

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly,
and lost among the host — as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XXVII

APRIL 1956

No. 4

"THUS HAVE I HEARD"—

"Sorrow Is," taught the great Buddha. The power of the first of his Four Noble Truths is being intensely felt by almost everyone, more particularly among the so-called civilized communities. Poverty and disease, disappointment and frustration, envelope all. Most of us are ever dissatisfied with ourselves and with our lives, with what we have and what we have not.

We look before and after,
And pine for what is not;
Our sincerest laughter
With some pain is fraught;

Our sweetest songs are those that
tell of saddest thought.

If we look around us in Nature we find everywhere joy superseding sorrow, beauty overcoming ugliness. We see Nature "red in tooth and claw" when we look at her superficially; but when we probe deep we come upon the heart of the great Mother, ever throbbing with compassion. In Indian philosophy Nature and her wonderful processes are described as *Lila*, a gorgeous play; and the highest attribute of Deity is called *Ananda*—Bliss. Life

originated in *Ananda*; it moves and has its being in *Ananda*. Intuitive poets, who have perceived this fact, speak of the "pleasure which there is in life itself," and bid us perceive that "the Soul of Things is sweet, the Heart of Being is celestial rest." In the deeper nature of every creature there is a living spring of happiness, of harmony and contentment. Real happiness is an inherent quality of the Soul. According to the *Gita*, one of the names of the Soul is "the enjoyer."

In spite of being so near, happiness seems to many of us to be afar off, for we are apt to judge *Ananda* or real bliss by the ephemeral sense pleasures and the deceptive allurements of mundane life which gladden us in their coming and sadden us when they depart. How can that which is external satisfy or bring happiness to the Inner Man? We judge life by its surface appearances—by the many comedies which please and the numerous tragedies which depress. To enjoy life in a real way we must

make it a habit to go to the core of every incident and try to learn its lesson. It is because we do not look deep enough that we miss the meaning and purpose of life, and hence its joy. In all events we must look for the hidden meaning, the hidden beauty, the hidden good. The Joy of Life is ours only when we are able to distil out of all experiences, pleasurable or painful, the perfume they contain. Real happiness is above pleasure as it is above pain, for it is made of the essence of both.

In our civilization people are so fervently seeking pleasurable impressions—even though they are brief and transitory and in the ultimate analysis not worth pursuing—and so anxiously avoiding disagreeable ones, that they fail to see the value of pain and suffering. A little thought would convince us that we cannot have happiness without suffering. How could we know joy without the contrast of sorrow? Pain is the womb of progress;

without it we would stagnate. But how many recognize this fact? To enjoy life, therefore, we need to go through every experience, pleasant or unpleasant, with graciousness and equanimity. Our happiness or unhappiness depends far more on the way we meet the events of life than on the nature of the events themselves.

People fail to derive joy from life because they try to go through the serious business of day-to-day living without proper knowledge. Study of human events and human problems is essential. It develops in us the true sense of humour which enables us to laugh at our own childishness in being elated over the soap-bubbles of life and to smile at our own weakness in heaving sighs of despair at the least mishap. A real sense of humour also implies the capacity to make others happy, by performing loving deeds, by rendering gentle service.

All who joy would win
Must share it,—Happiness was born a twin.

SHRAVAKA

“WHO’S AFRAID OF KARL MARX?”

AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARXIAN DOCTRINES

[**Dr. L. Delgado** is an English educationist and an international banker of recognized ability. A personal letter accompanied this article, from which we extract:—

“I have long felt that large numbers of the intelligentsia of many countries have accepted the main doctrines of Karl Marx too easily, and I believe that this tendency is now discernible among the less literate classes in India. This, of course, implies no reproach or censure, for the thoughts expressed by Marx seem on the surface to be noble ones: indeed, some passages from *Das Kapital* are indistinguishable from recent papal encyclicals.

“You will realize that economic thought has evolved considerably in the time that has elapsed since Marx wrote. Many of the theories then held are no longer professed: this change is discernible as early as Marshall, of Cambridge, and has been completed by Robbins, of London. It is in this new light that the article I enclose would interest many of your readers.”

Any philosophy which justifies war and violence, as Marxism does, cannot but be rejected by clear thinkers who are lovers of Wisdom and of their fellow men.—ED.]

In this article the author, as an economist, is not concerned with the merits or otherwise of communism as a political creed. Indeed, this is a field which is essentially the preserve of the politician, where the economist can do no more than advise.

We shall be concerned, however, with the economic reasoning behind the doctrines of Karl Marx, which form the acknowledged cornerstone of the communist state. Political beliefs, like ethical concepts, are matters of opinion and cannot be proved or disproved, but economic propositions are capable of exact measurement. If communism consisted merely of the old utopian socialism of St. Simon, it would be difficult to attack it without laying

ourselves open to the charge of materialism. But Marx has lightened our task by elevating communism to a “scientific” socialism, thereby presenting us with propositions in which there is no room for equivocation.

The work in which he enunciated his principles bears unmistakable signs of the author’s experiences and environment. Karl Marx was born in Treves (Prussia) in 1818, and studied at the Bonn and Berlin universities. His political activities and his writing—he edited several clandestine newspapers—obliged him to be continually on the move between France, Germany, Belgium and England. After 1848, he remained in London until his death in 1883, eking out a miserable

existence in a socialist *milieu*, living in dingy rooms and garrets and spending most of his waking hours in the Reading Room of the British Museum. The first volume of his *Das Kapital* appeared in 1867. The whole work is very long, some two thousand five hundred pages, and is incredibly dull. It is not certain, by the way, that it was all his own work; he appears to have borrowed considerably from Rodbertus. It makes use of mathematical formulæ which do nothing to clarify the text but which to simple minds endow the work with a scientific aura. It is extremely doubtful whether one in ten thousand communists has ever read the work, while the proportion of those who, having read it, have understood it must be smaller still. It must be admitted that the book is very difficult to understand, various passages being obscure to the point of raising doubts whether the author was not trying to explain points that he did not understand. Fortunately for demagogy, Marx explained the kernel of his thesis in his *Communist Manifesto* (published nearly twenty years before *Das Kapital*) which is as short and fiery as the greater work is long and dull.

Marx's arguments run as follows. The employer pays the worker less than the latter is capable of producing (measured in terms of money), or else he would not employ him. It is to the interest of the employer to pay as little as possible in order

to increase his profit. This lower limit, which always operated, according to Marx, was a subsistence level. As soon as this limit was exceeded, the population increased until a subsistence level was again reached, according to the iron law of wages which was widely held at the time. The employer paid the labourer subsistence wages but received the full labour value of the commodity produced. The difference was surplus-value, which was pocketed by the capitalist. This is the famous theory that has captured the imagination of workers everywhere.

From this point, Marx argued that the greed of the employer for surplus-value led him to lengthen hours and to intensify work, thus fostering a spirit of unrest among the workers. The employers, on the other hand, in their search for methods rendering labour more productive—which in effect meant the acquisition of machinery—competed with one another, and those who could not afford the increasingly expensive equipment fell by the wayside. Hence capital becomes concentrated in fewer and fewer hands while unemployment increases as machinery takes the place of labour.

Since the workers received only subsistence wages, there was not enough purchasing power available to take up the goods that were being produced in increased quantities with the new technique. Marx

said that this led to a frantic search for markets abroad, which resulted in wars for spheres of influence, etc. In the meantime the class struggle was being embittered by the rise of a class of the increasingly wealthy in juxtaposition with a class of the increasingly poor. Strikes, lock-outs, and other labour troubles would take place. The social fabric would be weakened by successive shocks, and one day the proletariat would rise and destroy capitalism. Capitalism would thus destroy itself.

So far we have the communists wholeheartedly with us. But let us examine Marx's arguments a little closer. The concept of surplus-value is based four-square on the subsistence theory of wages, which itself is a deduction from the Malthusian theory of population. The example of the last hundred years shows us that an increase in the means of subsistence has not led to an increase in population sufficient to swallow up the improved standard. Numbers have increased, it is true, but the birth rate has fallen and the size of families has decreased. The parental urge is not as firmly implanted in men and women as Malthus imagined. It follows from this that the iron law of wages does not operate with the force that Marx asserted.

As a matter of fact, Marx did not accept the Malthusian theory which, as we have seen, is the basis of his surplus-value notion, because had he done so he would have been com-

pelled to admit *either* that all schemes for social improvement were hopeless, because any improvement would be absorbed by an increase of population, *or* that if the standard of living could be raised by family limitation, there was no need for schemes of social amelioration. But he was bound to accept the iron law of wages even at the expense of rejecting its foundation, because without it nothing is left of his surplus-value doctrine. This inconsistency is not obvious to the ordinary layman and still less to the illiterate.

The Marxian concept of wages flows from the labour theory of value that was held by the classical economists. This states that the value of a commodity expresses the amount of labour "congealed" in it. This theory looks at value solely from the side of supply: the demand side is totally neglected. It is obvious that utility is equally important in determining the value of a commodity. How else can we explain the value of a product not due to human labour or the value of the works of the old masters? The value of all things depends on the element of scarcity relatively to wants. This concept explains the high salaries of film stars—one example of wages that would have baffled Marx! According to the labour theory of value, an article which turns out to be useless would still have the value of the labour it took to produce it. But this

is absurd, and Marx had the colossal effrontery to explain this away by stating that in such a case "the labour does not count as labour." Any follower of Marx who believes this will as readily believe that the earth is flat—except perhaps when his pay packet is absent at the end of the week because his labour has not counted. No, wages are not explained in terms of subsistence but in terms of marginal utility, to use the scientific term, which is quite a different matter.

Even if we accept Marx's somewhat foggy notions of surplus-value, it is not clear why the capitalist should want to use machinery, since surplus-value (as Marx expressly states) can be obtained only from man-power. No surplus can be obtained from machinery, yet the progress of industry is characterized by the increasing use of machinery. Marx saw the force of this argument in Volume I of his work: he promised an explanation, but he was unable to find one. More than this, Marx is completely unable to explain why it is that the rate of profit in all industries tends to equality although the proportion of labour to machinery varies from industry to industry. By the way, as Russia is not as highly mechanized in as large a variety of industries as the countries farther West and pays lower wages than almost any other country in the world, it follows that she is the biggest exploiter of surplus-value. Surely there is something

wrong here, and we haven't said a word about the vast forced-labour camps in that unhappy country.

So much for surplus-value. Now what about the lengthening of hours and the intensification of work in order to increase this surplus-value? The facts simply do not support Marx. It must be abundantly clear to every free worker that the hours of labour have much decreased over the last half-century and the conditions of work vastly improved. We need hardly elaborate on this except to point out that nowhere has this occurred to a greater extent than in that arch-capitalist nation, the U.S.A. Here, again, the Russian worker is far behind his freer brothers. Why is it that the Russian government is loath to allow foreign travel to its subjects? Might it not be because such travellers would draw invidious comparisons?

As for Marx's contention that capital would become concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, the contrary is in fact true. The principle of joint-stock organization has enabled vast numbers of people to contribute, however modestly, to the capital of enormous undertakings. Dozens of well-known companies number their shareholders in tens of thousands. Marx's deductions from the supposed concentration of capital, that unemployment would increase, has been proved wrong by the facts. It is true that unemployment, heavy at

times, is met with in the capitalist world, but the fact remains that far more people are in employment now than when Marx wrote. Unemployment is an economic and not a political phenomenon.

Marx's theory that wages were insufficient to take production off the market, while it might be true in some communist and in some Oriental countries, is certainly not true of the Western world. The standard of living of the workers has improved out of all recognition in the West, and again nowhere more than in the U.S.A. The lowest paid worker now enjoys comforts that were luxuries for the very rich in Marx's time. The great rise in the standard of living of the masses has been followed by great progress in industry, both of consumer and of capital goods. We may be permitted to ask the followers of Marx: For whom are the capitalist mills grinding, since the masses have no purchasing power?

It is true that there is great competition for markets abroad, but this is not because the workers are poor. On the contrary, it is because workers have purchasing power that industry is able to offer them its products. The greater the production, the cheaper each unit will be, at least until a very advanced stage in the productive process. Moreover, many raw materials come from the less industrialized countries, giving rise to the exchange of commodities to the advantage of both parties to the deal.

We see therefore that nearly all Marxian thought is untenable. No economist, not even in the U.S.S.R., holds the views expressed either in the *Communist Manifesto* or in *Das Kapital*. The theory of value is particularly difficult to swallow for any honest thinker. But the myth must be maintained. Mr. Beer, the biographer of Marx and his exponent, dismisses Marxian economics as a "political slogan," adding that "such militant philosophies need not in themselves be true, only they must accord with the sentiments of the struggling mass," and the doctrines of Marx "will for long have the force of truth for the masses, and will continue to move them."

Our contention is that any movement or idea based on a false proposition is doomed to failure. As education and understanding become more general in the world the workers will see the true light and disown the philosophy that has embittered their lives. Karl Marx was certainly the first man to present us with socialism on a scientific basis—as against the socialist idealism of Claude Saint-Simon, François Fourier, Robert Owen or Louis Blanc—but it turns out to be pseudo-scientific.

Marx held an uncompromisingly materialist conception of history. The socialism he preached *had* to happen because economic circumstances forced a certain line of conduct upon people: he could not

see that man could rise above his environment and reshape it, and could not understand that economic factors may manifest themselves otherwise than in a class struggle. An increasing number of workers and employers are moving towards the thought that labour and capital

are not opposing forces, but complementary. Both factors are essential in production: the interests of both are the same. Employers are specifically mentioned here because we are not so simple as to suppose that capitalists are perfect.

L. DELGADO

THE DECIMAL SYSTEM IN INDIA

In an interesting article, "*Decimalisation of the Indian Currency*" by Mr. D. B. Halpern, in the January issue of *Envoy*, the history of the Indian rupee is briefly sketched, the author's primary concern being the probable effects from the proposed decimalization. Mr. Halpern seems to feel that the greatest difficulty will be experienced by some 50,000,000 adult illiterates who will not be prepared to understand such a change. With its introduction, however, he foresees resulting greater production and literacy, for the present system is "time-wasting and cumbersome." With all due respect to his foresight, it is felt that he sins against the masses of India. Who in India has not heard time and again, "one Anna in the Rupee" and known it to represent $6\frac{1}{4}$ per cent? Similarly 4 or 8 or 12 Annas in the Rupee mean, respectively, throughout India, 25, 50 and 75 per cent. These percentages are easy of comprehension. More difficult are the pies or $1/12$ th of an anna, *i.e.*, $1/12$ th of $1/16$ th (or $6\frac{1}{4}\%$) of a rupee. Yet the Indian mentality is through long usage able to estimate even this. Sometimes a Westerner confronted with the elaborate façade of an Indian temple fails to understand the motif, while the Asian takes it in synthetically as it were, in a single comprehensive glance. Some-

times booksellers have tried to pinpoint one or two books in their show window. The window-shoppers in India are disappointed. They want a full display.

