THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly, and lost among the host—as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—The Voice of the Silence

VOL. XVII AUGUST 1946 No. 8

THE PROBLEM OF FATE AND FREE-WILL AS VIEWED BY SHELLEY

[**Mr. F. A. Lea's** concern with "the conditions of that forgotten aim of politics, a right relationship between human beings" has been responsible for his six years of community living, in groups engaged in agriculture and education. He is a Pacifist. He is the author of *Carlyle: Prophet of Today* and *Shelley and the Romantic Revolution.* The evolution of Shelley's thought on a subject of such universal interest as fate and free-will is handled in this article with insight.—ED.]

Percy Bysshe Shelley was pre-eminently a lyric poet. Endowed by nature with an incomparable power of expressing, spontaneously and immediately, the moods of elation and despair occasioned by his experience of the world, he is beloved by many who have never been troubled by the problems with which that experience tormented him, and are happily unconcerned with the solutions he advanced for them. Yet he himself set more store by these solutions than he did by his most popular lyrics, and, since they stirred him as deeply as the beauty of nature or the woman he loved, they are the theme of his greatest poetry.

It is impossible to judge rightly either Shelley's poetry apart from his philosophy or his philosophy apart from his poetry. If we attempt to do the first, we fall into the error of appraising the poet's success or failure without any clear idea of what he set out to achieve; and if we attempt the second, our attention is almost unavoidably directed to the wrong quarter. For *the goal which Shelley pursued was a world-view capable of reconciling his reason with his intuitions of beauty and goodness;* and because poetry of the highest order is the voice of the whole man, in whom the conflict between reason and intuition is in abeyance, the very index to the significance of the poet's conclusions is the sustained intensity of his verse.

Shelley died in his thirtieth year.

Thirty years is not long enough even for a man of genius to evolve a coherent philosophy out of his own experience (and Shelley's philosophy is nothing if not "existential"). But it is long enough for his thought to undergo several striking transformations. Three fairly distinct phases can, in fact, be distinguished in Shelley's intellectual development: and much misinterpretation might have been avoided had his critics been able to realise this. By attributing the ideas of one phase to another, they have constantly ended by imputing their own confusion to him. In this essay, I shall consider only one aspect of the development: that which relates to his changing views of the problem of Fate and Free-will.

Throughout the first phase of his literary productivity, from the year in which he was expelled from Oxford for publishing *The Necessity of Atheism* down to the close of 1813 when the *Refutation of Deism* was written, Shelley was more or less dominated by the rationalistic thinkers of the Enlightenment, to whom he assimilated Lucretius, Spinoza and Godwin. His enthusiasm for these authors was, as he himself clearly perceived afterwards, due largely to revulsion against "the shocking absurdities of the popular philosophy of mind and matter, its fatal consequences in morals, and their violent dogmatism concerning the source of all things." Of these absurdities, instilled into him from childhood, one of the most offensive had been the belief in a world of everlasting rewards and punishments after death. Against this, and the concept of free-will implied, he was led to pit a doctrine of absolute determinism. In one of the Notes on *Queen Mab*, his principal poem of the period, he writes:—

> Motive is to voluntary action in the human mind what cause is to effect in the material universe. The word liberty, as applied to mind, is analogous to the word chance as applied to matter: they spring from an ignorance of the certainty of that conjunction of antecedents and consequences....The advocates of free-will assert that the will has the power of refusing to be determined by the strongest motive: but the strongest motive is that which, overcoming all others, ultimately prevails; this assertion, therefore, amounts to a denial of the will being ultimately determined by that motive which does determine it, which is absurd.

It should be observed that there is no necessary connection between determinism thus defined and the materialistic doctrine that man is only a physical organism: any more than there is a necessary connection between this doctrine and the demonstrably absurd idea that man is an organism exactly like other animals and motivated by exclusively the same wants. Most of the *philosophes* whose scepticism attracted Shelley, however, believed all these things: and he himself spent much time vainly endeavouring to confine his moral and æsthetic intuitions within the limits imposed by rationalism.

The second phase in the dialectic of his development opens with the sudden intensification of these intuitions. In his twentieth year he fell in love passionately for the first time. He fell in love not only with a girl, but—and this in no metaphorical sense—with nature. The beauty of a personality, the beauty of a flower, aroused kindred emotions—and converted him into a poet. And it was this love that rescued him from materialism. The beauty he perceived was real, his perception of it was real; the only happiness he could now conceive for mankind was a life lived in obedience to this reality: that, he knew, would be a truly human life. For the specific properties of the human could no more be reduced to those of the animal than the properties of water can be reduced to those of hydrogen and oxygen. Reason, if it is to be realistic, has to assume these emergences.

But the experience which rescued Shelley from materialism did not rescue him from the necessity of thought: on the contrary, it confronted him with a new and tormenting problem. The logic which had taught him that all things were subject to fate, now taught him that all he loved was subject to the fatality of death. In the past, he had been able to console himself for the evils of the present by assuming that creation would be carried forward by fate to a millennium. But with the experience of love, that assumption, even supposing it could be proved, suddenly ceased to console. For how could any millennium eclipse the knowledge that this woman, this flower, upon whose beauty the very quick of his own being seemed to depend, was doomed to pain, disfigurement and ultimate dissolution? Fate, extolled as the deliverer in *Queen Mab*, becomes, in *The Revolt of Islam*, a terrible antagonist from whom the poet strives in vain to shield himself and his love. "Time shall be forgiven," he cries, in accents that must wring the heart of any man with a heart to be wrung, "Time shall be forgiven, though it change all but thee!"

In an unfinished poem, *Prince Athanase*, Shelley says of his hero that:—

> There was drawn an admantine veil
> Between his heart and mind,—both unrelieved
> Wrought in his brain and bosom separate strife.

His heart told him that love was the supreme good; his mind, that love was doomed. To reconcile heart and mind became now the "strongest motive" of Shelley's life. His will, if we choose to put it that way, was concentrated upon the solution of this problem. But it would be more truthful to use his own former language, for he had certainly not volunteered for this torment of division. It had been forced upon him by the circumstances of his life. The irrationality of men had compelled him to clothe his instinctive rebellion in reason—and no man who has ever loved supposed that he had chosen

to love. It was with reference to the experience of inspiration that Shelley remarked on the "presumption" of calling consciousness and will "the necessary conditions of all mental causation, when mental effects are experienced insusceptible of being referred to them." He was predestined, as Paul and Augustine knew themselves to be.

And if the problem was not of his choosing, neither was the solution. A moment came when Shelley was able to comprehend the division of his own psyche. But so to comprehend one's own experience is impossible unless one is detached from it: and to be detached alike from personal longing and personal possession is to be delivered into the keeping of an impersonal love, in which all previous loves are consummated—and one which lies beyond the reach of fate:—

> What to bid speak
> Fate, Time, Occasion, Chance and Change? To these
> All things are subject but eternal love.

For to be detached is to see not only oneself, but the whole universe of one's experience, objectively—as it veritably is: and thus seen, the whole is beautiful. The very fate that denied what we most deeply wished is the fate that has thereby granted our wish, an object no longer of dread but of thanksgiving.

Shelley's heart and mind were reconciled for a moment: hence the spirit-stirring poetry of *Prometheus Unbound*, in which he dramatises the inward conflict, writ large upon the face of humanity, and its conclusion. He believed that the force which had brought him a new wholeness, and which he experienced as the force of love, was the same that operated throughout the universe to bind the parts into new unities, each having its own specific properties:—

> The one Spirit's plastic stress
> Sweeps through the dull dense world, compelling there
> All new successions to the forms they wear;
> Torturing th' unwilling dross that checks its flight
> To its own likeness, as each mass may bear;
> And bursting in its beauty and its might
> From trees and beasts and men into the Heaven's light.

This force—the Logos of Christian theology—Shelley called "the One." It was a personified Necessity: no longer, however, the abstract Necessity extolled in *Queen Mab*, but a Necessity of which he had concrete experience, and to which he could give concrete expression. To express it, indeed, became now the "strongest motive" of his life.

Although, in that third phase which began during the composition of *Prometheus Unbound*, he was driven, by the resistance his new love encountered within himself and the world, once again to set the One apart from and in opposition to the Many—thereby entering upon a still deeper cleavage and despair—that was not before he had glimpsed a truth which he believed to stand at the heart of every high religion, and learned the meaning of the phrase "a service which is perfect freedom."

F. A. Lea

IS INDIAN PHILOSOPHY MARKING TIME ?

[**Shri G. R. Malkani,** Director of the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner, surveys here the current philosophical scene in India, finding its dead level broken by the work of two outstanding original thinkers—Sri Aurobindo and Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya.—ED.]

Philosophical studies are not very popular at the present time in India. But philosophy retains a perennial interest for all cultured people. In fact, it is the barometer of the state of culture in a particular society. Art, literature and religion have necessarily a philosophical background. They draw their vitality from that intellectual region where things are not seen piecemeal, but as a whole. It is this final and integrated view of things that alone can satisfy thought and be a source of inspiration for the lesser activities of life. However, therefore, one may avoid those technicalities into which philosophical thinking easily degenerates, the urge to philosophise, to take the long view and to see things as a whole, as from a pinnacle, is innate in human nature and cannot be denied.

Indian philosophy has had its day. It was inspired by a kind of religious zeal. Its ideal was "to know that, knowing which all else is known," to know the truth that will break the bondage of ignorance and the resulting pains of an empirical existence. Every important religious movement has culminated in a philosophical formulation of the truth. Religion in India is free, and so is philosophy. The two have always gone together and reacted upon each other. In fact, knowledge of the truth has always been understood to be the highest form of religion, or at least the most important element in it. We cannot separate religion from truth. Truth is the goal of theoretic consciousness, and philosophy is the highest expression of this consciousness.

European culture has not kept strictly to this association of religion and truth. Religion in the West is confined to the affective and conative aspect of life, and truth to the purely cognitive. The one is divorced from the other. Truth is supposed to be definitely a subject-matter for science, and philosophy is supposed to stand in some dubious relationship with science. Both are the expression of the theoretic consciousness and are therefore naturally allied.

But philosophy is made to trail behind science. It hangs on to science as a kind of refinement of its conceptual scheme. Many modern philosophers think that the only real philosophy is the philosophy of science, by which they mean an elaboration of those fundamental concepts which are needed for a scientific approach to things. Philosophy is rarely taken in its true sense

of *metaphysics, i.e.*, a search for truth that goes beyond physics and so beyond all science. If there is no supersensible reality, there is also no truth which is inaccessible to science, and which therefore demands a different mode of approach for its comprehension. Philosophy is thus subordinated to science.

This science, again, so narrowly conceived, stands on one side and religion on the other. They stand at the opposite ends, and often come into conflict. It is natural that truth should come out the victor in the end, however that truth is conceived. The palpable and verifiable results of science easily throw into the shade the unverifiable beliefs and dogmas of religion. And so the conflict deepens, to the great disadvantage of religious practice.

India still retains its old tradition of a philosophy that is intimately allied to religion, occupying, indeed, the privileged place of religion itself. But this tradition is at present blurred by the intimate intellectual contacts with the West and the new and growing importance of scientific research and scientific progress. The present-day philosophical movements in the West, discrediting philosophy as a function of metaphysical truth and confining it to the perimeter of scientific ideas or to the study of lingual forms, have had a powerful influence on the teachers of philosophy in India. They draw their ideas from Western writers of note and have a passion for being reckoned up-to-date. The result is that their philosophical activities are divided and dissipated. Like their Western prototypes, they do not seek metaphysical *truth*, but only the rationalising spirit of thought. It is not *a philosophy* they want, but only philosophising.

