ॐ

Unveil, O Thou who givest sustenance to the world, that face of the true Sun, which is now hidden by a vase of golden light ! so that we may see the truth and know our whole duty.

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. III AUGUST 1932 No. 8

WAR AND PEACE

During this month of August India will celebrate Krishna-Jayanti, the Natal Day of Shri Krishna, the loved child, who stole the heart of elders, the adored youth who taught how to play the game of life, the sage counsellor who incessantly laboured for peace, and when necessity compelled led his disciples to the gory field of battle because it was the field of duty. In whatever phase of his incarnation we meet him, we encounter a teacher, a guide, a friend. Ever an inspirer, his deeds are living examples even to-day and his words vibrant with power can be heard in our twentieth century. On his flute he goes on playing the Melody of Life—and "plays, and plays, and plays".

Generally Krishna's philosophy is regarded as martial. This is because the *Gita*, the best known and deservedly popular embodiment of his teachings, is not generally read as a part of the *Mahabharata*. It is read and studied as a piece apart, severed from its context. It is true that the whole of the *Mahabharata* is not of equal and uniform value; it may be true that in course of ages interpolations occurred; but the reader of the *Gita* misses the depth of its message if he does not familiarize himself with the words and deeds of Shri Krishna in other parts of the great epic. The events which precede the war bring out the less known aspect of the life of Krishna, showing that he loved peace more than war, which was forced upon him and his party. Human persuasion, philosophical disquisition, spiritual appeal, were fully used; grave warning was given repeatedly; and only as a last resort, only as a means of upholding

righteousness, justice and truth, did he consent to take the field; and even then, charged with peace and with the power of preserving and sustaining all, he acted as the charioteer, as a guide to his friend and devotee whose duty to war was forced upon him.

Both in its historical and psychological settings, the *Mahabharata* and the *Gita* bring the lesson of peace in preference to war, and war only as a dire necessity for the sake of righteousness and peace. It is a great temptation to analyse and study the political significance of Krishna's diplomatic mission at the court of the blind king Dhritarashtra to disarm his uncontrollable and lusty-minded son, Duryodhana, and to contrast it with the recent attempts at "disarmament," but we must refrain, and turn to the consideration of the more important psychological aspect. If the divine statesman and diplomat, the eloquent and righteous Krishna, did not succeed in bringing Duryodhana to sense and peace, it is not to be expected that MacDonalds and Mussolinis, Hoovers and Herriots, will. No, we must go to the root cause—human passion and anger and greed (kāma, krodha, lobha) which are "the gates of hell".

All evolution proceeds from within outwardly; the phenomenon of war in the visible world is but a materialization of the psychological and invisible war between the impulse and the idea, between the blood and the brain, in the heart of man. In the constitution of every man the mean and the selfish elements are present. Lust and love, anger and mercy, avarice and charity fight in each one of us. The Eternal War is between our past and our future, between our fate and free-will, between our instincts and aspirations. That war can be and has to be ended. Then only is ours the experience of the Immortals —the Living in the Eternal Now.

The way to lasting peace begins with a perception. The woe of the world is rooted in human soil. The sap which helps its growth is the personal self of man.

Krishna, the Man of Peace, has taught that neither torture of the body, nor the eradication of the force of desire will precipitate lasting peace. Such antics may blind us to the existence of war and all other evils which permeate our very being. Recognize their existence, accord them their due place in the scheme of things, use them instead of being used by them—this is the striking message of Krishna.

Evil begins its life in the human kingdom. The force which manifests as the force of evil in men cannot be destroyed; it can only be transformed. Spiritual exercises are not for the extermination of the lower nature but for transforming it. This world will not improve if men quit it; this earth which every day is revealing

new hells built by the hands of passion and greed, will begin to unveil the beauties of heaven when men construct with compassion and understanding. To raise the self by the Self—that is the real way to world-peace. Given a certain number of men and women in each community and country who have overcome their own spirit of greed and competition, and the peace of that community and country is assured. Krishna teaches this peculiar form of other-worldliness, which is not a loathing but a loving of this world. This is the basic idea of Raja Yoga, the Royal Road to the Kingdom of Peace.

And now we will let the reader ponder over and apply the lesson of the following extracts from Bhagavat Yana Parva (belonging to Udyoga Parva of the *Mahabharata*) to his own problem, to that of his country, and to that of the world at large :—

Krishna to Duryodhana:

Great is the advantage in Peace to both sides. Peace, however, does not recommend itself to thee ! To what else can it be due but to thy loss of understanding ? If one's understanding is confounded one can never turn his attention to what is beneficial. One that hath his soul under control never disregardeth any body in the three worlds—no, not even the commonest creature.

Duryodhana to Krishna :

Thou doest always censure me. Indeed thyself and all reproach me alone and not any other. I, however, do not find the least fault in myself. I do not even after reflection behold any grave fault in me, or even any fault however minute.

Krishna to Duryodhana :

The disposition that thou art repeatedly manifesting is of the perverse kind. Persistence in such behaviour is sinful. Do not yield thyself to the influence of wrath ! The exertions of the wise are always associated with Virtue, Profit, and Desire. If indeed all these three cannot be attained, men follow at least virtue and profit. If these three are pursued separately, it is seen that they who have their hearts under control choose virtue ; they who are neither good nor bad, but occupy a middle station, choose profit which is always the subject of dispute ; while they that are fools choose the gratification of desire ! The fool who from temptation giveth up virtue and pursueth profit and desire by unrighteous means is soon destroyed by his senses. He who seeketh profit and desire should yet practise virtue at the outset, for neither profit nor desire is really dissociated from virtue. He who seeketh all three, may, by the aid of virtue alone, grow like fire when brought into contact with a heap of dry grass. He who behaveth falsely towards those that live and conduct themselves righteously, certainly cutteth down his own self like the forest with an axe.

Krishna to Dhritarashtra and his Court :

Listen to me, ye sinless ones ! The words I will speak will soon lead to beneficial results, if indeed ye accept what I say in consequence of its recommending itself to you. Forcibly seize and bind this wicked king in the enjoyment of sovereignty ; the time hath come for doing this. For the sake of a family, an individual may be sacrificed. For the sake of a village, a family may be sacrificed. For the sake of a province, a village may be sacrificed. And lastly, for the sake of one's Self, the whole earth may be sacrificed. Bind Duryodhana fast, make peace with the Pandavas. Let not the whole Kshatriya race be slaughtered on thy account.

LOCKE'S MESSAGE FOR TO-DAY

[**Dorothy Turner, M. A., B. Sc., Ph. D. (London)**, formerly a Research Assistant at University College, London, is now a lecturer at the Komensky University of Bratislava (Czechoslovakia). She is the author of several works on the History of Science and the History of Science Teaching. Her article comprises her thoughts on the Tercentenary of the birth of the English philosopher. We might well quote his last words ere he died on the 26th October 1704 : " In perfect charity with all men, and in sincere communion with the whole church of Christ, by whatever names Christ's followers call themselves."—EDS.]

John Locke, the most important figure in English philosophy, was born on August 29th, 1632. This was the year which saw the publication of Galileo's *Dialogues* and much of the active preparation of Descartes. Locke's life thus began when the profoundest changes were working like leaven in the thoughts of men. His mature years witnessed the triumphs of these changes and their influence we find in his philosophy. His life, indeed, spans the period when science first obtained a footing in the lives of men. Since that time it has spread into every corner of civilized life. It was Locke who caught the new ideas and through him they found a place in political thought and have been handed down to our own time. Thus his teachings have a special interest for us as we celebrate the Tercentenary of his birth.

Locke was the philosopher of the English Revolution of 1688. His theory of government justified the revolution in the eyes of the world and his practical wisdom helped England to adjust her government to the new conditions and to stabilize her constitution. Locke's political ideas were the driving force in America nearly a hundred years later when she threw off the English yoke. His teachings, working their way through other minds, helped to bring about the collapse of the outworn medieval system in France which, with its battle cry of Liberty, proclaimed the world-gospel of the rights of men.

Locke's philosophy spread still more when the prestige of England rose after the defeat of Napoleon and her wealth increased after the Industrial Revolution. His principles of freedom, toleration and the sacredness of private property became cherished ideals of nineteenth century thought and dominated the whole social life of western Europe. We, too, have inherited them. But now they are being threatened with destruction on one hand and critically challenged on the other, so that we may well ask how these ideals took their origin and what message their prophet has for us to-day.

The starting point of Locke's thinking is to be found in his early interest in the problems of contemporary science. He used to

try chemical experiments himself and discuss them with Robert Boyle who was his friend for many years. Locke also studied medicine and was an occasional practitioner. He was in close friendship with the great physician Thomas Sydenham and used to accompany him on visits to his patients. In later life, Locke was privileged by intercourse with Newton and other Fellows of the Royal Society. The close contact with scientific thought is evident throughout all his writings.

In the middle period of his life Locke was brought into the vortex of political affairs. He was for many years in the household of the famous Earl of Shaftesbury to whom he acted as secretary, family physician and educational adviser. Through him, Locke met prominent Whigs and learnt much of the details of government service and the trend of political thought. After the fall of Shaftesbury, Locke spent some years on the Continent where he met men of science and of letters, many of them political refugees. During these years his ideas on the basis of society and on the art of government were taking shape and his opinions becoming known. Meanwhile, in England, events were moving fast, culminating in the Revolution of 1688. Thereafter Locke had nothing to fear. The following year, therefore, he returned to England and found welcome and fame awaiting him.

Until his return, Locke had published only minor works. He was now in his fifty-seventh year, rich with the experience of many years of thought and with freedom to make his opinions known. One book therefore followed another in quick succession. His *Letters on Toleration* appeared in 1689, a work pleading for religious liberty. In February 1690 appeared his *Two Treatises on Government* and a month later, his great *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, a work long expected and upon which he had laboured at intervals for nearly twenty years. In the years that followed there appeared several studies on practical problems such as the effect of the lowering of interest on the value of money and on the coinage. A few years before his death in 1704 appeared his treatise on education and studies dealing mainly with religious toleration.

Like the men of science of his day, Locke began by making a clean sweep of old notions and built up his principles from the whole range of particular instances coming within his experience. Though he occasionally poked fun at those who were always busy with telescopes and quadrants, yet his whole thought was based on the enquiring, experimenting and analysing methods of the man of science. In his theory of knowledge, Locke rejected the old notion of *innate ideas*. It had always been so convenient for philosophers to call a principle innate when it defied explanation according to their schemes. But Locke would

have none of this and declared that all our ideas are the result of experience, being based upon reflection and sensation. In working out the growth of ideas, Locke distinguished between what the mind perceives and what is due to the mind itself, in other words between primary and secondary qualities. The distinction which goes back to Democritus, had been set forth clearly by Galileo to whom Locke was directly indebted. The primary qualities of a body were explained by Locke as its boundaries, shape, size, hardness and so forth, its secondary qualities as its colour, taste, smell and our sensations of heat and cold. Thus in a universe in which there were no ears, tongues, noses or other sense organs, the primary qualities would yet remain and we could argue about shape, quantity and motion. Such a universe of primary qualities was the one explored by Galileo, Newton and their followers. Such was the realm of extension and motion of Descartes and such the world of "external objects" from which, according to Locke, the mind derived its ideas. This view of externality was of immeasurable service in the hands of Locke in freeing philosophy from many obscurities. His emphasis, too, on experience was the very thing that men needed to give them a new outlook on the political problems of their day.

In building up this theory of government, Locke shows how actions must be judged, not according to some supposedly inherent principle of right or wrong but according to their consequences. Thus instead of holding that kings govern by Divine Right, he judges all forms of government according to their effect on the people who are governed:—

> The whole trust, power and authority . . . is vested in him for no other purpose but to be made use of for the good, preservation and peace of men in that society over which he is set, and that this alone is and ought to be the standard and measure according to which he ought to square and proportion his laws, model and frame his government.

This sane principle of government for the good of the governed lies at the basis of all Locke's theory and has become part of the theory though not of the practice of all civilized nations.

Locke's constructive doctrine contains an analysis of the question of property. He says:—

> Every man has a property in his own person . . . the labour of his body and the work of his hands . . . Whatsoever then, he takes out of the State that Nature has provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it and joined it to something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.

Locke then illustrates his meaning from the cases of reclaiming waste land, ordinary agriculture and industry, showing how the worker has the right to the part of his labour he has "mixed with" the common stock. This last point is important and should be contrasted with Marx's principle that man has a right to the whole of his labour.

Following his doctrine of property, Locke discusses the rights

of man in society. Although he declares that the "natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth," yet he explains that mankind formed societies for the protection of property and the preservation of peace and safety. The basis of society, he considers, lies in a kind of contract. This fiction of the social contract was used by Locke as a telling illustration of the mutual relationship between individual and State. All Locke's readers knew an ordinary commercial contract to be an agreement in which each side pledges itself to do something provided the other person carries out his obligation as well. Locke explained that when men joined together in societies it was *as if* they made a contract but that their rights remained even after they had relinquished the executing of them to a central government. Thus man's right of doing what he thinks fit for the preservation of life and property and the avenging of wrongs, he exercises through the power of society. But since society exists, according to Locke, for the "safety, peace and public good of the people," and since in what he calls a "perfect democracy" laws are executed by those chosen by the people, he shows that if a government fails to serve the community for which it was called into being, the individuals, by virtue of their original rights, may choose another government. By such arguments, he justified the Revolution of 1688 and refuted the old doctrines of absolute power and Divine Right.

Locke's picture of man as a free member of society enjoying the advantages of society and complying with the rules he has himself helped to make, have come down to us through the Liberal thought of the nineteenth century. Thus after many struggles, we now enjoy Civil and Religious Liberty, Adult Franchise, Self-Government and generous social services including Education, Public Health, and Insurance against Sickness, Unemployment and Old Age. By such means the modern State has taken upon itself more and more the care of the sick and needy and has recognised the right of its members to a voice in the government. Except under Bolshevism and Fascism, the personal rights of individuals have been left to adjust themselves. Thus, while modern States insist that their members do not grow up illiterate, they allow the choice of vocation, the spending and investing of money, the housing, care, number and control of the next generation almost entirely to individual whims. Moreover people are left to the relentless working out of economic forces with the consequent suffering that we see around us to-day. Such *laissez-faire* policy worked very well during the nineteenth century but is wholly unsuited to the highly organized industrialized States of the present day.

We need, in fact, to go back to Locke and include more factors

in our conception of the State. With his wide views in mind, we may be able to strike a better balance between what the State takes upon itself and what it still leaves to individual freedom. We all love the expression "private enterprise" but we know only too well that private interest and social interest by no means always coincide. Private enterprise, backed up by fortuitous circumstances, may involve the exploitation of ignorance and the plunging of thousands in distress. Such evils have always existed but their effects are more serious in these days of large-scale production and world-wide connections than in the early days of simple commerce. Some results we see around us in the muddled world with its anomalies of over-production and mal-distribution with falling prices in some lands and want of the barest necessities of life in others.

To evolve a technique of economic control which shall bring order out of the present confusion will not be easy, but it must be attempted. It may involve a curtailment of those individual liberties we love so much. It will certainly demand collective action between the holders of capital, the bankers, manufacturers, farmers both within the different states and as international unions among themselves. In such a way there may come order instead of economic anarchy. The strength of such collective action may direct the investment of capital into channels socially useful, and save much of the human effort now wasted in needless competition. Still more, it may save the world from the follies of international war and thus approach Locke's ideal of a commonwealth "for the good of all mankind".

DOROTHY TURNER

PRIMITIVE RELIGION

[**Francis James, M. A.,** went to Nigeria as an educational missionary and for eighteen months he lived with and studied the primitive tribe of Isokos. He is now engaged in research work in Anthropology.

In this fascinating narrative the author gives one answer to the problem discussed last month in this journal (pp. 504–5)—how to handle the prevalence of witchcraft among African Negroes.

Let the reader note the close similarity between the beliefs of most civilized men and women and those of these "primitives". Both believe in "The Great Father" and "The Great Friend who lives in the Sky" and who appoints His own representatives on earth to minister to the needs of human souls, punishes human sins and rewards human charities. But—says our author, these "primitives" are more free from theft and adultery than Europeans. Moreover, their tribal government also seems to be superior to our democratic states; for, to them persons matter more than things, while our civilization consists of buying and selling things without any great concern for the welfare of persons.—EDS.]

Of recent years there has been a great deal of research on the origins of religion, in the hope of discovering how man first came to a belief in God. The results of this research, among the aborigines of Australia, among the Eskimos, among the Melanesian savages, among the Bushmen of Africa who were there before the negroes, are now available. As usual there is no full agreement among the scientists, but there is a great deal of support for the view that at the most primitive stage there is always to be found a simple belief in a Supreme Being. Usually this Supreme Being is thought of as living in the sky, as being the Creator, and as being one who punishes evils and rewards good. It is further held by some that the other manifestations of paganism such as animism, witchcraft, human sacrifice, etc., are actual derogations from this earlier purer monotheism.

Certainly in Africa which I know at first hand, the belief in a Supreme Being is strongly held. There is no tribe in Africa from which that belief is absent, and though a great deal of African culture and religion has spread by contacts and borrowing, the universal belief in this Supreme Being has probably been reached by African people by itself; the primitive would say it was revealed to his earliest fathers by God. How does the primitive conceive of this Supreme Being? In West Africa he is known to some tribes as "The Great Friend who lives in the Sky"; another tribe speaks of him as "The Great Father". Among all African peoples he is connected vaguely with the creation of the world, and with the phenomenon of life itself. The primitive is no theologian; he does not ponder over the existence and character of God, nor reduce his religious belief to a system. Questioned about God, the primitive says

God created the world, that all other gods derive their power from him, that he lives in the sky and reveals his anger by thunder and lightning, that he makes the crops to grow and women to bear children, and that he always punishes those who are evil and blesses those who are good. He is sexless, distant, unknowable.

The primitive idea of God is therefore vague, though very real. And since the primitive is a little afraid of this distant God and does not claim to understand or control him, he believes that God has placed other, nearer, more reachable gods in the world. I may be allowed to describe in brief the religion of the primitive tribe with which I lived, and this description will give essentials of religious belief and practice which will hold good with variations for most negro tribes.

Next in importance to the worship of God, who is worshipped by invocation each morning on rising and occasionally by sacrifice, is the strong belief in reincarnation. The African tribe consists of those who are alive in the spirit world as well as those alive on earth. Every child born becomes the earthly home of a departed spirit, and every time a man dies a spirit enters heaven. Hence the proverb "A birth on earth means a death in heaven, and a death on earth means a birth in heaven". Often I have heard a native say, pointing to a young lad: "There is my grandfather". This strong belief in reincarnation accounts for the African desire for children, and for polygamy as the means to secure them. When a man dies, there is not only the first burial to inter the body, but also the second and more important burial when a plantain tree trunk is buried with great ceremony, which is believed to ensure the entry of the spirit of the departed into heaven. Should the family of the deceased delay this second burial too long, the spirit of dead man will haunt his children and bring calamity to them, until the rites are performed. There is much that is good about this ancestor worship, and it strengthens tribal and family feeling, for each member of the tribe knows that the ancestors are watching over him and that he owes them a duty. For the same reason no native owns land in Africa, but only the use of the land, for it actually belongs to the whole tribe, living and dead. Similarly the remarkable obedience shewn to the tribal Elders is due to the fact that they are acting for the ancestors. The ancestors are worshipped every fourth day, and always on the occasion of a birth or a marriage.

Ancestor worship leads naturally to the worship of the founder of the clan. Of this I may give an instance. I was staying one day in the head village of a powerful clan; this clan had been founded by a native who came with his wives to that country in search of land some 200 years ago, and on seeing a feather floating down to his feet from the sky, it was taken as a sign that God wanted him

to settle there. In time his offspring grew into a large clan. But every year all the members of the clan met before the clan fetish, which consisted of four clay figures. One represented the founder of the clan, and stuck in his head was the actual feather which came to him as a sign; another was his head wife; another was a slave; and the fourth was a child. Before any woman of the clan can have a child, she must offer sacrifices to the founder of the clan, symbolised in the clay figure. On the day in question I saw a woman covered with white chalk walking through the village, and, following, I saw her enter, right away in the bush, a sacred grove. Upon seeking admission, I was refused, but after some time I was allowed to enter on condition that I sat silently in a corner. This I did readily enough, overjoyed to be in at the actual worship of the most powerful and secret fetish in the country. As it happened I was asked to leave very soon, as the priest said the clan founder was angry at my presence; but not before I had seen paganism at work. In front of the four huge clay figures, was a priest, a priestess, and several sub-priests, all coated with white chalk. Kneeling down was a woman, confessing her sins to the fetish and asking for a child. After her confession, the priest cast lots with broken kola-nuts, the sign of the founder's approval being the facing upwards of all the broken sides of the nuts. The sign was a refusal of the founder's approval. Seven times the woman confessed, the priest urging her to confess everything. At last he told her that the founder was angry because she was withholding something, whereupon the woman began to cry and to confess that she had become the priestess of another fetish. Once she had confessed everything, the nuts came down the right way, the priest said she should have a child, and the woman went away satisfied. That I think was a typical case of clan paganism; the native's belief is that the founder of the clan is in the spirit world, seeing all on earth and watching over his offspring, and he grants fertility in women to increase his clan, only to those who do good, confess all, and make their sacrifices to him.

