THE UNITED LODGE OF THEOSOPHISTS,
"Maitri-Bhavan"
15, Sir Krishna Rao Road,
Basavangudi Bangalore City.
LIBRARY COPY

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly, and lost among the host—as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—The Voice of the Silence

VOL. XXIV APRIL 1953 No. 4

215

"THUS HAVE I HEARD"—

The wise Solomon spoke of "the holy spirit of discipline." Statesmen of every nation today advocate the practice of discipline by the citizen. Sometimes it is sought to impose discipline from without, and then, invariably, soon or late, rebellious tendencies break loose. The lesson of the Sages, ancient and modern, is that there is only one discipline truly efficacious and that is Self-discipline. From within his own consciousness a man must evolve his own code of discipline. No one can be coerced for long by another, be the other politician or priest; the feeling that the politician is exploiting his loyalty and patriotism, the priest his devotion and faith, arises and rebellion of some kind occurs.

Robert Burton in his *Anatomy of Melancholy* speaks of "the fear of some divine and supreme powers, which keep men in obedience." Nevertheless, the growth of human conscience and of moral insight does take place, however indirectly, as these are not directly taught. Then the fear of powers, divine or demoniac, is overcome and the mind becomes ready to exclaim: "Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God!"

Therefore discipline from within one's own mind must arise and become the guide to conduct. In the early stages of this looking within for guidance of outer acts, the person's own motives are hidden from him. Pride and self-regard are so natural to his being that the Egotist becomes the disciplinarian. Declaiming that he is the master of his fate and the captain of his soul, he proceeds to devise ways and means to express his own soul's freedom. This does not take him very far and soon his pride and self-regard, subtly disguised, begin to function, covering his ambition for money and popularity with the veneer of a desire to do good, for which these are necessary.

The ways of Providence and Nemesis are strange. In earning money, in gaining fame, in wielding power, in practising kindness, charity and sympathy, in pouring out love itself, the human mind-soul learns the art of disciplining its per-

sonal self. Strength of character, the habit of gentle service and the manifesting of devotion to the interests of loved ones begin to unfold. But pride continues to rule the will. Self-regard dies hard. Both hide their faces subtly and unless these are perceived and noted true self-discipline cannot be undertaken with success. When one aspect of our lower personal self tries to discipline another, it is a contest between the Devil and his disciple.

The Soul's disciplining of its personal self is the higher, true discipline. It begins to operate only when the foibles of the good, kind, affectionate, but all the same Egotistic, person stand revealed to the inner Divinity which shapes its own ends, however rough the hewing by the personal ego. The human being is a sprite, an elemental, posing as a godling. Karma tears the veil off his consciousness and reveals him as possessing in germ the powers of the Spirit, of a God, and as capable of evolving into a Sage-Seer. Then only does the real discipline begin.

The discipline of the disciple seeks the true teacher who has the faculty of imparting knowledge without coercion or controlling the freedom of the will. A true guru does not make slaves of his disciples; does not claim obedience from them. The disciple has grown to recognize that docility and receptivity are necessary if he is to acquire the knowledge imparted; that concentration and reflection are necessary if he is to understand, to discern, to evaluate; that obedience to the teaching carries within itself the higher obedience to the teacher.

In the course of his development he perceives how the great Guru, the Self-realized Teacher, in instructing the self-prepared pupil, is Himself the Sublime Pupil of the Most High, whose Body, invisible and visible, is Living Nature Herself. The real Guru observes the Divine Discipline of obeying Nature and, having obtained mastery over Nature's Law and laws, obeys them. Thus the disciple learns the lesson of true discipline—to obey Teachings and Teacher, the former permeating Living Nature, and the latter embodying the Wisdom in the single book-volume of His Disciplined Brain. And so there is this piece of instruction in H. P. Blavatsky's *Voice of the Silence*:—

> Desire nothing. Chafe not at Karma, nor at Nature's changeless laws. But struggle only with the personal, the transitory, the evanescent and the perishable.
>
> Help Nature and work on with her; and Nature will regard thee as one of her creators and make obeisance.
>
> And she will open wide before thee the portals of her secret chambers, lay bare before thy gaze the treasures hidden in the very depths of her pure virgin bosom. Unsullied by the hand of matter, she shows her treasures only to the eye of Spirit—the eye which never closes, the eye for which there is no veil in all her kingdoms.

SHRAVAKA

"THE LESSONS OF HISTORY"

[It is a thought-provoking evaluation of history, informed by a deep humaneness, which **Miss Cicely Veronica Wedgwood**, English historian and journalist and President of the English Centre of the International P.E.N. Club, develops in this essay. Her books include studies of Oliver Cromwell and of William the Silent. For *William the Silent* she was awarded the James Tait Black Prize. She concludes her article on an inspiring note: "The cardinal lesson of history is the deep brotherhood of man, not only in space, but in time."—ED.]

In this utilitarian epoch the writer of history is often asked: What is the use of history? Because I am not myself free from the utilitarianism of the age and because I have not always the courage of my convictions, I do not often dare to answer: None, except to give pleasure.

Personally I study history because I like people, and I write it because I like writing. In fact, it gives me pleasure. But that is not usually considered justification enough for doing anything nowadays. There must be deeper reasons, or more plausible excuses.

When I was a student I believed, with the optimistic aspiration of youth, that history held the key to most of the problems of life and that I was on the highway to finding it. There was, surely, an essential wisdom to be extracted from the knowledge of all that men had ever done in the past, rather as one squeezes the juice from an orange. The great synthesis, the rhythmic pattern, the certain purpose behind all things—these would surely emerge, for the simplification of all problems and the enlightenment of the world.

Walking in the green water-meadows round Oxford, when I was young and the sky seemed so much higher than it does now, there were certainly moments when a great revelation seemed almost within sight. Perhaps out of the woods which fringed the gently rising slope, or by the tranquil waters "above Godstow bridge, when hay-time's here" on a warm June day, I should meet the immortal Scholar Gypsy and understand the universe.

At that time, had anyone asked me the use of history, I should have said with a plenitude of conviction that it was the master science, the science of mankind, the fountain of all knowledge. Since then I have become too keenly aware of the limitations of historical evidence, the uncertainty of historical judgments and the fundamentally unscientific nature of historical studies. I would hesitate even to defend history on the narrower thesis which is often put forward, namely, that it is an important guide to current political problems. Interpretations of history certainly play an important part in

creating modern political problems but that a profound knowledge of history was ever of much use in solving them, I have yet to learn.

This is not to say that knowledge of history is totally useless or totally harmful. The world as we know it grew from its past as a child grows from its childhood and something we certainly ought to know about what has been. But it is important also to recognize that of all knowledge historical knowledge is the most uncertain. It consists not of established and proven truths, but of a collection of opinions formed by men, from time to time, on the very insufficient data afforded them by fragmentary records, fragmentary survivals, and the fragmentary recollections and opinions of other men. There is such a thing as historical truth, but it is difficult to define and impossible to discover. The most the historian can hope to attain is an honest approximation to it.

Here indeed is the crux of the matter for the historian. He is in quest of the unattainable and he knows it. He knows that his best result will only be something like what really happened. How tempting therefore to allow his own prejudices to sway the balance of his judgment when he considers the evidence before him ! I suppose no historian who ever lived has been free from unconscious deviations of this kind, and very, very few from an occasional conscious one. Yet, for all that, there is a world of difference between the man whose fundamental intention is honest, or shall we say *historical*, and the man whose fundamental intention is dishonest, not historical but propagandist. The one is concerned to find out what he can of the truth ; the other is not concerned with the truth at all, but only with the ulterior effects that he can achieve by elaborating or suppressing it. This vicious travesty of history is often mistaken for history, indeed its success as propaganda depends on its being so mistaken.

A great historian has said that history is not the truth, but the search for the truth. What then is the use of this quest for knowledge, which can never end except in an approximation ? What can this poor, fragmentary half-science teach those who study it and those who read it ?

There is, I think, no general or absolute answer to this question ; I shall attempt nothing more than a personal one. I no longer believe that any general lessons or even great truths can be learnt from the study of history. If there is, behind the jungle of events, some master plan which explains all, if there is, behind the conflicts of good and evil, of evil and evil, of good and good, behind the gigantic confusion of misapprehension and waste, some coherent and greater purpose with which all must in the end comply, I doubt if any historian is equipped with the godlike knowledge to understand and interpret it. History, as known to God, may contain the key to all

things; but history as known to man can never do so.

On a lower level I have already said that I am doubtful of the usefulness of historical knowledge in politics. On the contrary it seems more often to increase bitterness and exacerbate hatreds. "You attacked us in 1870, 1914 and 1940," says the Frenchman to the German, and the German replies, "You snitched Alsace at the end of the Thirty Years War." No one is the better or the happier for a *tu quoque* of that kind. But the fault here of course is that historical knowledge is being used *alone*. Historical knowledge deepened by philosophy and mellowed by compassion may be, and perhaps sometimes has been, useful in creating better understanding between individuals at least, if not between nations. The tragedy is that historical knowledge in the political field is very rarely accompanied by these two essential concomitants.

Ultimately it seems to me that the valuable lessons of history are the simplest, the most individual and what today often seem the most old-fashioned. Political lessons are, and will be, read and taught differently by each nation and by each different age and epoch. Economic lessons will be repeatedly reshaped to meet current economic doctrines. The general atmosphere of history as taught undergoes startling changes; in the West for many centuries the emphasis was always on the steady decline of man from some mythical golden age. Then, with a revolution of conceptions, history about 200 years ago became, and long remained, the story of man's steady progress towards an attainable millennium. Neither version seems to have incorporated the true lesson of history. Even to the greatest and most subtle minds the rhythms and movements of civilizations appear differently and suggest different conclusions, and the value of a monumental work like that of Professor Toynbee seems to me to be philosophic rather than, strictly speaking, historical.

Yet there remains, in so far as we can trace it, the fascination of individual conduct; the achievements, the failures, the moral problems which have faced men and women in the past. The great defence of historical studies is that they increase knowledge of our fellow men. They bring us into touch, however feebly, with hundreds of thousands of human beings and with some part of their experience. The old fashioned study of Great Men had much to be said for it. Rightly understood, the contemplation of a noble mind is always valuable. The wide vision of Asoka, the steady endurance of William the Silent, the iron determination and singleness of purpose of a Florence Nightingale —these things are unusual, yet they are human. They are a part of our common humanity and a legitimate inspiration. Nor is there any necessity to idealize such figures or write them larger than they were. Men and women are more illuminating

and more helpful when seen with all their faults.

Though men and women, great of heart and of mind, seem to me to justify the study of history, they are not the only justification. Hundreds of thousands of others, from all times and all ages, have left some faint recollection, have added some small thing to our knowledge of men's souls and minds. There is something to me perhaps exaggeratedly moving in these countless flickering signals still left burning faintly in the huge darkness of past ages. Sometimes no more than a phrase or a single moment has been fortuitously preserved. A traveller 300 years ago, crossing from Scotland to Ireland in the ferry boat, entered in his diary that the boatman was an honest fellow with Dickie, his fine lively son, to help him. Nothing else of those two, the boatman and his son, remains; snatched from the blackness before and after, there is the boy's name, this one little picture of a boat rocking at a quayside in Galloway, and the knowledge of a relationship, the father and the son working together—one of the most ordinary things in the world perhaps, but beautiful, the useful labour, the simple love, the pride of the father in his strong young son.

It is not on the most ambitious levels that history seems to me to teach the highest lessons, but rather in these humble reaches. I would seek the lessons of history from the study of individuals, of their motives, their sufferings, their weaknesses, strengths, misfortunes and happiness, rather than in the larger, vaguer, more ambitious regions of history which are subject to greater and more dangerous errors. The cardinal lesson of history is the deep brotherhood of man, not only in space, but in time.

C. V. WEDGWOOD

OUR FUTURE CITIZENS

Writing on "The Problem of the Child" in the "New Corporation Special Supplement" of the *Calcutta Municipal Gazette*, Dr. K. P. Ghosh, a Councillor of the Calcutta Corporation, administers shock therapy to the social conscience. It is in no spirit of carping at the shortcomings of an administration harassed by a thousand problems incidental to the establishment of the new Nation on a stable foundation that attention is drawn here to his strong castigation of "the criminal folly of slothful apathy towards children." There is danger in postponing amelioration of the conditions under which so many of the citizens of tomorrow are growing up—the unhealthy refugee camps, the crowded bustees, the streets where shelterless destitute families—and their hapless children—are living, not only in Calcutta and in West Bengal, with which Dr. Ghosh is especially concerned, but elsewhere in India as well.

Dr. Ghosh castigates the tendency "to ascribe our failures to lack of funds and remain complacent." He calls for specific improvements, to be made possible by priorities in allocations for child welfare. The evils of high infant mortality, child labour, beggary and demoralization are among the ones that he mentions. It may be true that the country cannot afford, by reason of its heavy commitments for defence and police costs, for one thing, to take the necessary ameliorative steps immediately. It is certainly true that it cannot afford to put off these steps too long.

LITERATURE AND FREEDOM

[The world can rarely have been in greater need than at the present day of pens to serve the ideals of unity and tolerance, and men to wield them without fear or favour. The fact that the International Congress of the P.E.N. is this year to hold its annual session in Dublin makes this article especially timely and apposite. We share the hope expressed by **Mr. R. M. Fox** that advantage will be taken of the opportunity it will afford for the full and frank expression of views and an uncompromising stand against the forces of reaction and intolerance.—ED.]

When peace came to Europe the first impulse was to cry "Never again!" Gazing through the drifting smoke at the débris of splendid cities it is not surprising that sensitive observers felt the need for affirming human solidarity and protesting against the senseless cruelty of war. Hiroshima was denounced as an evidence of barbarous atavism unworthy of civilized man. An American investigator, intent on serving his fellows, caught the spirit of the time in the title of his book, *One World*. For a moment it looked as though humanity was willing to accept the view that we must all make the best of living together in this world we share, irrespective of differences of colour, creed and social opinions.

This seemed a wise decision for a war-torn, ragged, limping world to make. There was so much to do in the way of rebuilding and rehabilitation. The sick and the wounded, the displaced persons, the thousands of orphans, required attention.

