropriate ones are written.

It is more than likely that no known European church tunes will ever fit any native translation of a hymn. A vast field, with fame awaiting its pioneers, now lies to hand, namely, the collecting of native tunes and melodies and the creation of hymns in the native languages to fit these tunes. We find a certain number of melodies common to many of the languages on the West Coast of Africa. Thus some of the native dance tunes of the Gold Coast, reproduced by gramophone records, were instantly recognized among the Ibibio of the Okanafun clan as tunes of their own.

There is also another domain where philological errors are rife and create disappointment, namely, the cultural one. All West African tribes have had several culture contacts. No tribe has an indigenous culture, one evolved entirely by itself.

The Rev. Father Williams in *The Hebrewisms of West Africa* draws attention to a widely diffused type of culture which extends, so far as Africa is concerned, from Cairo to the Canaries. Father Williams's thesis is that the diaspora of the Jews resulted in a number of them settling in various parts of Africa and there perpetuating a culture, of which so much still remains as to be recognizable today as Jewish, hence the title of his book.

The title is unfortunate. What the Reverend Father is describing is the existence of items of culture among the tribes of West Africa similar to, or even identical with, those of the Hebrews. To state that West Africa owes this identical item to the Hebrew is to make a deduction from evidence that is non-existent.

The known facts are, that the Hebrews entered Egypt as Nomad pastoralists and left as skilled craftsmen and agriculturalists. The time spent in Egypt is not agreed upon but the accepted limits are 250 to 400 years. In either case the period affords a sufficiently long sojourn for the Hebrews to have become thoroughly imbued with the Egyptian religion and culture.

The subject of Egyptian cultural influence on the Jews cannot be discussed here but two indications of this influence will be given.

Traces of Egyptian influence are conspicuous throughout the book (*Exodus*). Its language shows a large infusion of Egyptian words : the enactments of the Mosaic law are based upon Egyptian life.[1]

It is well known that the native tribes to the West of the Nile have

[1] E. A. Wallis Budge. p. 11.

also been repeatedly exposed to Egyptian influences and culture, ever since Egypt began to trade with and to send expeditions into Africa. It is thus not surprising to find among the West African tribes the same signs of culture as one finds among the Hebrews. Both people inherit from a common cultural source. So much for the background of modern missionary effort in West Africa; now for the philological errors.

Philologically, what happens when a people acquires a culture, either by imitating it or by having it imposed upon them, is a question that does not appear as yet to have been asked and answered. The answer to one aspect, is the following truism. *In an acquired or imposed religious culture the technical, or key-words are not indigenous but foreign.*

In the great Ibo tribes of Nigeria there is a sect who call themselves Umundri, *i.e.*, the children of Ndri or Nri. They claim to be of sky origin, from the sun, and perhaps in the term *Nri* one may detect the Egyptian root *Re*, *Ri* or *Ra* = Sun.

An examination of their culture shows a worship of the sun still existent today. One of the Ibo words for the Supreme Being is *Chuku*. A local Ibo word for the sun is *chi*; as in such expressions as "*Ra Chifo*," a form of greeting, meaning, "Until the sun rises." A similar expression exists for the setting of the sun. A halo around the sun is called *ndi chie* where *ndi* = children. But this root *Chu* is too close to the Egyptian root *Shu* for the resemblance to be a fortuitous coincidence. In the worship of *Chuku* or of *Chiuku*, one sees such a true Sun worship as in Abyssinia and in ancient Egypt. *Chuku* appears to be a pure Egyptian word, whereas *Chu* is the Ibo for the Egyptian *Shu*.

Now in Christian religious instruction, *i.e.*, in catechisms, and in translations of the Bible into Ibo, many missions have adopted the Ibo word, *Chuku*, to translate the word God. But is God the sun? What concepts of the Christian idea of God can the Ibo convert have, accustomed as he is to a worship of the sun?

This sun-cult background manifesting itself through the Christian teaching, due to the use of vernacular words to translate the Christian words, can be seen in operation among the South American Pagans. "The Quecha of Bolivia assimilated the Holy Virgin to their female Earth Deity, and credit her with the invention of coca-chewing, while Brazilian aborigines identify Christ and St. Peter with the sun and moon, respectively." [1]

Similar types of errors, through disregarding the above italicized rule, can be detected in Southern Nigeria. Thus among the Ibibio, the word for the ghost of a dead man and hence for the ancestral spirit is *ekpo* but the missions have selected this word to translate: "devils."

[1] *Cultural Anthropology*. By R. Lowie. 1946. p. 375.

For the native, *ekpo* denotes the disembodied "ego," the persistent personality. Now the *ekpo* of one's ancestor is revered and adored. Prayers are offered to it, which is not at all the attitude a missionary expects to be adopted towards Satan and his Host.

The word adopted by the old Romish missionaries for "holy" was *nkisi*, fetish, a most unfortunate selection.... The old missionaries had made a still more egregious blunder in the word which they adopted for "church," *nzo ankisi*; this is the common word for "grave"; it is a euphemism meaning "fetish house." The missionaries called their churches—the buildings—"fetish houses," and then, apparently in perfect ignorance of its meaning, they spoke of the *nzo ankisi a Roma*, "the church of Rome." To the native ear it meant the "Roman grave," so we cannot wonder that the poor people became a bit confused when the "company of believers" was called a "grave"; the whole idea was an impenetrable mystery.[1]

If a new heaven or a new earth is to be presented to the heathen, it is useless to use their terms, because their terminology fits into, and is part and parcel of their Pagan religious background. If the key-words are to retain more than a semblance of their Christian significance in their Pagan environment, they must be words new to the Pagans, words which carry new ideas.

Pagan words cannot be emptied of their Pagan content or treated as Pagan material objects were when Pope Gregory instructed St. Augustine, in his mission to then Pagan England, to cleanse and purge with holy water the Pagan temples and then to consecrate and dedicate them to the worship of the true God. Words are crystallized psychology and, once crystallized, cannot be metamorphosed by any missionary alchemy. If we think otherwise we deceive ourselves.

Some of the Roman Catholic Missions have avoided this pitfall, not because they were consciously aware of it, but because a certain procedure was forced upon them by the multiplicity of Pagan tongues. They found themselves at the gates of a Tower of Babel and decided to use a type of *lingua franca*.

However deplorable, from an æsthetic point of view, this device may have been, nevertheless from an instructional point of view the choice is sane. A new technique is being introduced and with it the technical or key-words are also taught in place of selecting "inadequate vernacular terms" from a local Pagan dialect.

In the Prefecture of Buea which covers the British Cameroons, such a great veriety of languages is spoken that the *lingua franca* selected by this Roman Catholic Mission for the instruction of its adherents is "pidgin" English.

Two extracts from a book for children will show that the contrast between the new and the old order, between Christianity and Paganism,

[1] *Pioneering on the Congo.* By W. H. BENTLEY. 1900. I, p. 236.

is well defined and well kept. The decalogue is being presented to the child :—

4. And Moses he been bring them people close for the Hillside, and them here how God, He been talk for inside them cloud say :
1. "I am God your Massa. You no must get other god only me. You no make juju.
2. "You no talk God name for nothing.
9. "You no want other man he woman."

Christ before Caiaphas :

2. For back, Caiaphas he been stand for up, for talk for Jesus say :
"Me, I do swear You by God whe He de live, make You talk for we, You be Christ the Bikin for God who He de live, or You no be ?"

Jesus, He been answer for He say :—"Yes, Me be."

After the high priest he been tear cloth he say :

"He done curse God ! How you de member for them one ?"

All them been halla say : "He done fall ; make he die."[1]

At the back of the selection of a *lingua franca*, to surmount the difficulties of multitudinous languages, may possibly be discerned the unthinking acceptance of the rule that by making the entire instruction of a new religion in a new language one can control the teaching and the concepts taught.

M. D. W. JEFFREYS

CO-OPERATIVE EDUCATION

One of the most recent of the valuable studies of the Reserve Bank of India in the co-operative field is its survey of "Co-operative Education," international in its scope and practical in its recommendations. That education in the principles and practice of co-operation is tremendously important, if not indispensable to success, seems obvious. Co-operative schools, training classes, study courses for co-operative office-bearers and employees as well as ordinary members in many countries bear witness to the widespread recognition that co-operation in many lines has a definite technique that must be mastered.

The failure to provide for co-operative education on any adequate scale in India, with all due deference to the efforts in certain of the more co-operatively advanced states such as Bombay and Madras, must be held partly responsible for the failure of the Indian Co-operative Movement to meet the high hopes which had been entertained for it.

Yet, if enthusiasm for a calling cannot by itself produce the master craftsman in any line, no more can technical virtuosity alone suffice. Emerson was right in declaring that "every great and commanding movement in the annals of the world is the triumph of enthusiasm." No more than honesty as a policy or non-violence as a technique can co-operation as a mere tool of economic betterment command full loyalty or readiness to sacrifice the self-interest of the moment for the group's long-term good. The failure of propagandists to impart the philosophical basis of the movement as expression of human brotherhood and the slurring over of the possibilities of co-operation for character formation is a disservice to the public and the cause. Co-operation at its best is not a mere expedient ; it can and should be made a way of life.

[1] *Bible History : A Pidgin English Edition of Dr. Knecht's Child's Bible History*. 1930. pp. 46, 126.