In addition to the worship of the ancestors, and of the clan founder, there are innumerable spirits, represented by fetishes, which watch over farms, trees, ponds and rivers. Sacrifices are offered to these before work of any kind is undertaken, to ensure freedom from calamity, and to secure good fishing, hunting and farming.

But paganism is not merely a clan or tribal thing. In my tribe each individual has two special private fetishes, made of wood. One is supposed to represent the spirit which created that person, acting for God, and this spirit must be placated and served each day, if protection is needed. The other is the soul of the person, visibly represented in an object to be worshipped for if that soul is

not properly served by sacrifice to the fetish, the soul will leave the person and death results.

The primitive, then, with the fetishes of his creator, his soul, his farming, fishing and hunting spirits, his clan founder, his ancestors, and above all his Sky-God, to serve, has his life filled with religion. Indeed the primitive does nothing apart from religion. Every birth, marriage and death is vitally related to the ancestors, whose concern it obviously is. Every piece of work done is preceded by worship and sacrifice. Each day begins with an invocation to the Sky-God. The whole tribal, clan, and family life, is surrounded and interpenetrated by religion. And *of nearly all the expressions of primitive religion it may be said that they make for morality. The penalties for theft and adultery in a primitive tribe are so heavy, that primitive society is probably much freer from these two evils than European.*

But, what of evil? How does the primitive explain it? If God is beneficent, and ancestors wish well, what can one say if a man who serves his gods faithfully is rewarded by calamity? And here the phenomenon of witchcraft comes to the aid of the primitive. Should any one who has lived a good life suffer calamity such as poor crops or no children, this is believed to be the work of witches, and witches are hunted down and killed.

The belief in witchcraft is common to all primitive peoples. It is a belief which has only recently died in England, and it survived some 1200 years of Christianity here. The only cure for the superstition is rationalism, the objective study of natural causes, and this is utterly alien to the primitive. He does not distinguish between causes acting in nature and those acting in persons. In my tribe *e. g.* if twins are born, one is killed, since twins are deemed unnatural, and it would be treason to the tribe to allow a person who is the embodiment of evil to live. Similarly a death due to dysentery is said to be the work of a witch. Any infraction of the normal course of nature is believed to be the work of evil spirits actually resident in a person, and usually in an old barren woman. To kill such a person is thus highly praiseworthy, and witch-detecters are believed to be a social asset. Hence when the British Government protect witches who are anti-social and evil, and punish those who benefit society, the primitive African is utterly non-plussed. To him, witchcraft is a perfectly satisfactory answer to the problem of evil, and the remedy is plain.

Witchcraft, then, an evil and cruel superstition, and the killing of witches an abominable practice are both understandable once one sees them through native eyes. This does not mean they are to be tolerated; but quite certainly they will not be abolished by mere denunciation. And no account of primitive religion would be complete which ignored this important phenomenon.

Africa to-day is a continent in transition. Indeed every primitive people to-day is in transition. The "acids of modernity" brought to these simple peoples by Western secular scientific civilisation, are dissolving native society and breaking down tribal cohesion. In this process of destruction primitive religion is the first element to decay, for it is based on a non-rationalistic outlook, and it withers at the first touch of modern science. And though there is much that is cruel and evilly superstitious in paganism which ought to be abolished, there is also much that is valuable which ought to be preserved. First, is the unity of primitive life. *In Europe each activity of life, art, learning, industry, pleasure, and even religion, may be detached from the whole pattern of life, and a man may follow one activity to the exclusion of all the others. Not so in primitive life. Life to the primitive is a unity, it has a fixed pattern, and it is penetrated by religion.* No one activity may be pursued apart from religion. And this unifying influence of primitive religion is a powerful and good thing. Secondly, paganism inculcates loyalty to the group above loyalty to one's selfish desires. In African society the group is always more important than the individual and the group includes the ancestors as well as the living. Thus even marriage is never an affair of individuals or even of two families, but an affair of two clans and of the ancestors, and the social sanctions making for the permanence of the marriage contract are strong indeed. Thirdly, paganism exalts the value of human personality. In Western society things tend to matter more than individuals, and vast impersonal forces mould the lives of the mass of the people: *In Africa persons matter most, and things count only in so far as they are related to persons.* In the natural community of family, clan and tribe, character and personality are created, and it is the considered opinion of the leading German missionary philosophers that the African has more of the true meaning of life and of personality, than the individualistic Westerner.

It seems likely, then, that whereas in the past African heathenism has been regarded as a dark and evil thing to be utterly crushed out and supplanted, now, alongside this necessary work of destroying the evil in it, there must go this work of preserving those elements in primitive religion which are of great value, and which are lacking from much Western religion. Certain it is that the primitive has not lived in utter darkness and error all these centuries, waiting until the Anglo-Saxon race in its goodness could take them to the light of truth. And it may well be that the task of this century will be for the white man to get alongside the African, that each may learn from the other.

FRANCIS JAMES

THE MYSTICAL TEACHINGS OF AVICENNA

[**Dr. Margaret Smith, M. A.,** has familiarized our readers with the Theosophy of Persian Mystics through a series of articles in our last Volume. Recently she has published two new books *Attar* in "The Wisdom of the East" Series and *Studies in Early Mysticism.*

The following very interesting article shows once again how time and space make no difference to those who are able to see truth—always the same, universal and impersonal. Students of Theosophy will better appreciate this article by noting what H. P. Blavatsky has to say in her *Theosophical Glossary* :—

> "Avicenna was the latinized name of Abu-Ali al Hoséen ben Abdallah Ibn Sina; a Persian philosopher, born 980 A.D., though generally referred to as an Arabian doctor. On account of his surprising learning he was called "the Famous," and was the author of the best and the first alchemical works known in Europe. All the Spirits of the Elements were subject to him, so says the legend, and it further tells us that owing to his knowledge of the Elixir of Life, he still lives, as an adept who will disclose himself to the profane at the end of a certain cycle."]

Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) belonged to the school of thinkers in Islam who were known as "The Philosophers," a title given to those who had made a special study of the Greek writers and, in particular, of the Neo-Platonists. This development of the study of philosophy within Islam had begun as early as the ninth century A.D. Abū Yusuf al-Kindī of Kūfa (ob. A.D. 860) became head of the first Muslim School of Philosophy at Baghdad, and he and his fellow-scholars were responsible for the translation of numerous Greek philosophic works, including the so-called "Theology of Aristotle" which was, in fact, Porphyry's Commentary on the "Enneads" of Plotinus. al-Kindī's work was continued by al-Fārābī (ob. A.D. 950), a Turk by origin, who studied at Baghdad and afterwards went to Syria, where he lived the life of a Ṣūfī giving his time to study and contemplation. Among his writings were treatises on "The Soul," and "The Faculties of the Soul," and "The One and the Unity". al-Fārābī makes use of language which is deeply mystical, and he was one of the first to adapt Greek philosophical terms for the use of Ṣūfism.

In the second half of the tenth century there was a further development of a theosophic doctrine within Islam, due to the rise of the "Brethren of Purity" (*Ikhwān al-Ṣafā*), a group of ascetics who were also philosophers, who set forth a system of spiritual philosophy, the aim of which was attainment to knowledge of the Godhead. Their great Encyclopædia consists of fifty tracts on every branch of philosophy and of these, eleven deal with Mysticism. They taught that the essence of man consisted in the soul, and that the goal of man's existence should be to live "with Socrates, devoted to the Intellect, and with Christ,

to the Law of Love". Further, they held that all nations had their contribution to make towards the ideal of ethical and moral perfection, and that the morally and spiritually perfect man should be "of East-Persian descent, an Arab in faith, Irāqī by education, a Hebrew in worldly wisdom, a disciple of Christ in conduct, as devout as a Syrian monk, a Greek in knowledge, an Indian in the interpretation of hidden things, but lastly, and above all, a Ṣūfī in his whole spiritual life".

Such were the forerunners of Avicenna, and it was into the heritage which they had left behind that he was able to enter, and it was on their teaching that he was able to base his own doctrines, which represented a fuller and more complete system of theosophy.

Abū 'Alī al-Ḥusayn Ibn 'Abd Allah Ibn Sīnā was born in A. D. 980 at Afshana near Bukhārā, of Persian parentage, and he proved to be one of the greatest and most original Persian thinkers of his time. He was known as "The Prince of Learning" or "The Chief of Teachers" (*al-Shaykh al-Rā'īs*). He received an excellent education in Islamic theology and jurisprudence, and also in geometry and astronomy, physics, logic and metaphysics, and he made a special study of the writings of the philosopher already mentioned, al-Fārābī. He also studied medicine under a Christian physician, 'Isā b. Yaḥyā, and mysticism with Ismā'īl the Ṣūfī. When still a youth, Avicenna had the good fortune to be successful in his medical treatment of Nuḥ b. Manṣūr, the sultan of Bukhārā, who gave the boy access to his valuable library, containing many unique volumes, and here Avicenna was able to gain much of the knowledge that enabled him to make so great a contribution to the learning of his day; he began to write when he was but twenty-one. He lived a somewhat wandering life, settling down for periods at different princely courts, and among these he appears to have spent a happy time at the court of Ma'mūn b. Ma'mūn, Prince of Khwārazm, but when this ruler's territories were annexed by Maḥmūd of Ghazna in A.D. 1017 Avicenna had to take flight. After being imprisoned by the Amir of Hamadān, Ibn Sīnā escaped and took refuge with the Buwayhid prince 'Alā al-Dawla, at Isfahān and there he enjoyed a period of tranquillity, giving most of his time to writing, while in the evening he used to hold meetings for the discussion of philosophic questions. He died at Hamadān in A.D. 1037.

Avicenna's writings include a treatise "On the Soul," a "Guide to Wisdom," and also a few poems in Persian. His earlier writings were mainly a development of Neo-Platonism, but towards the end of his life he drew up the outline of an Oriental Philosophy, representing his original ideas. Of this he actually wrote only two sections, on Logic and Mysticism, and the latter, "The Indications and Annotations" (*al-Ishārāt wa'l-*

Tanbīhāt), gives his development of the Ṣūfī doctrine, a doctrine based upon the Unity of all Being, in which Ibn Sīnā shews himself to be the forerunner of the later Ṣūfī mystics in their monistic teaching.

His conception of the Godhead is that of Absolute, Perfect Unity, the First One, the Sole Cause, Who alone is Necessary Being, Ineffable and Incomparable. From this Absolute Unity proceeds the World of Ideas, or the "World-Spirit," which also is not subject to multiplicity or change. Below this world is the World of Souls, the Essences which give life to bodies. Below this world again, are the worlds of the Active Intellect, and of material things. Matter is defined by Avicenna as contingent being, a passive possibility, and creation means the giving of actual existence to this contingent form of being. Evil exists only in what is contingent, and what appears to be evil is a good from some higher point of view. "It does not enter into the plan of the Divine Wisdom to abandon lasting and universal Good, because of fleeting evil in individual things."

God is the Supreme Beauty as He is Perfect Goodness, but Beauty, says Avicenna, is the veil of Beauty, and the outward appearance is linked with the inner reality, and so the manifestation of the Divine Glory serves to conceal the hidden mystery, as the sun, when a light cloud covers it, can be looked upon, but if it shines in all its splendour, it is invisible, being veiled by the excess of light. Yet this King manifests His glory to His creatures, He does not grudge to them the right to meet with Him, according to their capacity for approaching Him.*

In his teaching on the nature of the human soul, Avicenna holds that the Rational Soul, which controls the lower or carnal soul, and is itself enabled to penetrate to the mysteries of the higher realm, by the enlightenment given by the World-Spirit, is the real man, who has been brought into temporal existence, but is a pure Essence, a substance indestructible and therefore immortal. Life in the body, and the whole world of sense, serve as a means of training and purification for the soul. In his *Qaṣīda* on the Human Soul, Avicenna writes:

It descended upon thee from out of the regions above;
That exalted, ineffable, glorious, heavenly Dove.
'Twas concealed from the eyes of all those who its nature would ken
Yet it wears not a veil and is ever apparent to men.
Unwilling it sought thee and joined thee and yet, though it grieve,
It is like to be still more unwilling thy body to leave.
It resisted and struggled and would not be tamed in haste,
Yet it joined thee and slowly grew used to this desolate waste,
Till forgotten at length, as I ween, were its bounds and its troth
In the heavenly gardens and groves, which to leave it was loath.
Thick nets detain it, and strong is the cage whereby
It is held from seeking the lofty and spacious sky.
Until, when the hour of its homeward flight draws near,

* Risālat Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān. *Cf.* Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, who writes of the "Divine Darkness, which is in truth Light Unapproachable, dark through excess of light".

And 'tis time for it to return to its ampler sphere,
It carols with joy, for the veil is raised and it spies
Such things as cannot be witnessed by waking eyes,
And so it returneth, aware of all hidden things
In the universe, while no stain to its garment clings.

The poet asks why it was cast down from on high to this drear abyss of earth, and himself suggests the answer:

Was it God Who cast it forth for some purpose wise,
Concealed from the keenest searcher's inquiring eyes?
Then is its descent a discipline wise but stern,
That the things that it hath not heard it thus may learn.
So 'tis she whom Fate doth plunder, until her star
Setteth at length in a place from it rising far,
Like a gleam of lightning, which over the meadows shone,
And, as though it ne'er had been, in a moment is gone.*

In his mystical treatise entitled "The Bird" (*Risālat al-Ṭayr*), Ibn Sīnā tells of the difficulties of the Way by which the soul seeks to ascend again to God, when it has cast off the fetters which bind it to the earthly and the material.

A band of hunters went out to catch birds, and after the nets had been spread, a number of birds fell into the snare, the author being represented as one of them. The birds suffered at first from their confinement in cages, but gradually became accustomed to it, until certain of them managed to escape and were able also to help their companions to freedom. Though still bearing the remnants of their chains, they took to flight, and while on their journey beheld eight high mountains; with great efforts, the birds surmounted the summits of all up to the last. When they reached the foot of the eighth mountain, they found that its peaks stretched up into the clouds of Heaven, and other birds were there who, after hearing the story of their tribulations, told them that beyond this mountain was the city where dwelt the Great King: every wretched one who took refuge there and entrusted himself to the King, was shielded by His power from all harm. So the travellers took heart, and directed their way to the city of the King, until at last they reached it and received permission to enter. They went in then to the Royal palace, and when they had passed through one spacious ante-chamber after another, at last the suppliants entered into the presence of the Great King. When the veil between Him and themselves was raised, and their eyes beheld Him in all His glory, the birds were filled with amazement and confusion at that sight, and they could not make their complaint but the King, by His kindness, re-assured them, and sent them back to those who had oppressed them, with the command that the chains they still bore should be removed.

On the return journey the birds begged their brother (the author) to give them his impression of the King, and he said:

He is that One in Whom is united all imaginable Beauty, wherein nothing unlovely is found, and Supreme Perfection, wherein nothing is lacking. In

* I quote Prof. E. G. Browne's translation.

His Face is found all beauty, and in His hand all kindness. That one who serves Him faithfully will obtain the highest joy, but he who deserts Him will be lost in this world and the next.*

Elsewhere Ibn Sīnā teaches that pure souls, which are filled with a desire for perfection, can attain to the perfect fulfilment of that which they so ardently desire, even in this life, and to the beatitude of the celestial world hereafter. If we concern ourselves with material things and do not long after the Divine Light, the cause lies in ourselves, not in the Supreme Perfection, which is continuously manifested forth to those who have eyes to see and the will to seek. Those who are weak of will or deficient in intelligence will either attain to a state of happiness fitted to their capacity, or it may be that they will be granted another body suitable to their condition, and may thereby attain in the end to the degree of the spiritually perfect.† So Avicenna accepts the possibility of re-incarnation for those who cannot attain to perfection in this life, though he expressly rules out the possibility of transmigration of the human soul into animal bodies.

It is by Love that the soul can become fit to receive the revelation of the Absolute, which in its highest degree means that which the Ṣūfīs call Union. Avicenna asserts that as all created beings have within them a natural desire for the perfection which secures their well-being, every means to such perfection is loved as the source whence this well-being is derived. Now the most perfect object of such love is the First Cause of all creation, Who is the Beloved of all His creatures, to whom He has revealed His glory. If His Essence was hidden from them, they could have no knowledge of Him, but on the contrary, the Absolute does manifest His Essential nature to His creatures, and is not hidden save to those who have veiled themselves by the veil of weakness and defect.‡

Therefore the soul which is filled with desire for perfection and love towards that Divine Being in union with Whom perfection is to be attained can go onwards and upwards until its goal is reached.

Avicenna, in dealing with the Path by which the soul can attain to union with the Divine, says that there are three types of religious aspirants:

(*a*) The ascetic (*zāhid*), who renounces all connection with this world.

(*b*) The devotee (*'ābid*) who observes with rigour the exterior requirements of religion.

(*c*) The gnostic (*'ārif*) who gives himself up wholly to meditation upon the Kingdom of God, seeking therefrom the illumination of his soul by the Divine Light.

It is the gnostic alone who seeks to bring the senses and the imag-

* The great Persian mystical poet 'Aṭṭār makes this allegory the basis of his famous poem *Mantiq al-Ṭayr* (The Discourse of the Birds).

† *Fī'l-Bahjat wa'l-Sa'āda* (Types of Enjoyment and Happiness).

‡ *Fī'l-'Ishq* (Treatise on Love).

ination under control, to detach himself from all the vanities of this present world, and thus to attain to the Divine Reality. So will he find that his inmost self is open to receive the Divine revelation, and illumination from on high, and he will be empowered, when his soul so wills, to raise himself to the Light of God, free from the distraction of worldly concerns, yea, bidding farewell to all these, until all within him will have become sanctified. This alone is the true gnostic, who knows no other object of adoration than the Divine Being, and who is moved neither by hope of recompense nor by fear of punishment, for his eyes are fixed upon God alone.

There are stages and degrees in the contemplative life, to which the gnostics alone attain in this world.

The first stage for the gnostic is that called "Will," the stage of Right Intention. Through this, the one who is convinced of the Supreme Truth will discipline his soul in directing it towards God, with the ultimate hope of attaining to union with Him. While this stage continues, he is called the "aspirant" (*murīd*).

The second stage is that of self-discipline, with the three-fold aim of removing all save God from his path, of subordinating the carnal soul to the rational soul so that the imagination and intellect shall be attracted to the higher, and not to the lower, and of making the conscience sensitive to admonition.

The third stage is that of the entire surrender of the soul, now freed from the distraction of sensual desires, to the spiritual love which seeks to be dominated by the qualities of the Beloved. Now to the initiate appear flashes of the Divine Light, and moments of mystic joy, brief as lightning gleams, which pass away again. These are known to those who experience them as the mystic "states," and according to the mystic's capacity to receive them they become more and more frequent.

In the fourth stage the mystic has no longer need of self-discipline in order to receive the Divine illumination, but wherever he looks he beholds the image of God. It may be that he is bewildered by his experiences, but as he becomes accustomed to the Light given him, he attains to a state of perfect tranquillity. Thence he passes into the fifth stage, when God's Presence is continually with him (*sakīna*) and the transient flash is transformed into a shining flame, and he attains to that direct knowledge of God, which means that he will henceforth walk continuously with Him.

Then he arrives at the sixth stage, when he contemplates God in himself, and being carried outside of himself, though he appears to be present, yet in truth he is absent, and now the mystic experience becomes easy to him, so that it comes to him when he desires it. After having passed through this stage, he finds that

it no longer depends even upon his will, but in all that he looks upon, he sees only God, and so he can turn aside from this transient world and ascend into the world of Reality, and this is the seventh stage.*

Thence he passes from striving to attainment, and in the eighth stage his inmost self becomes as a polished mirror wherein is reflected the Face of God, and the highest of joys will take possession of him, he will rejoice in his own soul, since in contemplating it, he contemplates God therein.

Then in the ninth and final stage the mystic passes away from himself and contemplates the Divine Majesty alone, and if he regards himself, it is only as that which contemplates. Now he has arrived at complete union with God.†

Yet the gnostic, though now living the unitive life in God, is not unmindful of his fellow-creatures. Before he entered into that union with the Divine, he could not endure any distraction by worldly things but now he is protected from all disturbance, and he is able to take a fresh interest in the world around him, and to feel a Divine compassion towards all God's creatures. He willingly forgives to others the wrong they do to him, and bears no malice, for his soul, being purified from sin, concerns itself only with God.

It is clear that Avicenna was deeply versed in Neo-Platonism and profoundly influenced by the teaching of Plotinus, yet he is one of the most original of the earlier Persian philosophers and mystics, and his theosophical doctrine combines Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic theories with Persian mysticism, and perhaps, too, with ideas derived from Buddhism. His writings‡ have had a far-reaching influence in both East and West, and that influence has been exercised not only on Ṣūfism within Islam, but also on Christian Scholasticism.

