

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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"THUS HAVE I HEARD"—

The demand for a religious philosophy which would satisfy the urge of the human heart for some mystical experience of inner contentment has been gathering momentum. In several places and in different ways this demand has found expression. But the man who is its most earnest and persistent public exponent at the present hour is Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, practical statesman and idealistic philosopher. His silent but effective work at Oxford; the point of view which his books present; his fine attempts, through his translations of Sanskrit and Pali texts, to educate the Western world in Indian mystical thought; his advice and admonitions to his own countrymen to eschew the outer trappings of ritualism and blind belief and to make their faith enlightened;—these are beneficent influences.

Appropriately he brought this out at the Philosophical Congress held in Christmas week at Mysore, pleading for "a generous view of the

ideas of different philosophies." He asserted that

the function of philosophy was a metaphysical demonstration to elucidate, define and reconcile propositions and the human problem. The supreme reality made no distinction between man and man, to whichever class of religion he might belong. They should have a broad vision and take into account the increasing knowledge and also the different religious traditions; it was thus the duty of all philosophers to make a *samanvaya* of these.

The comparative study of religions begun by the Western Orientalists in the 19th century was a splendid philological attempt; but while it enthused the special scholar it left the ordinary man cold; for the reading of the former's critical tomes, of his learned but wooden translations, did not take the ordinary man any further. He wanted bread but was given stones in the shape of technical translations. The labours of Indologists, Egyptologists and others demonstrated that the ancient world

had numerous peaks of sublime knowledge which revealed the timeless and spaceless Wisdom-Culture of Humanity. But of what practical use was this demonstration to the civilization of our era, made and sustained by materialistic and technological science? The results of the two wars and their aftermath compelled the thoughtful to recognize not only the fallibility of modern science but also the futility of its underlying philosophy of might and empiricism. Large numbers of people are looking, not for a creed to believe in, but for a religion to live by—a Universal Religion of Man, who must teach himself to become godlike. Dr. Radhakrishnan said that

if the present world was to be led on the path of peace, fundamental ideas of different religious traditions must be co-ordinated with generosity in human relationship and they must interpret *Sutras* and *Brahmasutras* in a liberal sense.

A comparative study only of the language structures of old-world faiths is not sufficient; a comparative study of the ideas, philosophical and ethical, is essential. And this again, not with a bias in favour of the fetish theory and the ludicrous notion of the old civilizations having expressed but the babblings of infant humanity. Did humanity begin in savagery? The answer is in the negative and the splendid work of archæologists and others presses us to the opposite view. Of narrow views have been born some anthro-

pological and other theories, e.g., such an interesting and even plausible but not altogether correct or consistent interpretation as that of Sir James George Frazer in *The Golden Bough* and other works.

Our highly esteemed and intuitive philosopher Dr. Radhakrishnan is setting for himself and his colleagues a very arduous but not an impossible task in proposing to co-ordinate the ideas of the different religious philosophies. This involves dealing with the annals and traditions of many nations; even so far as historic material goes, i.e., that which is found scattered hither and thither throughout ancient classical literature is difficult of co-ordination. H. P. Blavatsky wrote:—

If coming events are said to cast their shadows before, past events cannot fail to leave their impress behind them. It is, then, by those shadows of the hoary Past and their fantastic silhouettes on the external screen of every religion and philosophy, that we can, by checking them as we go along, and comparing them, trace out finally the body that produced them. There must be truth and fact in that which every people of antiquity accepted and made the foundation of its religions and its faith. (*The Secret Doctrine*, II. 794)

The sublime task of divining the Fountain Source of Wisdom from which religions, philosophies, sciences, all branches of knowledge, have sprung is at least partially done by H. P. Blavatsky in her great books, especially *The Secret Doctrine*. Why should not the researcher of the middle of the 20th century use the information and the arguments there offered? An unbiased endeavour in this direction requires courage, but that it will be amply rewarded is the conviction of

INDIA'S NEED OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

[The lecture which we publish here in condensed form was delivered by the well-known Indian scholar, **Dewan Bahadur K. S. Ramaswami Sastri** of Madras, at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on October 13th, 1952. The points which he makes merit thoughtful consideration by Indian statesmen and educators at a time when zeal seems in some quarters to be outrunning discretion and Wesley's epigram, "I haven't time to be in a hurry," has a special relevance.—ED.]

In assessing India's need of the English language, we must avoid alike hypocritical appreciation, hysterical denunciation, and hypercritical derogation.

The English language is by no means sweet and euphonious like Italian, or stately and sonorous like Sanskrit. Many Indian languages are far superior to it in sweetness of sound and stateliness of utterance. But English must be studied by us. English must be the medium of collegiate education in India until we have an agreed All-India vocabulary of scientific and technical terms, until excellent text-books come into existence in the modern Indian languages, and until the Indian languages grow adequately in power of expression. *We cannot pledge ourselves to this or that period of time for this but must constantly work for the realization of our ideal*, not neglecting the study of Sanskrit, which is indispensable not only for the consolidation and growth of the modern Indian languages, but also for the preservation of the immemorial and vital Indian culture, of which the

war-torn and war-weary world is sadly in need.

We opposed British rule in India but have not been against the English language which has been a powerful unifying force.

My first endeavour will be to assess aright the innate strength and vitality of the English language and to find out the causes that have contributed to its growth and the special features of its excellence. I wish to refer to them not only because it is worth our while to study the English language to understand and appreciate such excellences but also and chiefly because we must and will take steps to bring into existence the environment which will enable us to make our modern Indian languages attain such excellences in full. These have attained in poetry, and especially in spiritual poetry, heights to which English poetry never attained in its proudest moments; our religious and philosophical literature is unique. But our modern Indian languages yet lack suppleness and plasticity and cannot as yet express the entire gamut of modern thought.

I value the English language, then, not only as the vehicle of the multi-form English literature or as a language known and studied all over the world but also and mainly as the language *par excellence* which can modernize and vitalize our Indian languages.

There are three special features worth noting about the English language. The first is that it has several layers of words. The bottom layer consists of simple Anglo-Saxon words. Next is the layer of French words and above this that of Latin and Greek words. From the time of the English translation of the Bible and the era of Shakespeare we have a fine blend of all these elements in the English language. Since then the expansion of British commerce and the British Empire has brought in many foreign words which have been duly assimilated. The invention of the printing-press played its part in stimulating the growth and spread of the English language; and the popularity of English literature, and especially the phenomenal growth of the drama and the novel, brought about a blend of the simplicities of rural speech and the refinements of urban speech. Owing to all these forces, though Britain has no longer its former pre-eminence in the realms of wealth and power, the English language has risen to its position of a world language.

Secondly, there was never for the English language any specially constituted controlling authority. The existence of an Academy no doubt

holds bad and ill-equipped authors in check, but it also leads to the regimentation of writing because literature under academic control tends to conform to set patterns. Too much of writing in conformity with a pattern becomes wearisome in time, as happened in later Sanskrit literature and in some of the modern Indian literatures as well. But if too much imitation is bad, too much and too unbridled and unregulated innovation is equally bad. A new word or a new metre may be ugly, whereas an old word or an old metre may be beautiful. Much modern "free verse" in English is too free and is not verse at all.

Thirdly, even today English is a growing language. Its hospitality knows no bounds. It takes in new words from everywhere, whenever it is necessary to do so. That is why it has a wonderful range of verbal expressiveness, a remarkable plentitude and flexibility and an unparalleled wealth of vocabulary. Today the English language combines directness, terseness and simplicity with suggestiveness, ornateness and elaboration when such qualities are needed for the full presentation of the author's thought and the enhancement of ideological effectiveness in combination with literary charm.

I feel that such a combination of directness and terseness with flexibility and literary charm has not come fully into existence in the modern Indian languages and has to be learnt from the English language.

There is yet in them, as also in Sanskrit, a mediæval flavour and there are also conventional and stereotyped modes of expression and much circumlocution and hyperbole. Poetry especially seems to be hobbled by convention.

The primary function of words is to make thoughts clear to ourselves and to others. Precision, clarity and brevity are the prime requisites in every language. But we must add to these beauty and charm, rhythm and cadence. Prose must have these in its own way as much as poetry. Style is the art and craft of self-expression and must not be hampered by rigid mediæval conventions. Today in the Indian languages we must learn to prefer the familiar word to the far-fetched one, the concrete word to the abstract and the short word to the long; and to prefer brevity to circumlocution.

This is not all. It is true that we must express ourselves grammatically while aiming at concise and logical, idiomatic and artistic self-expression, but it is equally true that grammar may become a dictator or a tyrant instead of a constitutional and benevolent monarch who guides us without putting us in fetters. I have a high regard for Sanskrit grammar as well as for the grammars of the various Indian languages but I feel that there is vital need for their simplification. Sanskrit is today a very difficult language to learn because of its multitudinous conjugations and complications. The great writers in Sanskrit,

however, as well as in the modern Indian languages, use only the simplest and best-known grammatical forms and ignore the others, though the lesser writers, in their pedantic passion for displaying their learning, act otherwise. Let us not forget Carlyle's warning: "In my opinion the best grammarians of the traditional type have been the worst writers and the best writers the worst grammarians."

Similarly the tortuous and complicated metres in the Indian languages have to be simplified. Here again the great masters have shown the way, though lesser writers flourish recondite metres in our faces. New and beautiful metrical forms have to be fashioned for use. Rabindranath Tagore has done valuable work as a pathfinder.

There are certain realms of literature in which especially we must learn lessons from achievements in the English language. In the realm of epic and didactic poetry both Sanskrit and the modern Indian languages have risen to the very highest levels and have produced masterpieces. To this achievement we have added today memorable patriotic poetry. But in the realms of pure Nature poetry, revelling in the beauty of Nature for its own sake, and of lyric poetry delineating beauty and love, and in the domain of light and humorous verse, we have yet to show outstanding achievement.

The novel, especially the historical novel, and the short story, the social

drama and the historical play have made some progress in India. Ancient India excelled in epic stories and ponderous romances, fables and parables. But the fiction of today as a document of life and as a cross-section of society, and especially the historical novel, are only a few centuries old even in the West, where they have attained wonderful heights. The short story is another new and wonderful literary art. Ancient India excelled in the romantic drama but had very few historical dramas and even fewer social dramas. The *Mudrarakshasa* is in a class by itself. Tragedy is in India a practically unknown literary form. The higher comedy as distinct from broad farces has not established itself yet in India. In all these *genres* our achievements so far, in the Indian languages, have not been noteworthy.

In humorous writing also we have few eminent achievements. We have plenty of comic journals with social titbits and political cartoons of occasional merit. But India has yet to produce a first-rate humorous journal like *Punch*. The genuine humorous note is hardly ever heard in Indian drama or fiction, essays or skits.

In the realms of history, autobiography and biography, as well as in the multifaceted art of essay writing,

we have yet to achieve distinction. These were practically unknown in ancient and mediæval India and we are still feeling our way in these realms of literary expression.

But apart from these realms, we need the English language for gaining full mastery of the physical, political and social sciences. Even now we are prone to be preoccupied with words instead of facts and to lose the realistic approach without which mere ideological perfection and idealism are a snare. We have yet to achieve the fused, combined and harmonized art in which realism and idealism are commingled in an integral vision of the world and communicated in simple and beautiful expression. We have yet to produce simple, easy and accurate modern books, manuals and primers, and popularly priced series like the Penguin and Pelican series, to bring the light of both ancient and modern knowledge to the homes and hearts of all.

Nay, we require finally the aid of the English language for carrying India's spiritual thought all over the world, for promoting universal brotherhood, welfare and peace and for spiritualizing life and making it divine by the sublimation of the lower values into the higher values of life.

K. S. RAMASWAMI SASTRI

ON TURNING HANDLES

[Mr. Roy Bridger, who argues here so persuasively for a return to a more natural mode of living, is one of the pioneers of the "Back to the Land" Movement in Britain. He has himself won back to productivity from a derelict state a holding in "the largely independent region of the Western Highlands and Islands of Scotland," and from it, he writes, "he can now survey the world which has not managed to extricate itself—yet." The article gives a valuable message to those Indians who are enamoured of mechanization and technological advance.—ED.]

The challenge of a difficult environment, as Professor Toynbee so abundantly demonstrated in *A Study of History*, may be the principal factor in the emergence of a new civilization. The stimulus is particularly urgent when provided by poorness of soil. Thus Hellenic civilization was born not in the deep-soiled Bœotian lowlands but on the stony ground of Attica.

But no soil, poor or rich, is a perpetual cornucopia from which endless civilizations may derive. Creation, as between soil and man, is a mutual, continuous process. Although a poor soil can inspire a people to creative efforts it is also true, and much more frequent, that a civilization can destroy the soil which made and maintained it. Mr. Edward Hyams, with a perspective worthy of Toynbee, has described in his recent book, *Soil and Civilization*, the gradual destructive impact of man upon a landscape which Nature, working through vast periods of time, had clothed in forest. The soil of Attica had not always been poor. Its deforestation, begun in prehistoric times, was by the rise

of Athenian civilization almost complete. A solution was found, but it was a solution which carried its own undoing. The ruined soil of Attica was reclaimed, in the absence of sufficient top-soil nutrients to grow enough food for the population, by planting subsoiling trees like the fig, the olive, and the vine and by trading the products of these trees for imported wheat and other foodstuffs. Since land transport was out of the question, ship-building and seafaring developed. And, as has happened with fatal repetition throughout history, the fighting power developed in defence of trade provoked enemies and allies alike into challenge and combat. Mr. Hyams concludes with masterly penetration:—

Her greatness required the support of relatively enormous food imports. Not even the genius of Pericles, the unscrupulous diplomacy and naval talents of Themistocles or the shrewd boldness of Cleon could save Athens from the trap which the poverty of Attican soil had set for its human parasites.

It is as a parasite, in fact, that man has chiefly manifested himself,

according to the author. Harmless in the nomadic stage, content to take his chance among rival species and otherwise to leave well alone, he enters at the dawn of history upon a career of parasitism which has deviated only rarely into the much more difficult art of soil-making, and which at the present day has reached the virulence and extent of a disease. Mr. Hyams instances the American Dust Bowl and the tragic invasion of tropical Africa by mechanized monoculture. But the salient point is that, while early peoples could complete the destruction of their soils at their leisure, and while even the conversion of Oklahoma into the Dust Bowl took the energetic pioneers 50 years, today, with the aid of the enormously powerful machinery now available for soil-mining, it would take no longer than 10 years to turn a semi-arid steppe, subject to drought, into a desert, and to possess in exchange

a few hideous cities, a few hospitals, a research institute, a few art galleries and theatres, some libraries, half a hundred factories, a score or two of rich men, and a population of depressed proletarians.