Reason can be an aid towards truth, but it can also be a hindrance. Free-thinking is supremely an example of the free spirit of reason, leading not to truth, but to vacuity. There is no end or goal that need be reached, and that religiously demands to be reached. Ultimate truth is supposed to be humanly unattainable.

On the other hand, the ancient Indian tradition cannot be wholly laid to rest. That tradition is, to get at the truth and nothing but the truth, as a kind of religious obligation. Unfortunately, the social and cultural environment of the past, making for an introvert mode of life and thought, has gone for ever. We go to the past to seek for similitudes with present-day Western thinking, or to exhibit some lifeless pattern of thought which has an antiquarian interest, or merely for glorifying the past as a past, but never for renewed inspiration or a philosophical revival. Indian philosophical thinking of the present day plays with Western ideas which are foreign to our mental make-up, and it plays with its own ancient heritage as a lifeless limb of the past. There is no creative thinking, no vital sense of truth. Philosophy has ceased to be a grand pursuit to be grandly performed.

There are, nevertheless, indications that the human mind cannot rest satisfied with a divided allegiance which robs it of the substance and the reality. There are two present-day thinkers of India who have revived the ancient tradition but presented it in a form which is essentially rational and which has much in common with the free creations of Western thinkers. These two who have made a notable contribution to Indian thought are Sri Aurobindo and Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya.

Sri Aurobindo is a mystic, a person who can claim to have seen something of the truth and to speak out of his personal experience. He can rightly claim to have a philosophy which is not tied to the scriptural texts or their classical commentators. He does not write a commentary, which has been the time-old method of Indian leaders of religious thought. He gives us a system of his own which has every mark of creative genius. Indeed, he does not present it in the strict forms of logical thinking. He presents it in a form which is more poetical than logical. Whatever may be the value of his conceptual scheme, it is bold, novel and thought-provoking. We may criticise it. But we cannot quite refute it. It appears to have a background of experience which is not common experience, and to that extent our criticism may fail to do justice to it and may even fail to be pertinent. His style again is far from being lucid. It does not facilitate critical analysis of his ideas. We are often left in mid-air with vague ideas whose significance is yet to be determined.

We may agree with him or not. But he is original—challenging to some, and dazzling to others. His system is given in the three volumes of *The Life Divine.* He is a critic of Maya-vada, the system of thought associated with the great name of Sri Sankarācharya, and an advocate of a view which is more allied to the qualified non-dualism of Sri Ramanujācharya. But the presentation and the atmosphere are all his own.

The other great thinker, Professor Bhattacharyya, is less well known. In the form and presentation of his thought, he is the very antithesis of Sri Aurobindo. He is a dialectician first and last. He does not write voluminously. There is rarely a touch of poetry in his writings. Every line that he writes has the rigidity and the exactness of a mathematical formula translated into the language of philosophy. There is nothing loose in his writings, nothing that is not impregnated with meaning. To summarise his writings, one must either bodily quote him, or leave out the refinements and exhibit just the bare bones, which may give quite a misleading impression of the original.

At the same time, there is no quibbling or hair-splitting about him. The refinements of expression are matched by refinements of perception—a deeper, finer and more discriminating insight into our intui-

tive contacts with reality or experience as a whole. He has written papers, articles and a few books too, and they all display a subtle mind. No Indian thinker can come anywhere near his level of logical exactitude and lingual precision.

His inspiration also is Vedantic, perhaps of the Advaitic type. But his presentation is so original and free, that it is often difficult to trace back his thought to any particular thinker or school of thought. He writes real philosophy without any literary flourishes. But, for that very reason, his writings are difficult to follow and forbidding even to intelligent and earnest readers. It needs perseverance and a will to go through them and to comprehend them. If the word can be enemy to the thought, we have an example of it here. His writings go unnoticed because they are heavy stuff and demand an unusual exertion of thought for their proper comprehension and appreciation.

These two thinkers are the signs of the times. They have freed Indian thought from its dogmatic moorings and worthless imitation. They have revived the spirit of Indian philosophy with its religious bias. They have achieved a synthesis of substance and of form, the ancient truth and the forms of reason that can appeal to the modern man with his rational bias. Other Indian thinkers who are often prominent on the stage, and whose writings are more widely read and known, lack the conviction, the creativeness and the artistry of these two real philosophers.

There is a general philosophical lethargy in India at present, because India has not yet found its philosophical soul under the impact of Western modes of thought and the circumstances of modern competitive life. Philosophy, like religion, bides its time. It is only a crisis in the intellectual and the emotive world that calls forth a new creative effort. In all probability, the present time is such a crisis, which has not yet reached its constructive and creative stage. We are moved by conflicting influences and vacillating in our allegiance. When this vacillation will end is the secret of the future, but its ending is the desire of every well-wisher of Indian thought and culture.

G. R. MALKANI

BELGIUM'S CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN CULTURE

[We published in our April issue an illuminating essay on the contribution of Hungary to European culture. Here a well-known Belgian writer in the French language, **M. Rene Golstein,** novelist, poet and critic, describes most interestingly what another of the smaller countries of Europe has contributed to the culture of the Continent as a whole. Gratitude demands the recognition of cultural achievement, as of service rendered, and in publishing such articles as this THE ARYAN PATH seeks to do its part to help to draw the nations closer to each other in mutual appreciation.—ED.]

A little country, placed, to quote a line from our poet, Émile Verhaeren, " between the ardent France and the rough Germany. " Belgium, because of its fortunate geographical position, its maritime and temperate climate, its soil and the working capacities of its inhabitants, has, for a long time now, aroused the envy of the larger countries. It has always been a battle-ground, but it is also a centre where two great cultures, the Latin and the Teutonic, are united.

Forming an independent state since only 1830, the provinces which form the Belgium of today lived all through the history of the Middle Ages and of modern times, a life with similar interests and aspirations and often with the same struggles.

As has been said rightly, Belgium is one of the oldest cradles of freedom in the Occident. Since the thirteenth century, there have been no serfs in Flanders. Nowhere else were there free towns more numerous, richer or prouder of their privileges than in the Belgian provinces. The urban civilisation was brilliant ; each free town had its own charter and its workers were united in all-powerful guilds.

The rise of the cloth industry began in Flanders at the end of the eleventh century. The harbour of Bruges acquired in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries considerable importance. Bruges became a great warehouse of European commerce and had the characteristics of a great cosmopolitan port. But Bruges was soon to know the decline of its power. The city enfolds itself in the silence of its canals and its monuments and its incomparable artistic characteristics can be found intact today. Bruges was to give place to Antwerp, which became in the sixteenth century, as has been written, " the Common Fatherland of all Christian Nations. " It developed into the warehouse of the world.

After desperate but fruitless efforts to free themselves from Spanish domination, the Belgian provinces knew, at different times, periods without glory and lacking in outstanding personalities. Despite this,

it can be said that our provinces made a constant contribution to European civilisation, but that they had, under the Dukes of Bourgogne, a particularly rich period from the intellectual point of view. We shall not go so far as to say with one of our historians, " Just as Greece celebrates its Periclean century, so we may glory in our century of Philippe le Bon, a period during which the arts in every aspect soared marvellously." A country is great which leaves, in the history of civilisation, the names of artists and of scientists who have a universal significance, who have a representative value in all parts of the world, and which possesses also monuments and an architecture characterised by fundamental originality.

As regards the monuments of religious art, we must not confine ourselves only to pointing out our beautiful Gothic cathedrals built in stone. There are others which obtained a special character from the use of brick—St. Sauveur and Notre-Dame in Bruges, amongst others. Is it necessary to mention the townhalls of Brussels and Audenaerde and the incomparable Grand Place of Brussels, with all its guildhalls ? An urban life, distinctly democratic, has given rise to an architectural art which gives evidence of the pride and the tenacity of the people. Most of these masterpieces are of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

The Louvain University, founded in 1426, soon became a great centre of knowledge and of culture, though it remained medieval and scholastic. In the latter part of the sixteenth century the University counted 3,000 students and had fifty colleges.

But unquestionably there is one art which justifies Belgium's pride and boast that it has brought an essential contribution to European civilisation : it is painting.

We do not care much to solve the controversy as to whether the brothers Van Eyck invented oil painting, as their greatest claim to glory is to have left behind works which reveal at the same time Flemish mysticism and all the characteristics of a personal art, and also gifts of an exceptional colouring.

Many painters made " *le voyage* " to Italy. If some of them became Italianised, the profound originality of most of them was not affected by the contact with another country. At all events, if they benefited by the lessons of Italian art, they succeeded in expressing Flemish art with its individuality, its own simplicity. Close behind Van Eyck came Campin, Roger van der Weyden, Hugo van der Goes, to name only a few, who lent to European art the richness of the Flemish and the Walloon schools. But some painters, even more than those just cited, have been the real and total incarnation of Flemish art, without any concessions or compromise.

Such is Breughel who derives inspiration from the people and from folklore. He is, in the highest sense of the word, the painter of the

Flemish soil and the poet of the humble. Nothing escapes his searching eye, not a human weakness, not a physical or a moral defect. He paints the peasantry at their kermesses, in their home life. He shows a special tenderness for the outcasts of fortune. His analysis sees through their souls. His peasants are bound to the earth in a constant struggle. And the landscape of Breughel has also a restraint, a precision of detail which, far from reducing, increases their poetical beauty. Lastly, in parables and proverbs, Breughel's desire was to assimilate the fancy and the spirit of Flanders into his painting. And always the colouring is equal to the invention. As for Jerome Bosch, his visions, which are of an unparalleled audacity, turn his art into a kind of forerunner of the surrealism of a few centuries later.

Flemish art is at the height of its glory with Rubens and Van Dyck. Rubens, painter of the court of the Archdukes, is not only a painter but also a diplomat. Van Dyck is the painter of the princes of the world. Flemish art has universal recognition.

But painting is not our sole contribution to European civilisation.

In the Renaissance, among the master printers are Thiery Martens, Christophe Plantin and his son-in-law Moretus, who lived in Antwerp.

André Vesale, chief physician of Charles V, and after that of Philippe II, is the father of anatomy. Later, Van Helmont was to be the father of modern chemistry. At the end of the eighteenth century, Minkeleer, Professor at the University of Louvain, made a discovery marked out for an immense diffusion: coal gas. In the later nineteenth century, Zenobe Gramme discovered the direct current and the alternating current, and then constructed the first dynamo. Belgian science prides itself on securing several Nobel prizes.

Literature asserts itself, during the sixteenth century, in the mysticism of Jan van Ruysbroek. During the struggle against Spain, Philippe de St. Aldegonde won great renown with his book, *La ruche de la Sainte Eglise Romaine.* Undoubtedly several centuries were to elapse, in the course of which the unfortunate circumstances from which our country suffered would not allow it to affirm its essential qualities, and, for instance in literature, there was a long silence. But in the eighteenth century the European and elegant art of the Prince de Ligne is highly praised.

Then, since the establishment of national independence, Belgian literature has commanded attention, bringing its own contribution to French literature. Do Belgian writers when writing in French, reveal special characteristics which distinguish them from French writers? This question, often discussed, appears to me rather futile.