MARGARET SMITH

---

* *Cf.* Plotinus "When the phantasm has returned to the Original, the journey is achieved. Suppose him to fall again from the Vision, he will call up the virtue within him and seeing himself all glorious again, he will take his upward flight once more, through virtue to the Divine Mind, through the Wisdom there, to the Supreme." Ennead VI. 11 tr. Mackenna.

† *Fī maqāmāt al-'ārifīn* (Stages of the Contemplative Life).

‡ The Arabic text of Avicenna's Mystical Treatises has been edited by M. A. F. Mehren (Leyden 1889) and the text of the "Ishārāt wa'l-Tanbīhāt" by J. Forget (Leyden 1892). For accounts of Avicenna's life and teaching *cf.* de Boer "History of Philosophy in Islam," and Carra de Vaux, "Penseurs de l'Islam" IV.

THE CYCLE OF THE SENSES

[**Helen Bryant** is known to our readers by two articles; "What Makes a City's Personality," and "The Reincarnation of Cities". In the following contribution she shows one phase of universal law of Cycles.—EDS.]

Man's senses are the addicts of repetition. They worship pattern: they are never so happy as when finding it repeated—in sound, in colour, in movement. We love to trace the orderliness of reiteration in the most wayward things—in the arrant wind that bows a cornfield in wave after rhythmic wave, in the sea that beats back and forth in its obedient tides, in the ironbound accuracy of hurtling planets, the geometric perfection of crystals, the cyclic pattern visible even in the vagaries of man's history. Our reaction to this order is a feeling of satisfaction: We are tranquillized by repetition, and entranced with it. For it is very rare that we fully perceive the perfection of a great pattern at the first contact: be it a symphony or a solar system, a song or a philosophy: our first impression is necessarily sketchy—our senses are so still, so insensitive! Only at the third or fourth encounter—when we are beginning to *await the expected*—do we have any thing like a complete joy of it. Then, the *recognition* of the recurring pattern and its kinship with other patterns, sharpens the ecstasy. Not variety, but familiarity, is the spice of life.

Why should this be? Why do we cry out for arrangement of life in cycles, and for the intricate interlocking of these cycles, so that, interdependent upon each other, they must return?

Ah, that may be the solution. They must return—and, returning, seem proof to us of the logic of our desperate desire for eternity. With each repetition comes a little deeper certainty, fresh fuel for our eager hope. So that we treasure it, hold out our hands to it, warming our faith—so susceptible to the cold breath of doubt and fear. Each spring following spring, each atom returning irrevocably upon its beaten path, each city that renews itself, each civilisation that rises and declines, each re-discovered "discovery," each repeated art, is a balm to our senses and so to our souls. Recognising each isolated fragment as part of an infinite and eternal whole, we reconstruct that whole—or try to, and, seeing ourselves as infinitesimal but actual parts of it, are soothed and re-assured.

But the senses themselves—these discerning and codifying things—what of them? Are they not part, too, of the whole, subject themselves to the cycle of change and recurrence and, for that very reason, in some eras more able than in others to perceive, to document, to reconstruct? Perhaps civilisations are the mere outward evidences of some far deeper and simpler

rhythm in the senses of man. *Perhaps, at this moment, there is a sense at so low an ebb that we are practically unconscious of its existence.* Our senses of sight and sound are so over-exercised to-day, fed with such insistence and indiscrimination that a more delicate sense might well be lost through pure starvation—lack of meditation, simplicity, repose. Only in far lost corners of silence and tranquillity may it be found, so that, when we stumble across it, we deny it, call it quackery or fanaticism, or at best, illusion.

An illogical denial. For we are willing enough to believe in the existence of things which evade detection by our senses but not our machines. Quite gleefully we claim the existence of sounds we cannot hear, colours we cannot see. Perhaps once there were men who *could* see those colours, hear those sounds: and perhaps there will be such men again. Even in our own time the sense of sight and hearing are in constant flux. To-day the sense of sight is supreme, but its supremacy is very, very recent! To-day the eyes bear—very competently, in spite of the parrot cries about deteriorating eyesight!—a tremendous burden. For seventeen or eighteen hours out of twenty-four they stand a strain no jungle hunter ever imposed upon *his* eye-balls! Hours of perceiving and transferring to the brain the significance of millions of tiny black slugs printed closely together, hours of being battered by streams of light, sometimes steady, sometimes glaring, sometimes flickering—and, almost with every day, fresh demands. Perhaps the word should not be supremacy, but slavery. . . .

Be that as it may, such a state of affairs did not exist before the days of photography, of printing, of illustrating, above all, of artificial light. Further back still, and it was to the ears rather than to the eyes that our ancestors trusted even for their safety. Nowadays, the responsibility of self-preservation devolves upon the latter, which must dart hither and yon, watching traffic and traffic lights, edges of railway platforms, and the sudden appearance of obstacles upon roads. Our warning shout is no longer "Hist!" but "Look out!"

But the wheel turns, and already the supremacy of the eyes is being challenged. With the advent of the radio the sense of hearing is taking possession of a vast new kingdom. Already we hear our politics instead of reading them: listen to our operas instead of seeing them, and to lectures while our text-books stay unopened on their shelves. Is the day approaching when we shall find it so much easier to listen that we shall cease to look?

Or will some stranger sense appear, coming again among us because its time is ripe, its cycle achieved? Men are thinking deeply to-day, struggling to understand the pattern and substance of this cloth of existence in which the frail threads of their own egos are woven, and, to a few of

them, sometimes, there comes, like a subtle fragrance, a foretaste of an unnameable awareness. . . Humanity is the marriage of sense and spirit made manifest. Such a marriage may well have had—and have again—some liason agent, some connecting spiritual tissue far more perfect than any or all of our five physical senses. There are indications that such a "tissue" or sixth sense can be fostered by fasting and denial of the other senses. Our present civilisation is unwilling to do this: it is very heavily weighed down with the luxuries of a machine age. Yet perhaps that does not matter: perhaps, like a sun below the horizon, the lost sense but waits its proper time to return and bring a flowering, a summer in the spirit and the blood. . . .

HELEN BRYANT

"The Present is the Child of the Past; the Future, the begotten of the Present. And yet, O present moment! Knowest thou not that thou hast no parent, nor canst thou have a child; that thou art ever begetting but thyself? Before thou hast even begun to say 'I am the progeny of the departed moment, the child of the past,' thou hast become that past itself. Before thou utterest the last syllable, behold! thou art no more the Present but verily that Future. Thus, are the Past, the Present, and the Future, the ever-living trinity in one—the Mahamaya of the Absolute IS."

H. P. BLAVATSKY (*The Secret Doctrine* II, p. 446)

WHAT DOES DEATH MEAN TO YOU?

II.—THE INADEQUACY OF RATIONALISM

[**Max Plowman** continues his meditation on Death and Sorrow and interestingly analyses the rite of mourning. He distinguishes between facts of sense perception and Reality visioned by imagination which latter must be used to understand the meaning of death.—EDS.]

In a previous article I endeavoured to show that an impersonal attitude to death could only be maintained if we abstracted the idea from experience and treated the affections of the heart as matter for pure reason. I contended that what is thought to be a realistic or scientific attitude was an intellectual pose and could not be adopted save by a misunderstanding of the province of science, since death has no objective existence and is, for human beings, without meaning except as subjective experience. I now want to show that the prevailing indifference to subjective experience is due to a mistaken belief in the validity of objective truth—a belief fostered by our natural disinclination to face painful reality.

Indifference to death is now professed everywhere. It is a commonplace of our literature. It is apparent in our customs. The show of mourning for the dead has come to be regarded in England as slightly vulgar, to be condoned only among the poor and ignorant. Mourning of any kind is, socially speaking, *de trop*. Unwanted are those who mourn, for they are a social nuisance. Blank unmeaning ignorance is generally felt to be the unhappy but unavoidable portion of the bereaved, and it is unattractive. We wish to be kind to the bereaved, for they have suffered misfortune; but we do not expect to be called upon to share their grief, for, in our view, that is to make bad worse.

Professed ignorance in the face of death has now taken the place of religious belief. This ignorance, hardening into a negative dogma by means of the acceptance of scientific fact, declares that the destiny of the individual at death cannot certainly be known, but that all probability points to extinction; and this "probable" of science has become a sort of standard of intellectual integrity: "the best minds" of the day say "probably," and intellectual snobbery accepts the "probable" as dogmatic. Hence the decay of mourning which, if carefully traced, can be shown to have proceeded all through the last half century, step by step in precise exactness with the growing acceptance of purely rational ideas. And if we believe the dead at death are extinct, then mourning has lost its historic *raison d'être* and becomes a survival, necessarily insincere. But this thought is

too rigorous for our vague sentiment: we prefer to say that we curtail the signs of mourning out of respect for the feelings of the dead, who, because they loved life, would have hated to depress it.

The speciousness of such an argument is obvious; for a lover never yet was found whose love could be abated by thought of the beloved. It is not the dead who decree the measure of our love. "No mourning by request" is a bequest beyond the power of probate, because the love that expresses itself in mourning can no more be abated than it can be created by request. But if we believe that the dead are really extinct, then the sooner we turn from the thought of them the better; for life is short, and if the death of our most beloved is just an interruption in the business of life, clearly it is our duty to make it as short an interruption as possible.

This, in point of fact, is just what happens. I do not say that most people believe in individual extinction, though the belief is common; but what is painfully clear is that most people are at heart so bewildered by the thought of death that they turn from it as useless and distressing. Evasion thus becomes a habit of thought, so that when death touches them closely, their only hope is to run away, even though this running away means a denial of the heart. Practised evasion has totally disarmed them, so that at sight of death they flee from him, taking refuge in the distractions of existence, persuading themselves that it is their sense of reality which tells them that life, and not death, is important. But they escape at the price of a terrible insincerity, the insincerity of denying the powerful heart out of respect for the impotent intellect. And the penalty for this insincerity is fundamental disintegration: it really means the harbouring of fear until fear turns death into a secret and perpetual menace, threatening to every living relationship: it means a gradual hardening of the heart, a steeling of the will, in order to achieve a loveless self-sufficiency, and finally a mistrust of anything but the most obvious sense-pleasures. The Queen in *Hamlet* is a perfect example of this decline.

Indifference may well denote spiritual atrophy even when it is our own death that has to be faced. I myself have seen the very apotheosis of this attitude. Fifteen years ago I saw it embodied in the lives of English youths who, at that time, were daily facing death in fighting aeroplanes. And never have I seen death look so small: it became quite literally a trifling matter, by habit of thought not to be thought of. But admirable and heroic as it is to set one's life at less than a pin's fee in the cause of honour so "the readiness is all," what ghastly superficiality is it that would hold a trifling view of life for the sake of an easy exit by the way of death? For small as death looked in the eyes of those young men, life looked even

smaller—a thing of such gross and empty pleasures as to be contemptible. Written across their faces was the tragic finding of Macbeth: "Life's but a walking shadow." Like him they had attained indifference, like him they had drunk the cup to the lees; like his their indifference was the indifference of desperation—of men to whom Fate was an implacable enemy, and Destiny the certainty of defeat.

The rationalist attitude shown by indifference to death is to be rejected not because it is unsound but because it is atavistic and implies the return to a form of blind animal consciousness man had already surpassed thousands of years ago. It betrays its atavism in the fact that it always leads to cynicism; for man cannot return upon himself without self-scorn: he cannot deny his own consciousness without that form of spiritual suffering which shows itself in contempt. The determining factor of human consciousness in the past was that it took the love line, and by adventuring along the path of its extended sympathies entered upon a world unknown to animal consciousness. It is therefore useless to point to animal consciousness as if it contained the basic truth of human consciousness; and whenever science goes out of its way to do this, it is, in the strict sense of the words, corrupting and beastly. Its realism is partial, insufficient and misleading. True realism must face the entire sentient man.

What then shall we do who reject the way of rationalism as having no answer to our question? Where shall we turn who have discovered that the world of science is a little bounded world wholly contained within the world of religion? Shall we fly to orthodoxy and deliberately pretend that the graven monuments of dogma are identical with the warm breathing forms of faith? Recognising the insufficiency of the intellect, shall we fly in the face of intelligence and accept a *credo quia impossibile*? What shall we do who, by reason of the fact that we have loved with all our life, are precluded from taking the path of slowly hardening indifference? Of the love that has called us beyond mortal life, shall we make a religious effigy which denies the identity of the object of our love?

Shakespeare has put into the mouth of a murderer the reply of rationalism to those who mourn:

> For what we know must be, and is
> as common
> As any the most vulgar thing to sense,
> Why should we in our peevish opposition
> Take it to heart? Fie! 'tis a fault to heaven,
> A fault against the dead, a fault to nature,
> To reason most absurd . . .

and the only reasonable answer we can make to this is that it is completely wide off the mark in offering doctrinally to show why what *is* ought not to be. The King's homily is an echo of the Queen's, "Why seems it so particular to thee?" to which Hamlet so adequately replies, "Seems, madam! nay it is. I know not 'seems'". What shall we do, to whom the imperative present "is" of loss is not convert-

ible into the past of "was," which is the change heart-hardening indifference would make? Are we really content to allow the identity of a beloved individual to pass from the particular consciousness of a beauty all its own, into the general consciousness of oneness with nature or mergence in the primal unity from which it sprang?

Belief in immortality has been called the pathetic fallacy, and thus likened to that so-called figure of speech by which the poets of all ages have given to natural objects the attributes of their own imaginations. Now if indeed this process be what it seems to the prosaic mind—nothing but a turn of metaphor artfully wrought to enliven the sympathy and produce in the reader willing suspension of disbelief—then poetry is what the purely rational mind believes it to be: a form of deceit engendered by the adornment of untruth which is decked with imagery so pleasing to the senses that they are indulged at the expense of the truth-loving mind. But such an idea is destructive of the very unity upon which the conception of truth depends: it can only be held by those who have mean and partial conceptions of truth and have made a virtue of their own shortcoming.

Let us take an example. When day dawns, the simplest expression of that fact is contained in the words "day dawns". Science can add to this simple statement a description of the event: it describes the revolution of the earth in relation to the sun and is thus an enlargement of the original statement, being an account of the process by which the event occurs: it determines the facts and thus increases knowledge of the event. But the truth is still unborn in the individual consciousness, because the emotions, which are as essential to man as the mind, are untouched by either statement: the reality is not presented either by the plain statement of fact, or by a description of the process. But when Shakespeare says:

> But look, the morn in russet mantle clad
> Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastern hill

he states the truth in its living reality. And how has he done this? He has created an image whereby the event is immediately present to the mind's eye and the responsive senses; and he has done this by departing completely from the terms of fact to the terms of imagination. The important point to note is that although he has made a complete severance from fact, he has told the truth *in a measure* unattainable to the most accurate statement that could be made of all the relevant facts. His truth is therefore greater than the truth of fact, not subject to fact but, on the contrary, comprehensive of fact and additional to it. By mirroring the truth in his own imagination he has surpassed the facts and presented the reality.

Now nothing but a misuse of the rational mind can describe such a gift of consciousness as pathetic fallacy; it is pathetic

fallacy only to those who mistrust their imagination. But the poetic statement can only be appraised by those who have, in some degree, the faculty that was employed in its making, and here the rationalist defaults. The poetic statement appeals to a higher level of consciousness than the rationalist concedes; but the incontrovertible fact about that consciousness is that it is the distinctively human consciousness. Not by the willing suspension of anything can we appreciate the poetic statement, but only by the activity of the imagination, which is the creative power of faith. The poetic statement represents the progression of the mind from the rational level to the higher imaginative level, and not (as the rationalist would have us believe) a regression from the real to the fanciful. It supplies to consciousness those elements of the whole truth which were lacking in the statement of rational truth. It shows a synthesis of the powers of human understanding which any lesser statement cannot achieve.

What is our conclusion from this? We conclude that truth itself is pathetic fallacy to those who have not the energy of faith, or the power of imagination. We see that what has been described as pathetic fallacy so far from being fallacious, is beyond the whole realm of fact, and—what is more important—we see that reality belongs to the same region, that *reality has being in complete independence of fact*. Reality is what we are in search of, so we shall have need to remember that it is only to be comprehended by the statement of poetic truth; also, that the apprehension of reality does not imply disharmony between truth and fact but only intensification of the power by which they are perceived.

This intensification is indeed the creative process by which man not only becomes aware of truth that cannot be comprised by fact, but by which he bodies forth express likenesses of the truth in images that are irresistible to consciousness. For truth meets with acceptance, not by ratiocination, but by that response of the whole organism which is pure recognition. It is this recognition that is commonly called vision.

William Blake, the English mystic, said: "Everything possible to be believed is an image of truth." What did he mean by that profound statement? Certainly not that every idle fancy of a lunatic is true. If we would understand him I think we must find out what he means by belief, for clearly he does not regard everything as possible of belief. Fancy, in this sense, cannot be believed: unlike imagination, it does require the willing suspension of disbelief. Fancy is essentially lacking in that intensification which is the concomitant of imagination: it is the sport of the mind, and neither springs from the sense of objective truth, nor moves toward it; it is incapable of the strong persuasion of belief. Imagination, on the other hand, is the drawing together of every conscious and unconscious faculty in the formation of a con-

cept which, when formed, will be an express image of that portion of reality which was propagative in the mind; for the creative process of the imagination calls upon all the faculties to act at the fullest extent of their capacity, and this united action can only be brought about by the entire self-committal which is belief. When all the faculties are thus both aware and active, the impress upon them and the expression they take will be of truth. *If* we can believe anything, then what we believe will be an image of truth.

Belief in immortality is either a projection of man's creative imagination, or the play of his idle fancy. The measure of truth we can apprehend is according to the degree of belief: a conclusion which calls to mind the words, "According to your faith be it unto you".

MAX PLOWMAN

The following from *The Theosophical Glossary* of H. P. Blavatsky explain her statement that "There are two kinds of magnetization; the first is purely *animal*, the other transcendent, and depending on the will and knowledge of the mesmerizer, as well as on the degree of spirituality of the subject, and his capacity to receive the impressions of the astral light." (*Isis Unveiled* I. 178) (See the article which follows.)

HYPNOTISM (*Gr.*): A name given by Dr. Braid to various processes by which one person of strong will-power plunges another of weaker mind into a kind of trance; once in such a state the latter will do anything *suggested* to him by the hypnotiser. Unless produced for beneficial purposes, Occultists would call it *black magic* or Sorcery. It is the most dangerous of practices, morally and physically, as it interferes with the nerve fluid and the nerves controlling the circulation in the capillary blood-vessels.

MAGNETISM: A Force in nature and in man. When it is the former, it is an agent which gives rise to the various phenomena of attraction, of polarity, etc. When the latter, it becomes "animal" magnetism, in contradistinction to cosmic, and terrestrial magnetism.

ANIMAL MAGNETISM: While official science calls it a "supposed" agent, and utterly rejects its actuality, the teeming millions of antiquity and of the now living Asiatic nations, Occultists, Theosophists, Spiritualists, and Mystics of every kind and description proclaim it as a well established fact. Animal magnetism is *a fluid*, an emanation. Some people can emit it for curative purposes through their eyes and the tips of their fingers, while the rest of all creatures, mankind, animals and even every inanimate object, emanate it either as an *aura*, or a varying light, and that whether consciously or not. When acted upon by contact with a patient or by the will of a human operator, it is called "Mesmerism".

THE STORY OF HYPNOTISM

[**Dr. H. J. Strutton** who writes this interesting article is the Editor of *The Occult Review*. To facilitate his study the reader's attention is drawn to some extracts on the preceding page.—EDS.]

Of the many scientific terms in common use to-day, none, perhaps, is more loosely applied than the term "hypnotism". It is used to cover not only the accepted phenomena of suggestion, but every conceivable type of mental mastery of others, from fascination to domination. Between "hypnotism" and "mesmerism" no distinction whatever is drawn in popular usage; although, between the two states, a profound difference exists, however closely the physical phenomena may resemble each other superficially.

Although the word "mesmerism" has its origin in its association with the name of the famous practitioner of the art in the eighteenth century, it is to Paracelsus that should be awarded the honour of having first rediscovered and introduced the practice of what was then known as "magnetism". The adoption of the prefix "animal" came later, with the work of Mesmer.

In proof of the contention that Paracelsus *rediscovered* rather than originated the art of magnetism, may be adduced the fact that "thousands of years ago the Phrygian Dactyls, the initiated priests, spoken of as the 'magicians and exorcists of sickness,' healed diseases by magnetic processes. It was claimed that they had obtained these curative powers from the powerful breath of Cybele, the many-breasted goddess".

This quotation is from a valuable article by H. P. Blavatsky, entitled *Hypnotism: Black Magic in Science*, which appeared in *Lucifer* for June 1890. A reprint is now available as No. 19 of the U. L. T. Pamphlet Series, obtainable from the publishers of this magazine.

Mesmerism is characterized by Madame Blavatsky in her own quaint terminology as "antediluvian". "The blossoms of magic, whether white or black, divine or infernal," she says, "spring all from one root. The 'breath of Cybele'—Akâsa tattwa . . ." The scientists of Mesmer's day, had they but realized the fact, were offered a key which would have unlocked some of the deepest mysteries of the human constitution. In view of the subsequent trend of events, it is perhaps fortunate that orthodox science failed to grasp to the full the significance of the phenomena of Mesmerism.