Suddenly all this was changed. Instead of one world, we were confronted with two worlds in perpetual conflict. The cold war is merely a time of preparation for hot warfare, with its programme of annihilation—invasion, napalm bombs, the atom bomb and all those other ways of mass killing which the clever scientists are perfecting in secret, with no expense spared.

If the world chooses to follow the path of destruction rather than the path of creative adventure it must be because the makers of public opinion have recommended that course. Writers cannot evade their responsibility in this matter. It is true, of course, that there has never been a lack of pens to serve ignoble causes. Nazi Germany had its full quota of professors and pundits ready to advocate and justify its worst excesses, its racial domination and its brutal tyranny. Before the Hitler malady overtook Germany one could meet bands of young people—youths and girls—wandering along the mountain paths, picnicking in the woods, strumming guitars and singing of the glories of nature and of peace. This *Wandervogel* movement had its thousands of adherents and, had it been allow-

ed to develop freely, might have made Germany a land of democracy and peace. After the Second World War, too, the feeling for disarmament was widespread in the land. This was encouraged to begin with, but now the militarists have insisted that the Germans take their place in the ranks of those who stand for a division of the world on lines of war and hatred.

In times of social tension—such as our own—the forces of repression are active. It was so in the years following the Napoleonic Wars when the world was shaken by the storms of the French Revolution. In Britain there were countless victims of the laws against a free press and free speech. Yet the influence of the French Revolution spread, for repression can never prevent the advance of a social movement born of the needs of the time.

The parallel between this earlier after-war period and our own times is very close. But America's rôle in them has been quite different. The newly established United States gave an impetus to the revolutionary movement in France and helped to clear away those remnants of feudalism which still cluttered the stage in Europe. Today America takes the lead in resisting any influence that comes either directly from the mighty upheaval in Russia or—like the various national movements in Asia—takes its rise out of similar forces in a changing world. The spectacle of America vainly trying to sweep back the tide with a broom has its comic side but when there is an atom bomb tied to the broom it ceases to be funny.

Panic repression has been the key-note of recent years. Men and women whose only crime is that they have been sensitive to suffering and social injustice, have been hauled up before blatant committees for investigation of their beliefs. Mr. Truman himself has suggested that people might be afraid to put their names to the Declaration of Independence—the foundation document of the States—for fear of imprisonment or loss of employment. And this rule of terror has been carried out in the name of "Free Society."

This wave of repression is particularly harmful to writers who, to do their best work, need scope for the exercise of a free creative spirit. American writers of an earlier age, such as Emerson, Thoreau and Whitman, would almost certainly have come into conflict with the present organs of repression. One wonders whether men like Theodore Dreiser, Jack London and Sinclair Lewis might not find themselves in gaol if they penned their biting social criticisms in our era. From the standpoint of intellectual freedom the world has taken a step backward. When men are imprisoned or victimized for their social opinions, the whole of the intellectual life of the time is poisoned, for honest, fearless criticism becomes impossible.

This situation will confront the

International Conference of the P.E.N.—representing the writers of many lands—when, in 1953, it meets in Dublin. Will this Conference stand for the free spirit of literature not only in the East but in the West as well, where its voice should be more effective ? Meeting in Dublin, the capital of a country not officially linked with the United Nations, the conference should speak with the greater freedom. One hopes that the responsible spokesmen of literature will not run away from the issue by merely mouthing partisan platitudes about the " Free Society " of the West, for all writers worthy of their pens know very well that the " free world " of which they speak does not exist except as an aspiration in the minds and hearts of honest men.

A Chinese woman, Dr. Han Suyin, who received her medical training in London and has friends in the East and the West, has said with fitting dignity what she feels is true about the " intellectuals " of her race who have been condemned for staying in China instead of joining the trek to Hong Kong or Formosa. In her book *A Many-Splendoured Thing* she writes :—

> They remained to serve their people. They believed beyond political ends, beyond wars and balances of power. They did not join their voices to the small indignant chorus of those who pollute the word of freedom with hope for a third world war to re-establish an order dead long ago.
>
> Freedom is indeed a jewel beyond price but to invoke it as a social bludgeon to increase the strife in the world does not help the cause of literature or of truth. If one can speak of the spirit of literature—and the phrase still has a meaning—it is the task and privilege of writers to lift the lamp of understanding high so that its beams may light the whole path of human endeavour. Toleration, a sense of human solidarity, a respect for the opinions of others—however widely these differ from our own—this is the true spirit of literature.
>
> Our great heritage of literature, of art and of drama, is valuable because it is an expression of the human spirit. If there is no belief in that expression, there is no reason to treasure the books, plays and pictures that have come down to us through the ages. The intellectual integrity of the writer is not only essential for his own work ; it is essential also for the health of society. Unless the writer guards his independence he will not be allowed to emphasize the oneness of the world, the need for friendship between East and West. On both sides of the Iron Curtain that hangs across the world there is fear, suspicion and ignorance which can be exploited by vulgar vested interests that profit by war. Not by becoming partisans can writers best serve their cause but rather by drawing together all those who want to build the free society of the future which will extend its boundaries to include the East and the West.

R. M. Fox

GEORGE SANTAYANA—A MEMORY

[Such a glimpse as **Mr. Neville Braybrooke**, Editor of the quarterly *The Wind and the Rain* and the annual *Translation*, gives, helps the reader to get a new sense of the essential human quality of the late Spanish philosopher Santayana who has left a predominantly intellectual impress on his times.—ED.]

Early September and the Roman sun sweltering down upon the Church of St. John Lateran, drenching it in a steaming haze: one step of the pilgrimage was over; but the pilgrimage was neither architectural nor devotional, for it was to see the philosopher, George Santayana. Earlier that week Emilio Cecchi, the Italian critic, had said that a visit to Rome would be incomplete without a visit to Santayana and that introductions were not necessary. One just went, as in past centuries men went to visit the Oracle. Names, also, were not necessary, since there were stories current of certain American literary pundits who had gone, proclaimed their identities ("I have reviewed your books, Mr. Santayana.") and were as gently passed over in their turn as probably their reviews had been. For Santayana, Cecchi told us, was essentially interested in people for their own sakes: age and reputation did not enter into his scale of values —and so, with this exhortation ringing in our ears, Elizabeth King and myself set forth.

Santayana had rooms in a convent 10 minutes' walk past St. John Lateran. To reach it we went down a narrow lane where, idly lolling against each other, soldiers were strolling with their girls. At the gate of the convent a sister opened the door and ushered us into a small room, heavily shuttered. Then there came the sound of an old man's walk which was not so much a shuffling as a steady padding and, garbed in a dressing-gown, patting rather than shaking our hands, he sat down and began to talk away. Quite how the conversation began I cannot recall, but once it had begun it flowed smoothly and gracefully—like his own writing. It was mainly about *Gil Blas* and whether, as in that novel, the old become bores without realizing it. There was a note of questioning and, though no reply was solicited, the course the enquiry ran was as in a conversation piece in which the characters remain nameless, but at the end of which one suddenly realizes that all sorts of personal incidentals have been slipped in. One incidental I recollect was Santayana declaring that he read both the *New York Herald Tribune* and *Osservatore Romano*, believing that the truth lay somewhere between the two. When we rose to go, he simply said: "Yes. There are many more important things in Rome than me to see."

A little while later I wrote to Santayana asking him for an article

for a review which I edited, telling him that I had always admired some lines of his that I once found quoted in a Charles Morgan novel. The lines were :—

> It is not wisdom to be only wise
> And on the inward vision close the eyes :
> But it is wisdom to believe the heart.

I take this from his reply :—

...you quote from a sonnet of mine, perhaps the first I ever wrote, which many people have liked, as a religious meditation, if not as poetry. I had been reading the *Bacchæ* of Euripides and in one of the choruses had been struck with the words...which I translated in the first rather loose line which you quote, and built the rest of the sonnet round it. Even then, as applying to religion, as you may see if you read the previous two sonnets, in the first publication of mine, ten years later (1894), it represented a past phase of sentiment in me. However, I am happy that it should have found appreciative readers.

It is perhaps worth while putting this on record, because when the great die there is nearly always an attempt to twist their words and, if some of the world's worst wars have been waged in the name of religion, then also some of the worst twisting in men's thought has been carried out in the name of religion by imposing earlier sentiments upon later beliefs and juxtaposing the two. But this is the personal memory of a man, not an assessment of his thought, and whenever I pick up his books memory comes back with a picture as I saw him on that hot Italian September afternoon. I am reminded of Cyrano de Bergerac's old age and how, to tease the nuns, he would speak of the steaks he ate on Fridays—the sisters knowing full well that he was such a saint that he ate next to nothing during the whole week. Without stretching that comparison too far, it symbolizes for me, better than any other, a man who, though in his 80's, no matter how urbane and civilized he might appear, never lost a certain boyish playfulness.

NEVILLE BRAYBROOKE

PENAL REFORM

The bringing of the Indian Penal Code and prison administration into line with the most enlightened penological theory and practice is overdue. The First All-India Penal Reform Conference met in Bombay in February 1940, but one has heard little since of the Indian Penal Reform League formed at that time. Certain States have effected improvements in the handling of youthful offenders and a recent Bombay Act permits periodic visits home by long-term prisoners with a good behaviour record, but prison reform in general has lagged and from time to time reports of "third degree" methods in interrogating suspects have shocked the public conscience.

The National Government in January 1953 sought the views of the State Governments as to the need for radical change in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The following month the recommendations of Dr. Walter C. Reckless, a criminologist loaned under the UN Technical Assistance Programme, were made public. They include Juvenile Courts; separate accommodation for women offenders, with women administrators; and the introduction of probation, which, he said at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on November 12th, 1951, was successful in 75 to 80 cases out of 100 in the U.S.A.

A basically important proposal of Dr. Reckless is for a change in the concept of the purpose of imprisonment, from that of punishment to that of social rehabilitation.

OUR CONSCIOUSNESS OF GOD

[**Dr. S. Vahiduddin** of the Department of Philosophy in the Osmania University at Hyderabad considers in this essay a topic of perennial interest. The inner assurance of a higher Reality, a Presence and a Power behind the changing pattern of outer events, is an idea innate and persistent in human consciousness, however dwarfed by the ascribing of human attributes to That which may be spiritually sensed though never fully comprehended by the finite mind —ED.]

The consciousness of God as a fact and a phenomenon has an interest of its own. It is independent of the question of God's existence. As many have found their way from the consciousness of freedom and responsibility to freedom itself, so we may also be led from the consciousness of Deity to Deity Itself. But that is another question. The consciousness as a datum cannot be denied. Our purpose is confined to a phenomenological description of what that consciousness is. It is not a psychological description. Psychologically we may be interested in knowing the mental factors at work, their genesis and the laws that govern them. That is already an interpretation and an interpretation is not our object. We want to make the consciousness retrospective, to make it speak for itself.

But the consciousness of God has one disadvantage. Unlike the consciousness of freedom its universality may be challenged. There have cropped up now and then in history religious outlooks without the notion of God and personal immortality. It may also be questioned whether God and immortality are so indissolubly linked together that the one leads to the other. Impressed by the testimony of history, earnest thinkers have been forced to affirm that God and immortality are not really pivotal to the religious consciousness. Schleiermacher has affirmed in unmistakable terms that God does not constitute an essential element in the religious consciousness. Paradoxical as it might seem in a Christian thinker like Schleiermacher, in his famous *Discourses* he has identified religion with a feeling and a vision of the universe. The consciousness of God is only one among many possible forms of religious consciousness.

Though it is hardly possible to agree with Schleiermacher in his characterization of religion, it may be that primitive religion may refer only to the beyond, without any distinct consciousness of God. God in our consciousness is invested with moral attributes, more or less pronounced. But religion, shorn of its moral moments, is the irrational and the numinous of which Rudolf Otto speaks. Religion, then, does not exhaust itself in morality and an ambiguous attitude in relation to God is not ruled out by history.

But who knows whether the great teacher who developed a full-fledged religion without God had not a consciousness of God in such fullness that silence was the only medium through which it could be conveyed? Or that God in his phenomenality, as an object of worship and prayer, as *Ishvara* and creator, that was ignored, while Brahman remained too lofty for words? Even the strong conviction of God that Goethe's Faust entertains does not pour itself forth in words. Rejection and affirmation become equally presumptuous. Perhaps the idea of something above the distinctions of being and non-being is lurking in the thought of Buddhism. Oldenberg has no doubt that the idea of Nirvana has grown out of speculation about Brahman. It seems that Buddhist thought only brings us before a mystery which is an abyss for the reason.

However that may be, our purpose is to show how God is present in our experience. William James has subjected the sense of presence to an interesting analysis. His remarks deserve attention, not only as the considered views of an influential thinker, but also as representative of an age. James assumes a primitive sense of presence, which, if worked upon, forms the basis of our apprehension of the real. Pierre Janet has shown how in pathological cases the sense of the real fails and the world appears dreamy and unsubstantial. No doubt in moments of great emotional crisis our hold on the real gives way. Whitehead cites the murmur of William Pitt, English Prime Minister, on his death-bed, at a dark hour in the Napoleonic Wars: "What shades we are, what shadows we pursue!"

This is a human reaction of ontological and axiological import. The aims that we have faithfully sought all our life seem divested of all value. The apprehension of ourselves as shades is the awareness of our unsubstantiality, and the apprehension of the shadow that we pursue is the consciousness of the valueless emptiness of our pursuits. The strife that is life does not simply become "ignoble"; that would still be something. But all the hurly-burly of life becomes only "sound and fury, signifying nothing." Such a moment of emotional crisis is illustrated in Turgeniev's *Smoke*. The world, the gay life of society and the heat of political controversy suddenly appear as vapour and smoke.

Whatever its ultimate foundation, the sense of the presence of God cannot be ignored. It sometimes takes curious forms. The person feels himself pursued by some one and frequently looks back. Or he may feel his double following him at every stop. The writer of a document quoted by James expresses himself thus:—

> I think it well to add that in this ecstasy of mine God had neither form, colour, odour, nor taste; moreover, that the feeling of his presence was accompanied with no determinate localization. It was rather as if my personal-

ity had been transformed by the presence of a spiritual spirit.