MONASTIC MUSINGS ON COUSIN DEATH

[**Swami Agehananda Bharati** presents here his considerations on a subject which concerns every man. Those convinced of the omnipresence of Life, in which even the mineral atom shares, will not admit the blankness and inertia which he tentatively ascribes to the stone, chosen by him to symbolize non-consciousness. Likewise those who have themselves brought back from " dreamless sleep " inspirations, intuitions, insights of many kinds, which were not theirs when they went to sleep, will fail to find convincing his equating of unconsciousness with " dreamless sleep " as also with final Bliss. But, while many may not agree with his conclusions or share his hope for a rather too facile escape from the round of birth and death, they will find in his article a challenge to preconceptions and a stimulus to thought.—ED.]

Some famous man has exclaimed : " How sweet is Death ! Thank God that it exists, else the world would be intolerable." We can underwrite this and hold its confirmation obligatory for a philosopher, even though he be a hedonist, a eudæmonist, or a utilitarian—or rather because of being such. Yet it takes a good deal of humour plus a spirit of enterprise to see it, and the faintest trace of Philistinism is an unsurmountable obstacle to candid reflection on death, which the philosophic tyro must think a gloomy subject.

At the outset we shall have to rid ourselves of loyalty to any eschatological dogma. As long as we abide by what the priests declare on the matter, we remain guilty of a sort of spiritual Philistinism.

There are two types of eschatological promise—pessimistic and optimistic—their respective votaries being philosophers and prophets, quite promiscuously ; it is wrong to believe that the former necessarily tend to pessimism, the latter to the other extreme—there have been as many pessimist prophets as optimist philosophers, *e.g.*, Calvin and Bacon. Both these outlooks are too subjective to serve as all-valid criteria for the problem ; hence, they are no better than full adherence to the scriptures. We shall try to apply a dose of philosophic common-sense.

The question whether there is going to be *something* after our demise or whether there will be *nothing* has been the standing Problem ever since young Nachiketas put it to Yama, to the great embarrassment of the Old Man. The question is as bewildering to wise men today and the answer is no nearer. We do not have the assurance to venture on a self-concocted reply nor shall we commit ourselves to any reply given in the world's bibles. We shall try to hold before us whatever our minds can fancy, and then adjust our attitude to these possible eventualities. Without trespassing on epistemological grounds, we can imagine but three kinds of post-mortem

states: (1) There will be nothing at all or (2) there will be something bearing some relation to what we have been or done here or (3) there will be something quite unconnected with what we have been, done or imagined.

Let us start with the last. Suppose a man came back to tell us that he had experienced some kind of consciousness, but that it was impossible to re-think or narrate it—although he had not forgotten even the details. This is what Lazarus is said to have reported, according to an apocryphal record. Well, such an account is of no interest to us. The premise on which we must agree for dialectic expression should be one of at least formal logic—and this demand is not satisfied by this 3rd proposition. Formal logic permits us to depict an elephant singing "*O sole mio,*" or even the famous hare's horns of our Nyaya logicians—but it does not permit a square circle or boiling ice-cream. It can connive at any weird Puranic description of how the good and the wicked fare after death, but not at Lazarus' proposition, so this is out of present consideration.

As to the 2nd possibility: here lie all the hope and anguish of mankind. The pessimist's as well as the optimist's experiences can move only within this sphere. Here again there are but two subdivisions: either we shall, in some way or other, receive reward for our virtues and punishment for our vices, or we shall receive suffering or happiness through the unconditioned will or whim of some Being in charge.

If the latter be the case, we had better not think of such a Being, and least of all pay it obeisance, but try to have a good time now. The alternative—reward for the good and punishment for the bad—amounts either to the logically acceptable Indian teaching of Karma, or to the non-Indian paradises, heavens, hells, purgatories, etc.

Of course there may be some prejudice in our contention that even independent, untraditional reflection rather leads toward the Karmic line of eschatological thought. But the deductions of our non-Hindu and non-Buddhist colleagues in support of eternal salvation or eternal damnation as resulting from our ephemeral deeds (and we cannot understand human action as other than ephemeral) fail to convince us. They do not fit into the causal *nexus* natural to our minds. The idea that there is no such *nexus* incumbent on the great Dispenser of reward and penalty, makes us then blame Him for having installed this faculty in His creatures. If the Buddhists thus claimed an eternal sequence from a non-eternal cause we could understand it, as causality is radically denied there—the *patticca-samuppada* is no causal statement—but even the Buddhist prefers the Karma explanation.

If we feel attracted by psychological idealism we may hold that whatever we *want* to be, or *believe* to be the state hereafter, some such state

will be conjured up, one which we have loved to imagine or one which we have dreaded. All this presupposes, of course, that we take a surviving entity for granted. To put it simply: the psychological idealist, or the solipsist, expects some pleasures or tortures beyond, which he can now conceive as proportionate to his good or wicked demeanour. Such an attitude is very common and sound, and it is usually also that of the unreflecting. It certainly serves as a stimulant to charity and civility and as a deterrent from their opposites.

To be in a position to catch hold of a last prop if all else has failed, and to clasp a last chance to make up for a lifetime's ethical failure, is a comforting thought, moreover, for Mr. Everyman. This accounts for the fact that redeeming sacraments, confessions, ablutions and absolutions in the last critical minutes are welcome even to such as would before have been the least suspected of "believing." Oliver Ropes, the notorious gangster, is reported to have said, in his Negro dialect, on calling a priest in before his execution: "One never know, do one?"

The first suggestion, however, seems to us the most interesting one, *viz.*, "There will be nothing at all." Now Bergson found that "nothing" was a fictitious notion—being either an inversion of "something" or a substitution by anything else. But this is not what we mean by our eschatological "nothing." In this respect at least, we are too Cartesian in our mental make-up. Unless the *cogito ergo sum* applies to the hereafter, we cannot take the matter up at all—neither can the believers in a gospel.

What we here mean by "nothing" is a state of complete unconsciousness—or at least as complete as that of dreamless sleep—positing that there is a state like that. Judging by common-sense alone and skipping all reflection for the moment, we must conjecture that there cannot be any subjective difference between such a state and that of a stone—positing again that a stone is as blank and inert as we think. This may be what the *Yoga-Vasishtha* refers to as "*pâshânavat-samam*," *i. e.*, "like unto a stone"; strangely enough, this book points this out as the very highest state of spiritual achievement, above the *turîya*-state of superconsciousness usually mentioned. And the *Shruti* itself declares that the soul merges into Bliss at the time of deep sleep.

What are we to make of all this? Well, risking some discomfort on the part of those who understand Bliss anthropomorphically, *i.e.*, sensing a relation, however faint, with some positive pleasure, we like to interpret these dicta in a more literal way. We identify that Bliss with absolute, stone-like inertia or non-cosciousness. Many objections are bound to arise here and they are well understandable to the psychologist. All, from the outspoken Epicurean to the severest Shankarite, tend to claim something positively conscious for

the final state. We can only reply laconically, that it is all only a matter of taste. We contend that what we " remember " to have been hours of dreamless sleep, were the very best ; or, put in a banal, concrete manner, the most " agreeable. " What we actually remember is not the unconsciousness of that sleep itself, but the pleasant sensation that time had passed without our witnessing it—this being one of the rare instances of a purely negative sensation.

So, apart from the philosopher's desire to be sure, by not expecting too much and too fancifully, he can hardly make out any state or event to be more blissful than that sleep ; which may have occurred far less often than we think. Making a retrospective comparison, he will find that those hours of deep sleep were more blissful, indeed, than even moments of consummated beauty and love. Perhaps this was what made Wagner's Kundry cry at a most critical moment, when the gates of redemption were flung open for her once again :—

" *Schlafen, schlafen,—ich muss....* "
(Sleep, O sleep,—I must....)

Now if a life, or a series of lives of moral and spiritual endeavour be crowned by such a state, it should suffice as a philosopher's hope ; though it goes without saying that the true philosopher does not bother about the possible outcome of his efforts. Yet the fantast growls at the prospect, asking, " Is this all, after so much toil ? " This attitude seems to explain the various and ofttimes fantastic exigeses of texts stating the likeness of deep sleep and death—or salvation.

The older works did not draw a very distinct line between the latter two. In his dialectic opposing of the monists, Âchârya Râmânuja committed himself to the claim that " if one were to lose one's individuality, one's individual consciousness, when merging into the Absolute—no one would ever try for such a state. " Well, here the Master was evidently wrong. I know many people, cœnobite and lay, who would strive their utmost to realize a state of lasting " nothingness " or " unconsciousness " of the type dealt with. The Buddha Himself and His radical schools, headed by Nagârjuna and the Mâdhyamikas, philosophers not to be despised, neither presume, nor care for, nor promise anything but the dissolution of consciousness —*shûnya*, the Void.

We cannot help feeling that all opposed conceptions are lacking in philosophic prowess—it is no joke to get established in and ready for an eternal void. But as said above, taste is the only criterion. Those who do not want Paradise, prefer " Nothing " to it. Some have stated that they would even prefer Hell. Ajita Kesakambali, Charvâka and most of the rank materialists here and in the West, propound absolute non-existence after death—the inescapable conclusion of the teaching of the oneness of body and soul. The objective student of these

and, on the other hand, of the most spiritualized schools, feels that their respective eschatologies converge to some identical state.