As stated above, between the Mesmerism of the early practitioners and the hypnotism of more recent times, a wide gulf exists. While the theory and practice of the Mesmerists are based upon the recognition of the

existence of a direct vital transmission, such a possibility is denied by the practitioner of the purely hypnotic school. While the one, legitimately employed, may prove of tremendous value in the cure of disease, the other is definitely open to criticism. Indeed, in the article already quoted, H. P. B. goes so far as to declare that the "one (Mesmerism) is beneficent, the other (hypnotism) maleficent, as it evidently must be; since, according to both Occultism and modern Psychology, *hypnotism is produced by the withdrawal of the nervous fluid from the capillary nerves*, which being, so to say, the sentries that keep the doors of our senses opened, getting *anæsthesized* under hypnotic conditions, allow these to get closed". Madame Blavatsky then proceeds to endorse the views of the French Mesmerist, A.H. Simonin, when he maintains that while, under hypnotism, it is merely the lower, animal instincts which are primarily involved, under the influence of Mesmerism or Magnetism, "there occurs in the *subject* a great development of moral faculties". The possibilities of the true magnetic sleep, in fact, are such that the late Mrs. Attwood, in her remarkable work, *A Suggestive Inquiry into the Hermetic Mystery*, seems to have drawn very near to the discovery of its use in the process of initiation into the Mysteries.

The point of divergence in theory and practice between the Mesmerists and hypnotists may be traced to the fateful Commission appointed by the French government in 1784, which included among its members the famous Benjamin Franklin. These investigators decided that the effects produced by Mesmer were all the work of imagination! Thenceforward two definite streams of development may be traced. On the one hand may be found the practitioners of the true occult art—de Puységur, du Potet, Deleuze, Dr. Elliotson, Dr. Esdaile, Boirac, and so on; and on the other Braid, Bertrand, Liébault, Bernheim, Charcot, Heidenhain and Moll, all representative of what may be termed the "suggestion" school.

Modern hypnotism may be said to date from the time of James Braid who, in 1841, began his investigations into the practice of Mesmerism. As a result of his researches he threw aside many of the current magnetic theories. He found that hypnosis could be induced by fixed gazing and kindred physical means, and, most significant of all, by direct verbal suggestion.

Adherents of the suggestion theory are, perhaps naturally, prone to regard the methods of the Mesmerist as being, after all, merely suggestive in their *modus operandi*. The present writer, despite many years' intimate association with a Mesmerist of high order, was formerly inclined to the view that "suggestion" explained everything. An incident was witnessed, however, which left no room for doubt as to the

actuality of the Mesmeric or magnetic stream.

A Mesmeric sensitive, still in the waking state, and in the absence of the Mesmerist himself, was invited to go into a room by a door over which, unknown to the subject, passes had been made with the intention that he should *not* enter. Yet–he entered! Under the pretext of hanging up his hat in the hall, the subject was induced to retrace his steps, in order to give the experiment another trial. He turned, and found that an invisible force barred his exit through the doorway! It was subsequently noted that the passes had inadvertently been made from without, *inwards*. The subject could go with the stream, but not against it, despite intention, or possible telepathic suggestion.

Under the guise of magnetic healers, Mesmerism has never, from the time of Mesmer to the present day, been without its faithful followers; and it is not without interest, in this connection, to note that the *Journal du Magnetisme*, founded by du Potet in 1845 is still in existence, under the editorship of Monsieur Henri Durville.

Many remarkable cures are to the credit of mesmeric or magnetic healing, from the production of drugless anaesthesia, under which even major surgical operations have been painlessly performed, to the revitalization and restoration of the function of limbs atrophied through disuse from paralysis or kindred causes. Great as its value has undoubtedly proved to be when legitimately used by the healthy and pure-minded operator, even this is not without its dangers, since it is possible for the Mesmerist suffering from any physical or moral complaint, unconsciously to infect his subject with his own trouble.

It will be noted here that the stress is laid upon the direct transmission of the vital magnetic fluid. Suggestion plays a negligible part, and may even be entirely absent, though sometimes the two methods are intermixed.

If, then, there is danger from the use of the purely magnetic method, what shall be said of the promiscuous use of "suggestion," whether alone or in conjunction with the Mesmeric process? As hinted by H. P. B. above, suggestion acts only on the *lower* animal instincts. The tendency of its use is to weaken the link between the higher and the lower. No amount of induced suggestion can take the place of the action of the higher self upon the personality in the elimination of weaknesses and defects of the lower nature. Moral fibre, like muscular strength, is only to be obtained through exercise. The task of self-mastery by the will must sooner or later be taken in hand by the man himself. To resort to "short cuts" which promise quick results is not only to defer the day of reckoning, but actually to complicate matters karmically.

The evil of the spread of hypnotism and suggestion, unfortunately, does not end here. The

art of suggestion has in recent times been brought to such a high state of efficiency that it is becoming a positive menace to humanity. For it is through subtle methods of suggestion that the "mass mind" is moulded according to the secret dictates of wire-pullers. Close observation will reveal to what an alarming extent the public mind is bombarded with deliberate suggestions made for commercial, political and other purposes by those who would secretly and selfishly exploit their fellow men.

Another development springing from the methods of the hypnotists which is open to criticism is that of psycho-analysis. As generally practised this serves to unlock what H. P. B. refers to as "those secret drawers, dark nooks and hiding places in the labyrinth of our memory" which are better left closed and not interfered with by outside influence, until such time as the ego himself decides to open them. Like hypnotism, psycho-analysis abrogates the higher powers in man, and on that score alone is morally indefensible.

A whole volume could be written on the developments of hypnotism and suggestion, and the menace of their future growth. Meanwhile, the clue to the mysteries of initiation into higher state of consciousness which there is strong reason to believe is hidden in age-old science of what is now called Mesmerism, lies neglected except by the few. One can only lament the tendencies of the day, and close with stern warning uttered by H. P. B. at the close of the notable essay which has been so freely quoted in this article.

Experiments in "suggestion" by persons ignorant of the occult laws, are the most dangerous of pastimes. The action and reaction of ideas on the *inner lower* "Ego," has never been studied so far, because that Ego itself is *terra incognita* (even when not denied) to the men of science. Moreover, such performances before a promiscuous public are a danger in themselves. Men of undeniable scientific education who experiment on Hypnotism in public, lend thereby the sanction of their names to such performances. And then every unworthy speculator acute enough to understand the process may, by developing by practice and perseverance the same force in himself, apply it to his own selfish, often criminal, ends. *Result on Karmic lines*: every Hypnotist, every man of Science, however well-meaning and honourable, once he has allowed himself to become the unconscious instructor of one who learns but to abuse the sacred science, becomes, of course, morally the confederate of every crime committed by this means.

H. J. STRUTTON

DETERMINISM AND FREE WILL

[**J. D. Beresford** continues the study of the fascinating subject of fate and free-will commenced by Prof. C. E. M. Joad in our May issue and on which Prof. G. R. Malkani wrote in our June number.—EDS.]

In the course of the few thousand years of which we have fairly exact historical knowledge, man's subjection to a belief in Fate as a determining influence on individual life has played a curious and interesting part. The belief entered very early into religion. Primitive man if we can judge him by the contemporary savage had sometimes a destructive faith in his own impotence before the retributive powers of the gods he had invented. To break a strict Taboo was to incur penalties that he could not in some cases avert by any propitiation of the powers he had offended; and his beliefs were often deep enough to kill him by auto-suggestion,re-inforced by the warnings of witch-doctors and his own terrors.

The Greek Nemesis was no doubt partly a racial development of these early superstitions, but the conception was later rationalised and developed by the brilliant philosophical thought of the period. Originally allied to Artenus and a comparatively unimportant member of the Greek mythology, Nemesis came to be regarded as personifying the guardian of the law, and hence to be associated with the individual conscience. Later, however, we find her represented by Herodotus in the guise of an impersonal figure of destiny administering rewards and punishment to nations and individuals on principles that accord very nearly with those of the laws of Karma.

After the fall of Greece and Rome, however, darkness settled upon Europe and when we come to the revival of learning we find belief in destiny taking strange and perverted shapes. In the 16th Century for example, when the avenging "hate" of earlier beliefs had been crystallised into the conception of a single omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent god, the ideas of predestination or pre-ordination were hung as a perpetual threat over the human mind. The perversion in this creed of Calvin's is due to the oblivion of those aspects of the Greek Nemesis which gave it a true ethical value. The doctrine of Predestination assumes that every human being is born in sin and condemned, *ipso facto* to Eternal Punishment, unless he shall find "grace" by adopting certain sectarian beliefs, the essential attitudes required being those of repentance and submission, the latter to the tenets of the particular faith involved. In the development of Predestination, the precise nature of the submission and the manner of conversion presented various phases, some of which are still extant. But those who are interested will find the

typical absurdity admirably described in Principal L. P. Jacks's sketch "A Psychologist among the Saints".*

An aspect of this general fate-threat made by the tribal god still survives in all forms of the Christian religion. The great Taboo remains, but altered in form so that the eating of the forbidden fruit appears now as the falling away from the "true faith" in whatever particular version it may be presented by the sect in question, with the emphasis laid on the positive act of submission as the "sole means of grace". The threat, however, remains the same, eternal damnation no matter what may have been the individual's moral and spiritual life. "Unless ye thus believe in the Trinity, ye cannot be saved," says the Athanasian creed of the English Church; and the Roman Church, though it may offer Purgatory for the alleviation of its own sinners, holds out no hope to those who die in another faith.

We come to a more intelligent and intelligible version of the belief in Fate, in the old philosophical dispute between Determinism and Free-will; and we may quote our definition of the former as being:—"that every action is causally connected not only externally with the agent's environment, but also internally with his motives and impulses. In other words, if we could know exactly all these conditions, we should be able to forecast with mathematical certainty the course which the agent would pursue. On this theory the agent cannot be held responsible in any sense".

The form taken by this contention displays the influence of science. We have substituted for the tribal god, an inexorable process. All question of rewards and punishment has disappeared, and man is presented as no more than a by-product of evolution,—an interesting phenomenon but probably ephemeral. This, perhaps, the most pessimistic and deadening of all beliefs, reached its maximum influence in the nineties of the last century, a time when materialism had its strongest hold on thinking minds in England. Since then its decline although slow has been sufficiently well-marked to indicate the general trend of opinion. And strangely enough, it has been the steady advance in the science of mathematical physics and the comparative stagnation of that of biology, which has been responsible for a sudden quickening in the process during the last ten years.

In fact these brief notes on the changing aspects of an over-ruling Fate, have their origin in Sir Arthur Eddington's presidential address to the Mathematical Association, reprinted as a Supplement to *Nature* in its issue of February 13th, 1932. The subject of the address was "The Decline of Determinism," and Sir Arthur having quoted definitions from Laplace and C. D. Broad, settled finally upon a third given by Fitzgerald in his translation of

* Included in *Among the Idolmakers* by L. P. Jacks. (Williams & Norgate, 1911)

Omar Khayyám !

With Earth's first Clay they did the last man knead,
And there of the Last Harvest sow'd the Seed:
And the first Morning of Creation wrote
What the Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read.*

Now the reason why this recent pronouncement of Science should have a peculiar significance for readers of THE ARYAN PATH, is that, as we shall presently see, Sir Arthur Eddington's exposition of the modern scientific attitude in this regard is one that will comfortably accommodate the doctrine of Karma, which for Theosophists takes the place of the Greek Nemesis,† and resolves the vexed problems of Fate and Retribution. For, as I have urged before in these pages, modern Science working along its own path is now continually stumbling upon the truths of the Inner Wisdom, throwing here and there little gleams of light into minds that cannot be reached by other means.

Sir Arthur's main argument opens with a division of physical phenomena into two classes, one that we regard as impossible, the other as highly improbable, and proceeds to show that we may safely prophesy that causes in the mass will produce certain results when "the predictions and regularities refer to average behaviour of the vast number of particles concerned in most of our observations"; but that when "we deal with fewer particles the indeterminacy begins to become appreciable . . . until finally the behaviour of a single atom or electron has a very large measure of indeterminacy".

Finally, to complete as nearly as may be the analogy we are seeking, Sir Arthur says, still speaking of the electron:—

> Actually we can have contemporaneous knowledge of the values of half the symbols, but never more than half . . . . . Instead of two paired symbols, one wholly known and the other wholly unknown, we can take two symbols each of which is known with some uncertainty; then the rule is that the product of the two uncertainties is fixed. Any interaction which reduces the uncertainty of determination of one increases the uncertainty of the other . . . We divide the uncertainty how we like but we cannot get rid of it.

The lecture closes with the words:—

> These revolutions of scientific thought are clearing up the deeper contradictions between life and theoretical knowledge, and the latest phase with its release from determinism marks a great step onwards. I will even venture to say that in the present theory of the physical universe we have at last reached something which a reasonable man might almost believe. (!)

We might go somewhat further than this in adding that scientific thought is slowly making its way towards a physical explanation of the universe which is implicit, however different the statement, in the ancient Wisdom-Religion; and that, whatever the method of enquiry, if the search is pressed

* It is an interesting commentary on the general subject to note that this, in effect a summary of Omar's philosophy, should have been written early in the 12th century. As an aspect of fatalism it may be put beside the Turkish proverb "What God has written upon your forehead, *that* will happen".

† Cp. *The Secret Doctrine* I, p. 642.

far enough, diligently and sincerely, all problems of life and matter will ultimately find a single solution. But for the moment our purpose is solely concerned with this question of free-will, and before going further it will be as well to make a brief summary of the three aspects in which it has been here presented.

The first is from the point of view of what may be described as "primitive religion" beginning with the earliest beliefs of the savage and reaching the stage at which Christianity, for example, has now arrived. In this development the dim realisation of determining law is always anthropomorphic and takes the figure of some superhuman being, earth-god, tribal god, world-god, each succeeding figure approaching more nearly to the ideal of omnipotence, and omniscience. But with these last ascriptions, the rationality of the figure begins to fail, since if God is all-powerful and all-knowing, his creation, man, becomes a mere puppet whose ultimate destiny must be foreseen by his creator and who is therefore bereft of all but the absurdest semblance of free-will. For there can be no logical escape from the deduction that if God knows the end, then that end is pre-determined.

The second point of view is that of philosophy of which all that need be said here is that after "great argument about it and about," we came out "by the same door" through which we entered,—inevitable consequence of the fact that the disputants to whom we listened were each and all arguing to prove a pre-determined assumption.

Finally we find this new-born science,—product of three centuries of applied learning and experiment, whose exponents have adopted the postulate that any result however unexpected and confounding must be accepted if it is sufficiently justified,—passing through a stage of strict determinism to emerge in the form indicated by the quotations given above.

Now what we find in common among these various aspects is a recognition of some over-ruling law, coupled with an inability to state it. The belief in Fate, of which even the most primitive man has an intuitive awareness, has led humanity to the wildest and most fantastic of deductions. The belief in the law of cause and effect influenced the scientists of yesterday to affirm that it was invariable and could not, in any circumstances, be affected by the human will. But in spite of superstition and science, an inner conviction not less than commonsense continues to fight a winning battle in defence of free-will.

And, as we so often find, the truth lies between the two extremes, Sir Arthur Eddington states the case for the physicist by saying that when we consider a collection of atoms the law of cause and effect holds, giving us the power of accurate prediction in the physical world; but that when we come to the contem-

plation of the ultimate unit, we are faced by the conclusion that it has a certain latitude within its own ambit. Let us compare that conclusion with what we know of the great law of Karma.

To begin with we may note that men and "angels" are "the slaves and creatures of immutable Karmic and Kosmic law,"* and that "those who believe in Karma have to believe in *destiny*".† But this law, on the scientific analogy is that which prevails when we regard matter or humanity in the mass. Let us now consider that individual who corresponds to the electron. "Man," writes Madame Blavatsky "is a free agent during his stay on earth. He cannot escape his *ruling* Destiny, but he has the choice of two paths that lead him in that direction."‡ Thus we see that Sir Arthur Eddington's analogy draws a little closer. Our electron about which he can posit one certainty only at the expense of increasing our uncertainty regarding it in another direction, appears within the limits imposed to have a choice of alternatives, but no escape from the "*ruling* Destiny".

Nevertheless if we carry the matter one step further we see that the law is ultimately one of our own making. Karma, in effect, is self-induced, an inevitable result of certain first causes, and one that must obtain until its purpose is satisfied. But "were no man to hurt his brother, Karma-Nemesis would have neither cause to work for, nor weapons to act through. It is the constant presence in our midst of every element of strife and opposition . . . that is the chief cause of the 'ways of Providence' . . . Karma-Nemesis is no more than the (spiritual) dynamical effect of causes produced and forces awakened into activity by our own actions." §

Here, then, we have the heart of the whole matter. We see free-will determined by its own exercise and invalidating itself by wrong use. We have the power of choice but it will be progressively delimited if we choose wrongly. Thus Free-will and Determinism co-exist and re-act one upon the other,—even as in the happy analogy Sir Arthur Eddington has provided by his instance of the electron in which "any interaction which reduces the uncertainty of determination of one increases the uncertainty of the other". For our wrong choice in previous incarnations tends always to circumscribe the exercise of free-will in the incarnation that follows. ¶

Yet at the end we may believe that "good will be the final goal of ill," and the law of Karma-Nemesis be resolved.

J. D. BERESFORD

* The *Secret Doctrine*, I. 276. † Loc. cit. I. 639. ‡ Loc. cit. I. 639. § Loc. cit. I. 643,4.
¶ An interesting example may be found in "Karmic Visions" by "Saujna" (H. P. Blavatsky) originally printed in *Lucifer* in June 1888.

MY DUTY

[**Dr. Paul E. Johnson** is Professor of Philosophy at Hamline University (St. Paul, Minnesota, U. S. A.); he has lived in China and is able to appreciate oriental points of view. He has written two articles—"My Duty" and "Your Law". The conflict of duties is talked about by every man and every woman and is continuously discussed from a thousand platforms. The problem nears solution only when discussions on theories give way and actual action is being devised. Carlyle was right when he said that "the end of man is an *action* and not a *thought*, though it were the noblest". The Theosophical teaching on charity, sacrifice, etc., in relation to duty as action is described by H. P. Blavatsky in her *Key to Theosophy* (p. 191 *et seq*) in a very practical way.—EDS.]

My duty is under suspicion. It has enjoyed an honourable past. Even when unwelcome, it has been respected. Though endured as necessary evil, it has yet been well spoken of. It has associated with the best company and played with the noblest sentiments. But now its place in modern society is less secure. It is secretly resented and openly abused as enemy to freedom, remnant of slave-morality, symptom of morbid repression. What shall we do with our duty? It may not be comfortable to have around, but on the other hand it is hardly just to condemn it without a hearing. In the face of these conditions, it would seem to be our duty to examine our duty. Let us ask of duty three leading questions: What? Where? Why?

First of all it is essential to know *what* is my duty. A duty is a recognized obligation. It is something due or required that one has no right to overlook. It is an ought that demands obedience, a stern challenge that cannot honorably be denied. A duty frequently involves difficulty, invokes effort, often sacrifice and deprivation. This has given rise to the impression that duty is opposed to desire. So the ethics of "rigor and vigor" has called men to conquer their desires and renounce natural inclinations. Conduct is moral, says Kant, only when consciously performed from duty.

The artificial rigour of such teaching is evident. Shall we not desire the good life, and did not Kant himself most earnestly desire his duty? No little disfavour has fallen upon duty by such false contrasts. Finding effective goodness in much human desire, it is not surprising that many have chosen it instead of formal duty. But there is a valid contrast between the conduct of purpose and impulse. There are two tendencies in human conduct; one is impulsive response to every stimuli, instinct, or desire without regard to plan or outcome, without effort to direction or control; the other is reflective behaviour which seeks definite goals and brings inclination under the discipline of will.

Duty is not the enemy of natural impulse. Its task is certainly not to crush desire or deny inclination. *But to act from duty is*

always something more than to act on impulse. It is characterized at all times by a sense of direction, a consciousness of going somewhere for some cause. The duty motive is opposed to aimless activity. It objects to following the line of least resistance, whether it be the inertia of habit or the carelessness of mere impulse. It is control of conduct by clear principle and steady purpose. A duty need not be disagreeable, nor should its worth be measured by its difficulty. But it must be approved by the whole self, and pursued with conscious resolution. To accept a duty is to have a purpose for living.

In the second place, *where* is my duty? It may be interesting to contemplate duty in general, but for practical purposes it is more urgent to know where our duty lies. For no sooner do we begin to assume duties than we run into difficulties. Duties conflict and obstruct each other. There are many claims to duty. Who can follow them all? There are many voices calling in contradictory tones, yet all in the name of duty. The Kentucky mountaineer *ought* to ambush his neighbour and defend his family. The American patriot *ought* to murder, steal, lie and hate in 1917, and love, speak truth, be honest and mild in 1927. The business man *ought* to serve his customer and drive his competitor out of business. The advertiser *ought* to tell the truth and sell his goods by skilful falsehood. The politician *ought* to save his country and destroy the other party at any cost.