Now James seems to suggest that our consciousness of God is of like nature. Nothing can be further from the truth. We never become conscious of God in his substantiality, to use the traditional language, but effectively in feeling and experience and ideationally as the reference of thought. The consciousness of God is totally different from the consciousness of a thing or a person. The religious experience is not to be distinguished by the non-religious only in the effects that it produces, in the joy or shudder that is its outcome. No wonder that James, with his predilection for finite gods and higher selves, has been led to misunderstand the nature of the consciousness of God. It becomes for him like our consciousness of a departed soul. He asserts that many persons possess the objects of their belief in the form, not of mere conceptions accepted by the intellect as true, but rather of "quasi-sensible realities directly apprehended."

Now what we maintain is that the consciousness of God is wholly other. The writer of the very document cited above corrects himself immediately and gives a more faithful expression of what he felt. He adds:—

But the more I seek words to express this intimate intercourse, the more I feel the impossibility of describing the thing by any of our visual images. At bottom the expression most apt to render what I felt is this: God was present, though invisible; He fell under no one of my senses, yet my consciousness perceived.

How then is God really experienced? If we look at the experience cursorily we are struck by the personal character of God. It is not our concern to show how far personality can be attributed to God. We are only in quest of the way we become conscious of Him. He is never present as a finite being, engaged in a struggle which we only hope He will win and with whom we cast in our lot. The consciousness of God knows no risk, be it in the pragmatic, the Kantian or the Existentialist sense. It knows no "either...or." The way we become conscious of God as a person in our prayer and communion may not be considered elevating for fastidious speculation. Fichte has vigorously condemned it. But the way God appears in consciousness betrays the man and his spirit. On different levels of spiritual development the consciousness of God appears differently. If God is taken as the object of love, He is understood as the Idea of personality in its fullness. And if the Deity is taken as other than personality, It can only be a more in this otherness, not a less. God may appear as a solace and a hope and also as a wall against which our efforts avail not. "I have known God in the frustration of my aims," remarked Hazrat Ali.

God may well appear in our consciousness as super-personal, as a direction or an aim that is always

elusive. God is then experienced in self-transcendence. K. Jaspers seems to move on this plane. God is found in the frustration of all our thought and action. Even when we are conscious of God negatively, as "*neti, neti,*" even in the negation there is something positive hidden; we somehow divine what we are aiming at. Even in religions with a highly developed personal consciousness of God the references to his super-personal character are legion. God is experienced as "beyond, beyond all beyond and still beyond."

The communion with God of the creative religious genius, of the saint and the *rishi*, may be totally different. Without understanding what they are, we can only divine their experiences. The common man also *lives* God in an uncommon way at certain rare moments of his life. Such moments may bring about conversion and decide the future course of life. Pierre, the hero of Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, experiences the sudden awakening of the consciousness of God.

> And suddenly in his captivity he had learnt, not by words or reasoning but by direct feeling, what his nurse had told him long ago: that God is here and everywhere....And the closer he looked the more tranquil and happy he became. That dreadful question, What for? which had formerly destroyed all his mental edifices, no longer existed for him. To that question, What for? a simple answer was now always ready in his soul: "Because there is a God, that God without whose will not one hair falls from a man's head."

But we need not go even to experiences of such a rare order. As love remains for many of us only a dream and a longing, so these experiences too evade the light of everyday reality. Our purpose is well served if we can bring to light the consciousness of God as a phenomenon of everyday significance.

Sometimes God reveals Himself in conditions in which one would least expect Him. In perverse moments, in moments of sin and degradation one may feel the sudden nearness of God. God may reveal himself in an awareness of our alienation from the Divine Order. Many practices of certain religious sects and individuals have their root in such morbidity. What is more natural and salutary is to feel God not in sin when we are wallowing in it but in repentance. The feeling of degradation is the feeling of value that has unfortunately not found fulfilment in our life.

Many are the ways and the forms in which we become conscious of God. We may feel the presence of God in all that we do, feel or think, and religion will assume a corresponding form. If God is experienced as activity and urge, a religion of action is born and a life of duty becomes the goal. Religion then becomes a mission and a crusade. If God is lived as the affective atmosphere, religion takes on an æsthetic character and man is lost in contemplation of everlasting Beauty.

If God is lived as a constant reference of thought, religion takes the form of knowledge; it seems to be God's knowledge that makes possible the knowledge of things around us.

It is interesting to observe down the ages, in a single historical religion, the shifting of accent from one to another of these, the tension of opposites making for the vigour and health of a great religion. The contrast between the *vita activa*, and the *vita contemplativa* of Martha and Mary is an abiding contrast. Our consciousness of the Divine is also rich in contrasts; now one and now another moment becomes salient. Whether we live God as the breath of our life, or as the Light that flickers at a distance or as the frustration of our action and the despair of our thought, God steals into the heart in a way all Its own.

S. VAHIDUDDIN

ENGLISH AND HINDI

A constructive contribution to the Hindi-English issue in respect to higher education in India was made by Prof. N. K. Sidhanta, in his Sir Krishnaswami Aiyar Endowment Lectures at the Andhra University, Waltair, on February 11th and 12th. He touched on the problem in considering "The Future of the Indian Universities" and dealt with it specifically in lecturing on "The Future of English Studies in India," which he regretted had become a political issue.

The same University Commission Report which had called for the replacement of English as the medium of instruction in University studies as soon as possible had urged the continuance of the study of English in view of the growing world knowledge and world thought, especially when the philosophy of the "oneness of the world" was in the making. This key to modern Western knowledge, Professor Sidhanta urged, would be helpful in laying the foundations of the new Indian Nation now in the building.

Against Hindi as a substitute for English he mentioned the difficulty of standardizing the language, which had several dialects, its unintelligibility to most Indians, its deficiencies in textbooks as well as technical terminology and its lack of a great literature.

English, on the other hand, was necessary as a world language embodying the researches in every aspect of art, science and culture. India still had much to learn of world culture and science. And, we would add, the West has much to learn of India. This desirable exchange is threatened in both directions by the menace to the linguistic line of communication. For one thing, as Professor Sidhanta did well to bring out, the present free interchange of teachers and students from all over the world would end with the supersession of English.

But if world unity is threatened by the substitution of Hindi for English in higher education, what will be the effect upon national unity if more and more universities adopt their respective regional languages as the media of instruction? Is the facility for intercourse among the educated which English has so long provided to be scrapped for a babel of tongues?

THE CASE AGAINST FLOGGING

[Flogging should be an unthinkable punishment in any country that calls itself civilized. It is particularly painful to learn of agitation in its favour in Britain, which, in its welfare Programme, has offered such convincing proof of its recognition of the dignity of the individual and the worth of man *qua* man. **Mr. George Godwin**, well-known and courageous British essayist and the author of *Noted British Trials* and *The Great Revivalists*, offers here statistical evidence against the claim that flogging has a deterrent effect, either on the victims of this brutal and sadistic torture or on others. It is a thousand pities that what should be universally recognized as a clear moral issue should require an argument on the score of expediency to be brought against the reintroduction of flogging.—ED.]

A private member's Bill for the reintroduction of flogging for certain offences will have been debated in the House of Commons before this article appears. My purpose is to state the case against corporal punishment, and the validity of an argument is not affected by any change in the law.

The widespread demand among sections of the population in England for the reintroduction of flogging for certain crimes is, I believe, due to two main causes.

First, the sensational presentation of crime reports in the popular press. A survey, over only a limited period, reveals a sequence of hares raised, pursued for a while and then inconsequently abandoned. This is part of the technique of popular journalism which prefers sensation to statistics. At the moment, the focus is upon crimes of violence and the consequence is ill-founded fear in the public mind, a fear directly due to the distorted picture of the facts propagated by sections of the sensational press.

The second factor, even more lamentable, is the judicial endorsement of the demand. This advocacy of the reintroduction of flogging is led by Lord Goddard, the Lord Chief Justice. And there is reason to believe that he has carried a number of his judicial brethren with him, though not, however, all, nor the head of the legal profession, the Lord Chancellor.

First, what are the facts ?

Until September 1948 flogging could be imposed for robbery with violence, and armed robbery. Corporal punishment was abolished as from that date.

The figures of these crimes as known to the police have not increased since the abolition of flogging as is generally believed, but, on the contrary, have decreased. In 1946, 804 such crimes were known to the police. At the date of abolition the number was 978. Since then decrease has been consistent. The

latest figure—for the first half of 1952—is 359.

If we look at the overall picture of present-day crime we find that what has happened is that there has been a general upward curve for crimes of most kinds, or what is popularly known as "a crime wave." What causes have produced this crime wave are not easily discovered. That they are exceedingly complex is certain. One may say that lawlessness follows always on the great national act of violence we call war. But, while it is true that crime does tend to increase in countries lately engaged in war, that answer will not do. The present upward trend in most categories of criminal offences is troubling not only those nations that were drawn into the Second World War, but those also that escaped that experience. There is a crime wave in England, or, to put it more prosaically, an increase in crime. But there is also a like increase in Sweden, a country that was actually enriched by the last war and suffered no direct or indirect disadvantages from it.

The history of penology reveals a rhythm in the recurrence of crime. "Crime waves" recur at intervals, and do so without any obvious causes.

Lord Goddard takes the view that the only way to deter the "cosh boys," and others who attack the old or the defenceless for purposes of robbery, is to flog them. He believes that flogging is a deterrent, and that is the justification of his case, without which it falls to the ground. And the facts are against him.

In 1948 a Departmental Committee which had been set up to consider the matter, prior to the passing of the Criminal Justice Bill referred to above, reported on the deterrent value of flogging and found that it had no deterrent value. It was found that the subsequent offences among those flogged were more numerous than among those offenders not flogged.

Convicted of subsequent serious crime :

Flogged, 55.%
Not Flogged, 43.9%

Convicted of subsequent serious crime with violence :

Flogged, 10.6%
Not Flogged, 5.4%

Convicted of subsequent offences of violence :

Flogged, 13 4%
Not Flogged, 12.4%

According to the Committee's Report : "Even among the first offenders, the subsequent record of those flogged was less satisfactory than that of those who were not flogged."

There exists what may be called the "give 'em their own medicine" school. This approach is, of course, one very easily understood, since it has its roots very deep in human nature, namely, in the desire to hurt the hurter, or to take revenge. It is not, of course, advanced on this ground, but on the argument that a brute well flogged will think well before he attacks his next victim.

What can be said here ?

During the course of a talk given at the London headquarters of THE ARYAN PATH, Mr. Dawtry, General Secretary of the National Probation Officers' Association, a man whose whole life has been spent in studying the problems of the criminal, said that the man flogged became the prison hero, a bad thing indeed for the younger men undergoing imprisonment. And he added that there was a type of man who reacted defiantly, as though to say, " I can take it. They can't break me ! "

The generally accepted view that the wave of garroting which broke out in Liverpool in the '80's was stopped by flogging was denied by the Committee, who added that corporal punishment had little effect on the incidence of robbery with violence.

Does flogging act on others as a deterrent, even if, as the figures indicate, it fails to deter the flogged ?

Such a question cannot be answered positively. What might be asserted with assurance is that *certainty* of corporal punishment would act as a deterrent, and for the same reason that all abstain from holding red-hot pokers. For it is *the certainty of punishment*, or of any other given unpleasant consequence, that acts as a deterrent rather than its severity or barbarity.

We can, even so, draw conclusions from past experience. During the period of the High Rip Gang in Liverpool, the popular press advocated flogging as a remedy. Mr. Justice Day, taking the same view as the present Lord Chief Justice, sought to end the outbreak by that means. Men who appeared before him at the Assizes were ordered when convicted to be flogged. During the first three years (1887-1889) there were 176 cases of robbery with violence in that city. In the last three years the number had risen to 198. Flogging had failed.

This Committee concluded its Report with the following words :

> After examining all the available evidence, we have been unable to find any body of facts or figures showing that the introduction of a power of flogging has produced a decrease in the number of the offences for which it may be imposed, or that the offences for which flogging may be ordered have tended to increase when little use was made of the power to order flogging or to decrease when the power was exercised more frequently.

At a recent London meeting, Lord Chorley, Vice-President of the Howard League for Penal Reform, said :

> It is difficult for Englishmen not to feel ashamed when the Lord Chief Justice is leading a crusade to bring back this form of punishment. There can be no doubt that the fact that the Lord Chief Justice has been using his position in the way he has is one of the main reasons why this agitation for the restoration of flogging has become so prominent.

The Law is, notoriously, slow to move. Legal reforms have seldom been initiated by lawyers. They have come as humane and generous impulses from laymen. In the matter of corporal punishment, as in many others, the Judicial Bench

has typified this distaste for reform which seems to infect those whose business is with the Law.

Little more than a century and a half ago there were over 200 capital offences in England. You could be hanged for stealing five shillings, for associating with Gipsies. And little children so small as to be invisible above the front of the dock of a criminal court were condemned to be hanged for stealing.

But no voice was raised from the judicial bench against such barbarities. On the contrary, the judges favoured the retention of such ferocious punishments. And when, in 1800, a Bill was introduced into Parliament for the abolition of the death penalty for most of the venial offences then punishable by public hanging, it was another Lord Chief Justice, Lord Ellenborough, who led the attack upon the Bill in the House of Lords, using the following words :—

Your lordships will pause before you assent to a measure pregnant with danger to the security of property. The learned judges are unanimously agreed that the expediency of justice and the public security require that there should be no remission of capital punishment in this part of the criminal law. My lords, if we suffer this Bill to pass, we shall not know where to stand; whether we stand upon our heads or upon our feet.

It was this same Lord Chief Justice who threw out the general observation : "A little hanging hurts no man."

How far have we advanced since then ? Not very far, it would seem. Long since it has been abundantly proved that corporal punishment, that is, violence, is no answer to violence. Flogging has been abolished by nearly every civilized state in the world *outside the British Commonwealth*. Now it is suggested we should go back to it. Surely, to do so would be, in the words of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Simond, to "put back the clock"...

When a judge sentences a man to a term of imprisonment he imposes a punishment of which his sole knowledge is its extent in months or years. No English judge who ever passed a sentence of imprisonment ever knew what he did, since no judge knows what imprisonment means in terms of mental and spiritual suffering and physical and mental degradation and deprivation. He thinks in numbers : so many years. And it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise unless, as an act of humility, a judge on promotion to the Bench voluntarily underwent a term of imprisonment to qualify himself to pass sentences on others with some understanding of what such punishment involves.