To which might be added sundry other achievements of very dubious value. The American Indian, ranging without restriction across a world with which he felt a living kinship, has given place to the stunned and stupefied victim of television, glued for hours before an incoherent panorama of second-hand experience. The romance of the Covered Wagon,

the deceptive promise of the Big Trail and the irresistible appeal of the great open spaces have all dissolved, leaving an existence precariously balanced between the tyranny of the time-sheet and the emptiness of mass entertainment. So thoroughly has the campaign for freedom from want been carried on, in those communities whose emancipation from the soil is most advanced, that the necessity of toil has been succeeded by the despotism of the labour-saving device. The comparatively fool-proof household routine formerly within the reach of any housewife brisk with a broom or handy with a needle, now calls for a working knowledge of physics and electronics. Stone-Age man, preparing a primitive mammoth trap, could never be sure that a mammoth would fall into it. The operator of the fully modernized housing unit, faced with the lights and switches of a time-controlled cooker issuing meals with the relentless precision of the predetermined schedule, must sometimes feel that the rôles of hunter and hunted have been reversed. The uncertainty of the next meal is not a great deal less comforting than the inescapable certainty of it.

The main purpose of the machine, it has always been understood, is to increase production—or, viewed through the soil's eyes—consumption. But what has happened is that, instead of a small number of people taking life at their leisure with a modest premium of risk from dangers unknown, there are now

multitudes of people rushed through life at top speed and at their wits' end how to deal with dangers which are becoming only too depressingly well known. Sir Charles Darwin, in his recent book, *The Next Million Years*, prophesies that the world will have a high population, with a large minority suffering from or in continual danger of starvation, and that men will be more ruthless and more indifferent to human suffering than they are today. That doesn't sound too good.

Judged on his past form, man would appear to have little hope of avoiding the bleak world thus depicted. The main reason for thinking that it need not be inevitable can be gathered from a study of those deviations into the difficult and patient art of soil-making upon which certain civilizations have for one reason or another embarked. Nothing in Mr. Hyams's book is more fascinating than his chapter on the ancient empire of the Incas, which he goes so far as to call the most perfectly symmetrical and stable political unit ever achieved by man.

Politically the empire was based upon a form of state socialism, with a centralized bureaucracy regulating the social life of the people down to the last detail. Yet the extensive terracing, irrigation and road building which made it so prosperous were not, as in less stable civilizations, achieved by slave labour, but by the development of the faculty of co-operation. The organization

of communal labour had the sanction of religion, and the result, says Mr. Hyams, was "a system in which agricultural practice and social organization were locked together in a perfect artifact of the mind and spirit."

Confronted with the problem of increasing population, the Inca response was not shifting cultivation or territorial aggression. It was to *make* more soil. The people expanded their arable land on to the mountain slopes, in a series of horizontal surfaces like a flight of gigantic stairs. Furthermore the arid and barren coastal strip was turned into a luxuriant garden by means of irrigation—a feat of engineering seldom surpassed even by modern machinery. The manurial value of fish was accorded full importance in a system of careful obedience to the natural law of return. Even the lakes were turned into floating gardens, first by anchoring mud by means of osier reinforcements, then by planting trees to fix the new islands with their roots and finally by building up a soil suitable for growing crops. In the desert great pits were dug and the sand was removed; in the fertile soil then uncovered, crops were planted, the sides of the pits providing shelter against the wind. To which Mr. Hyams adds the ironic foot-note: "In Britain today farming land is being lost to the builder at the rate of about 50,000 acres per annum."

That brings us back to the present day, to the factories, the gadget-

ridden human units, the mass amusements designed to kill time, and to that bleak world ahead in which mankind seems likely to grow ever more insecure and more ruthless. But we have seen enough, I think, to realize that it *could* be otherwise.

And it is not as if we started, like the Incas, from scratch. The devices for soil-exploitation which they lacked—iron, money, milch cattle, the plough—are all as potentially constructive as they have been, in unwise hands, destructive. Above all we have that device of endless possibilities, the wheel. Harnessed in the service of industrialism and militarism it has simply run away. The machine, originally a simple device to add to human effectiveness, has been geared and powered up until it has become an object of fear and contempt. “He reached mechanically for a cigarette,” one stands a good chance of encountering in light fiction. He probably had good reason for doing so, anyway. The wheeled device had long passed the stage where it could enrich his life discreetly and harmoniously. It was now a clamouring, soul-destroying monster. Instead of giving thanks for a wonderful aid towards the fulfillment of life, he had to reach—mechanically—for a cigarette, to “steady his nerves.”

There is an important distinction, to come to the heart of the matter, between the power-driven machine and the mechanical device, which may include any non-powered con-

trivance from a spade to a wrist-watch. The mechanical device needs, throughout its period of operation, the conscious attention of the operator. Its life is simple and harmless, an orderly motion of wheels, cogs, ratchets and levers, needing the initial impulse of human will and power to set it going, and a constant renewal of the same to keep it going. The mistake was made when a non-living form of energy was substituted. An electric switch cannot think. But the operator of a device in motion *should* think. Man, as part of a living soil community which is never static and whose equilibrium needs maintaining very carefully, has the responsibility of giving his mind to whatever job he is doing. And that itself is its own fulfillment. When he walks away from the power-driven machine, reaching for a cigarette to steady his nerves during the tedium of waiting until the next switch has to be pressed, he is not only evading the responsibility but missing the fulfillment. A good illustration is provided by the milking machine. A contract has been entered upon between two members of the soil community—man and the milch animal. A bond, a feeling of appreciation for individual requirements, is created. No two cows are alike, any more than two human beings are. Even if they were they would not be machines, to be approached by machines, and this is realized by all true stockmen.

That there *is* a case for the use of power-driven machinery—when ap-

plied constructively, as in soil-conservation work—has been argued quite eloquently in certain quarters. But I think a thousand million pairs of hands could do just as well. Human hands are not as slow as they were in Stone-Age days. We have had the tremendous discoveries of the wheel, the lever and the handle since then. Nothing has

surpassed the handle as the supreme instrument for gaining time on the limitations of our natural capabilities. Compared with devices of more recent manifestation it is itself limited. But its limitations are a factor of the highest importance, and one which the increasing precariousness of our ecological status may force us to accept.

ROY BRIDGER

GOVERNMENT PATRONAGE TO ART

Mr. Russell Lynes, Managing Editor of *Harper's Magazine*, considers in the Autumn *Yale Review* the question of Government patronage of the arts. His thesis is that patronage of the arts is essentially an individual process and need not be on the grand scale. We extend patronage when we buy a cinema ticket, and when we choose a picture for our wall. Mr. Lynes denies that objecting to leaving the judgment of art to a committee is an attack upon the democratic process. He writes:—

In matters of the public good, decisions in a democracy are left to the citizenry, but in matters of private faith, and in questions of the private good, whether it is the selection of a wife or a hat, or of a work of art the individual's choice is supreme.

He implies that official taste is no proper substitute for individual evaluation of good and bad taste. Moreover, the artist cannot be made official without being benumbed and then "the living arts fall into other hands...the hands of the uncaptured, the disrespectful, and the uncomfortable searchers after truth."

The article is timely. The International Conference of Artists organized by Unesco and held in Venice in late September discussed direct governmental subsidies as well as the reduction of taxes and duties; and State awards to dramatists and actors are proposed under the Bombay plan to foster drama, announced on 17th October as being formulated.

The argument for State help is, of course, the service which art—and, in the broader category, culture—can render to appreciation of the fact of human unity and of higher values than material ones. The reduction of taxes and duties on all non-profit cultural enterprises seems unexceptionable. To fancy, however, that any State will give direct subsidies to individuals or organizations, without concerning itself about their future productions or activities seems highly unrealistic. Folk wisdom has long recognized that the payer of the piper may and probably will claim the right to call the tune.

SARVODAYA—ITS LOGIC AND TECHNIQUE

[In this article **Shri S. K. Ramachandra Rao**, Research Assistant in the Department of Social Sciences of the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, describes the background and working of the important Sarvodaya Movement in India.—Ed.]

The word *Sarvodaya* was coined by the Father of the Indian Nation to translate "Unto This Last," the expression borrowed by Ruskin from the Gospel according to St. Matthew (XX: 14) for the title of his great work, in which he pleads for the ideal of morality in political economy. *Unto This Last* was one of the formative forces in the life of Gandhiji, who analyzed the work into three basic ideas—the good of the individual is contained in the good of all; the equal worth of all vocations in so far as they yield a livelihood; and the excellence of manual labour. The other two of the trinity of influences that stirred and propelled Gandhiji were Tolstoy's philosophy of "bread-labour" and the doctrine of disinterested action taught in the *Bhagavad-Gita*. Creatively contemplating these teachings, Gandhiji discovered the supremacy of the two principles of truth and non-violence, and interpreted the meaning of human existence in their light. He experimented with the application of these principles to man's corporate and political life. The full significance of these experiments can of course be judged by history alone. But one of the immediate and tangible consequences of Gandhiji's career

was the emphasis on ethics in the political emancipation of our country; and this has prepared the ground for translating into action the teachings of Ruskin, Tolstoy and the *Gita*.

Gandhiji in his lifetime initiated many a constructive programme calculated to improve the lot of all Indians. He dismissed as shortsighted the Western policy of "the greatest good of the greatest number"; his programme envisaged the greatest good or welfare of all (*Sarvodaya*). And in carrying this programme to fruition, he insisted that the means were at least as important as the end; hence his emphasis on right conduct.

This is reflected in the economic plan he proposed for our country. The four fundamentals on which this plan rests are, in the words of Shriman Narayan Agarwal, simplicity, non-violence, the dignity of labour, and human values. It is, however, not a plan for the Government to push through, although the Government can make a substantial contribution to its implementing. It is rather for every man to appreciate and execute.

Gandhiji strove to revolutionize the thinking habits of the people to accord with the best traditions of

our culture, for thus alone is to be ensured the building of real democracy. *Sva-rājya* is a very ancient expression, and its meaning is not restricted to political autonomy; it is more naturally employed in our philosophical literature to signify self-sufficiency, self-reliance, a sublime state of human existence where one fears not another, seeks nothing but is absolutely self-contained. *Āpnoti svārājyam* is equivalent to "He has realized the Godhead." This is the ideal of all religious endeavour and the genius of Gandhiji asserted that this was the ideal of our political and social endeavours as well. The means to realize this sublime end must doubtless be equally sublime. The message of the Upanishads: "By renouncing alone is immortality gained," crystallized in the doctrine of *anāsakti-yoga* (the discipline of disinterested action) of the *Gita*, suggested to Gandhiji the gospel of service (*seva*). All the constructive programmes he initiated were inspired by this principle of selfless service for the welfare not of one party or section of the people, but of all. The lofty purpose for which this great son of India lived and died was *Sarvodaya*.

This meaning of the Mahatma's advent in Indian history was recognized by a handful of close but silent followers of his, who assembled in Sevagram in March 1948 and decided to launch the Sarvodaya Movement, of which indeed the Mahatma was a living embodiment. They

were persons of high integrity, who had made great sacrifices for the cause of the country, who had dedicated their lives to constructive work and who never cared to step inside the portals of power. Dr. Rajendra Prasad (whom the country later managed to make her President), Acharya Vinoba Bhave, Shankarrao Deo, Kaka Kalelkar and Kishorlal Mashruwala (who recently passed away) were among the well-known people present. They decided that *Sarvodaya* was to be a movement only; there was to be no organization, lest it degenerate into a party or a sect; it was to have no membership in the usual sense of the term. *Sarvodaya* emerged as a brotherhood (*samāj*), open to each "who had faith in Gandhiji's teachings and ideals and who tried to give expression to them in his or her own life." Adherence to the *Samāj* was to be ratified only by one's own conscience; one was always at perfect liberty to describe oneself as belonging to the movement so long as one accepted the Gandhian ideology and practised it in actual life, irrespective of whether the leaders of the movement were aware of one's doing so or not. The person thus identifying himself with the movement was to designate himself not as a *sadasya* (member) but as a *sevak* (worker). "While," in the words of Dr. Rajendra Prasad, "every *sevak* will be free to do the work that suits him best—of course consistent with the teachings of Gandhiji—he will not do anything

in the name and on behalf of the *Samāj*."

Therefore it is that "the *Sarvodaya Samāj* will not act as an organization, it will not undertake any work or programme by itself, although all *sevaks* are expected to be doing something or other in furtherance of some constructive work." Every April an annual conference of all *sevaks* is to be held, and on February 12th *melas* (fairs) are to be arranged at places where Gandhiji's ashes were immersed in holy waters. For these congregations, attendance is altogether optional and such of the *sevaks* as choose to attend must come as pilgrims, making their own arrangements. Here the workers meet, exchange ideas, relate experiences and thus strengthen their faith in constructive work and prune it with wisdom. They are bound by no sort of organizational control or party discipline.

Nevertheless, there is at Wardha in Madhya Pradesh an organization known as the *Sarva-sevā-sangha*, which, as Vinoba explains, is an organization not of men but of activities, which functions only as an advisory body, offering such help as is solicited. "This body will have no force except that of service," says Vinoba. Lest corruption set in, it is emphasized that money can and must be dispensed with in running such a brotherhood of workers. The twin laws of right life, as Vinoba describes them, are physical labour (*śarīra-śrama*) and non-possession of wealth (*aṣarīgraha*).