Where in all this maze of conflicting codes and loyalties shall the honest seeker know his duty? There are many to suggest and even command. But by its very nature, a duty cannot come in this way. *My duty cannot be imposed upon me from without, or required by external enforcement. No other can give or assign me my duty. A friend can advise; a government can compel legal obedience; a community can exercise the authority of social approval or disapproval. But a duty is by nature of its moral character self-imposed. I must accept it for myself in order that it be mine.* For duty is voluntary obligation.

This may appear to increase our difficulty. To make every man a law unto himself only promises to add to the conflict already so disconcerting. It has exactly the danger of democracy, that authority rests with the people instead of descending upon them from above. And freedom of conscience goes farther in this direction than legal privilege or political franchise. For whereas legal, political, or social authority operates from without, the moral authority of conscience acts from within. While a democratic Government places legal restraints upon me, the claim of a duty resides only in the free decision of my conscience to accept it. And by conscience we mean no strange voices from distant heaven or muttering earthly crowds, but the whole mind of the individual engaged to the best of his ability in

moral judgment.

The dangers of individual judgment are chiefly ignorance and selfishness. As Jefferson saw that education is the safeguard of democracy, so we may recognize that intelligence is the safeguard of conscience. My conscience is just as good and no better than my individual judgment; and my first duty is to educate that judgment to know what this duty ought to be. The danger of selfishness is more serious, but it will likewise yield to wise treatment. The remedy lies in seeing that my duty is wherever good may be found. As Walter G. Everett† suggests, duty is co-extensive with human values. That is to say wherever a good or human value is at stake, there is a duty. Wherever it is possible to conserve or increase the sum total of human values, the good man has cause to act.

We often have an impulse to act where our own good is at stake. There appears to be a more elemental urge to save my good than to undergo risks for the welfare of others. The so-called instinct of self-preservation has been loaded with our manifold sins of selfishness and driven back to the wilderness. We are in the habit of pronouncing human nature selfish, and easily assume that every man will naturally look out for himself. But it is not true that every man naturally looks after his own interests. Persistently we deny our good of the future for the good of the present. Continually we take the part for the whole, surrender the larger part for the fragment.

If we can extend our view of the good to larger perspectives, the failures of fragmentary living will be corrected. The man who can bring himself to consider his own future good, will then by the same process lift his eyes more readily to the good of others. The expansion of attention to more remote goods thus means extension of appreciation in every direction until we find our duty concerns the distant values of other persons as well as our own future. In fact, so inclusive is the network of human relations that to be a member of the human race at all is to find my good bound up with the good of others. My very status as a human being concerned in the fate of human values, endows me with a duty toward all fellow-creatures. It is myopic to suppose my duty could end with myself, my family, or my nation. For values are everywhere related, and the good we seek is common weal attainable in the largest sense only by common consent. *The good of all, when rightly viewed is the duty of each.*

Yes, perhaps, if every one accepts his duty. But it is all too evident that everyone does not do his duty. The most urgent question after all is not what or where but why. *Why* should I do my duty? Because it is reasonable. No one can deny it is unreasonable to live by mere habit or impulse. For habits and

† *Moral Values*, p. 252.

impulses are naturally unreasoned; they act often unconsciously, usually without careful scrutiny or attention. They are what they are by virtue of their freedom from reflective control. But it may also be insisted that duty too is unreasonable, with exhibits of fanatical cases in which blind obedience to duty thwarted reason. To this we simply reply: that is not what we mean by duty. *Blind duty is either habit or impulse and thus contradicts the duty of intelligent purpose.* My duty must be reasoned. Inherited duty is not mine, but another's; habitual duty is not my present duty; impulsive duty is not my consistent, persistent duty. Only after reasoning upon our motives do they become clear purpose. And only then have we any right to act from duty, because it is reasonable to defend the good.

Again, why my duty? Because it is independent. Every duty is a declaration of independence, a revolt against bondage to custom or external coercion. My duty may coincide at most points, (in truth it should at many points) with the legal and moral standards of the group. For man is a social animal and his good as we have noted is largely consonant with the social good. But the mark of a duty is that it is not altogether another's choice but my own. I freely choose to obey this law or coincide with that custom, and the acts springing from this motive have quite a different flavour from those of a slave beaten into submission. They are voluntary obligations and carry the joyous eagerness of a race in which a man desires the goal he strives after. The advantage of duty over legal restraint is just this unification of all desires and driving forces in human nature, just this release of all one's powers into the direct channel of a chosen aim. It is the advantage of independent motive power, of self-control over remote control.

Finally, why my duty? Because it is responsible. Impulsive motives are like sails waiting for a breeze, or moods dallying with the chance temper of the moment. Duty-motives are steady, for they are geared into regular purposes which hold true above variations of wind and weather or mood and temperament. The man who is good or honest, kind or just only when he feels like it is not the easiest one to live with. The public servant who is faithful to his task only when the mood is upon him is hardly to be trusted. Duty is the one dependable motive for conduct. The destiny of human values is too dear to leave to chance, to impulse or passing mood. It is my duty to live by duty.

Next—"Your Law".

PAUL E. JOHNSON

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

"NATURAL" AND "SPIRITUAL" MYSTICISM*
SHANKARA AND ECKHART

[**D. L. Murray** wields a silent but powerful influence by casting the thought of the British public into an idealistic mould. In this able review of a remarkable volume he provokes thought on several occasions: students of Theosophy should examine it in the light of their philosophy, while those not familiar with H. P. Blavatsky's instructions will find it a useful and elevating experience to define and reconcile the distinction between "natural" and "spiritual" mysticisms.—EDS.]

Theosophy, H. P. Blavatsky tells us in her *Theosophical Glossary* is "Wisdom Religion, the one religion which underlies all the now existing creeds—the substratum and basis of all the world-religions and philosophies". The ideal of a universal human religion is one to which many will subscribe who are not able to accept all the detailed revelations to be found in the literature of modern Theosophy; and that the religious experience of humanity under different forms and in different ages and climes presents these universal features, to which Theosophy appeals, is a point to which Dr. Rudolf Otto's latest book contributes a weighty proof.

> East is East and West is West,
> And never the twain shall meet.

If there is any sphere in which that is true, it is *not*, declares the distinguished auther of *The Idea of the Holy*, the sphere of religion, the sphere of mysticism. To prove this assertion, he has made a systematic study, as thorough and laborious as only a German scholar knows how to make, of two classic masters of mysticism, one from the East and one from the West. The Eastern teacher is the Indian Acharya Sankara, who flourished about 800 A.D.; the Western is the medieval German Meister Eckhart who lived between 1250 and 1327 A.D. The creeds of these two teachers were different; their philosophic cultures were different. By no possibility can Eckhart have known and been influenced by his great Asiatic forerunner. In these circumstances it might seem strange if the Brahman and the Catholic Christian agreed in a general sense upon the main principles of their faith. What Prof. Otto demonstrates with an abundance of detailed quotation is something much stranger. It is that there is an almost word-for-word correspondence between these two mystical writers all along the line of their metaphysical

* *Mysticism, East and West.* A Comparative Analysis of the nature of Mysticism. By RUDOLF OTTO (Macmillan, London. 16*s.* net)

affirmations and their devotional precepts. It might seem at times almost as if one Spirit were dictating to them the very phrases in which they were to record an identical message.

Nor does the wonder end here. For in an Appendix (important enough really to have been incorporated in the text) Prof. Otto examines the religious thought of Johan Gottlieb Fichte, the celebrated Idealistic philosopher and disciple of Kant, who wrote in the first years of the nineteenth century and behold! we are able to trace the same line of thought once again, and with the same close resemblances of phraseology, so that Dr. Otto in making extracts from Fichte is able repeatedly to set in brackets the Indian equivalents for the ideas that the German philosopher is expressing, though, as he says, "in Fichte there is not the slightest trace of direct relation which the East (just as he had no intimate knowledge of Eckhart)".

Only a close study of Dr. Otto's book itself can adequately supply a knowledge of the doctrines upon which there exists this remarkable consensus of East and West. But we may quote his own summary of the points upon which the two teachers he has principally studied coincide.

> Brahman, high above the personal God; the personal God submerged and disappearing in the suprapersonal Brahman; the indentity of the soul and Brahman; salvation as identity with Brahman; Brahman determined as the unqualified, pure Being and Spirit, without attributes, without distinctions within itself; the world lacking real being, floating in the indefiniteness of Māyā and Avidyā—all these have, point for point, their parallels in Eckhart, extending even to a surprising identity of phrase.

And in addition to these great ideas which the Indian and the Teuton both accept, there are also, in Dr. Otto's opinion, certain large principles which they are agreed in rejecting. (1) Both are opposed to "illuminism," which Dr. Otto does not define very closely, though he includes in it "fantastic visions, occultism, or miracle-hunting"; the illuminist "experiences objects of a supersensual but still empirical sphere by means of a sixth sense". The knowledge that Sankara and Eckhart pursue is "utterly different from all knowledge of the senses or of reflection, or anything we can achieve by logical mental processes." It follows that, (2) according to them, the true mystical apprehension does not come through emotion, from excited states of feeling. It is "knowledge based upon real being," though not gained by ordinary process of argument. And lastly (3) they are both, Dr. Otto insists with especial vigour, opposed to "nature-mysticism," as expressed in such verses as

> I am the mist of the morning. I am the breath of even.
> I am the rustling of the grove, the surging wave of the sea.

Theirs, we are told, is "a spiritual, not a nature mysticism . . . . a spiritual, not a natural nor an aesthetic valuation". Nature mysticism, in Dr. Otto's view, is "a sublimated naturalism even in its

highest and most abstract forms, and therefore easily passes into the fervour of erotic mysticism"—a snare to be avoided.

It is upon this last point that the present reviewer would wish to offer some diffident remarks from a standpoint that may be described as (in a very loose sense) Platonist. Dr. Otto, it now becomes important to inform the reader, is not concerned simply with the points of agreement between his two mystics: he is conscious, and wishes to make us equally conscious, of points of divergence. On the basis of a wide common conviction he finds that the "Gothic" Eckhart and the Oriental Sankara build certain deeply differing doctrines. The chief of these antitheses and the one upon which I wish to dwell, concerns the true significance of that world of multiplicity, of Becoming, the Kantian realm of phenomena, the Indian veil of Maya, behind which must be sought the indivisible Unity of the Godhead, pure Being, the *noumenon*. What is the relation of the One to the Many? Let us hear Dr. Otto:—

> When Eckhart insists that we must also leave God [*i. e.* the personal God of popular and dogmatic religion] and climb beyond God, that God disappears and enters into the mode-less Godhead, it might seem as if this going forth of God and of the world with God out of the depth of the Godhead, were only an unhappy anomaly, a fate to be redeemed or a great cosmic mistake to be corrected. This is indeed the case with Śankara, for whom the coming forth of God and the world from the primeval oneness of Brahman is the great "mistake" of Avidyā. But it is not so with Eckhart. God is the wheel rolling out of itself, which, rolling on, not rolling back, reaches its first position again. . . . . But it is not an error to be corrected in Him, that He is eternally going out from and entering "into" Himself; it is a fact that has meaning and value—as the expression of life manifesting its potentiality and fullness.

Now what is here presented (we may note) is a divergence between Eckhart and Sankara, rather than between "Gothic" (*i.e.*, Northern European) thought and Oriental thought as such. For Dr. Otto informs us with the full authority of his immense studies in Indian mysticism that there are other types of Indian religious thought which avoid this absolute negation of the value of activity within the phenomenal realm, renouncing "Nirvana in order to remain in the unending activity of Samsāra" (page 231). But is this preference for the "dynamic" over the "static" type of mysticism, this faith in Eckhart's God who "glows and burns without ceasing with all His riches, all His sweetness, all His joy" *within* the world of ordinary experience, which "becomes, when it is found again in God, a place of joy and of joyous spontaneous action in all good works," is this preference really consistent with the uncompromising rejection of nature-mysticism which we have already quoted? If Eckhart made such a cleavage is Eckhart on this point a good teacher for today? Dr. Otto here seems to us to be misled by his own well-known doctrine of the *numinous*, of the Divine as revealed in the

character of the "Wholly Other". For if we take this idea of the "Wholly Other" literally we must be shut up in that mysticism which negates activity, we must acquiesce in an Ultimate Reality that utterly transcends the world of ordinary living and excludes it. But if the Godhead is "the wheel rolling out of itself" and informing life in its "potentiality and fullness," then it is surely impossible to limit this immanence to the sphere of ethical endeavour and to the quest for salvation in the narrowest religious sense. We shall not oppose the "spiritual" to the "natural" and "aesthetic" valuations," but seek to trace the Spirit in nature and beauty as in all the manifestations of the hidden Source of Life. There is no true opposition between a natural and a spiritual mysticism, only between a vital and a devitalizing religion.

D. L. MURRAY

THE PUZZLE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY*

[**C. E. M. Joad** has been praised and criticized in the press for the last several weeks because of his two new books. We have the co-operation of his keen western brain which analyses and examines the product of the painstaking eastern brains of Professor Dasgupta.

In his review Mr. Joad raises the interesting question of the Indian theory of the evolution of philosophy in particular and, by implication of knowledge in general. *Shruti* (Revelation), *Smriti* (Tradition), *Itihasa-Purana* (History-Mythology) mean something quite different from what these terms imply in western theology, Christian mysticism and modern science. On this subject THE ARYAN PATH hopes to publish some useful articles.—EDS.]

Ten years ago Professor Dasgupta brought out the first volume of his history of Indian philosophy. The work achieved immediate recognition. It was destined, it was obvious from the first, to become the standard work on the subject. It was clear, it was scholarly, it was authoritative, and it was enormously comprehensive. In an Introductory chapter Professor Dasgupta surveyed the ground which he then proposed to cover. The first volume was to contain an account of the Vedas, the Brahmanas and the earlier Upanishads, the Buddhist philosophy, the Jaina philosophy, the Samkhya-Yoga, the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Mimamsa systems; the Sankara School of the Vedanta the treatment of which was begun in the first, the philosophies of the Yoga-Vasistha and of the Bhagavad-Gita together with an account of the speculations of the Indian medieval schools were reserved for a second. At the end of the second volume there was also promised a chapter containing Professor Dasgupta's estimate of the value of the philosophical development

* *A History of Indian Philosophy*. By SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA. Two Vols. (Cambridge University Press. 30*s*. and 35*s*.)

he had described. After a ten years' interval the second volume, delayed by the ill-health of the author, has at last appeared. It has all the virtues of the first, and it faithfully fulfils its promise in regard to the ground covered; but the concluding chapter of critical estimate of Indian philosophy as a whole is missing. Instead, the author speaks in his new Preface of a third volume dealing with pluralistic and dualistic systems of Indian philosophy, and even of a fourth and a fifth which will describe the lesser known schools of Vaisnavism, and give some account of Indian aesthetics and political philosophies of law and right. The third volume, we are told, is nearly ready, but we shall, I am afraid, have to wait a considerable time for Professor Dasgupta's own comments upon his long journey through the wilds of Indian thought, if, as he originally intended, he reserves his chapter of estimate and valuation to the end of his survey.

In the absence of this last chapter Professor Dasgupta's method may be described as that of pure exposition. His object is to tell us exactly what the doctrines are which different Indian philosophers have held, how they have developed and how they are related to each other, with no more of comment and interpretation than will serve the purpose of exposition. In order to make sure of rendering his account and interpretation of the various systems as accurate as possible, Professor Dasgupta has gone wherever possible to the original sources. More particularly in the recently published second volume he has had recourse to manuscripts unpublished, and, in some cases, previously unknown. Not only were they moth-eaten and difficult to read, but as he tells us with justifiable pathos, it was only after he had read them all through that he could assure himself that most of them contained no new matter worth recording, and that beyond the satisfaction which this assurance gave him, his time and trouble had been wasted.

Absorbed in his task of exposition, Professor Dasgupta has studiously refrained from comparing Indian with European philosophical ideas. In many cases the parallels are close enough—*practically all the theories which the West fondly regards as its own are to be found somewhere or other in this immense speculative mass*,—the main difference being, in his own words, "the difference of the point of view from which the same problems appeared in such a variety of forms in the two countries,"—but he has left it to others to point them out. He has also refrained from criticism of the views of other critics whose interpretations differ from his own, a duty which, he says, many friends have enjoined upon him; but, as he drily remarks, "criticism has been considered beyond the scope of this work

which, as at present planned, will cover some 3,000 pages when completed".

Raised by Professor Dasgupta's exertions to an eminence from which it is possible to take a bird's eye view of the whole field, one is able to appreciate for the first time the distinguishing characteristics of Hindu thought, and to understand the wideness of the gulf that separates it from European philosophy. It may not be out of place to consider for a moment the reasons for this separation, and for the consequent ignorance of and comparative indifference to Indian philosophy in the West. For this lack of understanding there are, I think, two main reasons: the form of Indian philosophy is unfamiliar, the content unsympathetic. The form of most of the Indian systems is broadly the same. There is a set of poems or prose aphorisms, the Vedas or the Upanishads, from which the system derives and upon which it is based. There are treatises written in short pregnant sentences, the *sutras*, usually in commentary or exposition of the original poems or of the ideas contained in them. The *sutras* being held in the greatest respect, any new thought or speculation which occurs to subsequent thinkers is announced in the form of a commentary upon or development of the thought of the *sutras*. It has, therefore, first to be reconciled with them, in the sense of being shown to be merely a development of ideas already latent in them, and secondly, to defend itself against the criticism of rival systems. In this way, the original poems, the *sutras*, and the commentaries upon and developments of the *sutras* come to form an elaborate system. As the system grows, it has to meet unexpected criticisms, and to withstand the impact of new ideas for which it is not in the least prepared. Thus each system "grew and developed by the untiring energy of its adherents through all the successive ages of history; and a history of this growth is a history of its conflicts".

The process I have recorded is quite unlike anything in Western thought, and gives to Indian philosophy an air of unfamiliarity. The original poems and prose aphorisms consist of philosophical truths intuitively perceived, revelations of reality, which are considered to need neither argument nor defence. The *sutras* are more like lecture notes than books; short and pithy, they bristle with technical terms and are full of allusions to the objections brought by rival systems which they are seeking to refute. Not only are the technical terms not explained, but they are used in different senses in different places, while the allusions, intelligible enough to those who no doubt had direct oral instructions on the subject, are lost upon Western readers.

Puzzled by the form of Indian philosophy, the Westerner is unable to see why it should have been adopted. Is it not, he cannot help wondering, prejudicial

to new thought to compel it to accommodate itself within the bounds of a traditional system? Does not the religious veneration with which the systems are regarded as complete compendia of truth tend to stifle free enquiry, and to substitute scholarship and textual criticism, dialectical skill and the ingenuity which is required of those who must fit new pieces into old frameworks, for the free play of the unfettered mind? The Westerner finds the implied criticism of these reflections confirmed by Professor Dasgupta.

> All the independence of their thinking was limited and enchained by the faith of the school to which they were attached. Instead of producing a succession of free-lance thinkers having their own systems to propound and establish, India had brought forth schools of pupils who carried the traditionary views of particular systems from generation to generation, who explained and expounded them, and defended them against the attacks of other rival schools which they constantly attacked in order to establish the superiority of the system to which they adhered.

The history of the systems extends for about two thousand years. Their development seems to have stopped about the beginning of the seventeenth century, and with the development of the systems Indian philosophy itself seems to have come to a standstill.

In the second place the doctrines themselves, although of profound metaphysical importance, are uncongenial to the Western temperament. In a valuable chapter on the unity of Hindu thought, Professor Dasgupta singles out the doctrine of Karma, the doctrine of Mukti and the doctrine of the Soul (this last, of course, is not to be found in Buddhist philosophy) as common to most of the Indian systems, and specifies a pessimistic attitude to this world as a pervasive feature of all of them. That these doctrines do in fact encourage the attitude of fatalistic resignation which seems to the Westerner to characterise the East, is, I think, undeniable, and his temperamental incapacity for renunciation in life is at once the source and the measure of his instinctive antipathy to the doctrines which seem to him to require it. He can, for example, never rid himself of the suspicion that the doctrine of Karma is perilously akin to a purely passive Fatalism. I do not myself think that this suspicion is just; for by knowledge, contemplation and strict adherence to the five great vows a man may liquidate his past karma, and, no more karma being generated, break the chain of birth and rebirth which the potency of past karma entails. But whence are to be derived the determination and the will necessary to acquire the knowledge and to keep the vows? If a man is free, free *before* he has liquidated his karma, well and good; there is no difficulty and he can at any moment begin the new life which the Indian sage enjoins. But how, then, represent him as at the same time determined by the

fruits of past karma which he is reaping?

Again, Indian philosophy teaches that pleasure is an appearance only, and that indulgence in it only perpetuates a long train of causes and effects in which pain is bound to preponderate over pleasure. The Western's reasons may be convinced but his heart is untouched. Not only does he on the whole enjoy this world, but he believes that a certain amount of pleasure in it is good for him, and instinctively feels that those who belittle this world and its enjoyments are really crying sour grapes. These are temperamental and not intellectual differences. The European middle-classes, and it is the middle classes who have written the books and formed the ideas of the West, probably have as pleasant lives as any race of human beings that have yet existed, and they are not going to be easily convinced that they are miserable because the assumption of their misery is required to prove the truth of a particular philosophy. They are much more inclined to think that there must be something wrong with a philosophy which can be true, only if they are unhappy.