How much more does this limitation apply in the case of flogging ! How many judges have witnessed a flogging ? How many of the thousands who now agitate for the reintroduction of flogging have even a faint idea of what that form of punishment means in terms of ferocity and inhumanity ?

As far back as the time of Plato the problem of punishment was exercising the minds of men. Plato himself said that retribution should have no part in punishment. A wise community, he said, punishes the individual to keep others from doing wrong from fear of punishment.

But that does not go far enough for us today. For the individual who abstains from crime from fear of punishment remains morally unreformed. Today the philosophy of punishment aims at the moral reformation of the wrong-doer so that he will conduct himself decently without the deterrent of a fear of prison or of the lash.

This, it may be objected, is the very long view. It is, of course, since we all have our moral limitations and defects and even our criminal impulses. But you arrive at your destination by travelling towards it.

Are we facing the right way when we consider a return to corporal punishment? The writer, for one, does not believe it.

GEORGE GODWIN

A SCHOLARLY "IPSE DIXIT"

With what amazement will Brahmin pandits, among others, receive the serious attempt of Mr. George Boas of the Johns Hopkins University in the January *Philosophical Review* to demolish "the legend that the ancient philosophers had secret doctrines which they did not publish"! So successful does Mr. Boas consider his demolition of the "legend" so far as concerns "Plato and Aristotle, or even Pythagoras—if there was such a person" (!) that he concludes his article on "Ancient Testimony to Secret Doctrines" with the naïve proposal that "the whole idea had better be discarded as another legend dating from the time when superstition was taking the place of reason."

He rejects the testimony of many in the early centuries of the Christian era, implying that he has better understood the spirit of Plato than did the learned Neo-Platonists, so much nearer Plato's day than ourselves. But one wonders how he would explain away the following statement ascribed to Plato (Epistle II, p. 312) in I. P. Cory's *Ancient Fragments of the Phœnician, Chaldæan...and Other Writers*:—

> You say that, in my former discourse, I have not sufficiently explained to you the nature of the First. I purposely spoke enigmatically, that in case the tablet should have happened with any accident, either by land or sea, a person, without some previous knowledge of the subject, might not be able to understand its contents.

Is it likely that such great teachers as Pythagoras and Plato, any more than the ancient Hindu Sages or the Buddha, Jesus or Paul, made no distinction in what they taught the masses and what they gave to the tested and proven few?

The *ipse dixit* of a modern scholar who has partially investigated a corner of the subject is a grain of sand beside the mountain of evidence for a once universally diffused Secret Doctrine. It is proved by the fundamental agreement in the doctrines of widely separated teachers, by the widespread traditions of lost texts and their commentaries and by the venerable institution of the Mysteries.

Exegetes of the dead letter might well ask themselves whether it is reasonable to reject, for want of open confirmation in the writings of specific teachers, the possibility of secret doctrines of which, if uninitiated, they could not speak and which, if initiated, they would not publicly avow.

COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY

[We publish here the first of two parts of an article on this important subject by **Mr. Karl H. Potter, M.A.,** who is in India as a Fulbright Scholar, attached to the Andhra University. Comparative philosophy has a distinct contribution to make to mutual understanding between peoples, which the American Fulbright Act seeks to promote.—ED.]

I.—PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE

Is comparative philosophy to be considered an exotic oddity or an essential part of philosophy? The question: "Why compare in philosophy?" has seldom received attention, much less an adequate answer. As long as cross-cultural studies were carried on by specialists interested in the languages or customs of a country for their own sake, no justification for their activities was needed, though little attention was paid to their work, except by other specialists. A new turn has been given to international studies in recent years, however, by the recognition that provincialism of outlook in political spheres is a constant source of danger and must be eliminated. The end in view was world peace, and the instrument decided upon for the purpose was the United Nations.

In like manner, provincialism in philosophy has been criticized in very recent years. The result was the meeting, for the first time on any sizable scale, of minds from all parts of the globe. The culmination of this tendency may be taken to have been the conferences in Hawaii in 1945 and 1950. Unlike, however, the programme of the United Nations, which actively aims at a specific goal—world peace—the programme of the philosophers, seems to be lamentably obscure.

* * *

Developments in contemporary philosophy in America and Britain have brought once more to the fore a question which has plagued philosophy throughout its whole history—the question of the rôle of common sense. Philosophy, it has often been said, starts with common-sense beliefs and, by criticism, analysis and other techniques employed in various methods of inquiry, hopes somehow to come out with the truth. Recently the return to the starting point, common sense, has been manifested in various quarters and in various fashions.

In Britain, G. E. Moore has proclaimed, in effect, that common sense cannot be transcended. He scoffs at those who hold that we can justify anything except ultimately by appeal to common sense. Wittgenstein,

following the same lines of thought, suggested that the most philosophy could do was to clarify common-sense beliefs by attention to the niceties of language, the verbal pitfalls which lead us to nonsensical beliefs. This cry has been taken up with great gusto by John Wisdom and others, and is receiving much attention at present.

Following another implication of the same basic line of thought, Bertrand Russell has sought to turn the attention of philosophers to the incorporation of the advances of the physical sciences. The idea is that attention to the implications of scientific discoveries will improve common sense to such a degree that a systematic account of the universe can eventually be evolved without recourse to mystical or metaphysical insights. Several philosophers in America, picking up this suggestion, have called for the construction of a language to express this systematic account, which would in effect be a reconstruction of ordinary language along the lines suggested by science.

The preoccupation with "ordinary language" and common belief follows upon a period in the history of Western thought where philosophers had made a fetish of remarkable theories which were considerably at odds with common-sense opinion. When Berkeley suggested that in some sense the table actually wasn't there when nobody was looking at it, and Hume announced that we really had no way of being absolutely certain that the sun would rise tomorrow, the common man's eyebrow went up in amazement. It is not surprising, in the light of history, to see a swing back to common sense.

Moore, in a lecture, held up his hand and said, in effect: I know this is a human hand; I can't prove it, and I doubt if anyone can; this knowledge is the starting point of inquiry, not its end result. Russell starts his inquiry with remarks about "animal inference"—and aims, not to repudiate it, but to improve it. The revolt against metaphysics was an extreme manifestation of the return to common sense; though as a thesis it has failed, the attitude behind it permeates the philosophical atmosphere in America and Britain today.

Philosophers in India should be able to look at this development with equanimity, for the history of their own thought shows revolts of exactly the same kind. The *śūnyavāda* of Nagarjuna must have impressed the common Indian as Hume's scepticism impressed the Europeans, and a swing back to common sense was made by the logicians Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Śaṃkara's rather summary treatment of this world in his zeal to explain matters of the spirit inspired the inevitable reaction in Ramānuja and Madhva.

Nor is this oscillation between theory and common sense confined in the West to recent developments in empiricism. The part of Plato's theory concerning the absolute hierarchy of the Forms was a fantastic theory to a common-sensical Greek,

and it was not long before Aristotle put the common-sense view down on paper, while incorporating such of Plato as he found consistent with or illuminating for his own view.

The important point, however, is to see that in each of these contexts, "common sense" refers to a different thing. The common-sensical Greek would have found the common sense of Russell or Moore quite remarkable; truths which seemed obvious to Dignāga were anything but obvious to Madhva. Now it is worth considering what implications the "Back to common sense" cry of recent empiricists has for philosophy. For what this cry means is: "Back to the common sense of present-day America and Britain."

It becomes increasingly obvious not only that common sense differs from time to time, but that it also differs from place to place. From the reaction of present-day Indian philosophers to contemporary empiricism, it is evident that they do not find in these recent developments a return to common sense at all. They find it quite fantastic that philosophers should so blithely avoid even mentioning that aspect of things which to Indian common sense appears to be of the utmost importance —namely, the individual spiritual life and its development. Roughly (but only very roughly), one might say that, where the ordinary American or Briton is oriented through science toward a solution of public problems, the ordinary Indian is oriented through religion toward a solution of private problems, in the sense that the salvation of each individual soul is his own concern.

The problem, as I see it, then, is to bring the common sense of various cultures together, so that we may work co-operatively in understanding and harmony toward a common goal. Any solution to this problem will necessarily be subject to the historical oscillation of thought we have discussed. In other words, we must hope to eliminate the discrepancy between the common sense of spatially separate societies by attention to the general rules of development of temporal discrepancies within any society.

The constructive thing to ask next, then, is: How does common sense develop and change? This is by no means an easy question to answer. Many forces play upon the thoughts and beliefs of the ordinary citizen and determine to some extent in what direction his thinking will lie. One of these forces, and not the least important, is the influence of philosophers. That influence is often indirect. But the history of thought, in both India and Europe, provides examples where popular opinion has developed along lines suggested by philosophers. The American concept of government owes much, as is well known, to John Locke, while contemporary opinion in India finds much to agree with in Śaṃkara's writings, and not by accident.

But, as was suggested above, the main fashion in which philosophy moulds opinion is by suggesting

extreme theories containing insights which can be incorporated into common sense. Each time the fantastic implications of a theory are rejected, during the reaction which follows a certain amount of constructive thought is saved out of it and incorporated into common sense. The process takes time, of course, and while the improvements are being absorbed into the opinion of the man in the street, the philosophers are far ahead of him, spinning out new and more fantastic theories.

In the light of this last consideration, we may say that philosophy takes its rise from enlightened common sense—common sense which is a few jumps ahead of ordinary opinion. But the test comes, nevertheless, at the level of the man in the street; if he does not follow the lead of the philosophers, they are cut off from the roots of their usefulness and beat a hasty retreat back to common sense.

If this account of the general character of the history of thought —oscillation between enlightened common sense and bold new hypotheses—is correct, how can we turn philosophy in a non-provincial, international direction? The answer, "by comparison," is generally as unilluminating as the professed aim of so-called "comparative philosophy," which aims to "promote understanding." The problem is not what, but how.

The difficulty is *not* that the East and the West have certain features in their thought which are bound to distinguish the one from the other for all time to come. Certain eminent scholars, writing on this issue, have talked as if all we could do was to recognize the peculiarities of an alien culture and allow for these differences whenever we talked with someone or heard a paper read by someone from that culture. It is very important, to be sure, to recognize what the common-sense basis of the philosophy of another culture is, but not because it represents an ultimate barrier beyond which we cannot pass. For as we have seen, common sense is dynamic, not static; even now in India we find philosophers absorbing the common-sense precepts of the European tradition. When constructive thought begins to come forth from these men, it will be, I hazard, quite fantastic from the point of view of enlightened common sense in present-day India; but common sense will change, and before long those views may be accepted in part, in that fashion which has been repeated down through the ages.

Nor is the problem one of salvaging bodily all that is worth while from each tradition, by corporate decision, so to speak. For this is a superhuman task, one which could be achieved only by someone who already knew what the ultimate truth was—for without knowing that, how can one tell what is really worth while and what is not? An *a priori* decision of this sort is worthless, unless it represents an opinion based on the common sense of all

cultures—and then it will not be an *a priori* decision, but a prediction about the behaviour of our future thinking—a hypothesis which can only be found to be true after observing how world thought does develop. Concerning a "synthetic world-philosophy" based on *a priori* grounds we may say what the geology professor said when, while giving mineralogical analyses of various stones presented by his students ("this is a piece of schist, gneiss," etc.), he was offered a brick: "This is a piece of damned impertinence!"

Nor do we want merely a *description* of the common-sense beliefs and attitudes of the members of another society. For this will be quite unhelpful to the philosophers of one's own culture, unless they happen to be interested in that sort of thing as a hobby. Merely describing a belief provides no way of getting to appreciate it—the common-sense belief of the average Hindu that he will be reborn in accordance with the law of karma to work out his salvation in the next life is usually received with a laugh in the West, whereas the sublime faith placed by Americans and Britishers in the ability of the physicist eventually to solve all the problems of the universe appears to the Indian utterly asinine.

The problem is rather to *steer* the common sense of various cultures in a certain direction. We might call the point at which the common sense of the world is to meet a "compromise," except that that would suggest that the goal was an artificial construction invented by philosophers as a point toward which to steer. We cannot have such a construction, because it assumes that the common-sense opinion of the world will follow the philosopher's lead—an assumption which we have no right to make.

KARL H. POTTER

A DELIGHTFUL COMPILATION

The Baroda Museum and Picture Gallery, one of the finest institutions of its kind in the Bombay State, has now published a *Handbook of the Collections*, prepared by the Director, Dr. Hermann Goetz, and his assistants. Most of it consists of descriptions of exhibits, though each chapter has a general introduction sketching the background of the particular section of exhibits.

Dr. Goetz has always in mind the fundamental correspondences and the exchange of influences between diverse cultures, so that we get notes like: "King David (the Christian ideal rishi-ruler,) statue," etc. The Museum is managed with imagination.

This is a valuable publication, for it gives "some orientation to the visitor," which is necessary for him to make the best of the wonderful opportunity for imaginative understanding of many civilizations that such a collection of cultural creations from all over the world offers. And even to those of us who do not seem likely to visit Baroda soon the 45 pages of photographs of exhibits will be a delight. An impressive one among them is one (p. xxxiv) of a 16th-17th century brass figure of Kuan Yin, and on her brow shines a compassion that is awful to behold.

ANDREA CORSALI TO GIULIANO DE' MEDICI—FROM INDIA

[More Indians than Europeans, probably, will agree with **Shri Bhajan Singh Sehmi,** who is pursuing his medical studies at the Royal College of Surgeons at Dublin, in this arraignment of flesh-eating and of vivisection. There are cogent arguments in favour of vegetarianism besides the appeal to conscience. The avoidance of cruelty, like the reasonable claim for the less coarsening effect of a meatless diet, may have but a limited appeal in a materialistic age, but that the world's limited acreage could support vastly more people on a vegetarian than on a meat diet is a factor which deserves very serious consideration.—ED.]

Andrea Corsali, writing from India to Giuliano de' Medici in the 16th century, said: "Like our Leonardo da Vinci, the inhabitants of these regions eat no flesh, and permit no harm to be done to any living creature." Why Leonardo da Vinci was a vegetarian was perhaps well explained by himself, when he said:

> I have from an early age abjured the use of meat, and the time will come when men such as I will look on the murder of animals, as they now look on the murder of man.