Charles de Coster, author of a kind of national epopee, *La légende de Thyl Uilenspiegel* inaugurates the series of great writers. All literary

schools in France have their repercussions in our country. The symbolist school blossomed out at the same time in our country and in France and some of its more representative writers are Belgians.

In poetry, Émile Verhaeren, Charles van Lerberghe and Max Elskamp, add, beyond all question, something original to French poetry. If, in our opinion, Maeterlinck is greater as a poet than as a playwright and a thinker, he also has given, in the field of thought, a kind of literary popularisation of the present conceptions and this in a language at one and the same time harmonious and simple. A historian like Pirenne has synthesised in a masterly manner the history of Belgium. I am not qualified to speak of Flemish literature, but I can assure you that it is rich also in talent and that some Flemish writers are well known over all Europe.

From Roland de Lassus to Grétry and Cesar Frank, Belgium has also a great and unbroken musical tradition.

Thus, through history, Belgians have always been represented where real values appear in Europe. From the position of Belgium in Europe, from the fact that it forms a nation where both Latin and Teutonic elements are represented, the Belgians have inherited special qualities. Belgium, besides the contribution of its scientists, its artists, its writers, gives to the world the example of a hard-working and serious-minded nation. A little nation, whose ambition is to secure the well-being of its inhabitants, it has for many years set an example in what concerns social order, trying to solve, for the best and in concord, workmen's problems and enacting very progressive labour legislation.

Today once again, by recovering, at a speed which calls for the admiration of the world, from the new wounds inflicted on her by Germany in a second war and a second occupation of Belgian territory, Belgium maintains a tradition of work, of struggle and, let us also say, of success.

RENE GOLSTEIN

THE TRIPOD OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

A plea by Shri C. Rajagopalachari for the integration of science, religion and politics appears in the Inauguration Volume of *India Speaks*, under the title "Vedanta, Science and Socialism." Truth being one, the attempt to hold contradictory ideas under whatever labels cannot but be disintegrating to the consciousness.

Politics without religion is leading the world to an abyss of wickedness even as religion contrary to accepted politics is sham and hypocrisy....Even as the maladjustment of religion and science must be righted, so also must religion and politics be harmonised if we recognise the importance of reality in life.

He points to the Vedanta of the Upanishads as the necessary solvent. Its recognition of the essential oneness of all life—everything being animated and sustained by the Universal Immanence—and that the very nature of the Deity is Law, brings spiritual doctrine measurably near the basic theories of science. In politics, he writes, it leads directly to the Socialist State, defined as "a State where every one will have what he needs and every one must give his best to the rest of Society." For that, the Vedantic code of conduct, with its emphasis on duty, on altruism, on aspiration and on self-control, offers indeed a most effective spiritual basis.

India's proud mission must be to establish the tripod of a new world order—Vedanta, Science and Socialism. They harmonise with one another and can support a new order as no other structure can.

THE CULTURAL CONTRIBUTION OF ISLAM

[In his presidential address before the Indian Philosophical Congress, meeting at Trivandrum late in December, **Prof. M. M. Sharif,** M. A. (Cantab.), of the Aligarh Muslim University, included a wealth of cultural data as background material for his philosophical study proper. These, which we have brought together here, bear eloquent witness to the heights Islamic culture reached in the years of Europe's mental obscuration, and the great rôle it played in keeping alive and propagating the ideals of civilised living.—ED.]

Islam in its early days infused into men a spirit the like of which history had never known before. Persia and Byzantium, the two greatest empires of those times, tried to stem its rising tide, but in the struggle were themselves swept away; and by the first centennial of its founder's death, it had spread from the Bay of Biscay to the Indus and the confines of China, and from the Aral Sea to the upper cataracts of the Nile, over more than half of the then known world, wielding an empire greater than the Roman Empire at its zenith. This was an empire which, in spite of vast changes in its boundaries, saw its rise till the third quarter of the sixteenth century.

It could boast of one language, Arabic, as its *lingua franca*. It had a number of towns with a prosperous population of one to four million inhabitants, with tens of thousands of garden villas, lavishly furnished with magnificent paintings, rich tapestries, curtains and chandeliers, with thousands and thousands of public baths, and with strongly macadamized roads and solidly paved lanes lighted with public lamps. It possessed the largest navy in the medieval world and had mastery over the Atlantic, off the coast of Spain and West Africa, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the China Sea and the Pacific Ocean; and kept a mercantile fleet that made monthly voyages from the Atlantic to the Pacific, touching at all the important ports, including those of Malabar, on the way.

It ran industries that manufactured highly finished goods such as leather and metallic goods, carpets, tiles, pottery, soaps, perfumery, paper, glass, jewellery and cotton, silk and woollen fabrics, admired both in the East and in the West, with factories spreading from Persia to the banks of the Danube on the one side and the heights of the Pyrenees on the other. In leather, cotton and silk fabrics alone, several European names owe their origin to the Muslims. Such are, for example, morocco, cordovan, muslin (from Musul), cotton (from Ar. Qutn), baldachine (Baghdad), damask (from Damascus), fustian (from Fustat), taffeta (from the Persian Tafta),

tabis (from At-tabic, the name of a silk-manufacturing family in Baghdad).

It carried on trade by sea routes from Korea, Japan and the Philippines to Spain and France and indirectly, through Jewish and European tradesmen, to England, Sweden and Norway and by land routes from North Africa to the heart of Siberia.

It was the first to manufacture gunpowder, an invention as important in the medieval ages as the atomic bomb today, and to blazon shields with heraldry and coats of arms.

Its men dived deep into the sea to bring out pearls, penetrated low into the earth to dig out gold, silver, lead, iron, antimony, mercury, marble, turquoise, rubies, lapis-lazuli, azurite, kaolin, cornelian, sulphur and asbestos and produced naphtha and tar. They spread a "veritable network" of canals in the lands through which pass the Euphrates, the Tigris and the Nile, and gave to Europe the taste for spices, scents, ginger, sugar and coffee.

They set ideals of civic life, home life, hygiene, agriculture, architecture, irrigation, calligraphy, music, dress, food and games for all Europe. And all this centuries before Columbus went westward in his search after the queen of the East and, sighting the shores of America, shouted with joy "Indiana! Indiana!"; centuries before Vasco de Gama could begin our bad days by reaching the land of Columbus's dreams, your motherland and mine, by the calamitous guidance of Ahmad, an Arab sailor of repute whom he entertained as his honoured guest and guide throughout the voyage; and at a time "when there was not" yet "so much as one public lamp in London," when the streets of Paris were yet unpaved, when "the dwellings of the rulers of Germany, France and England were" still "scarcely better than stables, chimneyless, windowless, with a hole in the roof for the smoke to escape"; and when the priests of Europe deemed it a great virtue not to bathe and change for months.

There was no village without a mosque, and elementary and secondary schools sprang up as adjuncts to mosques, their curriculum being the reading of the *Quran*, stories about the life of the Prophet, reading and writing, a little poetry and the elements of arithmetic and grammar. For higher education, students went either to colleges, academies and universities or to individual teachers. With rulers, princes, ministers and wealthy nobles it was the fashion to become patrons of learning, to hold academic discussions, to open schools and colleges, to set up laboratories and to establish hospitals and libraries.

The first college was established by al-Māmūn in Baghdad. The second college for higher studies, called the Nizāmiyyah, was founded in Baghdad in 1065 (or 7) by Nizāmul Mulk, a Persian Vazir to the Seljuq King, Alp Arslān. It was a residen-

tial college in which theological studies had the same place that afterwards classical studies had in European universities. Reuben Levy (*A Baghdad Chronicle*, Cambridge, 1929) holds that some details of its organisation appear to have been copied by the early universities of Europe. Al-Ghazzāli headed this institution for four years late in the eleventh century A. D.

An interesting story is told about a pupil of the Nizāmiyyah who, having taken, along with a group of students, a heavy dose of an infusion of anacardia, lost his wits and came naked to the class. When, amidst the laughter of the class, the professor asked him to explain his shameful conduct, he very seriously replied that to sharpen their intellect he and his class-mates had drunk the infusion of anacardia but that it had made them all lose their senses with the exception of himself, who had luckily remained sane!

After a little over three centuries the Nizāmiyyah was merged into a new institution named al-Mustanṣiriyyah which was the first educational institution to have a hospital attached to it. Other well-known colleges were al-Rashīdiya, Amāniyya Tarkhaniyya, Khātūniyya and Sharifiyyah in Syria and Rambiyya, Nāṣiriyya and Ṣalāḥiyyah in Egypt. In course of time the Nizāmiyya type of colleges spread all over the Empire, there having been thirty in Baghdad, thirty in Alexandria, twenty in Damascus, six in Mawsil, and one at least in all other important cities, such as Cairo, Nayshāpur, Samarkand, Ispahān, Merv, Balkh, Aleppo, Ghazni, Lahore, etc.

In Spain were laid the foundations of what are now called universities. The chief of these were the Universities of Cordova, Seville, Malaga and Granada. Their curricula comprised theology, jurisprudence, medicine, astronomy, chemistry and philosophy. The portals of the University of Granada bore this inscription :—

> The world is supported by four things only: the learning of the wise, the justice of the great, the prayers of the religious and the valour of the brave.

Scholars from all over Europe flocked to these universities for study.

Besides in these institutions of higher studies education was also imparted by individual teachers in their own homes or in the mosques or shrines which had special quarters reserved for travellers, students and teachers. Both the teachers and the students were supported by the endowments given to these mosques or shrines by wealthy people. These teachers were highly respected. In the mosques, lectures were delivered not only on theology but also on other branches of learning, and not only to regular students, but also to all those adults who cared to attend them. Nāṣir Khusro writes in the eleventh century that the mosque at Cairo was daily visited by five thousand men to hear lectures on various subjects of study.

Moreover, the large number of observatories which sprang up in

different parts of the Empire were also colleges for teaching astronomy, just as the hospitals which also arose at the same time served as colleges for medical studies. Besides, there existed literary societies and study circles which held their meetings in the homes of the aristocracy.

During the 'Abbāsid period paper manufacture became an indigenous industry. Paper-making was indeed the greatest boon that Islam gave to Europe through Sicily and Spain. Books began to be written and sold by booksellers and book agencies in large numbers and thousands of private and public libraries sprang up. In the tenth century Mawsil had a private library where scholars were supplied with free paper. In the same century the founder of the library at Basrah granted stipends to scholars working in it. Some libraries were very generous in lending books. Yāqūt mentions that he once borrowed two hundred books from the Damīriyyah Library of Merv. There were twenty public libraries in Spain alone. The Library of Cordova possessed about four hundred thousand books.

The Baitul-Ḥikmat at Cairo is said to have had two million books, and that at Tripolis in Syria, which was burnt by the first Crusaders, contained three million books, of which fifty thousand were copies of the *Quran* and its commentaries. That means that this library alone had three-fourths of the volumes which the Bodleian Library has, or more than half the volumes that all the libraries of India taken together have been estimated to possess today. In the library of al-Ḥākim books were arranged in forty chambers, each containing about eighteen thousand books. The Khazīnat-ul-Kutub, a library founded at Sherāz by 'Aḍud-ud-Daula, a Persian King (d. 984 A. D.) was surrounded by parks and had three hundred and sixty rooms and pavilions. The magnificence of these libraries becomes all the more astounding when we realise that all the books were manuscripts, for we are talking of a period when there were no printing-presses. Besides these, there were several other famous libraries such as those at Baghdad, Ram Hur-Muz, Basra, Ray, Merv, Balkh, Bokhara and Ghazni. All over the Empire mosques also served as repositories of books. Men of learning were appointed as Librarians. Even such renowned scholars as Avicenna, Ibn-Maskewaih and Ash-Shabushti held posts as Librarians.

