

# THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,  
and lost among the host—as does the evening  
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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## IMMORTAL LITERATURE

### A NOTE

The true sublime, by some virtue of its nature, elevates us: uplifted with a sense of proud possession, we are filled with joyful pride, as if we had ourselves produced the very thing we heard. . . . When men who differ in their habits, their lives, their tastes, their ages, their dates, all agree together in holding one and the same view about the same writings, then the unanimous verdict, as it were, of such discordant judges makes our faith in the admired passage strong and indisputable. —LONGINUS

Through the constant changes of his moods and thoughts, man himself remains ever constant. Further, the ever shifting scenes of his life point to the immortal perceiver that man himself is. What is true of man has its parallel in literature. Each generation, each century, produces its own literature, most of which is forgotten; but there is that literature which is immortal, which survives the onslaught of Father Time and endures through the ages and the yugas.

We publish below a very interesting article on "Literature in Its Changing Moods" by Mr. B. J. Wadia, whose love for the best in letters and whose knowledge of

English literature are alike great. We welcome him among our contributors and we hope that now that he has retired from the arduous duties of a Judge—he adorned the Bench of the Bombay High Court for many years—he will give the benefit of his discriminating literary apprehension and appreciation to the public and among them to the readers of THE ARYAN PATH. The theme of his study prompts us to draw attention to the truth about literature of enduring nature. We should learn to distinguish between literature that is great and literature that is immortal.

It is legitimate and logical to infer, for example, that in the very

age that the grand hymns of the *Rig Veda* were composed there must have been works of other creators, great and small; there must have followed the process of the survival of the fittest, and during the centuries much, much of literature must have perished, leaving the *Rig Vedic* hymns to continue their task of inspiring human minds. Or, coming to more recent history : before our eyes is going on the sifting process in the mass of literary creations of the great Elizabethan period of English history. Shakespeare has survived and will live on to delight and to instruct the generations yet unborn. But can we say the same of other authors of that period? And again, for how many millenniums will the plays of Shakespeare himself survive? The like of Valmiki and of Homer, of Kalidas and of Shakespeare, have their eternal elements which cannot be disturbed by the discovery of aeroplane or television. But are there other forces, intellectual and moral factors, which push out of existence even great literary creations, leaving the immortal ones to continue their benevolent task?

The development of a language is seen in its literature. Ideas are the soul of words and even when a language dies the ideas live on. Those languages live longest whose literatures deal with immortal ideas. Thus Greek lives on as a dead language because it has been the vehicle of Pythagorean wisdom, Platonic ideas, and so on. Sanskrit is a

living language because it incarnates the sublime in thought and aspiration and the appeal of that sublime is so powerful that it continues to attract generation after generation of men to experience it. There are ideas too deep for words but not for sounds, and there are sounds which are too deep for mortal minds to fathom. Mystics who penetrate the profound depths of such immortal ideas use the device of parables and fables to convey them in words, just as poets use metaphors at another level.

Space forbids any lengthy consideration of that which may be appraised as Immortal Literature in comparison with that which may be named Great Literature. The difference between the true mystic's realization and the lucid philosopher's reasoning may be mentioned as corresponding to that between the two types of literature.

When the philosopher apprehends and becomes a poet and when, in his turn, the poet unfolds into a mystic, we have the perfect literary creator. Only a mystic can bridge "the mystic gulf from God to Man" of which Emerson spoke; and only the mystic who can wield a pen can produce immortal literature. So convincing a teacher of English literature as Arthur Quiller-Couch states that Dr. Johnson had small capacity to understand mysticism and adds, "It is also something which even Shakespeare did not understand, though he unconsciously relied on it."

The intimacy of the mystic with words gives birth to immortal literature. The capacity to express in words what the mystic realizes in experience brings to the vision of mortals immortal truths, and these can never pass away from human

ken. This avenue of thought will lead the young literary creators in the India of today to a wonderful mint in which they can fashion immortal coins out of the golden nuggets which Nature provides.

## LITERATURE IN ITS CHANGING MOODS

Literature is the thought of thinking souls. It deals with the great elementary feelings and passions which are a necessary and permanent part of human nature. Human nature being unchanging in its deeper aspects, the literary achievement of a country at first sight produces an impression of uniformity. That is the impression produced by the literature of England through the centuries. But the impression wears off when we realize that there are shifts in literary fashions also. Forms that are popular and attractive in one age are replaced by those of another. Many forms have, however, changed but little. The lyrical tradition is the surest and most lasting of England's endowments, even though we do not know enough to trace its earliest history. Songs of love, devotion and patriotism speak to the world of an unchanging humanity from generation to generation. In the verses of the Persian Omar Khayyam, the Roman Horace and the English shepherd, Robert Herrick, there is the same familiar mood. Each is troubled by the pathetic shortness of human life,

each shrinks from the thought of death, and each tries to dispel the thought with the scarcely consoling resolve to enjoy life while it lasts. How similar also are the main portions of the folk-songs and legends of the world! Neither man nor nature has changed profoundly since the dawn of creation. The same stars shine above, the same passions stir men to their depths; flood, drought, war and pestilence still undo the labour of generations of men. And yet literature, which deals with all these, has undergone various changes as it has received new directions from its shifting environment. Sometimes it is in conflict with the aims and the ideals of science. But science cannot enlarge man's moral vision as literature can. That is the function of literature. It is life that is the great educator, and true literature does not cut itself off from life and its realities.

The establishment of English as one of the world's great literatures was due largely to the foundation afforded it by the classical Renaissance. It had its beginnings at least nine hundred years before

Chaucer saw the light of day. But it was under Queen Elizabeth that Spenser gave voice to the national ideals that inspired her spacious times. He set the tradition of English poetry which the centuries have carried on. There were, however, more writers than readers in his time. Up to the middle of the eighteenth century very few people were sufficiently educated to read and write. The humbler amongst them listened to tales round the home fires.

The love of a good story is one of the few mental cravings that accompany mankind till the end. But in the times of Elizabeth and the Stuarts the drama became the most popular and attractive literary form, and the theatre was the school-house of popular instruction. Through it the people grew familiar with their country's history. With a vividness new to the age the drama held up the mirror to the past and handed on its own picture to posterity. The name of Shakespeare is still, for an immense number of readers, a sort of superstition. He was himself also an actor; and it is said that whilst writing the ghost-scene in Hamlet he passed a long night within the hallowed walls of Westminster Abbey for inspiration. We do not know how he was received by his audience, but he was certainly never slighted and insulted as, for instance, Molière was flouted by the high-brows of France. Shakespeare made the stage eternal. The world in which he lived is dead; the world which his pen

created will never die.

The drama was the natural way of expressing the national ideas and sentiments of the time. But after Shakespeare the influence of the stage began to wane. The party spirit became the guiding factor in political life, and the scene of patriotic appeal shifted from the Globe and the Blackfriars to Westminster. An increasing number of people was learning to read as the country advanced. The Restoration was a landmark in history. It meant not only a change of government, but also the beginning of a new England, in life, thought and literature. The greater portion of the literature of Doctor Johnson's time consisted of novels, and it is incredible when we think of the large stream of novels at present that they are really the youngest thing in literature. Beginning with *Pamela* in 1740 their number increased so rapidly that Sheridan made Sir Anthony Absolute in *The Rivals* complain of the poisonous effect on young minds of reading these "trashy novels" from the circulating libraries. Later still, Wordsworth complained of the craze of novel-reading. But the craze has come to stay. It were idle to guess what new developments are possible in the novel form, or whether, as the novel has largely supplanted the drama and partly assumed the province of poetry, it may not in turn be ousted from the dominant position it has held for the last two hundred years. The novel is undoubtedly a great intellectual

achievement, and the time has long gone by when a plea for the habit of novel-reading need even be entered. Fiction is popular all over the world, and of all literary agencies it best answers the cravings of the mind.

The reading public of England changed the form of literature in the last century. Poetry had revived from about the end of the eighteenth century, but the years 1821 to 1834 marked the most melancholy interlude of mortality among the English poets. Keats died of consumption at Rome in 1821. In 1822 Shelley was drowned off Leghorn and in 1824 Byron succumbed to marsh fever at Missolonghi. Scott, worn out by the struggle to meet his creditors, died in his Scottish home in 1832 and two years later Coleridge gave up a long and unequal struggle with ill health. Some of these came to an untimely end; accident, disease and frustrated effort have accompanied their memory. Wordsworth lived on, but his earlier impulses for humanity had been numbed. Tennyson and Browning continued their work late into the century, but Matthew Arnold deserted poetry as something not strong enough to save culture and civilization.

One of the marked features of the literature of the last century was the absence of a great school of poetic satire. The age had its moments of fun and parody, but it never endured the lash which Dryden administered to the men in power and Pope to the general public of their times. Satire

seemed out of place in the romantic movement which changed the old ideas of art and literature. The literature of the eighteenth century was essentially the literature of the town, but towards its end the centre of interest changed from the coffee-houses and clubs and the drawing-room to the open country, which was the real land of romance. Like Falstaff, men began "to babble of green fields." Literature now took more interest in men in humbler circumstances, in the simpler ways of living, in children and even in the dumb animals. Is it not significant that there were no children and no animals in the literature of the preceding centuries? Even the youngest of Shakespeare's characters had left their childhood far behind. But the greatest attraction now was the life of the countryside. Nature was romantic in her moods both of benignancy and of strife.

This great change in outlook accompanied not only the advance of democracy but even the growth of industry. The possibilities of industrial wealth seemed boundless. Queen Victoria was by this time well established on the throne of her ancestors. Carlyle was preaching his new gospels, and railing at his own generation in trying to organize a still chaotic world. Ruskin's name went with that of his master. Democracy was still on its trial, and none could yet estimate its importance in the scheme of things. The story of human life in the streets, the factories and the countryside was

lit up by flashes of valour and beauty and sacrifice, but was not without touches of squalor and greed. Literature began to deal with life's growing problems from many points of view, the most important of which was that of the humanist who dared to speak out. Far away in Ayrshire Burns first raised his voice in lyric exaltation of the man who was "a man for a' that," regardless of the guinea's stamp. The best known of all the Victorian pleas for the poor was Hood's immortal "Song of the Shirt." It was reprinted in journals, translated into other languages, woven into handkerchiefs and sung in the streets of London. Mrs. Gaskell gave a most pathetic picture of the working-class life in Manchester in her novel, *Mary Barton*, which appealed to a wide audience and won the admiration of Carlyle and of Dickens. Ebenezer Elliott and William Morris showed how in a changing England Poetry took Poverty for its companion.

It is impossible to consider literature merely as an ornament of the libraries. It is not an escape from life, nor a refuge only of leisure hours. It is one of the greatest forces for mutual understanding and appreciation among the nations of

the earth. Today its influence is waning, like that of religion, in a world torn by discord and strife, where might is right, and the only right. This is an age of many books and few readers. We are far more ready to listen to the literature that comes through the radio than to the old master voices which alone can lift the human soul. The war-winds have uprooted many of the sanctities of life, and the future alone can tell how many will survive in the "new order" of things. The Victorians had faith in progress and in the dawn of better times. That faith grew dimmer as this century advanced. Two great wars have made the future darker than it ever was before. But it were best to cultivate the faith of the optimist, the literary optimist. He of all people brings a smile to trembling lips, makes us believe that true love is immortal, that clean, honest laughter is a gift, not an acquisition, and that in the printed page we can help the world to forget its sorrows, its worries and its failures. Literature has its changing moods in all countries on the earth, but supreme over them all is "man's unconquerable mind."

B. J. WADIA

# MORALS AT THE CROSSROADS IN THE U. S. A.

[ **Hervey Wescott**, a Western student of philosophy, religion and science in the light of history, is on solid ground in the modern welter of discreetly guided thinking, in this, that or the other direction, when he advocates giving a man the facts and letting him draw his own conclusions. For every student who abandons the old and trodden highway of routine to enter upon the solitary path of independent thought—Godward—the world is the saner, and the richer. For no honest searcher after the eternal truth will come back empty-handed, and each original thinker with an inspiration of his own to solve the universal problems can lay at least his mite upon the one altar of Truth.—ED. ]

Humanitarian American educators have long endeavoured to create institutions of learning that would serve the ideal function of education in a democracy by becoming generating plants for practical idealism. But the essence of idealism—the desire to give before receiving—is a practical religion inherent in a purposeful philosophy of life. The acquisition of such a philosophy and its consolidation in the character of men is necessarily antecedent to specific economic and social gains, although, given a few genuine practical idealists, many may be inspired by their example. Example, however, has its limitations. Man is primarily a rational being, and unless there are already firmly implanted in his character the seeds of a philosophy of altruism, or of a "Religion of Solidarity," as it was called by Edward Bellamy, example will not compel alteration of a self-centred programme of living.

The realization that an integrated metaphysics has been the missing

vitamin in attempts at moral education is gradually dawning. Dr. Robert M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago has played a helpful part in furthering such an awakening, but the elements out of which must come a wide-spread recognition of the need have been brewing for some time. The new God of the West, Modern Science, after rightfully displaying a distrust of traditional theological answers to the human equation, developed a religious zeal of its own under the guise of a crusade in scepticism. This same scepticism, has, however, begun to cancel itself out. The natural scientist, triumphant from major victories over the physical elements, has arrived at *terra incognita* in social and moral problems. What is worse, his tools of dissection, so useful in the laboratory, fail to fit the needs of the new occasion. Being a man of honour he has begun to admit his predicament.