People argued that it was as cruel to eat vegetables as to eat flesh. To this, Leonardo da Vinci, a storehouse of universal knowledge, replied that plants did not feel pain; if they did they would have the power of flight like birds and animals, which were able thus to flee from those who might wish to do them harm.

India has had throughout her history liberal minds in search of truth and justice; therefore it is not surprising to find complexities in the Asian continent. The philosophy of the Hindus as well as of the Buddhists is based on the fact of physical and mental suffering, *dukkha,* as was preached also by the noble Buddha. When Leonardo and Pythagoras used the word "pain," they also, no doubt, meant physical and mental suffering.

Asoka, the great Mauryan Emperor (264-227 B. C.) is claimed to have been the first one to open hospitals for animals. He was much influenced by Buddhism and, by virtue of his kindness, politeness and justice, he is one of the most celebrated heroes in Indian history. The animal hospitals which he founded were on large pieces of ground enclosed by high walls. The area was subdivided into wards to accommodate different sorts of animals, and all were treated with great care, the aged ones being particularly well looked after.

Throughout her long history, worn out by great revolutions, split by internal dissensions, plundered and

disturbed by foreign invasions, India has retained the ideal of the preservation of animal life. One of the Moral Laws ascribed to Brahma and mentioned in the *Sastras* is: "Thou shalt not destroy any living creature; for thou and it are both my creatures."

The greatest man of modern India, Mahatma Gandhi, was a vegetarian. Bernard Shaw also realized the wrong of flesh eating, and became a vegetarian. A living example of a great Indian who is a vegetarian is Acharya Vinoba Bhave, who has been called "the god who gives away land." Acharya Vinoba Bhave is an extraordinary crusader, a follower of Mahatma Gandhi, and one who has done much good work in India.

Flesh eating is wrong, and if man is to attain to the integrity of his being, he must give up flesh eating. In the universe, the Essence of Life being indestructible, Life will continue even without the existence of men, but man has no right to take the life of any living creature. Flesh eating is a savage habit. A savage, feeling himself superior to lower forms of life, is tempted to conquer and misuse them. But in a proper civilization there should be justice and tenderness shown towards animals and all living creatures, and India has shown this element of mercy in her traditions. In some parts of India even creatures like flies and ants are treated kindly, in an effort to achieve the noblest of the virtues—justice.

John Ovington, who was at Surat late in the 17th century, observed the charity shown by the Jains of Surat towards flies and ants. He wrote:—

Once a year the charitable Banian prepares a set banquet for all the flies that are in his house, and sets down before them upon the floor or table, large shallow dishes of sweet milk and sugar mixed together, the most delicious fare for that dainty little creature. At other times he extends his liberality to the ants, and walks with a bag of rice under his arm, two or three miles forward into the country, and stops as he proceeds at each ant-hill to leave behind him his benevolence, a handful or two of rice strawed upon the ground, which is the beloved dainty on which the hungry ants feed and their best reserve and store in time of need.

Excellent health has been ascribed to the Russian peasant, who lives on a well-balanced vegetarian diet of soup, bread and cucumbers, with very little meat. At the age of 70 a Russian peasant, in spite of a considerable consumption of alcohol, is said to retain a youthful appearance, virility and freedom from arteriosclerosis, etc.

The flesh-eating habit has very likely blunted man's reaction to an even more brutal practice, namely that of vivisection, which forces physical and other tortures on innocent and helpless animals. Should it not be enough to know of such cruelty and injustice, to make man desire to stop flesh eating? The answer is: Yes; but unfortunately many are selfish. The question,

however, must not be left here. Those of us who do see the wrong that is being done to animals should try to convince others of it and of the misery which is inflicted on the dumb creatures. So we may persuade them to a more proper and merciful way of living. If people could see the actual treatment of animals in the slaughter-houses, and in the vivisection laboratories, surely many would give up flesh eating. There are organizations opposing vivisection and others upholding vegetarianism in India, Holland, Britain, America and many other countries of the world. It is our duty to support these good causes, for they need all the possible help that each vegetarian and anti-vivisectionist can give.

Let us hope that India will retain the memory of Andrea Corsali's letter to Giuliano de' Medici and, with true justice, help in the merciful treatment and preservation of all living creatures in every part of the earth.

BHAJAN SINGH SEHMI

THE WORLD INVISIBLE

Introspective evidence for a living Universe (and, perhaps, by implication, for the reawakening of super-physical perception once common to the race) is brought forward by Mr. John Custance in his arresting article "Philosophical Reflections of a Lunatic." (*The Hibbert Journal*, January 1953) During a period of manic depressive psychosis, he beheld a changed Universe, alive with horrors during the depressive phase but peopled in periods of "elation" with angels and gods of many a pantheon.

> ...there were elves and sprites in the trees and streams, fairies in the flowers, all things, indeed, were instinct with spiritual power and life.

He insists that he knows these experiences to have been actual, in much the same sense as other experiences of his life. That the form given to these elementals may have been subjective in its origin would not, to our mind, invalidate the possibility, accepted by the ancient Aryans as an indubitable fact, of personality and intelligence in more than one phenomenon-producing Force in nature. Mr. Custance, indeed, recognizes what he saw as being analogous to the vision of primitive men and quotes Professor J. B. S. Haldane in defence of the validity of their vision:—

> In early times the world appeared to be peopled by spiritual powers, friendly or hostile, reaching out in every direction, whereas we now commonly picture the world outside the bodies of living creatures as completely indifferent to interests or values of any sort....But our ancestors had at least as good powers of vision as we have, and they saw something different....we only deceive ourselves if we imagine that vision and interpretation can be separated.

William James, too, he recalls, had maintained that "the ancient idea of personal forces behind the physical was certain to recur in the long run." Mr. Custance's proposition is eminently sound that "by accepting as actual all the experience of man and not merely the physical aspect, it may eventually be possible to understand and master it."

THE HUNGER AROUND US

[In his article "On Turning Handles" in our February issue, **Mr. Roy Bridger** pleaded for a return to a more natural way of life. Here he approaches the subject from another angle. More attention to the relation between the methods of cultivation, diet, habits and the health of man is certainly necessary and Mr. Bridger's insistence on the superiority of natural foods is unchallengeable. Civilized man has in many cases made a sorry wreck of a body that should be a living temple, worthy of a living God in the making. A balanced diet is certainly a great desideratum; a vegetarian diet can include all necessary animal proteins in the form of milk and milk products, and fresh fruits and vegetables are great builders of resistance to disease. The purification as well as the strength of the body is desirable; and a balanced vegetarian diet is superior from that point of view to one including meat.—ED.]

In 1905 a young English botanist arrived in Pusa. Three years previously, in the course of an otherwise conventional paper on fungoid pests in the West Indies, he had written with a first flash of the insight into the nature and purpose of disease which was later to make such a profound impression on a far wider public: "Plants, when in health, possess a very considerable power of defence against all parasites, fungi included."

In the 20 years Albert Howard was at Pusa a great deal of valuable work was done. His reputation as an authority on disease resistance was steadily built up. The land under his control at the Experiment Station began to stand out from the surrounding countryside. But his own methods were standing out even more conspicuously. He had by now realized the fundamental error of what he called "fragmentation." The study of the plant could not be isolated from that of the soil in which it was grown. Soil, plant, animal and man lived together in a balanced relationship, the harmony of which could be disturbed by faulty cultivation. While others busied themselves with the myriad manifestations of disease, he studied the strongest and healthiest plants to discover their secrets.

From these investigations one supreme lesson emerged—the health of those areas where organic wastes were returned to the soil. In 1924 a new Institute of Plant Industry was founded at Indore, and Howard was appointed Director. It was here that was perfected the method of composting waste materials which became famous as the Indore Process. It was described in detail in *The Waste Products of Agriculture*, which he published in 1931.

Few pioneers have seen their work so widely accepted, and the writer of this book, with its highly specialized subject-matter and its prosaic title, could hardly have foreseen the

extraordinary appeal it was going to make to large numbers of people who had previously given the question little if any thought. For he had now decided to retire. His wife, a distinguished botanist who had shared his work, had died in 1930. Farmers and gardeners everywhere, however, were adopting the Indore Process, and tributes to its success were coming in from all parts of the world. The lectures of the now knighted Sir Albert Howard were in great demand. In England a group of doctors who were becoming convinced that faulty nutrition was at the core of the tremendous problem of ill-health with which they were confronted, saw in his work still further confirmation of their views. A new and revolutionary public health campaign was launched with the memorable "Medical Testament," in which they declared :—

No health campaign can succeed unless the materials of which the bodies are built are sound. At present they are not. Probably half our work is wasted, since our patients are so fed from the cradle, indeed before the cradle, that they are certain contributions to a C3 nation.

If there were still any doubts about the part played by nutrition, they were removed by the appearance in 1939 of the outstanding *Nutrition and Physical Degeneration*. Its author, Weston A. Price, was a well-to-do dental surgeon from Cleveland, Ohio. Struck by the almost universal presence of dental decay, and of diseases of all kinds, he began to see that to understand the nature of disease it was first necessary to study human beings in health. Realizing at the outset the close connection between food and health, he undertook a remarkable series of expeditions to the most distant parts of the world, with the object of studying groups living in isolation on locally produced foods, together with other groups in contact with modern civilization and living partly or wholly on modern commercial foods. These journeys, accomplished between 1931 and 1937, took Dr. Price to Switzerland, the Hebrides, Alaska, the South Pacific, Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Peru. On his return from the last of these journeys he at once commenced to put his unassailable findings into book form.

To read through *Nutrition and Physical Degeneration* is to become aware, in one haunting picture after another, of a lost world. Here and there, in groups and sometimes in whole peoples, where the comparatively simple rules of health were understood and obeyed, mankind broke through to that happy flowering which exists potentially for every species. When we consider the arctic tern on its vast migrational flight between the northern and the southern polar regions we feel that the zenith of life for that bird has been reached. The great soaring cedars do not invite our compassion by having failed to achieve their inherent outlines. And in the smiling faces of the primitives can be

glimpsed the outlines of mankind. Moreover, human beings, when in health, possess a very considerable power of resistance against disease.

It is a striking fact that the facial characteristics of the various races *in health* are remarkably similar. The face is round, the nostrils are wide, the dental arch is broad and symmetrical, and the teeth are well-formed and regular. "One is impressed," wrote Price, "by the stalwart physical development and high moral character that Nature has been able to produce from a suitable diet and environment." In general, the diet best suited to an environment is provided on the spot. The Eskimo, consuming large quantities of animal fat, is fortified by food which would be excessive in the tropics. Food is best eaten whole and eaten fresh. The diet of the American Indians in their primitive state was limited largely to the wild animals of the chase, yet, despite the rigours of the climate, health was magnificent. Of 2464 teeth examined, in 87 individuals, only 4 had been attacked by dental decay. It was found repeatedly that people using animal food proved superior to vegetarian peoples. Of the Fiji Islands Price reports:—

> Even during the times of most bitter warfare between the inland or hill tribes and the coast tribes, those of the interior would bring down during the night choice plant foods from the mountain areas and place them in caches, and return the following night and obtain the sea foods that had been placed in those depositories by the shore tribes. The individuals who carried these foods were never molested, not even during active warfare.

But with the introduction of modern refined and processed foods the body fails to fill in its potential outlines. It becomes elongated and angular. The face and the dental arch are narrow, the nostrils constricted. Mouth-breathing develops and the chin recedes. Distorted and protruding teeth betray a general breakdown in health marked by the appearance of diseases of all kinds. In the Alaskan frontier towns where trading stores had been established, dental decay was found among American Indians to have attacked 40% of all teeth, with over 90% of individuals affected. The hospitals in the regions of the modern Eskimos were full of arthritis and tuberculosis cases. Few primitive stocks of the South Pacific Islands were so famed as the people of the Marquesas. Today a sick and dying people, ravaged by epidemics, is paying the penalty for having displaced their traditional foods by imported refined foods.

The pattern, uniform even in its breakdown, can of course be observed much nearer home than the South Pacific. In heavily protected research laboratories and on remote testing grounds man presses on towards complete control of the environment. But in his relationship to the enigmatic laws of life a myriad deformities proclaim a gathering failure.

Dr. Josué de Castro, in his recently published *Geography of Hunger*, has revealed no less realistically the sombre predicament of the human race impaled upon the barbs of its mightiest challenger—hunger. He too emphasizes that food shortages and famines are the familiar pawns in this life-and-death contest. The greater danger is from an insufficiency of the quality foods, chiefly animal proteins. What made the Vikings a lasting symbol of physique and endurance? Why are the Pygmies—pygmies? Certainly not because of any deep-rooted racial characteristic, or of the accident of geography, for both are found side by side with peoples of very different stature. Simply because the Vikings made ample use of seafoods, while the Pygmies of the tropical interior have little access to animal foods of any kind.

If the Pygmies suffer from the limitations of the environment and their own inertia, they have at least been permitted to live out their stunted existence with their low-grade food sources free from plunder by invading peoples. Dr. de Castro's scientific investigations do not prevent him from being a caustic politician (Lord Boyd Orr, in his foreword, remarks that the title of the book might well have been *Hunger and Politics*.) As a Brazilian he has some hard things to say about the American "good neighbour policy," and even harder ones about European colonialism. The variations on exploitation are presented with uncomfortable candour. The Roman latifundia have sunk into oblivion; the colonial plantation system, under which the best of the produce is shipped to the colonizing power, while the poorly paid workers are maintained on a diet of inferior cereals, still flourishes.

The methods of Chinese farmers in preserving their agriculture in the face of so many formidable natural obstacles have gained for them a good deal of respect, but in Dr. de Castro's opinion there is a nutritional explanation for the lack of enterprise which has left them content to endure floods, droughts, plagues and famines without tackling the troubles at their sources. Many of the farms are too small to provide the quality foods as well as subsistence crops.

According to the second FAO World Food Survey, supplies in most of Asia are failing to keep up with the increase in population, and the people obtain barely two-thirds of the nourishment they require. It is estimated that an additional 1,300,000 tons of rice is wanted annually, but exportable surpluses have dwindled considerably. With the gradual disappearance of huge exportable surpluses from the international scene, greatly increased efficiency in land management is called for. Does this mean mechanization? A pre-war calculation of the daily output of work from all sources—human, coal, oil and water power—gave the average inhabitant

of the U. S. A. the lead with .557 horse-power per head. The average British output was .277 h.p. and the figures for India and China were .020 and .019 respectively. At first sight there would seem to be some justification for the growing tendency to think in terms of industrialization in the undeveloped countries, as a means of increasing the purchasing power of the peasant.