The latter, including Thera- and Mâdhyamika-Buddhists, the *Yoga-Vasishtha*, etc., *hope* and *aspire* for that state of virtual inertia consequent on the destruction of individuality; and the former, including all Western materialistic schools from Anaximander to the Marxists, merely *state* its inevitability with a shrug.

Some will hold that, if the materialists be right, it would be almost too beautiful to be true! If, without any ethical effort, we are to earn that incomparable state of eternal rest—of the stone as we think it—it would be a marvellous bargain indeed. Here, funnily enough, the materialists are the optimistic group. The spiritual are a bit cautious and will not risk anything; they try to establish a kind of balance by a virtuous or even an anchoretical career.

The charge of cowardice can apply in their case; for whatever has been made the target—be it the Seventh Heaven or our blissful, stone-like unconsciousness—if the means toward it, the *Sâdhanâ*, be sincere and difficult, the decision to take them up and to persevere is proof of the finest courage. Moreover, the adept may be prompted to show the path to others, whatever the end he may be convinced of.

To conclude this survey, let us take a more orthodox stand, on what our classical commentators want the relevant scriptural passages to convey: The soul merges into no inert Bliss, no *Jada-Ananda* in the event of death, or into that of the Death of death, as the *Brihadaranyaka* styles salvation; it merges into *Sat-Chid-Ananda*, Existence-Consciousness-Bliss, the Absolute. It does not then become inert, but Consciousness Itself; or rather it recovers its forfeited state. Well, if such be the case—all the better! If we adapt ourselves in time to welcome either of these contradictory or mutually excluding states, we can naturally be optimists—and that without the risk of bias or self-committal.

SWAMI AGEHANANDA BHARATI

AN OLD ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

[The Ontological Argument of Anselm and others for the existence of God is examined by **Mr. Rufus Suter** of the U. S. A. in this short article. It is interesting that the God whose existence this argument may be claimed to prove is no Personal Deity such as that conceived by various creedal religions, but Existence, which might better perhaps be described as "Be-ness" than as "Being."—ED.]

A favourite pastime for some of our most careful thinkers has been to try to prove things that people do not doubt. Scholars thus have filled large tomes with attempts to prove that $1 + 1 = 2$, and that the world we pry into in chemistry and physics is not a dream. Scholars similarly have tried to prove the existence of God. Men of genius, who might have spent their creative urge more expansively have been turned into intellectual drudges by this plodding sort of reflection, thankless because in the end their arguments win assent less widely than do the facts which the arguments are supposed to prove. But the lure of systematizing rigorous demonstrations is as irresistible to some minds as creating grand opera is to others.

In the present article we shall discuss an attempt to prove the existence of God first presented in fully explicit form by Anselm, an Italian born in 1033, who became Archbishop of Canterbury. Anselm, in his *Prologion*, defined God in such a way that if you deny His existence you utter a self-contradiction.

This argument, traditionally known as the Ontological Argument, may be analyzed into two parts: (1) a definition of God; (2) a bit of logical virtuosity by which the denial of existence to God lands the doubter in self-contradiction.

To discuss the second part first: for Anselm it was enough to examine only one proposition to behold the divine existence proved. This proposition was "God is not." If we understand what Anselm meant by "God," this proposition "God is not" will immediately reveal its self-contradictory nature. But before examining Anselm's definition, let us first look briefly at the reason he assumed that, if the proposition "God is not" is self-contradictory, the proposition "God is" is true.

Many of us will recall a principle known as the Law of Contradiction. First stated by Aristotle about fourteen centuries before our Italian Archbishop of Canterbury, it is not explicit in Anselm's treatise. It was part of the tacitly accepted background of his thought and of the thought of those for whom he wrote, as it is part of our background. The

Law of Contradiction, however, for those who are interested in the method of Anselm's argument, is a statement of the nature of contradiction: namely, two propositions are *contradictory* of one another if both cannot be true, but if also both cannot be false.

An example of mutually contradictory propositions is: "All men are mortal" and "Some men are not mortal." If we study these propositions we shall see that they cannot both be true; but we shall also see that they cannot both be false. One or the other must be true; and it is this characteristic of contradictories which makes them useful in the determination of truth, for if we know on some independent ground that one of the contradictories is false, we also know immediately that the other is true. To disengage another element in Anselm's method we should mention that his technique for showing the falsity of one of the propositions in his pair of contradictories is the same as that often used by theologians and geometers. It is, indeed, a favourite technique among deductive thinkers, though there is never any occasion for its use in the experimental inductive sciences. The technique is to show that a proposition involves a self-contradiction. No *reductio ad absurdum* is more effective that this demonstration that the position to which one's opponent is pushed involves a flagrant self-contradiction, such as "A cause precedes the First Cause," or "1 = 2."

As the intelligent reader has no doubt seen already, Anselm's contradictories are: "God is not" and "God is." The former of these propositions Anselm shows to involve a self-contradiction. The latter, therefore, is true. But how does he show the former to contain a self-contradiction? This will be plain when we consider his definition of God; but first we must glance at the vicissitudes of the Ontological Argument in the minds of some other thinkers.

Six centuries after the venerable Archbishop of Canterbury, the French inventor of analytical geometry, Descartes, propounded the same demonstration, except that he makes it more attractive for the mathematical-minded by introducing an analogy from geometry. In his *Meditations* is the hint that the proposition "God is not" is false for the same reason as the proposition "A triangle contains four interior angles" is false. Care should be taken to guard against the misinterpretation sometimes made that Descartes by such a geometrical analogy meant to imply the *existence* of triangles with three interior angles. The argument does not require, and he did not intend to assert, the *existence* of triangles. It requires merely that in the realm of self-consistent thought the idea of having three interior angles must be inseparable from the idea of a triangle.

Descartes meant merely that the jump from the definition of God to the fact that God exists is analogous to the jump from the definition of

triangle to the *idea* that triangles have three interior angles. The essential point is that in the Ontological Argument a transition occurs from idea, in the mental processes of a thinker, to that external reality which contains, for example, other minds. For Descartes there was nothing more paradoxical in this leap than in the movement from the conception of triangle to the implied idea that a triangle has three interior angles. At this stage of our discussion we do not know yet what Descartes meant by God. Hence, the force of these remarks is not apparent. Later, when we look into Descartes' definition of God, we shall be in a position to grasp the strength of his demonstration.

Let us add a remark about the Ontological Argument as stated by the Jewish metaphysician, Spinoza, who was so greatly impressed by the certainty with which geometers reach conclusions that he wrote metaphysics after the model of Euclid, with the paraphernalia of definitions, axioms, theorems and corollaries. In his *Ethics*, his definition No. VI is of God, and his theorem No. XI is to prove that God necessarily exists. By assuming as true the contradictory of the proposition to be proved, much as in geometry one assumes the converse of the parallel-line proposition, you run counter to an axiom and to some of the earlier theorems already demonstrated. God, therefore, exists.

The Ontological Argument has had a fascination for mathematicians. Even Leibniz took it seriously.

If the gist of this second part of our argument (the logical virtuosity) is clear, we are ready for the first factor, the definition. It has already been suggested that the cogency of the Ontological Argument rests upon the term " God " being so defined that the proposition " God is not " will contain a self-contradiction. This situation is obtainable if God is defined as " Being. " Then the proposition. " God (that is, Being) is not " is self-contradictory, if the copula " is " be taken as meaning " to be, " and not as being the mere linguistic symbol of the connexion between subject and predicate.

The fact is that this equation of God with Being or Existence is precisely what each formulator of the Ontological Argument did in his definition of God, although in each case the identification was more covert than has here been suggested. Anselm defined God as " That than which nothing greater can be conceived, " where existence is the least that can be predicated in the series of degrees of reality from " great," through " greater," etc. The idea is more direct in the familiar mediæval formula by which God is equated with the " *Ens realissimum* " (" The Most Real Being.") For Descartes, also, the identification is made under technical verbiage. He defines God as the Being whose Essence is Existence. For Spinoza, God is Substance.

If the Ontological Argument is not a play upon words—a learned pun in which the copula is confused with

the predicate " is " asserting existence, it is possible that it may prove something. The God whose existence is demonstrated, however, (that is, supposing anything *is* demonstrated) is not the God who is believed in by many Christians and others—not a supreme Personality. Only Existence is proved ; or, to express the idea less cryptically, it is only proved that something exists. The argument fails to specify whether this something is one thing, or two, or 831760002 things, or an infinitude of things in one or another sense of infinitude. The argument proves, in short, merely another of Aristotle's principles, known traditionally as the Law of Identity, which asserts : " Whatever is, is." And it demonstrates this, in the last analysis, by pointing out that if you deny it you run counter to his other principle, the Law of Contradiction.

There is a possibility that the Ontological Argument at most hints at our having knowledge that does not spring from empirical data, that is, from the facts revealed to our sense-organs upon which the experimental sciences are based. The knowledge, if there be such, is absurdly thin from some points of view. It does not tell us whether the something or things that exist are dreams, objects like tastes, colours, smells, etc., or are substantial facts in an external universe independent of our consciousness : or whether it is or they are, an unknowable Kantian *Ding an sich*, or an unfavourable Spencerian Absolute, or a Hegelian Absolute. It does not enlighten us about whether reality is material, mental, or a mixture of the two, or neither, or neutral, or something or things else. Yet such possible knowledge from another point of view is remarkable. For it would be rather unexpected, at any rate in positivistic quarters, if we could feel the least suspicion that we had any knowledge whatever which was not, strictly speaking, scientific.

