THE ARYAN PATH

Canst thou destroy divine Compassion? Compassion is no attribute. It is the Law of Laws—eternal Harmony, Alaya's Self; a shoreless universal essence, the light of everlasting right, and fitness of all things, the law of Love eternal. The more thou dost become at one with it, thy being melted in its Being, the more thy Soul unites with that which Is, the more thou wilt become Compassion Absolute. Such is the Arya Path, Path of the Buddhas of perfection.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly, and lost among the host—as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—The Voice of the Silence

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THE INFLUENCE OF LITERATURE ON HUMAN CHARACTER AND HUMAN HISTORY

[**Prof. Grant C. Knight** of the University of Kentucky (U. S. A.) is the author of several books, including *The Novel in English* and *American Literature and Culture*. He brings out in this essay how thought interlinks with thought across national boundaries and pleads for "a new or perhaps a revived literature ...which can lead us to a wisdom suitable to our times and without which we shall perish."—ED.]

There will be peace only when men have given up wickedness, and to persuade them to abandon their selfishness nothing, not even the power of example, is more potent than the word. One of the biographies of Jesus opens with the declaration: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." Nowhere can one read a more revealing, a more conscious statement of man's reliance upon the strength of the oral sounds and written symbols which make it possible for him to communicate his thoughts and feelings and which, with what is true divinity, have transformed the shape and habits of his body, the manner of his pleasures, and the nature of the society he has built for protection and comfort. From the age of the epic chant to the day of the shallow best-seller, literature has provided its follower with ideals and dreams and songs; it has appealed to his reason and fortified his courage; it has given him dissatisfaction with his present and hope for his future. It has even, in all languages and all lands, offered a scheme for human perfection, either here or in a hereafter. More than anything else it has moulded man's thoughts about himself and his God. More than anything else it has provoked the rise and fall of nations, the evolution of ideas that have become social compulsives. Today, in a small and quickened world, the word has an especially fateful potentiality.

The truth of all this is self-evident

to anyone who has read history and biography, to anyone who knows that, although emotions have motivated most behaviour, it has been the word of the orator and the writer which has converted those emotions into conviction and action. Even the casual thinker can recognize within himself a gradual evolution of personality based upon the things he has read and heard, a kind of repetition of the progress of human history from primitive ideals of fierceness and loyalty to modern ones of peacefulness and co-operation. The boy is father of the man only when the man is an adult, and the adult of this year, casting about for assurances in the midst of what appears to be chaos, is justified in reflecting upon the part literature has played in making him what he is and in asking himself what contribution it can make toward a more reasonable future.

It is therefore enlightening and heartening to review some of the instances which demonstrate the might of literature in the heightening of character, in the liberation and encouragement of genius, in the creation of national and international opinions. The examples are so many and so unquestioned that only a few of the celebrated ones need to be called to mind.

There is, for one, the case of Matthew Arnold. Impatient, wayward writers have for years been mocking his critical dicta ; today those dicta throw a searching light upon the dark places in life and literature. Arnold's longing for tranquillity, for order, for balance, for reason and the will of God has for the twentieth century an immediate urgency and an immediate promise. And it is no depreciation of Arnold to acknowledge that much of his critical structure was laid upon the foundation built by Alexander Pope in his " Essay on Criticism." Nor does it harm Pope's fame for us to see that he was acquainted with the thought of Boileau and of Horace. Indeed, one of the most interesting things about the study of literary influences is the discovery that an exploratory and creative mind in one century will set in motion a chain reaction which will cause explosions in later centuries. Henry Thoreau absorbed some of his concepts of the good life from a reading of the *Bhagavad-Gita*, and when he rebelled against one of the evils in the American government he went to jail rather than lose his peace of mind. The aftermath of this step was his secession from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, announced in an essay entitled " On Civil Disobedience," and it was the reading of this essay which furnished Mohandas Gandhi with an invincible weapon with which to resist wrong.

Sometimes a book, like a compound of two elements, will inaugurate a series of reactions in different directions, ending in an explosion at one end and only a muffled sound at the other. Emerson, familiar with the fortitude of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, with the Christ-

ian stoicism of Augustine and the bumptious heroism of Carlyle, published an essay on self-reliance which Friedrich Nietzsche, in exile at Pforta, took as confirmation of his meditated creed for a Superman. "And truly," wrote the American,

> it demands something godlike in him who has cast off the common motives of humanity, and has ventured to trust himself for a task-master. High be his heart, faithful his will, clear his sight, that he may in good earnest be doctrine, society, law to himself, that a simple purpose may be to him as strong as iron necessity is to others.

The author of "Self-Reliance" addressed this exhortation to a generation of his countrymen who, he felt, were living timidly within the moral and intellectual boundaries set out by Calvinism. But to the German such words were a clarion call for the exaltation of the *Uebermensch*, and his teaching, misunderstood in its fundamentals, certainly carries some of the responsibility for two world wars. On the other hand, Maurice Maeterlinck, reading the same essays of Emerson, found in them nourishment for his own idealism, for his drama of silent eloquence and quiet moments, of interior beauty.

Examples of the influence of literature upon young writers can be multiplied to a great number: of Spenser and Homer upon Keats, of Emily Dickinson upon Stephen Crane, of Kipling upon Frank Norris, of Herbert Spencer upon Jack London, of Pater and Huysmans upon Oscar Wilde, of Flaubert upon Maupassant, and so on until we reach the horizons of literary history. True, we are dealing here with only a very small and exceptional part of the human population. It is much more important to inquire whether literature has had, whether it can have, a comparable influence upon the mass of people who spend their days in the common occupations, in the common toil, the people whose eyes and hearts must be turned toward goodness if they are ever to slough off that wickedness which makes peace impossible of attainment.

Twentieth-century civilization is an exceedingly complex product, composed of countless economic, religious, philosophical and artistic stresses, and impregnated with the innumerable ideas of the makers of maxims, with the traditions and lore of the folk, and with the experiences of the living. Yet it is no exaggeration to say that this civilization, to use the word in its broadest application, is in the main an edifice designed by only a few minds, by, one is induced to say, only a few books. The common man, to be sure, has read but a few of those books. Perhaps he has read none. But he has nevertheless had his life, his personality and character, and his hopes formed by great masterpieces of literature; he is, by a kind of mild determinism, the end of a long train of concepts that have been preserved on the printed page and passed on through the speech

of teachers and other readers. It cannot be denied that the culture of the East has been derived from sacred books like the *Koran* and the *Vedas* and the *Upanishads* and from the hoarded wisdom of Confucius and Gautama and Lao-Tse. The list of these books is very short, yet these volumes have determined in the large and in detail the manners, the attitudes and the beliefs of hundreds of millions of human beings. In no other part of the globe have more persons given more allegiance to so few writings.