The discoveries and the inventions which he conceived to be new boons

to human relations have often doubled the troubles. Nor is he altogether blameless, for by his shortsighted attempts to treat the human being as a formula in a test-tube he has gradually convinced his flock that morality is expediency, that man is an elongated ape and that happiness is to be found in the selfish satisfaction of basic animal instincts such as those involving sex, food and shelter. Now the brave new world, because it is honest, is beginning to frighten itself. Psychologists, dominant influences in the field of education, have begun to realize that when a student is indoctrinated with the idea that his confused self is simply and solely a bundle of conditioned reflexes, he is a poor candidate for superimposed exhortations to idealistic behaviour. Ethics professors who spend the first half of their course telling students the degree to which a primary "moral nature" has no basis in fact, find a common response to counsels of perfection subsequently given in Ethics B, to be summarized in three words: "Why should I?" Before reaching this all-embracing conclusion in an Ethics course, moreover, students have received considerable impulsion along the same general pathway of thought by the insistence of the average anthropologist or biologist on man's being a fortuitous concurrence of atoms, coming from nowhere and with a similar destination.

The necessity of a rational basis for ethics is apparent to the greatest educators—if not to all. Many

Ethics professors would like very much to teach a system that would carry a genuine and self-compelling weight, but where is it to be found? Certainly not in the social sciences, daily illustrating their inability to penetrate the deeper metaphysical essence of human nature, nor in the old-time religious dogmas, for these have been both entirely irrational and a failure in promoting human solidarity. Perhaps a few words of counsel may be taken from Thomas Paine, who wrote:—

We must go back and think as if we were the first men who ever thought.

If we divest ourselves of both contemporary and medieval prejudice, we may be on the road to a deeper understanding of the relation between moral and mental qualities, between "intuition" and intellect. Begin, for instance, with the primary realities observable through simple introspection—reason, the moral nature, intuition and instinct. Somewhere in man there is a sense of justice, somewhere the desire to find enduring values, somewhere the desire, if only a desire, to believe in immortality. Why should these fundamental qualities of *human* nature be considered as secondary rather than as primary in an analysis of man? Why should not nature reveal reality to us through intuition and moral perception as well as through intellect, and should not the instinctive beliefs of men for millenniums in the soul and in an independent moral consciousness give us pause for serious thought? To select

an admirable statement of this argument from the Gifford Lectures of W. Macneile Dixon :—

On every side today you meet with an exaltation of the intellect at the expense of the spirit. You may trust, it is said, your thoughts, but not your aspirations. In your ideals you employ, it seems, a private script, a language unknown to nature ; in your logic, on the other hand, nature herself speaks. You see the design. Nature is rent asunder. You enthrone the measuring, weighing, calculating faculty of the human creature. His remaining attributes are irrelevant. But who told you that nature had drawn this line? Where did you learn of this preference? Nature has no preferences. If she has given us deceiving souls, how can you argue that she has given us trustworthy intellects? If nature misleads us in the one case, she very probably misleads us in the other, and if that be so, it were best to wind up the debate, and turn our attention to stocks and shares. We should at least, then, aim at a conclusion which the intellect can accept and the heart approve.

Moral attitudes are influenced to a marked degree by contemporary opinion relative to the origin of man, his present significance in the totality of evolution. Today the wholesale destruction of belief in Christian eschatology has left educators, and, in fact, all intellectuals, with a congenital distrust of the words "soul" and "immortality." Yet it has been the opinion of many noble and respected minds that the question of human immortality is in importance second to none. "If

immortality be untrue," wrote Buckle, "it matters little whether anything else be true or not." "That man," said Goethe, "is dead even in this life who has no belief in another."

This matter of either acceding to or denying the plausibility of human immortality is indeed crucial in its bearing upon morality. Every ethical system is based upon certain fundamental principles, for which permanent value is claimed. Yet if there is no permanence in man himself, if the whole human story is without meaning, it is indeed the ultimate folly to live for any ideal higher than pleasures of the moment. Upon no such structure can be built a civilization of social co-operation, but, fortunately, mankind is loath to accept fully the modern materialism. Perhaps Schopenhauer sensed the answer when he wrote:—

In the furthest depths of our being we are secretly conscious of our share in the inexhaustible spring of eternity, so that we can always hope to find life in it again.

And it was the opinion of that worthy mind, to which many before and since, from Plato to John McTaggart, have likewise subscribed, that each man is in fact on a long pilgrimage, engaged in an endless process of growth through experience, and that the soul, as the real essence of individual man, returns again and again from death to new birth for the purpose of continuing tasks not yet fulfilled. Such a view not only fails to violate the sanctity

of reason, but suggests a compelling basis for social ethics in outlining the life of man as an incident in a co-operative enterprise of evolution—intimately related to himself as an individual. And yet such a conception, though in no way dependent upon theology, would find great difficulty in obtaining a respectful hearing in our halls of learning. The fault lies in the fact that the development of modern thought has been appallingly one-sided. Intellectual leaders have concentrated their efforts entirely on a "pragmatic" approach, geared to the laboratory, all the while blindly assuming that their method is incompatible with metaphysics instead of being one of its essentials.

It is obvious that the purposes of education could never be fulfilled by indoctrination in a metaphysical system, but, conversely, it is equally true that deprecation of metaphysics in general, and of any theories regarding soul and immortality in particular, leaves the student "indoctrinated" with a negative scepticism unable to furnish the driving desire for social co-operation.

Every ideal has its root in metaphysics. On the basis of a materialistic or purely economic philosophy what support is there for exhortation to a life of service? Yet even the position of the economic determinist is a metaphysical position, usually unconsciously held. And since it is generally conceded that there can be no moral virtue without conscious choice, it seems imperative that

Ethics courses should include discipline in metaphysics. Each individual student should think through to his own basic conclusions respecting the nature of reality in human nature, instead of absorbing views like a sponge from the popular mind-set.

It is at this point that the contribution of Robert M. Hutchins can be fully appreciated. He proposes to supply through education the tools of philosophical and moral evaluation, and then to leave the individual to become his own authority on ultimate matters of moral value. To fear Fascist or Catholic implications in such a proposal is utter nonsense, for in fact it offers the only alternative to regimentation. Men who are taught to think for themselves on fundamental issues will continue to do so when they confront the smallest details, refusing to become blind followers or blind leaders of the blind.

Intellectually honest educators are beginning to perceive that when modern science cleaned house by removing medieval theological débris, she also threw out the chairs upon which to sit. A purposeful explanation of man's destiny, consciously based on metaphysics, is in no way rendered incredible simply for the reason that metaphysics is distrusted and because dogmatic religions have failed to solve the problem. The eternal questions remain, after being covered over in turn, first by priestcraft and then by a newer materialism. Satisfactory answers to the ethical equations cannot be supplied

unless this obvious fact is recognized.

An Ethics professor should not be requested to blue-print the answers, but he should be expected to state the issues fairly. If John B. Watson holds forth for environmental determinism, Pythagoras and Schopenhauer will be found to balance the scales adequately. If Freud rises to proclaim that morality is a reflex action of sex-drives, Plato, the source of Western idealistic philosophy, will state the reverse. And among the moderns themselves there are also the materials necessary for contrast. Alexis Carrel, William McDougall, G. Lowes Dickinson and John McTaggart of England have a great deal to say but lack an intelligent and interested audience.

An Ethics professor has a serious responsibility. He is aware of his natural, personal bias, and that it should not obstruct careful consideration of a view sharply contrasting with his own, nor prevent students from becoming each his own responsible moral authority. Often he admits to his class that he is a pragmatist, a moral relativist, a "naturalist," or whatever he may call himself, but this is not enough. He should make his own position clear not only by naming it, but also by stating the fundamental postulates upon which it rests, together with its metaphysical implications, so that students may be taught to evaluate critically all basic hypotheses.

Even then, the task of fairly pre-

senting the bases of moral evaluation is yet far from complete. It is well to contrast the opinions of recent moralists, which differ in specific detail, but it should also be within the perceptive range of an intelligent professor that the whole of these systems together are strongly biased by "the climate of opinion" of our age, to borrow Whitehead's phrase. That "climate of opinion" or "frame of reference" is strongly pro-materialistic determinism, and *anti* any conception of morality which rests upon the hypothesis of individual human immortality. This is the most important "bias," a conditioning effected by the dominant intellectual influence of the day, and is not only anti-religious, but also is disinclined to consider the metaphysical questions which religion has attempted to answer. Yet the fact remains that no self-compelling rational morality can be built without considering the nature of permanent values, and hence the problem of individual immortality.

Two contrasting philosophies must be presented to students—for, in fact, only two exist. There is first the philosophy of complete moral relativism, based upon the conception of a world where "whirl is king" and permanence is but delusion, and, secondly, the philosophy of permanent, purposeful development of the moral individual through the medium of change. If moral theories are presented to the student *after* he has been made aware of this

great dichotomy in human thought, he gains both a deeper and a more mature perspective. If the realities of one age become the "untenable hypotheses" of another, it may be that the quest for rational meaning and purpose in the human drama is not yet finished, and that it is profitable to seek a solution to the moral equation from a view-point which recognizes that the "eternal questions" need to be attacked anew.

Peter Drucker, in *The End of Economic Man*, describes with penetrating insight the despair of the masses when they perceive the inability of an economic ideal to give a meaning to individual life and a rationale for social ethics. Economic determinism, psychological behaviourism and biological ethics are of the same essence—all based upon the assumption that man

is an irresponsible creature of chance circumstance. What other ultimate conclusion can be reasonably held? There is only one, and it is inextricably interwoven with a hypothesis of human immortality which describes man as a permanent soul whose development is regulated by attendance to permanent values.

The Ethics professor, then, in all humility, should be willing to undertake a comparative study of religions and philosophies, both ancient and modern, and to encourage a similar procedure, while at the same time welcoming in open discussion the efforts of students to reach a new synthesis. Traditions of thought which balance by contrast the modern bias should have their hearing and their respectful consideration both in the classroom and in student publications.

HERVEY WESCOTT

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Alas, alas, that all men should possess Alaya, be one with the Great Soul, and that, possessing it, Alaya should so little avail them!

Behold how like the moon, reflected in the tranquil waves, Alaya is reflected by the small and by the great, is mirrored in the tiniest atoms, yet fails to reach the heart of all. Alas, that so few men should profit by the gift, the priceless boon of learning truth, the right perception of existing things, the knowledge of the non-existent!

*The Voice of the Silence*

# THE PROBLEM OF THE BUDDHA IMAGE

[ **Shri O. C. Gangoly**, a well-known Indian art critic, demolishes here the absurd theory that Indians were incapable of sculptured representation of the Buddha before they took instruction from the Greeks. The idea of ancient India, the generatrix of cultures, having gone to school to the infant culture of Europe is flattering to Western vanity; otherwise so fantastic a theory as that which Shri Gangoly successfully challenges could hardly have gained a serious hearing.—ED. ]

The Lahore Government Museum contains a large number of Buddhist Images of a school of sculpture variously designated as the Hellenistic, the Greco-Buddhist and the Gandhara School. They are believed to have been made during the rule of the Kushana Emperors, beginning with Kaniska, who had his capital city at Purusapura or Peshawar and who, according to various estimates, reigned sometime between 72 and 120 A. D. The Kushana Empire covered the territory known as Gandhara (a name as old as the *Mahābhārata*), the extent of which varied from time to time but which included the whole of the Punjab, a portion of the Kashmir Swat Valley and a fraction of Afghanistan. Numerous examples of Buddhist sculptures recovered from these sites have been collected in the museums of Lahore, Peshawar and Calcutta and in various European museums. In 1910 a great French antiquarian read before a coterie of his friends in Paris a paper in which he claimed to prove, on the basis of study of a series of sculptures in the Lahore Museum and at Hoti Maradan, that the Indians could not formulate the

figure of their national God—the Lord Buddha—and that the first Image of the Buddha was made not by any Indian sculptor but by some Greek artist of Gandhara. This assertion was broadcast all over the world and, through the agencies of Reuter, this startling news was telegraphed to all the newspapers of India, which published the substance of this paper that purported to prove the Greek origin of the Buddha Image. The original paper in French was first published in English translation by the India Society in 1918, so that very few Indian scholars had any opportunity to examine the evidence and to contest the conclusions of the French savant.

In 1912, at the Oriental Congress held at Leyden, an Indian scholar read a paper in which he contested the claim of the Greek origin of the Buddha Image. In another well-documented paper published in 1926, the same scholar showed by numerous quotations from other scholars committed to the Greek theory that the Image of the Buddha had existed long prior to the rise of the Gandhara School. In another very well illustrated paper it was proved by the

same scholar that the formulation of the Buddha Image—that of a Yogi seated in a peculiarly Indian pose—was an essentially Indian conception, based on and derived from earlier traditions of the Yaksha Image which had been current in various parts of India before the advent of the Buddha. It was further proved that side by side with, and perhaps earlier than, the earliest representation of the Gandhara School, the Image was represented in the School of Mathura, that in all probability the first Image of the Buddha was formulated by an artist of the Mathura School and that the characteristic Indian conception of the Buddha differed fundamentally from the presentation we meet with in the thousands of cross-breeds of the Gandhara School. Notwithstanding this able demonstration of the Indian origin of the Buddha Image, the Archæological Department is still committed to the theory that the first Image of the Buddha was formulated in some part of the Gandhara country by some Greek artist, and that this Image, formulated by a foreigner, has been copied throughout the later history of Buddhist Art—in the Images of the Amaravati, of the Mathura and of the Gupta Schools.