Fortunately, however, for the physical structure of the human species, already a disabled casualty in the industrial scramble, a universal society with a continually rising energy output is unattainable. There is simply not enough coal, not enough oil and certainly not enough usable water power. The easiest and least expensive schemes are in operation now, and most of the remaining projects call for enormous initial outlays. There are not enough potential technicians. Moreover, the unhappy examples of those countries where a dispossessed section of the peasantry has been absorbed by the factories demonstrate only too plainly that there is not enough nervous equilibrium to stand the impact of sudden industrialization.

Not this way will mankind escape from the sea of hunger which has gained upon the anguished millions who did not get enough food. For man is a living being and it is his business to think about the laws of life, not only as an individual but in relation to the whole world of living beings of which he is a part. If a forest is cut down save for one tree the survivor cannot function as it did before. The birds which had sheltered in the forest are scattered. The rain that falls finds no humic sponge to absorb it. A cold wind moans over a broken harmony. When a man enters a factory the same tragedy occurs—he is cut off from the harmony of Nature and from the opportunities of studying the laws of life. By subjecting the living part of his environment to the ruthless mechanical processes of the factory he is exerting the maximum disturbance of the harmony. His responsibilities as a farmer and a guardian are refused. Fragmentation is complete.

ROY BRIDGER

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

HERBAL LORE *

This book, well printed and charmingly made up, is the fifth by the same author of a series intended to consist of eight, called the Culpeper House Herbals. The previous volumes bear telling names: *Herbal Delights*, *Compassionate Herbs*, *Elixirs of Life*, and *Hearts-Ease*. The flavour of the past pervades also the present book, which is divided into eight chapters according to the human organs for the treatment of which the various herbs dealt with in its 324 pages, 25 of them devoted to "indexes," are supposed to be useful.

Starting with "Herbs for the Circulation of the Blood" and ending with those "for the Brain," the book contains numerous pen portraits of plants credited with medicinal properties. Every chapter opens with a few pages of medical or pharmaceutical history, the physiology of the organ concerned, and some remarks on the healing powers of plants which could not be included in the text proper because of the authoress's self-imposed limitation of dealing here only with those herbs whose medicinal properties are located in their green parts. To chlorophyll, the hero of the book, astonishing powers are ascribed, such as prevention of scurvy, stimulation of the pigment at the roots of the hair and protection against distension and prominence of veins; these properties are very different from what is known of the green pigment to physiologists or nutritional experts.

The introduction is followed by short essays, one on each of the plants described, arranged in alphabetical order. The name of each plant is given in several European languages and often also in "Indian," Chinese, Turkish, etc. The headings also inform us sometimes about the planet under whose "dominion" the particular herb is placed, the parts which are used, its constituents and finally, the action ascribed to it. Preceding the more prosaic parts of the text, and on many pages pleasantly interrupting it, we find poetic references to the plant under discussion. From Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and Shakespeare's famous line, "There's rosemary, that's for remembrance," to Edith Sitwell's praise of peach leaves, the book contains an anthology of botanical verse.

Some data on the plant's habitat, the colour of the flowers or the shape of the leaves and often a useful hint as to their being eaten in salads or cooked like spinach, lead to the concluding remarks on medicinal properties. They have not changed since the oldest herbal in my possession, printed in 1594 A.D. Only, the instructions do not now contain references to the dosage, while indications have remained as all-embracing as they were four centuries ago.

> For instance, the rose is given to strengthen the heart, the stomach, the liver, and the retentive faculty; it is good against all kind of fluxes, prevents vomiting, stops tickling coughs and is of service in consumption.

Why all this should be found under "Herbs for the Circulation of the Blood" is difficult to explain.

Sixteen neat drawings illustrate the text.

If Mrs. Leyel intended to catch the expression, style and atmosphere of the numerous herbals published from the 16th to the 18th century, she has succeeded admirably well. But the few additions to old folklore drawn from her own experience—she apparently is a herbal practitioner—might prove

---

* *Green Medicine.* By Mrs C. F. Leyel. Drawings by Mildred E. Eldridge. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 324 pp. 1952. 31*s.* 6*d.*)

dangerous to readers of our day. When she states "I have found even the use of cayenne almost as helpful as the treatment itself for the healing of a gastric ulcer,"—one feels that such advice might have been more acceptable to the giants of the table a few hundred years ago than to the weaker constitutions of the present age. Still more objectionable is it to recommend "a tisane" of digitalis leaves "when the pulse is weak and abnormally slow."

Wholesale attacks on scientific medicine and its remedies sound rather funny when coming from somebody so ignorant of this subject as is the writer of this book. On page 18, the astonished reader finds the following statement: "Compound E or cortisone, which has lately been given such widespread publicity, is a hormone derived from a poisonous African plant called Strophanthus Kombé, which is used by the natives as an arrow poison." The next page contains the following confession: "Chloromycetin is, I believe, a synthetic form of penicillin."

And yet, it would be fascinating to get a critical account of the curative properties of herbs used for hundreds of years all over Europe and to compare them with their counterparts applied in India by practitioners of indigenous systems. Herbalists could also take legitimate pride in the fact that the greatest revolution in medicine since the discovery of the antibiotics had its origin in the activities of plants producing these complicated substances in the course of their own struggle for survival.

The moral of this unfinished chapter in the history of human advance is, however, that no herbalist, not even the most expert botanist, could have discovered unaided any of these miraculously healing remedies, these true elixirs of life. Only the closest cooperation between various branches of modern science, chemistry, bacteriology, mycology and clinical medicine put means in our hands to stamp out the infectious diseases and to prolong healthy, useful life far beyond the limits which, one generation ago, seemed to have been ordained by Nature.

ROBERT HEILIG

RELIGION

The Archæology of World Religions. By JACK FINEGAN, (Princeton University Press; Geoffrey Cumberlege, The Oxford University Press. xl+600 pp., 9 maps and 260 illustrations. 1952. $10.00 or 63s.)

Archæology has seldom been put to a better use than to illustrate, as here, religious practices among various peoples. In undertaking to present a general survey of world religions, the author no doubt set before himself an enormous task and has largely succeeded therein.

Appropriately enough the matter has been presented in a popular style; every one of the ten chapters reads like "a public lecture with lantern slides." And the reader gains more than a superficial acquaintance with the tenets and ceremonies of the different religions as also with the life-events of the founders and teachers thereof, the accompanying pictures providing an excellent aid to memory.

The ten religions dealt with in the book are Primitivism, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Shinto, Islam, and Sikhism. Conspicuous by their absence are Judaism and Christianity. These have been treated of by the same author in an earlier publication under the more exalted title: *Light from the Ancient Past: The Archæological Background of the Hebrew-Christian Religion.* This special treatment speaks perhaps of the writer's personal attachment to and deeper knowledge of that faith.

He clears the ground by drawing a

fine distinction between the realms of the natural (common sense and science) and the supernatural (magic and religion). The origin of the latter goes as far back as the appearance of Man on earth, and his long march through geological ages is traced down to the stage where we call him *homo sapiens*, "man the wise," a being capable of dabbling with the supernatural. Here then we are at the springs of practices, animistic and dynamistic, mostly of a magical nature, which later grew in intricacy and which are collectively called by our author Primitivism. They persist to this day and are in evidence everywhere, notably in Africa, America and the Far East islands. "The number of persons living on the level of 'primitivism' in religion is commonly estimated at about 175,000,000." (p. 3) The primitive and prehistoric art compares well with the art of historic periods as illustrated by cave paintings in France and the colossal stone idols of Easter Island.

Having thus disposed of the world-wide Primitivism, the author turns to Iran, India, China, Japan, Arabia, and finally once again to India, describing the aforementioned nine well-defined religions. The picture presented of the religion concerned in each case is properly set against the relevant geographical, political and social background. This makes the reading as interesting as it is instructive. The choice of quotations from the original scriptures, in translation, matches the photographic reproductions of the select archæological objects.

In a reproductive kind of work, as the present one essentially is, any mistakes that may be found are to be ascribed to the sources drawn upon. Certain reliefs at the Buddhist cave monastery of Bhaja, for instance, have been declared to be "certainly from a non-Buddhist background" and are identified as Surya driving a four-horse chariot, and Indra riding forth upon his elephant (pp. 148 and 275). In reality, they present no anomaly whatsoever. They *are* Buddhistic and depict certain incidents of King Mandhata's expedition as narrated in the Buddhist work *Divyavadana*.[1]

Forms like Gatila for Jatila (pp. 271-2) and Kullavagga for Cullavagga (p. 236 *et passim*) seem to betray the writer's unfamiliarity with the pronunciation of the original names, while Vamsa for Vatsa (p. 234) may be a misprint. In the matter of dating Indian works, the author has upheld the most conservative views, as, for example, placing the completion of the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* in the Kushan Period (A.D. c. 50—c. 320).

B. CH. CHHABRA

Religion in the Modern World: A Symposium. By VISCOUNT SAMUEL, R. H. THOULESS, S. RADHAKRISHNAN *et al.* (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 110 pp. 1952. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

This book will be welcomed by all those who believe in religion and who are concerned about its apparent powerlessness to prevent the modern world from drifting into chaos and dissolution. It will be welcomed, not only for its contents, valuable though these are in themselves, but perhaps even more for the organization whose inauguration it announces.

The London School of Religion is something new in the history of man. Theological schools of many different persuasions have long been with us, as also have universities for the study of academic philosophy. But a School of Religion comprising scholars and leaders of different faiths and concerned with a free and co-operative study of the part that religion can and should play in solving the problems of the modern world—this surely is something new. To be sure, the Indian reader may feel that, in this volume at least, the emphasis is still predominantly Christian; but at any rate it is a non-dogmatic Christianity, and the fact

[1] See *Bulletin of the Prince of Wales Museum of Western India*, No. 1, 1950-1951, pp. 15-21.

that, of seven contributors, one is a Jew and one a Hindu suggests that the School is aiming at real co-operation and is concerned with the practical application of essential religion to every aspect of human life.

As was perhaps to be expected and will probably be the case with most readers of THE ARYAN PATH, the present reviewer has found the chapter by Dr. Radhakrishnan the most in harmony with her own ideas. But she has found also much that is both reassuring and stimulating in the rest of the book, especially in the forthright and challenging chapter by Canon Raven on "Is there a Christian Politics?" Though he writes as a Christian, the title would be more expressive of the contents if the word "Religious" were substituted for "Christian," for there is nothing in them that will not command unhesitating assent from those who believe in the Gandhian approach to politics.

This is a book that should not be overlooked by the thinking and reading public. Those who feel that religion has deplorably little to say in the modern world will find encouragement; those who feel that the day of religion is over and that we must concentrate now on science will find something to give them pause; and those who have lost interest in the subject of religion may find something to make them change their minds. It and the School of Religion from which it has emanated will certainly give renewed hope to those who believe that religion is of supreme importance.

MARGARET BARR

If Thou Criest after Knowledge. By SIR AYLMER FIREBRACE, C.B.E. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 320 pp. 1952. 25s.)

Sir Aylmer Firebrace, the author of *If Thou Criest after Knowledge*, was a student of the late John Doorly, who was a lecturer on, and a teacher and practitioner of, Christian Science—first of the orthodox, and then of his own, variety. Sir Aylmer's book is an exposition of this teacher's system, which is a mixture of symbology and a special brand of numerology. This latter fact the author specifically denies, expending pages on a sometimes rather strained effort to fit Biblical teachings into Mr. Doorly's numerical categories.

What the book chiefly suffers from, however, is the author's apparently complete lack of knowledge of Comparative Religion, which leads him to make statements that not only betray a deep-rooted sectarianism, but are sometimes quite incorrect. As a typical example of this, in the summary under the first chapter heading we read: "Mankind still puts its trust in the Bible." Whereas the truth is that by far the greater portion of mankind puts its trust in such works as the *Vedas*, the *Koran*, the *Talmud*, the Upanishads, the *Bhagavad-Gita*, and the Buddhist as well as other sacred scriptures. And at this stage of his development *homo sapiens* is not going to be persuaded that religious Truth is limited to any single "revelation," as Sir Aylmer seems rather naïvely to believe.

Such a sectarian and dogmatic tone is unlikely to appeal to readers of THE ARYAN PATH. This is unfortunate, because the fact remains that the aspect of Christianity known as Christian Science, in its orthodox statement, much of which is to be found in this book, has more in common with the basic teachings of Eastern philosophy than any other branch of Christianity. Its recognition, so far from Christian orthodoxy, of the Christ as the divine nature in all men, of pre-existence and co-existence rather than "Creation," and of the fact that all which is unlike THAT WHICH IS must finally be of the nature of illusion, is identical with some of the profoundest teachings of the East, however different its terminology; and it thus provides an urgently needed bridge whereby Christianity may be reconciled with the older Eastern faiths.

ESME WYNNE-TYSON

One in All: An Anthology of Religion from the Sacred Scriptures of the Living Faiths. Compiled by EDITH B. SCHNAPPER. Wisdom of the East Series. (John Murray, London. xvi+155 pp. 1952. 7s.)

This latest addition to the Wisdom of the East Series is a thoughtful and judicious selection from the chief scriptures of all the great religions of India, China, Japan and the Middle East, from the ancient words of Krishna to the modern utterances of the Bab. The book is constructed on a simple plan. It has three sections, entitled "The Preparation," "The Path," and "The Goal," each with three sub-sections in which two or more extracts from 14 great Faiths are given. These are Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism of India; Shinto, Confucianism, Taoism and Zen Buddhism of China and Japan; and Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Sufism and Baha'ism of the Middle East. Starting with the Upanishadic "Awake, arise..." the first sub-section is about the search for knowledge and truth followed by Purification and Non-Attachment. The cardinal virtues of Love, Humility, Devotion and Renunciation are brought out in the section on "The Path," leading to the goal of Enlightenment and New Life and Identification with the One in All.