The cultures of the West are now marked by diversity, confusion and disillusionment, and this fact can be attributed in some degree to the conflicting ideologies with which that half of the earth is beset. Books are plentiful; most of the people can read; many of them are bewildered by what they read. Romantics still rest their hopes upon an Asiatic anthology called the *Bible* and upon the writings of Rousseau; these two, by supplying a gospel of emotional non-materialism, have considerably affected European and American cultures.

Upon this hopefulness Darwin's *Origin of Species*, substituting the idea of biological, geological and botanical growth for that of divine spontaneous creation, fell as the most destructive atom bomb in the history of human thought. Since the publication of that book in 1859 it has become increasingly difficult even for romantics to think of man as a creature little lower than the angels and of this as the best of all possible planets. Classical calm fell before painstaking research. Of course, Arthur Schopenhauer had earlier insisted that life was evil because it was pain and boredom and struggle, but some deeply rooted impulse within mankind—doubtless that very Will whose existence Schopenhauer deplored—resisted his defeatism. However, Darwin's book had the sanction of the modern scientific method; its pessimistic implications were the fruit of demonstrable data; and the Western intellectual has been obliged by the theory of natural selection to see life in its harshest outlines. More than any other book it has seemed to justify the organized competition which has become the regular, destructive feature of Western civilization. Only a few persons have read *The Origin of Species*, yet by a diffusion of thought and action it is likely that every person now alive has somehow been touched by it.

Schopenhauer and Darwin were not alone in their defacement of the romantic image. The writings of Karl Marx, of Friedrich Nietzsche, and of Sigmund Freud have also compelled us to take a new inspection of ourselves, to alter our judgment of ourselves, to debase our dignity or level off our confidence while we rearrange our scheme for the good life in terms of material benefits rather than spiritual good. Marx robbed us of some of our divinity by recreating us in the bodies of economic men, and Freud

diminished our size by picturing us as driven and twisted by the libido. Yet anyone who fears that these three writers leave Western man in a forlorn state should examine their teachings anew. For each predicts or suggests a bright future: Marx through the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of a classless society; Nietzsche through man's ability to surpass himself; Freud through a liberation from nervous disease. Western civilization has by no means surrendered to decadence.

Because the *Bhagavad-Gita*, the *Koran*, the *Ch'un Ch'iu*, the *Tâo-Tê-King*, the *Bible*, the *Contrat Social*, *The World as Will and Idea*, *The Origin of Species*, *Das Kapital*, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, *The Interpretation of Dreams* have proved the profound influence which literature exerts upon the intellectual and moral practices of modern man one cannot help wondering whether in our present dismay and fear we have not the liveliest need for a new, or perhaps a revived, literature, one with an instant appeal to the consciences of men everywhere, one which can lead us to a wisdom suitable to our times and without which we shall perish. Over half a century ago Walt Whitman called in "Passage to India" (a poem which should be required reading in every school around the world) for the union of the genius of the West with that of the East, for the blending of Oriental mysticism with Occidental materialism. His magnificent rhapsody offers a clue to the kind of literature which should emerge from our present agony. The literature of the West has been manufacturing the carpet of real, substantial stuff; the literature of the East has woven the design; it is high time that the figure be placed in the carpet, that literature interpret life with wisdom and delight as well as represent it with accuracy.

This is to say that we need a literature which will transcend the national. It should be a literature of compassion and love, by no means weakly and sentimental, but strengthened by an awareness of the mystery, the sweetness, the burden, the loneliness of the mere act of living, by an invitation to us to meet and understand and like each other, by a recognition of the soul that breathes through humanity. It should ignore distinctions in race and colour and creed and nationality and should concentrate upon the value of man as man, a being who through the ages has been obstinately, blindly, and sometimes with astonishing unselfishness, climbing toward a summit which he can scarcely have glimpsed. Given a literature of such truth and nobility, modern man will lift his head with renewed trust in himself and his destiny.

GRANT C. KNIGHT

OUR SHORTCOMINGS
A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY

[**Rao Sahib K. Appasamy, M. A., B. D.**, of the Lucknow Christian College, has prepared this "charge-sheet" in national self-examination for THE ARYAN PATH. We are glad that he has been requested to read this paper before the Psychology Section of the Indian Science Congress, meeting early in January, because the more widely the shortcomings he points to can be recognised, the better for their cure. His article is meant particularly for Indians, and foreigners who read it should remember that intentionally only one side of the picture is presented here, and without the pleas in extenuation that might be entered. We do not believe that for the overcoming of these weaknesses we should look, as he suggests, to dietetics or endocrinology or any physiological treatment. A moral weakness can be overcome only by brooding upon and practising the opposite virtue. That elementary principle of moral hygiene is part of India's inheritance of wisdom, to which we would have her children turn increasingly, not in vainglory but in eagerness to learn, that they may exemplify and teach. We commend this charge-sheet especially to Indian youth, for reading with an open mind.—ED.]

Every nation has its shortcomings; and we have our own. No scientific study has been made of our shortcomings with a view to remedying them. The British have their own faults, such as snobbery, heavy eating and drinking, muddled thinking resulting in muddling through all their affairs and so on. The Americans are juvenile in their thought processes, easy to get aquainted with, and soon forgotten; dealing in superlatives; minions of business, slaves of a standard of living, robots of routine; the men are docile in their relations to their women folk. It is up to them to study their defects and up to us to study ours, to analyse, to discover the root causes, to try out remedies in small groups and, when successful, to tackle the whole country. Several of the shortcomings I shall mention exist in other nations also; but we have a larger share of them and to a more detrimental extent. A Chinese visitor some time back said: "A foreign government is a convenient peg to hang all one's shortcomings on." But we are now in a period of transition; and we cannot with sincerity blame anybody but ourselves for the massacres in Noakhali, Tipperah, Bihar Sheriff and Garhmukteshwar. India has never invaded any country—except in the way of peaceful penetration—but has always been a victim to foreign invaders, not merely because the foreigners were strong, but because they always found help from within.