RUFUS SUTER

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

The Malays : A Cultural History. By Sir Richard Winstedt. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., London. Revised edition. 198 pp. 1950. 15*s*.)

This is the revised edition of a very conscientiously written book which first appeared in 1947. The author is conversant with all aspects of Malayan history, whether ethnological or linguistic, religious or social, political or economic. With the recent political and social changes in South-East Asia there has been a greater need for the understanding of the people of Malay and Indonesia and their cultural heritage. The present book supplies us with trustworthy material for such an understanding.

The main racial elements in Malay are three : the Negrito, the Sen-oi and the Jakun. The Sen-oi-Sakai are the connecting link between the Indonesians (Battaks of Sumatra, Dyaks of Borneo, etc.,) and the Austro-Asiatics (the Veddahs of Ceylon, the Khasis of Assam and the Mundas and their kinsmen of the Central belt of India). The Jakuns represent the Mongoloid element that migrated to the area much later, between 500 B.C. and the time of Christ.

Nearly 85 per cent of the Malayans profess Islam. Islam was introduced from India in the 14th and 15th centuries. But Hindu influence had been dominant in the country since the time of its introduction towards the beginning of the Christian era. The Malayan society, political organization, religious beliefs, literature, arts and crafts were deeply influenced by Hinduism. Islam could not totally obliterate the older cultural traits. The Malayans evolved a very peculiar syncretism of the older Hindu elements with the new religion. This point has been well brought out by the author in the various chapters of the book.

After the introduction of Islam the Malayans destroyed all their idols, but on the linguistic side the Sanskrit words for "religion," "fasting," "teacher," "heaven," "hell," etc., had become too familiar to be abandoned. Many Hindu ceremonies connected with birth, initiation and marriage have survived. Elaborate Hindu rituals survive in the enthronement ceremony of a Malay king.

A most impressive lesson taught by Hinduism was that the Seer is born of austerity and that fasting and abstinence win magic power and spiritual victory. In the beginning of the 16th century there were 50,000 ascetics in Java alone. Islam respected them, and the old ascetic tradition was continued, later on, by the Sufi teachers. The Malayans still use many of the old Hindu magical incantations with slight modifications, *e.g.*, using the name of Allah at the beginning and at the end.

The ancient literature still endures. There are Malayan translations of the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*, both derived from Javanese sources. These epic tales were popularized by shadow plays. Stories of the *Panchatantra*, the *Kathasaritsagara*, the Javanese *Panji* tales, are still popular in Malay with a slight Muslim colouring.

The Malayan syncretism is best illustrated in some of the Malayans' religious beliefs :—

> The Perak medicine-man was taught to invoke his predecessors of old and Siva and Vishnu to defend the fellers of a new rice clearing from the malice of Arabian genii, Persian fairies, Hindu demigods and Indonesian nature spirits and to ascribe his incantation to Siva the Divine Teacher, Siva the Destroyer, Brahma and Luqman al-Hakim, father of Arabian magic.

But the author points out that momentous changes are now taking place in South-East Asia. The knell of theocratic culture is sounding in the Malay world and religion and politics are beginning to be conceived as two separate fields of activity. The modern insistence on individual rights rather than on social duties is at the moment regarded by the Malayans as of great poitical value.

P. C. BAGCHI

The Enchanted Glass. By HARDIN CRAIG. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 293 pp. 1950. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

The title of the book is culled from a passage in Bacon's work, *The Advancement of Learning* : "For the mind of man...is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced." The author, a Professor of English at Stanford University, seeks to peer into the "enchanted glass" of the Renaissance mind, as revealed in English literature in the widest sense of the term, by exploring a mass of material having for its theme, in some form or another, Man and his welfare.

In Professor Craig's opinion, "erudition—science, pseudo-science, philosophy, history, school-learning in general with all its vagaries and variations, —has an important bearing on the interpretation of the literature of the Renaissance." Thus rays of light are let into the cosmology of the 16th century; its philosophy, shot with Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic thought; its witchery and astrology and magic, with references to Agrippa's writings; its veneration for Latin, with quick glances at Ascham; its theology, as exemplified in Hooker's immortal work; its enquiries in the fields of psychology and science; its passion for logic in general and Ramistic logic in particular; its preoccupation with religious problems; its partiality for rhetoric, oratory, pedantry and dialectics.

Behind this variegated façade of intellectual activity there was the great force generated by the Renaissance, a force that was manifest in the exploratory enthusiasm, dash and spirit of adventure of the Elizabethans. Illustrative passages, not only from the giants, Marlowe, Shakespeare, Spenser, and Burton, but also from the lesser fry, are given in support of the main argument. The author's enthusiasm for Bacon is, however, manifest everywhere; the various chapter headings and the motto at the head of each chapter are all extracted from Bacon's works. Professor Craig claims that the Elizabethan age was, at least in some respects, better than our own. Whether one agrees with this view or not, it will certainly pay to read the book as an introduction to the literary history of the Renaissance period in Great Britain.

R. BANGARUSWAMI

Goethe the Poet: By KARL VIETOR. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, U. S. A. $ 5.00)

Prof. Karl Viëtor holds the Kuno Francke Chair of German Art and Culture at Harvard; he has written a very readable book on *Goethe the Poet.* It is to be followed by a companion volume on "Goethe, the Scientist and Philosopher." Goethe's vision of life is very much needed in our times. In his view of life there was a fundamental difference and conflict between ordered evolution—which was Goethe's innermost faith, and was, to him, true Nature—and forced and violent change.

Therefore, all great passion is, for him, a disease; it is psychic illness in the individual soul. Goethe gave expression to the idea in a paradoxical way: "It is inherent in my nature; I would rather commit an injustice than tolerate disorder." Goethe was *not* a conservative; he did not believe that there was rigidity in things. He saw "continuous development" everywhere. He trusted rather "in the gradual organic growth of all living forms." Not only was Nature's transformation of man, Nature; but also man's transformation of himself was, to Goethe, a part of Nature.

Goethe was a humanist, but his humanism and his faith in humanity were such that "the man who trusts the divine over him and in him is capable of self-perfection, and this achievement can be his." Goethe saw the workings of a Power in Nature and in man which, following Socrates, he called "the demonic." "Man may turn whithersoever he will, he may undertake whatever it may be, always he will return to that path which nature had once designated for him." "No man can alter a fibre of his being, however much he may add to his stature." "Such *must* thou be, thyself thou canst not fly." Goethe's vision of life includes "a sensitive contact with the universal-divine presence." "He feels it as a formless, ever present power surging up everywhere about us, its essence filling and permeating the Universe." It may not, as Goethe said, be "comprehended but is accessible."

Altogether a very interesting book.

N. A. NIKAM

The Meaning of Beauty. By ERIC NEWTON. (Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., London. 15s.)

Yet another attempt to clutch at the intangible essence of Beauty and declare in triumph: "Lo, here it is—Beauty's self, her tantalizing secret!" Vain are all these attempts, yet must they be made from time to time, for, while the failure is implicit in the task, the adventure itself is most exciting and is often its own reward, both to the adventurer and the spectator. Mr. Newton realizes at the outset that Beauty cannot be seized in a frontal attack, or measured and pinned down. He accordingly follows a subtler, if less bold, strategy. He looks about and about, before and after; explores the affiliation between beauty in Nature and beauty in Art; explains how the medium meddles with the Dream during the process of its translation into Art; expatiates on the vicissitudes of "good taste"; reinforces his points by periodic glances at the classics (there are over 50 illustrations in the book), and gazes for quite a few minutes at Veronese's "Mystical Marriage of St. Catherine"; passes in quick review the newer

schools and coteries; attempts a study of the relation between form and content; and clinches the whole affair with a set of interesting definitions. If it means anything at all, "beautiful" (says Mr. Newton) "describes the perfect balance between sensation and perception, between the sensuous and the intellectual." The key word, of course, is "balance"; and round it, it would be wise to build all theories regarding the meaning of Beauty. Mr. Newton's book is born of knowledge and enthusiasm, and he writes with both candour and insight. One may not agree with all that he says, but one will close the book a greater votary of Beauty than ever.

K. R. Srinivasa Iyengàr

Alaṁkāra-Saṁgraha. By Amrtanandayogin; edited by P. G. Balakrishnamurti, M.A., B.O.L. (Śrī Veṅkaṭeśvara Oriental Series No. 19. Śrī Veṅkaṭeśvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati. 175 pp. 1950. Rs. 3/4).

Students of Sanskrit rhetoric will be delighted with this critical edition of the *Alaṁkāra-Saṁgraha* of Amṛtānandayogin, based on three important manuscripts. This work deals in 11 chapters with all aspects of rhetoric. In fact, it is a compendium of all the writings on poetics and dramaturgy down to the times of the author, who, according to the editor, belongs to the 13th century. Manva Bhūpa, the patron king at whose request the author composed this work, was a devotee of Śiva. Unfortunately, this king remains unidentified.