While a new system is always troublesome and temporarily inconvenient, it is believed that provincialism and procrastination might introduce in general decimalization merely another system among several already confusing. The acrobatic Indian mind seems to be able to grasp readily the difference and application of, let us say, the Bengal *maund* of 82 lbs. and the Bombay *maund* of 28.

The inconvenience of decimalization is only to be feared if it is not vigorously introduced and made universal throughout the country. Half-baked measures make confusion and produce protests and outcries. But does not the world as a whole need one comprehensive monetary system? The U.S.A. and Canada have a decimal coinage but adhere to the British pound and ounce weight and throughout our one world we have Rupees/Pounds/Guilders/Francs/Bushels/Kilos/Candies/Tons, long and short/Gallons/Ounces and Fine Ounces, etc. What a united world!

W. D. T. B.

FAITH AND REASON

[**Shrimati Lila Ray** has just published a small volume of interesting essays on instructive subjects, written in her lucid style ; it is entitled *Equities*. In this article she articulates ideas about which many good people have vague feelings. They are the basis of the morality of the civilization of the morrow. Much of what she writes, *e.g.*, on Reason, Faith, Instinct, Intuition, etc., echoes the profound teachings of H. P. Blavatsky.—ED.]

'Tis greatest now, and to destruction
Nearest ; there's no pause for perfection ;
Greatnesse a period hath, but hath no station.

—DONNE

A completely rational person is supposed to be one who treats all problems alike, whether they are moral or scientific, æsthetic or technical or religious. And indeed there was a time when men looked forward to the possibility of solving problems, including personal and moral ones, by a uniform method. During the nineteenth century reason was man's refuge from the vexations of human destiny, of life, of death. People believed it would ultimately provide us with the means of solving them. For our grandfathers truth was the truth of empirical investigation rather than of speculative inquiry. The pioneers of modern thought sought to vindicate reason as against the authority of books and institutions. They were inspired by a revulsion from the mediæval reliance upon petrified words and meaningless magic formulæ. The constructive side of rationalization is represented by the great works of science. Science is a word used to identify the powers and processes which have trans-

formed man's material world. These have been regarded as the only reliable form of knowledge for so long now that contemporary man finds it difficult to make use of any other in dealing with either his daily problems or problems of greater magnitude. What guarantees do we have that an intimation of the divine will is genuine? May it not be deceptive? How are we to distinguish between true guidance and the waste-products of our psychological machinery? So many iniquities have been committed in the name of revealed religion that men in general have lost confidence in these things. And now new abominations, no less revolting, have been committed in the name of science and reason. Where are we to turn? To what? We are told a retreat from reason has set in. We are backing away from it, but what are we backing into?

Faith is of two kinds, ethical and mystical. The mystical relates to the spiritual apprehension of divine

truth apart from proof. Theologians define faith as the decisive act in a mental process which mediates a relation between the human and non-physical world. Intuition is the means by which this is achieved; it gives immediate apprehension of fundamental truth. Mystical systems cannot be erected upon a basis of rationalization but ethical ones can.

Ethical faith relates to the belief in religious doctrine as it affects character and conduct. It has been largely superseded by a secular code of conduct, a code which is now embodied in the laws of the great democracies. All law was, in its origin, theological, and these codes therefore have religious underpinnings, but ethical faith can be agnostic. "If a man is a true man," wrote Confucius, "what is the use of rituals?" Secular humanism is an adequate sanction for morality. Goodness does not depend upon religion. There is a clear distinction between a sense of right and wrong and the mystical perception of a relation between the individual and the cosmos at large. Morality is the determination to oppose tendencies to action and restraint with consciously held social, ethical or spiritual values; it is the fruit of an unremitting struggle against badness, an inner struggle. Crimes and criminals do not establish moral precedents, no matter what sanction, divine or devilish, may be invoked to justify them.

In incorporating codes of conduct in their laws states took over from religion the function of controlling people's behaviour up to a certain point. No man need commit himself to a moral or religious or political purpose beyond that involved in obedience to the law. Each is also left free to cherish any belief he likes, however different, as long as he does not violate this basic code. Secularism, therefore, does not mean disbelief in religion, nor does it mean scepticism or the divorce of religion from politics. It does represent a common denominator of agreement as to what constitutes a standard of decency and honesty, acting as a kind of spiritual cement. It rests upon the united will of the citizens, the general will, and is acceptable to adherents of any one of the great historic religions, to deists, to pantheists, sceptics and all others, provided they are not fanatical believers or unbelievers. It belongs to the common people, all people, not only the majority, for it is composed of rules which are equally in the part and in the whole and therefore adequate. And in giving people of all creeds a common ethical standard it provides a springboard of resistance to the tyranny of militant groups, both religious and political. For one of the great disillusionments of our time has been the realization that the State is not more infallible than the Church and violates its own codes as easily. Man turned to the State for a defence against the

militant Church. To what shall he turn for a defence against the militant State?

Faith also has, and in the past has had to a far greater extent than at present, an explanatory function. Today religious explanation is reserved largely for matters beyond the range of science. The only intelligent questions one can ask about the physical world are those relating to quantity and the only acceptable answers are those ascertainable by measurement. This leaves large areas of consciousness untouched. In the explanation of physical phenomena reason produces more accurate and useful interpretations than faith. Theology distinguishes reason from faith as the exercise of the human intelligence upon religious truth. Different churches and different periods of thought have sought to defend themselves against reason by laying down limits within which it may be used. The ultimate, supernatural truths are everywhere reserved as the field of faith. The areas of consciousness which lie between the borders of faith and reason are unexplored and ignored. Can the field of experience be so restricted? Can either faith or reason exclude or refuse to take cognizance of any experience, no matter where it occurs, without jeopardizing the truth? In this intermediate area the rules of evidence do not apply and traditional theological formulæ are also inadequate. Are we therefore to

refuse to argue about moral and spiritual questions and appeal to instincts and to unconscious needs, to refuse to appeal to general principles and confine ourselves to the problem of the moment, to expedencies?

Science is steadily encroaching upon the sacred precincts of religion. It is claimed that psychology has convincingly shown that conscience is a product of learning and not a divine mechanism built in by God. May it not be a *karmic* mechanism built by what mankind has learned in the course of living? Both reason and faith, studied more deeply, arrive at conclusions which do not appear irreconcilable. The terrible mother of whom Jung speaks, for instance, is dramatically realized in the goddess Kali, and Freud's idea of a fully psychoanalyzed person as one who can meet without perturbation any situation he is called upon to face corresponds curiously to one aspect of the Indian idea of a fully enlightened person, one who has attained supreme spiritual knowledge. The conflict between science and religion is a conflict between natural and authoritarian religion. Competitive explanations are no longer involved. The difference is a difference of procedure, of the kind of logic used.

Few men actually choose between reason and faith, nor is such a choice necessary. Reason is the compulsive urge to impose order on fields of knowledge and experience. Faith,

through intuition, gives immediate access to knowledge; it is itself a kind of experience, a subjective experience. Kant distinguishes between "practical" reason which is specially concerned with the performance of actions and "pure" reason which, for him, provided principles, synthesizing into a unity by means of comprehensive generalizations. It transcends the understanding, he says, and more or less identifies it with intuition. Both Plato and Aristotle use *nous*, the Greek word for reason, for all the meanings it can have and strictly for the faculty which apprehends intuitively.

In intuition, therefore, we appear to have a link between faith and reason; it is common to both. The fundamental truths which are apprehended by intuition may be scientific and they may be spiritual. Mystics tell us the highest dogma of the spiritual is the affirmation of the material. And Spinoza, the prince of rationalists, dispensed with external criteria for truth. "He who lives under the guidance of reason," Spinoza writes, "endeavours as much as possible to repay his fellow's hatred, rage, contempt, etc., with love and nobleness." This, surely, is more a spiritual and moral effort than intellectual!

Reason therefore involves much more than mere observation. It needs concepts not derived from objective experience and objective experience is of importance in setting problems for philosophy and

religion. For man is both a rationalizing and a religious animal. So it is that he not infrequently appears both irrational and non-conformist.

From the bottom to the top of the animal scale there is evidence of a powerful impulsion from within, urging the organism toward actions, guided by such intelligence as there is, which tend to serve great biological ends. This same impulsion also tends to serve spiritual ends. Bergson defines intuition as "instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting on its object and enlarging it indefinitely." May not the soul, like the animal, be endowed with an instinct for self-preservation, an urge to work out the salvation man is upon earth to achieve? Intuition can be described as instinct on a higher level. There is no opposition between instinct and intelligence, provided we consider them at the same level of development. They work together, supplementing and complementing each other, forming a living entity activated by a vital urge.

Intuition is not a substitute for thought or entirely different from it. Three stages have been distinguished in the thought process. In the first, or empirical, isolated facts and events are recorded by the perceptions. It is described as the alphabet stage. In the second, or the stage of scientific knowledge, the interconnectedness and laws of relationship between these facts and phenomena are explored. It is the sentence

stage. In the third, the stage of intuition, the unity of the basic design is perceived, its meaning grasped. Here the mind apprehends all things as an integrated whole. Let us turn once again to Spinoza, for his times resembled our own. Intuition, he says, is "thoughtfulness matured to inspiration," a state which is possible only to a mind which has gone through the discipline of the rational stage. It also transcends it in the clear, unequivocal vision of the mystic. Reason cannot be disassociated from faith, or science from philosophy. The human consciousness is predominantly intellectual but the intuition functions when our deepest interests are at stake.

The fact is that much truth has to be rescued from the errors of traditional religion, and error has also to be destroyed in scientific and secular humanism, before we can achieve an imaginative synthesis which will restore the ecological balance which has been so disastrously upset in the last fifty years.

Our century is on its cusp. From the vantage point provided by the middle we can look behind us at what has gone and forward to what is likely to come. Man has gloried in the role of *homme révolté*. Furi-ously he has attacked every established institution, social, religious, political. He has relentlessly opposed orthodoxy and regimentation and all manifestations of the arbitrary use of power. He has fought for

individual freedom, secular education, a true and free speech; he has been spontaneous, independent, morally uncompromising. The blindest devotion and the most violent opposition have set their mark on our times in martyrdom and treachery. Man has also been cunning and cruel, deceitful, arrogant and a humbug. There has been confusion, frustration and anxiety where there should have been clarity and consideration. Insecurity has never been greater. Three of the greatest revolutions in history have taken place, the Russian, the Indian and the Chinese, and two of the most terrible wars.

A reassessment is urgent if we are to survive. Many conceptions of life are indestructible, but they must be restored to their true meaning. The fabrications with which we have overlaid the natural world are of no use to us now when we seek once more to inform ourselves concerning the divine nature. The divine nature, being prior in knowledge and nature, should have been considered first, but we thought it last, giving precedence to the objects of nature, the things of our senses. Having thus wilfully and perversely reversed the order of philosophic argument, is it strange that we find ourselves involved in contradictions? The machine is no assistance in making the adjustment which will save mankind from destruction. Undirected by faith, science builds monstrous engines.

Our knowledge, exact and efficient as it is, must be paralleled with faith. The two must fuse in our conception if we are to respond to the tasks of the future without rejecting past conquests of spirit. What more adequate defence can man have than the defence of adequate ideas? The conditions for a religious revival exist. Let it not be a revival of discarded dogma but one which will consolidate the gains the great challengers of moral complacency have made through their

defiance and clear the way to a realization of the spirit that is young in all changes, animated by the breath of the cosmos, a source of constant renewal, a spirit whose strength lies in liberated thought. For, as we explore the new areas of consciousness which shall be revealed to us in the coming years, we shall see what has not been told us and consider what we have not heard. Faith dwells in the house reason builds.

LILA RAY

SHARING RESPONSIBILITY

Few things in a democracy are more hopeful than evidence of the spirit of shared responsibility. It is obviously this spirit which has prompted more than one retired individual to put his garnered wisdom at the disposal of his countrymen. We have recently received a useful little book by a retired Superintending Engineer of the Punjab, Shri Champa Lal, C.E., M.I.E., I.S.E., *Industrial and Construction Co-operatives*. In its eighty-odd pages he has offered detailed suggestions for the organization of several industries on sound co-operative lines.

Of special value are his experiences with workers' co-operative societies for the carrying out of public works. The co-operative system, he maintains, offers the necessary incentive to hard work in the shape of fair distribution of profits. It also helps to prevent corruption and profiteering and results in considerable savings to the Government as well as better pay to the workers, on road construction projects, for example. He cites figures in substantiation of his claims for savings to the Government on specific undertakings by a

co-operative labour society formed and guided by the author in the Kangra District.

Other such societies subsequently formed did not succeed in the Punjab in the context of impending Partition and its tragic aftermath, and there were other factors, which offer lessons for the future. But the plight of irregularly employed unskilled labour in both cities and rural areas is such that no plan promising relief should be rejected out of hand. Labour contract societies with nothing to sell but the work of their hands offer a solution for some of this horde of the underprivileged, given enlightened guidance from official or honorary workers and sympathy from contractors who could use their services. The Public Works Departments of the different States will naturally be an important factor in the success of such societies. If they are to make steady employment available to the labour contract society members, not only a sympathetic attitude but also efficient planning ahead will be required. Shri Champa Lal's book may help to point the way.

THE MORAL IMPERATIVE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY

[**Dr. Philip Lee Ralph** is Professor of History and Chairman of Social Studies at Lake Eire College for Women, Painesville, Ohio, U.S.A. He is very interested in Far Eastern history and culture and is the author of *The Story of Our Civilization* and co-author of a two-volume *World Civilizations* published a few months ago.