Very recently the main plank in the argument for a Greek origin has been taken away by the discovery of a very early text relating to the canonical injunctions of Early Buddhism. The pivot of the argument of the protagonists of the Greek

theory is that in the earliest monuments of Buddhist art, *viz.*, those at Bharhut and Sanchi—datable about the second and the first century B. C., respectively,—in the various scenes illustrating the life of the Buddha, His figure is not represented and His presence is suggested by a symbol, either an umbrella (a *chatra*), or a pair of feet (*pādukā*) indicating the presence of the Lord. From this it has been inferred that the formulation of the Figure and the Image of the Effulgent One—the Personality of Immeasurable Radiance, *Amitābha*, as the subsequent texts describe Him—was beyond the capacity of Indian artists. It has now been proved by a very early text of the Buddhist canon that there was a specific injunction laid down in the canon which prevented the representation of the Buddha in any pictorial or plastic form. It has been the consistent belief in all Vedic and Post-Vedic thought that the Transcendental Being, whether in the Vedic formulation, or in Hinayanist Buddhist conceptions, could never be caught within the limits of measured lineaments. What was possible was to devise a form (more on the models of earlier non-human and super-human types—Yakshas, Devas, Cakravartins—than on the basis of the portrait of the historical Buddha) which could provide a convenient support for the meditation of the faithful, or the lay-devotee. And it was as a useful aid to devotion, an easy implement of meditation or a comfortable support for contempla-

tion that the Image of the Buddha crept into the later developments of Buddhistic doctrine. And when the necessity arose the Image was immediately formulated in the *ateliers* of Mathura.

One of the most important and significant impediments, then, to an iconic representation of the Buddha was the canonical interdiction against any visible image of the Buddha, implied in the words of the Buddha Himself and recorded in the *Brahmajāla-Sutta*, a part of the *Digha-Nikāya*. The Buddha is reported to have said:—

The outward form, brethren, of Him, who has won the Truth, the Tathāgata, stands before you, but that which binds it to rebirth is cut in twain. So long as His body shall last, so long do Gods and men behold Him. *On the dissolution of the body, beyond the end of His life, neither gods nor men shall see Him.*

As is well known, this *sutta* deals with the most fundamental Buddhist doctrines and its canonical authority was too sacred to be despised by any artist; none, in view of the above assertion, could ever think of attempting to render in visible form One who had passed into the realm of invisibility and was thus incapable of being seen by either gods or men.

Here, then, we have an authoritative explanation why, on the reliefs at Sanchi and at Bharhut, the Buddha's invisibility is suggested by omitting His figure. From the strictly Hinayanist point of view, it

would be a heresy to depict the Invisible One in any visible form, just as from the strictly aniconic conceptions of Vedic thought, the Bramha, the Transcendental Being, could not be represented in human shape.

But for this indirect injunction, no lack of technical skill or of creative genius, nor any manner of incapacity in the Antiquarians' sense could ever have prevented the native artists of India from rendering the personality of the Greatest Spiritual Figure of her history in worthy and adequate plastic forms, as the later history of Indian Buddhist art has so brilliantly demonstrated.

When the devotional cult of the Buddha, that is to say, the cult of the personal worship of His Image in the form of an Icon ( a *pratimā* )—arose, about the latter part of the first century B. C., and the Indian sculptor was called upon to provide Images for the use of worshippers, he had already provided Images for the earlier forms of cult-worship that had existed before the advent of the Buddha. Those had included the Vedic God Indra, Skanda, Viśākha and Agni, the Images of the Jaina Religion and also those of numerous village-gods of popular folk-worship ( chiefly represented in early and prehistoric terra-cottas ), of which the most wide-spread cult was the worship of the Yakshas—of one or another of these, as the presiding genius of a particular culture-area, each city in India had a special Image.

So the Indian Image-maker had in his ancient and traditional repertoire an ample supply of iconographic formulas, patterns and types out of which he could easily formulate the Image of the Buddha. There was no necessity for him to go to extra-Indian sources to borrow the lineaments of his national, religious and spiritual patterns and types. In ancient Indian tradition there were definite canonical prescriptions for visualising a *Mahā-puruṣa* or a Superman. This theoretical fundamental type of the Superman was conceived as having thirty-two characteristic marks or *lakṣaṇas*. And in Buddhist texts which belong to times much earlier than any contact with Hellenistic culture, the peculiar Image of the Buddha is indicated by these thirty-two characteristic marks of the Superman. In other words, a definite idea of the Buddha's appearance existed before the time of actual representations in plastic forms or icons.

In early Indian art, represented by a series of pre-Christian stone Images of Yakshas, there existed an old and widely venerated type which was naturally adopted by the new cult of the new religion of the Buddhists as soon as the personal worship of the Buddha grew up, imposing the necessity of formulating an Icon for worship. This had to conform

not only with the thirty-two *lakṣaṇas*, or characteristic marks of traditional Images of the Superman, but also with the cult of the Yakshas which immediately preceded in current popular worship and was superseded by the newly established cult of the Buddha-Worship. In these circumstances, it is impossible to conceive that any figure of Socrates or of Christ could have been used by the Indian Image-maker as the model for his formulation of the first Image of the Buddha. To suggest such an absurdity is to ignore the whole history of Image worship and of Image-making in India, which had existed before the advent of the Buddha.

The theory of the so-called Greek origin of the Buddha has been demonstrated by recent research to be untenable, and the more probable theory of an indigenous origin has been accepted by several groups of European scholars and savants—a fact very little known in India and ignored by Indian Indologists. There is nothing surprising in the facts established by recent research not yet having been able to overtake the misrepresentation of the origin of Buddhist art, for “a Lie can travel around the world and back again, while the Truth is putting on its shoes.”

O. C. GANGOLY

## SELF-HELP

[ **Miss Constance Williams**, after a successful business career, has set out to examine herself and recommends this to every one of us. This self-examination is of the utmost importance, but should we not first have a standard by which we may judge ourselves? If we do not, no matter how thorough our examination, it will be fruitless, and where can we obtain a good working standard but from the true immemorial Wisdom—Religion?—ED. ]

An indispensable volume in the libraries of our grand-parents was a book called *Self-Help* by a materialistic old gentleman of the name of Samuel Smiles. That book was very typical of their age, an age of industrial expansion, an age when material possessions were beginning to count for more than an illustrious pedigree, an age when the "Self-made man" was becoming an increasingly familiar figure.

*Self-Help* is necessary in our generation also, but for us the Self has a deeper, wider meaning than it ever had for our parents. We are beginning to find that material success is but a very small part of life, that the "Self-made man" for all his pride in his achievement is not necessarily a happy individual.

And that is what we are all seeking today—happiness. One by one we find that the material possessions we have striven so hard to obtain do not bring us Happiness. We ask ourselves in bewilderment what we *do* want. We grow annoyed with ourselves for being dissatisfied.

Yet this dissatisfaction is very natural—and very healthy. It is what the poets call "Divine Discontent," and only by passing

through this stage of discontent can we ultimately find out just what it is in life that we are missing.

One cause of our bewilderment is that we are living in an age of transition and all our values, the values in which our parents believed so implicitly, are in the melting-pot. We do not know what to believe. Science is destroying the faith our fathers held and although it is working hard to replace that by another—and perhaps a better—faith, that faith is not yet ours and in the meantime what are we to do? By what are we to guide our lives? What ideals can we uphold as being worth striving for?

It is a common thing today to find that the ideals we profess are not the ideals we live by. For instance, we teach our children that the greatest height of nobility is always to tell the truth, quite ignoring the fact that it takes a noble man or woman to lie correctly at a crucial moment. We lay too much stress on exactness of detail and neglect the real issues.

As Robert Louis Stevenson very truly says,

The habitual liar may be a very honest fellow and live truly with his

wife and friends; while another man who never told a formal falsehood in his life may yet be himself one lie—heart and face, from top to bottom. This is the kind of lie that poisons intimacy. And, *vice versa*, veracity to sentiment, truth in a relation, truth to your own heart and your friends, never to feign or falsify emotion—that is the truth which makes love possible and mankind happy.

Let us have ideals by all means, but let us be consistent. Let us teach our children ideals which they have some hope of attaining. Let us give them a religion which is not at complete variance with the society in which they have to live. It is our duty to show them how to live true to the real essence of life rather than to preach a "Sunday only" religion.

And in order to achieve this we must be true to our own character instead of attempting to mould it into an ideal our neighbours profess to admire. Yet it is far harder to be our real selves than to conform to the accepted pattern. Everyone we meet endeavours to change us, those nearest to us most of all. And our natural laziness, or pleasantness, or dislike of hurting people's feelings will be our greatest obstacle.

For to be labelled "different" today is almost to be made a social leper. Yet if we are strong enough to be different, in other words to be ourselves, the opinions of others will have far less power to hurt us than if we tried to conform and continually fell from grace.

And in time they will accept the strong character as different, they will tolerate from him that which they would quickly condemn in more timid beings, and in time he will become an authority unto himself. He will not only build round himself a circle of *real* friends, *real* people who have gravitated towards him because he has deserved them; but people will turn to him for help and advice, they will naturally lean on him when they are in trouble and he will be admired as a living example of a calm, strong character, all because he refused to do as other people told him.

And what is, of course, more important, if we are able to do this we shall become a real integrated personality, complete in ourself, able to bear solitude, able to make our own decisions and stand by them, and we shall really know contentment, which is one of the rarest things in the world today.

So Self-Help in our time means examining our own nature until we really know ourselves, really know what we want out of life, and then directing all our energies into building up the many facets of our personality into one consistent whole and achieving that which we desire.

The person who can do this is very rare indeed. Most of us change our minds according to every passing mood, every gust of emotion. We want one thing today and another entirely different thing tomorrow. The only way we can overcome this weather-vane habit is

by ruthless self-examination, self-discipline, SELF-HELP. And, although we may at first be stigmatised as selfish and hard we shall be of far more use to others in the long run because of the very strength of character we shall build up, upon which they will be able to lean as

upon a rock.

In other words, we shall be the sort of person who counts in a community, the person to whom everybody immediately turns in a crisis and, what is more important, the person who is able to withstand and to handle the crises of his own life.

CONSTANCE WILLIAMS

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## BEAUTY AND MORALITY

Bernard E. Meland, writing in the Autumn 1941 *Personalist* on "Some Philosophic Aspects of Poetic Perception," sets up an artificial dichotomy with dangerous implications when he refers commendingly to "the impulse to prefer beauty to moral rectitude" and asserts that "wherever moral passion is in dominance, the more subtle and fragile forms of the human spirit are put to disadvantage." He cites reprovingly the attitude of the Hebrews and of the early Christians towards the æsthetic life and of Plato towards the fine arts. One cannot, he claims, absorb their spirit

without chilling a bit toward sentiments and insights which stand in their own right as expressions of beauty, unrelated, in any essential way, to the strenuous ends of the good life.

The conclusion rests upon a false premise—that the positing of the superiority of spirit over matter necessarily leads to regarding spatial objects generally as corruptive of the spirit. To consider them as such would be to see in blindness or in deafness cause for

congratulation—the closing of one avenue of approach by the Powers of Darkness—a position which only the bigoted fanatic could take.

True, artistic appreciation is more an emotional than a mental experience, but a work of art may convey a great moral truth and a moral precept may be couched in words of lambent beauty.

Between prudishness and the æsthetic spirit there is indeed conflict, but true morality knows naught of prudishness. Its basis is union and harmony, rhythmic relations, the suppression of errant inclinations, the performance of that which is necessary, which "counterbalances the cause and the effect and leaves no further room for Karmic action." But true beauty, in art as in Nature, also rests on harmony and balance and restraint. Mr. Meland writes that for the æsthete beauty and truth are "facets of the one cosmic crystal." The complementary facet is morality and it is not to belittle the arts to find in the mastery of the art of living the acme of beauty as well as of truth.

## THE FAMILY vs. THE STATE\*

[ There are two sides to the institution of the joint family, still widely prevalent in India, and which **M. N. Srinivas** criticises here. Undoubtedly it does sometimes bear heavily upon individual hopes and inclinations but equally undeniably it serves as a check to the development of individualism and selfishness, which grow so rampant in the West. It is worth noting that some leading Western social workers have urged joint family responsibility as the solution of otherwise almost insoluble socio-economic problems.—ED. ]

Today in India the family is completely swallowing up the loyalty of the individual. Family loyalty prevents the individual from dedicating his energies to the service of any larger group. The small fish is swallowing the big one. This is the main tragedy of our national life. The finest elements of society, the most intelligent, educated, sensitive and idealistic, are wasting themselves in winning bread for a number of relatives, all of them probably ne'er-do-wells. If this strong sense of family loyalty were not deeply rooted in the middle class our country would have advanced much farther, socially and politically, than it has so far.

The middle class no doubt is numerically insignificant. But politically and socially it counts for much. The country's leaders very frequently come from the educated middle class. And if the best elements of the middle class were not obsessed with this family loyalty, a number of first-rate men would

have been released for the service of the country.

We shall now try to consider how exactly this happens. The joint family is very much alive even to-day. It may not be there in its old form. Members of four or even five generations living in one house with all their wives and children, the expenses of birth, marriage and death of every member being met out of a common fund, is certainly rare these days amongst the middle class. But the joint family survives in some form or another. Brothers with their wives and children often live together. Again, though economic conditions force people to go away from home, brothers meet, say, at the *Shraddhas* of their parents. All the brothers are present at any birth, death or marriage occurring at one of their homes. A well-to-do brother aids a poor one. A brother who is in the city looks after the education of a brother's son, or of a younger brother. The consent of the eldest brother is

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\* The lack of any serious study of the working of the joint family in India has compelled the writer to write from his own experience and observation. But he is certain that what he has written about is a common thing in the life of the middle class all over India.—M. N. S.

usually sought for the marriage of any son or daughter of any of the younger brothers.