Various kinds of activity are suggested on Gandhian lines: work towards communal harmony, the abolition of class distinctions, economic equality, the promotion of the cottage industries, basic education, village sanitation, the welfare of aboriginals, relief work, the development of agriculture, prohibition, and so on. Gandhiji laid great emphasis on *khādi* (hand-spun and hand-woven cloth); in fact, he calls his system "charkha economics based on non-violence." Besides being a basic feature of an economic plan, *khādi* is described as an emblem of peaceful and non-violent order on the moral plane. Vinoba calls it *Vastrapūr ā-devī* (the goddess of cloth) even as land is *Annapūrṇā-devī* (the goddess of food): it is claimed to be the key to self-sufficiency and self-reliance. In the *Sarvodaya* conference, seven rules, only by way of illustration, were suggested, such as the wearing of *khādi*, spinning, the use of village-made things, village sanitation work and basic education. Vinoba describes it as the "programme of discipline for self-elevation." How can one seek to elevate others without himself being elevated? Thus, the primary requisite for a *Sarvodaya* worker is disciplining himself in the best aspects of our culture.

One of the greatest achievements under the auspices of this movement, one still in process, is the *Bhū-dāna-yajña* launched by Acharya Vinoba. The secret of the economic welfare of India lies in agriculture; and

agriculture has suffered in our country because of the system of land-holding; the creation of vested interests by favouring loyal Zamindars who are only absentee landlords; excessive subinfeudation; land in the hands of non-tillers and tillers possessing no land; and similar evils. This has invited the doctrines of Communism to gain ground in India.

The Congress, which was wedded to the policy of the abolition of the Zamindari system, has of course succeeded in persuading the National Government to put the policy into action, but it is obvious that the programme is an extremely difficult and dangerous one. Whatever its success, it can never ensure good-will on the part of the Zamindars. Vinoba has conceived the idea of asking bits of land from the landed folk as gifts for their landless brethren. He began preaching the gospel that land, like air and water, belonged to all and was not properly the monopoly of a few; but he realistically recognizes that the existing state of affairs cannot be so easily rectified. To expiate the error, he recommends the well-known policy of giving alms to the destitute.

The *Gita* declares: "He who only eats and does not give, is a thief!" And the donor does not grudge his gift, for he acquires merit therefrom; in fact, he thanks the one who receives it. Vinoba tells the land-donors that what they are doing is a sacred rite, a *yajña*. And when a

saint of such sterling purity as Vinoba begs on behalf of the landless, who dares to refuse? He objects, however, to any sense of meanness, which goes with beggary, or the air of superiority which goes with almsgiving; he points out that the donor is only rectifying to some extent the previous misdeed of monopolizing the possession of that which belongs to all. There has been a marvelously enthusiastic response to Vinoba's call, and beyond doubt the pleasant revolution that has been inaugurated thus non-violently has proved a formidable challenge to Communism in India.

Kaka Kalelkar pleads for the creation of a new culture of *Sarvodaya* in the life of humanity, co-ordinating various lessons of history. And the Sevagram resolution seeks "to strive towards a society based on Truth and Non-violence in which there will be no distinction of class or creed, no opportunity for exploitation and full scope for the development of individuals as well as groups." Vinoba describes *Sarvodaya* as a revolutionary *idea*—to be thought over and acted upon. In this world, torn by violence in thought, word and deed, darkened by the clouds of distrust and hatred hanging over mankind, in this thickening gloom, *Sarvodaya* is indeed a ray of tender light promising health and life; it is a sure balm for ailing humanity. But will man heed wisdom?

S. K. RAMACHANDRA RAO

WE NEED SCIENCE-STEEPED STATESMEN

[There can be no two opinions as to whether the objective attitude of true science would be valuable in the world's statesmen, as is ably argued here by **Mr. Alfred S. Schenkman** of the Paedagogisch Institut of the University of Utrecht in the Netherlands, lately a Teaching Fellow in the Social Sciences at Harvard University (U. S. A.). Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's interpretation of the scientific spirit, which Mr. Schenkman quotes, is especially persuasive.

The spirit of science, however, necessary as it is, is not enough to insure " a better and safer world. " Expediency as a motive and efficiency as an aim are no more adequate as guiding principles than sanitation and material well-being are as satisfactions for the human soul. Neither sensitiveness to beauty nor reverence for moral grandeur nor aspiration nor the sense of human brotherhood, with its flowering in compassion, altruism and self-sacrifice, is learned in the scientific laboratory. To quicken these, the educationist must draw upon the intuitions of the poets and the artists, the lives of the great servants of humanity, the insights of the prophets of all lands and times, and the values and the ethics they have taught. These are at least as necessary as the scientific spirit for statesmen and for laymen, if men are to rise to their full stature and if the countries of the world are to live in mutual helpfulness and peace.—ED.]

" Even so, oxen, lions and horses, if they had hands wherewith to grave images would fashion gods after their own shapes and make them bodies like to their own. " So wrote Xenophanes, and he was a keen observer—of society, as well as of animals. Even today his comment holds true. It can be applied to groups of men who have power—to theologians and to philosophers, to mathematicians, to politicians, to scientists, etc. And the power is not always political power; it is as often power to control the destinies of men by controlling their education. Plato wanted philosopher-statesmen; scientists today want scientist-statesmen.

We write about scientists and edu-

cation. Scientists at the moment have a power and a prestige that in past generations were reserved for others—for politicians and (in some periods) for religious leaders. Scientists have vested interests, just as have theologians or politicians, and they want to " fashion gods after their own shapes. " We are not thinking here of the occasional scientist such as Jeans who tries literally to make God out to be a scientist, in this case a supreme mathematician. Our thought is rather that scientists, even the ordinary or garden variety, want to make other human minds " like to their own " ; and they are tending to propagandize for this. Specifically, from the prestige of their position, they want

to convince the world that "everyone should know science," which is true, and that "if people only knew more about science" the world would be a better and safer place to live in. The latter supposition is dubious, but its truth or falsity depends on how we make our definitions.

The scientists are not alone in their propagandizing. The professional educator who is not trained in science himself but who wants to train others in this field of power is also an exponent of their theory. And the average man who does not understand science but who is interested in education is impressed by the "science in general education" slogans put out by the "experts."

The professional educator gets away with his glib pronouncement that "everyone should know science." But even his colleagues do not stop to ask with sufficient insistence *how* one knows science. They assume the perpetuation of a not-too-good educational system; and they seem to assume too that the way they learned science is the proper way—which means that science is thus operationally defined as "that which I learned in school science courses." (This requires the assumption that one learns only in school!)

Take the second of the suppositions above, that also has concealed an operational definition of "knowing science." "If people only knew more about science the world would be a better and safer place..."

There is a short somewhere in the circuit that produces the better and safer world unless the methods of learning science are at least made explicit. Until we do this we cannot be sure that scientist-statesmen would be desirable.

Some people blame science for all the ills of the world. That is the one extreme. The "if people only knew more about science" school says that things are the fault of statesmen's not knowing their world. But the impact of science is not science and knowledge of this impact need not necessarily involve detailed knowledge of science. So, what difference if a Churchill didn't take to science in school and a Cripps did—or if Nehru took the Natural Science Tripos at Cambridge and Truman did not?

Yet there is a difference. Again it depends on what we mean by science. Nehru himself, India's first Minister for Scientific Research, asks this question and answers it well:—

What exactly does the spirit of science mean? It means many things. But it certainly means not only accepting the fresh truths that science may bring, not only improving the old, but also being prepared to upset the old if it goes against that spirit—to accept the new, to accept the disintegration of the old, not to be tied down to something that is old because it is old, not to be tied down to a social fabric, or an industrial fabric, or an economic fabric simply because we have carried on with it, although it goes contrary to the spirit of science, or to the new dis-

covery of science. The spirit of science means all that.

And in the same talk, in which India's Prime Minister opened one of his country's great new national laboratories in Bihar, he goes on:—

There is a curious hiatus, I find, in people's thinking, even in scientists' thinking, who praise science and practise science in the laboratory but who discard the ways of science and the methods of approach of science, the spirit of science, in everything else they do in life. And they become completely unscientific about it. Now, if we approach science in that way, it does some good—no doubt it will always do *some* good. It teaches us new ways of doing things: it improves, maybe, our condition of industrial life, etc.... But the basic thing that science should do is to teach us to think straight and to act straight and not to be afraid of anything or of discarding anything or accepting anything, provided there are sufficient reasons to do so....

There is quite a difference, is there not, between such a conception of science and the common version that science is a collection of useful tricks or recipes to be learned. But the question comes, did Nehru come to see things with this insight because of his science "training"—or because of his years of thinking, in prison? And did Cripps, Nehru's friend, not learn as much from his struggle against illness as from his formal training in chemistry?

Certainly, conventional science teaching, or training, has not usually produced critically minded scientists.

And, equally surely, a *smattering* of such teaching in science will not make the difference that separates a reasoning man from one who is incapable of reason. The scientist who has gone through the traditional mill will build up his feelings of self-importance by attacking others for gullibility, whereas his own *naïveté*, in philosophy, politics, or religion, will not ordinarily be less and may be more than that of the persons he denounces; on many questions, even in science, the scientist is often more helpless than the intelligent lay reader. And is the intelligent layman automatically in a better position merely because he has been "exposed" to science in school?

The scientific spirit involves accepting the "disintegration of the old" and involves discarding things. Yet often science is taught by teaching-technicians who in name only are scientific. Even the well-established scientists are all too often against originality or new discoveries because they tend to overthrow their own hypotheses, or "laws." Scientists themselves, in their actions, do not usually recognize the revolutionary nature of science.

This being so, it is stretching a point to expect statesmen to do so. The surprising thing is that some of them do; and not necessarily only the ones who have "taken" science in school. A Franklin Delano Roosevelt had a good understanding of the world and of the place and possibility of science in it. But he had enlarged his vision to include

science because he had to, because his place in world history required him to do so. It was not a case of early teaching having big results. *Perhaps* the same is true of Churchill; he certainly refers often enough in his speeches to the possibilities of science, as well as to the problems caused by it. But it is well known that he had no real science work in school.

Men of this type, it would seem, have minds receptive to the new. They are not trained in the details of science, but they need not be if they have receptivity as a characteristic of their nature. Receptivity, however, is not a marvellous gift that in itself infallibly decides things. The statesmen-administrators are advised by their Ministers (or Under-Secretaries), by Civil Servants, and by other advisers. The personalities as well as the training of the advisers are important ingredients which go to form final decisions of political leaders. Since this is so the processes of government are largely determined by reaction to personalities.

If we may use the educator's terminology we may say that the great political leaders are continually having courses "given" them—courses in science, in history, in international relations, even (sometimes) in psychology. They may have good teachers and they may have bad. But their education is an ongoing process which does not end with formal schooling. The education that life itself gives is real, even if

it doesn't often get the recognition of the professional educator. (In life, incidentally, just as in school, the "student's" reaction to a "subject" or to a decision is influenced very much by the "teacher," by the way the subject or the problem is presented, and by likings and dislikings that have been built up in the "candidate's" mind over many years.)

We are thinking, let it be clear, of the great statesmen, who are willing to learn. To a certain extent the same process is involved in the case of the ordinary politician coming to conclusions. But there we are more likely to be dealing with men who have minds already made up about major issues and who more often come to decisions by "horse-trading" than by reasoning. If the political mind, or any mind, is closed, it matters little whether or not the person possessing it has "studied" chemistry or biology in his childhood or youth. (Besides, is it not a contradiction in terms to say that a person has studied sciences and has a tightly closed mind?)

An eminent writer on constitutional history said years ago that "a constitutional statesman is in general a man of common opinions and uncommon abilities." The judgment is one of insight. One of the uncommon abilities that this statesman must have is the ability to flex his mind; he must have an uncommonly receptive mind. But the common opinions he must also hold, though let us hope that he is

ahead of his people. Today it is definitely not a common opinion throughout the world that the truth must be followed "wherever it may lead." Political leaders therefore cannot remain leaders if they are too scientific. Hence the dilemma of our times, which is all too often solved in an unfortunate manner, as at present; that is, men who are selected as leaders are selected for their common opinions and not for their uncommon abilities to tackle what needs to be tackled with wisdom and with vision.

The problem, ultimately, is one of education, of school education. We can have adult education and we can have briefing of Ministers. But if we raise whole generations of children to become uneducated adults, uneducated even if literate, it is clear that "adult education" will not of itself be so powerful as to break the vicious circle. It cannot of itself produce the necessary common opinions of higher level, which would in their turn produce more statesmanlike statesmen.

To be sure, accidental education can result. Popular articles on science and the writings of distinguished scientists may transmit facts and even insights to the "ordinary man." If there is a real incentive, a real need to learn, men in politics and in "affairs" can readily enough pick up some knowledge about science, and about the scientific method too, elusive as that is. Consider, for example, the effectiveness (in Britain) of the Parliamentary and Scientific

Committee, an unofficial group of members of both Houses of Parliament interested in science. It has close to 200 Parliamentary members:

But most of us are only too well inoculated against any type of education by our experience in schools and by the continual bombardment of the media of mass communications. We have been exposed to so many facts and formulæ that there must be exceptionally powerful forces operating if we are to open ourselves to the discoveries of science and to a true realization of the impact of science on our civilization. There must be powerful forces operating if our education is to be made meaningful. If it is not, if the level of common opinion is not raised, we shall not have our scientific-spirited statesmen; for statesmen come into power by selection and election and not out of a clear sky.

The trouble is with the schools. Yet, since society is to be judged by what it does for its schools and for its teachers, the blame goes to society. Science actually can transform the world—in a good way and not in a bad. But to complain: "If people only knew more about science" is not a solution. We must have schools which teach and not merely train; we must have schools which teach not only the formulæ but also the spirit of science.

As Nehru warns us, when he fears that the spirit of science "may somehow fade away":—

Science is not a matter of merely looking at test-tubes and mixing this and that and producing things big or small ; science ultimately is a way of training the mind and of the whole life functioning according to the ways and methods of science, that is, the whole structure, social or otherwise, functioning in the spirit of science. If science is Truth, then you must follow that Truth. But, generally speaking, people think of science as something isolated, in terms of test-tubes and mechanical appliances which have no other relation to life except as providing them some conveniences. Well, certainly science does and should provide conveniences. Science, indeed, has built up the structure of modern life and you cannot exist without it. Wherever you go, you come across some major application of science, and yet the people who utilize that application from morning to evening and profit by it, do not realize what lies behind it—the manner of thinking and the manner of acting and functioning. They take things for granted. They do not know the long history of science, of trials and errors, of experiments and hundreds of fail-

ures, and then the success, accidental or deliberately striven for. Nor do they think of the things which are called scientific temper, scientific mind and scientific method, which really are more important than actual discovery. If you do not have the method but accidentally reach a discovery—well, you have that and no more. Therefore, I am a little afraid when I hear so much praise for science, that science is going the way of religion. And that is dangerous as far as I can see....