The purpose of the book is to show the similarities between all these faiths in their teaching on the living of the life; for "those who live the life shall know the doctrine." For such the fundamental doctrine of universal unity is everywhere apparent, however expressed. Those not yet aware of the striking similarities, even in statement occasionally, between the teachings ascribed to the world's Saviours will find here a simple and loving introduction.

J. O. M.

The Doctrine of Awakening: A Study on the Buddhist Ascesis. By J. EVOLA; translated by H. E. MUSSON. (Luzac and Co., Ltd., London. 310 pp. 1951. 21s.)

It is necessary to bear in mind that the author and the translator of this volume present their work to two very different publics. By reason of the place and time of the original production (Bari, Italy, 1943), it was almost inevitable that the author's views should be biased by the prevailing opinions concerning race. These views are responsible for his interpretation of *Ārya*, as set forth in an early chapter, and make themselves felt at intervals throughout the book. Where, however, such views do not percolate, as in the paragraphs on *Suññatā*, the matter is ably handled and the text proceeds on more or less conventional lines. Not the least interesting contribution of the work is to show the extent to which preconceived views can influence a consideration of the Buddhist teachings.

Appreciating the difficulty of translation when giving supporting references, one feels an additional necessity to draw data from the widest possible range of Pali texts. The substratum of the Buddha's teaching is the *Abhidhamma*, but this *Piṭaka* the author dismisses briefly in three lines (p. 278). According to the foreword "Sources," only the *Sutta Piṭaka* has been used, and of this principally the *Majjhima-Nikāya* since, it is stated, a good Italian translation of this existed. The treatment of excerpts from the *Dhammapada* (58, 59), which also exists in Italian translation, is, however, particularly bad. The author employs them to draw the following conclusion (p. 43): "Only in certain Western misconceptions is Buddhism—considered in later and corrupted forms—presented as a doctrine of universal compassion encouraging humanitarianism and democratic equality." What, then, becomes of the *Appamaññā*, the Illimitables, of *Samatha-Bhāvanā*, the practice of Calm, or even of *Metta*?

Of later chapters, much of "The 'Void'" and "Up to Zen" could have

been dispensed with, since the author did not permit himself space to support his assertions.

A. A. G. BENNETT

Buddhism: Volume Two—Mahayana. By C. H. S. WARD. Great Religions of the East Series. (The Epworth Press, London. 222 pp. 1952. 15s.)

This little book makes no claim to originality. The author has no direct acquaintance with Buddhist texts in any language, and has therefore been compelled to rely exclusively on second- third- and fourth-hand sources for every iota of information. Fifty items are listed in the Bibliography, but the author appears to lean most heavily on less than a dozen books. It is not without significance that of the writers of these works only one is a Buddhist, while at least three are Christian missionaries, and several are well known for their unsympathetic attitude towards Buddhism. We are therefore not surprised to find that although Mr. Ward has handled deftly, and arranged neatly, a considerable quantity of information about the history and doctrines of Mahāyāna Buddhism, he has failed to come within a million miles of its spirit. Our old friend, the doctrine of the Void, for instance, which has bewildered better brains than Mr. Ward's, Hindu as well as Christian, has of course been misunderstood completely. How absolute the misunderstanding is, can be judged from the following passage :—

> It is sufficiently strange that Santideva should close his great book, the *Bodhicaya* [*sic*]. recognized to be the loftiest and most deeply religious of all books on this subject in Mahayana literature, on a note of sadness, if not of despair: "Since all being is so vacuous and null, what can, what shall be acquired? Who can be honoured, who can be reproached? How can there be joy and sorrow, the loved and the hateful, avarice and non-avarice? Wherever you search for them you find them not."' (p. 206)

Presumably the book is intended to emphasize the fact that we must look to a gospel other than that of Mahāyāna Buddhism for anything of spiritual value. The chapter on the Tantras repeats the usual clap-trap, while that on Buddhism in Tibet could hardly be less sympathetic. Most interesting of all is the chapter on the Chief Causes of Decline, wherein the factors which led to the disappearance of Buddhism from India are enumerated. One may not agree with the author's conclusions, but he has treated the subject with impartiality, and brings to the notice of the reader aspects of this highly controversial question which are sometimes overlooked. The most sympathetically written part of the book is Chapter XIX, The Doctrine of the *Pāli Piṭakas*, in which the human aspect of the Buddha's personality has been treated with understanding and insight. Here and there in the book are a few factual errors, such as the ascription of Amritānanda to the ninth century instead of to the 19th (p. 56).

In his foreword the Editor of the Series says: "There is no other book in English which does for the student what this does, and I believe it will be a standard text-book upon the subject for many years to come." This may be true if the student desires only superficial and unassimilated information; if he is in search of something deeper and more spiritually satisfying (and if he is not, why study Buddhism at all?) he must seek it elsewhere than in this well-meant but wholly inadequate book. The price, moreover, is very high for such a small volume.

BHIKSHU SANGHARAKSHITA

The Dhammapada (Text and Translation). By NARADA MAHA THERA. (Maha Bodhi Society of India, Calcutta. xxiii+359 pp. 1952. Rs. 2/-)

This gem of Buddha Wisdom is becoming more popular. Already some excellent translations exist. This one, by Narada Maha Thera of Colombo, with the Pali text in Roman script and an English translation, is a useful addition to their number and will be wel-

comed by lovers of "the footfalls of the *Dhamma*." Dr. Cassius A. Pereira in his Foreword values the *Dhammapada* as to him "the best single book in all the wide world of literature." This sounds like a bit of exaggeration; but Dr. Pereira further states :—

> For forty years and more, it has been my constant companion and never failing solace in every kind of misfortune and grief.
>
> There is not a trouble that man is heir to for which the Lord over sorrow cannot point out cause and prescribe sure remedy. One never turns in vain to these stanzas of incomparable beauty for advice, for alleviation of life's manifold pains, or for message of cheer and penetrating insight.

Similar praise has been bestowed on the *Bhagavad-Gita*, *The Imitation of Christ* and *The Voice of the Silence* by their respective devotees. The simple and forthright sayings of the Master Gautama have a peculiar effect on earnest searchers and the *Dhammapada* has certainly proved an awakener and an energizer to many a mind-soul.

In modern India this pocket edition should have a very large circulation. We wish the price were not so high. Nevertheless we congratulate the Maha Bodhi Society for securing from the Maha Thera Narada permission to republish this translation; his Notes to the 26 Cantos will be an aid to the student; but the *Dhammapada* cannot be really understood without some application of its wisdom in daily living.

O.

Songs of Zarathushtra. The Gathas. Translated from the Avesta. By DASTUR FRAMROZE ARDESHIR BODE and PILOO NANAVUTTY. Foreword by S. RADHAKRISHNAN. Ethical and Religious Classics of East and West. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 127 pp. 1952. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

The series of books published by Messrs. Allen and Unwin under the title: Ethical and Religious Classics of East and West, is a praiseworthy attempt to place before the intelligent reader, at a desperate time in the history of the world, the highest wisdom and the spiritual heritage of mankind. No one would deny the need for such an undertaking. This latest and valuable addition to the series carries a foreword by Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and deals with the Gathas or Hymns of Zarathushtra which form the most ancient part of the Avesta, the collection of the sacred writings of the Parsis.

Comparative religion is always a stimulating and rewarding study for those prepared to break through the barriers of isolation erected by sectarianism. It will therefore profit us to know more of the ethical teaching and high ideals which have sustained a community of mankind, small in number yet great in philanthropic enterprise. In such an examination, we are brought to the very origins of monotheism, to the era of the Gathas and Vedas when man first came to know God and rejoice in His revelation. That such mystic enlightenment should exist so long before Christianity is a fact salutary in itself. Moreover, the teachings of Zarathushtra have to some extent influenced both Jewish and Christian thought and the creeds of the Gnostics.

In this attractive little book, the authors—one a Parsi priest, the other formerly a college lecturer—who together form a competent team, have given us in their text passages on: The Prophet at His Devotions, The Creation, The Origin of Evil, The Choice, Zarathushtra's Exhortation of the Devas, Zarathushtra's Dedication to His Mission, His Attainment of Divine Illumination, Questionings, The Manthra or Holy Word, Zarathushtra's Struggle to establish the Faith, Spenta Mainyu the Holy Spirit, The Conquest of the Druj, Zarathushtra's Communion with God and his Powers, The Good Kingdom and Fulfilment; these being Sections 28-34, 43-51, and 53 of the *Yasna*, mainly after the text of Geldner. In addition there is an excellent introduction, a very useful glossary, a select bibliography carefully compiled,

and an adequate index. As Dr. Radhakrishnan states, it is a beautiful work.

H. J. J. WINTER

The Glorious Presence: A Study of the Vedanta Philosophy. By ERNEST WOOD (Rider and Co., London. 248 pp. 1952)

This is "a Study of the Vedanta Philosophy" as the descriptive subtitle puts it, "and its relation to modern thought." The author has avoided technicality as much as possible and written a simple text with copious illustrations drawn from American life. Chapter by chapter he has followed a teaching method, showing the bearing of each thought on "ordinary" life. The book consists of four parts. In the first, the general Vedantic position as regards the meaning of life is set forth. In the second, the means to maturity of mind are explained. In the third, Shankara's *Dakshinamurti-stotra* is translated and commented upon. And, in the fourth, Vedantic ideas are compared with those of other systems, Eastern and Western.

In a very engaging style, Mr. Ernest Wood conveys the quintessence of Advaita-Vedanta to the modern reader. He gives also practical hints for the concentration of the mind and meditation. Very wisely he chooses in Part II to discourse on the Four Disciplines (*sādhana-catushtaya*) which, according to Shankara, are essential for a prospective student of Vedanta. Equally wise is the selection of Shankara's hymn to Dakshinamurti as the theme of Part III, which gives, in a nutshell as it were, the Vedantic doctrine of Reality and the means to realize it. The comparisons made in Part IV, however, would seem to be rather too ambitious. They cover not only the other Hindu schools but also a wide range of ancient and modern Western thinkers, from Plato and Aristotle, through Locke, Berkeley and Hume, to Kant, Schopenhauer and Emerson and other Americans.

The present book will serve well the purpose for which, I believe, it is designed, *viz.*, to whet the appetite of those who want to have some knowledge of Vedanta and prepare the way for the study of the classics either in the original or in translation.

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

The Book of Certainty. By ABU BAKR SIRAJ ED-DIN. (Rider and Co., London. 108 pp. 1 Plate. 1952. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

The publishers claim this volume to be "the first authentic modern account of Sufic teaching written *from within*." Every page bears out this claim, for the author is steeped in the esoteric teaching of the Sufi sheikhs. He discusses the three Degrees of Certainty—*haqq al-yaqin*, *'ain al-yaqin* and *'ilm al-yaqin*—and the doctrine of the four Paradises, supporting his argument not so much on written authority as on oral transmission. Every point made is related to an apposite text in the *Koran*. The author displays a familiarity with the mystical systems of other faiths, and brings a broad-minded attitude to his exposition. He writes attractive and faultless English, so that it is both enjoyable and instructive to peruse his little volume.

A. J. ARBERRY

The Life of the Servant. By HENRY SUSO; translated by JAMES M. CLARK. (James Clarke and Co., Ltd., London. 150 pp. 1952. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

This is the autobiography of a 14th-century German mystic, a Dominican friar, told in the third person as it was written down by the "spiritual daughter" to whom Suso confided his experiences. He did so solely to strengthen her in her own sufferings and temptations, and with no thought of publication. The simple beauty of the careful and faithful translation reflects the beauty of thought and diction of one who, as Professor Clark points out in his preface, was a rare combination of saint and poet.

This is a book to buy and keep and to reread many times. There is the

fresh, unmistakable sincerity of an intensely personal devotional experience; there is the witness of that experience to the same ineffable Reality which, transcending all times and forms, is the source and theme of all true mysticism. For Suso there is no contradiction, no difficulty, in passing from the loving contemplation of the Mother Mary, of the deeds and sufferings of Christ, and the bridal loveliness of "Eternal Wisdom," to ecstatic absorption in the "abyss" of the Godhead beyond all form. There is a direct, childlike simplicity of apprehension which is both attractive and convincing.

It is, I think, a book for all. Some of the incidents narrated in it are of a touching human tenderness and dramatic power. Suso's friary was no "ivory tower" remote from the world's turmoil. There is a Franciscan affection, too, for the natural world; the references to bird, beast and flower show us the heart of the poet. The "visions" which so often nourished and consoled his spirit were a poet's visions.

There is material, too, for reverent psychological study. Suso was a child of his time, perhaps, in the sternness of his ascetic discipline; our own danger may be too easily to discount its value. But two at least of his favourite personal symbols are also universal in their recurrence—the red rose and the morning star. His use of them is profoundly moving. An honest and beautiful book, worthily translated and worthily produced.

MARJORIE SYKES

The Psychology of Religion. By L. W. GRENSTED (Geoffrey Cumberlege, The Oxford University Press, London, New York and Toronto. 181 pp. with Index. 1952. 6*s*.)

We have here a very valuable addition to the already fairly large number of books on the psychology of religion. Being at once both a psychologist and a man of religion, the author steers clear of the two pitfalls that so often beset the path of the writer on this subject: he sets out neither to vindicate nor to demolish religion; and he neither under estimates nor over estimates the part that scientific psychology (as distinct from metaphysics) can play.

He summarizes the findings of various schools of psychology, and, with constant cautious reminders as to what does and what does not belong to the legitimate province of psychology, he gives us his own tentative and never dogmatic views.

One of the most valuable parts of the book is the bibliographical note at the end and his wise closing advice to the would-be student to pay more attention to the great religious biographies and autobiographies than to textbooks if he wants light on the subject of the psychology of religion.

Valuable though the book undoubtedly is, there is no doubt but that Eastern readers will feel that it lacks something important. The bibliographical note at the end, certainly, makes reference to the religions of the East, but in the body of the book all the illustrative matter is taken from Christianity. And one cannot help feeling that considerable light might be thrown on the whole complex subject by a consideration of the religious experience of Shri Ramakrishna and Sri Aurobindo, to say nothing of Nanak and the mystical poets of South India. A scientific theory, to be adequate, must fit all the facts, not just a few of them. The anthropologist school traces the beginnings of this subject in the religion of primitive man, the rest deal almost exclusively with the phenomena of Christian experience. It would seem that the book has yet to be written that will do for the psychology of religion what, for example, Wells and Nehru and Van Loon have tried to do for history, namely, make an approach to it that shall be both universal and scientific, and so put it on an equal footing with all the other branches of

Psychology and with all other systems that have Man as their object.