In his work *The Making of Humanity*, Briffault observes :—

Roger Bacon learned Arabic Science. Neither Roger Bacon nor his later name sake has any title to be credited with having introduced the experimental method. Roger Bacon was no more than one of the apostles of Muslim science and method to Christian Europe : and he never wearied of declaring that knowledge of Arabic and Arabic science was for his contemporaries the only way to true knowledge. Discussions as to who was the originator of the experimental method are part of the colossal misrepresentation of the

origin of European civilization. The experimental method of the Arabs was in Bacon's time widespread and eagerly cultivated throughout Europe....

Although there is not a single aspect of European growth in which the decisive influence of Islamic culture is not traceable, nowhere is it so clear and momentous as in...natural science and the scientific spirit.

Science owes its very existence to Arabic culture. The ancient world was pre-scientific. The Greeks systematized, generalized, and theorized, but the patient ways of investigation, the accumulation of positive knowledge, the minute methods of science, detailed and prolonged observation and experimental inquiry were altogether alien to the Greek temperament. What we call science arose in Europe as a result of a new spirit of inquiry, of new methods of investigation, of the method of experiment, observation, measurement, of the development of mathematics in a form unknown to the Greeks. That spirit and those methods were introduced into the European world by the Arabs.

Among philosophers, Al-Kindi was an encyclopædist. He wrote 263 works. It was he, and not Descartes, who first held that the mathematical method was essential for philosophical enquiry. He wrote a book to prove this. His principal work on optics was widely read both in the West and in the East. He wrote also on astronomy, geometry, astrology, arithmetic, music, physics, psychology, meteorology, and politics. Among the other philosophers of Islam Al-Fārābi wrote on mathematics, astronomy, logic, politics, physics and music; Avicenna on theology, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, politics, zoology and botany; and Ibn Rushd on jurisprudence, physics, grammar, astronomy and medicine.

In his Introduction to the *History of Science*, Sarton enthusiastically writes:—

The main task of mankind was accomplished by Muslims. The greatest philosopher, al-Fārābi, was a Muslim; the greatest mathematicians, Abu Kāmil and Ibrahim Ibn Sinān, were Muslims; the greatest geographer and encyclopædist, al-Ma'sūdi, was a Muslim; the greatest historian, al-Ṭabari, was still a Muslim.

Deutsch writes:—

The Quran is a book by the aid of which the Arabs...came to Europe as kings to hold up the light to humanity while darkness lay around, to raise up the wisdom and knowledge of Hellas from the dead, to teach philosophy, medicine, astronomy and the golden art of song to the West as to the East, to stand at the cradle of modern science and to make us late-comers for ever to weep over the day when Granada fell.

M. M. Sharif

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF PEACE

[**Prof. P. S. Naidu,** who heads the department of Education at the University of Allahabad, opened, with the address which we publish here, the symposium on this subject in the Psychology and Educational Science Section of the Science Congress held at Bangalore in the first days of January. We fully agree that mental reorientation is the world's urgent need and also that the power of ideals to transform character is great. "As a man thinketh, so will he become" is a truth that long antedates modern psychology. Its implicit endorsement by a modern psychologist of standing is a hopeful omen.—ED.]

We have won the war, but lost the peace. That seems to be the feeling uppermost in the minds of serious-minded and far-sighted leaders at the present moment. This pessimism is engendered not merely by the dangerous potentialities for another war in the very instruments of the so-called peace which are being forged by the European Powers, but also by the unenviable war record of the Western races during the last hundred years. What strikes the student of human affairs is not so much the actual event of war as the constancy with which it repeats itself in spite of all the conscious endeavours of mankind to ensure peace.

How can this murderous tendency be transmuted into love of peace and good-will? There seems to be no easy solution. Yet peace and goodwill must reign if the race is to survive. Man's mind must be transmuted into an organ of universal co-operation and love, and to this end the most enlightened statesmen of the world are straining every nerve. But, unfortunately, they think and act in terms of the externals of human behaviour. That which pertains to the internal, and hence the essential, conditions of peace, *i.e.*, in the human mind, is beyond their ken. The ultimate failure of all peace plans may be traced to their incapacity to touch and transmute the inner nature of man.

My contention that the framers of programmes for universal peace are all preoccupied with external and superficial conditions may perhaps be illustrated best by analysing Mr. James T. Shotwell's brilliant article on the Second World War. He traces the growth of European civilisation from its beginnings in ancient Greece, and demonstrates how in the West "the climax of militarism was apparently the climax of culture." European history, therefore, seems to teach the misleading lesson that human progress depends on the continuance of war. The West has found the war system to be the most powerful solvent of political and social problems. So, both at the conscious and the un-

conscious levels of the leaders' minds, war as a policy has firmly entrenched itself. What, then, is the remedy?

Mr. Shotwell says that, as a first step towards the establishment of peace, we should "re-learn the history of civilisation itself, with a proper appraisal of the evils which war has caused." Then, as a second step, the re-education of the totalitarian countries should be taken up. But how? The answer is not clear. Alongside this re-education, certain broad-based economic and political measures are prescribed. Economic prosperity and social security, then, are considered to be the necessary foundations for peace.

Over and above these measures, it is said that the defeated nations must have their defeat brought home to them to the fullest extent, and be made to feel that peace alone pays, and not war. It must also be made clear to them that nations nurtured under freedom are more powerful in war, and happier in peace, than those whose minds are trained in slavery.

Finally, of course, the creation of some powerful international organisation to check aggression by collective effort is contemplated for the maintenance of peace.

Reorientation of historical and cultural studies to emphasise the need for unity and the fostering of co-operation, good-will and neighbourliness among the nations are other items in many current programmes for the establishment of peace on earth. These also bear on the environment in the midst of which man has to live.

Of the means for remoulding directly and effectively the perverted inner nature of man nothing is said, and nothing is seriously attempted. Remoulding of the environment will, it is believed, bring about willy-nilly a change for the better in the structure of the human mind. But will it? A change of heart, it is admitted, is a prerequisite of peace. How is to it be brought about, except by psychological means?

It is the solemn duty of psychologists to step in at this stage to help the seekers of peace with theoretical knowledge. The practical application of that knowledge is not our concern. We shall have done our task when we have shown how to analyse with a fair degree of accuracy the structure of the human mind.

Let us now essay a psychological analysis of the head and heart of the warring nations which we wish to convert to peace. At the outset, it should be understood that the psychologist has to start with behaviour, and then seek for its effective causes in the mental structure. Now let us ask: Are we agreed among ourselves in regard to the fundamentals of psychology? We are not. However much we may lament it, disunity is there. But let us hear what the leading schools have to say about the psychological conditions of peace.

The behaviourist holds that the primitive reflexes may, through

conditioning, be patterned into just those types of activity which result in war and aggression. I recollect vividly the late C. F. Andrews's graphic account of his visit to a Japanese nursery school. The two-year-olds, in military uniforms, were stepping to the music of a military band. He burst out laughing at the funny sight, but his companion, the late Rabindranath Tagore, remarked with a grave face, "It is no matter for laughter." It wasn't. The Japanese infants were being conditioned to war and aggressive behaviour. So, the brutality of the Nazis, the Fascists, etc., may be explained as the result of the deliberate conditioning of the young. If we accept this explanation, then what is the remedy? Mr. Shotwell says, let these people be reconditioned to peaceful pursuits making for economic security and prosperity. But this solution is utterly useless. Schmalhausen, in his striking work *Why We Misbehave*, remarks,

> However great our faith in the environmental determinants of human behaviour, in the truly astonishing power of economic and social forces to shape and mis-shape our lives, we shall be missing an amazing amount of insight if we ignore or minimise the importance to human nature of factors such as the psycho-analysts and the dynamic psycho-pathologists deal with. ...There is a lurid chapter in the history of human conduct that has very little to do with specific economic determinants, but has a great deal to do with certain distortions and perversions resident in human nature.

To the behaviourist, mind is unmentionable. He does not see that the energising agent behind all patterns of conditioning is the mind with its motives, its drives, its impulses; so long as these are not controlled, mere control of the environment will be fruitless. Pure psychological "environmentation" is of little value to seekers for the conditions of peace.

The mechanistic position outlined above may be challenged by an adherent of the Gestalt School. No systematic application of *Gestalttheorie* has been made to the analysis of the psychological conditions of war and peace. But we may easily sketch in broad outline the field dynamics of war and peace. Tensions and gaps in the field of behaviour lead to acts of aggression. So long as the whole (or the Gestalt) is a real unbroken whole, so long is there equilibrium in the field. The moment a gap is created, the equilibrium is disturbed, and then the organism pursues that course which will finally restore the lost equilibrium. Living space, racial purity, divinity of the state, and similar conceptual devices are used by unscrupulous leaders for creating gaps in the field of behaviour of the ordinary citizen. These gaps urge men and women to seek any means available for closing them. The leaders convince the people that war is the only satisfactory means to the desired end. But in the very act of closing one gap, another is created; and the whole is no sooner

organised than it is broken. Witness the phenomenon of responsible leaders already talking about World War III !.

Field dynamism is certainly better than behaviouristic determinism, in that it does not emphasise the environment to the exclusion of the mental factors in behaviour, but it does not go deep enough into the hidden motives. We have, therefore, to turn to depth psychology for the diagnosis and treatment of the social disease known as war.

Depth psychology approaches the problem from many angles. Setting aside the "power" approach popularised by Adler and used with telling effect by Russell, let us give our attention to Freud's views on war and peace. The great exponent of psycho-analysis holds that man has in him an active instinct for hatred and destruction. In its extreme form this instinct functions as the death instinct. When it operates on a large scale it becomes a terrible menace, but its energy may be canalised into the world outside. Such externalisation results in relief to the patient. That is the secret of the attraction which war has for many civilised nations. What is the remedy ?

Freud observes that "complete suppression of man's aggressive tendencies is not in issue. What we may try is to divert it into a channel other than that of warfare." Freud feels that this indirect method for banishing war should make use of the two factors of compulsion and cohesion which are usually operative in a civilised community. The reign of peace, he says, may be ushered in by

> the establishment by common consent of a central control which shall have the last word in every conflict of vested interests. Two things are needed, one a Supreme Court of Judicature, and the other the creation of an organ of effective force for backing up the Court.

Freud's analysis forces on us the following conclusions in regard to the foundations of peace :—

(1) The suppression of war mentality and brutality must be achieved by the transfer of sovereignty to a larger combination of national groups founded on a community of sentiments linking up the members.

(2) The union of peoples must be permanent and well organised; it must enact rules to meet the risk of possible revolts; it must set up machinery ensuring that its rules shall be observed.

When all is said, it is force that Freud is advocating as the means for establishing universal peace. But with force in our midst, I have no doubt that war will never disappear.

The psychological foundations for peace may be well and truly laid on a bed-rock of hormo-psycho-analytic principles. McDougall has given us a most impressive scheme of the evolution of instinctive impulses and emotions into sentiments and scales of sentiment values. He begins with a plurality of primitive propensities and their concomitant emotions, and

demonstrates how they grow into the vast spreading tree of human sentiments.