C. E. M. JOAD

The Ethical Religion of Zoroaster. By M. M. DAWSON, LL. D. (Macmillan & Co., New York).

"The preparation of this book has taken nearly fifteen years"; its writing was undertaken at the suggestion of Rev. Andrew Jackson Jutkins D. D. of the Methodist Episcopal Church to whom it is dedicated. It is a companion Volume to the author's *Ethics of Confucius*, and *Ethics of Socrates.*

With patience Dr. Dawson has selected and classified quotations; he has linked them with his own remarks; thus each of the 33 chapters is devoted to a particular topic. The book gives a very good idea of the Zoroastrian creed as it is viewed by minds not influenced by mysticism. However, the author has shown discrimination in not rejecting Pehlevi books; nor has he confined himself to the *Gathas*, but has made use of Yasts and Nyasis also. Pehlevi, Pazand and Persian texts are a part of the Zoroastrian tradition and affect the daily life of modern Zoroastrians even more than do the Gathas.

It is one of those volumes which informs the Christian world about the teaching of an oriental religion. As such, we must regard it as belonging to this second period during which the labours of the orientalists who translated sacred texts are being utilized for the benefit of the general public. The first period closed with the completion of the task of translation of all important oriental texts. The second is devoted to understanding and appreciating the old-world faiths. Those who would never go to a series like the *Sacred Books of the East* will read one like *The Wisdom of the East.* The volume before us is of the latter type. Such volumes prepare the work of the third period yet to commence, when the mystic and not only the metaphysical, the esoteric and not only the ethical aspects of ancient eastern religions will be studied. Then will the world perceive the Theosophical teaching that there is a common source from which all philosophies and religions have sprung; and all of them for a common purpose—to help man to understand his own nature which is identical with the Great Nature; to aid him in realizing that God is within him, nay is himself, master of all processes in manifested universe.

S. E.

The Religion of Tibet. By SIR CHARLES BELL. (The Clarendon Press, Oxford. 18s.)

Tibet has attracted the attention of different peoples for diverse reasons throughout the millennium and a half of its recorded history. The un-recorded pre-historic past of the country remains largely down to this day the *Terra incognita* even to anthropologists. This character of *unknownness* clings to very many institutions of Tibet which, has succeeded in sustaining its world-championship as the "forbidden" country, defying the most subtle tactics of modern publicity. The lure of occultism deepens round such an unknown entity in the human family and generations of intrepid researchers, of secular as well as of spiritual leanings, have attempted to penetrate the veil of mysteries across the Himalayas. Sir Charles Bell is a renowned authority on Tibetology and his *Tibet: Past and Present*, (1924) and the *People of Tibet*, (1928) is now followed up by the *Religion of Tibet*, completing a cycle of fascinating survey richly illustrated and documented. Living amidst the Tibetans for 18 years with one year in the forbidden city of Lhasa, and speaking their language as he did, the author could pronounce his opinions on some of the most intricate problems of the inner life of the Tibetan people. Moreover, this extensive knowledge of things Tibetan deepened his sympathies for the people and gave him a rare intuition as the supreme price for years of painstaking research. He preserved a thorough objectivity of judgment and enriched his narrative with shrewd observations of men and things; and hence his pictorial documents are no less interesting than the literary ones which he has handled with rare mastery and discrimination. For years his book will remain the best descriptive survey of the Tibetan sects, organizations, and their workings. Two valuable pictures, one representing the Indian Buddhist Pandits, *Arya Asanga* and *Vasubandhu* painted by Tibetan artist, and another, a photo of the tomb of the renowned Bengali Buddhist reformer of the Tibetan religion, *Atisha*. (1000 A. D.) bring back to our mind the fact that India and Tibet stand mysteriously linked up spiritually through Buddhism in spite of almost desperate barriers physical, ethnical and linguistic. Allowance being made naturally for the inevitable falling off from the pristine purity of early Indian Buddhism, we must still consider it to be very remarkable that a people whom their next door neighbour, China (a cousin, moreover, of the Sino-Tibetan family) always despises as "troublesome savages," were embraced into the spiritual fold of Buddhism and reclaimed from savagery to civilization.

The secret of success of Buddhist India in this act of cultural reclamation has been found hy the author to lie in the deep humanitarian impulse of the religion of the Buddha. "All good works whatever are not worth one-sixteenth part of the love, which sets free the heart. Love which sets free the heart comprises them". (*Itivuttaka*, iii. 7) It is this hidden current of disinterested love which fertilised for centuries the awful deserts of Central Asia and which influenced the mind and soul of the nomadic hordes of the Turanians, the Turko-Mongolians and the Sino-Tibetans who vyed with one another for over one thousand years in building centres of cultural and spiritual activities in the monasteries of Khotan, Turfan, Kucha, Tuen Huang and other zones of Ser-Indian archæology, and Tibet is one of the biggest and most remarkable laboratories of this cultural fusion. Its pre-historic chapter of Shamanism, magic, human sacrifices etc. attached to the old *Pon* religion were slowly but surely transformed by Indian Buddhism which had to make a series of compromises with the preceding cults. The history of the introduction of Buddhism, its expulsion and return, till it became the national religion of Tibet has been narrated through the first hundred strirring pages of the book; while the second half is devoted to a most valuable and

painstaking description of the later Tibetan sects and their priesthood, slowly extending its sway for the whole of Tibet and even beyond to Mongolia, the bone of contention between China and Tibet for centuries. The tolerance, of the Buddhist Mongal Khans of Central Asia was proverbial, for they invited the first miniature Parliament of Religions, with Christians, Zoroastrians and Confucians working peacefully before the Assembly of the Buddhist Khans. Tibetans were the great intermediaries in this transmission of India's culture to the Far East and the history of Tibet, therefore, should gain increased importance in the mind of the students of Asiatic history. We missed very much the section on the Art of Tibet; (Tibetan painting, bronze, etc.) which is the twin sister of Tibetan religion. The valuable researches of MM. Paul Pelliot, Hacking, Bacot, G. Roerich and others also might have been utilized, to demonstrate that some of the finest specimens of Asiatic *arts* and *handicrafts* have come from our friends of Tibet.

KALIDAS NAG

Indian Dust, being Letters from the Punjab. By PHILIP ERNEST RICHARDS. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 6s.)

The end of the reading brings a sense of disappointment. Not that these letters written to kith and kin are not colourful; not that they are devoid of sincere thinking and earnest aspiring; but that such a man as Richards having laboured in this country for nearly a decade should have got so little out of the real India!

He had a vision of the Great Mother ere he left his native land; he wrote:

> The Himalayas are the loftiest mountains in the world. Indian sages are the sagest in the world. India is the oldest, the most mysterious, the wisest land in the world—and we are going to India!
>
> Envy us, congratulate us. (p. 16)

His intuition led him to the feet of that devoted servant of Sarasvati, Brijendra Nath Seal, who was a fellow passenger on that voyage to India the only one which Richards took. That voyage "made a new man of him". He came to teach English literature at the Dyal Singh College, Lahore; after four years he went to the Islamia College of the same city. He died and his body went to the dust of India, he loved.

During the first month of his arrival he said:

> Only a god could give India all the love a man would give India; and only a god could say of India how beautiful she is, and what greatness lies ahead of her (p. 28).
>
> I do not feel in the least superior to the world here, nor yet inferior. . . . . It will be seen that India is immortal. When she has learned a few lessons from the West, she may lead the world. If India *were* India, Great Britain would not be so on top of the world as she is now—even in practical matters. (p. 31).

Richards had no use for the missionary "who keeps a carriage, has electric light and electric fans in his house and suffers other hardships for the gospel" (p. 97) but he confesses that "I would have a carriage and electric fans if I saw the way to them" (p. 98) in spite of the fact that he told Ramsay MacDonald that he was a Socialist (p. 98). In justice to him however it must be pointed out that he believed that "a people devoid of the means of action with effect, in the daily concerns of life, cannot possess the things of the spirit. Trade is a moralizing and a spiritual force—trade and manufacture are essential to manhood. That is the rather surprising conclusion I have come to out of the ripe experience of five months" (p. 48). He was a free-thinker (p.47) and was "at a loss to understand why different religions should despise each other when they are so much alike" (p. 91). And he was not a rank materialist: "I am unconvinced by Sir Oliver Lodge and other psychic writers. I incline to believe in ghosts, but even ghosts do not persuade me in immortality. I neither believe nor disbelieve" (p. 197). Yet—

> In every one of us there is something divine that puts on flesh and endures a thousand ills,

and deserves its reward for its heroic deed in becoming human (p. 129).

" I hold by faith, not by memory, the belief in previous incarnations" (p. 17).

The Volume is divided into three parts; it should have been into two. The first half contains a record of his intuitive perceptions, a clear insight, untainted by the corroding influence of the society of Britons in India. Richards started out well—"God, Sir, if you come out here I wonder what you would think of Anglo-Indians. I have met but occasional samples of them, for neither Norah nor I seek society, except Indian Society" (p. 55). But he did not succeed in resisting that soul-killing influence, as the second half of the book shows. Why was this ?

With idealism and with vision he started; feeling that here was ancient grandeur and ageless wisdom he wanted to touch the border of the Sari of the Real India; and yet, he seems to have made no attempt to seek out the reason of India's immortality, mystery, sagacity. For example he did not prepare himself by study and contemplation ere he set out for Amarnath—it was a journey, not a pilgrimage. He could not fathom the meaning of the cry of the devotee—"Amarnath, I come, I come!"; he ends his descriptive letter—"Religion! a gruesome subject my masters". He did not succeed in piercing the maya of psychic and creedal India, behind which lies hidden her real soul.

This type of Britisher is not uncommon in India. He sees that—

> Kindness is the rule in India. If a civilization is to be judged by its manners before all other tests, then India possesses a more advanced civilization than the West . . . . Almost everyone here gives you love, and looks for it. Christian resignation seems to be practised here every day, by Mohamedans, Hindus, and Sikhs; who, in worldly respects, are so poor and defenceless; whose living is a few rupees, and whose death is perhaps a puff of fever. (p. 26).

And yet he does not ask what force moulded such tolerance and such disregard for earthly existence.

He finds that—

> Almost every student in the college wins love at first sight, and an affectionate relationship springs up between him and you; unless you are that peculiar kind of Britisher who lives in a region as cold as the moon, or unless you are a stranger to love, and blind to the spiritual in homely form (p. 31).

And yet he does not look for a philosophy of life and conduct which would enable him to resist the influence of that deadening cold, and to bring forth from within himself the spiritual in the routine of life.

He acknowledges that—

> The maintenance of discipline, and the settlement of relations between the Hindus and the Mohamedans provide us with matter for our deliberations (p. 39).

And yet he does not see that the solution for his problem lies in a real study of the history and the tenets of these religions, which would unveil to him the similarity which he suspects must underlie them. Again, "the thing here they call *education* stinks in my nostrils," (p. 60) and yet he does not ask what kind of education built ancient India, and what makes Indian students "the gentlest, the most highly civilized, the most beautifully sensitive natures I have ever met". (p. 18)

In short he passes by the wisdom of the Rishi and the Sufi because he sees the ignorance of the sadhu and the moulana. Thus men like Richards miss the opportunity kind Karma brings; in them the ancient East remains submerged in the modern occident which has reared them.

Richards' personal religion had much of beauty, grace and truth in it—it makes for the charm of the book as of the man. He tried to live up to his belief, "never ostracize a man however much you may object to him". (p. 18.) He had a fine sense of reverence for life and he was strong in hope for India he loved. While he regretted that "what is now so beautiful will vanish" (p. 30) he believed that "India will remain; nay India will be revealed".

O.

The World of Epitomizations.—A Study of the Philosophy of the Sciences. By GEORGE PERRIGO CONGER. (Oxford University Press, London. 29*s.*)

This is in every sense of the word a weighty volume. Of its 600 pages there are but few which do not show an array of references to works of modern philosophers and scientists, and a simple calculation proves these to number 2,285. Great industry has gone to the making of this book and Dr. Conger records his indebtedness to many colleagues and students of Minnesota University in this connection. For the most part it is highly technical and some of it not easy reading. From the first page to the last we find no reference to Indian or other ancient philosophies, nor to mystic, occult, or theosophical literature—it is emphatically a modern production, the outcome of modern thinking and research, and yet.....the whole volume is an exposition of the Hermetic axiom "*As above so below*," and might have been written as an expansion of :–"From *Gods* to *men*, from Worlds to atoms, from a star to a rushlight, from the Sun to the vital heat of the meanest organic being—the world of Form and Existence is an immense chain, whose links are all connected. The law of Analogy is the first key to the world-problem, ..." (*The Secret Doctrine*, I,604)—words familiar doubtless to many readers of THE ARYAN PATH.

The author's argument is stated with admirable clearness and succinctness :

> The Universe is a vast system of systems which strikingly resemble one another in the details of their structures and processes. Among these systems, or realms, are matter, life, and mind. The structures and processes of matter, or the physical world, resemble those of life, or the organisms, and both matter and life resemble mind. But below, or beyond the realm of matter there appear to be three other systems also, by the similarities of their structures and processes, identifiable as realms. These are the realms of logic, number, and geometry-kinematics, constituting a great cosmic sub-structure just beginning to be known as such. The Universe, although it is not a mind, begins with structures and processes which are logical and culminates in structures and processes which are personal. Human personality, socially developed, is, thus far, the highest concentration, the most complete epitome of the universe.

In short, as we have learned otherwheres, "to become a Self-Conscious Spirit, the latter must pass through every cycle of being, *culminating in its highest point on earth in Man*". (*The S. D.* I, p. 192. Italics by the reviewer.)

Dr. Conger divides his book into two main portions, the first deals with the date of the natural sciences, cosmogonic, biotic and neuro-psychological realms, and in this the reader is, as it were, in the region of tangibilities and should find this part of the book rich with suggestive information. Division II treats of the data of logic, number and geometry-kinematics arranged in accordance with the hypothesis of epitomization, and here we are on less solid ground where we must truly be prepared to recognise that "thoughts *are* things". To appreciate the work readers versed in the terminology of modern theosophy must be prepared to translate conceptions into a new nomenclature. Thus we have "realms" of matter, life and mind divided into "levels" not planes, or subplanes, and we have "parallelisms" not rays. The structures characteristic of each of the "levels" will be called "Monads" and, according to the hypothesis developed in this book, all the monads of the various levels and realms exhibit significant resemblances in their characteristic structures and processes, "this may be called epitomization by analogy. Epitomization by parallelism differs somewhat from this". A significant statement. The author notes that the numbering of levels within a given realm "does carry some indication of evolutionary sequence—the numbering of monadic characteristics within a given level does not"; this is what, in the light of theosophy, we should expect.

From so lengthy a book, so packed with statements and references it is impossible to do more than select a very few striking sentences out of the many which might be paralleled with phrases from *The Secret Doctrine*.

1. "Here," says Dr. Conger, "we make the assumption that the tubes, or some corresponding distributions of energy, or some conditions which, in connection with material structures, appear as energy, exist in their own right at a level prior to that of electrons; although the possibility of building up such tubes of force from monads of a realm prior to the cosmogonic for the present must remain largely an assumption." For science, yes, but not for the student who appreciates that "Fohat hardens the atoms" *i.e.* by infusing energy into them and "electrifies into life, and separates primordial stuff or pregenetic matter into atoms". Neither are "tubes" of energies alien to the minds of any who have studied the subject of occult physics.

2. "In the monads of the new level, *i. e.* units of electric charge, the monads of this level, *i. e.* lines of force remain as constituents...Jeans is 'tempted to imagine' that lines of force play a part in atomic structure". And again "according to Schrodinger, an electron may be regarded as the limit of a set of vibrations". Here are adumbrations of approach to the Eastern doctrine of *tattva* and *tanmatra* and that very heterodox scientist, Sir. J. H. Jeans, might be tempted to study the *Vishnu Purana.*

3. "Problems connected with the genesis of astronomical bodies show surprising resemblances to problems of biology." "That astronomical bodies re-produce in bi-parental process has been maintained for nebulae by Gifford, and for stars by Lindeman and Bickerton." "In cases of bi-parental reproduction in the biotic realm, there are notable processes of reduction of the number of cromosomes in germ cells. Nothing of the sort is ordinarily suspected in astronomical bodies; but according to the hypothesis of epitomization, some facts in astronomy and chemistry which have no ready explanation may be set in parallelism with biological reduction." Again, after more detailed discussion of some of the chemical problems connected with the anomalous groups of the periodic table of the elements, we read:–"At any rate these *may* afford a parallelism with biological processes of formation, cleavage and growth of a fertilized egg." And so we are set thinking of some archaic phrases from early stanzas of the Book of Dzyan in which we learn of the Ray which "causes the Eternal Egg to thrill, and drop the non-eternal Germ, which condenses into the World Egg"; and later, when Fohat "hardens the atoms," "reflecting the 'Self-existent Lord' like a mirror, each becomes in turn a world".

When we pass to the Biotic Realm the author begins with "organic chemical monads" at one end of the scale and mounts to "Social Monads" at the other; and by "social monads" he intends human societies, National, Imperial, Federated States, and finally racial or continental civilisations! A wide net indeed, but "Father–Mother spin a Web, whose upper end is fastened to spirit,...and the lower one to its shadowy end, matter; and this Web is the Universe." It is nothing less than universal integrations to which Dr. Conger leads our thought. His reflections lead through ideals of Leagues of Nations to suggestions that the "life process in the earth must not be isolated from the rest of the cosmos but must be regarded as receiving impulses from life elsewhere". "The problem of Man's place in the universe is a problem of the adjustment of the most intricate structures, those of man's mind in Society, to the most inclusive structure of structures, the universe." Again "since the cosmic process comes to its epitome and focus in mind, in society, God, even if He is not a Mind but a Person 'in and by Himself,' is at least to be approached by us in ways that are intelligent, personal, and therefore social. Since the cosmic process culminates in such adjustments, the object of religion, although not an individuate person like one of us, nor a corporate person like one of our organizations, may be called a "Culminate Person"—which is surely something like

H. P. B. and which others have called "THE GRAND MAN". Therefore we learn with interest and expectation that Dr. Conger has another book in preparation which will treat of the ethics and philosophy of religion.

EDITH WARD

The Religion of Scientists. By C. L. DRAWBRIDGE. (Benn, London. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

This volume embodies the results of an enquiry recently undertaken by the Christian Evidence Society into the religious beliefs of scientists. Six questions were addressed to all the members of the Royal Society and the replies of two hundred of them are here carefully tabulated and analysed by the Editor of the work, Mr. C. L. Drawbridge.

Any undertaking of this type is obviously attended by formidable difficulties. A large number of those approached found the questions asked them to be too obscure to warrant a definite answer, while of those who replied the great majority expressed themselves in extremely cautious terms. In view of the character of the questionnaire it will be seen that this attitude was justifiable enough:

1. Do you credit the existence of a spiritual domain?
2. Do you consider that man is in some measure responsible for his acts of choice?
3. Is it your opinion that belief in evolution is compatible with belief in a Creator?
4. Does science negative the idea of a personal God as taught by Jesus Christ?
5. Do you believe that the personalities of men and women exist after the death of their bodies?
6. Do you think that the recent remarkable developments in scientific thought are favourable to religious beliefs?

Nevertheless the questions strike one as being on the whole well chosen; such shortcomings as they possess are in the main those that inevitably attach to all enquiries of this type; they cannot in the nature of the case be free from ambiguity. This lack of precision was, as one would expect, peculiarly distressing to those scientifically trained minds to whom the questionnaire was sent. Yet it was characteristic of them also that for the most part they failed to realise that although no strictly accurate replies were possible, their answers could yet serve to reveal a great deal about their attitude to the universe. For it is clear that they have a very definite *symbolical* significance: they go a long way to indicate the source of the individual's "life".

The general impression which one receives from this volume is that scientists as a class are not markedly illuminated men; they have paid a certain price for their extreme pre-occupation with the plane of objective fact. Further, in the case of a large proportion of those here represented, their work is so technical that—apart from the fact that they may lay claim to possessing highly disciplined intelligences—their ideas on the subject of religion would seem to have little more claim on our attention than those of, say, a businessman, an actor or a naval officer. The study of physics or biology may easily lead a man to a discerning appreciation of the fundamental religious problems; that of hydrography, metallurgy or hygiene is hardly likely to confer upon him any notable advantage in evaluating them.

It may be said in conclusion that the results of the enquiry go a long way to substantiate the view that the scientific materialism of the last century is to-day definitely losing its ascendancy—as will be apparent from the following analysis of the replies which were furnished to the questions enumerated above:

	Yes	*No*	*Doubtful*
1.	121	13	66
2.	173	7	20
3.	142	6	52
4.	26	103	71
5.	47	41	112
6.	74	27	99

LAWRENCE HYDE

Dṛg-dṛśya-viveka: An Enquiry into the nature of the "Seer" and the "Seen"; text, English translation, and notes. By SWAMI NIKHILANANDA. Sri Ramakrishna Asrama, Mysore. Re. 1.)