He is one of the small band of scholars who think honestly and dispassionately on the subject of national and international morality. In this forthright article he considers the notorious gap between the individual's superior morality and the tribal ethics of sovereign states. The individual accepts as practical the principles implicit in the doctrine of Universal Brotherhood, but witnesses his government opposing any real attempt to use them in state affairs. His political leaders fail to see what he clearly observes: that "unwittingly and unwillingly, we have all become our brother's keeper."—ED.]

The absence of a reliable moral code governing the behaviour of nations in their relationships with one another has long been remarked and deplored. Centuries of social evolution have produced relatively effective disciplines for the individual members of organized societies, not only in such intimate units as the family but also in fairly large and impersonal communities. In spite of the fallibility and waywardness of human nature, moral sensibilities have been nurtured and made fruitful in the development of individual personalities. But there is a notorious gap between the ethical principles accepted by even the ordinary and passably good citizen of a civilized community and the principles which seem to underlie the policies of organized states. Since the days of Machiavelli at least, it has been debated whether the state is amenable at all to the

moral restraints that have become almost axiomatic in private life or whether the State is a law unto itself, bound only by considerations of calculated interest and the limits of its own strength. Paradoxically, the growth of successful and powerful governments has exposed and augmented a state of anarchy between governments.

In modern times considerable effort has been directed toward the replacing of international anarchy with a system of international law. This highly commendable effort has met with limited success, not only because of the inherent difficulty of law enforcement over a wide area, but also, and more fundamentally, because of the lack of a tradition which would give such a law the sanction of universal assent. Within well-established communities, whether civilized or primitive, the greater

part of law is not a conscious creation but the embodiment of custom. Parliaments and congresses grind out huge quantities of legislation every year without producing a very marked effect upon the basic law of the land. Barring revolution, legislation can modify but little the fundamental habits and relationships of the body of citizens. Similarly, a really meaningful international law cannot be created by fiat or by solemn resolutions. A formal renunciation of aggression does not put an end to war; neither does a judicial condemnation of international aggressors, even when it is carried out by victors who are in a position to enforce their sentence upon the vanquished. International law will be respected only when it appears as the crystallization of the experience of nations that have begun to share a community life. International law can be no stronger than the moral sensitivity of the separate nations that support it. Unfortunately, there is no simple recipe for the heightening of moral sensitivity, but the need for such a transformation has become increasingly apparent.

The dichotomy between private morality and public amorality is seen in traditional attitudes toward the stakes and techniques of diplomacy, the handling of international disputes and the problem of world organization. While in the field of personal contacts, even with strangers and foreigners, it is natural to

assume at least a fifty-fifty chance of finding mutual trustworthiness, it is considered the height of *naïveté* to regard any foreign state (perhaps even one's own) as dependable and honourable except when its own immediate interests clearly impel it to be. Acknowledging the principle that states are naturally at enmity with one another, it is argued that any effective scheme for world government must incorporate a paramount authority with sufficient force at its disposal to coerce recalcitrant nations. And the schemes die in embryo because no powerful nation is willing to surrender its sovereignty—which means, to put it bluntly, its right to act irresponsibly in a crisis.

No sane member of a civilized human society would dream of claiming sovereign independence for himself. To do so would be to jeopardize his most precious interests as well as to alarm his neighbours. Sovereignty is not to be confused with freedom. Actually, the more freedom is recognized and embodied in the *mores* of a community, the less will the individual wish to burden himself with defences against the violation of his own personal rights. Enabled to take off his armour and lay aside his weapons, he becomes more completely freed for the business of living. True, there remains an organized power within the state to protect the individual against violence and to punish him if he resorts to crime,

but under normal conditions this force is hardly noticeable or needed. The consciousness of belonging to a respected and purposeful community, the habitual acceptance of the norms of group behaviour, play a much larger part in shaping the conduct of the ordinary citizen than does the presence (or absence) of the local police force. Among nations, however, there is as yet no such community sense and no such established tradition of reciprocal respect. Hence, the nations cling tenaciously to their sovereignty, even though it is a heavy yoke on their shoulders and a stumbling block to the realization of greater freedom.

The proverbially low estate of international morality is not attributable to any insurmountable defect in human nature or to the inherent limitations of politics. It can be accounted for historically by the fact that nations have been, until recently, generally isolated from one another, with only casual or traumatic contacts and little opportunity for discovering abiding common interests. In ancient times it was possible for an entire civilization to run its course and disappear without serious repercussions in other parts of the world. Our own age is unique in having created a condition of proximity and interdependence among nations.

Because human progress is a spotty affair at best, it is inevitable that institutions frequently fail to

accommodate themselves to changes in the environment or in the balance of social forces. We enter the age of jet planes while our political habits and concepts are still in the "horse-and-buggy" stage. The terrible secret of the atom, unlocked by erudite scientists, becomes a pawn in an international struggle where the prevailing code of ethics is no higher than that of the cave man. Perhaps it would be fairer to say that governments today in relationship to one another are in a condition analogous, not to the Stone Age, but to that of the frontiersman living precariously on the edge of civilization. The frontier dweller is notoriously independent, quarrelsome and quick to avenge an injury, but he can also be friendly, generous and hospitable. He is an ambivalent kind of creature, half forerunner of a more expansive and freer culture and half outlaw. The frontier has a curious morality of its own, which is by no means entirely savage, but which is inadequate for the needs of a civilized state and a miserable foundation for an international code of ethics. And there is one significant and startling difference between the historic frontiersman and the modern nation state; the resources of the latter are by no means meagre or primitive. Frontier morality, hardly less than cave-man morality, is disastrously dangerous when its adherents are equipped with nuclear weapons.

Some contend that it is utopian to imagine that the nations can ever

be brought to bind themselves with a rigid code of conduct such as applies to individuals in a community. Certainly it will be a difficult accomplishment, but it has never been easy to establish ethical standards, either for the group or for the individual. The taming of the ego, the instilling of attitudes of unselfishness and responsibility, has been the most formidable task confronting any society during its formative stages, but it has also been the most essential requirement for progress to a higher level of community life. The development of an ethical sense is never automatic but always the result of painful struggle, beset with anxiety and disappointment. In view of the diversity of opinion as to what constitutes desirable behaviour and in view of the refractoriness of human nature, it seems almost incredible that much moral progress could be achieved. Yet history bears impressive witness to the growth and maturation of conscience, to the displacing of the blood feud by adjudication, to the enlargement of the orbit of loyalty, and eventually to the discovery that forgiveness is sweeter than revenge. A moral truth, first projected by prophetic genius, becomes gradually incorporated into the social consciousness of a community as its utility is demonstrated by experience. And, as the community gains in maturity and as the scope of its contacts widens, standards of behaviour must be examined objec-

tively and broadened or refined accordingly.

The great question of our day is whether the nations can manage to replace their tribal consciences with a world conscience before they destroy one another, along with every hope of a viable international order. Will they be able to make the big moral jump in time to prevent World War III or World War IV? If so, the lead obviously will have to be taken by the most powerful nations, because they are the ones who hold in their hands the means of wiping out civilization and reducing the world to chaos.

For too long the advocacy of international-mindedness has remained almost exclusively the concern of idealists, even visionaries, as if the cause was a work of extraordinary merit, hardly to be encompassed by the ordinary citizen. Tribute is paid to the concept of world government as an ultimate ideal, earnestly to be desired—like the Kingdom of Heaven—but likewise indefinitely postponable. Meanwhile statesmen concern themselves with more immediate and “practical” issues, above all with the quest for national security.

The irony of the situation is that in the present state of military science and technology there is no such thing as security, there are no impregnable defences, there is no immunity from the death-dealing fires and poisons of the laboratory. The only salvation for any nation now

lies in self-imposed restraint and in the institution of measures directed to the benefit of all. For the first time in history the fate of the inhabited world has become a single one. If the nations cannot live together, they will die together. The security which is feverishly sought in a race for superiority in devastating weapons is like the desperate security of a gangster who has holed up in his hideaway, determined to "shoot it out." It is the false security which grimly fulfils the scriptural prophecy: they who would save their lives will lose them.

Beyond the fact that the projection of moral standards into the international sphere has become a necessary condition of survival rather than a mere pious dream, there is a deeper reason why the task must be undertaken. Private morality cannot be maintained independently of the moral standards practised by the organized groups that predominate in world affairs. Moral and ethical codes, whether primitive or advanced, always have relevance to the society in which they operate. Their efficacy grows with use and dwindles with neglect. But no longer is any society a self-contained experimental laboratory. The technological revolution of the last fifty years has drawn the nations together, whether they wish it or not. The actions of individuals, as well as of nations, have effects beyond the borders of their own state and will be judged in the court

of world opinion. Unwittingly and unwillingly, we have all become our brother's keeper, and our neighbour is an alien whom we never expected to meet. Hence, time-honoured codes of national interest suddenly appear limited and parochial, insufficient to serve as mainsprings of action in a community which encompasses the experience, the needs and the aspirations of the whole human family.

The gap between private ethics and public policy has begun to put an unbearable strain upon the individual. He stumbles against and is frustrated by the double standard. He is thrilled by an unending procession of scientific marvels, proof of the triumph of the free intellect and forecasting a fabulous era in which man may conquer time and space. Then he finds that scientists are bullied into silence by suspicious governments or bought and sold on an international black market. His religion—whether Eastern or Western—impels him to accept the Golden Rule and the brotherhood of man; but he sees these precepts excluded from affairs of state and learns that, although a nation may be anxious to dump its surplus goods abroad, morality is not for export. Struggling to rear his children to be unselfish, generous and decent, he must send them out into a world where the assassination of millions of their fellow human beings may, at any instant, become the order of the day. It is no wonder that people are breaking under the

strain, succumbing to neuroses or feeling themselves drawn into a spiritual vacuum.

The moral and spiritual values which give meaning to civilization and to life itself will atrophy and our souls will shrivel within us unless we inject and activate these values in the entire sphere of public, national and international relationships. This is a large order, but it is

not sentimental altruism. Upon the success of the undertaking depends, ultimately, the safety and sanity of every individual. There is no longer a question of having one world or several; we already have one world. The choice, and one within our power to exercise, is between a co-operative world and a blighted planet.

PHILIP LEE RALPH

THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS

The discovery of ancient manuscripts in a cave on the shore of the Dead Sea, some of the texts of which parallel many of the New Testament texts though they antedate them, has been causing quite a furor. Scholars naturally and as usual disagree as to their origin and exact dates, but agree on their authenticity.

Edmund Wilson gives an interesting and apparently reliable account of the discovery in 1947 and the subsequent vicissitudes of the scrolls in his book *The Scrolls from the Dead Sea*. He records the "tensions" and "fears"—expressed and unexpressed—among both the Jews and the Christians throughout the research on the manuscripts:—

These new documents have...loomed as a menace to a variety of rooted assumptions, from matters of tradition and dogma to

hypotheses that are exploits of scholarship.

New Testament scholars, it seems, have almost without exception boycotted the whole subject of the scrolls.

It seems fortunate, therefore, for the Cause of Truth that so unprejudiced and able a man was on the spot and has recorded so carefully the facts about the scrolls and the controversies surrounding them.

For those who are neither bigoted Jews nor Christians but students of comparative religion, philosophy and ancient literature, neither consternation nor surprise was engendered by this discovery. It simply confirms anew that one core of Truth is discernible in all times and places. Only those claiming uniqueness need fear other gleams of the Eternal Verities.

E. P. T.

MACHINE: MECCA OR MOLOCH?

[Mr. R. M. Fox here presents some of his reflections on a vital subject which should provoke the thoughtful to action.—ED.]

If we are to believe the industrial experts—all learned and honourable men—humanity is now on the verge of a marvellous Golden Age in which mechanization is finally to lift the burdens from the backs of the toilers and make possible a fuller life for all. This is good hearing, for, not long ago, we were threatened with universal destruction through the mechanical perfection of our new Bombing Age.

The prospect of a glorious future, through "Automation," interests me greatly because my experience of the Machine Age has not disposed me to accept its proffered benefits at their face value. I confess to feeling sceptical. It has always seemed to me that people hymn the glories and benefits of mechanization just in proportion to the distance they are from being tied to the machine. It is quite true, as one gentleman remarked, that it is difficult to feel a slave to the machine if you step into a super model of a luxury car and drive in a lordly manner through the streets. But maybe a spell on the assembly line of the Ford motor works would induce another feeling.

An investigator in the Detroit factory has described how it was the job of one man to fasten the nuts underneath the chassis. Lying on his back, he propelled himself

along on a wheeled plank. He had to work feverishly to keep up with the cars as they moved along, before they drove off from the end of the assembly line. So his life, gazing upward from the floor to the bottom of the cars, was a medley of sweat, choking dust and grime.

If the new Automation method of production puts an end to this kind of occupation it will have served a human purpose. For my part I think it would be better if such a worker were to propel his wheeled plank to the nearest river and make an end of such a sordid parody of human existence. Yet I must venture to doubt that the new Automation will remove monotony, drudgery and exhausting labour from the workshop.

Several years ago engineering experts told us of the thinking mechanisms that were being developed for workshop and office use. These machines, we were assured, were able to correct themselves if they made a mistake and required very little supervision. Obviously the electronic brain was to supersede the manual worker.

One advocate of science applied to industry explained blandly that we could not object to machines being used for mass destruction because, in any case, the object of the machine was the elimination of un-

necessary human beings in industry. The number of supervisors required would be smaller and smaller. At last we might even discover the self-regulating, self-adjusting principle of the machine and so be able to eliminate the last man from industry and possibly from the world.

All this is hazy and extravagant theorizing. In practice we know that the further introduction of machinery makes life more precarious for the man or woman, girl or youth, working at the machine. The competitive principle demands that even if hard physical labour is diminished, the individual worker is geared to ever speedier machines, needing closer attention and exhausting the nervous energy of the operative.

During the pre-war years I read, in an English journal called *Fact*, an account by a girl in a factory of her experience in rapid, repetitive production. Here the girls were set in competition with each other. So fierce was this competition that overlookers grudged every second that the operative was not busy at high pressure. Even the time needed for visits to the toilet was watched as closely as the speed of the machines.

"I suppose we can't stop them doing that?" said one overlooker to another, with a jeering laugh as a girl switched off her machine and departed.

Full employment in Britain since then has made a big difference to

the degree to which workers can be driven. But, under the new regime of Automation, it is doubtful if full employment will be maintained. One strong argument for Automation is that fewer workers will be needed. And is there any reason why—accepting the mechanical standards of our time—the owners should treat their human servitors in any way different from the machines?