This account is confined to the conscious levels of the human mind. Below this level there is the unconscious, and psycho-analysis takes account of what hormic psychology neglects. Sentiments at the conscious level, and complexes at the unconscious, hold between them the secret of the war mentality of the civilised nations.

In order to change this war mentality into peace mentality we must first unearth and destroy the complexes. Having purified the unconscious and made it our ally, we must proceed to tackle the savage instincts and emotions: sex and acquisitiveness are the mainsprings of neurosis. Thereafter the sentiments must be so organised as to lead finally to the submergence of the individual consciousness in the cosmic consciousness.

McDougall has demonstrated with clarity and with approval that the West has organised its scale of values with self-regard as the sentiment which dominates all other sentiments. This self-regard has been the undoing of the West. It is the root cause of wars, as of all the aggression, oppression, colonisation and cultural subjugation that we have witnessed in recent years. It is leading steadily to the doom which Freud feared would overtake civilisation, namely, self-destruction of the civilised races. This self-regard must be replaced by Para-Brahm-regard, the master sentiment which our Vedantic thinkers have held up as the only goal fit for human beings to strive for.

The Great Powers engaged in framing the new peace treaty are either of the democratic way of thinking or the communistic. None of them have any idea of eliminating force. And, so long as force is there, it will breed hatred and suspicion. Moreover, the democratic and communistic methods for establishing peace handle the scales of value of group or national sentiments in the wrong manner. They make no attempt to change the master-sentiment, which is "self-regard" for the democrats, and "collective acquisitiveness, collective greed and collective enjoyment" for the communists. Both are bound to fail in the long run.

The proper psychological conditions for peace can be created only by handling the sentiment scales of nations with a view to the gradual elimination of the fundamental propensities by simplifying human needs. It is here that the non-violence, Satyagraha, prayer and fasting recommended by Mahatma Gandhi come in. But I submit that Gandhiji does not go far enough. We must go ahead and accept the highest Vedantic ideal as a living force in practical politics. How is this ideal to be translated into practice in the war-ridden world today? That is a problem for the politicians of our country. We are not concerned here with problems of psycho-technology. Our task has ended when we have laid down the broad psychological principles for the guidance of the men of action.

P. S. NAIDU

A NEW CRITIQUE OF THEISM

II.—SAMADHI AND THE NATURE OF REALITY

[**Shri P. Chenchiah,** a widely travelled South Indian Christian of broad interests, Retired Chief Judge of Pudukkottah State, brought out in his first article on this subject, published in our last issue, the historical background of the new developments in theistic theory. This article further paves the way to the consideration, in the third and last instalment, which will appear next month, of the new theories of Sri Aurobindo, Sri C. V. V. and the Christo Samaj.—ED.]

While in the West the opposition to religion comes from the acceptance of the technique of science, in the Upanishadic and post-Upanishadic periods the divergences, often radical, arose from the different interpretations put on Yogic experience among those who used the Yogic technique. Yoga was the only commonly accepted mode of spiritual enquiry and the researches of the forest-dwellers are at one on the necessity for its use. The acme of Yoga was Samadhi. The Sadhaka at some stage of the practice found himself withdrawn from the world of the Jagratha (waking) condition, with its outward motions, polarities and tensions, into a psychic world where consciousness subsided, the mind ceased to toss in waves and the self entered into a self-forgetting blissful sense of oneness and the peace that passeth all understanding.

The Yogis are all agreed on the character of experience in Samadhi. The differences arose in the interpretation of Samadhi in its bearing on the nature of Reality. The absolute Monist maintained that the meaning of this experience was that the Jivatma (individual self) ceased to be, that Paramatman became One without a second, and that Paramatman was impersonal. This interpretation did not satisfy the Buddhist, who maintained that all that happened in Samadhi was that mind and personality were oblated without their disclosing any substratum of existence. We are not concerned with this criticism. Some felt that the Adwaitic interpretation of the experience was not satisfactory either in its identification of Jiva (the individual self) with Paramatman in such a way as to falsify Jiva or in its assertion that the " One " was impersonal. These two criticisms are the root causes for the theistic reaction.

Other elements in the reaction, though not so pronounced, made their appearance in course of time. The Samadhi experience, it was felt, did not oblate or render invalid, much less non-existing, the normal modes of Jagratha life. The significance to be attached to the return from Samadhi to the Jagratha condition, and to the inability to remain in the Samadhi condition perman-

ently, was dimly perceived but did not play a serious part in the philosophy of theism till the three modern schools of thought referred to above drew out the implications of these facts and made them corner-stones of their structures. These reactions did not take place simultaneously nor were they perceived with equal clarity but there can be no doubt that they unconsciously shaped Indian theism before it became fixed in the Agama Period.

The critique of theism of the three schools of Aurobindo, C. V. V. and the Christo Samaj, in gathering these reactions and working out their implications to the full, marks a new stage of development. It is unfortunate that the energies of theism were diverted into two different channels that arrested its main development—one, the temple worship of agamas and the other, the polemics between the dualist and the monist. The latest turn in the statement of the theistic position rescues it from these dissipations and makes a new forward step possible. How it does so can best be explained by drawing attention to the outstanding features of these schools, *vis-à-vis* the Adwaitic and the traditional theistic doctrines. Naturally the new critique is a searching examination of the Samadhi condition and its implications, and starts with a critique of traditional Yoga.

To take up first the Beyond and the Above as Tat: In the Yogic experience of Samadhi, the mind is withdrawn from its outward motions in narrow currents and flows into a wide expanse, feeling a sense of release. The feeling is akin to what rivers must feel, if they did feel and could express themselves, when they flow into the sea or, as Ramakrishna Paramahamsa puts it, to the feeling of a fish confined in a pot when released into the sea. It is essentially a feeling of boundless horizon and limitless sweep. There is also a sense of identity with all, for the many have flowed into the One.

But could it be said that the experience justifies the assertion that the Jivatma has become one with *Paramatman*, not only on the surface of the latter but also in its depths? The criticism does not raise the issue, so prominent in Semitic and Barthian theology, that there is an infinite qualitative difference between God and man and that therefore no identity or even similarity between them could be postulated. The criticism is rather that while identity is secured, as it were, on the surface in breadth, it is not secured in depth. The Jivatma is not only restricted on the sides separating it from other Jivatmas, but is also cut off beneath from the depths. When the rivers flow into the sea and the sea withdraws from the creeks and subsides into a halcyon calm, the separate waters draw together into a vast expanse and sink beneath the depth of the waves. Yet to identify the rivers with the sea in its depths would hardly be correct. In Yoga it may be you

reach the Universal Self, *i. e.*, an unlimited mental expanse, yet the self retains the character of Jivatma and does not hold the full content of Paramatman.

The Indian theist does not maintain, like the Barthian, that God stands over against man but feels that he stands under or over, without standing against. Samadhi corrects the view, as does modern psychology, that man comes into existence as a pot with water in it, as a brain to which is attached a separate mind, with the suggestion that body and mind stuffs first come into being before the allocation of mind and body. The mind, like the rain, and the matter, like the earth, are at first vast and undifferentiated; afterwards, when the matter is developed into body, mind fills it and becomes bound by it. The sun and the earth first—the creeks, the lakes and the catchment-basin next. The Yogic experience is the return to the original condition and not a transcendence of Jiva or of mind and matter.

This criticism was born when the primary impression of Samadhi was critically examined. There is the *Avyaktha* (unmanifested) not only in the *Vyaktha* (manifested) but also beyond it. This Beyond has to be recognised and this recognition is the ground of theism. It is a denial that in Samadhi we reach the All or the Whole, an affirmation that in it we reach only the boundaries of the *Vyaktha* and that what remains below the plumb-line is the "Other" or the "Second." Only if you can imagine the sea as being all on the surface can Samadhi be complete union with the All—Brahman—using these expressions only to convey the meaning. So far, there is no question of the nature of the Beyond but only the assertion that Samadhi leaves a "Beyond" untouched.

As this idea forms the foundation of the "critique" we may look at it a little more closely. The intervention of death or, curiously enough, the non-intervention of death, according to the stand-point adopted, points to the same conclusion. We cannot speak with certainty of the Rishis of the past. Their experiences are not within the reach of our verification, though they are within the range of our faith. Yogis like Sri Ramakrishna have survived Samadhi and have later undergone a bodily dissolution which we onlookers, at any rate, cannot distinguish from death. Their death indicates that Jiva comes only with limited potentialities and is cut off from the reservoir of infinite potentialities of Brahman—and, having exhausted those limited potentialities, passes away. If their passing away is the proof that they reached the Beyond and became one with it, how is it that they remained at least for some time as *Jiwan muktas?* What happens after Samadhi, whatever it be—life for some time or immediate death—suggests that *Avyaktha* was not reached.

In *Kaka Bhujandar Nadi*, the

Rishi says that he knocked at the gates of *Avyaktha* but the doors did not open. We have in the levels theory of the Jivatma an embodiment of his idea. We owe it to the theosophists that our attention is prominently drawn to it. These seven levels are said (*The Secret Doctrine* I. 267) to be "the Spiritual or divine; the psychic or semi-divine; the intellectual, the passional, the instinctual, or *cognitional;* the semi-corporeal and the purely material or physical natures." The supramental levels are the "Beyond" outside the reach of man and Yoga, Sri Aurobindo holds. According to the Kumbakonam school of Sri C.V.V., the Kundalini of man is not the cosmic Kundalini but the Kundalini that sums up the past creation. But there are other Kundalinis which have to enter the human frame in its march towards supramental levels. The Christo Samaj school also propounds the Pauline idea that man is body and soul but that the Spirit lies outside the creative process, waiting to enter.

Can personality be ascribed to Tat (That)? As to the personality of the Absolute Brahman, the controversy turns on the identification of personality with consciousness. On one side it is argued that, since in Samadhi we transcend Jagratha avesta (waking state) and leave consciousness behind, the deeper reality is impersonal. On the other, the fact that in all conditions of Samadhi some sort of consciousness, though not of the pronounced type of Jagratha, survives, is taken to prove the personality of the Ultimate. In this connection there is reasonable ground for holding that the *Sabija* (with seeds of consciousness) and *Nirbija* (without seeds of consciousness), *Savikalpa* (differentiated or conditioned) and *Nirvikalpa* (undifferentiated or unconditioned), *Sampragnata* (with knowledge) and *Asampragnata* (without knowledge) Samadhis, now graded in text-books as ultimate and penultimate stages, originally represented two terminals of experience—one giving rise to the view that the Ultimate is personal and the other that it is impersonal.

Modern psychology in its study of hypnotic trance conditions confirms the idea that personality develops consciousness in its cognition of external objects and employs other modes in its direct and inward apprehension of objects and minds. In such an apprehension objects do not stand out sharply as against the subject; all distinctions are, not obliterated, but maintained and mediated in a different manner. The view that argues from consciousness to personality or from want of consciousness to want of personality are no longer tenable in the light of modern psychology. Consciousness and unconsciousness are not two realities but only two modes in which one reality acts.

Outside the region of this controversy, indications are not wanting that Yoga favoured personality of or in the Ultimate. The description of the Ultimate as *Sat-Chit-Ananda*

(Existence, Intelligence, Bliss) which is characteristic of the Upanishads and of Yoga, records the verdict against the impersonal, though still distinction between divine and human personalities is possible. It is significant that *chit* and *ananda*, predicated of *Sat*, are attributes of personality. It is a well-attested fact that in the Samadhi condition Yogis have acquired *trikala gnana* (knowledge of past, present and future) and revelatory knowledge not to be gained by ordinary means. This again reinforces the belief that in Samadhi there is no eclipse of personality though there may be of the consciousness of the Jagratha condition.