I hope you will think in terms of science, not in that limited way and just as something which helps you to gain your ends. Of course, if your ends are big, then it is well and good ; but if the ends are small, and narrow and limited, then it is not well and good. You should think of science as a method of approach to life and life's problems generally....

If "science-steeped statesmen" are statesmen who think of science in this way, then we need "science-steeped statesmen."

ALFRED S. SCHENKMAN

POEMS FROM A SEASHORE

[Translated by W. PACHOW and LILA RAY from the original Chinese of DR. TAN YUNSHAN—ED.]

I

If the sea is content
Why does it cry interminably?

2

The stars are always peeping
Into the secrets of the sea.
They do not even know
When they have fallen into it!

3

Fish and lobsters,
Being born in the sea

Cannot know its vastness.

4

The Moon sinks into the sea
And yet is bright as crystal!
The stars sink into the sea
And yet they twinkle!

5

O waves, you thrash and roll
But you cannot leave
The surface of the sea.

THE NATURE AND VALIDITY OF MYSTIC EXPERIENCE

[A point which bears upon the subject discussed here by **Shri C. V. Srinivasa Murty, M. A.**, of the Maharaja's College, Mysore, is that not all mystic experience is of the same order of validity. The advance of man is through a series of progressive awakenings, at each of which he feels that now, at last, Reality has been reached. The difference between the lower ranges of mystical experience and such spiritual realization as that attained by a high soul like Gautama or Jesus is great indeed. The attempt to compare the latter with psychic or pathological states would be ludicrous. The man who has attained to any degree of mystic recognition of order and purpose in the universe, and of man as the microcosm of Great Nature, has to that extent freed himself from sectarianism and attained to a measure of universality of outlook, even though—especially if he is unlettered—he may avail himself of the terminology most familiar to him in his attempt to formulate what is essentially ineffable. The genuine mystic experience is not to be confounded with psychic fancies. What the true mystic experiences on the mountain-top he brings down to the valley in the shape of a more purposeful life and a compassionate devotion to the service of his fellow-men.—ED.]

To take up first the meaning of Mysticism: the term is often taken to mean something indefinite and inexplicable. It is generally identified with intuition, which, unless properly defined, is more often than not a name for ignorance of the causes at work. Definitions are legion and they will not help us. The best that can be done is to indicate the sense in which it is to be used in this paper. Mysticism is essentially an experience which gives us not merely a feeling of intimate and personal relationship, but knowledge as well. The knowledge derived from mystic experience is described as intuitive and is regarded as opposed to knowledge derived

from reasoning. The point of view developed here does not envisage such a conflict between reason and intuition. Radhakrishnan observes:—

In order to be able to say that religious experience reveals reality, in order to be able to transform religious certitude into logical certainty we are obliged to give an intellectual account of the experience.... There can be no final breach between the two powers of the human mind, reason and intuition.¹

Intuitive mystical experience cannot be regarded as a special gift. Every rational individual has the capacity for it, and does experience it at some moment of his life. In

¹ *The Hindu View of Life*, pp. 16-17.

its higher levels, it is, in a sense, a direct and intimate experience revealing knowledge. The sage, the scientist and the philosopher may have a mystic experience which is qualitatively more significant than that of the layman because of their special cultivation in their respective fields. The term is wrongly confined to religious mysticism. Such restriction of the term cuts at the root of the possibility of validating mystic knowledge.

A great man—be he a scientist, a philosopher or a poet—with a well-stored mind and deep contemplation of the mystery of the universe who is able to translate his speculative awareness of things into actual experience has a claim to be called a mystic. Such awareness and experience in that aspect of the universe described as *sacred*, as distinguished from the *secular*, is religious mysticism. Hence religious mysticism is the same mysticism applied to a unique aspect of man's experience.

It is clear that mystic experience is universal in character. But there appears to be a difference between the intuition of the scientist and that of the saint. The scientist who is a mystic looks on the world and his subject-matter appears to him to be something different from himself, something external and objective which he contemplates and with which he communes. But the religious mystic feels that he is commun-

ing with himself, and more of himself, and experiencing a feeling of self-transcendence to achieve the presence of or identity with the Supreme and the Divine. There is knowledge, illumination and blissful experience. Bertrand Russell beautifully remarks:—

The mystic insight begins with the sense of a mystery unveiled, of a hidden wisdom now suddenly become certain beyond the possibility of a doubt. The sense of certainty and revelation comes earlier than any definite belief.²

William James in his classic work, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, rightly observes that such an experience cannot be defined, cannot be expressed in conceptual formulæ. But it can be described. He mentions four characteristic marks of mystic experience: (1) *Ineffability*; (2) *Noetic Quality*; (3) *Transiency*; and (4) *Passivity*.³

An experience which has stamped upon it these four characteristic marks deserves the name of mysticism. Russell goes further and points to the reality revealed in the experience.

This reality is regarded with an admiration often amounting to worship; it is felt to be always and everywhere close at hand, thinly veiled by the shows of sense, ready, for the receptive mind, to shine in its glory even through the apparent folly and wickedness of man. The poet, the artist, and the lover are the seekers after that glory. The haunting beauty

² *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 9.

³ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 380-1

that they pursue is the faint reflection of its sun. But the mystic lives in the full light of the vision; what others dimly seek he knows, with a knowledge beside which all other knowledge is ignorance.⁴

To bring out the importance of the mystical outlook on life one can do no better than to quote the further memorable words of Russell:—

I believe that, by sufficient restraint, there is an element of wisdom to be learned from the mystical way of feeling, which does not seem to be attainable in any other manner. If this is the truth, mysticism is to be commended as an attitude towards life, not as a creed about the world.... Even the cautious and patient investigation of truth by science, which seems the very antithesis of the mystic's swift certainty, may be fostered and nourished by that very spirit of reverence in which mysticism lives and moves.⁵

While every individual has the potentiality for mystical experience, its highest ecstatic reaches are open to very few. Mysticism may be looked upon as the most intimate form of adjustment to the universe as a whole, in which the individual claims to achieve peace, harmony and joy. In order to appraise the claims made for mysticism correctly it is necessary to make an excursion into psychology, and especially that branch of it known as psychoanalysis. Modern psychological developments have thrown a flood of

light on the personality and have considerably influenced our attitude to religious problems. Thanks to the speculation of Sigmund Freud, the scope of psychology is no longer confined to the conscious processes.

Fanatics in the field unearthed the roots of the mental experiences of exceptional individuals in the fields of art, science, philosophy and religion, leaders of thought and life, and asserted that they resembled those of neurotics. They claimed that the religious life may be due to increased suggestibility, emotional excitement and frustration of the deep-seated impulses of the personality. William James observes—I think truly—that even more perhaps than any other kinds of genius, religious leaders have been subject to abnormal psychical visitations. Invariably they have been creatures of exalted emotional sensibility. Often they have led a discordant inner life and had melancholy during a part of their career. They have known no measure, been liable to obsessions and fixed ideas; and frequently they have fallen into trances, heard voices, seen visions, and presented all sorts of peculiarities which are originally classed as pathological.⁶

A number of our experiences—the normal as well as the exceptional—are suppressed or even repressed by us owing to custom, tradition and many of the newer social inhibitions of a complex society. These elements form a reservoir of energy which is dynamic and highly explosive. Many

⁴ Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

⁶ James, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

of our experiences, specially religious mysticism of the ecstatic type, are explained as an *up-rush* from the subconscious. It is said that experiences similar to those of mysticism may be brought about by self-hypnosis, auto-suggestion, or Yogic practices, involving fasting and affecting the digestive system. Shall we therefore dismiss mysticism as a malady of the human mind?

At this stage it is necessary to remind ourselves of the limitations of psychology. Psychology is a descriptive science. It can observe, describe and analyze mental experiences and, it may be, determine the causes and conditions that bring about certain of these. But it overreaches itself when it attempts to estimate the value of such experiences and their significance for human life. To say this is not to reject psychology. A correct knowledge of the origin and development of experiences described as religious throws much light on the formation of value-judgments. The application of psychology to the understanding of the religious mind has revealed the inner structure of the human mind and the potentialities of the human personality. Such knowledge, far from turning out religious sceptics, ought to purify religion and strengthen the religious spirit. But the origin of our religious experiences cannot determine their validity.

The religious mystic looks upon his experience as something unique, inexpressible. He lays claim to

supreme delight and joy ineffable. Though all the mystics have spoken with one voice of the inexpressible nature of the experience, yet, curiously enough, they have poured out their hearts in eloquent and emotionally charged words. Some regard the experience as having brought them into the very presence of the great Being, and the vision which, to begin with, is "dark with excess of light," later changes to an exhilarating sense of illumination.

The experience is the same but the manner in which it is interpreted depends upon the mystics' cultural and religious background. They all believe that the experience is something solemn and awe-inspiring, and that of an objective reality, felt to be more real than anything else in their lives. This intense "Reality-feeling" is accompanied by the emotion of refreshing joy and the birth of a new meaning in an intuition more akin to sense than to thought but distinguished from both by its immensely superior power to reveal the divine.

So far as the mystic is concerned, the experience itself is of a self-certifying character. He is troubled by no doubts or misgivings. But such certainty is purely subjective. Any experience, to have meaning for human life, must be validated. Our philosophic quest for truth and certainty requires that all aspects of experience shall be understood as a coherent whole and we can the least afford to pass by mystic experience, which through the ages has been

acclaimed as the deepest and the most significant.

If the point of view developed here is correct, the dilemma of mystic knowledge results from a wrong conception of the relation between reason and intuition. Rational knowledge is taken to be purely analytical and mediate, while the knowledge derived from intuition is regarded as synthetic and immediate. There need be no such hiatus between mediate and immediate knowledge, reason and intuition. The human mind works by analysis and synthesis. Reason and intuition may be regarded as alternative stages in the development of knowledge.

In the process of understanding the Universe as a whole, the highest flights of the speculative intellect may result in the summing up of the experience of a whole people in a deep and comprehensive intuition and the reality of the Universe may appear as a unique experience. What is merely mediate knowledge may be translated into immediate experience and the latter may become the basis for further advance. From this point of view there is nothing in genuine mystic experience which is not partially present in every rational individual. The experience differs in degree and not in kind.

Such an attitude helps us to distinguish genuine mysticism from the counterfeit. No one has asserted that the milder form of mysticism

is pathological. Though one finds in the lives of the mystics a certain element of monoideism and suggestibility their experiences, taken as a whole, necessarily point to large differences between the mystic and the hysteric. Delacroix observes:—

The soul of the mystic has a richness of intuition and of action which sometimes goes to the extent of delirium; but the power of adaptation to life, and the intelligence which stands back of the intuition, distinguish the ordering of the mystic life from that of the really delirious.⁷

Genuine mysticism contributes to greater and greater integration of personality, while in the pathological cases there is disintegration of the personality, paralyzing both will and intellect. William James recommends the pragmatic test for determining the value of mysticism. Truth is that which works. It is hardly necessary to array arguments against the pragmatic test of truth. It is enough to point out that "workability," good effects on the personality, etc., simply point to the direction in which truth may be discovered. If the mystic experience leads to larger integration of the personality, inner happiness, peace and contentment, we may believe that the experience itself is valuable. But the problem remains: How can we validate the mystic's claim to the revelation of a God who is a "presence," real and objective, authoritative and compulsive in character? The argu-

⁷ Quoted in *The Religious Consciousness*, by J. B. PRATT, p. 464.

ments that all the mystics speak with one voice as to the authenticity of the experience, and that genuine mystics are virtuous and sincere, do not carry us very far. In the first instance, it is not true that there is unanimity among mystics; there are among them pantheists and theists, monists and dualists. Viscount Samuel remarks:—

The character of the preacher is no guarantee of the truth of his doctrine. Exceptional virtue is one thing; divine insight may be another. Further, the saints of one religion say different things from the saints of another religion. Both cannot be right. The world cannot find here the sure test by which to judge between this creed and that, between one claim to mystic inspiration and another.⁸

There is every reason to admit that an individual can develop his spiritual capacities and achieve complete harmony with the universe of men and things, may even be dimly aware of a spiritual atmosphere pervading the cosmos. But there is nothing to justify a mystic's interpretation of his experience in terms of a particular theology. Freed from creedal interpretations, mysticism may be valuable in giving us the experience of true religion.

The feeling of Reality which the mystic experiences may be that of a comprehensive spirit expressed in and through the world. The con-

nected system of things and persons with which the mystic seeks harmonious adjustment may itself be partly responsible for stimulating the individual and leading him to a comprehensive and consistent experience.

In the present state of psychological and epistemological knowledge, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to say with definiteness whether mystical states give us a vision superior to anything we know. We do not know enough of subjective communications such as precognition, clairvoyance and telepathy to be able to judge the validity of supernatural understanding.

William James, a very sympathetic but at the same time a very authoritative exponent of religious mysticism, says:—

It must always remain an open question whether mystical states may not possibly be...superior points of view, windows through which the mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive world....Mystical states indeed wield no authority due simply to their being mystical states. But the higher ones among them point in directions to which the religious sentiments even of non-mystical men may incline. They tell of the supremacy of the ideal, of the vastness of Union, of safety and of rest.⁹

But these are, as James rightly believes, only *hypotheses*.

C. V. SRINIVASA MURTY

⁸ *Belief and Action*, pp. 67-68.

⁹ James, *op. cit.*

THE CHILD'S IDEA OF DEATH

[Mr. George Godwin, well-known novelist, critic and essayist, the author of *The Great Revivalists* and *Notable British Trials*, writes suggestively here of a psychological problem, one aspect of which has especially profound implications. Does not the child's inability to conceive that his own life will ever end point to immortality being an idea innate in every man, however emphatically denied by reasoning on materialistic lines or effectively silenced by sophistry? May it not be the whisper of man's spiritual intuition which assures him that there is that in him which shall not know death?—ED.]