The little book emphasises the importance of Buddhi (reason) in the gaining of knowledge by means of philosophy. Every student of the Upanishads knows the stress laid in them on *Buddhi* as the highest controlling faculty of the mind. Just as the waking consciousness is the standard of judgment even of our dream-state and unconsciousnesses, so Buddhi, is the standard of discrimination between Sat and Asat, truth and non-truth.

We cannot measure the world otherwise than by a standard which lies in ourselves and to expound which is the aim of philosophy. The whole process of cognition is a graded one from authority through mysticism to full realisation in Buddhi, and therefore it is essential that the searcher after truth should make himself a fit instrument to receive the gradual enlightenment on this course. The Upanishads are very definite on this point; purity of life is necessary for the clear working of the higher faculties.

The Dṛg-dṛśya-viveka is a handbook of Vedānta study through the method of concentration (samādhi), for it is only by this that Brahman is realised. The enquiry into the nature of the one who sees and that which is seen (equivalent to a study of the relation between subject and object) proceeds in 36 Sanskrit slokas which after the manner of the verse-upanishads discusses the fundamentals of the Vedantic theory of cognition. A couple of very interesting stanzas deal with the nature of Māyā and with the various degrees of Samādhi.

When reading the little book one realises its enormous value and help for both Eastern and Western students of metaphysics. The Western scholar in his "scientific" enquiries usually finds himself in the two-fold danger, *viz.* of introducing separateness into the intrinsic unity of the "All" (Sarvam), and of neglecting the existence of the "soul" behind and within the phenomena, the presence of the eternal observer and enjoyer of the world of manifestation. Therefore a revival in modern garb and modern application of the Vedantic spirit is a decided advance towards a satisfactory, rational interpretation of this mysterious Universe of ours.

The handbook helps greatly to clear up our concept of *consciousness*, which since the re-assertion of analytical psychology (this being as a matter of fact only a variation of the venerable Brahmavidyā of old), has become the—often misused—password of metaphysics. It is analytical psychology which by the introduction of the unconscious self has found its way back to the "Tat tvam asi" of the Vedānta, and thus even the student of psychoanalysis will benefit from a study of the *Dṛg-dṛśya-viveka*.

W. STEDE

This Surprising World: A Journalist Looks at Science. By GERALD HEARD. (Cobden-Sanderson, London. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

Mr. Gerald Heard is a propagandist for science, but it is a science of to-day, not of yesterday. Western science has in the past appeared proud to overbearing. But its pride, like that of many Western institutions, has of late years received a check; its fruits have been proved no less evil than good; even its basic assumptions have been questioned. In Mr. Heard's essay, as in the writings of such men as Drs. Singer and Needham, it may be discovered casting up its accounts, conducting an inquiry into its own shortcomings. If it has not yet found its soul, it may at least be found querying its psychology. Doubt has been cast not only upon its sufficiency but upon its claim to objectivity even in its own sphere, and Mr. Heard shows how in the effort at self-understanding it turns to a study of its own origins, its historical growth, hoping thereby to determine its subjectivity, and so define the more faithfully its final function and authority. A sketch of that history is what this essay mainly undertakes. It

is very condensed, and though one regrets that at times, for it leaves some issues ambiguous, it has on the other hand the imaginative appeal of the unencumbered outline sketch. The vital story of man, Mr. Heard holds, is the story of the development of his mind into ever-larger understanding, a widening scope of *significant* fact. The epochs of human thinking are all to be viewed as "stages in one unbroken enlargement of mind". It was never an easy process; the creative had to battle with the conservative tendency, the desire of more fearful minds to bind inquiry by their own limited presuppositions. The poetic solutions of myth and the "most fruitful" scientific hypotheses have alike "in their old age hardened into dogmas, and what was once a fine throw of speculation attempting to lasso new facts becomes a rigid band beyond which facts are not to be sought". Mr. Heard shows this occurring again and again through the ages, dynamic apprehension dwindling to dull assertion, dead myth driving man to creative science, dead science driving man to creative myth, forever escaping forward into new realms of the imagination. The great failure of science, he suggests, in its blind assurance of objectivity, has been its neglect of the subjective realm of psychology, leading necessarily to a mechanistic view of the universe humanly unacceptable because it denies human significance. To-day the scientist, driven by the emptiness of his own findings, has come full circle to the problem of his self-discovery, of a vision able to focus "the seer and the seen in one image". We are, says Mr. Heard, to-day on the brink of a great discovery, of man's perception "that his essential nature is a mind and the body is only its projection and also that the universe's essential nature is also a mind, and matter is only its projection".

There are those who may feel that Western science has gone a long way round to arrive at an ancient knowledge. The important thing is that it *is* arriving there, and along its own lines of discovery. That the acknowledgment should come from the pen of such a man as Mr. Heard is a significant fact. His essay, brief though it is, has a genuine liberating force—it marks him, as much as anything else he has written, as a man to be read.

GEOFFREY WEST

The Devil in Legend and Literature. By MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN. (Open Court Publishing Co., London. $3·00.)

This is a comprehensive treatise on the Devil whose adventures are described in a fascinating manner. It will become a book of reference. Not only do we learn about the origin and genealogy of the Devil, but acquire much information regarding his habits, tastes, disguises, amours, and the infinite number of names by which he has been known. The Devil's line of descent is clearly traced from the beginning of mankind to the present day, but so much information does the book contain, that the reader is apt to be bewildered.

The idea of the devil in the old Buddhist and Hindu theology is a purely metaphysical abstraction, an allegory of necessary evil. With the Christians, on the other hand, the myth has become a historical entity, the fundamental stone on which Christianity, with its dogma of redemption, is built. Each generation and nation has had its own particular devil, distinctive from all others, and indicative of the temperament and characteristics of the race. But in all the different nations of antiquity there was not one which believed more in a *personal devil* than do the Christians of the present day. Antiquity recognized no isolated, thoroughly bad god of evil. Pagan thought represented good and evil as twin brothers, born of the same Mother—Nature. At first the symbols of good and evil were purely abstract, such as Light and Darkness. Later they were identified with natural phenomena, such as Day and Night, the Sun and Moon etc. The ancient philosophers defined evil as the lining of

good: *Demon est Deus inversus.* But Satan never assumed an anthropomorphic shape until the creation by man of a personal God.

The following taken from H. P. Blavatsky's *The Secret Doctrine* (II,515-6) throws light on the subject:—

> Esoteric philosophy shows that man is truly the manifested deity in both its aspects—good and evil, but theology cannot admit this philosophical truth. Teaching the dogma of the Fallen Angels in its dead-letter meaning, and having made of Satan the corner-stone and pillar of the dogma of redemption to do so would be suicidal. Having once shown the rebellious angels *distinct from God and the Logos* in their personalities, the admission that the downfall of the *disobedient* Spirits meant simply their fall into generation and matter, would be equivalent to saying that God and Satan were identical. For since the LOGOS (or God) is the aggregate of that once divine Host accused of having fallen, it would follow that the Logos and Satan are one.
>
> Yet such was the real philosophical view of the now disfigured tenet in antiquity. The *Verbum*, or the "Son," was shown in a dual aspect by the Pagan Gnostics—in fact, he was a *duality*, in full *unity*. Hence, the endless and various national versions. The Greeks had Jupiter, the son of Chronos, the Father, who hurls him down into the depths of Kosmos. The Aryans had Brahmâ (in later theology) precipitated by Siva into the Abyss of Darkness, etc., etc. But the fall of all these Logoi and Demiurgi from their primitive exalted position, had in all cases one and the same esoteric signification in it; the *curse*—in its philosophical meaning—of being incarnated on this earth; an unavoidable rung on the ladder of cosmic evolution, a highly philosophical and fitting Karmic law, without which the presence of Evil on Earth would have to remain for ever a closed mystery to the understanding of true philosophy. . . .
>
> The identity of thought and meaning is the one thing that strikes the student in all the religions which mention the tradition of the fallen Spirits, and in those great religions there is not one that fails to mention and describe it in one or another form.

M. F.

Yoga:— International Journal for the Scientific Investigation of Yoga, Vol. I, No. I, October, 1931. (Editor and Publisher: Helmat Palmié, Harburg, Wilhelmsburg, Germany. 12·50 RM.)

This is an elaborately produced, large octavo volume containing contributions in German, English, French and Italian; also bibliographies of the works of Wilhelm Geiger and Arthur Avalon, and a list of the publications of the Pali Text Society. Most of the one hundred or so co-editors and collaborators are Germans and Indians. Amoy, Tokyo, Boston, Pisa and Paris have representatives, and there two in England. It is announced that five issues will appear annually comprising 600 pages.

Whatever the significance assigned to "Yoga," its scientific investigation necessitates experiment by specialists; and theoretical dispositions on the meaning of ancient texts, with which several articles are concerned hardly come within the declared purpose of this journal. But it appears from the investigations of the principal contributors that Yoga has become synonymous in the Kali Yuga, with psycho-physical practices and aims. The psycho-spiritual states of consciousness attained by ancient Brahmanic and Neo-Platonic Theurgy are apparently unknown to modern investigators. It is a significant commentary on the psychological condition of the human race to-day that physicians and psychologists identify hypnosis with *yoga* and expound the latter on the basis of psycho-analysis.

It is undoubtedly true that the magical powers of the Tantrics indicate a knowledge of physiology and anatomy and of will as an energy, of which Western science is absolutely ignorant; but it is also true that these powers are even more dangerous for man, psychically and spiritually than are invisible "rays" and high-voltage electrical currents, physically. Necromancy is now practised secretly and openly in all countries. Civilization is everywhere permeated by hypnotic suggestion and thought-transference. If "the scientific investigation of Yoga" becomes general and extends in the direction indicated by the main contents of this journal, our modern races are likely to experience a Nemesis similar to that which is said to have overtaken the mythical Atlanteans.

W. W. L.

My Diaries: 1888–1914. By WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. (Martin Secker, London. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Western civilisation to-day stands discredited by the Great War; it is not any longer held up to our esteem as the culmination of human effort and a pattern for the rest of mankind. Before the war, however, there were but few who entertained serious misgivings about it. To that small and distinguished company belongs Wilfrid Scawen Blunt.

The nineteenth was a century pre-eminently of colonial expansion. European nations, then in the hey-day of their power penetrated into every region of Asia and Africa, and sought to establish their dominion in sharp rivalry, enslaving or exterminating the original inhabitants. Dictated by economic motives as this policy was in truth, it was defended as Blunt points out—on the theory that "Evolution" required the "survival of the fittest": the weak must give way to the strong; Nature, they said, had ordained it. To Blunt this appeared an immoral and suicidal delusion. He abhorred the contention that a people who happened to be at a disadvantage from a military point of view deserved in consequence to be swept off the face of the globe. However seemingly backward a nation may be, he felt that it had distinctive and precious gifts which it ought to be allowed to cultivate unmolested.

His "Diaries," accordingly, record the activities in which he engaged and the controversies into which he was led in the endeavour to arrest European aggrandisement. Being an Englishman, he was concerned first of all with those lands where British power was extending itself; and as he had first hand knowledge of Egypt, that concern took the form mainly of opposition to the Egyptian policy of the British Government. The Occupation was effected in 1882 as a measure of temporary necessity, but in the next few years it became evident that the Conservative Government and Lord Cromer, their agent, had really no intention of yielding possession of the country: Egypt was to be made part of the Empire. To obtain a reversal of this policy Blunt applied all his time and energy, but his object was not achieved until after the war, and owing to causes with which he had personally nothing to do.

It may be thought presumptuous of a private individual to hope to alter national policy on issues of major importance, but Blunt was a member of the ruling class in an age when English affairs were largely in the hands of a group of aristocratic families, and enjoyed, therefore, exceptional opportunities of influencing personages in high office. He moved intimately in a circle which included most of the leading figures in politics, society, literature and journalism—a fact which lends additional interest to these Diaries and renders them invaluable for a study of the period which they cover and the personalities who played a prominent part therein. Theosophists would be particularly interested to note a conversation with Yeats in which the Irish poet menioned H. P. B. as one of three persons who had most deeply impressed him with power, the other two being William Morris and Henley.

K. S. SHELVANKAR

Freedom of Will. By N. O. LOSSKY, Translated by Natalie Duddington. (Williams & Norgate, London. 6*s.*)

Bergson has expressed his view that freedom of will is a fact of our experience, but—from the very fact that we *are* free—not one we can explain by concepts. Professor Lossky does not agree, and has tried to develop a system of concepts to express Free Will.

He visualises a "Kingdom of God" where the most intimate communion is possible between independent agents (his explanation of Intuition), and a kingdom of enmity based on repulsion between the elements. The upward way to the Kingdom of Heaven is hard, and cannot be found by merely willing it.

Man's purpose is to renounce his limitless formal freedom, choosing the good voluntarily and finally acquiring "positive material freedom in God".

So far as this picture accords with the decree of Karma—in the words of H. P. Blavatsky (*S. D.* I, 643) "absolute Harmony in the world of matter as it is in the world of Spirit"—the author carries the reader with him. But is not his assumption of a God endowed with personality a basic flaw? Has he thought to test his ideas by the teaching of Eastern wisdom? For, as he himself admits, his theory only partially succeeds. It has an air of mechanism, though he is fully aware of the danger.

However, it must be admitted that the author's system of metaphysics (he calls it "concrete ideal-realism") has a special value if only because it asserts the dynamic creative power of the self. We are not the slaves of our character, but we create our character and to some extent our body. The self, in fact, is a super-temporal, super-qualitative entity not dominated by its body, the external world, its own character, or its past. All these may be the occasions of action, but they are not actual causes. Moreover this metaphysic leads the author to a conception, which we should have liked him to develop, of something like reincarnation.

It should be mentioned that four chapters of the book are devoted to examining arguments used against Free Will and to showing the weakness of theories of Determinism and Free Will such as those of Hobbes, T. Lipps, Luther, Schopenhauer and Windelband. Systems of this type involving Determinism fail because they do not throw full responsibility on man for his moral actions.

G. W. WHITEMAN

Temple Bells. By A. J. APPASAMY (Association Press, Calcutta. Rs.2 8as.)

Dr. Appasamy who is a devoted Christian has served his religion well by collecting in this volume gems of Hindu thought, though they be of varying merit. The book is meant for his co-religionists, and is designed to meet the suggested need for a handy volume of selections from the religious literature of India for Christian readers. Naturally therefore, selection of the originals as well as selection of a particular translation among many are done from the Christian point of view. The Bishop of Madras in a foreword says:- "Some we shall at once recognize as true and helpful for our own religious life and worship. Others again will show us where the fuller revelation of our Lord Jesus Christ has enriched or superseded the groping of men." As a liberating influence among Christians the book is of value; as a true revealer of deep Hindu thought and feeling it is defective.

The motive and even plan of the volume can be profitably copied by other sects. Not a haughty toleration by one community of the faiths of sister communities, but a genuine appreciation of other faiths, by their study and understanding is the prime need of India.

E.

Other-World Stuff. By CHARLES J. WHITBY. (Rider & Co., London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

The publishers call this book a "challenge to the dictum of Hegel that philosophy has nothing to do with other-world stuff". It protests strongly against the current scientific and philosophic neglect of super-sensuous intuition and Transcendent Reality. Dr. Whitby welcomes the philosophic leanings of the latest scientific cosmologies, such as those of Jeans, Eddington and Whitehead. He prophesies that they are the prelude to a regular Metaphysic or an experimental science of the Spirit. He affirms his faith in super-sensuous intuition and points to the ancient traditions of Egypt, Jerusalem, Greece and India as significant in this regard. His spiritual creed is a compound of Plotinus and Indian Advaita together with a faith in the vast possibilities of Magic. After the Indian tradition, he insists on moral equipment for research

into these mysteries. He conceives of the Absolute as the One, compact of the three "hypostases" of Intellect, Life and Being, but lying 'beyond' these distinct yet mutually implying aspects as their source. Corresponding to them in the Jivatman are the capacities of Intellect, Love and Will. Every human individual has intuitive powers, though they are discouraged at the present day by the arrogant agnosticism of official science and philosophy. The aim of life is not merely knowledge but spiritual realisation—Moksha or Kaivalya. The author is a believer in the value and validity of the mystic attainment. He further affirms his belief in a heirarchy of higher powers—devas, aerial spirits, siddhas or perfected souls. He inclines to the spiritist hypothesis with regard to spiritualistic pheonomena. He prophesies that if this experimental Metaphysic of the Spirit is not taken seriously, the present "Babylonian Civilisation" is doomed to crash.

The book is attractively written and affords many apercus into the spiritual and occult traditions of humanity. But a "challenge to J. Hegel" must be made of sterner stuff. Assertion and castigation are hardly persuasive methods. We must beard the lion in his own den. Intuition is to be established by philosophic analysis and synthesis; Spiritism or Magic by patient experimental evidence. The book is more literary than scientific.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

Civilization as Divine Superman. By ALEXANDER RAVEN. (Williams & Norgate, London. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

It is a tempting task for students of history to read into the rise and fall of civilizations the operation of "laws". The cycles of culture and racial power are in fact readily explained by the doctrine of Karma; but this is not the kind of law it is usually hoped to find. Mr. Raven, though not a convincing philosopher himself, shrewdly suggests that modern thought has made itself ridiculous by trying to read into history the laws of biological evolution. Bernard Shaw's Methuselahs are as fanciful as Nietzsche's supermen are inhuman. H. G. Wells, the apostle of evolution in history, only achieves the appearance of progress by minimizing the triumphs of former civilizations.

Mr. Raven's own theory is interesting though not really edifying. He believes that the superman is not a vision of the future—he is already with us. Civilization is itself the divine superman. It springs into being as soon as agriculture enables surplus "capital" in the shape of food to be accumulated in large quantities. The new community, as distinct from barbaric nomad tribes, becomes a super-organism capable of growth, life and death, in a similar way to cellular organisms. And just as elements integrating to compounds follow different laws to protoplasm integrating to micro-organisms, so laws of a new type have to be sought for the super-organisms of civilization. They represent a higher integration than biology encompasses.

By applying this theory to the whole range of history, from Sumerian to modern U. S. culture, the author traces out various cycles—political, economic, social, linguistic, religious and artistic. Each cycle covers on an average 2,000 years. And in each of the different phases of the cycle a different code of morality will apply, based on the service exacted by the superman. However much Mr. Raven may argue that his theory gives religion a higher meaning by "rationalising" it, the impression remains that no conception of this type will make a religion of Communism, while the older religions such as Christianity and Buddhism are very seriously debased by it. This book contains many useful historical summaries, charts, and dates showing some of the cyclical aspects of civilization. But for a sounder rationale of the subject it would be preferable, as suggested above, to grasp the workings of Karma, which explains the cycles of historical civilizations as due to the inherent dynamic effect of actions either individual or communal.

G. W. WHITEMAN

FROM PARIS

A PLEA FOR INTOLERANCE

[J. B. is a French gentleman whose outlook is cosmopolitan. He is dissatisfied with the world, because he loves humanity. Once every quarter he will write for THE ARYAN PATH and tell us—how the world looks as it reflects itself in the mirror of Paris.—EDS.]

When visiting an Oriental museum, the "man in the street" seldom fails to express his astonishment at the fearsome and angry aspect of many Hindu and Buddhist deities. Christianity has not been guiltless of bloodshed, yet its images are always of a meek and gentle demeanour; how cruel then must those Asiatic religions be, whose gods signify their wrath in the very presence of their worshippers! It is replied that whether or not they are survivals of a time when the deity was conceived as a being to be dreaded rather than loved; or whether or not they symbolize aspects of divinity; they certainly do not represent "devils," but, on the contrary, friendly spirits who drive away the evil forces and destroy whatever might retard the progress towards the better. Should we not learn from them that destruction is the necessary counterpart of creation, and that nothing can be built up until much is pulled down and even rooted out?

Toleration is the slogan of the age. Christians have discovered it as a virtue when intolerance was no longer in their power; other people, who have no definite belief, are sincerely anxious to understand views which are not their own. But we surely push toleration too far. We take such pains to spare and respect not creative forces but dead carcases, inert remnants of what were once inspiring ideas; nowadays they simply block the way to human betterment. Had we done our best to remove them in time, we might have been spared the recent war. Fourteen years after its conclusion, who could pretend it was anything else than an appalling calamity? Yet the same disaster will overtake us if we do not, each in our own sphere, set out to deal with what has become a living problem for one and all. Might that not be considered as the spiritual and religious duty of our age? Some will say that this is taking a materialistic view of religion: if our stand-point is lofty enough, no human suffering, no destruction of life is of any consequence; if religions had not led to the betterment of earthly conditions, where should we be?—Still murdering each other in the primeval fashion. What is the use of hankering after a greater spirituality if we still allow collective murder a legal and—in all but a very few minorities—a moral recognition? Materialistic

our generation certainly is, and can no more help it than it could change climate. We must make the best of the "spiritual frost" (if I may so call it) of the present time. I put it then, that the problem of war is a pressing one, and should be considered first by all who are interested in spiritual progress. Will toleration help us to deal with it?

We have become much too respectful of old beliefs, obsolete rites, unintelligible scriptures, empty shells of all sorts. Religions, of course, are not the only obstacles to human betterment and to a new spirituality, but they are among the worst. What can we now hope to gain from them? They may indeed be "known by their fruits".