Indeed, the realm of experience which supports the impersonal view of the Ultimate is not derived only from trance and Samadhi experiences, but also from the phenomenon of sleep in its three grades of Swapna (dream-sleep), Shushupti (deep sleep) and Turiya (absolute sleep). Whether Turiya is an actual experience or a hypothetical stage postulated under the theoretical demands of Adwaita it is not easy to determine. That the arguments for Maya (the illusion of empirical reality) and the impersonal Ultimate are more logical than psychological may be inferred from the fact that Samkarite Adwaitism developed a latter-day technique outside the range of the Yoga of the Upanishads —a technique of logic which resembles more or less the method of psycho-analysis.

Ramakrishna Paramahamsa spoke in terms of Yoga experience whereas, in the land of Sankara, Southern India, Ramanamaharishi recommends a purely psycho-analytic technique of enquiry.

The new theistic schools mentioned above find no difficulty in attributing to Brahma a nature suggested by the highest development in creation, *i. e.*, personality, while recognising that the divine personality is in many respects not like the human.

P. CHENCHIAH

GOOD WORKMANSHIP

If inadequate pay is "disintegrating to person and to society," so is bad work. "The Lantern of Diogenes" in the Spring *Personalist* high-lights this indisputable truth. The clock-watcher, the man out to get as much and give as little as he can, has no legitimate place in any economy, least of all in a democratic one. The fact is only more obvious, not more true, on the higher cultural level.

Great art, architecture, literature, cannot be bought because unless they are infilled with men's souls they are not art, architecture, or literature.

Not the humblest, the most routine job, from sweeping the streets to adding columns endlessly, is well done unless a man puts something of himself into the doing. It is the man who determines the dignity of the occupation and not the occupation which measures the dignity of the man.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE ORDER THAT ENDURES *

European civilisation has produced four great narrative poems, sometimes called epic poems: Virgil's *Æneid*, Dante's *Divine Comedy*, Milton's *Paradise Lost* and Goethe's *Faust*. The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are sagas, and belong to a previous civilisation, if such it can be called. It is a striking and suggestive fact that of these four great poems no less than three are the outcome of an experience of civil war. Yet (I gladly confess) that until I read the late Charles Roden Buxton's penetrating little book, *Prophets of Heaven and Hell*, the significant fact had not impressed itself upon me. Possibly, Mr. Buxton was not the first to remark upon it; but I had never seen it mentioned before.

One is tempted to speculate whether what literary criticism is accustomed to describe as the architectural quality of these poems—their great and comprehensive design—was not in itself the consequence of a deep and absorbing preoccupation with the necessity of political order. These great poets had lived in time of anarchy; and they had learned on their pulses the truth uttered by the statesman whom Milton served, as Virgil had served Augustus: "Any order is better than none." They became therefore the prophets of Order. Not indeed of "any" order, for that would have been to betray their spiritual genius, but of what they believed to be the principles of all enduring order. *The order that endures* —that is the fundamental theme of their great works. For "any" order, though it may seem to be better than none, may be the very apotheosis of anarchy. We in Europe today should have learned this terrible lesson, confronted as we are with the fearful consequences of the order based on moral anarchy which was Nazism. But it is desperately doubtful whether we have learned it—doubtful indeed whether we are in a spiritual condition to inwardly digest the Scripture of events that is being unrolled before us.

However that may be, it is certain that the civil war amid which Virgil, Dante and Milton passed much of their lives made them ponder deeply on the foundations of political order. Virgil had been evicted from his ancestral farm to make way for one of Mark Antony's soldiers; Dante spent his maturest years as a political exile from Florence; Milton was barely tolerated under the Restoration. All three men had been near the centre of public affairs, Virgil as the intimate of Augustus, Dante as one of the rulers of Florence and Milton as the Latin Secretary of the Commonwealth. In spite of the differences in their creeds, they came to much the same conclusions: that the law of States must be in conformity with the moral law, and that earthly order ultimately depends upon the acknowledgment of a divine order. Of this divine order men can attain knowledge if they use their minds to

* *Prophets of Heaven and Hell: Virgil, Dante, Milton, Goethe.* By CHARLES RODEN BUXTON. (Cambridge University Press, London. 6*s*.)

search both their own hearts and the great pattern of human history.

All three poets—and for that matter Goethe also—are penetrated with a sense of the catastrophe which ensues upon rebellion against the divine order, or recalcitrance to the duty of upholding it. In all is an acute awareness of the necessity of sustained moral effort if civilisation is to be maintained against the forces which incessantly threaten to disrupt it. Their great poems are, in fact, restrained yet magnificent pæans to Duty. Even Goethe's Faust, who has been infected by the lawlessness of the modern European mind, is converted at last to the knowledge that enduring peace is only to be found in complete self-dedication to the struggle to maintain civilisation against the chaos of Nature. The closing symbolic picture of Faust engaged in reclaiming land from the sea in order that men and women may live peaceful and ordered lives recalls to our memory Virgil's conviction of the inherent tendency of Nature to degenerate the moment the moral effort of man weakens.

The quality which the three older poets have in common—and which finally preponderates in Goethe too—is what Virgil and the Romans called *gravitas:* a deep seriousness, an instinctive sense of proportion. To use Matthew Arnold's phrase, they have seen life steadily and seen it whole: but there is something more than this—they have seen life in a period of civil anarchy and they have seen it from a particular eminence to which the poet, as such, has no access. To have been the intimate of the founder of the Roman Empire; to have been the secretary of Cromwell; to have participated, in a position of authority, in the crucial struggle between the Empire and the Papacy in one of the greatest city-states of Italy—these are destinies to which the poet, as such, cannot aspire. These were three of the most decisive conjunctures in the history of European civilisation. And we are almost compelled to the view that it was the presence of these poets inside, as it were, of the mighty historical event, their location at the point where it was not only experienced but also shaped, which inspired them with their evident sense of vocation: they became prophets of state, not merely "makers" but makers of a civilisation, in a much simpler and more direct sense than that in which poets are conventionally supposed to supply a precious contribution to civilisation.

Hence comes, I think, the overpowering impression of their responsibility which they leave with us. Almost certainly. in point of pure poetic genius—"the vision of the faculty divine"—Shakespeare was a greater poet that either Virgil or Milton, and probably than Dante himself; but compared to any of them he is irresponsible. His spirit appears to hover, like an uneasy ghost, between the private man and the public entertainer. He was unburdened by the weight of obligation which pressed so heavily on the others, like Anchises on the shoulders of Æneas. Though he indubitably belonged to the unacknowledged legislators of society which (Shelley said) all true poets are, they had been acknowledged legislators.

And so, I suppose, it was that they set themselves to the task of rendering human life in a great pattern of the kind that would be discerned by one

who, being essentially a poet, yet carried some real share in the responsibility for practically ordering the world of men. The difference between this vision and that of a purely contemplative spectator is great: and so is the difference between their poetic techniques. The great epic or narrative poems of Virgil, Dante and Milton contain much humdrum work, large stretches of what to the capricious and individualistic taste of moderns seems like uninspired drudgery. The explanation is not simply that, as Coleridge justly argued, it is not in the nature of a long poem to be all poetry. That is true. But if it were the whole truth, great poets would never write long poems, as indeed they have long since given up doing in modern Europe. The so-called dull parts of the three narrative poems which belong to the moral fabric of European civilisation are the counterpart of the statesman's inevitable immersion in the routine of administration. They are necessary to the fulfilment of the duty of a great poet whose effective inspiration is neither that "sense of beauty which obliterates all consideration," nor the genuine "delight of the chameleon poet" in the light and shade of human existence, but a dedication to the task of infusing a conscious understanding of and reverence for the eternal moral order in the citizens of the commonwealth. Of this effort to approximate the city of Man to the City of God the unremitting effort of a Virgil, a Dante or a Milton to dignify the commonplace without denaturing it, to be as conscientious in craft over the dull as over the fascinating, is the satisfying symbol.

In a final paragraph which calls for quotation, Mr. Buxton describes the basic beliefs of European civilisation, to which these great poets subscribed and which they did so much to make current in men's minds:—

> Briefly, European thought has rested on some such fundamental conceptions as these: that the life of man is a good and not an evil, and that it has a purpose, a goal towards which we ought to strive; that there is a spiritual world, independent of Man but to which he is related; its laws create fixed standards which he can discover, of Goodness, Beauty and Truth, by which his works and institutions, including governments, are to be tested; that the individual man, as distinct from the social group, has a nature and destiny which give him dignity, a free-will, and with it the power and the duty to strive constantly towards something better. (It is for these reasons that liberty of thought, speech and action had come to assume supreme importance in the minds of Western Europe.) Civilisation, which opens an ever-widening field for knowledge, thought, experience and activity, thereby developing personality and helping the individual towards his goal, is neither valueless nor bad, but good. In return, as he cannot live alone, the individual must recognise and respect the laws of some wider whole. What is that "whole" to be? Humanity as a whole makes an imperative claim, for it contains a common interest which transcends all local or tribal differences. It is in this common interest that the most real and lasting basis for "justice" is to be found.

No one would pretend that in the long centuries prior to 1914, Europe did not fall sadly short of these ideas; but they were truly normative. Even the offenders against them expected to be judged by them. But now that we have seen the spectacle of a solemn assembly of nations before which one great Power brings a railing accusation against its ally and then, when the case has been heard and the accusation rejected, interposes its veto to prevent an acquittal, it is impossible to say that the conception of "justice" which European civilisation has honoured has any validity at all. Whether it will impose itself again by the necessity of the nature of things is a question of faith. But until it does, the anarchy which our four prophets of Western civilisation strove to exorcise will be hammering incessantly at our doors.

J. MIDDLETON MURRY

A SPIRITUAL ODYSSEY *

Rilke's qualities as a letter-writer have hitherto been known to English readers, unversed in German, only through two small and specialised collections. Now at last Mr. Hull has provided a really representative collection which, although he has drawn on only five of the fifteen German volumes, does cover the most important years of Rilke's life and form a whole, "with a definite beginning and end and unbroken continuity." Rilke was a voluminous letter-writer; "I write as the good rain falls," he once confessed, "without end." There were various reasons for this, chief among them perhaps the long periods of suffering, yet ultimately fruitful, solitude which he endured. He found human relationships difficult. At their worst, as he lamented, they only galvanised his lifelessness. And even when they enriched, it was at a cost. Everything was costly to him both through his intense sensitiveness and because his ideal of integrity was so exactingly high. But through letters he could maintain relationship, could enter into communion, with people at less cost than in person and could at the same time express his own vision of life and fertilise theirs. For although in one of his letters, during a period of anguished impotence to create, he could write to one of his dearest friends, "You can see that I am, as always, in a hurry to get to myself; I always assume that this theme is of interest," few poets have gone to such pains to help those, often unknown correspondents, who brought their work or their troubles to his notice.

This was all part of his belief that for an artist art and life were an inseparable whole and that every object which came to him, whether it was a flower, a picture, a book, a person, or a letter, belonged to the same task. The task was one of recognition, of lifting the object out of the stream of the transitory into the realm of meaning, of, as it were, discovering it to itself. That, he most passionately believed, was what the artist existed to do, what, indeed, humanity, placed between the angelic and the insensate worlds, was ultimately meant to effect.