(1) *Un-co-operativeness.* We are so highly individualistic that we are the greatest un-co-operating nation

on the face of the earth. Take our music, for instance. The best expression of our music is where each master develops the outline of a "*Rag*" to suit his own temperament and skill. *Yogism*, the highest type of physical, mental and spiritual exercises we have developed, is a highly individualistic affair. If we look at some of the progressive or aggressive nations, the majority of them co-operate, while there are a few individualists, who either lead them to greater glory, or act as deterrents. But with us our lack of team spirit or of *esprit de corps* has almost always acted to our detriment. If we watch a football team at play, we notice that there are eleven individual expert exponents of the game, but there is little teamwork. There have been instances of teamwork on the negative side for short periods, which will be dealt with later on. When one student federation starts, it divides itself into two, and both of these again divide themselves in turn, so that in the end there are only individuals and no federation.

Since there is no team spirit, foreign invaders have almost always found it easy to buy Quislings and to plant Fifth Columnists among us. Examples of political non-co-operation are found abundantly in our history. Even in prehistoric times, Krishna and Arjuna did not always agree. The ruler of Ambhi helped Alexander the Great; Mir Jafar helped Clive and Deoulat Khan invited Babar to come and crush fellow Indians. Hundreds of examples even down to this day can be quoted. You know the famous saying: "One Indian...a philosopher, two Indians...a squabble, three Indians...foreign rule." Foreigners have found it easy to "Divide and Rule" because our own character helped them in their policy. Whether want of team spirit is a result of our egocentricity, or whether egocentricity has developed out of our lack of team spirit is hard to determine; but the fact is that *both* exist side by side.

(2) *Egocentricity* is often defined as "a mind so selfishly occupied with one's own thoughts, desires, opinions and needs as to make one indifferent to the needs of others; looking at everything from only a personal point of view; considering "Self" the centre of the universe." In other words, "Myself first, let everybody else take care of himself." There is no *pro bono publico* in us. Like gods on the Olympic Mount, we are careless of the welfare of mankind. This is one of the main reasons for the defective functioning of our municipalities, District Boards and self-governing bodies. Our students often open water-taps but do not take the trouble to close them when they have finished. They start electric fans oscillating, but when they leave the room, the fans are left running. This is a waste of money not directly theirs. They have a total disregard for other people's convenience. Our unpunctual habits may also be laid at the door of our

egocentricity. In railway trains the lavatories are left in the worst possible state. Those who sit close to windows and doors keep them open or closed with regard only to their own convenience. Often I have travelled from Kathgodam to Lucknow in the same compartment with a tubercular patient whose relatives insisted on closing every window and door in the compartment, irrespective of how many would be liable to catch the infection through their egocentricity. Many of these patients were in the last stages of tuberculosis. The dowry system and the prohibition of widow remarriage may also be reckoned as social expressions of our egocentricity. Even in prehistoric times we read of Yudhishtira's being so egocentric about maintaining the honour of his word that he gambled away to Sakhuni not only his wealth and his kingdom, but also his brothers, his wife and himself. Harish Chandra similarly maintained his honour. Jai Chand of Kanauj maintained his egocentricity against Prithvi Raj of Delhi by inviting Mohammed of Ghori to help him. Many such examples are to be found in history. Other countries have their egocentrics, no doubt, but we in India have suffered from our egocentricity for thousands of years.

(3) *Something for nothing* or something more than we have worked for or paid for, seems to be the craving of our countrymen. Our wanting name, honour and prestige but not the hard labour connected with earning it, is one of the manifestations of wanting something for nothing. Every morning our garden is depleted of flowers by people who want to perform pujas. Our students demand that their absences be condoned and insist upon degrees even when they have put in the minimum or even below the minimum of required attendance and work. Quite often I evaluate examination papers (of home examinations) with the student looking over my shoulder and I often let him tell me how much he deserves for each question. His marks are usually higher than I would have given; even at that, if from the total the student finds that he has not passed, he usually asks for several "grace" marks. Several try to travel in railways and buses without tickets; and even those who pay have no compunction in riding in higher classes than they have paid for, or in carrying luggage in excess of what the rules permit. The students of Lucknow recently staged a big commotion trying to wrest concessions from cinema theatres. Servants think it is part of their "*dastoor*" to pocket an anna on every rupee and demand money from the bread-man, the egg-man, and whoever else happens to come to the house to sell anything. Our neighbours think our college compound is a common grazing-ground for all their cattle and all and sundry from near-by *mohallas* feel that it is their privilege to come in whenever they like to lop off branches from the trees for firewood; and they resent being checked.

Dr. D. Spencer Hatch, who started Rural Development projects in South India, and who is now doing the same work in Mexico, says that whereas Indians accepted, as a gift, seeds, the services of seed bulls, and instruction, Mexicans do not accept them gratis; they say it hurts their self-respect to accept something for nothing. And nothing is more irritating than the constant whine of "*Baksheesh!*" Gambling is a recognised form of wanting something for nothing. Round about Diwali time it is hard to get workmen of any type because of the addiction to gambling. The roots of this habit extend back to prehistoric times.

Extreme forms of this wanting "something for nothing" result in downright dishonesty. Milkmen adulterate milk, gheemen mix dalda with ghee, the grocer mixes sand with sugar and all types of food adulteration are results of wanting more money than the actual article is worth. Bribery, corruption and nepotism exist all over the world; but in India certain things—such as clearing railway goods, or getting a small complaint taken up by the police, or even seeing an official—cannot be done without greasing the palms. We may try to excuse ourselves by saying that these people are not highly educated. Lack of education is no excuse for dishonesty. But how about students who copy in the examinations; or, worse still, bring pressure on examiners? Last year *The Blitz* reported in full the proceedings in such a case. We all know that for every case that comes to light, ninety-nine do not. There have been plenty of schools and colleges where all sorts of dishonest help have been rendered to the examinees by the teachers and sometimes even by the Principal. I think we hold a record for this type of dishonesty. Maltreatment of library books may be cited under this heading or the earlier one of egocentricity; so much so that in some libraries—the Tokyo Imperial Library, for instance,—Indians are not allowed to draw books. *The Pioneer* of 3rd December 1946 says "A notice was put up at the United States Information Service Library in Bombay saying that the Library regrets that a number of valuable books are missing from the shelves and would the gentlemen who have taken the books kindly return them?"