Having written "The Child's Idea of Death," I ask myself: "Should this not have been 'The Griefs of Childhood'?" For I think it is true to say that, for a child, death—a going away—engenders grief through loss, without any conception whatsoever of the nature of death. A child may be moved emotionally by death, but not as an adult is moved by it. For a child's grief arises out of a sense of loss, of deprivation of what is familiar. From observation, I do not think it goes beyond that, real and profound as it may be for the short period of its effect.

No, a child does not mourn as an adult mourns. For in the adult the death of one beloved evokes a grief that is not centred on self, but arises out of the tragic sense of human destiny. This is the sense that all passes, all perishes. And it is, mercifully, withheld from the children. For them the only reality is Life, with death merely as a lamented or inconvenient "going away" of some familiar person, animal or inanimate but well-loved thing.

This, in some part, explains what

often appears as callousness, as lack of feeling, in the child confronted by the experience of a death in the family circle. It helps us also to understand, by a process of imaginative sympathy, the curious apparent disparity between cause and effect in the emotional reactions of the child. The death of a white mouse, a goldfish or a kitten will evoke intense grief; the death of an aunt or a grandmother, or of some other adult within the daily-life orbit of the child, complete—and apparent—callousness.

One or two personal experiences may help to illustrate this.

The first concerns the children of a large family dominated by an invalid grandmother, much feared and little loved. When this old woman lay dying, and seemed to those awaiting her end to be, like King Charles II, an unconscionable time about it, one child was delegated each day to go to the bedroom door and ask of the nurse: "Is Grandma finished yet?"

For these children the hoped-for announcement of the death of their grandmother meant the welcome

end of a hated tyranny; and their concern went no further than that. The spectacle of their father's anxiety for his dying mother left them untouched. I think they wondered why he did not share their contrary hopes, since the old woman bullied her son as she did her grandchildren. They had no understanding whatsoever of the emotional distresses of the adults about them.

The other case illustrates well, I think, two points. First, the great love which children can bestow upon their pets; secondly, the brevity of their grief on the death of a loved small creature.

Three children were involved, two little girls, one 10, the other 14, and a boy of 10. Two of the children, the elder girl and the boy, were French. The trio had made a great pet of a black female kitten. It was blue-eyed and adorable, as small kittens usually are. But one morning I came down and found it drowned in a water butt in the cottage garden.

It seemed kindest to bury the victim before the children came down to breakfast. They had left it a ball of black fluff, full of abundant life. It now lay, waterlogged and dank, on the spade with which I had fished it from the water. I buried the kitten but, knowing that the children would want to know where their pet lay, I made a little rough cross of pea-sticks and added a small circlet of lobelias for a wreath.

The little English girl, who dearly

loves all small creatures, was in great distress. She gazed at the little grave for a long time and then said: "May I dig her up?" She wished to see her pet once more. She was experiencing the pain of parting, which is the child's limited understanding of the finality of death.

After a breakfast eaten in silence this child returned to the little grave, accompanied now by her two French companions.

It was decided that the kitten's grave should be made really worthy of her. They sat down and began to make wreaths from the little flowers of a brick-path border. This was done with deep concentration and obvious awareness of the funeral nature of the enterprise.

But what is a funeral without a funeral service? This was the French girl's reaction. She liked dressing up. They all agreed upon this. There must be a proper funeral service for the kitten. A little later this was in full swing; a night-dress serving as a priest's vestments, the dinner bell and much perambulating around the grave giving an air of verisimilitude to the proceedings.

Already the first grief was passing away. What had been conceived as a funeral rite had already become a game. As I watched, unobserved, I saw the funeral procession proceed by leaps and bounds, with wild hoots of merriment.

Yes, what had begun as a sad, sad rite had become, in less than an hour, an enchanting game. The

little corpse beneath the sod was quite forgot. Such is childhood's grief!

But because a child's grief is short-lived, it would be, I am sure, a mistake to regard the emotions of children as shallow. While they are aroused they can be as intense as the emotions of an adult: perhaps more intense. Love and hatred are deeply felt emotions in many children; in the one direction to the point of sublimity, in the other well within the shadows of abnormal psychology.

A case recorded in the annals of my own family, which I came upon a few years ago in an old correspondence, illustrates the profound depths of feeling that may torment the soul of a child.

The child, a little girl of four, was intensely jealous of the baby sister. The baby died in its first year. It was placed in the small coffin and left thus so that it might be looked at for the last time by those who loved it. The little girl so hated this small sister, even in death, that she crept into the bedroom and cracked the infant's skull with a blow from a stone held in her little hand.

Nor was that early evidence of a later tendency to crime or cruelty. It was a child's revenge upon another who had stolen from her some part of that love which, before its coming, had been exclusively hers. That act of aggression against the dead, perhaps, suggests the child's mental and emotional identity with

the primitive savage. Cradled or confined, the baby was not beyond the range of her hatred.

What, then, does a child feel about its own mortality? Man, the only animal with foreknowledge of death, contrives in the rich feast of life to put away from himself this deep hidden knowledge. I do not think a child possesses it. I believe that for children "death" is something that happens to others, but never to oneself. Children, I am sure, believe that they will never die. Indeed, there are many adults who in secret cling to this belief.

All doctrines of immortality originate in this belief or are arrived at by a process of wishful thought. This is not to dismiss, offhand, the problem of the survival of human personality after death, with which these few general remarks on the child's idea of death are not concerned.

The inability of children to apprehend the real nature of the death of the body is sometimes illustrated by examples a good deal less charming than that which I have given of the funeral rites accorded a pet kitten by three children.

It occurs, now and then, that a child destroys the life of another child and does so under circumstances that suggest, judged by standards applicable to adults, a very real degree of turpitude. Small boys have been known to kill a chosen victim, and the action has brought them before the courts. In one such case, Professor Sioli, the

Italian psychiatrist, said of a boy's having held another under water until he was drowned: "Nice children sometimes do these things."

I do not pretend to the degree of imaginative sympathy that would be required to see such an act as it may have been experienced by the offending child. But one may hazard the guess that curiosity enters into such actions, and that there is in the perpetrator of them no understanding of their true character.

The inability of children to realize the fact of death does not apply, I am sure, to children in or past adolescence, or even those who are past the 12th year. It is at about that age level that children begin to ponder upon the subject. It may not be presented as a personal problem by some death in the family, and may be merely an intellectual preoccupation. But it may be much more where death has come, suddenly and unexpectedly, to either parent or playmate.

If I may, I will cite a personal experience in this connection which has at least the merit of being first-hand knowledge. I was at the time at a preparatory school in Brighton. I was 12 years of age. One day I quarrelled with another boy. We fought violently, as boys of that age often do, and I beat my opponent. Three days later the headmaster, with a solemn face, told us that this boy had died in hospital, following

an operation.

The effect of this upon me was profound, as is evidenced by the circumstance that after many years I can recall my boyhood emotions. I was plunged into a terrible gloom, in which horror, incredulity, fear and a sense of guilt entered, along with inability to realize that this boy had vanished forever. I do not think I was more sensitive than other boys; but that sudden confrontation of my childhood mind and imagination by the King of Terrors left a mark that remained, and remained permanently.

It would be pleasant, I suppose, if one could deal with a theme like this so that all comes rounded off and as we would have it; but that cannot be if one would strive after truth.

Looking back across the years, then, I ask myself at this moment whether the grief I felt at the death of a schoolfellow could be compared with that which I experienced at the loss of a wooden toy sailor in my second year. That loss was my first experience of grief. I have known grief many times since, and sometimes with an anguish beyond words—as when half my fellow subalterns failed to return after the Battle of Vimy Ridge. Yet the memory of the sorrow that followed on the loss of a wooden toy abides.

How strange, indeed, is the soul of a child!

GEORGE GODWIN

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

AN ARDENT SOUL AND AN HONEST MIND*

As a result of the publication of these three volumes during the last two years the writings and character of Simone Weil have attracted considerable attention in England, as they had previously in France. She is, indeed, in danger of becoming in certain circles the object of a cult, a thing which she would have repudiated with the full force of her mind and spirit.

She was born in Paris in 1909 of a Jewish family and enjoyed the doubtful privilege of a brother, her elder by three years, who was to prove even more brilliant intellectually than herself. As a student she delighted her teachers and Émile Chartier, the well-known French philosopher and essayist, who was her master before she entered the *École Normale*, recognized in her "a power of thought which was rare." But, after qualifying as a teacher of philosophy and teaching for a short time in various schools, her longing to experience fully the life of the working people led her to take a job in the Renault Works. Here, despite splitting headaches, she refused any preferential treatment. And it is clear that what she suffered at this time left a lasting mark upon her.

Later she shared for a time as a non-combatant the sufferings of the Republican army in Spain. During the Second World War she joined the French Resistance movement, but in 1942 went to America. Later in that year she was called to serve under the French Provisional Government in England, by which she was asked to write a report on the possibilities of bringing about a regeneration in France. To this task, the last of her life, she devoted herself during the early months of

1943 and in the second book under review we have the fruits of her labour. She died soon after finishing it, having characteristically refused the extra nourishment ordered by the doctors and kept strictly to the rations to which her compatriots in the occupied zone of France were limited.

During 1941 and 1942 she had, however, enjoyed the friendship of a Dominican priest, Father Perrin, to whom she confided the secrets of her inner life. To him, too, on leaving France she entrusted her papers and in particular the six letters in which she defined with a stark candour her deepest spiritual convictions and explained why, despite her devotion to Christ, she could not become a Catholic. It is in these letters, with which *Waiting on God* begins, and in the extracts from her note-books, arranged and edited by Gustave Thibon and contained in the third of these books, that she laid bare her inmost beliefs and the cross which she carried with such inflexible integrity. M. Thibon, describing his first acquaintance with her, remarks that, unlike most people, she displayed at first with alarming spontaneity "all that was most unpleasing in her nature, but it needed much time and affection, and a great deal of reserve had to be overcome, before she showed what was best in her."

This was typical of one who always felt herself to be unlikeable and who had, too, in her own words, "an extremely severe standard for intellectual honesty, so severe that I never met anyone who did not seem to fall short of it in more than one respect; and I am always afraid of failing in it myself."

* *Waiting on God*. (ix + 169 pp. 1951. 12s. 6d.); *The Need For Roots*. (xv + 288 pp. 1952. 18s.); *Gravity and Grace*. (xxxvii + 160 pp. 1952. 15s.) By SIMONE WEIL. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., London)

The truth of this is apparent in every word she wrote, in the concentrated clarity of her style and in her uncompromising fidelity to her own thought and vocation. But there was something crippling in it too, a mental and moral constriction which, though sharply defining her thought, made it in some degree opaque to the Light that liberates. Indeed her thought at times could be perverse, with that compulsive hunger for mortification which recalls the desert anchorites. For example, she not only believed "that the instant of death is the centre and object of life," with which we can agree, but that "even for the perfect" it was better that the death agony should be bitter, "if they are to attain to absolute purity."

It is not too much to say that she envied Christ his crucifixion. In such longing to do extreme penance in the body there is usually an element of mental pride, and a correspondingly morbid hunger for absolute abasement. This can often be felt in her very professions of humility, as it doubtless dictated in some measure her longing to be lost among the outcasts of this world, while insisting on the need to stand alone and repudiating the atmosphere of human warmth and what she called "the social trap." For her, affliction, which she distinguished from suffering as a blind mechanism which reduced its victims to mere nothings, was the most painful fact of experience, but also the most necessary. In "Last Thoughts" she wrote:—

It is in affliction itself that the splendour of God's mercy shines; from its very depths, in the heart of its inconsolable bitterness. If still persevering in our love, we fall to the point where the soul cannot keep back the cry "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" if we remain at this point without ceasing to love, we end by touching something which is not affliction, which is not joy; something which is the central essence, necessary and pure.

Such a passage and others like it, in which she stressed the need of passing beyond the conflict of pleasure and pain, are in harmony with the teaching

of the *Gita*, the words of which she described when she read it in the spring of 1940 as "marvellous," yet as also having "such a Christian sound." To one in whose eyes Christianity was "catholic by right but not in fact," because it excluded so many things that God and she loved, such a statement was possible. But despite her demand for a new and true catholicism, as for a new saintliness, universal in its love, she herself was as painfully attached as Pascal to her sense of sin and to the tortured symbol of the Crucifix.

But this did not prevent her from expressing with a singular insight, born of her desire to strip herself bare to the absolute, the eternal truth of the *via negativa* as a means to the one "free act which it is given us to accomplish—the destruction of the 'I.'" So scrupulously on guard was she against self-will that she feared even to pray lest she should interfere with God's will for her and she insisted that even in the way of goodness "we must do nothing more than we are irresistibly impelled to do."

Waiting on God meant for her an ever-increasing attentiveness to a will not her own, by which she might become the object of a pressure which possessed itself of more and more of the whole soul. But this could not exclude, for one so intellectual as she, the need to wrestle with God for meaning, "if one does so out of pure regard for truth." But such a pure regard implied necessarily the action rooted in inaction that Krishna taught. And in a very wise address on the right use of school studies she applied this teaching to the class-room, in which the knit brows of the student, she suggested, betrayed the same falsely willed effort as any tense search for God. The road to truth involved for her the same deeply attentive waiting as the road to sanctity, for which school studies could be quite as good a means as any other.

It was the same with human relationship. As little in human inter-

course as in prayer could warmth of heart, she argued, make up for a want in the quality of attention, of stilled receptivity. Love, of course, was essential to such attention, whether directed to a person or upon a landscape, but it must be a love so cleansed of self-regard that through the person God himself might make contact with every being and thing met. "I act," she wrote, "as a screen—I must withdraw so that he may see it."

This is only one of the key truths, though a basic one, by which Simone Weil directed her life. *Waiting on God* and *Gravity and Grace* are rich in such searching insights, and although we often feel the brand of affliction searing

her thought, the flame of a spiritual ardour as intense as it was austere burns through both books.

The Need for Roots is by contrast a political and sociological essay, but one which is based upon spiritual issues and so rises above partisan considerations. The disease which she set herself to diagnose in the history and downfall of France was essentially that of Western civilization. Hers was not a prophetic mind and she tended perhaps to look too much to the past for the organic truth which modern life had lost. But only one who knew the cost of sainthood could have seen so clearly the causes of her country's and the world's sickness.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

Introduction to Economic Organization. By HENRY SMITH. (Sylvan Press, Ltd., London. 186 pp. 1952. 12s. 6d.) Received through the courtesy of the British Council.