MARGARET BARR

Of God, the Devil and the Jews. By DAGOBERT D. RUNES. (Philosophical Library, New York. 181 pp. 1952. $3.00)

Dr. Dagobert Runes has a vigorous and scintillating mind and has done much for the dissemination of sane philosophical views. His present work breathes a passion for morality and justice; it is an attack on the West, where, according to Dr. Runes, the ethical framework has rusted and human values have been defied.

The stunning facts that "the theists are in a minority historically as well as actually," and that "man can live without God and can die without God," are stated in a straightforward manner in this indictment of the modern world. With arresting candour the author observes that "in all fairness to the Pagan world, neither Christians nor Mohammedans, the two dominant god-born religions, have in any appreciable manner contributed to the peace of the world." The indignant note in the title sounds again when we read:—

> The earth of Europe, the earth of the Americas, is drenched with the blood of Christians cut down by Christians, and heathens cut down by Christians, and Jews cut down by Christians—and not for the glory of God but for mere glory and for mere greed.

The whole book is an inspired elaboration of this theme, reminding one of Ruskin's work, *The Crown of Wild Olive*. In brief, vivid and pungent little essays written with clarity and engaging simplicity, Dr. Runes analyses the social and ethical maladies of modern man. His probings are deep and his findings disquieting. It was high time that a thinker of his depth and wisdom produced an indictment of the corrosive influences on modern culture.

In the sincerity of its wrath and in its surgical analysis this book attains poetic heights of thought and eloquence and the language naturally rises to the poetic level. The word "God" is used here in a broad and spacious sense; the title is mainly symbolic of the depressing ethical situation of today. The subjects of the essays themselves manifest the bewildering confusions of our age.

MOHANLAL KASHYAP

The God of the Witches. By MARGARET ALICE MURRAY. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 212 pp. Illustrated. Second, enlarged edition 1952. 21*s*.)

This work was originally published in 1931, and this second edition is to be welcomed, not only because the first edition has for long been virtually unobtainable, but also for the new matter now included, which, *inter alia*, gives the reader an entire new chapter on the position of the witch in the social structure. As most people are aware, the rise of official Christianity in the West was accompanied by the growth of a number of sects which were stigmatized by orthodox churches as heretical but which persisted, in the face of most terrible and bloodthirsty persecution, well into the Middle Ages. Some of these sects are known to have been at one time such serious rivals to the Church that it was even doubtful which would ultimately triumph. What is probably not so fully realized is the survival of a far older religion, which Dr. Murray conceives to be the cult of the Horned God, which also persisted down to the 18th century, and of which traces are to be found to this day.

Although there can be no doubt, as our author emphasizes, that both the sign of the Cross and the idea of the divine-human sacrifices were long anterior to Christianity, the persecuting Churches—for so they must be called—have so literally bedevilled the history of all other religions by calling their gods devils and all Magic so-called Black Magic and witchcraft that it is difficult to disentangle, from the completely biased accounts of the examin-

ers and the evidence of the hysterical or the tortured, any true picture of these ancient and persistent beliefs. Dr. Murray, however, has rendered us sterling service in this respect, and if the reader will remember—though it is not always too easy—to substitute the word God for Devil whenever the latter occurs, a definite picture will emerge, even though many details for which one would wish are, of necessity, not to be found. For those not already familiar with the idea of the Divine Victim as found in the West in historical times, Chapter VII, with its analysis of the cases of William Rufus, Thomas à Becket, Joan of Arc and Gilles de Rais will prove of particular interest. The thesis, as regards the first two named, has, of course, been treated much more fully by Mr. Hugh Ross Williamson in *The Arrow and the Sword.*

E. J. LANGFORD GARSTIN

In Search of the Hereafter : A Personal Investigation into Life after Death. By REGINALD M. LESTER. (George G. Harrap and Co., Ltd., London. 224 pp. 1952. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

One cannot question Mr. Lester's good faith in this simple description of his endeavours to communicate with his "dead" wife. But readers should not let their inevitable sympathy with him blind them in reference to his conclusions, as when he writes, repeatedly and arbitrarily, that "there is no alternative explanation" to the Spiritualistic one; or again: "I have therefore ruled out as evidence anything that could have been in my mind, either consciously or subconsciously." What he accepts as proofs of identity or cross-checks would be rejected by anyone who had studied, even slightly, the human constitution as given in Eastern psychology, or the potentialities of that subtle, all-pervading, registering agent, the Astral Light. Spiritualists often present, as their own contribution, portions torn from the Theosophical explanations of psychic laws and phenomena published by that great occultist of the last century, Mme. H. P. Blavatsky. These shreds and tatters, woven into the Spiritualistic ideas, do not give a true picture and afford no warning of dangers.

The book has interest as a record, and one notes a family likeness in the messages and conversations, their chit-chat level, and the almost sub-human atmosphere conveyed by such episodes as that of the trumpet (purporting to be used by the author's wife) nuzzling his face and head, and forcing his hand deep into its mouth. It may seem harsh to criticize the happy feeling induced by spiritualism but experience has shown that astral intoxication is more dangerous even than the judgment-deadening exhilaration produced by physical alcohol. Mme. Blavatsky also wrote of the true means of communion with the "departed," and the interest aroused by Mr. Lester's book, when first published as magazine articles, indicates the great need for her illuminating presentation of the facts. Sincerity alone is not enough when dealing with "the unknown."

L. M.

Matters of Life and Death: An Inquiry into Spiritualism, Faith Healing and Psychic Research Today. By GEOFFREY MURRAY. With an Introduction by THE DEAN OF ST. PAUL'S. (Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd., London. 200 pp. 1953. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

This competent, objective survey is developed from a series of articles in the *News Chronicle* in 1951. Mr. Murray has personally investigated various Spiritualist organizations, private mediums, and healers like Harry Edwards. He has browsed in the S. P. R. library, made researches into the historical background, and questioned the attitude of various religious bodies. As to his conclusions, he does not consider Spiritualists cranks, but is not convinced by their theories of "survival" and "spirits," being more inclined to give

"telepathy" the credit. He is impressed by the results of faith healing, but is again unable to accept them as due to "spirits." The concept of the powers of the human "soul" and "spirit" seems to him nearer the mark. With characteristic common sense he feels that "prayer" is a dangerous substitute for self-responsibility and obedience to natural laws of health, and that it is the nature of man (body, mind and spirit) that needs to be explored.

It is a pity that Mr. Murray, with his balanced outlook, has obviously never come across the Theosophical explanations of the phenomena investigated, for these give an integrated view. They agree with his conclusions, but furnish the rationale he has not yet discovered. Some so-called Theosophical works have become coloured by spiritualistic conceptions and do not give a true picture, but a study of Mr. Murray's evidence in conjunction with the writings of H. P. Blavatsky and W. Q. Judge on the human constitution, after-death states and psychic laws and phenomena would be most helpful.

E. L. MARR

SOUL IN THE LABORATORY

The tremendous importance of the concept of man emerges from the discussion by Dr. Humphry Osmond and Dr. J. H. Smythies in the January *Hibbert Journal* of "The Present State of Psychological Medicine." Psychobiology, the most influential school of psychology today, has, they concede, done well in drawing attention to the physical aspects of mental disorders. It is, however, essentially materialistic and reduces men to automata. "This reduction has underwritten the success of the totalitarian conspiracy." Psychiatrists, moreover, who claim to find a complete explanation of human beings and their beliefs and behaviour in the physical behaviour of the brain are incapable of giving neurotic patients the needed sense of individual worth or of dealing comprehendingly with psychotic patients' experiences of levels of consciousness the possible reality of which they cannot conceive.

It makes all the difference in the world to the patient if he is treated by a doctor who believes he is dealing with a spiritual personality with an immortal destiny to be fulfilled, or by a doctor who believes that human beings are skinfuls of physicochemical automata, a mechanical fault in which has brought the patient to see him.

Freud's mechanistic psychology is described as a variant of the materialism an excess of which "is making a mock of the art of healing," and his movement, psycho-analysis, as a dogmatic product of the human reason. Jung, however, with his concept of the unconscious mind, "gives us a glimpse of a vast, strange, and beautiful inner world more akin to the Eastern view of man."

It is, however, the results of parapsychological investigation which, the authors state, disprove human beings being automata. The work of the parapsychologists "will enable us to talk about the soul...from a basis of natural science." Certainly the value of the parapsychological findings as correctives of soul-denying materialism is great. But the laboratory can never yield the final secrets of the Spirit and Soul of man. One hopes that a new wall of orthodox opinion will not be erected on the very borders of the unknown to bar the way to subjective and intuitive approach to Reality.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

" _____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

Speaking at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on 5th February, under the chairmanship of Rajadharmaprasakta Shri T. Singaravelu Mudaliar, Mr. F. A. Taylor of the Asian Field Office of the International Labour Organization dealt with "Human Relationship in Industry." Supervision, he said, was a difficult art, involving the understanding of different personalities, who, moreover, were changing as a result of their experiences. Adequate supervision, however, played a very important rôle in winning and holding the workers' loyalty. Without it, welfare measures and incentives for increased output would not suffice. The fair and timely handling of industrial problems prevented their growing into large disputes for tribunals or courts to settle.

In the *Bhagavad-Gita*, as in the Confucian philosophy, the pattern of behaviour is set from above. Mr. Taylor brought out that the pattern of behaviour in industry was set from the top and communicated from the supervisor of many men to the supervisor of a smaller number and so on. Among the sound rules for good human relationships Mr. Taylor named : giving the worker an idea of his place in the industry ; advance intimation of changes affecting the workers and explanation of their necessity ; the utilization of each worker to his full capacity, with scope for special ability to find expression and credit where credit was due for useful suggestions as well as for outstanding or extra work. Man's innate passion for justice being so strong, it is not surprising that a supervisor's taking to himself the credit due to a worker is a fruitful cause of dissatisfaction. In short, Mr. Taylor brought out, according to the quality of the supervision, it was either a source of constant friction or it contributed to the smooth functioning of industry.

Washington Day was celebrated at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on February 23rd, by a Special Meeting presided over by Mrs. R. B. Watson, who brought out how Washington owed his hold on his soldiers and on the affections of his people not to his military or diplomatic genius—for he had neither—but to his sterling character. He had not had much formal education, but he had had a courageous and devoted mother and had guided his course from boyhood by high principles deliberately formulated.

Miss Evelyn W. Hersey, Social Welfare Attaché of the American Embassy, described how he had raised and trained his Revolutionary army and sustained its courage (helped greatly, we would add, by Paine), through years of hardships and discouragement until the Colonies had won their freedom. Chosen the first President of the new Republic, he had served two terms, dying soon after his long-deferred retirement to private life. Miss Hersey traced the development of the American ideals of freedom and equality to the increasing restriction of the right to exploit in the name of freedom of opportunity.

Shri M. Ramaswamy, after dealing with Washington's services and his qualities, brought out the lessons that India could learn from this honest and simple man, "a man of great reserve, with his own inner sanctuary." These included the desirability of talking less and concentrating on the job at hand ; also guarding against the dangers of sectional differences, against the threat

of which to national unity George Washington had warned.

The special number of the *Journal of the Ryūkoku University*, Kyoto, Japan, published upon the University's 30th anniversary by its Research Association, impresses one as painstakingly produced. The two articles in English, "Tibetan Buddhistology" and "Honen and His Doctrine of the Pure Land School," are full of facts and references, although the writers, not being quite at their ease in English, are sometimes obscure.

The first study is based on three texts: the *Bhāvanā krama*, the *Bodhipatha Pradipa* and a synopsis of Tsonkha-pa's *Lam-rim chen-mo*. The second examines the views of Honen, a 12th century Buddhist saint, upon the controversial question "whether the attainment of our salvation be grounded on 'Once calling the Name' principle or 'Many calling the Name' principle." The Name is the sacred Name of Amida (Buddha). It suggests a climate of religious thought not unlike that of the less enlightened forms of the Indian *Bhakti* cult. Unfortunately, most of the number is in Japanese and thus we are deprived of the interest of "Buddhism as Applied to Social Science," "Logic and Psychology in Religion" and "Current Trends of Thought in Japanese Youth." We especially regret missing the last.

Gutorm Gjessing in an article in the November 1952 *International House Quarterly* entitled "The 'Primitives' and Ourselves" has some interesting things to say about the difference between wisdom and intellect. He writes:—

> In the immense admiration of Intellect we have forgotten that Conscious Self covers only a very narrow sector of the human mind. But if we, with our senses and our intellect, are able to conceive but a small fragment of ourselves, we obviously are still more helpless when faced with entirely different cultures.... Basically our intellect is analytical and consequently it is individualistic, egocentric and egotistic. Wisdom, on the other hand, plumbs the great quiet depths of subconsciousness and unconsciousness. It is based not only upon observation but also upon the forgotten experiences of tradition: And it is not egotistic because below the conscious surface of the human mind rests not egotism but sympathy and co-operation....Intellect, reason thinks with brain alone, Wisdom thinks with heart and brain.

Gjessing applies these ideas to the so-called "Primitives," pointing out that for them all nature is alive and that they have the sense to work with her and not against her. Also they have understood that the real freedom of the individual is first and foremost to have a common life with other human beings. Instancing America's Dust Bowls as an example of this lack of co-operation, he shows that even the Bantu in Africa, in his agricultural efforts, sensed the need for retaining large trees in his fields to hold the soil together and keep it from being washed away by heavy tropical rainfall.

Although Prince Kropotkin had put forward his "law of mutual aid" as a scientific proposition at the close of the century, it was not tested and found to work in biology and sociology until the late 1930's. The author points out the great danger of believing that human behaviour is dictated by reason alone whereas it is largely dominated by the unconscious. National and international tensions are largely due to this delusion. Long-lived cultures like the Chinese, he thinks, were such because they believed more in the art of living than in the art of technical progress. The West, he says, needs to learn this lesson and to cease meddling intellectually with the unconscious depths of the human being, as this only acts as a hindrance in the way of our inherent wisdom expressing itself. Unless we do so our civilization can hardly be humanized again.