This is all due to lack of consideration for other people's property. My experience with Indian publishers has not been as satisfactory as with foreign firms. The town Rationing Officer in an address at the Rotary Club mentioned that there had been a sudden increase of 50,000 women in the returns when the ration census was taken. The Municipal, as well as the A. R. P. Census of the same year disproved the influx. Need I go back to our Epics and cite the instance of Ravana's cheating Seeta by appearing as a mendicant or the shouting of "*Asvathama*" as a means of deceiving Drona?

(4) *Emotional Judgment* or a mode of thinking which is not quite logical or rational is my next point. Mistaken kindness shown to children and students results in their expecting the same amount of mistaken kindness to be shown to them even when they are grown up. The mother or the grandparents often try to condone a child's mistakes; fellow teachers and well-meaning uncles try to persuade or to coerce a teacher into passing a student who does not deserve it. In the long run, we grown-up adults act like children. Misplaced sympathy is a definite weakness in our character, due to wrong judgment. When a student is caught doing something wrong, his fellow students sympathise with him. Our sympathies are not with the ticket examiner who has caught a ticketless traveller, but with the wrong-doer. Most often our sympathies are with the accused in a court of law, before we know all the facts of the case. We sympathise with jail-birds. Feeding able-bodied beggars is another result of misplaced sympathy.

A short-sighted policy is what we prefer and follow, rather than what would be good in the long run. We prefer temporary expedients and cheap substitutes rather than what is lasting. Examples for these are not far to seek. Look at the books we publish: the paper is cheaper, the binding is cheaper and, of course, the book is lower priced. An English or American-produced book lasts for 75 loanings; a book produced in India wears out in 10 or 12. The very method which our students follow in studying is short-sighted, not merely in studying only when the examinations are near but also in studying only what they consider will be asked, which they arrive at by a process of elimination of what has been asked, etc.

Our loyalty follows the principle, "Distance lends enchantment to the view." The present, whether in time or place, is not appreciated so much as the past. We speak of the golden age of Asoka, the peace that prevailed under Akbar. Our students always praise the high school from which they came. They never forget to say how good their village is, compared to where they are now living. Loyalty is a matter of emotion. There is nothing to be gained by being vainglorious about the past. However good our past may have been, a progressive nation ought to be loyal to the present and keep an eye on the future. There is no use resting on one's oars.

We are destructively critical, rather than constructively so. Originality of thought is found in very few of us—in spite of our being highly individualistic. When we are listening to an address, our minds are busy in formulating objections and counter proposals. Such a mind is an invaluable asset to a lawyer and we have a large number of lawyers. Whether we have a large numbers of lawyers due to this innate tendency or whether the large number of lawyers in our midst have

created this method of thinking, is hard to guess. When we have an international state, we might profit by supplying lawyers to the whole world, but as it now stands this quality is more a debit than an asset. I am sure that there are several who have many objections to this essay of mine.

So far I have been dealing with what I consider facts. My analysis may not have been complete; I may even have missed major points. My object in producing this essay is, that readers of this article may write to me, so that we may study these, as well as other defects and find out whether these defects be due to climate or to food, or to religious or social habits. MacCarrison's studies seem to indicate that it is possible to create or to change national character on the basis of diet. We will have to study other nations which have also had these defects. England in the time of the Stuarts, France under the Bourbons and Germany before the time of Bismarck had several of these defects. Let us ascertain how they reduced them.

One more thought and I have finished. In social psychology, the faults of the individual are accentuated in the group. Unless a certain defect is present in certain individuals who form the group, that group will not have the fault. Presuming that you agree with some of my major points, I wish to suggest one line of enquiry. Of recent date, plenty of research is being done in Endocrinology. According to Dr. V. H. Mottram, Professor of Physiology in the University of London, in his book *The Physical Basis of Personality*, the under- or over-development of the cortex of the suprarenals produces un-co-operativeness, poor judgment and irrationality. Since we as a nation are un-co-operative, irrational and emotional in our judgment, I wonder if the cortex of our suprarenals is functioning as it ought to? If not, what is the remedy? Other avenues of research may also be proposed and explored.

K. APPASAMY

ON NATIONALISM AND THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPE

[**Dr. Z. A. Grabowski** is a Polish author well versed in English letters, good studies of which he has published in his native language; he is also a novelist. He acted as a Correspondent in several theatres of war and has contributed to many British periodicals. He pleads here for a large-scale programme of education of European youths in internationalism, for a constructive faith in the community of the European peoples. This may be good and necessary as an immediate objective but every partial grouping is at best a half-way house. There is no grouping that will permanently stand except the universal brotherhood of man. Also he refers to "eternal ideas," instancing Christianity; there is a tendency in Europe to overlook the truth that "eternal ideas" antedate by millennia the advent of Christianity. "Eternal ideas" were repeated by Jesus; and the ancient originals need to be examined by thoughtful men like our contributor.—ED.]

The collapse of religious beliefs after the First World War necessitated the sudden and almost spontaneous emergence of political creeds. New political 'isms began to sweep the field. In Italy a political creed: Fascism—which never attained the emotional intensity of the German political religion, because of the inborn scepticism of the Italian people—made its appearance. The Italian revolution was anti-European. It declared Europe decadent and decrepit. Italy was to act as the great rejuvenator of the senile countries of Europe. This creed, taken lock, stock and barrel from the Futurist poet, Marinetti, appealed to Italian youth; to a much lesser extent to the older generation. Mussolini harnessed the youthful elements of Italy, playing on the knowledge of the deep sense of frustration among the younger generation of post-war Europe.

The German revolution, one of the dullest that ever took place, advanced nationalistic slogans, but at the same time declared its willingness to destroy the "decadent European culture." A new superman, based partly on the dreams of Nietzsche—one of the thinkers most conscious of the internal crisis of European culture—was to be born and bred, and trained in cruelty, to create a new balance of mind and action. The Nazi revolt was decidedly anti-Christian and anti-European. It proclaimed a return to primitiveness and even barbarity as the only escape from a shipwrecked Europe. But Hitler's religion was actually delivering the *coup de grâce* to Europe. It is astonishing that Germany, for decades past a clearing-house for European ideas, took a straight course towards barbarism, and must be held guilty of a shameful betrayal of Europe.