In order to get different treatment we will need some other principle of human conduct. At one time, perhaps, the feeling of reverence for God might have prevented us from debasing his image in our fellow men and women. Now I would prefer to say we must have reverence for Life. Yet the clattering machine to which so many are attached and with which they compete does not stimulate those feelings of awe, reverence and wonder that would help us to place mankind higher in the scale of the Universe and to make allowance for the demands of personality, bruised and crushed by the machine.

When I was fourteen I began work in a machine shop where I was employed from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., with one and a half hour off for meals. For this I received the sum of five shillings a week. In hours and money, things have improved since those days. Later I found other factory work in a larger machine shop where the work was subdivided and organized on rapid repetitive lines. My nearest approach to a

mammoth industrial undertaking was when I worked in Messrs. Vickers' armament works in Erith, Kent, where great cranes, running on rails, swung up blocks of steel to machine tables and these blocks were converted into instruments of destruction.

At that time Basil Zaharoff, the Armament King, had succeeded in getting the major number of shares and he spent some millions in fomenting war, other sums in dissipation and finally ended by buying up the little State of Monaco, which gave him possession of the gaming tables of Monte Carlo. Had Automation advanced in those days Zaharoff would have had more power but I cannot see what particular advantage would have accrued to humanity.

Where are our new standards to come from? At one time I had hope in political leaders and, perhaps, in leaders of the churches. Now I can see that these men, forceful and intelligent as they are, are the people who have helped to mould our present civilization and express the industrial standards of our time. They see nothing wrong in them and have every hope that by going along the lines of the present we shall find the solution of our social ills.

My personal solution was to get as far away from machine industry as I could, to cease being a tool of mass production and endeavour to become a human being again. In pursuit of this aim I went to Ire-

land, one of the least industrialized countries that remain. I doubt very much if Automation will make headway in Ireland, but there, though perhaps in a muddled way, I find a traditional sense of human personality, a rich individuality which a machine civilization has not conquered or crushed.

Talking to a small manufacturer in Dublin, I was informed that his workers on an average produce about 40% less than workers in the same trade in Britain.

"I cannot give them the same rate of wages," he told me, "But, on the whole, we get on comfortably together. I have had one man with me for thirty-five years, a woman for twenty-five and several over twenty years. I can trust them and they know they can trust me."

"Trade union organizers admit the difference. When they come along to discuss wage increases I show them the lower output figures. They explain it by the climate or else tell me that Irish workers are more easy-going by nature or temperament. Of course I grumble but, when I'm away from the factory, my workers do their bit just the same as if I were there!"

This attitude is a long way from the Automation idea. It doesn't even fit in with notions of industrial efficiency as we know it. But if I had to work in a factory again—which heaven forbid—I think that working for this Irish manufacturer would give me the best chance of a human life.

R. M. Fox

WHILE OLD SOULS LOOK ON

[Mr. Merton S. Yewdale has contributed to THE ARYAN PATH in previous volumes.—ED.]

When Gandhi died, the world lost a truly great soul. One wonders why he was taken away at a time when the world was so sorely in need of his spiritual guidance. Search the world today and you will not find another man of his soul stature. Many of the religious leaders of the present time are but heads of ecclesiastical organizations, which rest on material foundations and are occupied with vying for supremacy over one another. Gandhi was a heaven-sent world leader of souls. He lived far above the physical plane of material wealth. He lived above the mental plane of dialectics. He lived on bread and prayer—the food for the soul. Would that he could be here to console the millions of people who will be terrified unto death if the madmen of this benighted world should ever drop their terrible new bombs.

There is on this earth a Company of Old Souls who have experienced many, many incarnations. They have lived in different lands and among different peoples. They have seen all forms of government, all forms of religion. They have seen nations at peace and in war, and they know the strengths and weaknesses of mankind. They have seen nations rise and fall. Through the knowledge and wisdom which

they have gained from their many sojourns, they have attained a combined intuitive and rational understanding of life and the universe. They have no fixed home on earth. The universe is their home. But the earth is their deep concern.

What is happening on earth they have seen many times before, and the situation is very clear to them. As they look upon the scene, they see a world threatened with the most disastrous conflict ever known in history. But they observe also that the peoples of the world are tired of the long-drawn-out fighting and parleying. Men in all countries are deserting, and others are evading the drafts. Airmen, sickened with the thought of dropping any more bombs on human beings and animals, refuse to re-enlist. Civilians are impatient for the conflict to end without further bloodshed, and women all over the world are praying that their homes and the lives of their loved ones may be saved from death and destruction. For the first time in history practically the entire world population is opposed to war and is determined that it must cease. It may well be that this stern resolve to have peace will awaken the minds of the ruling powers to the realization that, without the support of the peoples, no more wars are possible. Further-

more, if they themselves continue with their mad plans to murder millions of people and destroy billions of dollars' worth of property, the peoples may one day rise and drive them from their seats of power.

These are the thoughts that come to the company of Old Souls, who already envision the day when Self-Government and Spiritual Neutrality will be the social order of life on earth. Let the united moral opposition of the whole world to war continue without ceasing, and the war will fall to pieces, the darkness of a long, dreadful Night will disappear, and a new Day will break, slowly, silently, hopefully; and all men will rise from their sleep and go out into a new world where there is no sound of guns, no men in uniform and no more war news. Bells all over the world will be ringing, in celebration of the greatest victory ever known—Man's victory over War!

It is the powerful nations with imperialistic ambitions that go to war once too often. All the great nations of the ancient world perished in war many centuries ago: Sumeria, Babylonia, Assyria, Chaldea, Egypt, Persia, Media, Macedonia, Greece and Rome. Only two nations survive to this day: India and China. These two are Old Souls among nations.

Let a nation have only knowledge and material wealth, and it will go to war sooner or later. Let it have wisdom and spiritual riches, and it

will for ever walk in the path of peace.

The Soul of the Universe, the Cosmic Matrix, is the home of souls. From Divinity as Cosmic Matrix, the universe comes forth and to Divinity it returns, in an eternal cycle of unceasing alternation. From Divinity comes also the idea of the One Indivisible, whence comes the idea of the One Divisible; and from the One Divisible comes the idea of Two, from which all things come. The universe is formed on the basis of pairs of complements: such as spirit and matter, day and night, land and water, male and female. The periodic appearance and disappearance of the universe constitutes Eternity.

Just as the body and the mind sleep every twenty-four hours, so does the soul, upon the death of the body, return to the Cosmic Matrix, where it, too, rests in slumber until the appointed time for its next reincarnation on earth. Old Souls know that any meritorious works which remain unfinished in one incarnation will be finished in the next. Thus, because of reincarnation, nothing that is indispensable to the good of mankind can ever be lost.

They are truly spiritual who do not think that their particular belief and practice of religion is alone acceptable to Divinity.

Good and Bad are sometimes only two aspects of Destiny. When its current is running to the advantage

of the individual, he calls it *good*; when to his disadvantage, he calls it *bad*.

Reason and intuition are the offspring of Instinct. Reason is masculine and objective; Intuition is feminine and subjective.

The rational mind, with its persistent consciousness of space, time and causality, sees life as past, present and future. The intuitive mind, with its flashes of illumination, sees life as an eternal present. The rational mind is scientific, and by analysis understands the phenomenal world of the visible. The intuitive mind is psychic, and by synthesis "sees" the noumenal world of the invisible.

Evolution and Involution are the two cosmic manifestations of Energy, which signify the two oppos-

ing polarities of life both on the earth and in the universe.

Persons who are active and centrifugal impress themselves upon life. Those who are passive and centripetal are acted upon by life. The first are the extroverts who give of themselves to life; the second are the introverts who give back in a new form that which they have received from life.

Forgiveness has a twofold merit: it opens the way for the offender to repent and to make amends for his misdeed, and it saves the soul of the offended from being sickened by the lingering memory of the injury.

To the soul, Truth brings a sense of pride; Generosity, a feeling of warmth; the Love of all things, tears of joy.

MERTON S. YEWDALE

FRANKLIN INSTITUTE

A valuable and lasting contribution to the 250th Anniversary Celebration of the birth of Benjamin Franklin is made by the January issue of the *Journal of the Franklin Institute*, a commemoration volume of nearly two hundred pages.

Mr. Henry B. Allen, Executive Vice-President of the Franklin Institute, describes in the Editorial Preface the plan to give, in a language comprehensible to the layman, a panoramic view of progress in the physical and social sciences and in economics in the last 250 years. The distinguished contributors all represent scientific societies or organizations in several countries which either honoured Franklin with membership or were founded by him or in his name.

From the numerous valuable contributions we have space for but a quota-

tion or two relating especially to one of the Celebration's aims, the promoting of better international relations. This should be served, surely, by recalling that Franklin at the age of sixteen, writing as "Silence Dogood" declared himself "a mortal enemy of arbitrary government and unlimited power" and that, near the end of his life he prayed

that not only the love of Liberty but a thorough knowledge of the Rights of Man may pervade all Nations of the Earth so that a Philosopher may set his foot anywhere and say "This is my Country."

Mr. B. Hubert Cooper writes:—

In truth, Benjamin Franklin was a Good Citizen of the World because he believed that all countries and all peoples were part of an even greater Neighbourhood of Mankind. He served his own Government well—but the chief objective of his life was to serve human beings in the hope they might develop a "moral philosophy...that would induce and oblige nations to settle their disputes without first cutting one another's throats."

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

IN A PHILOSOPHER'S HONOUR*

This way of honouring a Professor of Philosophy has much to commend it. It provides an excellent occasion for eminent thinkers from distant countries to review the dominant currents in their own fields of work, take stock of present achievement and forecast future development. It is also appropriate that a volume in Professor A. R. Wadia's honour should contain the fruits of philosophical inquiry in a variety of fields; for it thus puts us in mind of Professor Wadia's own versatility as a philosopher. It may also be taken to reflect Professor Wadia's deeper interests, which seem to have lain in social philosophy and in the philosophy of religion, as is evidenced by his published works, *The Ethics of Feminism, Civilization as a Co-operative Adventure, Religion as a Quest for Values*, etc. Of the twenty-two studies included in this volume at least half are either exegetical studies of particular religious concepts or discussions on general sociological themes involving casual excursions into the theory of education, political ideas or the like. One's first reaction to some of these essays is to say that they would have graced a popular journal better than a book of serious philosophical inquiries such as this; but fortunately the feeble ones are very few and compensated for by some valuable contributions.

Three discussions touch on education: "Academic Freedom for Such a Time as This," by Professor G. P. Conger; "The Role of Education," by Dr. Humayun Kabir; and "Science, Democracy and Education," by Professor R. E. Turner.

Professor Conger's point is not that the principle of academic freedom should be considered inviolable, but, on the other hand, that genuine or unqualified academic freedom is a myth. After all, education can only be an expression of the community; its peculiar social, cultural and moral ethics would imperceptibly restrict the scope of learning and teaching. Professor Conger's final word on this question of the teacher's intellectual freedom and responsibility comes to this:—

The answer is that it is a gentlemen's agreement; it lies in the individual, with or without a co-operating group.... In proportion as a man's training is thorough, his experience is broadening, and his will is sincere, he will live and teach responsibly.

One finds it easy to accept the conclusion without accepting the whole argument, in spite of the candour and fairness with which it is presented. Professor Conger treats freedom and responsibility in too sharp a contrast and with an undue emphasis on the restrictive nature of responsibility. If his emphasis were true, should we not be justified in dismissing this essay itself as nothing more than an expression of the present policies of the government and people of his country?

Dr. Humayun Kabir, in his paper, "The Role of Education," sets out to examine, in philosophical detachment, the dual claims on education: of education for life and of education for a living. His thesis is that at no stage of education is a sharp division between the two really tenable. The higher, though the more intangible, functions, those of helping the child to develop his personality and to search for values,

* *A. R. Wadia: Essays in Philosophy Presented in His Honour*. Edited by S. RADHAKRISHNAN, A. C. EWING, PAUL ARTHUR SCHILPP and OTHERS. (Copies available from N. A. Nikam, 28, III Cross Road, Bangalore 4. 364 pp. 1954.)

should be important at the most elementary as at the final stage. Dr. Kabir seeks to understand the nature of education by first understanding the nature of the human mind and its relation to the world. It is to the credit of his philosophic training that, despite his strenuous duties at the Ministry of Education, he has not lost the habit of getting down to the fundamentals.

In "Science, Democracy and Education," Professor Turner sets out to analyze the "cultural crisis" created by the impact of science on the older forms of social structures based on the great religious traditions—Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim and Christian. The inevitable conflict is rooted in the nature of the new knowledge, *i.e.*, in science itself. Science brings with it its own social correlative, its peculiar pattern of society. It should, therefore, be impossible to accept science and retain the older patterns of society. This basic conflict is not understood by the older communities and attempts are made to accommodate science within the traditional patterns of society. Old values die hard and it would be enthralling to watch the subtle process of the transvaluation of values.

Professor Turner has barely sketched the outlines of the problem—it asks for a book rather than an article—and there is little to which one can take exception. He is a Professor of History and is inclined merely to view the changing ideals and forms of society in the perspective of history with no attempt at judging and evaluating them.

"Varna and Caste," by Professor M. N. Srinivas, deals with an allied question. Professor Srinivas examines the observed facts of Indian caste life in relation to the traditional concept of *varna*. His thesis is that they can hardly be fitted into the *varna* model without distortion. For instance, the mobility and the lack of clarity which are a feature of caste are excluded by the rigidity of the fourfold *varna* scheme, which is strictly a hierarchy. Here

again is an old problem that may have a new significance for the Indian sociologist.

The bulk of the contributions are investigations in themes from Religion and Indian Philosophy, including "Mystical Elements in Islam," by Professor J. C. Archer. They make an imposing array of subjects, but in treatment they are of rather unequal merit. Each author brings to his problem a specialist's scholarship, but the studies are mainly exegetic in character. Training in Western philosophy has been applied, with good effect, to the consideration of a theme in Eastern religious philosophy in essays like "The Concept of Liberation in Indian Philosophy," "Samkhya and the Philosophy of Santayana," "Sunyata and Christian Kenotic Speculations" and "Ahimsa as the Supreme Ethical Principle." But in the others there is a lapse back into the old habit of descriptive presentation without an attempt at analysis and assessment. Professor Haridas Chattopadhyaya, in his essay on the Brahmanical concept of Karma, describes extensively the cardinal beliefs about Karma according to the orthodox systems, but he does not come to grips with the concept itself. Similarly, Swami Nikhilananda gives an exposition of the activist philosophy of the *Bhagavad-Gita*. Arjuna's moral dilemma on the field of battle and Krishna's exhortation are presented with clarity. But there is no attempt here to see whether the different philosophical systems mentioned in the *Gita* are harmonized and rationally integrated or its philosophy, in this respect, is merely eclectic. Similarly, neither of the essays on Jewish and on Muslim mysticism contains a thorough analysis of the concept of mysticism itself and, to that extent, both of them remain rather unsatisfactory.