This vocation he made peculiarly his own from the time, at which these letters begin, when at the age of twenty-seven he went to Paris to be Rodin's secretary. His relations with the great sculptor ended in a painful rupture but they set him on the path which he pursued with heroic patience to his death.

Rilke's unique sensibility had a morbid element in it of which he was conscious and which he tried to objectify and so pass beyond in his record, at once imaginative and autobiographical, of the experiences of *Malte Laurids Brigge*. Of that book, that "heavy, heavy book," as he called it, because it had drained his spirit so heavily, he had much to say in his letters that is painful to read. His torments of incapacity and spiritual drought often indeed suggest the desolations of the religious contemplative. Even his language was mystical, as when he wrote of still clinging too much to his posses-

* *Selected Letters of Rainer Maria Rilke: 1902-1926.* Translated by R. F. C. Hull. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London. 21s.)

sions and failing to achieve that boundless poverty which was his accepted task. But in this vocation he laboured under great bodily disability. His physical hypersensitiveness was almost pathological and he believed that he had become prematurely exhausted in spirit and body through his sufferings at the Military Academy to which he was sent as a boy: so much so that he could describe his subsequent life as a "long convalescence."

But the frailness of his physique only makes the victory he won out of weakness the more impressive. What he set himself to do, as these letters show with a delicate precision of insight which makes them unique, was, as he put it, "to stop being an outsider...to bind myself firmly to the reality which so often eludes me—to be there, not only in feeling, but also in knowledge, always and always." This task called for infinite patience and humanity, or, in his own words, for "responsibility for the deepest and innermost essence of a loved reality to which I am inseparably bound." It demanded of him that he should reject nothing, least of all the small things. A single rejection, be believed, forced the creator out of the state of grace and made him wholly sinful. It is hardly surprising that one so sensitive should have found this gospel of utter acceptance painful to live, in the world as it is, or that at times he should have morbidly exaggerated it. There was, too, in his æstheticism, devoted as it was, a certain bias and excess which a mysticism less bound to the senses would have corrected.

But these letters are, in consequence, like a lyre, exquisitely responsive to the music and meaning of life as it flowed over and through him. At times his sensibility almost overpowers us as it did him and we are conscious that the task of perfection which he embraced has become too much a cult of feeling. There is always this danger in æstheticism, even when it is so imaginatively informed as it was in Rilke, the danger of a self-centred refinement eating into the solid sanities of body and of mind. As some of his letters show, Rilke possessed a lively and penetrating wit and we could wish that he had given it a freer play as in the tragi-comic account of his parting at a railway-station with Ellen Key, which is as rich in humour as in imaginative meaning. But it would be ungenerous to complain of an over-cultivated sensibility which could so enchant with descriptions, of the nightingales, for example, in the garden of Meadon-Val-Fleury, of an ancestral farm in Sweden, or of the many scenes and places amid which he pursued his lonely quest.

That quest is the core of these letters. It is what makes them a spiritual Odyssey, as Keats's letters are. Rilke lacked Keats's virility and glowing human-heartedness. But he was a maturer spirit, with sympathies that mediated between the human and the angelic. His death, of which we are given a harrowing account, was as painful in its own kind as Keats's and was equally the culmination of a life which had been a learning to die and which had known its crowning moment of creation, of dying to live, in that "tornado of the spirit" in which *The Duino Elegies* was completed and of which he wrote that it was "an unspeakable storm, the very fibres and tissues cracked in me—there was never

a thought of eating, God knows what nourished me. But now it is done. Done. Amen." So all his waiting, his solitude, his at times morbid scrupulosity and introspection, found their reward, above all his long, long labour to open himself to people and things, to see in them what they purely were beyond the distorting veil of self-love and preference. Consequently these are the letters not only of a poet, but, as Professor Butler writes in her Introduction, of a poetical sage.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

B. C. Law Volume (Part I). Edited by Dr. D. R. BHANDARKAR AND OTHERS. (The Indian Research Institute, Calcutta. Price not mentioned.)

The goddesses Sarasvatī and Lakshmī have forgotten their traditional enmity and have presented a wonderful and rare combination in Dr. B. C. Law, who is at once a great scholar and a big Zamindar. Himself a devotee of learning, having to his credit more than forty learned treatises (besides a considerable number of articles) on a variety of subjects connected with Indology, especially on Buddhism and Jainism, Dr. Law is a great patron of learning, and his phenomenal munificence in aid of humanitarian causes, learned societies and educational institutions runs to a considerable amount. It was in the fitness of things that the Editors decided to present the famous savant, in appreciation of his scholarship and philanthropy, with a volume of learned articles, and the response from the world of scholars has been worthy of Dr. Law.

The first part of the *B. C. Law Volume* contains some sixty articles on a variety of subjects from scholars all over the world. Naturally enough, Buddhistic Studies account for the largest number of articles, followed by Classical Sanskrit, History, Religion and Philosophy, Art and Numismatics, Muslim History, etc. Among distinguished contributors from abroad may be mentioned the Marquis of Zetland and Drs. Keith and Coomaraswamy.

With his characteristic thoroughness and precision, Dr. De deals with the sources, characterisation, technique and critical appreciation of the *Mudrārākshasa* by Viśākhadatta. According to Dr. S. K. Belvalkar, Kālidāsa regarded Nature as instinct with life and sentiency, and depicted Śakuntalā as a true "Child of Nature" privileged to have intimate communion with the objects in nature in the midst of which she was brought up. Dr. Altekar makes a historical survey of the achievements of education in different ages and shows that

> the decline that overtook Indian civilisation towards the end of the 10th century was to a large degree due to the educational system ceasing to impart education that would produce scholars who would make their own contribution to the march of knowledge and science.

Dr. R. C. Majumdar draws special attention to the valuable data for the study of political and social history in the first section of the *Chīvaravastu* in the Gilgit MSS. In "The Age of the *Arthaśāstra*" the late Dr. Keith, the doyen of European Sanskritists, has examined the relation of the work of Megasthenes to the *Arthaśāstra*, considered the conflicting views of various scholars, and concluded against the antiquity of the *Arthaśāstra*, to which he has assigned a comparatively late date (not before 300 A. D.). Dr. D. R.

Bhandarkar shows that, according to the Śrutis, women can perform Śrauta sacrifices alone; but that the Smṛiti domination had deprived them of this right. Dr. Radhakumud Mookerji deals with the Gupta coinage and shows that Chandra was the personal name of the king, and Gupta his surname. As regards the authorship of the Vṛittis and Kārikās of the *Dhvanyāloka*, Dr. Satkari Mookerjee shows that both are the product of a single author—Anandavardhana. In his "studies in the History of Indian Plants," Professor Gode traces the antiquity of Jawar or Jndhla back to 2200 B. C. Dr. Dandekar's "Yama in the Veda" approaches the problem from the standpoint of evolutionary mythology and finds that "Yama did not at any stage represent any natural phenomenon." Dr. Chatterji points out that the Dharma cult is not a Buddhist survival as thought hitherto, but is very likely pre-Aryan in character, and that the Tantric element in Bengal Hinduism is the legacy of Buddhism. The early life of Chandragupta Maurya is given from Jain sources by Prof C. D. Chatterji. The philosophy of Vallabha and his school finds an exhaustive exposition in the learned paper by Dr. S. K. Maitra.

Lest the reviewer's references only to these articles be misinterpreted as his personal preferences, it may be stated that if this short review does not refer to the learned contributions by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Prof. Nilkantha Sastri, Rao Bahadur C. S. Srinivasachari, Drs. S. N. Sen, Benoy Sarkar, Radhakamal Mukerjee, Bagchi, Ghoshal, Barua, B. K. Ghosh, N. Dutt, C. K. Raja, Prof. H. C. Ray Chaudhuri and others, it is not because of any want of merit in them or of lack of appreciation, but only on account of the exigencies of space. The reviewer congratulates the Editors on bringing together such an excellent collection and strongly commends the book to all scholars and libraries interested in Indology.

A. D. PUSALKER

Kings and Beggars. By A. J. ARBERRY, LITT. D. (Luzac and Co., London. 6*s.* 6*d.*)

This is an English translation of the first two chapters of the *Gulistan* of Sa'di, who lived in the thirteenth century. The translator, Professor of Persian in the London University, giving a reason for his present effort, when already several English renderings of the work are in existence, says in the Preface:—

> All these translations are in greater or less degree unsatisfactory; some derive their imperfections from an insufficient linguistic competence in the translators; a more serious fault common to them all is that they were without exception based on an inaccurate text.

The text relied upon by Professor Arberry is the one "assembled" and collated by the late Muhammad 'Ali Furughi, while in translating it he has "tried to be faithful not only to the letter but also to the spirit"—a claim which is confirmed by the resultant rendering. The first chapter deals with "The Character of Kings" and the second with "The Manners of Dervishes." They are in the form of anecdotes, adorned with appropriate verses. Two short quotations at random may be given here to illustrate the theme, the technique and the translator's skill.

Speaking of Sufism:—

> In former days there was a group of men in the world, outwardly distracted but inwardly collected; now they are a crowd, outwardly collected but inwardly distracted.

> The mystics took their bread
> In solitude to sit,
> Not solitude instead
> To be consuming it.

The title is derived from the familiar worldly phenomenon that "the king of yesterday is the beggar of today, the beggar of today the king of tomorrow." The Preface and the Notes enhance the value of this translation.

G. M.

Vernal Blooms. By WILLIAM QUAN JUDGE. (The Theosophy Co., Los Angeles; The Theosophy Co. (India), Ltd., London and 51, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Bombay. Rs. 3/-, paper; Rs. 4/-, cloth)

This collection of over fifty articles by William Q. Judge, published on the vernal equinox, 1946, the fiftieth anniversary of his death, has, for the seeker of the rational explanation of things, a value out of all proportion to its price. The unpretentious title, with its implication of a world of law, contrasts as sharply with the catchy captions favoured by the psychic press as does the writer's consistent attitude —"Thus have I heard"—with the pretended authority of many purveyors of gape-seed for the curious. *Vernal Blooms* will appeal to a wide circle of readers of open mind and eager intellect whom personal experience or simple common-sense has convinced that there are phenomena related to the psychic or the spiritual aspects of nature and of man which physical science is impotent to explain.

The articles are informed by the broad tolerance, the true brotherliness and the sturdy common-sense that characterise Mr. Judge's *Ocean of Theosophy* and his other books and is as free as they are from any proselytising spirit, unswervingly loyal though Mr. Judge is to the Ancient Wisdom and to Mme. Blavatsky who repromulgated it as Theosophy. Mr. Judge does not share with the lay votaries of science the illusion that to name a thing is to define it, or that ability to define connotes understanding.

Many of the articles, like the fourteen "Conversations on Occultism," give the rationale of the occult arts in a straightforward manner, but the attempt to develop psychic powers is discouraged and necromantic practices are warned against. The dangers of astral intoxication are stressed and the lines between the psychic and the spiritual are clearly drawn.

> The placid surface of the sea of spirit is the only mirror in which can be caught undisturbed the reflections of spiritual things.

It is emphasised repeatedly that true and lasting progress lies not in the acquirement of abnormal powers but in self-conquest and Self-knowledge—"a life of altruism based on a knowledge of true philosophy." A part of that philosophy and inspiration to that altruism we are offered here.