To the Russian people who, in 1812, came into contact with the French armies advancing deep into Russia, French soldiers may have seemed strange, but they were not barbarians; to the Russian people who experienced the inhuman German occupation of 1941 and 1942, German soldiers and political officials must have appeared as cruel beasts and barbarians. Small wonder that the Russian people were strengthened in their belief that Europe was an inferior region.

The contrast between these two invasions seems to contain a valuable lesson. In Napoleon's time European culture and unity still existed, although mishandled by Napoleon who relied mainly on physical force. In Hitler's time European culture and unity did not exist, having been murdered in cold blood by Hitler.

The camps of Belsen, Dachau and Auschwitz dealt a fatal blow to the idea of progress as elaborated in the nineteenth century. Optimism about an almost automatic human progress has been blown to pieces. We are today in a deeply pessimistic mood regarding the human species and the future of our civilisation. Barbarism is at our very gates, and we witness an almost complete disintegration of the very concept of Europe.

It is against such a background of utter devastation that the problems of tomorrow must be considered. Where shall we find any redeeming feature in such a terrifying picture? Where are the chances for reconstructing and uniting Europe?

Certain factors seem to hold some hope for that almost superhumanly difficult task. First, Europe's imperialistic energy seems definitely spent. Historical analysis confirms the opinion that we have been witnessing a long process of settling down peacefully by various European countries that once were conquerors and warrior nations. This is a factor of great importance. Russia has many reasons for being suspicious of a Continent from which repeated invasions have tried to penetrate her seclusion. We should use this as an argument when discussing the federation of Europe, to which Russia is, for the time being, opposed. Russia has nothing to fear from an impoverished and devastated Continent where the chief disturber of the peace—Germany—has been made powerless. It is our task to convince Russia that her fears are unfounded; and this can be done by effective control over Germany.

Hitler organised the irrational forces of Germany to an amazing extent. He brought the idea of nationalism to a disastrous conclusion. His was an idea based on race and blood, a complete return to the primitive tom-tom. He demonstrated to all that nationalism, if allowed to flourish in its old form, was a destructive force. His rabid nationalism and racial ideas were completely opposed to the idea of European culture. Most European

countries comprise various national groups, and there is none which is racially "pure."

Nationalism seems to be a rather compromised vehicle. Patriotism is imbued with a deep and sincere love for our country and our ways of life; it is non-aggressive, and stands by itself. Nationalism, on the contrary, thrives on stirring up suspicions, on extolling the virtues and values of one group over those of another. It seems that while patriotism can live on unpretentious love, nationalism cannot live without jealousy, pride and prejudice.

Patriotic feeling found expression in Europe in the nineteenth century, and was closely connected with the great movements for freedom—in Italy, Germany, Hungary, Poland and other countries. During the whole of the nineteenth century patriotism, and later nationalism in its initial phase, contributed enormously to the enrichment of Europe's spiritual life. They ceased to act as such a stimulus after the First World War. Left without guidance and encouraged by the apparent unwillingness of the Western Powers to impose an international order, Nationalism had became a disruptive force by 1930. Since then it has degenerated into a deadly weapon. In the nineteenth century a force for liberating the nations, it has turned today into a force enslaving them.

The usual lot of ideas conceived by the human mind, is to continue to be fruitful and creative only for a limited time. Great ideas which once inspired great men became dangerous, destructive,—obstacles on the road to some sort of advance. That lot nationalism has shared. Only eternal ideas like Christianity can stand up to the test of ages.

Personally, I am ready to believe that we are witnessing a decline of nationalism. True, national hatred and jealousies are intense in today's Europe, but they seem to be like those circles on the surface of water —the stone is already on the bottom, and it will not rise again. The hatred which permeates the communities in devastated Europe is largely the reaction to Hitler's inhumanities. Hitler's crime consists not only in having indulged in primitive and barbaric nationalism, but also in having unleashed forces of hatred almost unsuspected in so-called civilised communities.

It is to be expected that those forces will exhaust themselves. They will leave an enormous emotional void, which should be filled by a constructive faith. This faith should preach the Gospel of the community of the European people, of genuine and sincere internationalism. I hope that European countries will regain their senses and come to the conclusion that, in this terrible atomic age which is upon us with all its horrors, frontier disputes are not essential, that economic autarchy spells disaster, that passports and economic barriers are obsolete, and that Europe must either become a unit or remain only a geographical

name. Europe today is ripe to build up her defences in the depth, if I may say so, of her cultural, spiritual and economic values.

One fundamental point seems indispensable in any move towards the integration of Europe—the education of the younger generation in ideas of international collaboration and of a European community. This constitutes the very foundation for any real peace and security.

Totalitarian systems have shown what enormous force there is in youth movements; they exploited the enthusiasm of youth for political purposes. They realised that young people in the democratic countries were suffering from a sense of frustration, and that their dynamic energies had to find some outlet. Banking on that knowledge they created their cohorts of devoted janissaries. It was astonishing how readily the young people of Germany responded to the call of the "Hitler *Jugend*" and other youth organisations, which simply cashed in on various youth movements such as the Boy Scouts and the "*Wandervögel.*" During my stay in Nazi Germany I saw at close quarters the working of these camps and Nazi Party "cloisters" where German people were educated in brutality. I have often asked myself why camps run on similar lines, but permeated with different ideas—those of European brotherhood and the collaboration of all nations—cannot be set up?

Nazi Germany demonstrated that young people can be moulded for evil and destructive purposes; the Europe of today has to show that youth can be educated for creative purposes. This cannot be done on a small and mean scale. The other day I was told that American educationalists were planning the establishment of an international university. This is a welcome idea, but what we actually need is a mass movement of young people across the borders of their countries, the setting up of huge international camps, allowing for the free mixing and intercourse of young people of all nations. International camps, summer courses, schools and universities, the exchange of young people on a large scale—these are the ways and methods which have to be placed at the disposal of Europe, and of the world, if words like "international understanding" are to mean anything. Only by the education of hundreds of thousands of young people in an atmosphere of brotherhood, only by an honest effort to fight down mutual suspicion and ignorance and to debunk various superstitions, can we break down those barriers erected by years of Totalitarian propaganda, of abuse of free discussion, and of contempt for any compromise.