Every student of economics knows that pure theory never solves an actual economic problem. Before it can be usefully applied to an actual problem one needs, among other things, an understanding of the special forms taken by economic activity at any particular time. Professor Smith (who during the war headed the English Ministry of Food's Price Policy Branch) here attempts an account of the important factors in the economic organization of the world today. In giving this he also traces, as far as is helpful, the history of these moulding forces.

His writing is so precise and clear that the manner of exposition contributes as much to our understanding as the well-digested information and orderly thinking. As a result, Professor

Smith has produced a book interesting and instructive even to a reader unacquainted with the technique of economic analysis, but also worthy of the student's attention because it defines the context in which economic theory must at present be interpreted in practical application.

The detachment with which he explores the economic implications of political developments like increasing governmental control of economic activities (p. 28) and the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States (p. 29), or the broader conflict of economic policy in the contemporary world (the last chapter) is admirable. And there is a challenge in his summing up of the contemporary situation:

The feat of will and imagination which the age demands is the formulation of an ethic of property which can stand as the basis of the capitalization of the more backward areas of the world.

R. P. S.

LITERATURE

Music for Mohini. By BHABANI BHATTACHARYA. (Crown Publishers, Inc., New York. 251 pp. 1952. \$3.00)

Truth is not always prominent in publishers' "blurbs," which makes it necessary to stress its appearance on the jacket of *Music for Mohini*. The publishers say that this novel is "different" and it is different. There is no doubt whatever about that.

The actual story is tenuous enough. Mohini, a young Brahmin girl of high social status—well-educated, and a gifted radio singer—seeks a bridegroom. Old Mother, for whom the modern world exists only as a manifestation of evil, is adamant in her demand that the bridegroom's horoscope must contain the eight favourable signs, and that he must be uncontaminated by Western ways. "The groom belongs to his circle.... They are all alike. No tradition, no true culture. Apes of Westernism!" Most of the book is concerned with Mohini's married life in the big Country House—far from everything to which she was accustomed—with her scholar-husband, Jayadev, whose dream is to "...reorientate the values and patterns of Hindu life ...to reveal ancient thought in its true splendour." We are shown her life with Jayadev and his mother and sister—and her gradual adjustment to the demands of the Big House and the ancient traditions which it represents.

It is evident that the story is a simple one, but what gives this novel its value is the strangeness, the colour, the splendour of Indian rites and rituals; which transported one reader not to another country but to another world. Space permits only few and brief references to these rites and rituals, but, to those unfamiliar with them, a few examples will reveal their "otherness" and age-old lineage:—

The bangle seller...scratched his chin. Young and ignorant, he mused, looking at her. No vermilion gleamed on the part in her hair, so she was still a maid....

On an altar specially erected for the ceremony (Bridal Day) the family priest had put a dark dainty pebble, the Holy Stone.... The priest sat on Jayadev's left and the bride's father on his right, and though the priest was an old experienced man, he feared the learning of this youth and pronounced the Sanskrit *mantra*, three thousand years old, with great caution lest he made errors in syntax or diction.

Finally, to make clear that the author of this book is no worshipper of the old, simply because it is old, the following must be quoted:—

...rural society (and nine-tenths of India was rural) was sick with taboos and inhibitions of its own making: the iniquities of caste and untouchability; the ritualism that passes for religion; the wide-flung cobweb of superstitious faith. The purity of ancient thought had been lost in misinterpretation.... But the new man of Jayadev's vision was not to be a hollow reincarnation—a spiritless copy of ancient Hindu man.

The publisher's claim is justified—this book is different.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

The Hidden Flower. By PEARL BUCK. (The John Day Co., Inc., New York. 308 pp. 1952. \$3.50)

When an Asiatic country happens to be occupied by white troops, we have, added to the human problems of occupation, a first-class racial problem. *The Hidden Flower* is an illuminating study of this problem in its most pathetic form.

It suddenly confronts in *The Hidden Flower* Dr. Sotan Sakai, an American Japanese repatriated during the Second World War, whom hurt pride had made aggressively Japanese. A young American officer met his daughter Josui one day, they fell in love, and wanted to marry. Young Kennedy's Colonel dislikes it, orders him home on leave; Dr. Sakai is bitterly hostile. But nature, and the prestige of the occupying power, triumph. The Oriental accepts the inevitable with calm resignation, and helps the couple to a Buddhist marriage.

But when Josui arrives in America, Western racial prejudice confronts Western individualism; Kennedy's mother refuses to accept either the girl or the marriage and, with the law on her side, determines to fight for her son. Kennedy gets his release from the army, finds a job in New York, and lives with his Japanese wife in a tenement. But they are alone in a wide, wide sea of white humanity. Allen Kennedy cannot stand up to it, for deep down in his heart, all un-awares, he hungers for his kind.

Vaguely, Josui feels this; so when the unwanted child quickens within her, and Allen goes home alone for Christmas, she quietly slips out of his life. So these two who had dared to defy their peoples' prejudices are driven back, defeated, to the bosom of their people.

With remarkable skill Pearl Buck paints the cultured life of Japan, its love of ordered beauty, its formalism, deep-rooted traditionalism, its contemplative cast of mind, its maturity. The contrast between East and West is most effectively presented in Josui's devotion to her husband; obedience, not equality, is her ideal. The most charming feature of the novel, however, is the manner in which Josui communes with her unborn child, the Hidden Flower, symbol of the essential oneness of humanity, and therefore, an outcaste in the world.

G. C. BANNERJEE

Folk Tales From Roumania. By ION CREANGA; translated by MABEL NANDRIS. Illustrated by IZA CONSTANTINOVICI-HEIN. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., London. 170 pp. 1952. 12s. 6d.)

Few of us ever knew much of Roumania; we used to dismiss it as an obscure Balkan state, and now that it has disappeared behind the Iron Curtain its obscurity has become absolute. Through the medium of this book, however, Roumania comes alive; for these tales stir old memories, perhaps

of Grimm and Æsop and Andersen, perhaps of more modern variations on their themes. In one story, for instance, the Red Emperor commands White Arab to take a mixed sack of poppy seed and fine sand and to separate the one from the other, seed by seed and grain by grain; and immediately we realize that Roumanian children read, grow up as we grow up, and die when the time comes as we die. Let the evangelist preach that we are members one of another; let the disunited nations and the world federalists pursue their ends: none comes as near the heart of the matter as the teller of folk tales, who knows that folly and pity and selfishness are our real common ground.

Ion Creanga was born of peasant stock in a village of the eastern slope of the Carpathians in 1837 and died in 1889. Mrs. Nandris writes:—

He used to dream of the stories his mother had told him round the crackling wood fire on dark winter nights...stories which had been handed down by word of mouth from generation to generation...It was his intense love of the patriarchal life of his village, that inspired Ion Creanga to write down these stories.

Mrs. Nandris's translation is admirable.

J. P. HOGAN

Towards Fidelity. By HUGH I'A. FAUSSET. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 237 pp. 1952. 15s.)

Mr. Fausset, who is no stranger to *The Aryan Path*, has carved a place for himself in contemporary English literature as a writer of distinction and integrity. Events and the spiritual forces behind them, men and the ideas that sustain them, and the filiations between men and the climate of thought in which they grow up: Mr. Fausset thus sees things in their right relation and ever looks for the reality hidden behind the cloak of appearance. In his novels, as also in his biographical and critical studies, Mr. Fausset has striven to penetrate with rays of light the circumambient fog.

Towards Fidelity is a continuation of *A Modern Prelude*, the autobiographical essay published about 20 years ago. Youth has been left behind; the War has saddened, maimed and half-maddened the surviving mass of humanity; *homo sapiens* is now apparently under a sentence of death, self-pronounced. What is left to live for, to strive for? Well may Valerie—she is you or I or anybody else—wring her hands in despair, and refuse to look at the sun, to look at beauty, or to accept the usual consolations of religion and philosophy. Valerie is all of us, and so Mr. Fausset's book is addressed to us all.

Mr. Fausset is no doubt a doubter, talking to other doubters, but more and more the tension between doubt and faith—constantly resolved and constantly renewed—spirals towards a faith that affirms the evolutionary destiny of Man. Mr. Fausset is widely read in the philosophical and spiritual lore of the West and of the East, and he has not permitted the lesser knowledge to stifle the higher wisdom. He has had to "abandon the easy creed of liberalism," and he now realizes that something like a transvaluation of values is urgent if man is to save himself by outgrowing his present limitations. The goal of spiritual life is not to be reached at an easy canter but is rather to be achieved through a lifetime of ardent aspiration and untiring effort. What we need is not an escape from life but a transformation of life—living "originally and mindfully in each and every realm of form in which we may find ourselves."

Mr. Fausset has wandered away from the certitudes of Judaism and Christianity and adventured among "the Himalyan heights of India's ancient philosophy, a philosophy more purely spiritual and psychologically subtle than any other in the world," and he has also responded agreeably to the Aurobindonian world-view outlined in *The Life Divine*. "The essence of the Indian vision" is concentrated in the tremendous equation: *Tat tvam asi*

(That thou art); and once one is set on the right road to realization, fulfilment cannot long be delayed. *Tat tvam asi* is really the sustaining mathematics of the Kingdom of Love, which is also the Kingdom of God: for all love is reared on the principle of equality of exchange leading to identity of interests (which includes the idea of forgiveness) and culminating in ineffable union. Love may begin with the body, but it cannot end there: likewise, our ideas of living may begin with the phenomenal world around us, but Reality comprehends more than that. The discipline of love and forgiving will defy Death itself, and then the Gates of Paradise will open of their own accord; and Paradise is in no remote clime or in the hereafter, but here and now, on *this* bank and shoal of time.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

The Writer and the Absolute. By WYNDHAM LEWIS. (Methuen and Co., Ltd., London. 202 pp. 1952. 21s.)

"As far as I am personally concerned, I am paralyzed the moment I try to write something I do not regard as true." This admirable statement is the diving-board from which Mr. Wyndham Lewis plunges into illumined void. Illumined, for his writing still has as much light as heat. But the void is the logical doom of a personality so split that, one part cancelling out the other, it is self-eliminated.

That is, perhaps, an ungracious comment on the creator of *Tarr*. But the passage of three decades since Mr. Wyndham Lewis wrote his early brilliant masterpiece has not enriched his vision with the quality of balance. Nor has the assembled material in his later writing been in good focus. The non-fiction volume under review suffers on both these counts. It is very readable, however. The concepts of literary freedom which Mr. Lewis discusses in his inimitable style are of fundamental interest in a world where creative writers are apt to find them-

selves packed into unwanted uniforms and ideas are often in chains.

Two-thirds of *The Writer and the Absolute* is a study of the bitter effect of such uniforms on two outstanding novelists of the age, Jean-Paul Sartre and George Orwell, whose work, Mr. Lewis thinks, has borne the compulsions of the Absolute and become distorted under the hard pressure. "Jean-Paul Sartre is, as it were, the hero of the present volume—or if hero is not exactly the word, I can think of no other. He is one of the least free men of whom I have any knowledge: which is why I have starred him in this book." And Sartre, accordingly, enters into the scheme of the book as a "case," a sufferer from *mal du siècle*. The author hastens to give the assurance that this is quite distinct from Sartre's literary achievement, "which is another question entirely."

And that is the trouble with this study. In detail it compels attention, even if one does not agree with the author's discoveries of "truth" which are often fragmentary, and even subjective, without a down-to-earth foundation. But it is mainly the general approach that is open to criticism. Mr. Lewis has himself been regarded, not too unjustly, as a "case." With his fine perception and capacity for satire, will he see himself one day through the eyes of his critics? If he does, he would perhaps be able to hit the "great big glaring target," he would blast the false image of the political philosopher, but how much of the creative artist in him would also be strewn in the picturesque wreckage?

BHABANI BHATTACHARYA

My Dear Timothy: An Autobiographical Letter to His Grandson. By VICTOR GOLLANCZ. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 439 pp. 1952. 12s. 6d.)

This first 400-page instalment of a letter from Victor Gollancz to his grandson "is the record of a search... for a manner of living that will enable

human beings to be true to the best that is in them." The author is frank, controversial, sensitive and humane, displaying wisdom and a varied experience. He is also contradictory, as is life, feeling aversion to birth control, for instance, yet considering that "widespread birth-control is an essential element in any genuine programme for the alleviation of primary poverty."

The author gives illuminating and fascinating details of life in an orthodox Jewish family, and suggests that we cannot understand Christianity without a previous understanding of Jewish orthodoxy. He emphasizes the importance of "the Law" to the Jew but also explains how a devout Jew may break any or all the laws "if by so doing you could save a single human life." Life is sacred and "God is a spirit." These deeply held beliefs are implicit and explicit throughout the book and must command our respect and sympathy, in spite of occasional verbosity and an almost too easy style.

The "letter" touches on many subjects, socialism, vegetarianism, psychology, the horrors of war and poverty, the nature of boys: "...my first discovery at Repton was that the boys were good...they were also intolerant, class-ridden, narrow...ignorant." There is a mystic understanding of the oneness of life, a humble attitude towards the great mysteries and a genuine good-will towards mankind in these pages. Altogether a fascinating book, at once easy to read and provocative of thought and argument. Most people will find fresh facts and ideas here and one feels that this would make an ideal volume for a discussion group. (Alas, there is no index!)

ELIZABETH CROSS

Victorian Olympus. By WILLIAM GAUNT. (Jonathan Cape, London. 199 pp. Illustrated. 1952. 15s.) Received through the courtesy of the British Council.

The book opens with the story of Lord Elgin's great achievement in transporting the Parthenon marbles from Greece to Britain and their subsequent acquisition by and transfer to the British Museum in 1816. These events contributed a good deal to the revival of interest in classical art.

There came Olympus again—a Victorian Olympus—on the summit of which sit beaming and powerful figures, living in golden houses, girdled by a gleaming world.

The most Olympian of these Olympian figures who gave a touch of glory and greatness to British art in the Victorian Age and ennobled the artist's profession by making him "admired, sought after, munificently rewarded," was Lord Leighton, a distinguished President of the Royal Academy and a renowned painter. His life and work, his personality, his character and biographical details occupy much of this charming and entertaining book.