In his critical Introduction the learned editor deals in detail with the significance of the work, the chronology of the author, and the subject-matter, chapter by chapter. It is curious that Amṛtānandayogin makes no mention of Dhvani, a predominant authority on poetics. The value of the present treatise is enhanced by the illustrative verses quoted from several earlier works, no longer extant. We strongly recommend this edition to the students of Sanskrit rhetoric in our universities and express our gratitude to Shri P. Balakrishnamurti for the labour he has spent on its careful production.

P. K. Gode

Hamari Adim Jatiyan. By Bhagvandas Kela and Akhil Vinay. Hindi. (Bharatiya Granthamala, Daraganj, Allahabad. 355 pp. 1950. Rs. 3/8).

This is, perhaps, the first pocket-encyclopædia in Hindi, or, for the matter of that, in any of the Indian languages, which is packed with documented facts and figures about the life, manners, customs, religion, literature, art, music, dance, professions and problems of the twenty-five millions of aborigines, such as the Todas, the Gonds, the Bhils, the Nagas, etc., who inhabit India. Now that we have it in our own hands to fashion the destiny of our country, it is but proper that we be well informed about these hitherto unknown fellow citizens of our Republic, so that they, too, may join us in our onward march. For, to know is to understand, to understand is to love; and to love is to serve. A pioneer and praiseworthy publication, indeed.

G. M.

Tantra Sāra Saṅgraha of *Nārāyaṇa* (Tāntric) *of Śivapuram*, (with Commentory). Edited critically with Introduction in English and Sanskrit by VAIDYARATNA PANDIT M. DURAISWAMI AIYANGAR. (Madras Government Oriental Series No. XV., Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. 546 pp. 1950. Rs. 15/4)

The Government of Madras deserves the best thanks of all lovers of Indian culture and literature for its wise decision in May 1948 to start the Madras Government Oriental Series of hitherto unpublished important works on philosophy, medicine, science, etc., with Shri T. Chandrasekharan, Curator of the Government Oriental MSS. Library, as the general editor.

The volume under review, which now appears in this Series, is based on two rare manuscripts of a work in Sanskrit verse on varied Tāntric topics composed, according to the editor, in the 15th or 16th century A.D.

The correct title of this work is *Tantra Sāra Saṅgraha* as it is a collection of important materials from several Tāntric works. The work consists of 32 *Paṭalas* or chapters comprising numerous formulæ and rites for the attainment of health and happiness, not to say superhuman power. The work is a storehouse of *mantras* and rites for the worship of several gods as a means for the removal of physical and mental diseases caused by *viṣa* (poison), sorcery, etc. In fact, there is a mixture of magic and medicine in the several formulæ recorded in this compendium. The value of these formulæ needs to be verified by all interested in the history of Āyurveda.

The editor has done a distinct service to the cause of Tāntric literature, much of which lies in unpublished form at present, by his critical edition of this encyclopædic compendium, which is a typical product of Malabar. It is only the critical study of the Tāntric works that can give us a correct estimate of Indian life and culture through the last 2000 years of political and social vicissitudes. The Tāntric foundations of Indian life and culture need more excavation and critical research; that which has been done so far has been done in a slipshod manner. We, therefore, heartily congratulate Shri Aiyangar and the Government of Madras for giving us a critical edition of an important Tāntric text of great cultural significance. The topical index so carefully prepared by Shri Aiyangar and published at the end of the volume is an admirable view-finder for the contents of the text.

P. K. GODE

In Defence of Philosophy Against Positivism and Pragmatism. By MAURICE CORNFORTH. (Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., London. 260 pp. 1950. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

To students of contemporary philosophy, this ably written book will prove stimulating if not also provocative. The author adopts the standpoint of Dialectical Materialism derived from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin with the struggle of opposites, the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new as its key concepts. In the light of this conception, he subjects to rigorous examination current philosophical theories, the Logical Positivism of Bertrand Russell

and the Vienna school and the typically American brands of Pragmatism, Instrumentalism and Semantics.

The main purpose is propagandist. The analysis is lucid; some of the criticisms are admirably marshaled. The author has no difficulty in exposing such short-comings as the doctrine of limitations and the unknowability of the real world, the narrow specialization of professional philosophical thinking, its scholastic phrase-mongering and its barren abstraction.

The constructive portion of the book is the second chapter where Dialectical Materialism is expounded. The task of philosophy is shown to consist in generalizing the laws of change and development as seen in the discoveries of science and in the whole complex movement of modern society, with a view to understanding the forces at work and mastering them. Philosophy should cease to be the intellectual exercise of men of learning and become the possession of the masses, their theoretical weapon, in their struggle to end the conditions which oppress them and to find the road to emancipation.

The great systems of modern thinkers are seen to reflect the character of the economic development and social life of their respective epochs. The mechanistic theory reflects the great age of scientific discovery; the discovery of the microscope issued in the monadology of Leibniz. The colonial expansion of the 19th century is seen to issue in Capitalist Imperialism. The new outlook is due to the rise of the proletariat and aims to liberate man from exploitation.

With all his pleading, Mr. Cornforth does not examine the uncritical assumption of the relation of man and objective nature, the fundamental failure to emancipate the mind of man from regimentation and the totalitarian suppression of individuality which are characteristic of the Communist ideology of to-day.

D. GURUMURTI

Vedanta Through Stories. By SWAMI SAMBUDDHANANDA. With a Foreword by the Hon. Shri Syama Prasad Mookherjee. (Sri Ramakrishna Ashram, Khar, Bombay 21. 178 pp. 1950. Rs. 2/4; $1.00; 5*s*.)

This is a laudable attempt to popularize some of the ideas of Vedantic philosophy through tales and anecdotes. Many of them are striking, energizing and helpful, and characteristic of the good Swami who is the President of the Bombay Ramakrishna Ashram. A good Introduction graces the opening pages and we hope with Swami Sambuddhananda that at least a few readers will be helped "to get rid of the obstacles to spiritual realization like fear, anger, attachment, avarice, pride, conceit," etc. The book ought to have a wide circulation.

O.

The Story of Joseph and Pharaoh: An Adaptation for Children. By FRANCES DALE. (Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., London. 52 pp. 1950. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

There is a growing mass of semi-literate and unliterary young people who have never read the Bible. To persuade them to do so, some writers have felt it their duty to make new versions of the Old Testament. The more religious of these usually mistrust the 1885 Revised Version in English. This is not because as literary purists they revere every word of the King James Version of 1611. They acknowledge the merits of both the old texts: the strong, simple beauty and remarkable durability of the language. But they do not consider either of them suitable to the needs of the progressive, up-to-date child.

Of course, one can easily make a case for toning down the directness of the Old Testament style in one or two places, but if the price is to be such novelettish evasions as Miss Dale's, it is surely too high. In her book she has expurgated from Genesis far more than the few immodesties that no doubt were very shocking to her Victorian forebears. She has deprived the Old Testament Book of its integrity, puissance and wisdom. Compare the beginning of Joseph's tale in the King James Version:—

> Now Israel loved Joseph more than all his children, because he was the son of his old age: and he made him a coat of many colours. And when his brethren saw that their father loved him more than all his brethren, they hated him, and could not speak peacably unto him....

This tight, pithy prose overshadows by contrast Miss Dale's tortuous watered-down manner. She is completely lacking the bold psychological realism of the original:—

> Now Jacob had many sons but Joseph he loved specially and had a pride in him from the time of his birth. This pride grew mightier and mightier as the babe passed through childhood to become a young man glowing with health and with great beauty of form and face.
>
> One morning, when the sun was high above the hills of Canaan where Jacob and his family lived together, Jacob gave a gift to his youngest son. It was from this giving that all the troubled and miraculous events arose which make this tale remarkable.

Remarkable, perhaps, it is in Miss Dale's telling; though not for the illumination she brings it, but for the enduring prose and vigorous truth she leaves out. We look in vain for the glorious Passages which have reverberated down the ages and caused the Bible to remain one of the sublimest books in the world:

> O my soul, come not thou into their secret; unto their assembly, mine honour, be not thou united: for in their anger they slew a man, and in their selfwill they digged down a wall.

Miss Dale makes no attempt to graft this genuine branch to her artificial tree, for which restraint we are grateful.

DENNIS GRAY STOLL

India and Malaya Through the Ages. Edited by S. DURAI RAJA SINGAM. (Editor, Kuantan, Malaya. Illustrated.)

Impressive pictorial evidence for the influence of Indian culture upon the culture of Malaya is assembled in this album. The ancient Indian colonization of Malaya is claimed to have affected not only the music, arts and crafts of the Malays, but also their language and their literature. Such a compilation as this, with its informative explanatory text, represents a definite contribution to present-day Indo-Malayan *rapprochement.* In the subsequent editions the excellent photographs should be more attractively reproduced.

E. M. H.

The Meaning of Evolution. By GEORGE GAYLORD SIMPSON. (Geoffrey Cumberlege. The Oxford University Press, London. 364 pp. 1950. 18*s.*); *Man Is a Microcosm.* By J. A. V. BUTLER. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London. 152 pp. 1950. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

While Dr. Butler (Courtauld Institute of Biochemistry, Middlesex Hospital School) deals with the chemical constituents of living animals and plants, Professor Simpson (American Museum of Natural History) discusses the whole course of the evolution of life and its meaning in terms of the nature of man.