This is an enormous programme, but no half-hearted measures are likely to bring about the desired result in our age, which is crying out for some truly international authority and solution. Only a bold and large-scale programme for the

education of young people can satisfy the needs of shattered Europe. We have to build from the very foundations, we have to tackle the human mind which conceives war and peace. We have to educate this human mind before it is too late. We have to construct new ways of approach in education by removing the shameful obstacles of frontiers, race prejudice and all the ugly paraphernalia of Nazism. Then and only then shall we be able to claim full victory over the forces of Nazism, of destruction and of hatred.

There is no greater adventure than such a crusade for the young people of today, no greater undertaking for those who want to secure peace for the harrassed world and to call a halt to the progress of barbarism which threatens to engulf our civilisation. Only a courageous and all-out effort in the sphere of education can save us from utter chaos. Such education in a new and glorious citizenship of Europe, discarding all imperialistic designs and concentrating on the defence in depth of Europe's human, spiritual and cultural heritage, can bring about a better future, can contribute to the laying of the foundation-stone for an integrated Europe.

Z. A. GRABOWSKI

THE DEATH PENALTY

The British Government's being reported to have under consideration legislation to abolish the death penalty for an experimental period of five years was the occasion for several interesting letters to *The London Times* at the end of October. Major Vyvyan Adams's motion, passed in 1938 by a substantial majority of the House of Commons, may, it is reported, now that the war is over, be given the force of law. He opened the correspondence by recapitulating some of the objections to the barbarous practice. He questioned its value as a deterrent, cited statistics showing that its abolition elsewhere had not caused the murder rate to rise, objected to the executioner's job being imposed on any one and appealed to Christian principles. The Mayor of Chelsea raised the bogy of criminals' resorting to murder to avoid arrest if freed from the fear of capital punishment. Mr. Frank Dawtry, Secretary of the National Council for the Abolition of the Death Penalty, assembled reassuring evidence on this point from several European countries and States of the U.S.A.

One of the most emphatic letters against capital punishment was from the Minister of Justice and Development in the United Provinces, Shri Kalidas Nath Katju. He wrote :–

> With 40 years' experience of the law courts in India I can say with confidence that capital punishment is not only barbarous but serves no useful purpose.... Had capital punishment been really deterrent... murders would have stopped long ago. To justify it as retributive is a libel on our civilization.

It is good news that legislation for its abolition is under consideration in the United Provinces. Its passage would bring them into line with the practice in many of the Indian States.

GHALIB'S VISION OF LIFE

[Too little is known in the West of the beauties of Urdu poetry and of the great Urdu poets. **Dr. S. Vahiduddin** writes here of Ghalib, one of the greatest among Urdu poets of recent times.—ED.]

Poetry can be judged by considerations of art alone. Maybe a poet has a message to give and great poets indeed like Dante and Tulsidas have let their art speak for a definite interpretation of life. But their interpretation is no part of their art. Art is a-theoretical. Above all it was Immanuel Kant who gave us insight into the nature of art. He proclaimed its autonomy. Art is neither morality nor science; it neither aims at action, nor is it given to knowledge. It is born of disinterested contemplation. But insight into the nature of values has driven us beyond the subjectively vitiated ideas of Kant. Contemplation without any interest is, no doubt, the character of the artist's attitude; it is not the distinction of art itself. The creation of art has as much objectivity and independence as anything else. When we contemplate the world incandescent with the divine passion of Mirabai, it is not Sri Krishna's historical figure or Mira's love as an event in time that fascinates us; it is only the objective manifestation of her vision in songs that overpowers us. Her poetry stands there as an objective structure resplendent with beauty, superbly indifferent whether any soul can appreciate it or not. Her visions have disengaged themselves from her historical existence only to find objective embodiment in her art. No doubt the perennial fascination of the Urdu poetry of Mirza Asadulla Khan Ghalib (1797-1869) equally abides in the objective forms in which the ideal significance of feeling and experience has found its supreme expression.

The poetry of Ghalib has nourished itself on Persian Poetry and Persian Poetry at its point of perfection has an excellence of its own. The poetry of Hafiz vacillates between this world and the world beyond. The wine he sings for and the love that is aglow in him have a relish and a fervour which are not of this world. We stand on the threshold of this world, cross it and immediately fall back upon the hectic world of sense. At times we are not even sure where we are.

Old Khayyam lives a life of this world, determined to exploit to the full the few sweet moments and the few sweet delights given to man. The fatuity of human life, the vanity of reason, the futility of power, the end of all things, great and small, the desire to mould the world according to the heart's desire and the very inanity of these desires make him hold his breath. Khayyam is a poet of love that passes in time; Hafiz, a poet of love that surpasses time.

Khayyam's is in essence a world of sorrow, a sorrow that vainly tries to forget itself.

Moulana Jalaluddin Rumi's art moves on a cosmic scale. He struggles with the mighty problems of existence, not with the theoretical indifference of the dialectician who is little worried about the results of his reasoning; he grapples with the infinite problems with love, the infinite in him. He approaches God on the path of love, love understood not as a psychical process but as a transcendent irrational drive which impels man from one stage to another till he has realised himself in the eternal one. Love is here the eternal feminine urge *(das Ewig-Weibliche)* which comes to the rescue of Goethe's Faust. But the artist and the mystic in Rumi have not always lived amicably together. It is now the artist who has fused the mystical vision in a creation of art; it is now the mystic who vainly tries to speak out the ineffable without any regard for art.

In Ghalib the mystical element is subservient to his art. It is as a poet that he divines the ideal significance of mystical experience; it is as a poet alone that he feels and sees the unity behind and beyond the infinite richness of sense. It is not as a speculative idealist that he calls the world with its myriad hues but a name and a deception; it is not as a mystic of the purest water that he finds the actual world as unreal as the awakening of dreamers in a dream. It is only as a poet that he contemplates beauty.

It is Beauty that brings concord in the diversity of the many. It was an urge for friendship which impelled the World Master to break the monotony of his oneness, fancies Schiller; it is the urge of Beauty to reveal itself to itself that has brought the world into being, imagines Ghalib. Like a true artist he holds a value which is valid only in its ideality to be a personal force that drives the cosmos. Beauty for him has not yet exhausted itself in its manifestations but unfolds itself in new forms. Nature is but a partial expression of beauty, the beauty that was once human has come to life again in tulip and rose.