It is almost the duty of the elder brother to see through the education of a younger brother. The younger is naturally grateful. He is not only grateful, but he looks up to the guidance of his older relative on almost every occasion. His attitude has something of reverence in it. The elder brother frequently decides every important thing for his younger brothers and the latter meekly submit to his decision. The powers of the former head of the joint family have descended to the eldest brother.

It must be said here that the elder brother really sacrifices a great deal to help his younger brother. The elder brother has his own wife and children to think of, first. Again, there are the younger sisters who ought to be married. Marrying his younger sisters is the eldest brother's first duty. Thus every pie that the elder brother gives shows great sacrifice on his part, and the younger is not unconscious of it. Of course there are cases where younger brothers have failed to remember the help they have received. But usually they are grateful, and even where they are not sufficiently grateful, the fear of social censure makes them pay back a little of what they have received.

The allegation that the help the elder brother gives is not disinterested does not really affect the issue. It only strengthens the case we

have been making. A sensitive person who knows that his benefactor expects a return will naturally want to pay off the debt first.

As soon as the younger brother is able to earn, he comes to the aid of his elder brother. And, again, he is expected to do by his younger brothers as his elder brother did by him. This he does whether he likes it or not. It is his Duty. The great *Gita* teaches the doctrine of Duty and everyone knows how much a Hindu is influenced by the teaching of the *Gita*. Kantian morality—an intense dislike of what you have got to do—comes very naturally to the Hindu. The whole force of his religious and social tradition is, however, on the side of Duty and the still small voice in protest is drowned in its noise.

Another fact has to be considered before we proceed with the argument. The joint family ranges itself on the side of tradition. Custom is king and it speaks through the elders. Children are married young. A boy is saddled with marriage and his consent is of no account. So a member of a joint family is burdened with marriage long before he knows the price he has to pay for it. He may find, on coming of age, that the tie which was forced on him so early in his life is coming in the way of his spiritual growth. These narrow ties, he realises, are preventing the dedication of his life to a wider cause. Then does his life become truly harrowing, caught as he is between a duty which asks him to

go one way and a desire which asks him to go the other. The very conflict is enervating. For every such individual who suffers such a conflict and decides in favour of duty, the nation has to pay a very heavy price. Not only does the nation suffer but the individual's life becomes painful. His deepest desires unfulfilled, he becomes bitter and morose, and takes a sadistic joy in compelling those who are dependent on him to do what *he* considers their "duty." All the results of frustration are here. All those who are dependent on him are forced to feel the pain of his self-sacrifice.

I am not saying that what binds the younger brother to the joint family is only gratitude. The sentiment is far more complex and hence I have deliberately used the vague phrase "family loyalty." This loyalty includes gratitude to the family member who has helped you, behaving towards those relatives who are dependent on you as he has behaved towards you, and, finally, regarding the family as the unit for whose good you have to work. The family is really an altar on which the individual sacrifices himself. Perhaps the origin of family loyalty is to

be traced to the long ages of joint family life. Perhaps it has a different origin. But the vital fact is that it is there and its existence affects the life of the nation and of the individual.

Now for the conclusion. Looking at the matter strictly from the point of view of society, family loyalty is responsible for much of good. But at what cost to society? If our leaders think that the cost is too high, that the finest individuals of the middle class cannot be allowed thus to sacrifice themselves, then they must attack the institution of the joint family. And unless this institution is destroyed and with it also the sentiment of family loyalty, our society will suffer greatly. The finest men will devote themselves to the prosperity of their petty families and the nation will be starved.

It is tragic to note that not one student of Hindu social institutions seems to have noticed the waste that is going on, even though any one with eyes will perceive it either in his own life or in the lives of those around him. The sooner we realise the gravity of the problem, the better for our society.

M. N. SRINIVAS

# JESUS CHRIST

## GLIMPSES OF HIS LIFE AND MISSION

[ This is the second of the series by **Ernest V. Hayes** which presents the Prophet of Nazareth as an Adept of the Good Law.—ED. ]

### II.—THE CALL

Save for one incident, the received Christian Scriptures say nothing about the youth of Jesus. The Gnostics, who held the theosophy of the Faith, had more to do with the shaping of the Gospels than orthodoxy is likely to admit. For the Gnostic, the outstanding first event occurred when Jesus was thirty years of age.

One incident told by Luke concerns him when he is twelve years old. His parents take him up to Jerusalem for a great festival. The Holy City is thronged, like Benares at some great celebration. In the one Temple, signifying the One, many Rabbis, the Brahmanas of Israel, are gathered. There are deep discussions, prolonged meditations, expressions of devotional worship. Among the throngs we find this highly gifted lad, Jesus, trying to understand the cross-currents of the sects, the conflict within and without the men he meets.

So absorbed is he that he stays behind when the festival is over. His parents, with a goodly company of their relatives and friends, set out again for Galilee. They miss their son and, filled with anxiety, they turn back, the mother's heart beating with prayer for his safety. They

find him in the Temple, sitting with the wise and the reverend, listening to them, asking them searching questions. These Rabbis are no longer like the inspired Prophets of old; they follow tradition and they are timid of new light. The boy surprises them with his precocity—with his spiritual understanding. Jesus has begun to see Reality, not as a stern Potentate to whom man must tremblingly offer the blood of goats and of calves, but as a Father—the Source within man himself—“The Atman seated deep in every creature's heart.”

“Why hast thou dealt thus with us?” complains the mother, utterly human as all mothers must be. “Thy father and I have sought thee sorrowing.”

“How is it that ye sought me?” replies the boy. “Knew ye not that I must be about my Father's business?” The words are not undutiful; they are profoundly mystical. He wants to share with them his own secret. The “Father” in them should realise swiftly what the “Father” in him has appointed him to do. He goes back with them to their home, Mary cherishing every word he utters, while he “increases in wisdom and in grace, in favour

with God and man."

We shall hear nothing more of him from the received Gospels till he is thirty years old. But legends will tell how in young manhood he went to Egypt and was there initiated into such wisdom as remained, into such adeptship as Egypt could still offer. The words quoted by one of the Gospel-writers—"Out of Egypt have I called my son"—and attached to a story of his being taken there as a mere child, for fear of Herod the King, and returning to Judæa after a brief stay, has more significance if we attach it to this visit of the young man eager for all wisdom.

Coming back from Egypt, he seeks the company of the Essenes. Our Gospels will speak of Pharisees, Sadducees and Herodians as among the enemies of Jesus, but not the Essenes. They are unorthodox mystics, having links with the Therapeutæ, and through them with Egypt herself. The Essenes are ascetics, not with the pose of the Pharisees but with the natural simplicity of the illuminated. Jesus must have found affinity with them, though his illumination is to pass far beyond theirs, for his public utterances later will be echoes of their thought and practice.

He has no intention of remaining in their monastic life. His heart will be with the ordinary people, oppressed, as they think, by a foreign yoke, but more truly by their own lack of vision. "Where there is no Vision, the people perish,"

said one of their own Prophets. That may have meant Vision for the Leaders of the nation. Jesus sees it as meaning Vision for the whole people, so that leaders in the exploiting sense are needed no more.

He is moved by accounts of the preaching of one John the Baptist, alleged by tradition to be his cousin. John is proclaiming the Kingdom of God. Asked if he considers himself the reincarnation of one of the ancient Prophets, John does not know. The Past? It is the Present he is concerned about. "Repent!" The Greek there really means "Think differently!" By a horrible misinterpretation it will come to mean in the Latin Vulgate: "Do penance!" Sin....do penance....sin....do penance—that will be the subtle poison of a popular religion claiming John and claiming Jesus. But alter your entire inner life of thought and feeling is the keystone, the oft-repeated motif of what John is teaching and what Jesus is to teach with even greater power. With greater power because of his tenderness, his unescapable compassion and understanding, for with him, as with Gautama Buddha, it is Love rather than Sternness that awakens the divinity in the worst man's heart.

According to our Gospels, John the Baptist will be declaring that a Greater than he is to come and subsequently he will see in Jesus the fulfilment of his prophecy. But a very different tradition will come down to us outside the Scripture. A fragment of a

people—the Mandæans—will survive to our own day. In *their* sacred writings, John will be the one they follow and Jesus will be spoken of with hostility. And in the overwriting of these sacred traditions of John and of Jesus, additions will be made when Catholicism has triumphantly emerged. These additions will point to fundamentals in Catholic sacramentalism as proofs of Jesus' being a deceiver. But it is likely that antagonism existed between the disciples of the two Teachers rather than between the Teachers themselves.

The fascination of "magic" is strong among the people from whom Jesus and John must draw their followers; all kinds of occult arts are flourishing, in spite of the stern prohibition of the ancient Lawgiver; mediums abound; and, inevitably, there is a vast increase in forms

of obsession. The greater part of the public ministry of Jesus will be restoring those possessed by "evil spirits." He will proclaim the true Yoga which has nothing to do with occult arts, save to deliver the man who practises them from the power of his own enchantments. It will be a difficult task; his loving healing of the sick and the devil-ridden will be seen as magical performances to glorify himself as a wonder-worker. In truth, he has but one talisman—"The Father," the Self of every human soul. He has but one ideal—"The Kingdom of God"—within each man as a possibility. He will be spared nothing by his friends any more than by his enemies. He will face all, for the sake of suffering humanity, for on him has come the Divine Compassion, the Eternal Truth, making him a Bodhisattva.

ERNEST V. HAYES

## OLD MAN AND NEW WORLD !

Mr. Robert Herring, Editor of *Life and Letters Today*, reminded us pun-  
gently in his August issue that

Plans for reconstruction allow for everything save one. They provide a New World, and forget that the person who is going to inhabit it is the same Old Man. It is the Old Man who wants curing of his dirty habits; then the world that he fouls may be more worth living in. Humanity—which is greedy, lazy, generous, despicable, sly, lamentable and lovable—is what has the final say. That isn't made better by everyone returning to all fours, so as to seem equal. It is done by those who kneel, rising; by those who can

stand, learning to walk, and by those who can walk, knowing where they are going and why.

In other words, if individuals in all countries sit down and wait till there is peace among the nations, till laws are perfect and society is reorganized, they will wait in vain. Politicians, priests, bankers, social workers, none of them can save us, but, one by one, each man can save himself, must save himself. Even the co-operators' "All for each" depends for its effectiveness upon the sincerity of their "Each for all."

## NEW BOOKS AND OLD

### THE LIGHT THAT FAILED \*

“ From the earliest times, ” writes Viscount Cecil, “ reasonable men have protested against the folly and cruelty of war. At intervals these protests have resulted in proposals for the substitution of some organised international procedure to take the place of war in the settlement of international disputes. ” The horrors of the last world war, the strong hatred of war which swept over the civilised world in 1919, and the personality of Wilson all helped to bring the League of Nations into existence. Viscount Cecil was most intimately associated with the working out of the plan for a League of Nations, and subsequently for more than a decade played an active part in its deliberations. In spite of the League’s latter years of frustration and failure, he remains a convinced believer in its possibilities, if only statesmen would be loyal to its basic assumptions. The League of Nations and what it stands for are so much a part of his public life that his autobiography is inevitably written round it, both in range and in interest. It was no polite exaggeration, but a frank recognition of facts that led President Wilson to write to Lord Cecil soon after the Covenant was completed : “ I feel that the labouring oar fell to you and that it is chiefly due to you that the Covenant has come out of the confusion of debate in its original integrity. ”

When the League began its work, it

was harrassed by doubts and opposition. But very soon it “ welded itself into a single cohesive self-conscious instrument confident of itself, convinced of having a mission to discharge and resolute to discharge it. ” In the first decade of its existence it was able to achieve much, both in the field of non-contentious activities, like the promotion of health and of social welfare and the economic rehabilitation of poverty-stricken States like Austria, as well as in respect of international peace. It was able, for instance, to settle the Aaland Islands disputes between Finland and Sweden amicably ; the dispute between Yugoslavia and Albania was settled to their complete satisfaction, to the surprise of seasoned politicians like Lord Balfour. The League established itself in a position of unprecedented international authority, and both the League and its sister organisation, the International Labour Office, carried through a series of social and humanitarian reforms of great value. A dozen or more cases of international disputes had been settled peacefully, which but for the League might easily have led to war. The Permanent Court of International Justice was set up, whose decisions and opinions in more than a score of cases were accepted by the Powers concerned. Persistent efforts were also being made to ensure the maintenance of peace. It was, there-

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\* *A Great Experiment : An Autobiography.* By VISCOUNT CECIL [ LORD ROBERT CECIL ]. ( Jonathan Cape, London, 16s. )

fore, appropriate that, about this time, with the support of the three leading statesmen of Great Britain, Ramsay MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin and Lloyd George, a movement was set on foot to present Lord Cecil with his portrait in recognition of his unique services to the cause of international co-operation and good-will.

The year 1931, when the authority of the League was very high and promised to reach still greater heights, was a turning-point, and the next decade saw the League discredited and powerless. It is not necessary to go over the tragic episodes of Manchuria, Abyssinia and Czechoslovakia in detail. It is more interesting to know what Lord Cecil's own analysis is of these years during which the League went down hill. While his language is extremely guarded and indicates no personal bias, Lord Cecil is relentless in his assignment of blame. From the outset the attitude of the British Government towards the League was ambiguous, and no attempt was made to transfer important international work to it. Influential officials in the Foreign Office did not conceal their suspicion of the League and all its proceedings. This was in 1920. Things did not improve. "The Prime Minister, Mr. Baldwin, was temperamentally in its favour. But both he and others regarded it as a kind of excrescence which might be carefully prevented from having too much importance in our foreign policy. Geneva, to them, was a strange place in which a new-fangled machine existed in order to enable foreigners to influence or even to control our international action."