It is nearly a hundred years since the publication of Darwin's work *The Origin of Species* (1859); but the thought of the great naturalist still dominates the evolutionary scene. The multitudinous elaborations and speculations that have afflicted the intervening century are but variations on the single theme of natural selection as explaining the development of species. The line of descent was expressed in Darwin's view of all creatures as "lineal descendants of some few beings which lived long before the first bed of the Silurian system was deposited." We do not know who these "few beings" were, and Professor Simpson does not enlighten us. Even *Eozoon*, "proudly named 'the dawn animal'" he informs us, "is now considered to be no animal at all, nor yet a plant or any form of life, but a mere inorganic precipitate."

When he comes to interpret the evolutionary process, Professor Simpson cites many examples in support of the theory that adaptive control exists, and he widens the conception of natural selection by defining it as "a process of differential reproduction," involving "complex and delicate interplay with those genetic factors in populations that are the substantial basis of evolutionary continuity and changes." He thinks that "Man is the result of a purposeless and materialistic process that did not have him in mind." Why plan, purpose, and goal should be absent in nature until the coming of man is left in some obscurity; but this does not prevent Professor Simpson from enlarging upon "the fact of responsibility and the ethic of knowledge."

Dr. Butler, like his American confrère, has the gift of attractively presenting a most difficult subject. He does not like the prevalent view of man as "a mere unit of man-power, a cog in a machine." Yet, for him, living things are "very complex mixtures of many kinds of proteins," with simpler molecules as auxiliaries, and man is differentiated only because of his ability to use symbols, and, through symbols, to acquire power over objects. His chief concern is with the living cell, and its tremendous transformations, and almost everything mentioned in his book has been discovered within the past 15 or 20 years. The coalescence of physics and chemistry with biology has now come to constitute a "science of life," but Dr. Butler advises caution in jumping to conclusions. After describing the great chemical complexity of even simple proteins, "we may find," he writes, "that we are still remote from knowing the secret of life, and that the whole of the living organism is greater than its parts." He admits that hardly anything is known of the "organizing factors" which take hold of the cells of an organism and direct

them to appropriate functions.

Dr. Butler quotes Paracelsus on his title-page :—

> Man is a microcosm, or a little world, because he is an extract from all the stars and planets of the whole firmament, from the earth and the elements; and so he is their quintessence.

There, perhaps, we may take leave of these works, both admirable in their descriptive power, with a special word of praise for the plates in *Man is a Microcosm*. It is permissible, however, to suggest that without the recognition of a triple evolutionary scheme—spiritual, intellectual, physical—the conception of man as the microcosm of the macrocosm becomes impossible.

BASIL P. HOWELL

Prehistoric India : To 1,000 B. C. By STUART PIGGOTT. (Penguin Books, Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England. 293 pp. 1950. 2*s*. 6*d*.)

Prof. Stuart Piggott has done a real service by the publication of his book *Prehistoric India*. The book contains seven chapters of which the first deals with the discovery of prehistoric India. He says at the outset that writing was known and employed in the third and second millennia B.C. and that prehistoric India includes all human communities in the subcontinent from the old stone age nearly to the Christian era. In his study of the Indian stone age he remarks that "to understand the subsequent prehistory of India we must look beyond its present frontiers to other lands of Western Asia." He then proceeds to review Indian archæology in relation to that of Western Asia as a whole and especially of Baluchistan, and points out the activities of the peasant communities in general.

Again, there are two chapters dealing with the cities of the Punjab and their decline, which, according to him, was due mainly to the onset of a foreign culture. It is difficult to agree with him when he says that the Harappa culture had possibly inherited the early Iranian tradition. We may remark that, however conservative Indian culture may be, its features influenced that of Iran, Babylonia and even Egypt.

In the last chapter he examines the linguistic parallels within the Indo-European group and takes for granted that the *Rig-Veda* was a composition later than the Indus culture. Even the possibility that it could have been precedent to that culture has not been touched upon. It is again remarked that the forts and towns that Indra is said to have destroyed are perhaps those of the Indus region and that the Dasas and the Dasyus might possibly be the people of Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro. He further enunciates without warrant that the Mauryan culture was to some extent indebted to the Harappa culture. On p. 288 he remarks: "Chandragupta Maurya was not a foreigner, no invader such as Harsha or Babur." To our knowledge Harsha was neither a foreigner nor an invader. Apart from some of the views on which we have to differ from the author, the book is, no doubt, well-written and contains some new materials worthy of notice by any archæologist.

V. R. R. DIKSHITAR

T. S. Eliot: The Design of His Poetry. By ELIZABETH DREW. (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London. 256 pp. 1950. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

This is a brave and honest book that gets down to the central problem in Eliot's poetry: interpretation; that it does not always succeed or satisfy is the fault, not of the author, but of the symbolic or "mythical" method used by Eliot. According to the author, Eliot adopted this method to secure the effects of concentration and intensity. But, as the meanings of many symbols are hidden away in recondite literature, and as no symbol can be pinned down to one meaning, Eliot's poetry perplexes even when it pleases. Elizabeth Drew has earned the common reader's gratitude by offering him a key to this poetry, the more so as the offer is made with no superior gesture, no pitying smile. To interpret the work of any writer, she believes that it is necessary to find the design that gives unity to it. This design in Eliot's work she finds in what may be called his progressive struggle from a profound disgust at the barren materialism of modern life to the healing peace of faith. It is her task to interpret Eliot's poetry in the light of this unifying design.

The early poems show us "the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history." The poet feels imprisoned in an empty, ugly, alien, society; the only thing he can do is to transmute its welter of triviality and horror into a wealth of objective symbols. From "Gerontion" onwards, says the author, Eliot's poetry is

> a record of the gradual development from the position when his *intellect* accepted Christian dogma through the stages by which intellectual acceptance grew painfully and arduously into a conviction embracing the totality of personal and social experience.

"The Waste Land," in spite of its concluding part, with its "awful moment of surrender," marks, according to Miss Drew, only a stage in this development. It is in "Ash Wednesday," however, that the corner is turned; the symbols here are of revived life and hope. And so on to the "Four Quartets," with their contrast between the revolving circle and the central "still point" of secure faith.

An interesting feature of this study is the attempt to illustrate the central theme of spiritual rebirth, as well as its several stages, from the "archetypal images" described by the psychologist Jung, which symbolize the process of "transformation" or integration of personality. While there is no question of borrowing, these age-old symbols of birth and death do help us to understand Eliot's symbolism.

G. C. BANNERJEE

All About H. Hatterr: A Gesture. By G. V. DESANI. (The Saturn Press, London. 239 pp. 1949. Reprint. 9*s.* 6*d.*)

The style could be no madder; the content hardly more bizarre; but from the ranting and the raving there emerge, the worse for the encounter with the author's mordant pen, sham sadhus, pseudo-mysticism, honorific titles, sex-obsession, man's exploiting man.

The experience on the Ganges bank rings true; an oasis of beauty in a desert of mockery. The phantasmagoria is lit by fitful gleams of philosophical reflection tending towards the fatalistic: "the Tyranny of Law": "*Accept*! Things *are*": "Carry on...."

E. M. H.

Bhārgava Nāḍikā. Edited by C. KUNHAN RAJA. (194 pp. Rs. 6/-); *Hariharacaturaṅgam*. By GODAVARAMISRA; edited by S. K. RAMANATHA SASTRI. (256 pp. Rs. 6/8); *Brahmasūtravṛtti Mitākṣara*. By ANNAMBHATTA; edited by P. S. RAMA SASTRI. (272 pp. Rs. 7/-); *Nyāyasiddhāntatattvāmṛtam*. By SRINIVASACARYA; edited by S. SUBRAHMANYA SASTRI. (82 pp. Rs. 2/8). (Madras Government Oriental Series Nos. XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX. Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. 1950)

The Government of Madras is to be congratulated upon its enlightened policy of bringing out critical editions of important, as yet unpublished works from the manuscript collections in the State of Madras. They have started the Madras Government Oriental Series for the publication of literary works in Malayalam, Marathi, Telugu, Tamil, Sanskrit, Kannada and the Islamic languages, and already 66 works have been taken up for publication in the next four years.

The *Bhārgava Naḍikā* is a short work in 1854 verses mostly in the *anuṣṭub* metre, dealing with an aspect of astrology, *viz.*, the *daśū*-system, according to which a man's life is divided into nine stages presided over by as many planets. Within each stage there are sub-stages, each further subdivided into four sections. The work gives no information about the author; occasionally others' views are cited, mostly without naming the writers. Though the work is based on a single MS., Dr. Raja has prepared a fairly accurate edition.

The *Hariharacaturaṅgam*, edited by Shri S. K. Ramanatha Sastri from a single manuscript, deals partly, as suggested by the title, with the fourfold army elephants, chariots, cavalry and infantry. The chapters on chariots and infantry are very meagre, but the others are exhaustively considered with details about their mythological origin, physical features, habitat, good and bad characteristics, and usefulness in war. The remaining chapters (5-8) deal with archery, diplomacy, the conduct of war and military sports. Godāvaramiśra was the *Guru* as well as the Minister of King Gajapati Prataparudra, who ruled over Orissa in the 16th century A.D.