Three excellent essays by eminent Western philosophers go critically over the ground covered in philosophy during the last half-century. These will be found of the greatest value, particularly to students of philosophy in India.

These are also, if one may discriminate, the best contributions to the volume. "Contemporary British Philosophy," by Professor R. I. Aaron, is a lucid statement of the main currents of British philosophical thought beginning with the time, about 1918, when the Hegelians and the Idealists held the field. Metaphysics had been the chief occupation for long, with Bosanquet, Bradley and, later, Alexander in control. The history of British philosophy since then could be summed up in the phrase "the eclipse of metaphysics." Professor Aaron is inclined to consider this neglect of metaphysics a real deficiency in British thought. The better part of this essay is given to an excellent *résumé* of the arguments advanced during the last half-century in the prolonged discussion about sense-perception—Broad's sensum theory and the phenomenological explanations of the Logical Positivists and the arguments against them—as well as about "thinking," "conceiving" and "concept." Altogether, therefore, this essay becomes an excellent introduction to the problems of modern epistemology.

The only other comparable contribution is a survey, "From Idealism towards Positivism—and Back?" by Professor A. C. Ewing.

This is an even clearer and a much fuller discussion of the course taken by philosophy in its flight from metaphysics. Professor Ewing points out that, under the wide-spread Wittgensteinian influence, "a chill paralysis has crept over almost all British philosophers . . . so that they dare not venture on metaphysical arguments or place real confidence in them if they do." But he makes it clear that we cannot even have critical analytic philosophy without making some concealed metaphysical assumptions. The excellence of Professor Ewing's essay lies in the fact that he does not merely present these conclusions but tussles with the actual problem, gives us the whole argument and the way he arrives at his statements at each step. He shows conclusively that

even the phenomenalist view of physical things leaves the door open for metaphysics. Most effectively, he establishes the validity of metaphysical thought against the onslaught of Positivist philosophy, whether it seeks to exclude metaphysics on the ground of the verification principle or by reducing philosophical disputes to a matter of linguistics. The essay may be said to answer the question, "In what sense can metaphysical terms and propositions be held to be meaningful?"

The upshot of it all is that there is really no justification for the belief that modern British philosophy has somehow refuted metaphysics. It has actually done a negative service to metaphysics by purging it of slipshod thought and language and by forging more effective tools for the philosopher. Professor Ewing ends with the hope that, perhaps, a new blossoming of a more illuminating metaphysics than we have yet known is round the corner. Both Professor Aaron and Professor Ewing regret the present decline of metaphysics and seem to presage a return to it.

The third essay of the same kind is "What Happened in Philosophy between 1900 and 1950?" by Professor E. A. Burt, who concerns himself with four specific developments: trends towards a world orientation in philosophy; the emergence of a philosophical theory of language; Existentialism; and the new developments in Marx-Leninism. Perhaps for reasons of space, Professor Burt has given little more than a brief indication of what is happening in these directions.

Three or four original contributions deal with allied topics. One of these, "The Nature of the Spiritual," by Professor Schilpp, is a long paper whose rhetoric seems to be at least as effective as its argument, if not more. Two others, "The Ontological Dimension of Experience," by Professor T. M. Greene, and "Linguistic Symbols and Legal Norms," by Professor F. S. C. Northrop, are based on extremely interesting original work.

Incidentally, they illustrate two of the most important vogues in Western philosophy today: Existentialism and Semantics. The first is described by the author himself as "a rather relaxed and ambulatory exercise in Existential phenomenology," while the second reflects the renewed interest in the philosophy of language under the Wittgensteinian influence. Finally, there is a short paper, "The Meanings of 'Does God Exist?'" by Professor D. M. Datta, which again is a study in the kind of analysis that

has come into vogue after Wittgenstein.

These twenty-two essays give a fair picture of the chief ingredients of contemporary philosophy, Western or Eastern. The volume is surely an appropriate memorial to Professor A. R. Wadia's work as teacher and philosopher, which has drawn from philosophers all over the world such warm appreciation as seen in this vivid gesture of good will.

V. Y. KANTAK

Trisastisalakapurusacaritra or The Lives of Sixty-three Illustrious Persons. Vol. IV. By HEMACHANDRA; trs. by HELEN M. JOHNSON. (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. CXXV. Oriental Institute, Baroda. xxxi+409 pp. 1954. Rs. 35/-)

This is a voluminous work in Sanskrit verse, written by Acharya Sri Hemachandra at the desire of his pupil, King Kumarapala, between 1160 and 1172 A.D. It consists of ten *parvas* or books and contains the legendary biographies of twenty-four Jaina Tirthankaras, twelve *chakravartins*, nine *Vasudevas*, nine *Baladevas* and nine *Prati-Vasudevas*. It is a great Jaina epic, written in simple Sanskrit, not lacking in beautiful descriptions, love scenes, figures of speech, wise generalizations and proverbial sayings.

The text was published between 1906 and 1913 by the Jaina Dharma Sabha of Bhavanagar. All interested in the study of Jainism owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Johnson for undertaking the gigantic work of translating this volume into English. The first three volumes, containing the translations of the first five books, have appeared in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series between

1931 and 1949.

The present volume, the translation of Books VI and VII, includes the biographies of Mallinatha, the only woman Tirthankara, and of Muni Suvrata, and an elaborate version of the Jaina *Ramayana*, which is very different from Valmiki's famous epic. Dr. Johnson has taken great care in translating the philosophic portions and consulted eminent Jaina teachers for explanation of technical points. The value of the translation is enhanced by the various appendices and indices added at the end of each volume, of which the Appendix on New and Rare Words, and the Indices of Names and Subjects and of Sanskrit and Prakrit Words are regular features of all the volumes published so far. The translator has pointed out numerous corrections in the text and they will be useful when a critical edition of the text is brought out. It is hoped that the Oriental Institute will bring out not only the translation of the remaining three books of the *Trisastisalakapurusacaritra* but also of Hemachandra's *Sthaviravalicarita* or *Parisistaparvan*, which contains a wealth of fairy tales and stories.

N. A. GORE

“A MEMORABLE BOOK”*

We are offered in this book a comparison between two civilizations. Not between East and West, or between a Northern and a Southern form of life, but between an ultra-modern and an old tribal civilization. As both happen to exist side by side in America, and as Mr. Priestley's strong point is that of evaluating modern life, while Jacquetta Hawkes possesses exceptional ability in the understanding of earlier times, they decided to visit both simultaneously and make a joint book. And they have made a memorable book of it. There are one or two hurdles we have to take. It is easy to see what they should have called the book, but we have to put up with the maddening title they have chosen. We are not given the impressions of each in a block; they interrupt each other. Generally we are told who is writing, but sometimes they play a little game with us, and we are not told which the author is unless we hunt up the Contents. The result is that on one occasion I could have sworn for two and a half pages that it was J. B. Priestley writing with his North-country detailed, man-of-the-world touch on modern civilization, when the scene suddenly changed and I found myself in Jacquetta Hawkes's hands—very curious.

J. H. visited the Pueblo Indians in New Mexico. They represent, she says, “the survival, astonishingly little corrupted, of a traditional and tribal society—more or less of the kind that we can assume to have been prevalent throughout the Old World in the early stages of agriculture. It is a stage before the individual has emerged into full independence; he is still merged in the tribal society.” J. B. P. found the urban Texas people representing, to quote J. H. again, “modern man returning to a point where the individual gladly allows himself to be swamped,

where he is happiest living exactly like his fellows and accepting their judgments.” But whereas the cohesion amongst the Indians is organic and their life is merged with Nature, the moderns cohere “not from within by personal knowledge and spreading talk but from without by mass communications,” while they are cut off from the rhythms of Nature. In one of her telling phrases she contrasts “the tribe” with “the crowd” and at once we see the vital difference. It is from J. H. that we get assessments of the significance of their joint report, notably in the very chapter which I imagined started with J. B. P., and these again reveal her outstanding quality of complete honesty in the cause of truth, never finding good only in one camp for the sake of an easy anti-thesis.

Mr. Priestley had better material for writing about, and is thus responsible for more of the book than his colleague. This is how I would vastly prefer to take my Priestley. He is an intellectual humorist, and thus can hit hard and deep. He is a prophet of woe in warning us against the urbanized values of the modern world. The English tradition in this line from Cobbett the farmer, through Carlyle the historian and Ruskin the æsthete and Morris the craftsman to Huxley, Orwell and Lawrence is nobly advanced by this work from the sane, human North-countryman. His prose is clear and swift; he commands the surprising phrase; his descriptive power has never been employed to better advantage; and on one occasion the poet in him is given rein for four pages before being eclipsed by the polemicist. He is out to frighten us (and succeeds) with some new words of his own such as *Admass* and *Hashadmass* and *Nemadmass*, while reminding us of the current word “motel” now used in America instead

* *Journey Down a Rainbow*. By J. B. PRIESTLEY and JACQUETTA HAWKES. (Heinemann-Cresset, Ltd., London. 289 pp. 1955. 18s.)

of hotel in order that the motor cars may not be offended.

The way of life which he depicts in this ultra-modern, urbanized, technical civilization is the most superficial and the *silliest* that has existed in the whole of recorded history. He is concerned, not with all America, but with Americanism *in extremis*, which is spreading. If all America were like this it would not be worth criticizing; but it will be a tragedy if it engulfs the best Americans, who are the most intelligent, the most courteous, the most generous and the most charming people on the face of the earth. What Mr. Priestley says and implies regarding the human peril of the situation is not exaggerated; it is profoundly and terribly true.

One complaint, though. He does not escape the pitfall of the popular publicist—the unconscious determination to please women readers (the box-office). You will find the same in Shaw. Mr. Priestley has a striking passage on how American women take it out on the men because the real women's world has been undermined by the ridiculously unfeminine society which has been created. A striking and true passage—

but shocking. Here are the women, he says, in a bad way, delivered over to "the masculine principle." He equates this urban rubbish with the masculine principle—very pleasing for women readers. Yet he must know that the masculine principle is nothing of the sort. It is the spirit of adventure, of hardship, of art, of idealism, of thought, or spiritual quest—as opposed to the feminine principle of earth and materialism, a lack of genuine thought (few women philosophers in history) and feebleness in art, which is not due to lack of opportunity, for when they have succeeded they have done so, as Havelock Ellis reminded us, exactly as men have done—by overcoming and thriving upon resistance. How could it be otherwise? Women have to produce mankind. Naturally they are interested in homely quarters for mankind, while man is free to be the thinker, the explorer, the saint, the artist, the idealist, the heaven-assaulter leading us upward and on. Men have been egged on by women in creating the machine, gadget, comfortable world of urban Texas; but it has turned out badly for the women, that is all.

JOHN STEWART COLLIS

Come Like Shadows: A Romance in Three Ages. By D. L. MURRAY. (Hodder and Stoughton, London. 413 pp. 1955. 15s.)

Metempsychosis, the theory of the transmigration of souls, is one of the oldest attempts whereby man has sought to assuage that tragic sense of unfulfilment which moved Shakespeare to write of life as "a tale told by an idiot."

It is an unusual and audacious theme upon which to construct a novel, and any writer who attempted the task without a very solid background of philosophy and ancient history, would have but a slender chance of bringing it off.

Mr. D. L. Murray, however, does possess those qualifications. Nobody who was not on terms of complete familiarity with the Dialogues of Plato, and, in particular, the *Phaedrus*, *Meno*, *Phaedo*, *Timaeus* and the *Laws*, could have constructed a story such as this without coming to grief. But let it be said at once that that misfortune has not befallen this author.

On the contrary, here is an imaginative power of a very high order, a capacity to recreate the past so as to transport the reader, in all the comfort of a great airliner, through time and space.

Mr. Murray's hero, Guy Meredith, is a sensitive who experiences far more

than those vague intimations of past lives which come to most of us, now and then, as elfin echoes from the deep recesses of consciousness, or in sleep.

He falls, as it were, out of this life into lives past, and it is the reconstruction of past periods, such as the France of Marie Antoinette and the Rome of the Cæsars, that gives Mr. Murray the enormous canvas and the colours with which to paint his vivid pictures.

It is probably true to say that nearly everybody goes through life in search of the Ideal Mate. Every emotional adventure is part of this hopeful quest.

If it be reasonable to believe that a truth informs Plato's Theory of Recollection, it is never better illustrated

than by that invincible hope which inspires men and women to seek the perfect partner.

It would be unfair to reveal the central love theme of Mr. Murray's fine novel, but in Guy Meredith's relationship with Wanda, we are given the strange and absorbing love story of two souls that, after many lives and many vicissitudes, achieve fusion.

Mr. Murray has written many very clever novels, but none that this reviewer has read of finer quality than *Come Like Shadows*. This novel reaffirms Mr. Murray's place, one already achieved by past work, as one of the most gifted writers using the medium of fiction in our time.

GEORGE GODWIN

Health, Healing and You. By URSULA ROBERTS. (The Aquarian Press, London. 128 pp. 1955. 10s. 6d.)

This book deals with the effect of greed, anger, resentment, fear, etc., on bodily health. The author is a "healer," and, although not a Christian Scientist, an "automatic writer" inspired by Mrs. Eddy. The book is written in an easy popular style and may well give some stimulating pointers to people who have not yet realized the way in which mental-emotional factors strongly affect the body. Corroboration of the fact stated by H. P. Blavatsky in the last century is always useful:—

Half, if not two-thirds of our ailings and

diseases are the fruit of our imagination and fears. Destroy the latter and give another bent to the former, and nature will do the rest.

But as regards the rationale of the healing processes suggested, we are on very dubious ground, and must reject the advice towards passivity given under the name of "curative communion with God," and the encouragement to self-centredness in the examples claimed to be an answer to personal prayer ("the person who caused my troubled feelings was transferred to another country"). We must look elsewhere for a cure; otherwise the "healing" may eventually be as bad as the original ill.