The Neoplatonic vision of finite existence as a separation from the Divine is transformed on the plane of art. The smell of the rose, the cry of the heart, the smoke of the candle that burns in the company of the Beloved betray in all their dissolution the estrangement that has come to pass, the estrangement from the goal of all that is. It is also only as a poet that he has divined the significance of the mystic vision of God, the God who is certainly not the highest in experience but whom the highest in experience only refers to. At this stage paradise with all its delights becomes but a nosegay in the niche of oblivion, a thing forgotten for good.

The mystical element in the poetry of Ghalib has become totally transfused in his art. Like a mys-

tic he stands at a loss to bring into harmony the many-ness of existence —the mortifications of love, the glamour of beauty, the pangs of passion—with the oneness of the real. When God alone is real, what is it all about ? For the mystic the vision is but a stage; for the poet the bewilderment is sufficient unto itself. As a beautiful portrait requires no further illumination from anything extraneous to its beauty, so the vision of the poet is a world by itself. He goes a step forward with the mystic. It is the desire for God that moves the world and the exuberance of life which is asserting itself even in the most insignificant particle of existence finds in Him its final justification. And what else is it but the spring that affirms its existence in the different colours of narcissus and tulip ?

But the conditions of life move him to sorrow and bring him to his senses, to a world of art pure and simple. *" La vie, c'est triste."* Sorrow and life go together; there is no escape from the bond that unites them. But sorrow has its ways. It comes as memory when the poet wistfully looks back at the light of other days, days redolent with the freshness of youth. All that gives birth to joy and life has become a thing of the past. His longing for the past makes him sad but resigned. When youth and love seem to have played themselves out, behold, a new world of desires awakens in him. Again he yearns to suffer for love and beauty, to pine for things worth suffering. But, when all is said, nothing is done and the poet seems in the end dimly to realise for himself the futility of these wistful longings, longings without any future.

The poet's attitude towards the sorrows and afflictions of life fluctuates, no doubt. Sometimes he defies them like the mythical Prometheus or, like his incarnation in history Friedrich Nietzsche, demands a wound that cannot be healed, a pain that cannot be relieved. But alas, he is human, all too human. Sorrows get the better of him and he falls prostrate; he cannot stand them any more. He asks for death and death does not oblige him. Even sleep, its congener in life, does not come to his rescue. He sees no light in the sinister gloom. The will to sin too finds frustration and he is all regrets for the sins omitted ! Even the delights of fruitless efforts seem to die in blank desolation. When hope is killed, the inferno begins. *Lasciate ogni esperanza, voi ch' entrate.*

But sorrow intensifies itself and creates indifference in its turn. The poet sees through the world and beyond. The wisdom of the sages, the worth of prayers, the fascination of art have exposed themselves to his eyes. But he does not end like Faust in cursing the world and its glamour and showing himself to be still its slave; he has simply done with it. His longings have lost their object ; his world has lost its interest. At last death itself that was so fervently longed for as an anodyne

for the burden of life promises no consolation to the disconsolate heart; the desire for the end finds a poor substitute in it.

The tragic sense of Ghalib's poetry is closely associated with his exulting consciousness of the worth of human personality. The present world and the world to come are hardly of equal worth. The whole realm of possibilities appears but man's own footprint on his way to the infinite. But with all the transcendent worth inherent in man it is given to the few to rise to perfect realisation. Man's misery is born of greatness, said Pascal. Ghalib's misery is born of the discrepancy that he finds between the worth of personality and the conditions that obscure it.

But in the midst of all these sorrows which constitute the life that is man's the poet smiles. His smile is not born of irony, for no trace of malice is left. It is a sympathetic comment on the hopeless situation in which he finds himself. It is not the outcome of the moral attitude towards life, for morality expresses strong resentment at the misery inherent in life. The poet who counts on the idea of beauty to work for beauty of action cannot be expected to echo the moral imperative with his smiles.

The poet's smile is instinct with humanity. He smiles and feels himself above the tragedy of life. The smile here is not the expression of pleasure but bespeaks the tragic sense of life. This tragedy, of course, has now become chastened and humane. The poet, who is so conscious that beauty passes and that life is sustained on its own destruction; the poet who looks at the burning sun as a candle exposed to the wind, has his moments of reconciliation and sunshine. What then if spring passes and beauty shows no love? They are sufficient in themselves; it is for us to reconcile ourselves to their way of being and to find joy and bliss in the values of their existence.

The world of Ghalib, then, is not the wide and broad world of a Shakespeare where life is reflected in infinite hues. It is the closed world of a fastidious and jealous aristocrat who would fain move only in selected fields of life, love and experience. There is also no denying that his experiments with the language were not always happy and no wonder that he could not hold constantly aloft the ideal of an artist. But certainly he has created a language instinct with genius and has embodied in his art visions informed with beauty.

S. VAHIDUDDIN

MUSLIM PATRONS OF HINDU LEARNING

[**Shri H. G. Narahari,** M.A., M.Litt., draws here a timely lesson from the concord which ruled between the Muslims and the Hindus a few centuries ago. It was rooted, as concord must be, in understanding, appreciation and mutual respect. In that lies the way back to mutual confidence and trust.—ED.]

Not many will still regard it as information that, for the first entry of the Hindu holy texts into Europe, it was a Muslim that was responsible. The Muslim is no other than the enlightened Prince Dara Shukoh, eldest son of the Moghul Emperor Shah Jehan (A. D. 1628-1657), at whose instance fifty of the Upaniṣads were rendered into Persian at Delhi. Dara Shukoh appears to have heard of the Upanisads during his stay at Kashmir in 1640. He was so taken by them that later he sent invitations to a number of Pandits at Benares to go to Delhi to assist him in translating them into Persian. The translation was completed in 1657. It was in 1775 that this translation came to the notice of the famous traveller and enthusiast for Oriental lore, Anquetil Duperron, to whom a manuscript of it was sent by M. Gentil, the French Resident at the Court of Shuja ud Daula, through M. Bernier. With the help of another manuscript which subsequently became available, Anquetil Duperron rendered the Persian into French and that into Latin. The Latin translation bore the title *Oupnek'hat*. It was published in two volumes during 1801 and 1802. This was rendered into German by Franz Mischel in 1882 and was followed by many translations into other European languages. It was the Latin translation of Anquetil Duperron that brought forth from the famous German philosopher Schopenhauer the very eloquent tribute that "in the whole world there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial and so elevating as that of the *Oupnek'hat*. It has been the solace of my life; it will be the solace of my death."