The *Brahmasūtravṛtti Mitākṣarā* is a very lucid commentary on the basic Vedānta text, the *Brahmasūtras*. It is written by Annambhaṭṭa, an Āndhra Brahmin, the son of Tirumalācārya. A junior contemporary of Bhaṭṭoji Dīksita, he lived in the first half of the 17th century. He is the celebrated author of the most popular handbook of Indian logic, the *Tarkasaṅgraha* and its commentary, *Dipikā*. This edition of the *Mitākṣarā* is based on three MSS., only one of which was complete. Shri P. S. R. Sastri has edited it carefully, noting the exact sources of the quotations and has added an informative Introduction in Sanskrit.

The *Nyāyasiddhāntatattvāmṛtam* of Śrīnivāsācārya is a short treatise in simple style, dealing with the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika school. As the author refers to the author of the *Dīdhiti* who flourished in 1547 A.D., our author must be assigned, at the earliest, to the latter part of the 16th century.

Shri T. Chandrasekharan, the general editor of the Series, would do well to evolve a standardized editorial technique and format. In all cases indexes of verses, authors and citations would enhance the usefulness of the works. Scholars would be thankful for greater care in the correction of proofs.

N. A. GORE

Collected Impressions. By ELIZABETH BOWEN. (Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., London. ix and 269 pp. 1950. 16*s.*); *The Heat of the Day.* By ELIZABETH BOWEN. (Jonathan Cape, Ltd., London. 319 pp. 6th impression, 1950. 9*s.* 6*d.*)

The depth and freedom from preconceptions of the reflecting mind determines the value and appeal of any "impressions—of books, scenes or events." These are outstanding, whether criticisms of books, in reviews or prefaces, accounts of dramatic productions and exhibitions, or sketches of the atmosphere of cities or of "the Big House" of the Irish country-side.

As critic, Miss Bowen is free from what she calls "the critic's godlike non-participation." She adapts herself, chameleon-like, to the mind of her author, reviewing appreciatively but with discrimination books on diverse levels.

Her reaction to the popular taste in art, in "Royal Academy"—brilliantly written—is cutting, if indulgent, ridicule. She does not lack the "inherent kindness" implied as essential to great art, but she is no sentimentalist :—

> ...judgment is the bone and muscle of pity. The reaction to human suffering must be awe, first, not simply the good cry.

Subjugating the personal to the impersonal comes out repeatedly in these essays. She cites Flaubert, for whom virtue in art was impersonality, and Gorki, who

> identifies happiness, purity, dignity with the *generalized* moment, when man rises clear of his cramping individual consciousness to the full of his human height, forgetting himself.

"Great novelists," she declares, "write...from outside their own nationality, class or sex," and without preassumptions which restrict the circle of readers to those who share them. "Literature," as E. M. Forster wrote, "tries to be unsigned." But art needs to use morality, Miss Bowen holds.

> ...it may be implicit but it has to be strong. By the plumb-straightness of lines and trueness of angles any work of the mind is, ultimately, judged; fancy may diverge from the upright, but there must be an upright.

She finds morality "the very nature of the Ben Jonson plays' superb competence," and finds in Gorki's novels "the strong torturous upward growth of the spirit of man, that will not stay down."

To read *The Heat of the Day* in the light of the "Notes on writing a Novel" in this collection is to realize Miss Bowen's consummate craftsmanship in her unobtrusive stress upon moral values. It has as background war-time London, with its stresses. She presents life irresponsibly lived, without prejudgment or overt condemnation, but she shows, in the course of the events she portrays, how treason punishes itself, how the ignoring of responsibilities to society subtly deteriorates the one concerned. Perhaps the most impressive moral lesson is the evil influence exerted, unconsciously and unknown to the woman responsible, upon the little mediocrity, met but once, for whom she had symbolized "refinement" and "respectability."

> For Louie, subsidence came about through her now knowing Stella not to be virtuous. Virtue became less possible now it was shown impossible by Stella, less to be desired because Stella had not desired it enough.

E. M. H.

Aquinas and Kant: The Foundations of the Modern Sciences. By GAVIN ARDLEY (Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., London. ix + 256 pp. 18*s*.)

There are many modern thinkers who draw a parallel between the 13th century and today. As the philosophers of the older age had the task of sifting and assimilating a mass of new ideas and reconciling them with traditional ways of thought, so in the modern age many new problems compel the thinker to seek new harmonies. Indeed, Dr. Ardley defines the present task as that of picking up the threads where they were left by St. Thomas Aquinas and carrying on. He believes that the Thomist philosophy elicited certain permanent principles of truth which at once produce indefinite development and provide the criterion by which to judge what is new. This book takes its place in the unending task.

So far, so good: but where does Kant come in? What has the great Catholic Master of the Middle Ages in common with the Protestant Rationalist of the modern era? Let the author answer:—

> Aquinas represents the metaphysician of the *philosophia perennis*. Kant on the other hand, as we understand him, in his basic contentions gets to the heart of the characteristic non-metaphysical preoccupations of the modern world. These preoccupations seem, *prima facie*, to be alien to the *philosophia perennis*. Consequently the juxtaposition of Aquinas and Kant throws the mediæval-modern conflict into high relief. It is the purpose of this work to moderate the conflict, and to show that what is *basic* to Kant is not really alien to Aquinas, but that they are, on the contrary complementary.

Just as the Christian Fathers and Aristotle seemed in opposition to the men of the 13th century but the conflict was resolved, so, Dr. Ardley believes, may be this modern conflict.

In making good his thesis, the author ranges over a vast area and touches on everything to which the word *science* has been applied since Galileo. He includes a competent analysis of Thomism and an account of Kant which amounts to a re-valuation of his contribution to thought. The writing is clear and economical and great care is given to the definition of certain terms, *e.g.*, *Physis* and *Nomis*, on which the argument turns.

The argument is enlivened with touches of humour, as, for example in the account of the Bed of Procrustes which is used, and re-used, as a parable of what the physicist does with Nature.

> He makes Nature conform to what he wants, and having done so announces that he has discovered a law of Nature: namely that all travellers fit the bed.... In brief, physics is a put-up job.

It is doubtful whether all physicists will accept the indictment, but it is quite certain that Dr. Ardley has dealt a shrewd blow at all thinking which proceeds from unverified assumptions.

The book is a competent piece of sustained argument, splendidly indexed, and attractively organized under sub-headings. Discriminating use is made of the insight of the poet to enlighten the argument of the philosopher. If the book does not finally persuade everyone, it certainly raises many questions which need to be answered by the scientific dogmatist.

MARCUS WARD

Roman Road. By G. R. LAMB. (Sheed and Ward, London and New York. 125 pp. 1950. *7s. 6d.*)

Here is a frank, not uninteresting and most instructive study in what the jargon of the day calls "escapism." The writer, born some 35 years ago, was brought up by his own account to be a misfit. His childhood was passed in a Manchester mean street, and the first mistake his mother made, he says, was inducing him to "go on learning until I was 16 instead of 14, so that in the end I should be free of the incessant money worry which had nagged her life." This brought "a deep social unsettlement and disturbance of the mind, more corrosive of happiness than occasional out-of-work periods or just-above-the-poverty-line standard of living." He stayed on at grammar school, worked hard, went to Cambridge with a scholarship which gave him £200 a year to live on, and left the University a blighted being, deplorably conscious that he was a misfit, but blaming the universe instead of himself.

"Society did not want me," he moans. The reason was plain; he had nothing to offer. He had developed into a poor creature without interests, tastes or principles. Educational effort had been wasted on him. He lived by playing an instrument in a cheap dance band.

When war came, he refused military service because he thought civilization "an idiotic myth." He went to a pacifist farm settlement and for the first time began to be a "real person" and to like T. S. Eliot's poetry because of its "Christian orthodoxy," though he was at this time apparently not a Christian. He did not stay at the farm long, but took gardening jobs, one of them at a Roman Catholic school. By this time he had begun going into a Catholic church experimentally and now found that here was the escape from his misfit unhappiness. The book ends with his reception into the Church and reminds one not unsympathetically of Matthew Arnold's verses in which a devout believer declares "This or nothing I believe" and the poet answers "For God's sake believe it then."

HAMILTON FYFE

CORRESPONDENCE

REPLY TO PROFESSOR N. A. NIKAM

I have read with great interest Professor Nikam's reply to my article "Evil Cannot be Conquered by Evil" in THE ARYAN PATH of January 1951. I am sorry to say that he has overstretched some of my points. That the greater evil conquers the lesser is no precept of any kind, but only a fact of a certain order of which we have to take note. I have nowhere *advocated* the use of force, except in certain contingencies where non-violent methods are bound to fail. There is also nothing to be said against the non-violent mentality in social and economic matters, where it amounts to social justice or charity.

The real issue is: Is there any purely spiritual force that is adequate to overcome certain forms of evil on the

physical and mental planes ? We can argue with the aggressor and appeal to his moral sense. But what if we find that reason has deserted him and that his conscience is dead ? We may be prepared to suffer rather than retaliate. Innocent suffering has a great appeal. But, firstly, it takes time to bring about a favourable reaction and it requires a certain cultural refinement in the aggressor. Secondly, it is only possible in the case of less violent forms of persecution. And, lastly, there is a very definite limit within which it can bring justice. It cannot affect ideological differences which are often the source of the injustice.