I remember, during the war, asking a fellow-soldier who was a Catholic priest how he could reconcile his faith with his duty as a soldier which undeniably consists in killing as many of his fellow-men as possible. He answered with the usual quotation "Give to Cæsar" &c., and also named many saints, like Saint Martin, who had been soldiers by profession. A student of Theosophy likewise quoted to me the beginning of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, where the objections of Arjuna are allayed by the divine teacher: nothing can really be killed, therefore he may unconcernedly proceed to fight and slay his own kith and kin. Or I might have been referred to that noble aphorism "Teach to eschew all causes; the ripple of effects thou shalt let run its course," of which we read a beautiful commentary in the May number of THE ARYAN PATH (p. 363). This argument indeed has a deeper appeal. But surely war is not only an effect; it is, still more, a potent cause of far-reaching evil, and we cannot get away from our present responsibility, like the Christian who is content to say that it is God's will.

Sacred books being always capable of numerous interpretations, it might be replied that my informants had misunderstood their teachings. But that, we contend, is the very danger of religious authority. That which has many contradictory meanings has no meaning at all. *Were it not safer to close all the sacred books for a while, and act simply according to the lights of our conscience?* We owe much to them, yet we have outgrown them. There is no crime for which a precedent or a condonation may not be found in books composed two thousand or more years ago. I grant that the inner self of man does hardly change, but the outer circumstances do; if we disregard them, we are trying to grow excellent seed in an unsuitable soil. An instance of this we have in the general attitude of the Catholic Church towards "social" reforms (of course there are a few—very few—exceptions). Feeding the poor and tending the sick was for many centuries the privilege of the Church and her divine mission. Nowadays we begin to

perceive that poverty and disease might to a great extent be rooted out; but there the Church is no longer with us, for it is written "The poor ye shall have with you always" . . .; it is a sinful error to hope for a fairer world or for anything else than what always has been, etc. Every yearning for human betterment meets with the same discouraging response from the Churches, especially, of course, from those where traditionalism reigns supreme, or which represent the majority in any particular country. Catholics in France, Lutherans in Germany, Anglicans in England are the fiercest nationalists and militarists. Did they not, during the war, all urge the combatants to "serve God and their country" a truly impossible and scandalous conjunction of ideals—and loudly call on the same God to destory their enemies, a spectacle that would be highly ludicrous if it were not so gruesome? In every country the same good Christians are the die-hard conservatives, the zealous patriots, the supporters of the army, those who hate, despise, or at the best, ignore all the rest of mankind, who oppose any reform and poopooh every generous effort. When I tax these people with narrow-mindedness, I may seem to have wandered to the very opposite of my initial proposition.

I should explain how I came to plead for intolerance.

Just about the time when THE ARYAN PATH was founded, we heard of many movements all tending to universal toleration and mutual understanding. THE ARYAN PATH itself declares its object to be that of: (1) forming nucleus of a Universal Brotherhood of Humanity; (2) studying ancient and modern religions; (3) investigating the unexplained laws of Nature. This last object is excellent in itself, though we have not yet found the Francis Bacon who will give us the *Novum Organum*, the appropriate method to carry out those investigations. No. 2 inspires us with many misgivings, as we tried to explain above. Sacred books are a positive danger, and those who rely on them for guidance do more harm than good. *They* will never help us to get nearer to No. 1, the Brotherhood of Humanity.

It is not always unprofitable to ponder over "what might have been". The responsibility of Theosophists in the last war is small (*it will be greater the next time*); even if unwilling to adjust an unhappy karma by a worse one, they could not have changed the course of events. But the Christian Churches? If they had enforced the commandment "Thou shalt do no murder" and their adepts to choose between soldiering and communion, what might not have happened? Hardly more perhaps than a slight disorganisation of the opposing armies; for a few thousand men a more merciful and more useful death than they afterwards met at the barbed wire, and last but not least, the extreme decay of

Christianity would have become glaringly evident. But very probably it would have revived in the blood of the new martyrs and saved the world once again. However, nothing of the kind did take place. I do not know whether the conscientious objectors in England professed themselves Christians; those who were shot in France (all elementary-school teachers, I am told) were free-thinkers.* Christianity proved a miserable failure in the crucial moment; it stands condemned once for all, and it should be done away with, for it bars the way to better things. *Conscientious objectors, not Christian monks, are the saints of the twentieth century.*

In America was started two or three years ago a certain "Threefold Movement" to promote "Cultural Unity (the union of East and West); Human Unity (The League of Neighbours); Spiritual Unity (the Fellowship of Faiths). It certainly proceeds from pure and noble intentions, and I would not speak of it disparagingly. A branch had been formed in France, but its members were, I imagine, disappointed to find the activity of headquarters centred on the "fellowship of faiths" and the preparation of the "Parliament of Religions". Instead of attempting to reconcile religions which feel no desire at all of being reconciled, as was flatly stated in many of the replies received and published in their organ "*Appreciation*" would it not be a far more useful work, and better calculated to further the purpose of the Movement, to deal with the various religions according to their deserts, *not* in a reverent or "tolerant," but in a *critical* spirit? The urgent problems of the period call for energetic and *intolerant* action—needless to say I do not preach any kind of physical violence or material destruction! Instead of delving into this or that religion for gems of thought which may have been overlooked, let your best writers expose the failure of old beliefs to help us through our present miseries; let them urge seekers after "truth"—the truth of to-morrow, not that of yesterday—to put away incomprehensible gospels and to follow freely their conscience. Some "believers" will be won over to us, and the others may at last perceive how far they have strayed from the spirit of their Master.

J. B.

* Quite recently another conscientious objector, also a school-teacher, was given a fair trial and sentenced to four months' imprisonment. He was first committed to a mental specialist; a man of 27 who refuses to countenance wholesale patriotic murder being obviously a lunatic!

CORRESPONDENCE

DREAMS AND REINCARNATION

I note that you very kindly say that you welcome correspondence. Therefore, I venture to remark on one of the Dreams mentioned in the most interesting article on "Dreams of Future Events," by Mr. R. L. Mégroz in your May issue.

The dream I refer to is the one recorded by Mr. F. Greenwood in his *Imagination of Dreams*,—in which the dreamer dreams of a severed hand on a mantel-piece—and, on the following day calling at a certain house he actually sees on the mantel-piece of the room in which he is received, a mummied hand.

Does this dream present any difficulty to a believer in re-incarnation? Is it not more a dream of recollection than prophecy?—a recall to memory of some action in the past which made a deep impression on the Soul, the Store-house of memory.

Would not the emotion so strongly stirred in the Ego, freed during the sleeping hours—sensing the past as well as the future—communicate itself to the physical brain on its re-entry into the body; thus causing the dream of recollection. Are not incidents and seeming coincidents quite incomprehensible except through the reasoning of the tenet of re-incarnation, or re-embodiment?

Cornwall, England. C. E. HINDLEY SMITH

[Our correspondent and those who are interested in the subject of memory and dreams will find that the following extract throws great light on it. It should be read in conjunction with pp. 59–79 of *Transactions of the Blavatsky Lodge* and also the U. L. T. Pamphlet No. 11 entitled Dreams.—EDS.]

The well-known fact—one corroborated by the personal experience of nine persons out of ten—that we often recognize as familiar to us, scenes, and landscapes, and conversations, which we see or hear for the first time, and sometimes in countries never visited before, is a result of the same causes. Believers in reincarnation adduce this as an additional proof of our antecedent existence in other bodies. This recognition of men, countries, and things that we have never seen, is attributed by them to flashes of soul-memory of anterior experiences. But the men of old, in common with mediæval philosophers, firmly held to a contrary opinion.

They affirmed that though this psychological phenomenon was one of the greatest arguments in favour of immortality and the soul's preëxistence, yet the latter being endowed with an individual memory apart from that of our physical brain, it is no proof of reïncarnation. As Eliphas Levi beautifully expresses it, "nature shuts the door after everything that passes, and pushes life onward" in more perfected forms. The chrysalis becomes a butterfly: the latter can never become again a grub. In the stillness of the night-hours, when our bodily senses are fast locked in the fetters of sleep, and our elementary body rests, the astral form becomes free. It then *oozes* out of its earthly prison, and as Paracelsus has it—"confabulates with the outward world," and travels round the visible as well as the invisible worlds. "In sleep," he says, "the astral body (soul) is in freer motion; then it soars to its parents, and holds converse with the stars." Dreams, forebodings, prescience, prognostications and presentiments are impressions left by our astral spirit on our brain, which receives them more or less distinctly, according to the proportion of blood with which it is supplied during the hours of sleep. The more the body is exhausted, the freer is the spiritual man, and the more vivid the impressions of our soul's memory. In heavy and robust sleep, dreamless and uninterrupted, upon waking to outward consciousness, men may sometimes remember nothing. But the impressions of scenes and landscapes which the astral body saw in its peregrinations are still there, though lying latent under

the pressure of matter. They may be awakened at any moment, and then, during such flashes of man's inner memory, there is an instantaneous interchange of energies between the visible and invisible universes. Between the "micrographs" of the cerebral ganglia and the photo-scenographic galleries of the astral light, a current is established. And a man who knows that he has never visited in body, nor seen the landscape and person that he recognises, may well assert that still has he seen and knows them, for the acquaintance was formed while travelling in "spirit". —H. P. BLAVATSKY (*Isis Unveiled*, I. 179-180)

EAST AND WEST

The difference which exists between India and Britain is mainly one of values and for that reason it can be reconciled.

If we look back over the past fifty years we see that an interchange has been taking place between these countries but it has been uneven because, in the process, the Indian has parted with his stock to make way for the other fellow's goods which had glamoured him. Western science and its intense application to the amelioration of physical existence has been seized upon with avidity by many who assert that they represent New India. In this greed for Western progress the acquisitors have jettisoned much of their ballast,—the great inheritance from the past, that sublime philosophy which an increasing number in the West, are beginning to recognise and absorb. Briefly, the new culture in India is even more intrigued by mechanisation than its originators. Although many Westerners have been attracted by Eastern wisdom only a few have studied and taken it up, while young India has vigorously taken to material science.

The great divide is actually caused by what each conceives of as life, as reality.

In the West it is understood as manifestation, "terra firma" so to speak, while the fact of all aggregations of matter being ephemeral is overlooked. In the East there is One Reality, the eternal, the cause of all manifestation, and earth is not firm by a moving whirligig of atoms. Thus we are confronted with certain definite contrasts in fundamental conceptions.

Take "Religion," for, under what is comprised by that term, there will be found a marked dissimilarity. In Great Britain the State religion is a form of Christianity with the dominant idea of the God transcendent; this Deity is regarded in various ways, as an abstraction, as a myth but more generally as an anthropomorphic personal God to be propitiated by individuals and conventionally worshipped once every week, if we leave out of account the comparatively few special occasions. The East recognises the God immanent; It is everywhere and always present.

But the widest part of the divide is to be found in the attitude towards death, for the dictum *Mors janua vitae* is in no wise a Western belief since it runs counter to "practical politics". Death is usually conceived of as "the End".

Vague references are made to a soul and various are the definitions of this nebulosity which is supposed to survive the body. But during the life of the latter it is relegated to a distance, presumably being present during religious observances and intercessory prayers. In some quarters, even the resurrection of the physical body is a belief which still persists.

Throughout the East, we find quite a different attitude towards death, frequently one that seems to denote a disrespect of earth-life, causing it to be held too cheaply and with comparative indifference. Followers of the Buddha almost invariably associate "liberation" with release from physical existence. While in parts of India the attitude towards physical life is marked by resignation, indifference or detachment, further East it fails to detract from a joyous racial psyche.

It is easy to trace from this difference in outlook the cause of diversity in temperament which again gives rise to a lack of sympathetic understanding between

the different races of East and West. But when we come to consider the ethical side and classify virtues, we find that the Western order of merit is very nearly completely reversed; for India does not accord pride of place to those which Westerners look upon as cardinal.

In the Christian West Truth and Honesty are regarded as pre-eminent, but is this so in actuality? Can it truthfully be said that every party newspaper is exempt from "suppressio veri" and "suggestio falsi"? and again has integrity of purpose entirely superseded hypocrisy? Surely a pharisaical attitude is as much to be deprecated as a casual lack of exactness oftentimes introduced to please or placate. "Faith, Hope and Charity but the greatest of these is Charity" is a Christian dictum, but it is in India and further East that it is so apparent in the lives of the people.

Unquestionably there are indications of a better understanding. Insularity and a crystallised mental outlook are much less in evidence than formerly. The war uprooted much of what prevailed but the plant was not entirely eradicated.

The tentacles of the material octopus are very tenacious though some have been cut off. New India might be careful lest those remaining do not get a strangle hold on her.

London M. R. ST. JOHN

THEOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

Readers unversed in the philosophy of Theosophy would gain very erroneous ideas from the article in the March ARYAN PATH on "Physics, Philosophy and Theosophy" by Philip Chapin Jones.

The philosophy of Kant may indeed provide an interpretation of modern conceptions of physics, but it misses the Theosophical view-point. This is pointed out in the Mahatma Letters: "Western critical idealism has still to learn the difference that exists between the *real being* of supersensible objects and the shadowy subjectivity of the ideas it has reduced them to." (p. 194) The difference is indicated in the same letter in the word in parenthesis in the phrase "system of pure (materialistic) reason".

"Space is not something real," says Mr. Jones, but H. P. B. (*The Secret Doctrine*, commentary on Stanza I, p. 35) wrote: "Space is the *one eternal thing* that we can most easily imagine, immovable in its abstraction and uninfluenced by either the presence or absence in it of an objective Universe." (*cf.* Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, part 1, section 1, 4, a). The words italicised are important because Theosophical.

Again: "time is merely the form of our external perception". But the whole Cosmos is a gigantic chronometer," says K. H. (*Mahatma Letters*, p. 193).

"Philosophy in the work of Kant, thus corroborates Theosophy." Perhaps! From a "human-plane-of-consciousness point of view"; but hardly from a "strictly philosophical" one. True philosophy would take account of illusion in the Theosophical sense.

Relativity is not the last word. Though he has abandoned his "curved space" Einstein clings to relativity. He may in his search for truth abandon even that which made him famous. But whether he does or not Theosophy must reject relativity, *as stated*. The careful perusal of the first few paragraphs of H. P. B.'s Psychic and Noetic Action might not be unprofitable to Theosophists anxious to square Theosophy with ephemeral scientific and philosophic (so called) theory.

There are other statements in the article to which exception can be taken, but the foregoing will suffice.

May I trust that this comment of mine will be accepted as coming from an onlooker anxious to see his side win.

Hamilton, Canada. CECIL WILLIAMS

[Is our correspondent sure that he has grasped all the aspects of the teachings on these topics put forward in *The Secret Doctrine*? Further, has he really understood the view-points of our original contributor? However, we will leave it to Mr. Jones if he deems it necessary, to clear up Mr. Williams's doubts.—EDS.]

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"————————ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

Sir Denison Ross reminded us in the *Observer* of 5th June of the centenary of the birth of the author of *The Light of Asia.* Theosophists more than others owe a debt of gratitude to Sir Edwin Arnold, for he served their cause, albeit unconsciously to himself. H. P. Blavatsky thought of *The Light of Asia* as worthy of being used with the *Gita*, and in her will expressed a wish that if her death anniversary was to be observed readings from these two volumes should be used. Then, Arnold said that "he loved India and Indian peoples," and he served them perhaps in the noblest way they could be served in that epoch. He dived in the vast ocean of Indian literature, and diving deep emerged with some splendid pearls. Of them he strung his *Islam's Rosary*, with them he fashioned *A Casket of Gems* and built *An Indian Temple.*

He was a pioneer and began expounding Indian thought, feeling and sentiment when the philologists were immersed in the task of translating Asiatic texts. The western public was ignorant of eastern wisdom, when in 1879 he lit the lamp of the law and held aloft his *Light of Asia.* The life and doctrines of Gautama were not known when the book was published, and became so very popular. Even to-day it maintains its attraction though in a somewhat restricted circle, which by no means is small, of Buddhists and Theosophists. Though many lives of the Enlightened One have been written, in the English tongue, *The Light of Asia* deservedly holds its own and continues to evoke response in many a reader of lofty mind and intuitive heart.

To some students of the Theosophical doctrine of Reincarnation the life of Sir Edwin Arnold offers a good subject for study. Here was a man born in England, who even in his Oxford days carried away the Newdigate prize in 1852 by his poem "Belshazzar's Feast," in which the oriental in him was at work. Four years later he came to Poona as the Principal of the Deccan college, and spent some six years breathing the wonderful atmosphere of India. Another great but a different type of Englishman, Mountstuart Elphinstone, was the Governor, then old in the service of his country as Arnold was young. Enthusiastically the professor turned learner and took up the study of Sanskrit, Persian and Turkish. Many have started on

a similar venture, with some enthralling end in view but gave way before the hard work involved in mastering oriental languages; others kept up and utilized the results for various purposes; Sir Edwin was one of the very few indeed whose Karmic, or shall we say Skandhaic, tendencies asserted themselves, and brought out from within the invisible astral cells and corpuscles, some memories, some promptings, some reactions of an anterior past. His case brings to our minds that of a great Theosophist, W. Q. Judge. A few months' stay in India, during which he developed some contacts, matured others, and returned to New York to sow the seeds he took away from this country; he laboured intelligently and faithfully and there grew a fine Banyan which sheltered and shelters to this day many pilgrim-souls of a variety of calibre and understanding. Similarly, though on a different plane, Sir Edwin Arnold: returning to London an 'accident' occurred; he had fully intended to come back to his loved oriental studies; but it happened that he answered a chance advertisement, and before he knew it, he was a leader-writer in the *Daily Telegraph* which then began to convey the scents and carry the spices of the Orient to many an English home. This Englishman, born and bred a Christian, who not only aroused respect for the Buddha throughout the West, but kindled the fire of devotion to the Great One in not a few hearts in Christendom failed to make any impression when he rendered into verse the life of Christ and called it *The Light of the World*. In spite of this experience, a group of Bombay Parsis planned to request Sir Edwin to write "*The Light of Old Iran*" but ere the scheme matured he died on the 24th of March 1904.

Not only with Asia but with Africa also Edwin Arnold had some Karmic links. It is not generally known that he was directly responsible for the arrangements of Stanley's journey to Africa to discover the course of the Congo, and that the celebrated explorer named after Arnold a mountain to the north-east of Albert Edward Nyanza. Again, it was Edwin Arnold who thought of the great trunk line traversing the whole of African continent, and he was the first to use the expression which Cecil Rhodes later popularized—"Cape to Cairo railway".

We mentioned Mountstuart Elphinstone, the historian and statesman, who, according to the Duke of Wellington, ought to have been a soldier. But while his martial achievements are forgotten his educational work endures. Like Arnold's, Elphinstone's Karma brought him the opportunity of serving the cause of western education in India. The two men were so different: we do not know if Elphinstone ever tried to dig into the old mines of Indian Knowledge; he

was young when some leisure came his way in Nagpur in 1804–05 and he spent it in reading classical and general literature. At the same age of twenty-five in 1856–57 Arnold was busy learning oriental lore. But it was Elphinstone's educational work which opened the avenue of service for men like Arnold. These two served India not for personal profit but for the ideals they cherished. It is recorded by General Briggs that Elphinstone had gathered together Marathi books, a pile of them, and on being asked the purpose of such ammunition he replied—" to educate the natives, but it may be our high road back to Europe". It is to such men that Britain owes her real supremacy in India. They have become rare and rarer in modern decades, a fact which contains a lesson of first-rate political significance.

Mr. Lloyd George expressed some very Theosophical thoughts in a speech reported in the *Manchester Guardian* of 27th June, from which we extract:—

If Jesus Christ came back after 2,000 years what would He see? asked Mr. Lloyd George.

He would see the world still bleeding from the wounds of the most terrible war ever waged in the history of mankind, bleeding and almost on the point of starving, still engaged with all their might in perfecting weapons more destructive, more terrible, more shattering than any invented and utilised in the Great War. That is what He would find after 2,000 years of the reign of the Prince of Peace. He would find the followers of Jesus of Nazareth with their six-inch guns, their rifles, and their explosives. So far from brotherhood he would find the nations more imbued with suspicion of each other, with distrust, enmity, fear, revenge, and hatred than at any time in the history of the world.

You can see it in things great and small. If Jesus's parents had to fly with Him to-day from the wrath of Herod they could not start on their flight without a passport from Herod himself. On their arrival in Egypt they would be refused admission as alien immigrants, impecunious. That is the new spirit of brotherhood amongst nations after two thousand years of Christianity!

But all the spirit of Jesus has not been lost . . . . we have not yet reached the spirit of fraternity, the spirit of brotherhood. That is a thing we have got to work at. . . . . The full spirit of fraternity is the only thing that will save the world.

Have you noticed the reception given to President Hoover's message? But the French say: 'If you take away one-third of our guns, if you destory the mobility of our artillery, where are we? We are at the mercy of the Germans.' Security? Brothers do not ask security against each other. Therefore it is a question entirely of changing the spirit of mankind.