In the concluding pages of the volume, Lord Cecil reaffirms his faith in the League; he incidentally points out what he considers to be the fallacy in the Pacifist position, and holds that "the use of force is not in itself inconsistent with love." He wants the British Government to stand firm for the principle that "no nation should attempt to take the law into its own hands and resort to aggressive war to enforce its rights." "Aggressive war is an international crime, and it is the duty of all peace loving and law abiding States to prevent or stop it." Lord Cecil also indicates his misgivings about a world State or a world federation, and in the concluding pages of his work, while hoping that in the future something of the kind may be possible, he believes that the appropriate course is to proceed step by step. He holds that "inside the framework of the League, a federation or confederation of geographically related powers might be set up with appropriate federated organs."

We close the volume with feelings of respect and admiration for a great mind that refuses to be discouraged by the present tragedy and believes that mankind is not destined to lapse into final barbarism and destruction, but is capable of creating a new world in which conflicts, if conflicts there must be, shall be subject to the rule of law. This expression of faith by one who is not merely an academical student of politics will be a source of comfort and of courage to those who are oppressed by the poignant horrors of the hour.

N. S. SUBBA RAO

## SCIENCE AND SOCIETY \*

Mr. J. G. Crowther, who is Scientific Correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian*, has written in this volume, mostly in the form of short chapters with attractive titles, a series of thought-provoking essays in chronological order on the co-relations between science and society, closing with a pamphlet addressed to scientists and telling them how they should conduct themselves if the world is not to end in complete chaos. He has a very readable and plausible style—too plausible, perhaps, since the reader is apt to be carried along willy-nilly, he knows not where. Mr. Crowther's book is full of plausible statements, for the majority of which he never stays to give evidence. Quite a number of his statements I know to be true, but some I know to be false. For example, he tells us that Roger Bacon "was the first European to give a description of the composition and preparation of gunpowder." I made a similar statement myself in my little book on *Roger Bacon*, published in 1920; but I may be more easily forgiven than can Mr. Crowther, for the discovery that the chapters of Bacon's *Epistola...de secretis operibus naturae et de nullitate magiae*, in which the composition of gunpowder and its preparation are revealed (or, rather, concealed, since the style is cryptogramic) are almost certainly interpolations of a later date, was not made until after my book had been published.

Whether Roger Bacon did know how to make gunpowder or not is a matter of very little importance; but whether the reader can safely rely on all Mr. Crowther's statements is another matt-

er. Indeed, it would need an immense library and several years of research, to say nothing of very careful functioning of the critical faculty, to check them all up. One of the most difficult things in the world to discover, with any degree of certitude, is what men and women in the past did and thought, and what was their motivation; and this impossible task is what must be achieved in order to construct any complete theory of the co-relations between science and society which goes much beyond the pretty obvious thesis that the development of science in any age has been to some extent conditioned by the prevailing state of society, and has itself had some effect in conditioning social development.

I think Mr. Crowther would wish to go considerably beyond this. He has been much influenced by Hessen, about whose lecture to the Congress of the History of Science held in London in 1931 he has something (very commendatory) to say, and Hessen, I venture to think, had been much influenced by Karl Marx. In spite, then, of all the things in Mr. Crowther's book which I like and which I am tempted to quote with approval, I cannot free myself from the conviction that the book is an essay in the Materialist Conception of History, which I do not like at all, because I do not consider it to be true.

But there is one passage in Mr. Crowther's book which I cannot refrain from quoting, because it expresses a most important truth so infrequently recognised and which Mr. Crowther might himself ponder:—

Writing is a technique. Its origin was prac-

\**The Social Relations of Science*. By J. G. CROWTHER. (Macmillan and Co., London. 16s.)

tical, and it has marvellous qualities. But like all other technical inventions it has limitations. It is not particularly suitable for describing the phenomena of the natural world. It is impartial in its descriptions of error and truth. Some day an inventor will devise a recording technique which will be automatically incapable of describing anything except the truth. Writing will not do this. In fact, in the short run, it spreads error more easily than truth, because it will record a free association of ideas which has little relation to reality. After these colloca-tions of ideas are described in writing, they

acquire a delusive reality from the reality of the script. The phenomenon is the basis of the popular belief in the truth of the written word.

"Scientists," writes Mr. Crowther, "cannot be above the battle, either in politics or in war." It is a debatable point. But whether scientists are capable of saving the world from destruction, or, assuming they are so able, how they should act to achieve this end, I confess I do not know.

H. S. REDGROVE

*Sri-Vidya-Saparya-Vasana.* By BRAH-MASRI N. SUBRAHMANYA IYER; trs. into English by A. NATARAJA IYER, with a Foreword by PROF. S. V. VENKATES-WARA IYER and an Introduction by DEWAN BAHADUR K. S. RAMASWAMI SASTRIAR. (Brahma-Vidya-Vimarsani Sabha, Madras. Rs. 3/-)

This volume of eleven sections, translated from the Tamil and patterned after Umanandanatha's *Nityotsava*, is the sixth general publication of the Brahma-Vidya-Vimarsani Sabha of Madras. It contains the basic or essential elements of the elaborate ritualistic scheme of worship of the Power-Goddess technically known as "Sri-Vidya," interpreted in reference to their esoteric metaphysical or philosophic significance.

The whole scheme, in common with many other traditional methods of worship once prevalent and practised in ancient India, gradually either fell into disuse or degenerated into extravagant practices. Though once Bengal was considered the home of Tantric worship, many worshippers in South India practise the "Sri-Vidya" as part of a daily programme of spiritual pilgrim's progress or metaphysical way-

faring.

Within the limits set for this notice it would be impossible to examine in detail the ritualistic programme and its metaphysical import. Nor is there any need, as an elaborate literature in English and in other languages of India is to be found in print. Tantric literature was intensively studied, for example, by Arthur Avalon (Sir John Woodroffe).

With one or two *obiter dicta* by the authors of the Foreword and the Introduction, it would be impossible to agree. The learned Dewan Bahadur remarks "Thus Sri-Vidya is Brahma-Vidya writ large." I am afraid it is not quite so simple as that. When the author of the *Vedanta-Sutras* deliberately used "Brahman" in *Athato-Brahma-Jignyasa*, he gave ample opportunities to all forms of worship. But, then, he immediately followed the matter up with a definition of "Brahman" as Creator, etc., of the Universe, *i. e.*, *Janmadyasaya-yatah*. Is that Supreme Agency Vishnu? Is it Siva? Is it Para-Sakti—Lalita-Tripurasundari etc.? Theological heads have been broken over this matter, and in the interests of philosophical

theory and practice Sri-Vidya should be kept separate and distinct from Brahma-Vidya.

Nor would it be possible to agree with Professor Venkateswara when he explains that the "essential fact" of "Mystic union is the conscious relationship between the Soul and Unity." If there is an element of consciousness Mysticism must commit suicide! For all consciousness must *ipso facto* be a consciousness of dualism, and mysticism and dualism are contradictions.

After all, in matters spiritual as in matters secular the proof of the pudding

is in the eating. The question whether the studied and systematic practice of Vidyas like the "Sri-Vidya" would necessarily lead an aspirant to the goal held out and sometimes furiously advertised must be left an open one. One thing, however, needs absolute emphasis and can bear any amount of repetition. That is that these Vidyas should be practised without expectation of any mundane rewards and advantages: *Qua Nishkama-karma*, they are excellent and unexceptionable. The author and the translator should be congratulated on their valuable work.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

*A Nation at Bay.* With a Foreword by K. M. MUNSHI. (C. K. B. Naidu, 212, Tenth Road, Khar, Bombay. Re. 1/-)

A very topical book. The material is not new; it is a collection of speeches and statements bearing on the Viceroy's announcement (8th August 1940) and on Mr. Amery's speech in the House of Commons (22nd April 1941) both of which are reproduced here in full. Gandhiji's statement, which is about the weightiest indictment in the book; the text of resolutions of the Congress Working Committee, the Hindu Maha Sabha and the Muslim League; the whole statement issued by the Standing Committee of the Bombay Conference; the widely differing points of view of men like Jawaharlal and Srinivasa Sastri, Sapru and Jinnah, Munshi and Setalwad, etc.; and the comments of the press, Indian, Anglo-Indian and British; are all assorted here for the reader to form his own idea of the political tangle.

It emerges from a reading of this book that whatever the clash of opinion between party and party, not one approves of the Amery-Linlithgow proposals. The stalemate can be resolved, it would appear, only by ceasing to regard the August declaration as final, by turning to the War as the central crisis and, for securing the fullest co-operation of the Indian people, by conceding the major demand of the nationalist party and so winning to the support of the democracies a historic nation.

Mr. K. M. Munshi, in a characteristically outspoken Foreword, emphasises the solidarity of the nation and the need for united endeavour at this juncture in history.

A book of this sort would impress one as more non-partisan and would serve its purpose better by avoiding the tacking on to names of derogatory or complimentary epithets; *e. g.*, "Truculent Jinnah and Tranquil Sapru," etc.

A. VENKAPPA SASTRI

*Ideals and Illusions.* By L. SUSAN STEBBING. (C. A. Watts and Co., Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

One question which Professor Stebbing considers in her attempt to be definite—for “to think in abstractions, when one’s concern is moral philosophy, is to fail as a philosopher”—is whether it can be right for Nero to fiddle while Rome is burning. And clearly she intends this book to be more than academic fiddling. Provocatively leaving without precise definition such terms as “intrinsic good” and “inherent evil,” she would give a lead to our troubled times by challenging us to become clear and definite and sincere about the detail of our ideals.

To dismiss ideals, ideas of what is valuable and worth aiming at, as without practical efficacy, is to talk nonsense—and those who have read the Author’s *Philosophy and the Physicists* and *Thinking to Some Purpose* will already know how devastating can be her patient and lucid exposure of nonsense. If to be “realistic” is to get things done, then he who has ideals and abides by them is eminently realistic. Our human world is sick partly because there are so many who are cowardly unfaithful to their ideals; but also because there are so many who are too lazy, complacent and timid to think out their ideals with sufficient clearness. All around us are the muddleheads who rave and bluster. We are being destroyed both by those who would repudiate all ideals whatsoever, and by those who would coerce us towards ideals that are spurious.

Professor Stebbing’s main concern is therefore to distinguish ideals which are, from those which are not, illusions. While denying “that anyone has a right to speak dogmatically for others in the matter of ideals,” she yet has her own profound convictions as to “what it is we most deeply desire, the attaining of which would bring us inward peace—that is, happiness.” After all, we may allow ourselves to be guided by our conscience, all the more so as “Morality is not to be *deduced* from anything else; the concept of moral obligation is not to be exhibited as a deduction from a system of the universe.” And it is from the standpoint, as it would seem, of an educated conscience, of a mind not merely highly speculative, but sensitive, undaunted, generous and humane, that Professor Stebbing would commend to us the life that is spiritual—spiritual being used to denote, not the “unworldly,” but “the love and pursuit of what is worth while for its own sake.” For “It is an illusion to find the value of our lives here and now in a life to come. . . . But it is also no illusion but uncontested fact that here and now we know that hatred, cruelty, intolerance, and indifference to human misery are evil.”

Alas, what is not contested by the noble is now the mockery of vast masses, the world over, terrible in their armaments. For which reason, perhaps, Professor Stebbing’s new book may be all the more suited to its purpose for being, in its constructive parts, not so much an intellectual formulation, as a persuasive expression of fine sentiment.

MICHAEL KAYE

*Mongol Journeys.* By OWEN LATTIMORE. (Jonathan Cape, Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

Most of us might experience some difficulty in drawing an accurate map of Mongolia, and some might even be slightly uncertain about the part of our planet in which this vast territory lies. The very word may suggest hardly anything except the name of that fearsome conqueror Jenghiz Khan who, dying in 1227, left to his sons an empire which stretched from the China Sea to the banks of the Dnieper. Mr. Lattimore is probably the best-informed of all foreigners concerning this little-known country and its high-cheek-boned nomadic inhabitants. He had the advantage of spending his childhood and much of his early manhood in China, and of being in consequence familiar with the Chinese language and with some types of Oriental mind.

His material is interesting but he might have put it through a finer sieve. Occasionally his book degenerates into what we may call traveller's trivialities. Moreover, great skill in presentation is necessary when a writer is dealing with places and people and names which to most readers will be unfamiliar and bewildering. This book, none-the-less, has obviously a high value for students of sociology, and as examples of the author's varied information I will excerpt a few passages from a chapter called "Death, Kindness, Religious Feeling" :—

According to the Mongols, no pasture ought to be grazed year after year by the same kind of stock—sheep for instance. A pasture ought either to be rested altogether from time to time or grazed by some other kind of stock, like cows or horses. If it gets no rest or change the steady accumulation of the urine and dung of the same animal ceases to be fertilising and becomes "poisonous."... Already it is clear that the Lama-Buddhist church of today does not owe its survival to spiritual vitality but to its accumulated privileges... While I agree with the missionaries that it would be hard to find a more debased religion than Lama-Buddhism, I think that their emphasis on superstition prevents them from recognising a genuinely religious way of looking at things and understanding things that is perhaps inherent in the life of a nomad of the steppe.

The Mongols, we learn, are so unusual that they pay no attention to the dead bodies of even their dearest relatives. Mr. Lattimore's guide, a very intelligent Mongol, speaking of his mother (whom he loved deeply) said that

She was old, and he must be there when she died. Then he would pick a fine place to leave her body, some lovely, clean and noble place. Her spirit would be free and the body shed, the bones discarded. He spoke of this as tenderly and lovingly as people sometimes plan a beautiful and quiet tomb.