We may be prepared to make the supreme sacrifice of life itself. But is it certain that even this will draw any more response ? And, if it does not, is evil conquered ? We are told by Professor Nikam that non-violence is "not inconsistent with resisting evil." But how are we to resist ? Laying down our lives meekly, and refusing to kill even if we could thereby save ourselves, is not resistance in any intelligible terms.

It is conceivable that meekness, whatever it may entail for the individual, has a value. Physical life as such has no great value. We can readily, therefore, sacrifice this life on the altar of a spiritual principle. But can the same thing be said about a community? Yes, if the community is a community of saints who care not for the good things of the earth but live wholly in spirit and for the spirit. But where is there such a community ? It is difficult to find an individual who goes so far, to say nothing of a community ! A community consists of persons at all levels, united by a common bond and common interests. Before the cultural and spiritual values can have any scope within it, it must live and thrive; and the only way it can do so is to guard itself on the physical plane by appropriate physical means.

No community or nation can be expected to commit suicide. Even the strongest men in it must be made to submit to the will of the whole in this respect; or they must at least cease to create dissensions through ill-conceived propaganda; for only thus can the discipline necessary to the commonweal be kept. There may be martyrs made in the process. But the community can console itself with the reflection that the life of the whole is more precious than the life of the individual. The whole can thrive only by the employment of those weapons which are the common stock of warring nations in an emergency.

It is argued that the search for deadlier weapons will defeat itself. "...if war is 'total' as it is now threatening to become, war will abolish itself." But then why should we blench at the prospect ? What is life worth without the qualities of courage and self-respect ? If it is possible peaceably to change conditions so that war shall not arise at all, that is all to the good. But the answer to aggressive and warring nations is not pacifism or talk about non-violence, but more vigorous preparation for war.

We must speak to every man or nation in the language that he or it can understand. There is no cheap solution to national or international rivalries. Sometimes, therefore, it requires greater moral stamina to face war and its consequences than to avoid war. Pacifism and escapism are poor

moral substitutes for the sufferings and rigours of war.

It is a common argument with those who unreservedly accept the Gandhian teaching on this subject that India became free because of the efficacy of a spiritual power, the sort of non-violent movement which Gandhiji started against British domination. Unfortunately, we are not persuaded of the validity of this argument. Where are those people *now* who were trained in the exercise of this power? And did not some of the worst communal riots take place before the very eyes of the prophet of non-violence and his devoted disciples? Could they do anything in the matter except to preach high moral principles of truth and non-violence when the worst had already been done, and the forces of law and order had ultimately prevailed through sheer brute force? The partition of India was an unmitigated evil, recognized by all true patriots. Could Gandhiji and those who took their clues from him prevent the evil by the employment of any spiritual force? How did they resist the evil? With their lives? The partition of India impressed all dispassionate minds with the greater efficacy of Muslim League tactics of browbeating all opponents by employing force and threats of force. Who won in the struggle—the spiritual force or the admittedly non-spiritual and violent forces let loose by the League? The British Empire was admittedly mightier than the League.

It appears to me that there is some misunderstanding about the ethics of violence. Professor Nikam poses the question: What happens to the agent who uses violence? The question is ambiguous. We should first of all seek to know what end the agent has in mind. Has he exhausted all the resources of sweet reasonableness? Violence cannot be an end in itself. It is only a means; and the value of a means is dependent upon and derived from the value of the end, which alone has intrinsic value. It is conceivable that violence gives rise to violence, almost endlessly. But if violence is tempered with charity—and there must come a time when there is some scope left for charity—we need not despair. Violence is a more sensible and practical way of conquering evil in certain contingencies than any purely spiritual force.

The Hindu religion makes no bones about the employment of physical force to suppress evil. The employment of such force is quite consistent with righteousness and spirituality of the highest order. Social duty and the religion of the spirit are not inconsistent with each other. All duties, however earthly and unpleasant, can be spiritualized. It all depends upon the spirit in which we do our duties. As social beings, we are bound by the discipline of the society which has educated us and made us what we are; we cannot run away from our duties to it.

As spiritual beings, we are not bound by anything. We are all complex individuals, inheriting the divine and inheriting the earth. We are sons of both God and man, whom we combine in our earthly existence. It is proper, therefore, that we should combine in our life, social duty with spiritual enlightenment, personal excellence with the welfare and uplift of fellow-beings. There is no opposition between these two sides of our nature; nor is there any between violent methods for limited social ends and unlimited spiritual greatness.

G. R. MALKANI

ENDS AND SAYINGS

" _____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

Dr. A. C. Ewing of Cambridge University, speaking on February 6th at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on "The State and the Individual," made a constructive contribution to the consideration of totalitarianism *vs.* the individual. While conceding that, short of complete State Socialism, the State had the duty to limit undue interference by individuals with the freedom of other men, he maintained that it should, in its own interest, insure to each the maximum possible control of his own life.

If freedom of speech, for example, was denied, the community suffered in the denial of the opportunity to have what was wrong in the prevailing views being separated from what was right "by the winnowing fan of criticism." If individuals, moreover, were systematically prevented from expressing their views, there could be no democracy in more than in name. It was even questionable how far people could be "real individuals," *i.e.*, beings with intelligence, initiative and responsibility," under a system of rigid coercion which limited service to the State more or less to that of a machine.

The community consists of individuals, and we shall be without the material to build a good State if they are not properly developed individuals. The state will then be like an elaborately constructed milling machine which has only chaff to grind and not wheat, or like a wonderful safe which contains nothing but dust and ashes.

Treating man as a mere means, not as "an end-in-himself," struck at the very root of civilization, Professor Ewing declared. Experts in science or government might be claimed to know best what was good for the people; they might be useful in deciding on means, but the individual had to have a voice in the determination of ends to be sought or fall into slavery.

A significant recent change in American literary interest was brought out by Mr. Norman Cousins, Editor of *The Saturday Review of Literature*, in answering questions put to him at an informal Bombay gathering on February 27th, under the auspices of the P.E.N. All-India Centre. The highly subjective novels, like those of stark and satirical realism, had waned in popularity. Americans were beginning to think in epic terms rather than in terms of mere realism. They had realized the importance to survival of recapturing the universal principles on which the true America was built. The last decade had seen a great revival of interest in Thomas Paine and Walt Whitman, who had contributed most to American citizenship; also in Emerson and Thoreau, and in the basic writings of Thomas Jefferson, in whom, too, there was the real pulse beat of America.

Though admittedly somewhat provincial in philosophy and even in litera-

ture, Americans thought of universal values. Lecomte du Noüy's *Human Destiny* and Toynbee's *Study of History* had been tremendously popular, heading the non-fiction lists.

Mr. Cousins suggested that the novelists had failed to rediscover America because they had failed to rediscover themselves. We were, he said, living in a neurotic age, in which Fear was the abiding reality. The sources of man's fears had to be recognized and the fears externalized. An epic novel remained to be written with the state of man in the 20th century as its theme. It should give larger goals to which allegiance could be given, and when men had those larger goals they could surrender their petty fears and create a larger and better life.

"Amongst all the 'ifs of history,'" declares Mr. Vincent Sheean in "The Buddhism That Was India" (*Foreign Affairs*, U.S.A., January 1951) "one of the most impressive is...what might have been Asia's history if India had remained Buddhist?" It is a pertinent question, since, as he points out, India is still "Holy Land" to the devout Buddhists of many Asian countries. Buddhism had been enlightening the whole of the East for centuries before the triumphant revival of Brahman orthodoxy had suppressed it in India, where there were today but a handful of the Buddha's followers, and only the beauty of the Buddhist monuments remained as remainders of the formerly wide-spread faith.

After the decline of Buddhism in India, caste had reasserted itself; and, abroad, though the Buddha had had no use for images or ritual, he had himself become "the reigning image of innumerable temples." Mr. Sheean makes a thought-provoking parallel between the cases of Buddha and of Gandhiji, in whom he finds a resemblance to the Buddha in thought and action. He notes in India "a species of deification of Gandhi...accompanied by a disregard for much of what he wished to teach his people," mentioning as an example the flourishing of communalism today.

> Some of the phenomena we see in India suggest that Mahatma Gandhi's laborious life may produce a not dissimilar result—that he will be revered almost to the brink of adoration, and, so far as practice is concerned, ignored.

"Is it possible," he wonders, "that Gandhi's teaching will have the same fate as Buddha's—will go somewhere out of the land of its birth and be, perhaps, almost forgotten there?"

It is a possibility against which we warned editorially as long ago as January 1949, apropos of the reported enthusiasm for Gandhiji's teachings in Japan. In that connection we urged that India should not fail to make full use and application of them herself, adding:—

> It is the greatest tragedy of Indian history that the Buddha's teachings found ultimately a more congenial soil abroad than on the Indian subcontinent itself. Will the people of Japan or some other country prove more consistently responsive to Gandhiji's message than do his fellow-countrymen?

History must not be allowed to repeat itself, for, whatever difference it might have made to Asia if India had retained Buddhism as a guiding force, India's own history would certainly have been far different and brighter; and sectarian bigotry would not have claimed its noblest modern victim in Gandhiji himself!