L. MARR

Population and Planned Parenthood in India. By S. CHANDRASEKHAR. Introduction by JULIAN HUXLEY. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 108 pp. 1955. 12s. 6d.)

This is a concise and excellently annotated examination of the growth of India's population, the problems it presents in raising the material well-being of the Indian people, and it is a discussion of the moral and religious considerations involved when it is sought to encourage people to limit the size of their families artificially.

Much of the book, as Professor Chandrasekhar points out, was originally written as the Presidential Address of the first All-India Population and Family Planning Conference in Bombay four years ago. The author is among those who apprehend that, unless the Indian people can be made to accustom themselves more widely to the idea of regulating the size of their families, India (and other underdeveloped countries with a high rate of human fertility) is in danger of coming up against the Malthus theory which predicted that the growth of the world population would outstrip the world's capacity to feed itself. Malthus put forward his ideas long before men could see that a technological revolution would vastly increase the world's productive capacity. In the atomic age, the Western nations have left this danger behind them: it now threatens India and the other underdeveloped countries of the world.

Professor Chandrasekhar, like all advocates of planned parenthood, is primarily concerned with the humanitarian aspect. For a country as poor as India at the present time, he argues, the raising of large families is a luxury that cannot be afforded.

Professor Julian Huxley, who writes an Introduction, takes such a pessimistic view of the improvements that can be effected by the expansion of agricultural and industrial production

so long as there is a steady rise in the birth rate that he urges "an active campaign" for birth control and the establishment of a separate Ministry of Population.

There are three aspects of birth control, however, which its advocates tend to ignore. First, any interference in the mysterious processes and impulses that lead to the perpetuation of the human race inevitably affects the balance of nature. If you succeed by various artificial devices in preventing one million people from being born, you can only do so indiscriminately. You restrict the birth of the good stock with the bad. The one potential genius, artist, statesman or poet has to be condemned with scores of thousands of simple average souls. There is no law that the youngest children in a family are the weakest physically, mentally, culturally or spiritually. The reverse is often the case.

Secondly, as the evidence in Western countries clearly shows, it is among the higher educated and middle classes that birth control makes itself felt first of all. Even in India smaller families are becoming more fashionable among the middle classes than among the "teeming millions" in our villages. Such a trend is bad for the overall interests of the nation.

Thirdly, the growing emphasis on birth control as a reliable means of narrowing the gap between production and consumption is likely to inject an attitude of defeatism into all the positive and constructive measures that are in hand and contemplated to raise the nation's living standards. Those who are engaged at any level in the great projects of economic reconstruction can hardly feel encouraged or inspired in their work if they live in a climate of social opinion which is suffering from a growing depression over the "torrential increase" year by year in the size of the population.

SUNDER KABADI

Man's Search for the Good Life. By SCOTT NEARING. (xii+146 pp. 1954); *Living the Good Life.* By HELEN and SCOTT NEARING. (xii+209 pp. 1954) (Social Science Institute, Harborside, Maine, U.S.A.)

In the closing pages of *Man's Search for the Good Life* Scott Nearing concludes:—

Man seeks the good life and seeks the good in life. With minor exceptions this holds true for the group as it does for the individual. He hopes for better days, aspires toward them, strives for them, believes in the fulfilment of his dream of heaven on earth.

The earlier chapters show this to be the historical outcome of economic, political and sociological upheavals.

Such hopes and aspirations are limited by individual and collective circumstance, experience and understanding. For objectivization, declarations are insufficient; will, competence and opportunity are required. "He who would live sanely must be able to link promise with performance."

This linking of "promise with performance" has been demonstrated by Helen and Scott Nearing in a twenty-year project during which they created a self-subsistent homestead in a mountain valley of Vermont, U.S.A., and which adventure they have delineated in a "plain practical account" in their book, *Living the Good Life*.

The actual living of their good life is explained with an abundance of agricultural and engineering detail in the various chapters of this book. They had had some prior "training in agriculture and forestry, in civil, mechanical and social engineering," which is seen to have been used to good effect in the way they "surveyed the problem at hand, thought about it, discussed it, made plans, assembled the needed materials and tools, and then proceeded to work

out solutions, in terms of the particular situations."

A small family, leading a "simple and austere" life, "working out a way of living and at the same time earning a living," they worked at "bread labour at least four hours a day, plus the short time needed to get . . . simple vegetarian meals." They eschewed "meat, tobacco and alcohol." Yet they attracted and welcomed guests because they were "always glad to see people of their way of thinking and living" and were ready to share, as they write, "whatever we have, do, feel and think."

The successful living of the good life by this family and yet the social failure of their project points to the divergences in human nature and highlights the tendency of present-day humanity to drift along without much effort at bettering their manner of living. People do not know that they could bring their natures under the influence of the universal good always surrounding them and only waiting, as it were, to be taken with courage and held by perseverance.

A perusal of these two books, especially the latter, awakens and inspires the reader to search for the good life. But before one could effectively embody these high ideals in one's own life, a clear and firm grasp of the principles to be followed would be necessary. If this were achieved by even a few individuals or groups, the sociological difficulties of such a project would diminish considerably. To encourage emulation and bring social amelioration seems to be the object of these twin volumes. They are the result of a gathering together and a harmonious blending of a wealth of material from the experience of the authors. Well-authenticated references from up-to-date books are given and authoritative writers cited.

ACHUTHA RAO

Living and Knowing. By E. W. F. TOMLIN. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 285 pp. 1955. 25s.) Received through the courtesy of the British Council, London.

It is being increasingly recognized by philosophers and scientists that the methods of mechanistic scientific explanation are inadequate for understanding life and whatever is higher than life. With the attack of Bergson on the claims of mechanism, philosophers have begun seriously to rethink their concepts. What is the standpoint we are then to take for interpreting the world, of which life, mind and spirit are essential, undeniable and the most important aspects?

This book is a very interesting answer to the question. It is aptly divided into five parts, "Man," "Nature," "Consciousness," "Value" and "The Supernatural," with an Introduction and a Conclusion. The author advocates what he calls the psycho-biological viewpoint. The basic concept, for him, is Life, which is at the same time knowing and living. It is not the mere life which the biologists study, but the Life which is spirit, personality. Machines are to be explained in terms of life, not life in terms of machines (p. 120). Otherwise, we shall have only a philosophy-by-reduction (p. 15). Naturally, such a philosophy will give rise to its opposite, a philosophy-by-compensation, which will affirm belief or faith in something supernatural accepted by courtesy. An age marked by materialism is compensated by irrational spiritualism, which often takes cover under some form of "mysticism" or "spiritism." Such excesses are due to a wrong understanding of life and a wrong approach in philosophy. Tomlin is opposed to materialism; yet he is not prepared to accept any misty form of mysticism. He rightly observes:—

If a thinker is faced with confusion on a plane of comparative unimportance, he tends to call it nonsense. If he is faced with confusion on a higher place,¹ he tends to call it

mysticism. Nor is this impression of confusion and vagueness dispelled by the esoteric vocabulary employed by traditional mystics. (p. 247)

Cheap mysticism is unphilosophical, but there is a higher mysticism which Tomlin accepts (p. 270). Knowledge of Life is not a misty dark night of the soul, but intellectual intuition, which is the same as genuinely metaphysical knowledge.

Tomlin makes a very careful examination of several philosophies, ancient, modern and contemporary, and shows how they have failed in explaining man's life. For they have either tried to interpret life in terms of matter, or separated matter and life and introduced a life principle different from matter. The author has really made a good point.

It is impossible to give an adequate idea of Tomlin's arguments and conclusions, with most of which the reviewer is very much in sympathy. The author stresses the idea of value. By being the centre of actualization, personality "is that which has a direct apperception of values. Strictly speaking, it *is* that apperception" (p. 259). Consciousness is not a pale light hovering over the brain, but is a reality:—

That which is known as life at the organic level and spirit at the super-organic level is merely consciousness becoming increasingly articulate, awake, and enlightened (p. 259).

The "supernatural" is not really removed from the natural; in fact, it is the natural (p. 208). Does not personality become supernatural for any mechanistic explanation?

This is a very valuable contribution to philosophy, preaching the avoidance of the extremes of materialism and irrational mysticism, and is worth a reading by everyone who wants to know how a fresh approach can be made in philosophy to the understanding of the significance of man's life and existence. The author's references to Indian doctrines, though not long, are appreciative.

P. T. RAJU

¹ "Place" must here be a misprint for "plane."—P. T. R.

Cultural Patterns and Technical Change. Edited by MARGARET MEAD. (Tensions and Technology Series. Unesco. Reprinted as a Mentor Book. The New American Library of World Literature, New York. 352 pp. 1955. 50 cents)

This survey is devoted [the editor explains] to the implications of technological change for mental *health*...

[It] will deal with the ways in which changed agricultural or industrial practices, new public-health procedures, new methods of child and maternal health care, and fundamental education, can be introduced so that the culture will be disrupted as little as possible, and so that whatever disruption does occur can either be compensated for, or channelled into constructive developments for the future.

This survey, prepared by a team of experts, was sponsored by the World Federation for Mental Health. It reflects a wise and modest concern for the cultural disruptions that may be caused by the technical changes now radiating from the West. They are being introduced rapidly into many countries from abroad; in the West they were indigenous and gradual. An enormous amount of information, accurate and well documented, is here offered on the various ways in which technical change is met by members of cultures into which it is introduced. Five whole cultures are studied in this light and cross-cultural studies are offered of technical changes in agriculture, nutrition, maternal and child care, public health, industrialization and fundamental education.

On the basis of this, some general principles are offered towards making easier the assimilation of these changes. Great respect is shown to the native values and customs of peoples, and the limits of available psychiatric knowledge (there is little valid data about mental illness outside the Westernized portions of the world) are acknowledged. It is emphasized that the natural insight of the members of the culture and the knowledge of its own social

scientists must be called upon, and will prove of value. Wise, too, is this insistence:—

In all technical change...the individual person is both the recipient of change and the mediator or agent of change. His integrity as a person, his stability as a personality, must be kept ever in focus as the living concern of all purposive change.

Some of the examples, however, suggest that respect for local cultures may be exaggerated (perhaps by recoil from Western overconfidence in the last century) to the point of timidity. In one case, the experts overcame an objection to a co-operative credit society, based upon the Koranic prohibition against charging interest, by finding another text that strongly enjoined mutual help. The book expresses an awareness that this seems too much like manipulation and even sacrilege; it suggests that when the local people undertake to find solutions they will "transform the new knowledge into a new expression of an ancient and beloved revelation." This is not satisfactory; for what are today popularly supposed ancient revelations are liable to contain later mischievous additions, irreconcilable with real welfare. Sooner or later, we have to appeal from existing practices to ultimate human values, and this survey seems to underestimate the capacity of the human soul for carrying out such reforms. While guarding against mental illness due to cultural disruption, it is necessary to educate people into non-attachment towards practices and a deliberate evaluation of them. Where the technical changes proposed conflict with existing custom, not manipulation (even by local people) but a judging of both in the light of more fundamental values is the way. This may mean either rejection of a technical advantage or a social reform; the verdict must be accepted bravely. In either case, it will lead not to a disruption but to a deepening and purifying of cultures, and will do no violence to mental health.

R. P. S.

Kant. By S. KÖRNER. (A Pelican Book. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex. 222 pp. 1955. 2s. 6d.)

It is impossible to appreciate the spirit of modern culture without some understanding of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. But Kant is a difficult writer, and so any attempt to make his thought more accessible to average intelligence must be welcome. Professor S. Körner's is a laudable attempt to bring the massive work of Kant in a small compass.

The interpretations of great works are not always helpful. Kant has suffered much at the hands of commentators, and his whole work was considered only as a theory of knowledge or, at the most, as a system of ethics. It is easily forgotten that Kant is the author of

not only one Critique but three Critiques and of several important little works. Even Bertrand Russell cannot escape the charge of having misrepresented Kant. Only recently the researches of German writers like Max Wundt and Heimsoeth have thrown new light on Kant's metaphysical background. But metaphysics has lost so much of its ancient prestige that Professor Körner does not do justice to Kant's metaphysical tendencies. The transcendent lurks in every domain of Kantian philosophy and gives it a truly religious pathos.

Still, Professor Körner has no doubt written a very readable book and at the end he has given us an interesting account of Kant as a man.

S. VAHIDUDDIN

Aquinas. By F. C. COPLESTON. (A Pelican Book. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex. 263 pp. 1955. 3s. 6d.) Received through the courtesy of the British Council, London.

There was a time when the historians of Philosophy dealt with the thinkers of the Middle Ages very grudgingly. It is now clear that in this period philosophical reflection was very lively and we cannot leave it out of account in our appraisal of the philosophical past. The towering personality of St. Thomas Aquinas, above all, deserves our respect and consideration. His method of treatment may not be to our liking and may appear pedantic. As Heidegger has recently pointed out, it is a great malaise of the present day that we hanker only after interesting things. A perusal of Father Copleston's book shows clearly that this great Doctor of the Church has something to say to the modern man which is of lasting interest.

The teachings of St. Thomas enjoy the official recognition of the Roman

Catholic Church and this fact may work to his disadvantage in modern times. But if we can overcome our prejudices we may learn much from him. The author gives a detailed and lucid exposition of the living thought of Aquinas and takes into account the possible criticisms that may be levelled against it at a time when the pretensions of logical positivism receive the attention they do.

That Aquinas's thought is a great force today we see in the concluding chapter on "Thomism." The works of Grabmann, Gilson and Sertillanges are classical studies and the excellent work of Father D'arcy is perhaps the most comprehensive in English. But this little work by Father Copleston may serve as the best introduction to the thought of one of the greatest thinkers of the Middle Ages for those who have neither the time nor the energy to probe into more extensive studies. The author's Bibliographical Notes give us all that we require for guidance in our future studies.

S. VAHIDUDDIN

Indian Inheritance. Vol. I: Literature, Philosophy and Religion. (Bhavan's Book University. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. 288 pp. 1955. Re. 1/4)

The Foreword explains that this book has a special purpose: to be an inexpensive textbook for use in university courses on Indian culture. One feels that it is comprehensive enough to be read rapidly as an introduction and then used as a guide in mapping out lines of detailed study, but needs more than the planned second volume on History, Culture and Social Development to make it an adequate basis for a university course. We should like to suggest the addition of two volumes of translated selections from Indian classics, both literary and philosophical. The Bhavan's own *Call of the Vedas* is a fair model.