The same man told Mr. Lattimore that he had a fine horse which had died, and that "he had chosen a fine and honourable place to leave its skull." This attitude, in Mr. Lattimore's opinion, is only due in part to the Mongol's belief in transmigration.

Here, in short, is a book which will either interest you deeply or not at all.

CLIFFORD BAX

*The Ramayana Polity.* By Miss P. C. DHARMA, M. A., D. LITT., with a Foreword by the RT. HON. V. S. SRINIVASA SASTRI, P. C., C. H., LL. D., D. LITT. (Madras Law Journal Press, Madras. Rs. 2/-)

Miss P. C. Dharma's thesis on the important topic "Ramayana Polity," which has earned for her the degree of Doctor of Letters of the University of Madras, is a substantial contribution to the understanding of the nature of

Polity in Epic India. There is a mine of information in this great epic of Valmiki and Dr. Dharma has exploited it, and has given us a monograph characterised by clear analysis and careful documentation. Several attempts to present a coherent picture of ancient polity have been made by distinguished professors like Jayaswal, Rangaswami Aiyangar and Law, but a need was felt to analyse the conditions of the Epic Age, with its two widely separated periods of the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*. The *Mahabharata* has a wealth of stories and instructions and inset dharma-sastras, more avidly studied than the *Ramayana*, the testament of Bhakti, Duty, and Prapatti, and it always stood as the Epic that revealed the soul of India for a millennium and more. Dr. Dharma shows that the polity that prevailed in the three domains of Aryan, Vanara and Raksasa peoples was not as divergent as might be presumed. This is an interesting fact.

Dr. Dharma's thesis on the whole is a valuable piece of work on a neglected aspect of research, fulfilling the words of the eminent writer of the Foreword: "I promise him—the reader—a golden harvest of wonderment and knowledge."

It will always be difficult to supply a suitable and an adequate terminology

in English for Sanskrit medieval terms, and the differences in concepts between medieval and modern times will always make suspect the appropriateness of the translated terms. But as the problems of mankind have always tended to recur, as man has been made to learn over and over again what he had forgotten, all knowledge is memory, is recapitulation. Mankind—faced with a modern civilization where conflict reigns between peoples and rulers or rather between government by the people and government by an Absolute Monarch, styled a Dictator—will find much that is relevant in the counsel of Rama to Bharata and in the behaviour of the ancient dictator Ravana. Rama-rajya appears to have been a fair arrangement, a workable compromise between the ruler's sovereignty and the people's representational sovereignty. It must, of course, be left to professional politicians whether or not they would welcome the return to Rama-rajya—a period of peace, of culture and of common happiness in the greatest measure. In any case, a knowledge of the ancient polity in such a clear and concise form as that in which it is given to us by Dr. Dharma will help greatly in gauging the soul of India and her ancient conception of Social Order.

K. C. VARADACHARI

*Ibn Khaldun : His Life and Work ;* trs. from the Arabic by M. A. ENAN. (Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore. Rs. 3/8)

Ibn Khaldun is one of the strangest characters in the history of Islam. His life seems startlingly apart from his work, unconnected, so much so that Ibn Khaldun as a figure in fiction would be strained and unreal, the stuff

of false fancy. The passion for struggle and adventure was a perpetual heat in his blood. But it was not adventure for its own sake. A self-seeking man, without scruples, this scion of a prominent house of Andalusia (Moslem Spain) moved through the restless fourteenth century, riding the wave-crest of sheer opportunism, rolling between Throne and Throne in the

Berber states of North Africa, from Egypt to Morocco. He returned evil for good. He betrayed friends. He despised sentiment as weakness and laughed at loyalty, gratitude and moral principles. To him the final end, self-interest, justified the means, however vile. For thirty years he indulged in reckless court intrigues and political strifes. He bent the confusion of the twisted times to his own purpose, and made himself an outstanding personality. Then he fell dizzily, a victim of his Nemesis. All his adventures came to naught. His dramatic life dwindled into a bitter anticlimax, an enforced quiet.

Strange that this crafty fortune-hunter should have been one of the foremost scholars of the Middle Ages : historian, sociologist, philosopher !

The seven-volumed *kitab al-Ibar*, his main legacy to world thought, is much more than a History of Islam. Its great interest lies in a probing analysis of social phenomena, and a formulation, on scientific lines, of theories on the state and on sovereignty. When, in the last century, European research

first discovered Ibn Khaldun, it was revealed that the Moslem thinker had framed theories which anticipated certain ideas and principles of Machiavelli, Vico, Montesquieu, Adam Smith and even Auguste Comte ! Ibn Khaldun had preceded the West by centuries in his profound exposition of the philosophy of History, as also of certain principles of Sociology and Political Economy !

Books on Islamic thought, either in the original or in translation, are almost rare in the English language. The interested student has baffling difficulties unless he reads Arabic or German. The volume under review is, therefore, especially welcome. Within its short compass it gives a fair indication of Ibn Khaldun's patterns of thought and measures their historic worth, comparing them with the heritage of later scholars and philosophers. As a biography, it is conventional, but competent. I wish, though, that it had a little more vividness, a little more human value.

BHABANI BHATTACHARYA

*Spiritualism?* By SHAW DESMOND. (Lyndoe and Fisher, Ltd., London. 3s.)

This appears to be the second venture by a new publishing house founded to publish books on astrology, graphology, palmistry and similar subjects, in itself an interesting indication of the trend of public interest in certain directions. It is written with Mr. Shaw Desmond's usual ease and mastery of his subject. He has not attempted to deal with the difficulties of "communication" with what he calls the spirit world, "something about which none of us know much, as yet," he adds. He covers a wide ground, how-

ever, and there is scarcely an aspect of his varied and long experience of Spiritualism which is not touched upon in these pages, even though he gives a more extended interpretation to the word than is customary. There is a chapter on "Astral Travelling," in which he recounts an incident that occurred to him in 1933. He had gone to bed early, and had fallen asleep :—

Soon afterwards, as it seemed to me, although I cannot give the exact time, I awoke in my bed. The room was dimly lighted. As I lay there, on my back, I felt myself lifted a little into the air and then carried or drawn along the bed until, as I think, my feet must have projected beyond

the end. Within a short time I, being throughout fully conscious but incapable of movement, found myself being brought back and then laid down on my bed. One thing I remember distinctly—the pressure of the pillow against the hair on the nape of my neck as I was replaced on my pillow.

An instance is also cited where Mrs. Dawson Scott, the novelist, although at the time in her house in North-West London, visited the author in his room at Twickenham. It is difficult, however, to accept Mr. Shaw Desmond's reference to "those irresponsible playboys whom we call in psychic research 'the dwellers on the threshold,' who play tricks just as earthly children will do." There is a grimmer reality behind this phrase than he imputes to it. Nor is it possible, with the records of Spiritualistic phenomena before one, to acquiesce in the author's statement: "There is no danger whatever to any woman or

man of sound body and mind going into trance or becoming 'sleepy.'" Indeed, while we may approve of his castigation of the two chief classes of objectors to his faith, the dogmatists and the materialists, there is a third class of critics who, studying these phenomena, reject the orthodox "spiritualistic" explanation of them. It was an eminent spiritualist of the last century—"M. A. Oxon"—who wrote: "Spiritualists are too much inclined to dwell exclusively on the intervention of external spirits in this world of ours, and to ignore the powers of the incarnate Spirit." Mr. Shaw Desmond inveighs against fraudulent practices; but there is little evidence that the phenomena can be controlled effectively, and the moral dangers of mediumistic communication are patent.

B. P. HOWELL

*The Hawkspur Experiment.* By W. DAVID WILLS. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 6s.)

This somewhat provocative book will annoy some, shock others and depress not a few. It must surely interest, and cause any intelligent reader to examine his own beliefs concerning discipline and punishment.

Mr. Wills gives what he calls a "personal confession of faith" rather than an official account of Hawkspur Camp where young people had the chance of a training in a free and sympathetic environment in order to overcome their social maladjustments.

Some of the camp members had been in trouble with the law, others had social and personal difficulties. Those readers who have any knowledge of "free" schools will recognise many similarities in the re-education of the

young adults in the camp. Those who were able to stay long enough to benefit by the psychological and other treatment have proved a justification for the method, but there were many disappointments. Incidentally a good deal of light is thrown upon the shocking failure of most official "reform" schools.

While our economic and educational system remains what it is there will always be maladjusted young people in need of such enlightened treatment as this book describes. What is somewhat depressing is that the author seems to show no desire for a change in society, he merely wants to help people to live in the world as it is. Surely his energies could help us change it!

The author declares that our social order must be remoulded, but at the same time he deplores the gradual

elimination of the well-to-do who can afford to finance social experiments! Elsewhere he speaks of "the dire consequences" of the levelling down of incomes. However, in spite of much that appears contradictory, much that

seems unscientific, this account is worth the serious attention of all concerned with the welfare of young people, while the general reader will find plenty of material for argument.

ELIZABETH CROSS

*Out of the Body.* By JOHN and ERICA OXENHAM. (Longmans Green and Co., London. 3s. 6d.)

The late John Oxenham was known all over the world as a prolific novelist and writer. During his last long illness, his thoughts turned to the after-death conditions, and one night he had a dream. This he embodied in a story and, upon this basis, he compiled this "parable of the life to come." When his sight failed him, he had the assistance of his daughter Erica. In an Epilogue she mentions that, for the last few weeks before his death, her father "lived in the atmosphere of this book."

The original dream appears to have lasted only a quarter of an hour, during which the author found himself "looking over endless distances—forests, rivers, lakes, and range upon range of hills and mountains, to what seemed the very ends of the world." He dreamed, among other things, that he met his wife, who had predeceased him. "You simply will be with whomsoever you wish, and you are there," he was told, and so it seemed to him.

The remainder of the volume is an

elaboration of this original dream structure, and all of it is marked by a deeply religious spirit of an evangelical character. It is reminiscent of the "summer lands" of spiritualistic literature, though the compilers here make it clear that they have no connection with spiritualism or psychic research. "We have," they write, "an assured belief in the teaching of the Bible." We are bound to pay respect to the sincerity of the message contained in this simply written volume, while taking leave to doubt its adequacy to meet the real needs of today. Any *devachan* is valid for those who may be experiencing it; but its place in the scheme of things will not be understood without a realization of Life and Death being but episodes in a continuing unfoldment of the soul, and of the nature of man's cyclic progress within the framework of a law of compensation. None-the-less, a kernel of truth is here, especially in the message that "love beyond the grave....has a magic and divine potency which reacts on the living," to use the words of quite a different author.

B. P. HOWELL

“*What Dreams May Come...*” By J. D. BERESFORD. (Hutchinson and Co. (Publishers), Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

As a novelist, Mr. Beresford has always been interested in ideas more than in men; in an Utopian future more than in the ugly present; and in the architectonics of form more than in the disturbing glow of colour. Mr. Beresford is a severely self-conscious and sensitive product of modern civilization; he is unescapably in it, but he is not of it; he would escape from it gladly but all that he can actually do is to ask the eternal questions anew in one more Utopian novel and to follow the adventures of yet another idea. “*What Dreams May Come...*” is the result.

Living in an uncongenial home, the hero, young David Shillingford, early gets into the habit of dreaming. His dream world presently acquires an integrity and a solidity of its own. During the aerial Blitzkrieg of 1940, David, now a young man of twenty-eight, joins the Auxiliary Fire Service; while on duty he is shell-shocked and loses consciousness for three whole weeks. His body is in a London Hospital, but his spirit has gone to Oion, the City on the Hill, the land of his heart's desire. He sees much in Oion, he changes much, and he makes friends with Karnak, Gourlaye and other inhabitants of this strange land. David is convinced at last that violence is not the way of achieving peace or happiness. Returning to London, David writes out his new Bible, makes

two converts and dies opportunely in prison.

David's is a deep dream of peace. Says Yajnavalkya in *Brihadaranyaka* :—

And when he falls asleep, then after having taken away with him the material from the whole world, destroying and building up again, he dreams by his own light. In that state the person is self-illuminated.

Uddalaka Aruni also says (in *Chhandogya*) that in deep sleep a man returns to his true Self and is united with the True. David too, recoiling from the beastly present and influenced by Utopians like Plato, More, Morris, Butler and Wells, creates in his self-illuminated state his own unique Utopia; it is a picture of humanity as it might be, as it will probably be in the thirtieth century; and, as Dr. Hood puts it, this future “sounds pretty good from his description of it.”

It would indeed be glorious if men and women could live together, banishing all rancour and prejudice and cultivating the arts of peace and of happiness. But men and women *would* turn away from the promised land—promised so long ago by the Christ and the Buddha—and maim and make themselves miserable. Meanwhile, sensitive souls like David (or Mr. Beresford) must dream their dreams of felicity and project their visions into a future that allures us from afar but which, alas, when we approach it, unaccountably flies further off, to our discomfiture. This is the tragedy of the human situation and Mr. Beresford has movingly portrayed it in his book.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

## SHORT NOTICES

*Table of Indian Food Values and Vitamins.* ( All-India Industries Association, Maganvadi, Wardha, C. P. Anna 1 )

A valuable and timely compilation from several sources. It gives the Hindi as well as the English names of

the foods listed and we are glad to learn that a complete Hindi edition is in preparation. It should be translated into the other Indian languages as well. Where incomes are so pitiably small, the question *what* to eat is only less important than *how* to eat at all.

E. M. H.

*Poems of Peace and War.* Christmas Humphreys. (The Favil Press, London. 4s. 6d. )

These poems are lovely and some of them are richly satisfying; they add their fragrant grains to feed the flame that keeps the heart alight. Such are "Autumn," "Anima" and "Humanity," and several more. Many are sheer beauty and relaxation of the spirit's stress, like "Avoca" and "The Hills of Connemara," but there are one or two—"Madrilène" and "Make Me No Vows"—that, for all their glamorous charm, the collection would, to this reviewer's mind, have been the more rewarding without.