Of the luminaries that shone round the sun mention may be made of George Frederic Watts, who "seemed to have stepped as if by magic from the struggle of Victorian middle-class life into a serene and ideal world"; James Abbott McNeill Whistler, who championed the cause of art for art's sake; Sir Edward John Poynter, eminent painter, professor and connoisseur; Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema who made a fortune from his pictures and yet remained true to his own self; Albert Joseph Moore, who "wrapped himself up in his painting and lived happily in a state of placid disorder and discomfort"; Sir Francis Chantrey, Holman Hunt, William Morris, Dante Gabriel Rossetti, John Ruskin and many others.

The eight reproductions are an additional attraction.

R. BANGARUSWAMI

Shakespeare. By ALLARDYCE NICOLL. (Methuen and Co., Ltd., London. 181 pp. 1952. 6s. 6d.) Received through the courtesy of the British Council.

Professor Nicoll of the University of Birmingham is the author of several authoritative surveys of British and world drama, and is also the General Editor of the annual publication, *Shakespeare Survey*. His industry and scholarship recall Saintsbury's and he has inspired many a younger man to adventure into the fields of literary history and criticism. His new volume on Shakespeare, one of the latest additions to Methuen's "Home Study Books," is addressed, like Heminge and Condell's First Folio, to "the great Variety of Readers." Shakespeare is a universalist, an indisputable constituent of world culture, and new assessments appear in an endless sequence "because the wonder which is in him defies exact description."

Professor Nicoll is fully aware of the revolution in Shakespearian scholarship that has taken place in the 20th century, but he is not prepared to dismiss as futile the Bradleyan tradition of imaginative interpretation. Accordingly, he tries to steer a middle course between the Coleridgeans and Bradleyans on the one hand and the Realists led by Stoll and Schücking on the other.

As a dramatist, Shakespeare would appear to view Man from three angles: Man set in nature; Man set in society; and Man set in the cosmic background—in other words, the natural man, the social man and the religious man. In his mature dramas, says Professor Nicoll, "these three planes of perception...are focussed into one dazzling beam of intuition."

When it comes to grouping the plays, Dowden's Four-period theory reappears, though with new titles: "The Young Dramatist at work," "Man and Society," "Man and the Universe," and "The Inner Life."

Professor Nicoll's comments on the individual plays are, as a rule, enlightening and shrewd and there are no startling hypotheses or extravagant similitudes. But once at least a controversial issue is presented as if it were a universally admitted fact: "He

(Hamlet) has his friend, his mistress and his enemy....” Readers of Professor Nicoll’s earlier monograph on Shakespeare know that, according to him, Ophelia had been Hamlet’s mistress before the commencement of the play’s action; but very few Shakespearean scholars have taken this view

seriously. Yet Professor Nicoll now takes it for granted that Ophelia was Hamlet’s mistress, even as Horatio was his friend and Claudius his enemy! For the rest, Professor Nicoll is a competent and wise guide to Shakespeare’s plays, and readers will no doubt give his book a ready welcome.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

OLD WORLD AND MODERN DEVELOPMENTS

Everyman’s Dictionary of Non-Classical Mythology. Compiled by EGERTON SYKES. (J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London. 262 pp. Illustrated. 1952. 15s.)

The compiler seeks to unfold before us the treasures of myth that preceded the Hellenic civilization. The material offered is not only fascinating but also vast in its scope and covers Buddhist and Hindu, Chinese and Aztec, Celtic, Hottentot and Phœnician Creation Legends. To mention only a few other items, apart from deities and rituals, etc., a multitude of symbolic objects are recorded, such as swords, cauldrons, chariots, rings, garments, stones, horns, etc.

It is a pity (as the compiler himself admits) that the rich material from the *One Thousand and One Nights* could not, for reasons of space, be included for comparative study. It is also to be regretted that in connection with the Grail story we find no mention of theories that are fast gaining ground, namely, theories regarding its Eastern sources and an actual temple of the Grail in Asia (cf. Lars-Ivar Ringbom’s *Grailtempel und Paradies*. Stockholm, 1951; Suhtscheck and Strzygowski, etc.) Similarly, parallels could be drawn between the Indian *Gandharvas* and such mythical figures as Lohengrin and the Celtic Ivonek.

The field of the compiler’s research being so wide and the scope of the edition necessitating such great compression, one cannot look for equality in the treatment of themes, nor perhaps

can one expect him to discuss all the findings of scholars as to the possible origins of such disputed figures as Loki. The latter, Snorri Sturluson to the contrary notwithstanding, is now usually credited with being of Vanir stock; the concept of Loki as a “culture-hero” is challenged by reputed authorities such as Prof. Hermann Schneider (*Die Götter der Germanen*).

Moreover, the possible lunar origin of Osiris might have deserved some special consideration. Sir J. G. Frazer put forward the theory that Osiris possessed a lunar significance. Plutarch long before had spoken of Osiris as the moon, whose humid and generative light was favourable to the propagation of animals and the growth of plants.

All the same, the book with its illustrations should prove of the greatest value to the general reader and show once again that our own European culture has roots which reach into strata far deeper than those of Greece and Rome.

HANNAH CLOSS

Central Asia: The Connecting Link between East and West and Other Lectures. By DR. JOHANNES NOBEL, with a foreword by DR. RAGHU VIRA (Saraswati Vihara Series, Vol. XXVI, International Academy of Indian Culture, Nagpur. 160 pp. 1952. Rs. 5/-)

During his recent sojourn as Visiting Professor at the International Academy of Indian Culture, Nagpur, Dr. J. Nobel, Professor of Sanskrit at Marburg

University in Germany, and well-known to scholars especially through his learned treatises on the Buddhist work *Suvarṇaprabhāsottama Sūtra*, delivered a number of lectures which have now been published in book form. The lectures sought, as Dr. Raghu Vira mentions in the Preface, "to reach out to the common man" and consequently the author had to limit himself to general, but nevertheless typical, observations; a difficult task indeed if we consider the vastness and complexity of the ground he covered.

The first of the lectures, devoted to an examination of Central Asia's historical position as a link between East and West, gives essentially a *résumé* of the various political, cultural and religious settings which existed in this area at different epochs. They are described mainly by quoting observations which have come down to our times from such famous travellers as Chang K'ien or Hsüan-Tsang but are also outlined with the help of the evidence recovered more recently by various Central Asian expeditions.

The spread of Buddhism was the theme of another lecture, which dealt primarily with the diffusion of Lord Buddha's teachings to China, Korea, Japan and Tibet; it gave mainly a sketch of the differing developments of Buddhism in these countries.

Undoubtedly the most interesting part of the book is the third chapter, a lecture delivered at the University of Nagpur, which contains a historical review of the introduction of Sanskrit literature into Germany. Here also a scholar might find some points of interest, especially in the part dealing with the life-work of the well known German scholar and poet, Friedrich Rückert (1788-1866), some of whose original studies have later been edited by Dr. Nobel himself.

Two more specialized themes are treated in the last two sections of the book: "Nirvāṇa and Brahman-Ātman," a profound study of these two conceptions and their substantial

differences, and "Japanese in Far Eastern Kulturkreis." This last lecture dealt mainly with the early cultural contacts between Japan and the Asian mainland and it has also some interesting notes on the development of the Japanese script.

Altogether, it has certainly been an admirable step to publish Dr. Nobel's lectures, thus making them available to a wider circle of the interested public, as they will be found a condensed but competent introduction to the various subjects mentioned above.

R. DE NEBESKY-WOJKOWITZ

Indians of the Andes : Aymaras and Quechuas. By HAROLD OSBORNE. (The International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., London. 269 pp. Illustrated. 1952. 25s.)

In this extremely well-written and interesting book the author summarizes the history of the highland peoples of the Central Andes who formed the nucleus of the great Inca Empire. For the prehistoric period he has chiefly relied on Arturo Posnansky's *Tihuanacu: The Cradle of American Man*, but his own studies, based on a personal acquaintance with the area, have enabled him to criticize the views of his predecessors in this field. His main conclusion is that for centuries before the foundation of the Inca dynasty (c. A. D. 1200) there existed a Megalithic empire uniting and controlling the tribes of the Andes. On the ruins of the old dynasty of Tihuanacu arose the Andean empire of the Incas, which lasted until 1532, when Atahualpa was treacherously put to death by the Spanish conqueror Pizarro, whose exploits have been recorded in picturesque detail by Prescott. Mr. Osborne's account of Inca civilization is a distinct contribution to the problem and it is interesting to note that he dissents from the views expressed by Louis Baudin in his *L'Empire Socialiste des Inka* and argues that the Inca state was organized as a strong hierarchy

with an exceptionally wide differentiation between the privileged and unprivileged classes. Where it deals with the nature of the Spanish conquest the book serves as a useful corrective to the hostile verdict of Las Casas and the pro-Spanish views of Salvador de Madariaga. The author's account of the present condition and culture of the Aymara and Quechua Indians is based on personal observation and as such is worthy of respect.

C. COLLIN DAVIES

New Light on the Most Ancient East. By V. GORDON CHILDE. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., London. xv + 255 pp. 39 Plates, III Text Illustrations and 2 Maps. Rewritten Fourth Edition. 1952. 35s.)

Revealing the secrets of the past must be as enthralling to the archæologist as plotting the curve of progress is to the physicist. And the two are closely related, for it is only by detailed study of civilizations that have passed that it is possible to forecast the trends of the future.

Prof. V. Gordon Childe, now Director of the Institute of Archæology in London, first published his book *New Light on the Most Ancient East* 24 years ago. Now he has given us a fourth edition, entirely revised and brought up to date in the light of many important discoveries. In spite of a devastating world war archæologists have not been idle and much valuable and unexpected material from the Near and Middle East has been excavated.

This is indeed a most excellent book, representing the results of almost incredible labour, and should be intensely interesting to students of world history. Certainly, to make the fullest use of the abundant material it contains, the reader should have more than a little knowledge of earlier excavations so that the new material may be properly appreciated. At the same time, even the most casual reader is likely to find it an absorbing study.

From Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Indus Basin a great deal has literally been unearthed that throws new light on the early civilizations. There are chapters on the oldest farmers of Egypt, the rise to power of the Pharaohs, the colonization of Mesopotamia and Indian civilization in the third millennium B. C. Archæologists have an uncanny skill in reading a nation's story from pottery, jewelry, weapons and so on and from the hundreds of illustrations in drawings and in plates it is possible for the reader to follow the conclusions of the expert.

It is a rather sobering reminder that at a time when the inhabitants of Europe were ignorant savages there were already in the East ordered government and pictorial art.

At the same time we should not be led to believe that just because a thing is old it must necessarily be good. Things are good or bad in relation to the times to which they belong and many of the so-called good things of the past would not be at all good today. What we praise highly in our own age will no doubt be scoffed at by our great-grandchildren.

But it is true to say that the study of the prehistory and protohistoric archæology of the ancient East is an indispensable prelude to a true appreciation of European prehistory. Man's ascent from the primeval slime to modern atomic explosions with their shadow of things to come has taken millions of years and it is the archæologist with his infinite patience and skill who enables the historian to give us so full and documented an account of the world's story.

A. M. LOW

Avicenna: Scientist and Philosopher: A Millenary Symposium. Edited by G. M. WICKENS. (Luzac and Co., Ltd., London. 128 pp. 1952. 15s.)

There appeared in Paris in 1900 a delightful and scholarly work entitled *Avicenna* written by Baron Carra de

Vaux. It omitted, however, a treatment of the vast medical knowledge possessed by Avicenna. During this half-century specialist writings by Professor A. J. Arberry, Mlle. Goichon, O. C. Gruner and other scholars have led us nearer to the day when perhaps someone with sufficient erudition and energy will supply in a single volume a still finer and more complete appreciation of Avicenna than did Carra de Vaux. For the present we are not only evaluating Avicenna afresh, we have still to examine many manuscripts, particularly in Turkish libraries. It is not yet possible to see the great man whole: we know he is a giant, but we perceive a giant partly in shadow with only certain features accentuated. So it is a pleasure to find amongst the literature of this year of celebration a millenary symposium by six Cambridge scholars which illuminates some of the dark places.

Avicenna: Scientist and Philosopher originates from a series of lectures delivered at the University of Cambridge during the Lent Term of 1951. The lectures are reprinted with valuable critical notes when necessary. The ample scope of the work may be judged from the lecture titles: Professor Arberry leads off with an illuminating account of "Avicenna: His Life and Times," followed by an original evaluation by Dr. Teicher of "Avicenna's Place in Arabic Philosophy" and a useful statement by G. M. Wickens on "Some Aspects of Avicenna's Work"; then Dr. Rosenthal gives a reasoned summary of "Avicenna's Influence on Jewish Thought," Dr. Crombie estimates "Avicenna's Influence on the Mediæval Scientific Tradition" and the Rev. Kenelm Foster concerns himself with "Avicenna and Western Thought in the 13th Century," mainly in relation to Thomism.

This slim volume, in its six chapters, has facts and ideas appealing strongly to both scholar and layman. The intelligent reader cannot fail to have his mind enriched and his vision widened by the impact of Avicenna through

its pages. For instance, Dr. Teicher traces to Avicenna something of Descartes, Kant and Bergson.

H. J. J. WINTER

The Meaning of Life in Hinduism and Buddhism. By FLOYD H. ROSS. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., London. 167 pp. 1952. 15s.)

In increasing numbers, thinkers in Europe and America, disturbed by the rigidity of contemporary Christian teachings, have turned to the religious concepts of India and China in search of spiritual guidance in this troubled age. They find it eminently satisfying that men like Dr. Radhakrishnan should be appointed to positions of great responsibility in the State. To such people this book will be a welcome addition to the large number of volumes already published on the Hindu and Buddhist conceptions of Man's place in the Universe and the nature of ultimate reality.

Professor Ross surveys the origin and development of Hindu and Buddhist metaphysics and urges that not mere religious toleration but the will to a better understanding of the fundamentals of Eastern religions is necessary if Western society is to take its place in a broader human fellowship. Although Western statesmen and even religious leaders talk, quite sincerely, about world unity and world organization, the dogmatism of Christianity tends to keep Europe and America as a whole thinking in terms of separateness from the rest of humanity.