Most of the articles in this book show intimate knowledge; many are authoritative; some communicate a deep feeling. Yet one cannot help wondering if

even the enthusiasm and learning of the contributors would lead to that emotional awareness of and spiritual kinship with Indian culture at which the publishers aim, except for one who has at least some direct acquaintance with the great works which are the monuments of that culture.

At least some of the chapters (*e.g.*, Swami Vivekananda's narratives of the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*) seem to be meant for the inquiring foreigner rather than the Indian student, who has generally absorbed more knowledge of his culture out of the Indian air than they give.

The chapters on "Sanskrit Kavya" and "Tamil Literature" are outstanding. The Section on philosophy lacks a full treatment of Buddhist philosophy, though in another Section Dr. Radha Kumud Mookerjee gives some of the Buddha's main doctrines in writing admirably of him as a religious figure.

R. P. S.

Vanalata. By Y. MAHALINGA SASTRI. Sanskrit. (Sahitya Chandrasala, Tiruvalangadu, Tanjore Dist. 17 pp. 1955. Re. 1/-)

This romantic piece carries us back to the fairyland of Kalidasa. There is the unmistakable stamp of classical tradition in its slender imaginative theme leisurely handled (through five cantos), in soft and delicate measures, to delineate *shringara-rasa* or the sentiment of Love in both its aspects. Both in theme and expression we see the author's imitation of Kalidasa.

It can be rated only as a good imitation, however, and not as an original work. One wonders why the author chose the mould of the *mahakavya* or court-epic in lieu of the lyrical for a work of unmixed lyricism. Considered

as a youthful work (it was written in the author's teens), it certainly deserves praise for its metrical felicity and memorable turns of expression. But by way of a modern contribution to the Sanskrit Muse it has nothing to offer. The theme of demigods as lovers, their separation, due to a curse, the beloved changed into a wild creeper (*vanalata*), the lover's embrace turning her into a damsel again and their eventual reunion is apt to be dismissed by the modern reader as hackneyed. But the poem deserves to be read for its sweet style, and it provides a course of easy reading to beginners in the study of Sanskrit poetry.

The Foreword by Professor M. R. Rajagopalan gives a full summary of the poem in English.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

The Charm of Indo-Islamic Architecture. By JOHN TERRY. (Alec Tiranti, Ltd., London; Taraporevala, Bombay. 40 pp. + 36 pp. Illustrated. 1955. 15s.)

For their dignity and grandeur the more famous examples of Indo-Islamic architecture are unique. The present volume by Mr. John Terry, sometime Head of the Delhi School of Architecture, contains a brief introduction and some sixty illustrations with descriptive notes. Apparently the work is intended for the novice, *i.e.*, one with no knowledge whatsoever of Indian art and architecture.

The book is rather poorly produced. In spite of the use of glazed paper most of the photographs have not come out satisfactorily. The introductory essay may, however, be of help to the uninitiated. It should, nevertheless, be pointed out that there is no attempt

New Concepts of Healing. By A. GRAHAM IKIN. (Hodder and Stoughton, London. 186 pp. 1955. 12s. 6d). Received through the courtesy of the British Council, London.

This book seeks to include some of the more recent insights on the part of psychologists and religious workers, and to relate these to the work of the medical profession.

Unlike many protagonists of divine healing, Miss Ikin does not disregard the contribution of medicine, surgery or psychiatry in the cure of disease. She evaluates justly the role of science in bringing relief to suffering and stresses the necessity for those qualified religiously and psychologically to get some selected medical training to correspond to the selected psychological training for medical men. The connection between ailing bodies, faulty mental processes and lack of effective faith, she holds, has now been firmly established and generally recognized.

Some interesting and fully authenticated cases of healing have been quoted

anywhere to indicate the dimensions of the monuments, nor are any architectural plans or cross-sections given.

The plates are arranged, more or less, in their historical sequence, but there is no coherent system in their selection and presentation. To give one instance, a corner only of Jehangir's tomb is shown, and one wonders why. Why not the entire tomb? Or still better, the views of the interior and of the exterior, as well as of his mausoleum? Does not Sher Shah's tomb at Sasseram deserve inclusion? What about some of the monuments of Gujrat? Perhaps one should not expect too much in a slim book of this kind, or compare its photographs with those of Martin Hürlimann, Odette Bruhl, Richard Lannoy and others.

SUDHIN. N. GHOSE

at length. There are chapters dealing with "Spiritual Healing and the New Physics," "Suffering and Service," "The New Testament and Healing" and "Psychotherapy and Spiritual Direction," which reflect a perception and a maturity which raise the entire level of the book.

To all those whose lives are made desolate by conflict and suffering—a negation of that fullness of joy for which living was intended—the author's contention that "the love and faith of someone who has learned through prayer how to provide a link between a sufferer and the 'life more abundant,' that in their sickness they cannot respond to or appropriate unaided," may save a life, will bring fresh hope and inspiration for living. Every thoughtful and discriminating reader will find himself echoing the Bishop of Lincoln's verdict on this thoughtful work: "I welcome this valuable book whole-heartedly and with a sense of profound gratitude to the writer...."

HILLA C. VAKEEL

The British Co-operative Movement. By JACK BAILEY. (Hutchinson's University Library, London. 180 pp. 1955. 8s. 6d.)

The National Secretary of the Co-operative Party traces here the Co-operative Movement in Britain from its abortive beginnings before 1844 down to the present. In that year the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, with twenty-eight humble members and a share capital of £28, found the formula for successful consumer co-operation: one member, one vote; sales at market rates and for cash; and dividends proportionate to members' purchases. Consumer co-operation is still the dominant type, but in 1953 retail distributive societies numbered 988, with over 11,000,000 members and annual sales of over £764,000,000.

Haphazard growth and overlapping functions partly explain the recent centralization of authority. The super-structure seems adequate if cumbersome, but what of the foundations? Co-operative idealism, which inspired the pioneers' efforts, is today reported

"discussed a little shamefacedly in the presence of 'business realists.'" Mr. Bailey insists that "co-operative business is the material expression of a social faith" and that "if that faith dies, co-operative business loses its social significance."

The warning is timely, and of wide relevance. It is not only to British co-operators that the trading advantages of co-operation appeal more strongly than do co-operative ideals. But there are hopeful signs. One is the Co-operative International, fostering trading and service relationships across national frontiers. Another is the fact that education, so enthusiastically supported by the pioneers, still finds a place in the programme of the Movement, if only as "a grudging salute to tradition and a costly concession to the starry-eyed." For co-operative education offers more than the key to business efficiency. It should keep co-operators in a materialistic age conscious of the ideals of mutual service and self-help, "Each for all and all for each," for which their Movement has traditionally stood.

E. M. HOUGH

The long cultural relations between Italy and England no doubt stood behind Dante Gabriel Rossetti's exotically mystic poetry. And it is interesting that in the September 1955 issue of *The Ryukokudaigaku Ronshu, Journal of Ryukoku University*, Kyoto, Japan, is published in English "The Idealism of Rossetti," by Koyo Naobayashi. In it is traced the idealization of the love motif in Western poetry, chiefly in the early Italian poets, who the author believes were greatly influenced by the spirit of St. Francis of Assisi. He says:—

The spirit of the Franciscans animated the early Italian poets, and through them, Dante Gabriel Rossetti.

The fervent love of woman of the early Italian poets expanded into adoration such as they felt toward the Virgin Mary.

He quotes a number of passages to support this theory, especially from Dante and Guido Guinicelli, and believes that Rossetti "remains within the Franciscan tradition," and that with him "the more pure earthly love is united insolubly with the more tender mystical love." Koyo Naobayashi also connects Rossetti as a painter with this theme of the early Italian tradition.

The Ryukoku University is doing research in Western culture and on the Pure Realm Teaching in China which is founded on principles of Mahayana Buddhism. The articles which follow are in Japanese. It is good that at least a part of their studies are made available to the international world of scholarship through this one interesting article in the international language.

THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF CULTURE

[The 350th Anniversary since the publication of *Don Quixote* was celebrated at the Institute on December 31st, 1955. A paper had been specially prepared at the Institute's request by its good friend **Professor Julian Marias**, internationally known educator and co-founder with the late Don Ortega y Gasset of the Institute de Humanidades, Madrid. This interesting critique presents a thought-provoking point of view, and is the result of a long and discerning study of the fascinating book.—ED.]

DON QUIXOTE AS SEEN BY SANCHO PANZA

The Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, wishes to commemorate a long-past insignificant happening: the publication in Madrid, 350 years ago, of an entertaining book, of a novel entitled *Don Quixote de la Mancha*. In 1605 the first part of this book appeared, written by a man then approaching old age, a man who had been a hero in the great naval battle at Lepanto, and an even nobler hero during five years of captivity in Algiers; a man who had later roamed the paths of Spain in the companionship of misfortune and poverty.

This man was Miguel de Cervantes, (1547-1616) who described himself as "one more learned in misery than in poetry."

In his book, Spain is not *described*, the Spain of the sixteenth century; it is a book that is made of Spain, and for this reason Spain lives in *Don Quixote*, miraculously conserved and transfigured. In its pages lies the experience of many years, the life of Cervantes. That is why this book has been called the *key* to Spain by a Spaniard, who died only recently and who, if I am not mistaken, was the greatest man of letters that Spain has produced since Cervantes: the philosopher, Don José Ortega y Gasset.

So many things have been said of *Don Quixote* and of its author that it is difficult to add one more. How shall I fulfil the desire of my far-away friends of the Indian Institute of Culture, who have asked for a few words about Cervantes on this anniversary of *Don Quixote*?

I shall choose the most humble point of view: that of the humble shield-bearer, Sancho Panza, who for 350 years has rather trotted than galloped through the imagination of many, mounted on his donkey to whom he addressed so many sweet words. I choose Sancho's point of view because the life of Sancho becomes one with that of his master and lord, Don Quixote.

Another eminent Spaniard, Miguel de Unamuno, gave as title to a book on *Don Quixote: The Life of Don Quixote and that of Sancho*, but, having thought a little more, he corrected his notes and left as the final title: *The Life of Don Quixote and Sancho*; thus to indicate that he wrote of one life, the life of Don Quixote *and* Sancho, or, what is the same, the life of Sancho *and* Don Quixote. How then does one see the tall, thin Knight of the Sad Countenance if one looks up at him from below, with the eyes of his faithful shield-bearer, as he straddles the ribs of his nag?

Some years ago, and the credit goes principally to Unamuno though not to him alone, the habitual image of Sancho as an "opposite" to Don Quixote, as a symbol or incarnation of the "realistic" as opposed to the "idealistic," the "material" as opposed to the "spiritual," "generosity" as opposed to "egoism," was discredited and rectified. Sancho's participation in *Don Quixote* was understood: the "quixotization" of Sancho, with not a little "sanchofication" of the Knight of the Sad Countenance. More than forty years ago, Ortega y Gasset advised those who counselled us to be Quixotes *or* Sanchos that Cer-

vantes had written to disprove such an opposition, and that if we had not realized this then Cervantes had written in vain. Don Quixote is not the protagonist of *Don Quixote*: the protagonist is the pair, it is Don Quixote and Sancho, a dual protagonist, an essentially counterbalanced friendship and, therefore, a dynamic one. Don Quixote and Sancho are not, it is true, as two friends usually are, on an identical footing, on the same human level; between them there is what we could call a "difference in potential." Because of this an electric current passes from one to the other and at times, when they are separated a little, a violent and invigorating spark.

But one must remember something more. Don Quixote is crazy, "*un loco*"; and one must take this seriously. In order to realize his impossible pretension of being a wandering knight, he must exercise violence over the world, transform and interpret life in his own way to make his vocation possible.

I have once said that the adventures of Don Quixote are not real; that does not mean to say that they do not happen, that they are mere dreams or hallucinations. But the adventures and their lamentable consequences (which were certainly most "real" as Don Quixote discovered in a most violent and bruising way) were always *something other* than that which Don Quixote believed them to be. They are affected by a coefficient of unreality, which Don Quixote finally, melancholically, must accept. He renounces the outcome, the "realization" of the adventure and remains with the vigour, the force, that is his: "*Bien podrán los encantadores quitarme la ventura, pero el esfurzo y el ánimo será imposible*": ("the sorcerers well may rob me of good luck, but of my vigour and enthusiasm—impossible!") In other words, Don Quixote superimposes on that world which we call "reality," his own personal world, in which inns are castles; windmills are giants; flocks and herds are armies; basins are helmets. From this comes his

constant collision with the world of "reality" of others, and, above all else, his collisions with the people themselves. It is here that Sancho intervenes. It is not mere chance that Sancho accompanies Don Quixote only *after* his first sally. The knight begins to be confronted by an alien world immediately; his escapades are condemned to failure from the first moment, for the impact with "reality" is too violent and brusque. So, of course, a rather battered Don Quixote returns to his little village having scarcely left it, and not even having gotten farther than the immediate surroundings of his home.

When Sancho becomes part of Don Quixote's world things begin to change. Sancho is "sane"; he sees the world as everyone else does: the friars are to him friars, the windmills are windmills, Maritornes is a servant in an inn. But, nevertheless, while the circumstances of Don Quixote (meaning the world surrounding him, his environment) are completely different from those of the priest, the barber, the innkeeper or the dukes, it is not so with Sancho. Yes, Don Quixote and his shield-bearer are in completely different circumstances, because one is insane and the other sane, yet they are *communicant*, that is to say, they live together, not only exist together in the same physical environment. Sancho, in his saneness, disqualifies and invalidates Don Quixote's perspective, but at the same time he begins to know and understand it, he sees it from within, he is associated with it, and his rejection of it comes *after* his comprehension.

At the risk of being somewhat pedantic, I should say that Sancho participates in the "assumption," in the animus in which Don Quixote lives, even though later his point of view becomes the opposite. I mean that when Don Quixote adheres and affirms, Sancho, using his good common sense, negates. Don Quixote's world is alive to him, exists for him, and he enters it provisionally, although at the climatic moment he hastily leaps back to the

everyday world. In one sense, then, Don Quixote and Sancho have the same world, in which two ideas of reality are combined and, therefore, their lives have a reciprocal sense. Within *Don Quixote* a new perspective is introduced, that of Sancho, a perspective which varies from time to time and that makes possible Don Quixote's travels through Mancha, the Sierra Morena, to Aragon and Barcelona.