From another pen poems like "Madrilène" with their sensuous beauty

might give pleasure without awakening misgiving. Why then in Mr. Humphreys' pages do they seem to toll a warning bell? To invoke "the dignity of the cloth" may be to court condemnation for prudery if not for cant, but *why* are liberties condoned in mufti that are denied to men in uniform? To be prominently identified in the public mind with a spiritual cause and message is to wear its mental livery, that cannot be put off at will. It is because Mr. Humphreys' name is identified with the cause of Buddhism, which he loves and has well served, that anything he publishes will be assumed by many to carry its imprimatur. We should be sorry to have Buddhism judged by "Madrilène."

E. M. H.

*Education.* Compiled from the Speeches and Writings of SWAMI VIVEKANANDA by T. S. AVINASHILINGAM, ( Shri Ramakrishna Math, Mylapore. Madras. As. 8 )

Whatever concerned human welfare, and more especially the upliftment of the teeming millions of the ignorant, starving and slave population of his beloved Motherland claimed all the forces of Vivekananda's dynamic soul. The fundamental curse hanging like a threatening cloud over this fair land he

visualized as ignorance in whose train came many attendant ills: superstition, poverty, the degradation of women and the moral weakness which made foreign domination possible.

Throughout his writings, as we see from this excellent compilation, the impelling call for education sounded ever and anon in Vivekananda's ear. On mass education *as understood in Ancient Aryavarta* depended the spiritual emancipation as the political and social freedom of India.

D. C. T.

# CORRESPONDENCE

## SUBLIMATION AND SUBSTITUTION

[ This communication from our valued contributor **Dr. K. C. Varadachari** was called forth by our reference in "Ends and Sayings" for November 1941 to an article of his on "The Doctrine of Substitution in Religion and Mysticism," which had appeared in the *Journal of Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute*. We disagreed emphatically with his suggestion that "lust could be utilized in such a way as to yield love instead of disgust and hate and misery," and he writes clearing his position of the most dangerous implications of that statement.—ED. ]

The aim of life is to grow from a primitive animality to a free spiritual being. The wide gap that separates the animal from the spiritual makes it impossible for us ever to link up the activities of these two in any intelligible manner except by way of opposition. It is certain that unless we *abandon*, renounce, annihilate, the animal within us, a permanent foothold in divine consciousness is impossible. The non-return to mundane animal life is the one promise of religion that permanently rules the consciousness of seekers after reality.<sup>1</sup> This being the case, it is true that *mere* substitution of ends in the place of previous ends, as in the conditioned-reflex theory, cannot help much by way of transformation. But the fact remains that a substitution of some kind, leading up to the resultant of a higher activity or flow of energy adapted to the higher poise of being, is a necessity. This is the sublimation of the instinctive energy brought about by the substitution of other or contrary goals,

of sufficiently ideal goals to make it possible for the human individual to seek them as more valuable intrinsically than the original instinct, which cannot but feel baffled by the task to which it is directed and therefore, being frustrated, seek regression or psychic outlet in the unconscious.

Freud defined sublimation as the way by which powerful excitations from individual sources of sexuality are discharged and utilised in other spheres, so that a considerable increase in psychic capacity results, from a, in itself dangerous, prohibition.<sup>2</sup>

And elsewhere he explained that it consists in the abandonment, on the part of the sexual impulse, of an aim previously found either in the gratification of a component-impulse or in the gratification incidental in reproduction, and the adoption of a new aim—which new aim, though genetically related to the first, can no longer be regarded as sexual, but must be called social in character. We call this process *Sublimation*, by which we subscribe to the general standard which estimates social aims above sexual (ultimately selfish) aims.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Vedanta Sutra*, IV. iv. 22.

<sup>2</sup> *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*. English translation, p. 322. Cf. *Energies of Men*. By WILLIAM McDougall, p. 307: "Its essence is the raising of the plane (intellectual, moral or æsthetic) upon which our tendencies operate."

*Psychology Down the Ages*. By C. SPEARMAN, Vol. II, p. 150: Sublimation, "a process wherein a motive of primitive order is replaced by a higher one," by somehow blocking the primitive way.

<sup>3</sup> *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*. By FREUD. English translation, p. 290.

Thus sublimation means, according to Freud and the Freudians, "the diversion of sexual tendencies towards ends that are foreign to primitive sexuality and socially more valuable."<sup>1</sup> Prof. Ernest Jones points out that this sublimation is a process of deflection of a sexual to a non-sexual goal.<sup>2</sup> In our ordinary society our instincts are not pure or isolated but are grouped according to the configuration of the situations. The configuration of instincts in highly civilized society shows that none of the instincts display the brute original primitive character that is observable in the lives of animals. And, as Pfister says, "As to its form sublimation presents no new phenomenon."<sup>3</sup> At best what is meant by sublimation is the instinct modified in its moral order, and we may add that it is instinct so modified or so deflected as to realize the ends to which it is applied in the moral or spiritual order. It is not enough to lift or to deflect an instinct so thoroughly as not to betray its origins or original "specificities," to use the excellent phrase of McDougall, to the social level alone, for the social is not, as many claim, at any higher instinctive level than the individual thinking being. The socialised instinct may be less selfish than the individualised one but it must be clear to any student of Crowd and Society that the intellectual or ideal level of the crowd is many times a retrogressive pull on the aims of the individual.

Pierre Bovet, criticising the views of Sécrotan, writes

It is one single tendency the development of which leads man from one to the other kinds of love. Diverse as they are in their objects, they all contain the same forms of *organic resonance*; and it is these latter which give to the kind look, the light touch, and the gentle voice of the Sister of Mercy, dressing the wounds of the sick, something of the primitive tenderness of the lover.<sup>4</sup>

Pierre Bovet continues: "From the psychological point of view, we should say that in the second stage the instinct is canalised and complicated, while in the third it is, in addition, deflected and Platonised."<sup>5</sup> The Platonised stage is elsewhere described by him as a stage

in which nothing of the physical behaviour of the first animal impulse remains, but which still reminds us of this behaviour by the organic resonance guessed at in ordinary speech and expressed through metaphors.<sup>6</sup>

This, indeed, is the psychological view of the substitution of ideal ends, gradually modifying the direction and canalising the individual's force originally used as an instinct. This general energy of the individual in action that originally impelled the animal behaviour is now directed or deflected into ideal channels. The twofold activity involved in the substitution is withdrawal as well as direction into useful higher channels. The Vision of the Ideal or of God in some elementary manner of perception is a necessity even in religious experience. It is this Object of the Vision that makes it possible for the individual to divert his energies in the new direction. Whether lust could be utilized otherwise or not, lust's fierceness and fury

<sup>1</sup> *Fighting Instinct*. By PIERRE BOVET. English translation, p. 106.

<sup>2</sup> *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, 2nd edition, p. 507.

<sup>3</sup> *The Psycho-analytic Method*. By PFISTER, p. 311. Quoted by PIERRE BOVET.

<sup>4</sup> *Fighting Instinct*, p. 110.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

are removed from it, and thus one becomes conscious of the weakness and the futility of the original object of lust. Its animal direction has been checked when the instinct of lust itself is frustrated or turned to the real object of satisfaction.

The fundamental Urge—call it “libido” in the sense of Freud or of Jung, or Mind-Energy—is that which supports the manifold play of self-being and self-perpetuation, the struggle for existence and the struggle for persistence or becoming. This is what continues to be the nucleus of existence and of immortality throughout man’s or even God’s Being. The animal and the social are but discoloured muddy canals of its flow, whereas the purity of its existence is realised in realisation of the Self, of the Great Brotherhood of man and of the Fatherhood of God. This may form the background, metaphysically speaking, of the *organic resonance* of the lust-love instincts, however contrary they may appear to one another when seen from their different planes.

But it is true to say that it is not the gratification or the satisfaction of lust that leads to its transformation. The author of *The Voice of the Silence* is entirely right in denouncing the theory that the gratification or the satisfaction of the animal can ever lead to spiritual realisation.<sup>1</sup> The doctrine of *anubhava* or the working out of sex or of instinct in the manner in which it has appeared amongst us will lead to worse than hell. On the contrary, the main aim in mystical and religious life is to take away from the

instincts the force that guides them and to lead it up to spiritual ends. The primitive resonance of the psychic may continue, for the aim is a substitute satisfaction which finally shall become the specific satisfaction as determined by spiritual life. To utilise otherwise in substitution means nothing more than the sublimation of the instinct by lifting its object from the plane of the animal vital and the human to the Divine Spiritual and the Highest.

There must be the substitution of higher ends along with the withdrawal from old ends; *ānukulyasya sankalpa* must be followed by the *prātikulyasya varjanam*. The life of man henceforth being governed by the Object of Realisation, God, all the powers of man become exclusively directed towards that Object. In the life of Śrī Āndāl, for example, the Object, because of its utter planal difference from anything that the human ever knows, has utterly reorganized the response, has canalised her incipient desire for the Lord, sexually even, into something appearing totally different, that is, asexual or Pure Platonized Love. The Hymns of Āndāl are illustrations of the transformative possibilities of the substitution, otherwise *vinīyoga pṛthaktva*, principle.

There is restraint of the mental modifications followed by *Īsvara-pranīdhāna*. When, McDougall writes, restraint leads to sublimation, the energy of the restrained impulse is guided into useful channels where it co-operates in sustaining activity directed to goals consciously approved by the whole personality.<sup>2</sup>

The aim of the substitution of higher ends or of God, even for instincts the lowest and most fierce, drains the energies away from them and leads to the modification of those energies or rather to the upbuilding of new organic

<sup>1</sup> *The Voice of the Silence*, pp. 17, 18. Cf. *Bases of Yoga*. By SRI AUROBINDO, pp. 174, 191 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Energies of Men*, p. 307.

or psycho-physical paths that yet somehow resonate with the previous ones. If it be not so there can be no study of the genetic growth of mind from its primitive nature to the present nor can we satisfactorily prophesy the future. It is because of these resonances in psycho-spiritual life with the behaviour patterns of animals and of insects even, that we perceive the possibility of modification of the human instincts into intelligent behaviour.

There can be no compromise with falsity or ignorance or the animal life. But that does not mean anything more than the building afresh—with the strength given to the self, the same strength that expressed itself previously in and through the mechanism of ignorance—of a new world of Godliness. The rose must indeed become the bud and become a new rose. This is the making of oneself in Spirit, without desire for external objects of sense, without any passion or lust or greed or hatred. Man in such a state of Platonic existence is one with his Self. He and His Object, God, have become one, and his entire nature has been fashioned so as to be suitable to the apprehen-

sion, the appreciation and the ānanda of the Object.

Thus it has been said if one could but know one's Object, it would be easier to attain it. Man's choice always has been between accepting the life of a frustrating environment and fulfilling Divinity; the wise have always chosen the latter whereas mortals have always tended to choose the former with all that it entails. The call to man has always been to throw overboard the world of sense and to substitute for it love for the Divine. This had to be done and, once done, the Object controlled the individual and transformed him, kneaded him into shape and fashioned him into the servant of the Spirit. Religion has always believed in this great possibility of God's transformation of His disciple. Conversion, leading up to divinization wherein the vital sex has no place, has been declared a possibility by the great Sri Vaishnava writer Venkatanatha in his *Rahasya-traya-sara*, and by Sri Aurobindo in modern times. Sublimation is a state arrived at through the process of substitution of *ideal ends* or of an ideal End or Object.

K. C. VARADACHARI

## AN EXPERIMENT IN ADVERSITY

The famous French writer André Maurois has distilled wisdom out of disaster. Exiled from home and country, stripped of all his possessions, he has found a truer sense of values. He contributes to the first issue of *Tomorrow* (U. S. A.) a significant article, "An Experiment in Adversity." Its kernel is the discovery that "nothing in life is ever truly possessed, save a steady faith, a clear conscience, and a well-stored mind. The rest is frailty." And the practical application of realizing that "as long as you are alive, there is in that frail little skull of yours a fortress no Blitzkrieg can storm"?

Since this inner retreat is the only one that will be left us when our home has been destroyed, and our favourite room shattered, it

seems to me that the first rule of an Art of Living ought to be: *Decorate and furnish with love and care that inner sanctuary of yours.* We take a lot of trouble buying the right arm-chairs, the right tables and the right pictures; certainly we should take even more trouble to adorn the invisible walls of our mind. We take a lot of trouble filling our library shelves with the best books, and we are right, but we should take even more trouble to fill our invisible shelves with the best thoughts and the best poetry, because we can lose our pictures, and our books (I have lost mine), but we cannot lose our culture; especially that part of it we acquired in youth. Memory, with old age, or disease, or wars, may fade. What was acquired first is last to be forgotten. Store your mind, when you are young, with beautiful poetry, with noble thoughts. You cannot imagine how helpful, comforting, and soothing, and exalting, you will find them all, if ever comes for you, as it did for so many of us, a time of despair and solitude.

## ENDS AND SAYINGS

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“ \_\_\_\_\_ *ends of verse*  
*And sayings of philosophers.*”

HUDIBRAS

The central problem of our time Shri G. C. Chatterji defined in his presidential address at the Aligarh Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress on 21st December as

to supply a meaning to life, to define the aim or purpose for which we live, and to indicate the manner in which that purpose is to be realised. If the lack of certitude in our modern temper has bred a mood of despair and a sense of the futility of all things human, what solution has philosophy to offer in this predicament?