A great weakness of modern Christian metaphysics is that the element of wonder and marvel is no longer there to stimulate the spirit of man. Christian truths are cut and dried, tabulated and indexed with cross-references. Since the time of Paul, says Professor Ross, there has been a tendency in the Christian tradition to define the Christian in terms of *what he believed* rather than in terms of *how he explored*.

Yet, paradoxical as it might seem, the capacity for wonder and intellectual

curiosity has never been offered greater stimulus in the West than it is today. In every newspaper and magazine there is a reference to some aspect or other of scientific discovery and research. Wellsian phantasy has given way to cast-iron accomplishment. In 25 years, says a German rocket expert, men will land on the moon. We gasp in amazement—but, although our intellect is stimulated, our spirit cries out, "What then? What is the significance? Where is the meaning?"

Life becomes meaningless unless men can find and follow the pathway that leads to self-enlightenment. Christian concepts of Good and Evil, of a future Heaven and a present Hell, are binding, not liberating. Indian thought has steadily avoided any attempt to explain the actuality of emotional or moral confusion in terms of a personal Devil or a cosmic principle of evil. Its traditional interpretation of spiritual and moral blindness, found in the *Gita* and elsewhere, is today finding some parallel in Western psychological analysis.

SUNDER KABADI

Professor M. Hiriyanna Commemoration Volume. Edited by N. S. SIVARAMA SASTRY and G. HANUMANTHA RAO. (Available from K. Chidambaram, Kavyalaya, Krishnamurthipuram, Mysore. 272 pp. 1952. Rs. 15/-)

This is a collection of studies prepared in honour of the late Professor Hiriyanna by his pupils and friends. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, his colleague in the Mysore University from 1919 to 1921, contributes an appreciative Foreword. Mr. N. Sivarama Sastry, one of the editors and a pupil, writes a brief biographical sketch.

Professor Hiriyanna became a leading scholar in many branches of Indology. The range of his interests and contributions is reflected in the variety of subjects treated by scholars from most parts of India in the present volume: textual studies in the Vedas;

the *Bhagavad-Gita* and Sanskrit drama; interpretative studies in Kautilya's *Arthashastra*; philosophic studies in Buddhist logic and metaphysics as well as pure philosophic reflections in terms of modern thought; literary criticism; the Puranic tradition and some pervasive features of the Indian outlook such as *karma* and *ahimsa*; and a couple of studies in Kannada literature. The editors have prefixed to the volume a bibliography of his own 10 published books and 70 articles and his introductions to books by others. He published early in his career, with English translation and introduction, three Upanishads, the *Brihadaranyaka*, the *Ishavasya* and the *Kena*, with Shankara's commentaries. He edited the *Naishkarmya-siddhi* and the *Ishta-siddhi* for the Bombay Sanskrit and Gaekwad's Oriental Series, with valuable introductions. His *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* and *Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, published by Allen and Unwin, have taken rank in modern studies as indispensable introductions to the subject.

Those who knew Professor Hiriyanna will endorse the picture of a high-minded, serene, conscientious scholar and teacher suggested by the Foreword and the Biographical Sketch. Scholars await with interest the posthumous publication of his last work, *The Indian Philosophy of Values*.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

Sri Aurobindo and the Soul Quest of Man: Three Steps to Spiritual Knowledge. By NATHANIEL PEARSON. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 127 pp. 1952. 10s. 6d.)

This book is a study of the first 12 chapters of *The Life Divine*. It is claimed to provide an illuminating exposition of the basic principles of Sri Aurobindo, whom the author calls a direct representative of the ancient Vedantic line of seers. *The Life Divine* presupposes a knowledge of Indian terms such as *Brahman*, *Prakriti*,

Purusha, Anandamaya, Manomaya, Avidya, etc., though Sri Aurobindo has explained most of these. Pearson translates a majority of them in terms of Western psychology. He often makes use of Western scientific advancement to show its pertinence to Sri Aurobindo's Eastern metaphysical thought, for example:—

particularly in the current investigation into the root of matter, we find the real significance of these new discoveries even more patently revealed. Thus in the large-scale experiments on nuclear fission, the forces which constitute the very centre of matter have been discovered to be not the ordinary physical cohesions known to classical science, but rather forces of a cosmic order, similar to those which uphold the whole material universe. The atom itself is thus found to contain the very keystone of the universe—a supracosmic Force.

Also, he quotes from the Christian Scriptures, trying to speak to the Westerner in terms familiar to him.

The first of the subtitle's three steps: "The Positive Approach to Spirituality," is to "establish the Divine Unity of all things." The second, "The Spiritual Basis of Personality," reveals "the soul of man as forming the basis of a higher development." The third step is knowledge of the Divine Nature.

The book is concise and, on the whole, well got up, if priced rather high. The author, however, uses too many capitals which mar the smooth reading of the book, *e. g.* :

Rather is it the Ground of the Supreme Reality, of which the Stillness of the Transcendence and the Dynamis of Cosmos are two complementary aspects or poles—negative and positive—which constitute its essential Oneness.

For the Western reader who finds *The Life Divine* stiff reading, this book is a good introduction to it.

K. APPASAMY

U.S.A., and Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, London. 250 pp. 1951. \$4.00 or 25s.)

When Princeton University celebrated its bicentennial in March 1947, a Conference on Near Eastern Culture and Society was convened, in which participated diplomats, educators, scientists and scholars from America, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Egypt, Iraq and Iran. The principal papers were critically discussed and were later revised by the authors. The outcome is this book, which should contribute in no small way, as Prof. Philip K. Hitti remarks in his Foreword, "to the achievement of a relationship of mutual understanding and respect between the West and the Near East."

Part I, "The West Meets the East: Progress and Prospect in Islamic Studies," deals with Islamic art and archæology, science and religion, and with Arabic and Persian literature. Part II, "The East Meets the West: Current Problems of Near Eastern Peoples," discusses the interaction of Islamic and Western thought in Turkey, Iran and the Arab States, and the national and international relations of those countries. In the concluding chapter H. A. R. Gibb writes on "Near East Perspective: The Present and the Future."

There are 13 well-written and weighty contributions. In discussing vital and delicate problems in which the East and the West are deeply interested, all the contributors show sympathetic insight and freedom from racial or national bias in understanding and evaluating the literary, cultural and religious achievements of Eastern peoples.

Prof. Arthur J. Arberry surveys accurately and informatively the development of Persian literature and the interest taken in it by Western scholars during the last three centuries. His mentioning that no scientific history of Persia has been written, that some of the most vital source books are as yet in manuscript, and that there is no adequate dictionary of the Persian

Near Eastern Culture and Society: A Symposium on the Meeting of East and West. Edited by T. CUYLER YOUNG. (Princeton Oriental Studies No. 15, Princeton University Press, Princeton,

language should stimulate further scholarly efforts.

Another valuable contribution is that on the Islamic religion by Edwin E. Calverley, who has traced the history of Western scholars' interest in its study

and who writes of the need "for appreciation of all that is right and good," wherever found.

This book is heartily commended to all who desire good relations between the East and the West.

M. HAFIZ SYED

Experiments in Living: A Study of the Nature and Foundation of Ethics or Morals in the Light of Recent Work in Social Anthropology. By A. MACBEATH. The Gifford Lectures for 1948-1949 delivered in the University of St. Andrews. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London. 462 pp. 1952. 30s.)

These lectures were delivered by Professor Macbeath, who holds the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the Queen's University, Belfast. They are concerned with comparative ethics and are based on recent work in Social Anthropology. The nature of primitive morality is illustrated with reference to the ways of life of the Trobriand Islanders, who inhabit a coral archipelago in the neighbourhood of Eastern New Guinea; the Bantu tribes of South-East Africa, with special reference to the Tonga tribes; the Australian Aborigines; and the Crow Indians of Montana.

For his material the author has had to rely on Malinowski, Junod, Elkin, Radcliffe-Brown, Lowie and other professional anthropologists. His aim is to show how human nature expresses itself under different sets of cultural conditions. From this he concludes that the nature of primitive man is essentially the same as that of men living under the cultural conditions of Western Europe, that both are moved by the same emotions, desires and reasons; and that primitive and civilized children enter the world with substantially the same mental constitutions and powers. He further con-

tends that primitive cultures, with their moral and social institutions, are the result of attempts to discover what is good for man, that they are experiments in living and, like our own, are only partially successful.

He is therefore concerned with man's conception of the good life, and the operative ideals which influence people in passing moral judgments. As these ideals work through the medium of institutions, he next proceeds to examine the nature of these institutions, the family, a canoe crew, a hunting expedition, a war party, or a religious society. The chapter on the Australian Aborigines contains a penetrating study of the significance of totemism. Other chapters deal with the constitution and powers of the primitive mind and the connection between primitive morality and religion. The book concludes with a scholarly discussion of moral rules, the moral ideal and moral progress. When dealing with the nature of the moral life the author is fully aware of the profound differences as to the nature of morality which are to be found among professional writers on ethics.

His main conclusion, which is accepted by the majority of social anthropologists, is that the innate endowments of the primitive and so-called civilized mind are the same. He therefore rejects Lévy-Bruhl's theory of the pre-logical mentality of the primitive and agrees with the conclusions of Lowie, Goldenweiser, Radin, Malinowski and others.

C. COLLIN DAVIES

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“ _____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS

“The Two Democratic Traditions” are penetratingly analyzed under that title in the quarterly *Philosophical Review* (October 1952) by Prof. George H. Sabine of Cornell University (U.S.A.). He brings out that whereas Anglo-American thought and practice have stressed liberty, in France and on the Continent the emphasis has been on equality. The Puritan Revolution in 17th-century England had established freedom for minorities, groups and associations under constitutional protection and regulation. The French Revolution had abolished second-class citizenship by elevating the State to supremacy over all other social organizations.

In so far, however, as voluntary “private associations able to exert a collective influence in politics” were suppressed, the citizen was denied “a justified sense of participation” and reduced to impotence. This had fostered “dictatorship based on an alleged mandate from ‘the people.’” The individual radicalism of the French Revolution had given place to the class radicalism of the present totalitarian *régimes*, producing, not the 19th-century bogey of the “tyranny of the majority,” but “the tyranny of a minority that can use social demoralization to monopolize terror and propaganda.”

Support for the “villagism” of Gandhian economics is furnished by Professor Sabine’s pointing to urbanization and industrialism as risks for democracy, levelling off “highly differentiated work groups and neighbourhood groups in which membership may be a genuine personal good” and introducing “remote and impersonal authority.”

A satisfactory balance can hardly be

achieved between liberty and equality as democratic ideals without the third member of the French Revolutionary slogan. Fraternity is implicit in Professor Sabine’s formulation of the democratic ideal of

a society and Government formed by the willing coalescence of human beings who could be at once spontaneous in their behaviour and responsible in their dealings with one another.

The mutual respect which is a *sine qua non* of democracy does not rule out differences of position or even of rank where such differences count as values and are not mere assumptions. But “second-class citizenship” is not compatible with mutual respect and the preservation of “irrelevant and invidious discriminations” against classes having equality with others before the law is admitted as “a rather conspicuous failure on the part of Anglo-American democracy.”

As another name for colonialism or imperialism, “second-class citizenship” is a denial alike of the democratic tradition and of human brotherhood—on the international scale.

“Appetite for Difficulty” is the rallying-cry which Dr. Arthur E. Morgan, famous American educationist and former Head of the Tennessee Valley Authority, sounds in *Manas* (Los Angeles) for October 8th, against the softness that shrinks from competition. “Soft people are usually negligible people.” Timidity and laziness and drifting with the current spell softening of character. Toughness and aggressiveness, Dr. Morgan declares, are necessary not only for withstanding social pressure on the individual but also for long-time survival and for the defence of civilized culture against brute force.

How can civilized culture prevail over brute force without itself resorting to its use? Dr. Morgan's twofold prescription holds a challenge to complacency and the course of least resistance. He calls first for eliminating arbitrariness, selfishness, privilege and injustice in the home country. This has wide implications but may command a readier assent than his second demand—for refusal to profit by exploitation, injustice and violence anywhere in the world.

However far this might go "to eliminate both the brute force of the exploiter and the brute force of red revolt," how many countries or even individuals today have "the necessary sustained alertness and aggressiveness," the necessary "appetite for difficulty," to renounce the economies effected and the luxuries obtained by purchasing the low-cost products of economic exploitation? Dr. Morgan does well to question: "What is the chance of our taking such a course, even to the extent of suffering the terrific hardship of going without the morning cup of coffee?"

Yet he has made uncomfortably clear the need for aggressive participation in the competition between humane living on the one hand and, on the other, arbitrary power and the brute force that "is always in the offing, ready to take control if civilized culture weakens." It is the lesson of history as well as of nature that "he who rests on his oars, no matter how secure he may seem, is on his way out."

Prof. Robert Peers, Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the University of Nottingham, writing in the Autumn 1952 *Adult Education*, calls for a consideration of the future of adult education and its positive tasks. He writes:—

...throughout its past history, adult education has been used to fill up the gaps caused by deficiencies in other branches of education ... Nothing is more certain than that, unless

adult education can be related to the needs and conditions of the present, the sense of purpose will be lost and the movement will become ineffective and moribund.

Professor Peers considers extreme specialization in higher education to be inimical to the qualities needed in a democratic society. Hence the need to complement it by the many-sided development of adult education. This is favoured by the adult's possessing the necessary maturity of mind and background of experience.

Not only, Professor Peers holds, should intellectual interests be kept alive for the retaining, by an aging population, of adaptability in response to new knowledge and new applications of knowledge, but also "adult education must concern itself with the quality of life in society." The increased leisure which technology has brought to the worker, he writes,

is without meaning unless increased leisure provides opportunities for the cultivation of interests and abilities which find little scope in the day-to-day tasks of modern industry. The creative use of leisure should lead not only to increased intellectual power, but also to a great development of artistic abilities and to the growth of those moral qualities which are the mark of true citizenship.

And he concludes that

adult education is no longer to be regarded as the last resource of the educationally under-privileged, but as the new hope of an educated democracy.

The problem remains how to give shape to these aims. What studies are to be pursued and how are people to be attracted to them? The field which opens out is vast and who is to draw up a priority list of values? Help can hardly be looked for from the creedal religions, which imprison rather than liberate the mind. How can we expect to have a society imbued with ideals and ethical in its practices unless liberating ideals and universally acknowledged ethics are made the basic foundation for the other branches of knowledge?