E. M. HOUGH

Women and Work. By GERTRUDE WILLIAMS. (The New Democracy Series, Nicholson and Nicholson, London)

Our Women. By SWAMI VIVEKANANDA. (Sri Ramakrishna Mutt, Karachi)

The New Democracy will not be established, and I think it cannot be established, by Statesmen and party politicians or economic experts, or by these alone, but by every man and woman. The new democracy is a new opportunity and a new responsibility. To this end, it is required that men and women shall educate or re-educate

themselves to the new tasks that lie ahead, the greatest of which is the creation of a global order based on spiritual freedom.

Woman has a great part to play in the New Democracy. She is the symbol of non-violence, if I may say so, and I cannot help thinking that, somehow, non-violence will save the world. The New Democracy and Non-Violence (by which I mean non-aggression and racial equality) are to me synonymous, and woman, more than man or along with him, has her glorious share to contribute and her share to claim in the global reconstruction. These two books are a contribution to the problem of woman and work from different points of view.

Mrs. Gertrude Williams's book is an interesting study of the nature and scope of woman's work in Great Britain.

"The war has made an immense difference to women's lives, both with regard to the kind of work they do, perhaps even more with regard to the public opinion concerning them."

The author holds the reasonable view that men and women are neither equal nor inferior nor superior, but different in the sense that they have to play different parts in relation to society. What types of work can women do? Ought women to get the same pay as men? Is it "unfair" for a married woman to earn a living? Has the part-time worker come to stay? etc., are some of the problems discussed in the book, which is extraordinarily well-illustrated. It has 13 statistical charts in isotype and colour-design and 65 photographs.

Our Women is a selection from the writings of Swami Vivekananda. It is a passionate plea for the spiritual emancipation of woman, and it teaches a liberal social philosophy. It corrects some seriously mistaken notions and prejudices, about the status and destiny of woman.

N. A. NIKAM

Brihadaranyakopanishad. (Sri Ramakrishna Math, Madras, Rs. 5/-)

The *Brihadaranyakopanishad* is the tenth among the ten Major Upanishads and is the biggest and the most important. Here the doctrine of the Absolute is clearly expounded, in the midst of miscellaneous matter, sometimes not strictly philosophical. There are already many editions of the text and also many translations available. Yet this edition is not a mere duplicate of any among the available publications. Here the text is first given, followed by a word-for-word meaning, with brief explanations of the words by splitting up the compound words where necessary for elucidation; and then there is an English rendering of the text. This enables one to understand the meaning of each individual word besides understanding the total meaning of the passages. There is an Introduction in which an analytical presentation of the content of the Upanishad is given in full; a good introduction to the text for those who are not acquainted with the Upanishads. This is the tenth in the series of Upanishad publications from the Math. As for neat printing and attractive get-up I have not to say anything after mentioning that the printing was done by the Vasanta Press, Adyar. To those who want the complete Upanishad in the original with enough aid to understand its total import and the meanings of individual words, there is no better publication than this now presented to the public.

C. KUNHAN RAJA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"_____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

The advice which the Prime Minister, Shri B. G. Kher, gave to the Anglo-Indians at the annual meeting of their Association at Bombay on July 1st was sound, however unpalatable to some who like to underline the *Anglo* in their hyphenated designation. "Cease trying to be third-rate imitations of the European and abandon dreaming of a Home other than where you were born," he adjured them, forecasting a great future for the community if it merged itself in the country's life.

Homesickness is understandable in an exile from the country of his birth, but a nostalgia for the land of some or even all of one's ancestors is an artificial and essentially unhealthy sentiment.

There are other communities than the Anglo-Indian some of whose members suffer from such an attachment, inconsistent with full co-operation with their brothers in this land to which they owe their filial duty and support. Long centuries of Indian domicile have not sufficed for certain Parsis to overcome their sentimental self-identification with the Persia of their distant ancestors. But among these, we may be sure, are not those whose great contributions to the country's progress were held up by Shri Kher for emulation by others of a different minority group.

Derivations and backgrounds are not without their own significance, but a man's antecedents constitute no valid claim to distinction. What he is, is what matters. As Shri Kher put it: "Worth, not birth, will count hereafter." With the general acceptance of that proposition would go at one sweep communalism and untouchability.

A striking index to the trend of capitalist thinking is provided by Mr. Eric Johnston's closing address before the recent convention of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the former stronghold of capitalist reaction. *The Christian Science Monitor* of May 4th comments approvingly upon his advocacy of abandoning the concepts of "old capitalism," based on "congealed and untouchable dogmas" about a self-regulating economy and loaded with "petrified prejudices" against organised labour, Government activity, and social planning. Only those familiar with Chamber policies of a few years ago can appreciate what a change this attitude represents. If the membership of the Chamber has moved with its former President, the way should be open for far-reaching socio-economic developments.

Specifically, Mr. Johnston called on his listeners to translate their advocacy of decent living standards, stable employment, and high productivity into such measures as the minimum wage, the annual wage, and profit sharing.

A better life for all, workers and owners alike, is envisaged by his faith in the power of men within the existing system to "mould their civilisation and

shape their world to meet changing needs."

Almost simultaneously, speeches at the American Management Association's Convention pointed to the imperative need for the abandonment by industry of "its 'autocratic and dictatorial' philosophy hostile to an environment of co-operation and loyalty." "Industry," it was remarked, "is full of men who can tell why a machine doesn't work but not why a man doesn't work."

A fair deal for the worker is not a matter of charity but of justice, and justice in the long run must prevail. India, with the retrospect which industrialised countries offer, need not learn the hard way that exploitation does not pay.

But the other side of the medal is the responsibility of the worker. His clamour for a fairer deal is justified, but he must remember too that civilisation is a co-operative enterprise in which duties balance rights.

Where lies the boundary line between necessary control of the individual in the interests of society and unjustifiable encroachment upon human rights? The question lies at the root of governmental theory. From the Jeffersonian dictum that that government is best which governs least, the pendulum has swung to general acceptance of a considerable measure of control as being inevitable.

The ruins of Nazism and Fascism stand as gaunt reminders of the danger of state domination run amuck. Yet the trend in public-health thinking in the democracies seems to be towards the tightening of control. The growing threat of air-borne epidemics, for example, is agitating public-health workers.

A smallpox outbreak in Seattle (U.S.A.) was traced to a soldier just back from Japan. Dr. Gilbert Dunnahoo, U. S. Chief of Foreign Quarantine, recently declared that co-ordinated action was the need. Dr. Hugh R. Leavell writes, in a moderate and balanced article on "Opportunities for International Health Activities" in the *American Journal of Public Health* for April:—

> Whether or not he likes the idea, the health of a man's neighbours concerns everyone on this planet....our health defences can be only partially effective unless built on a firm international or supra-national framework.

In the same issue, Lawrence K. Frank, writing on "Health Education," suggests that future years may see a growing acceptance of the principle that "the individual is not at liberty to endanger his life and to jeopardize his health, because he is a responsible, participating member in a social order, whose carelessness or perversity in regard to health is a threat to the integrity of that social order." As a moral appeal to the individual, this is unimpugnable, not so when linked with apparently approving mention of the growing trend to compulsory treatment, immunisation, etc.

Society can make out a good case for quarantining individuals exposed to communicable diseases, until the incubation period is past; it has no moral right to force inoculation or any other treatment on any individual against his will. A man's house is no longer his castle, save in a most attenuated and debatable sense. But if a man's own body be not held inviolable, then

the last citadel of self-determination falls. Eternal vigilance is still the price of liberty and the growing power of the medical profession in more than one country will bear watching.

A "return to the type of education that places mastery of subject-matter over the idea of making it painless" was called for by Dr. Elvin S. Eyster, Professor of Business Administration at Indiana University, in an address in mid-April before the annual convention at New York of the Eastern Commercial Teachers Association. *The New York Times* quotes him as saying that business men had complained to him about the lack of responsibility showed by high-school graduates in commercial jobs. Too often, he declared, "employees are willing to do only just enough work to get by their supervisors." It is indeed, as he held, for the schools to develop right concepts about work and to instil in their pupils the idea that democratic rights, if they are to be preserved, carry with them responsibility.

The lesson implicit in Dr. Eyster's plea, that anything worth having is worth effort to acquire or to defend, is especially important for a people emerging into freedom from too long tutelage. One of the great disservices to a subject people is the sense of helplessness and irresponsibility which foreign domination fosters. The attitude of the outstretched hand, palm upward, is as easy to acquire as it is difficult to change at once. Sir Jogendra Singh struck a virile note at Simla early in May when, addressing the Central Legislature's Standing Committee on Agriculture, he declared, "I am ashamed as a Minister for Agriculture to see India begging everywhere for food."

It is easy, and not unfair, to blame the alien rule primarily for the neglect of agriculture in this country, as of much besides. But placing the blame is not curing the evil. It has been a choice, in the present food shortage, between the begging-bowl and starvation, but at the earliest moment India must stand on her own feet, a virile nation, self-sustaining, with hands outstretched to give instead of to receive.

That education in Great Britain seems to be turning away from the examination system is indicated by a recent announcement from the Ministry of Education which *Time and Tide* of 25th May discusses editorially under the heading "Enlightened Education." The Ministry of Education suggests, *inter alia*, that examinations in secondary schools should be drastically curtailed and altered. The time is ripe for Indian education also to shake off the examination incubus.

Time and Tide draws up a heavy charge-sheet against examinations, recognising:—

(1) that "examinations before the age of seventeen or eighteen curb the natural development of young people's minds and prevent the schools from studying and fulfilling the individual potentialities of their pupils";

(2) that "examinations are not an infallible test, though they are the only one which can be devised"; and

(3) that

they impose on the student, often at the most sensitive period of development, a strain on the nerves and on the memory—by

no means the most important quality of the intellect—which may have very bad consequences indeed for the general development of the mind and character.

These evil consequences may include mental exhaustion which disqualifies the student for deriving full benefit from a university career, or even, fortunately rarely, may entail a nervous breakdown.

Putting, as examinations do, a premium upon physical memory, they discourage any real, sound cultivation of the thinking and reasoning power. More serious still is the effect examination-dominated education has upon the character in the formative years. As long as the object of education is to pass examinations, so long will our schools be encouraging selfishness—envy and jealousy and competition—instead of emulation and the altruism which is the world's great need.

International student exchanges and exchanges of professors between educational institutions in different countries is a hopeful contribution to the cross-fertilisation of thought. In a recent study, *United States Activities in International Cultural Relations* (American Council on Education, 744 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.), Dr. I. L. Kandel describes the contribution of the Institute of International Education at New York. A valuable feature of its service has been the centralising of information on available fellowships and scholarships, and on opportunities and conditions for study and research in the U.S.A. and abroad.

The establishing of contacts and co-operation with foreign educational agencies has been fruitful. The Institute arranges for the welcoming of foreign students on arrival and for their guidance in the institutions they attend. American University Unions in Paris and London have, it is stated, rendered reciprocal services to American students abroad.

The voluntary, privately supported character of the Institute has doubtless, as claimed, given it more freedom in its work than it could else have enjoyed. But that does not obviate the importance of the United Nations Organisation's giving more attention to education for peace than the League of Nations gave. Its more inclusive plans must take in also distant countries like ours.

And India in her turn must not forget, in her immediate preoccupation with the very necessary spread of primary education, to raise also the standard of her universities, so that they may attract students in numbers from Europe and America, in exchange for the stream of Indian students to the West. We do not want, the world does not require, a one-way traffic in ideas, goods or men.