He recognises that it is in the best tradition of Indian thought that “philosophy must face from time to time the practical problems of life and seek to supply those in search of guidance, not only doubts which will paralyse life, but certainties on which they can regulate their conduct.” But philosophy, in India as elsewhere, has not always recognised that obligation and must accept its fair share of the blame for the very defeatist attitude Shri Chatterji deplores. Philosophy by its derivation means the love of wisdom. And wisdom is something more than facts, though it includes them; something higher than dialectics, though dialectics is its tool. Metaphysics is indispensable as the background and the basis of ethics, but when philosophy wanders into the bypaths of barren speculation, when it becomes divorced from life, it is not the love of wisdom but mere word-spinning, wasteful of time and energy, if it does not actually encourage the attitude that makes

efforts at self-reform seem vain, and attempts to ameliorate conditions futile.

Philosophy might be defined as thoughts to live by. Be a man's professed belief what it may, each has his own philosophy, whether formulated or not, which he expresses in his life. And nothing matters so much to a man as his philosophy of life, his concept of himself and of nature and of the relationship between the two. As he thinks so, sooner or later, he acts. Convince him that the universe is a fortuitous concurrence of atoms, and that he can evade the consequences of his actions, and what incentive do you leave him for right conduct? Man has been taught that he is a thinking animal and current history supplies the evidence that he can act the part; convince him that he is an unfolding god and he will try to purify the temple of his body and to express increasingly the divinity within.

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Prof. Amaranatha Jha, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Allahabad, who presided over the Thirtieth Session of the All-India Sahitya Sammelan, held at Abohar on December 27th, dwelt not only upon the advantages of Hindi as the national language but also upon its needs and the services which the Universities have rendered to the Hindi language and literature. Not only has much work been done

in Hindi at the Universities of Calcutta, Patna, Benares and Allahabad but teachers at Lucknow, Lahore, Jammu and the Agra University are engaged in literary work in that language. The Allahabad University is bringing out a uniform series of Hindi classics on the line of the Oxford Poets series. Many of the leading Hindi writers are University men. Let us hope that the time is not far distant when we shall have lived down the reproach of Gandhiji in his latest brochure, *Constructive Programme, Its Meaning and Place*, that

our love of the English language in preference to our own mother tongue has caused a deep chasm between the educated and the politically-minded classes and the masses. The languages of India have suffered impoverishment. We flounder when we make the vain attempt to express abstruse thought in the mother tongue. There are no equivalents for scientific terms. The result has been disastrous. The masses remain cut off from the modern mind. We are too near our own times correctly to measure the disservice caused to India by this neglect of its great languages. It is easy enough to understand that, unless we undo the mischief, the mass mind must remain imprisoned.

Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy's analysis before the American Association of Museums at its Columbus meeting, of the sources of greatness in ancient art is not flattering, by comparison, to today's popular æsthetic theory. The museum objects of today were things for use, serving alike the souls and the bodies of the users. The artificial division between usefulness and beauty was foreign to the artisans of the past, free men, "responsible men, for whom their livelihood was a vocation and a profession." "A thing can only be beautiful in the context for which it is designed." Ornament

is nothing extrinsic, artificially applied to redeem an object from ugliness. "The beauty of anything unadorned is not increased by ornament, but made more effective by it. . . made to function spiritually as well as physically."

Ancient art did not aim at mere imitation. It presented things not as they look but as they should look. "Art is an imitation of the nature of things, not of their appearances." To appreciate the ancient works of art demands education not in sensibility but in philosophy. The works of art in ancient Greece as in ancient India were supports of contemplation, designed, "in Indian terms, to effect our own metrical reintegration through the imitation of divine forms." In this light the canonical traditions of Egyptian as of Indian art become clear. "It is the irrational impulses that yearn for innovation." What were the paradigms that the ancient works of art, with their balance between physical and metaphysical, symbols which meant the same in cultures widely separated geographically, were designed to recall? Transcendental concepts, the eternal realities.

Dr. Coomaraswamy condemns as a misuse of language speaking of an artist as "inspired by external objects." "Inspiration," he declares, "can never mean anything but the working of some spiritual force within you." And he deplores the visual education which is limited to describing physical actualities.

It is the natural instinct of a child to work from within outwards; "First I think, and then I draw my think." What wasted efforts we make to teach the child to stop thinking, and only to observe! Instead of training the child to think, and how to think and of what, we make him "correct" his drawing by what he sees!

More and more the need of co-ordination not only of different branches of science but also of all other knowledge is felt. Welcoming the 29th Session of the Indian Science Congress at Baroda, H. H. the Maharaja struck the right note when he said,

We have here representatives of all branches of Science. These branches are all interdependent, and the discoveries of one react upon the others. A Congress of this type can bring about greater co-ordination of the work carried on in different branches.

Again, Sir V. T. Krishnamachariar, the Dewan of Baroda, in welcoming the 5th Session of the Indian Statistical Conference, said:—

We should, as far as possible, replace detached, isolated and individual essays by investigations which taken together form a complete whole. In making this remark I have in mind specifically the problem of our rural life. A large amount of valuable work has been done on separate aspects of it and I do not, for a moment, wish to minimise their importance. But I feel that these separate investigations will gain in practical effectiveness if they are inspired by a clearer perception of the essential unity of rural life.

The geologist Mr. D. N. Wadia, presiding at Baroda on the 1st of January over the Twenty-ninth Session of the Indian Science Congress, proposed an international directorate of scientists, supplemented by economists, engineers and industrialists. Such a directorate would, he believed, by adopting the technique and the temper of science, make a better job of governing the world than those in power for the past five thousand years who have not only "failed to bring harmony in human relations, but have signally succeeded in making history one record of recurrent wars."

Those who rebuild when the present orgy of destruction is over will do well

to consider, more seriously than it has ever been considered before, the desirability of government by the wise—of substituting aristocracy, in its root meaning of Government by the Best, for demogogy, mobocracy, plutocracy and all the other perversions of the governmental ideal which have brought the world to the very brink of ruin. The principles of righteous government have been laid down from ancient times. They are to be found in some of the great codes of the world where the ideas of the truly Wise are enshrined. But how to find the men most fit to apply them, to hold the reins of governmental rule? For regenerated governments we need regenerated men to put in power.

The question may legitimately be raised, whether we can confidently place our future in the hands of the scientists and their advisers, technical and business, as Mr. Wadia suggests. He admits that there has been perversion of science though he views the wreckage its abuse has made possible as "an evanescent phase in the history of nations...to be compared to the havoc by earthquakes and tornadoes." Science, he promises, will rebuild a better world and "reintegrate the stricken people to a new and more secure life." But as long as science in the person of its votaries is venal, as long as its discoveries are at the service of national prejudice and hate, how dare men sign a blank cheque in its favour?

Mr. Wadia proposes as a preventive of the admitted perversion of science that "the hierarchy of pure science" assert "its patent rights on the common pool of strategic knowledge." By all means let it do so, but let it do it first and prove itself responsible

before it claims "a determining share in the governments of the world."

Lt. Col. T. J. Kedar, Vice-Chancellor of the Nagpur University, in welcoming the delegates to the Seventh Annual Session of the Indian Academy of Sciences, which met at Nagpur on December 25th, expressed gratification at the presence of four Fellows of the Royal Society but said that he looked forward with confidence to the day when, at meetings of the Royal Society in London, its members would look around to find how many of them had "won the honour of being Fellows of the Indian Academy of Sciences." A pleasantry, no doubt, but many a truth is spoken in jest. Cycles do repeat themselves and there would be nothing surprising in India's regaining at no very distant day the hegemony which once was hers in scientific knowledge as in moral culture.

We do not, however, follow the Vice-Chancellor in his attempt to whitewash modern scientists in respect of the misuse of the power which they have put in irresponsible hands. It is quite true that all natural things are good or evil according to the use to which they are put, but to give the public more knowledge than it is morally fit to use for good, power for evil to which it would otherwise not have access, is a crime ethically if not legally. This is his unconvincing argument for the defence:—

The horrors which non-scientists have let loose on the world are, however, not—as is frequently supposed—of the making of scientists. Knowledge is power, but the good or evil lies not in the knowledge that we possess or the power that it gives but in the purpose for which we apply it.

Even in ancient days they were crying "Peace, Peace"; when there was no peace and no basis for a lasting peace. Shrimati Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit spoke truly when she told the All-India Women's Conference on December 29th that "the establishment of world peace by the ending of national wars depends on the removal of the causes of wars." She pointed to some of the more obvious causes when she said that wars could be rooted out only by the ending of the domination of one country by another and the exploitation of one people by another and demanded that women's organisations throw all their weight in favour of world disarmament and labour peacefully for the establishment of a juster political and economic order.

As women we have a special responsibility cast on us... Shall we bear sons only that they may murder other women's sons and help to maintain a system which stands self-condemned? Or shall we raise our united voice in favour of a brave new world where human life and human liberty receive the respect which is their due, where progress and security are within the grasp of each individual?... Unless it is recognised that the new world must be built up on the co-operation of a free people in a free world order what ultimate good can come of a victory even by the so-called progressive powers?

A timely warning, especially for Indian women in their new-found freedom, against discarding in the name of fashion that which is fine and beautiful in Oriental culture is sounded by Begum Mir Amiruddin in *The Indian Social Reformer* for 20th December.

Imitation is proverbially the sincerest flattery, but when that which is imitated in another is that which is base in him the result caricatures the model and degrades the imitator. Imitation and emulation are the poles

apart. The latter aspires to make its own the inner qualities from which another's noble achievement has sprung; imitation seizes upon the adventitious and the meretricious, concerns itself with mannerisms rather than with the cultivation of the inward grace from which that which is admirable springs. Begum Mir Amiruddin writes :—

We suffer in a dangerous degree from a malady of imitation, dangerous because we do not emulate other races and nations in regard to habits and customs which have contributed to their progress but rather ape their shortcomings and weaknesses.

Her warning is particularly apropos in connection with her article on "Women and Social Reform" in the following issue in which she urges an attack upon the double standard of morality, along with the correction of other disabilities which continue to bear hard upon Indian womanhood—the discriminative inheritance and divorce laws and the outworn institution of polygamy. There can be no doubt that, as she writes, if men who led an immoral life suffered ostracism from society, and not merely women, social life would be rendered purer, but let us hope that India will avoid the disastrous error of sophisticated society in the West, which has indeed abolished to some extent the double standard but has done it by levelling down the moral standards of womanhood instead of by raising the ethical demands upon the traditionally freer sex.

His Exalted Highness the Nizam, in his message to the Eleventh Session of the All-India Oriental Conference which opened in Hyderabad (Deccan) on December 20th, reminded the delegates

that in the troublous times in which they were meeting, when not only democracy and freedom but the very foundations of society, culture and civilisation were under attack, it was "all the more incumbent on them to keep alight the torch of Eastern thought, philosophy and religion."

The Nawab of Chhatari, the President of the Nizam's Executive Council, in his inaugural address referred to the considerable contribution of India and the East to the great common pool which is the sum total of human knowledge and attainment.

To foster and promote Oriental studies is, therefore not merely an endeavour to encourage Oriental Art, Literature and Learning, to create a sense of just pride in our past...or to make us worthy of the great traditions we have inherited by bringing them before our view for constant inspiration, but also to spread far and wide that unifying influence which imbues the mind with the quality of detachment so necessary for wider understanding and nowhere so emphasised as in the East.

The late Sir Akbar Hydari's message recognised in the Conference itself an expression of India's determination "that the torch of pure learning shall not be extinguished." His second thought, he adds, on reading the names and the subjects on the programme

is the unity of our common heritage. And how it takes no count of Hindu or Muslim or Bengali or Madrasi or Sanskrit or Urdu. Pure knowledge is universal; learning knows no creed or community. Surely it is an encouragement to us today, when the stress is so often on points of disagreement, to know that however different the sources of our culture there is a common ground on which we may meet together in agreement.

These inspiring sentences, appearing as they do in one of the last public messages of a justly honoured and

broad-minded son of India, may well stand as his parting word to us all.

A major value of history, along with the lessons that it teaches, is the broad perspective that it affords. Its impartial presentation widens our horizon, shows us the mighty sweep of cyclic law, of action and reaction, and sets us on a hill-top of time from which we scan the distant centuries as if they were but yesterday and understand, beyond the barriers of the years, the hopes and the fears, the successes and the failures, of men quite like ourselves, of men who were ourselves, perchance, in other garb.

The rôle of the historian is a responsible one, as several brought out in their speeches and in messages read at the Indian History Congress which met in Hyderabad on the 21st of December. Rao Saheb Prof. C. S. Srinivasachari of the Annamalai University in his presidential address stressed the indispensability of unbiased judgment for the correct weighing of historical evidence and the need for an open mind, without which there was danger of becoming so wedded to stereotyped conclusions from insufficient data that new theories based on additional data

could not get a hearing. He warned that

this danger was particularly marked in those aspects of Indian historical studies that were associated with questions of race and culture-contacts and an examination of the social order and changes affecting them.

Distorted versions of present happenings lay their promulgator open to a charge of perjury, of libel or of slander. Partisan narrators of past events—they do not deserve the name of historians—are no less mischievous, though they may, with complete legal impunity, poison the wells of thought as they will, undermining the human sympathy which is the natural expression of universal brotherhood and fitting their readers with a steel armour of prejudice against other nations, other races, or the followers of other creeds. Professor Srinivasachari referred to the monumental undertaking of a history of India, comprehensive, accurate and impartial, in many volumes, for the preliminary plans for which the History Congress's approval and support were sought; and he urged in conclusion that the minds of historians "should be guided by large ideas and generous principles and not moved by narrow and particularistic impulses."