How is this possible? How can Sancho live in two worlds, that of his master and that of others? Sancho penetrates Don Quixote's fantastic, demon-filled world in the following way: Sancho sees Don Quixote *as* Don Quixote. When in Part I, Chapter 5, he first sallies forth, a neighbour, a labourer, who tries charitably to help Don Quixote and protests vigorously at his absurdities, says:—

Look here, my dear sir, God forgive me, but I am not Don Rodrigo de Narvaez, nor the Marguess de Mantua. I am Pedro Alonso, your neighbour; nor are you, dear sir, Valdovinos, nor Abindarraez; you are but the honourable hidalgo, Señor Quixano.

To which Don Quixote magnificently answers:—

I know who I am, and I know that I can be not only those I have said, but also the twelve Pares of France and even all the famed nine; my feats will excel all that they accomplished together and each of their separate deeds.

This pretension of Don Quixote has no echo, nor is it shared with anyone; it is understood only as insanity and delirium, because Don Quixote is alone, and is as yet without Sancho, his shield-bearer. After the second sallying forth, things are different. Sancho is not shield-bearer to Señor Quixano—the Quixanos have never had shield-bearers—but to Don Quixote de la Mancha. "I know who I am," Don Quixote has said, and now he could have added: "And Sancho believes it and can attest it."

Sancho Panza does not accept a quixotic interpretation of every element of reality; therefore, he is a part of the world of common sense. Yet, Sancho

does accept Don Quixote's pretension, and with this, the world of knighthood, the possibility of adventure, the probability of obtaining his island; and he accepts his own impersonation of shield-bearer.

In an article of 1915, Unamuno wrote:—

Don Quixote *pretended* insanity. This does not mean that he was not insane. His heroic insanity, his sublime insanity, consisted in playing the fool in the eyes of the world, in taking the world not for what it is but for what he believes it to be.

In this lies their difference, and their similarity at the same time—Sancho wants the world to be as his master imagines it: a world in which there are triumphs, battles, princesses, dukes and duchies and islands to govern, but he does not believe it to be so; he dares not alienate himself from reality and abandon himself entirely to such an interpretation. He only believes, in his own way, in Don Quixote; and this belief exists because of his love for Don Quixote, because of his personal trust in Don Quixote's kindness, honesty and devotion to his vocation. He is sure that the world is not as Don Quixote believes, but Don Quixote is what he is, a wandering knight, because "every man forms his own destiny" and "I have created mine."

To elevate "quixotism" or "quixotization" authentically and to its final consequences, Alonso Quixano (or Quijada) acquires a new reality that the outside world does not see, and Sancho does. Sancho behaves himself perfectly when with his master, but he aspires at the same time to be part of the everyday world around him, of the world that had been his only world until Don Quixote enticed him away from it and persuaded him to be his shield-bearer. And herein supervenes impossibility, the nucleus of the theme of *Don Quixote*.

Perhaps no other example illustrates more clearly the meaning of the thesis of Ortega y Gasset: "I am myself, and my circumstances." The "I" of Don

Quixote includes his circumstances, his world of unreality and insanity, in which knighthood is possible. On accepting Don Quixote, Sancho must receive with him those circumstances into which he resists entrance. Those who refuse to accept the quixotesque circumstances completely lose Don Quixote, remain strangers to him and do not understand *who* he is. Some, as the priest, the barber and Sanson Carrasco, who live in the world of Mancha, try even forcefully to make Don Quixote awaken from his delusions but they lose him.

The end of Part I is symbolic: Don Quixote is imprisoned in a cage and carried to his village. On opening the cage, only Alonso Quixano is found within; Don Quixote has disappeared; robbed of his circumstances, he has died, as a fish out of water. The others, the dukes, and in general all of the characters of Part II, have heard of Don Quixote; he is famous and they believe they know who he is, an insane man, a crazy fool, "*un loco*." As this means "nobody," they accept the fiction of the quixotesque circumstances as nothing more than fiction, and Don Quixote once again evaporates.

Those who meet him, know him; then they play jokes on him and make fun of him, which he never even suspects. Why? Purely because the world of adventure was never fiction to Don Quixote but exactly the opposite. On interpreting it as a joke, the others ruin and empty it, and leave Don Quixote in a vacuum, a hollow, as only the brunt of their games and jokes. This is why Part II of *Don Quixote* is filled with such deep melancholy, for although the hero is treated better and receives fewer blows, insults and abuses, he is not taken seriously; those whom he meets believe they know how to treat this fool and they are not even irritated nor do they beat him.

In Part I, other men took the ungainly rider for a real man, and reacted to what he said accordingly; the realiza-

tion of his insanity came to them later as an explanation and pacification. In Part II, all have pre-formed ideas; Don Quixote is an amusing fool, no one should take him seriously. Only the intemperate clergyman in the ducal palace treats him as did those in Part I. Then wonderful sparks of effective reality leap from Don Quixote, as if he were a flint. Still, to the others he is but an inoffensive idiot, only good for being laughed at, joked with, a toy to interrupt their idleness, or, as in Barcelona, a clown to liven their dull social life. There could be nothing so profoundly sad.

In Sancho, at the same time, a comparable transformation takes place, as is to be expected. As it is Sancho's lot to live within two sets of circumstances, the quixotesque and that of the everyday world, on changing worlds, Sancho also changes. While Don Quixote grows more and more idealistic, Sancho becomes more deeply quixotesque, his participation in the world of fancy becomes more complete and irrevocable. Yet he is constantly feeling the strain of temptation; the vainglory of being a famous man or a "literary figure" (for that reason he returns to authenticity as governor of the island, as he stumbles against "reality" and must accept the consequences of such a personage as a governor); certain impulses of rebellion towards his master; the conviction that he can "play" with him (the disenchantment of Dulcinea); the unconfessed contagion of the common vision of Don Quixote as a laughable type. As Don Quixote becomes, later, problematic even in his own eyes, the same happens to Sancho. Don Quixote in Part II, Chapter 58, says of the saints he sees on the altarpiece:—

They won heaven with the strength of their arms, for one must suffer to gain heaven, and I even now do not know what I have won with the strength of my deeds.

Sancho feels disturbed, estranged. It seems to Sancho that until then he has never known his master. At the same time it is as if he had never

known himself; and this to such an extent that when Don Quixote, close to death, recovers consciousness for a moment and disclaims his world of adventure and knighthood, Sancho cannot. It is he who now knows *who* Don Quixote is, because only with the

existence of Don Quixote can Sancho exist as what he is. Don Quixote must be the knight, for if he is not how can Sancho Panza be one who undoubtedly exists, the shield-bearer?

JULIAN MARIAS

A GERMAN CULTURAL WEEK

A German Cultural Week which evoked wide interest was held at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavan-gudi, Bangalore. The Consul-General for West Germany at Bombay, Herr W. von Pochhammer, inaugurated the week on March 1st at a meeting under the chairmanship of Shri B. P. Wadia. Cabled felicitations were read from Herr von Truetzschler, the Head of the Cultural Division of the Foreign Office at Bonn, the East Asia Association of Germany, Hamburg, and the Indian Institute, Munich, and messages from the Deutsch-Indische Studiengesellschaft, Stuttgart, and from Dr. F. Otto Schrader of Kiel.

The distinguished guests from Germany included, besides Herr and Frau von Pochhammer, members of the German Consular Service in Bombay and Madras, Baroness Bekker von Rath (whose exhibition of colour reproductions of German masterpieces and original modern paintings was much appreciated), and Baroness von Redwitz, who actively participated in the arrangements.

In his Inaugural Address Herr von Pochhammer introduced the different aspects of German culture with its keynote of synthesis and reconciliation. Centrally situated in Europe, Germany had been a bridge between Eastern and Western Europe.

In philosophy Nicolaus Cusanos had interpreted the universe in terms of the meeting of opposing truths and Hegel's dialectic proceeded from thesis and anti-thesis to synthesis.

Christian elements had been incor-

porated in the old German epics which long antedated mediæval folk poetry and the hymns of the Reformation. The widely influential Classic German literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries combined humanism and rationalism, classicism in form and recognition of individual worth, passion and moral idealism. Modern German literature reflected the literary tendencies of all Europe.

German art always inclined more to expressionism than to the formal classical ideal. It had reached excellence in portraiture and in landscape painting, both stemming from the religious painting in which European, like Indian, art began. Germany had many great musicians, from Bach to Hindemith and in music, as in philosophy, had already overcome the break made in her cultural development by World War II. Germans' interest in India dated back to the earliest German Indologists.

Another objective and illuminating lecture by Herr von Pochhammer was on "Some Aspects of German History." In another lecture Dr. W. Stache of the Maharaja's College, Mysore, dealt with "Philosophy and Science in Germany." An intimate glimpse of home and family life in Germany was given by Professor E. Weingärtner of the Indian Institute of Science, in his lecture on "Some General Aspects of German Life." Recorded music by German composers was a feature of each meeting and the audiences enjoyed selections from Mozart, Wagner and Haydn, and, appropriate to the lecture of Professor Weingärtner, a charming folk song.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“—————ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS

A Special Meeting was held at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, under the chairmanship of Shri B. P. Wadia, to honour the memory of India's great poet and worker for the country's freedom, Shrimati Sarojini Naidu. Professor K. Anantharamiah, the first speaker, dealt with her poetry, which had appealed to distinguished Western critics, as well as to her countrymen, in spite of the handicap imposed on her by the foreign medium. Professor Anantharamiah described her as a sensitive artist achieving in some of her poems a largeness of vision and a charmed utterance. He analyzed some of her poems, such as the symbolical "Indian Weavers," one of several poems immortalizing followers of humble occupations, and read a charming "Cradle-Song"; "Awake!" a moving appeal to the Mother Country which she served so nobly and lived to see attain freedom; and a beautiful devotional poem, "To a Buddha Seated on a Lotus." He considered the series "The Sanctuary" her highest poetic flight, achieving beauty and charm as well as profundity.

Dr. D. Gurumurthi dealt with other aspects of Sarojini Devi's vivid and vibrant personality: her genius for friendship and as a reconciler between Hindus and Muslims and others differing in point of view, and her scintillating wit. She had always been a remarkable orator. She had calmed riots by going fearlessly into the thick of them and quieting the people. Her personality attested the vitality of the Indian civilization. She had combined all the charm and beauty of womanhood with great courage and ability.

An interesting Seminar on "Fear, Anger and Jealousy," held at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, from February 18th to 21st, was planned with the help of Dr. M. V. Govindaswamy, Director of the All-India Institute of Mental Health.

In his opening lecture under Shri B. P. Wadia's chairmanship, Dr. Govindaswamy described the modern scientific studies of these three emotions, which had been charged with every behaviour disorder in the individual and also blamed for mass disturbances. He brought out also the serious consequences which chronic emotional stresses might have upon bodily health and not only upon mental health.

In the second meeting, presided over by Dr. M. V. Gopaldaswami, four staff members of the All-India Institute of Mental Health presented interesting papers. Shri D. Varadachari discussed the three emotions in general and showed that most fears of children and adults were acquired. Shri S. Narayan Murthy presented clinical case studies of abnormal children, indicating causes and remedies. Dr. D. Sen described psychological manifestations of fear and anger in mental patients and Shri S. K. Ramachandra Rao presented in a thoughtful paper the Buddhist teachings on these emotions and their control.

Dr. M. V. Govindaswamy presided at the third session, at which Professors C. V. Srinivasa Murthy and Shivram Shastri of the Maharaja's College, Mysore, dealt, respectively, with the importance of these emotions in sociology and their depiction in Sanskrit literature. Professor A. N. Moorthy

Rao, Director of Literary and Cultural Development in Mysore State, gave a brilliant analysis of certain of Shakespeare's depictions of these emotions: Macbeth's basic fear of the power of evil which he courted and to which he sold himself; the rages of King Lear; and the jealous frenzy of Othello, tortured most by the contrast between the purity of the Desdemona he loved and the lapse from it which he was tricked into accepting. Iago, displaying the related emotion of envy, seemed to have something wrong at the core.

At the closing meeting Dr. M. V. Gopaldaswami dealt with the causes of many undesirable attitudes and emotions in misguided parental treatment, over-solicitous, over-protective or harsh, emphasizing that prevention was better than cure. These emotions were passed to the next generation not by biological but by social heredity. Detachment was recommended for their control and even for minimizing pain. The sense of unity, "belongingness," was a safeguard against jealousy. Dr. Govindaswami in his lecture drew very interesting examples of these emotions from Sophocles and Æschylus, as well as from Indian mythology. Shri B. P. Wadia, in closing the Seminar, appreciated its value to the hundreds who had crowded all the sessions. Useful suggestions had been given for the control of these emotions. With much thinking on the great virtues, rooted in dispassion, the vices would fall away. Perhaps the next Seminar could be on the virtues, man's latent powers that could make him more than man. The strength that came from knowledge, service, sacrifice and real humility was the need today.

Addressing the Bangalore Rotary Club on February 27th, Major-General

S. L. Bhatia, F.R.S., I.M.S. (Retd.), recalled Wells's gloomy warnings of *The Fate of Homo Sapiens*. Wells had not overemphasized the dangers, but General Bhatia did not share Wells's pessimism. A very different civilization was, however, the only alternative to no civilization at all.

He deplored the cleavage between science and the humanities, which had brought the student into contact with the Master Minds of the past. Nations as well as individuals derived their noblest inspiration from the remembrance of their glorious past. The importance of intercommunication between science and the humanities could hardly be overestimated. Interestingly, General Bhatia drew upon Plato for the formulation of the "new" philosophy which science had to recognize for its salvation:—

Now when all the studies reach the point of intercommunication and connection with one another and come to be considered in their mutual affinities, then, I think, and not till then, will the pursuit of them have a value.

But the true State was within us, of which each was the founder. Good will had to prevail between nations as between individuals. The conscience of the individual, in which the highest ethical and moral principles were enshrined, should become the conscience of humanity. On the co-ordinated development of the mastery of the physical world and of ethical values depended the welfare, safety and progress of humanity.

The only alternative to the fate which threatened mankind was, he said, "education in the fundamental scientific as well as moral principles, which proclaim mutual love, faith and charity amongst all members of the human race." This was the new and widening horizon in science, which was dimly visible.