Names are also known of some great Hindu scholars like Gosvāmi Nṛsimha Sarasvatī who seem to have enjoyed the special patronage of this unfortunate Moghul Prince who was murdered by his ambitious brother Aurangzeb; the high esteem in which that learned man was held by the Prince is evident in a Sanskrit letter[1] which he addressed to him wherein he expressed sentiments of the utmost devotion and reverence. Kavindrācārya, another Hindu scholar, is said[2] to have espoused the cause of the Hindus on whom was being levied the crude *jizya* tax whenever they visited Benares or Prayag on a religious pilgrimage. Kavindrācārya seems to have plead-

[1] Introduction to *Kavindracaryasucipatra*, Baroda, 1921, p. 5.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

ed his case so eloquently before Prince Dara Shukoh and his father, the Emperor Shah Jehan, that the Emperor, shedding tears of remorse, not only abolished the hated tax but even conferred upon him the title *Sarvavidyānidhāna* (Repository of all Learning). Kavīndrācārya himself seems to have been free from all religious prejudices. In his library at Benares Muslim scribes seem to have been employed as freely as Hindu to copy Hindu works. It is interesting to note that the manuscript of *Vāmanasūtravṛtti* in this library was copied by a Muslim scribe called Allabaksh. The brilliant poet and literary critic Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha speaks in glowing terms of the patronage he enjoyed at the hands of Muhamad Dara Shukoh and the Emperors Shah Jehan and Jahangir. It was the second of these, the Emperor Shah Jehan, that conferred on him the title *Paṇḍitarāja*. (King of Scholars).

The Emperor Jahangir was so attracted by a Hindu ascetic named Jadrup that, whenever he could snatch an interval amidst his heavy responsibilities, he would rush to Jadrup and enjoy listening to his entertaining discourses. Such was the influence of this Hindu saint on the Emperor that we read of the latter's often changing laws in the State to make them conform to Hindu standards. In the *Tūzuk-i-Jahāngīrī*[3] (Memoirs of Jahangir) the Emperor himself speaks of how at the suggestion of Jadrup he had been tempted to change the laws even of his revered father Akbar and how accordingly he had ordered that thenceforth the weight of the seer would be 36 dams, in accordance with what is laid down in the Hindu texts, setting aside the old decree of Akbar that the seer should be 30 dams, which had prevailed till then.

Akbar himself was no mean admirer of Hinduism. His literary interests were no less noteworthy and broad. Among the Hindu works translated into Persian at his command are the *Atharvaveda*, the Epics, the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, an excellent treatise on Arithmetic—the *Līlāvatī*, and the *Tājaka*, a well-known work on Astronomy.[4]

Such then was the concord that existed between the Hindus and the Muslims in the Moghul period of Indian History. It should not be impossible even now for the two communities to live together in this happy relationship, for the Muslims to shake off their distrust of the Hindus and for the Hindus to free themselves from their own prejudices against the Muslims. It is the habit of History to teach by experience; and, likewise, it is a popular principle of Science to infer what man is from what man has been. Can we now contradict both History and Science? I hope we cannot.

H. G. NARAHARI

[3] Translated by Alexander Rogers and Henry Beveridge. (Oriental Translation Fund Series, Nos. XIX and XXII, London, 1909, 1914).

[4] *Ain-i-Akbari* of Abul Fazl. (Translated by Blochmann and Jarret, Calcutta, 1873, 1891). Book I, Ain 34, p. 105 ff.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

WORDSWORTH'S MYSTICISM *

Philosophers are seldom good interpreters of poets. Their tendency is to impose too much rational system upon the poet's intuitions. But there are exceptions and Mr. Stallknecht, who boldly and wisely proclaims in his Foreword that "there is no Wordsworthian system of ethics or of metaphysics and I have tried most conscientiously not to manufacture one," is certainly one of them. What he has done for Wordsworth, and done with exceptional penetration, is to link his philosophy of man and nature with the thought of certain thinkers, of Shaftesbury and Hartley, Kant and Schiller, Plotinus and Spinoza, and above all with that of Boehme. In doing this he has enriched the meaning of Wordsworth's thought without ever forgetting that it was poetic thought. There can in fact be no certainty that many of the parallelisms which he traces between passages in Wordsworth's poetry and in Boehme's or Spinoza's writings were due to an actual reading of the latter by the poet. Sometimes verbal correspondences make it highly probable, particularly when a copy of one of the books in question is found to have been in Wordsworth's library. But Wordsworth was notoriously not addicted to reading except in the book of life and a great poet's intuition can often reach directly and express in very similar images truths already uttered by other creative minds.

But if Wordsworth was himself no student of books of metaphysics, he was the closest friend of an omnivorous reader of them. And Mr. Stallknecht is justified in supposing that Coleridge's conversation was rich and vivid enough largely to take the place in Wordsworth's "education" of a more formal study of the philosophers. From 1796 to 1805, the crucial creative period of Wordsworth's life, the two friends did share one another's thoughts "about as completely as it is possible for two men of intellectual independence to do," and there can have been few doctrines reflected in the receptive lake of Coleridge's mind of which Wordsworth did not learn something and relate it to his own evolving experience. Although, therefore, Mr. Stallknecht may at times exaggerate the influence of such doctrines upon Wordsworth's stubbornly individual thinking, he has certainly made some striking discoveries in the literary background of the poet's thought which are of value less in themselves than for the way in which they clarify and extend the truth of some of his primary intuitions.

By far the most important of his discoveries is that of the influence of Boehme's mystical revelations upon Wordsworth's view of imagination as a creative and unifying faculty. Indeed some of his early chapters with their lengthy quotations from Boehme's writings are almost as much an exposition of

* *Strange Seas of Thought: Studies in William Wordsworth's Philosophy of Man and Nature.* By NEWTON P. STALLKNECHT. (Duke University Press, Durham, U. S. A.; Cambridge University Press, London. 21s.)

the doctrines of the seventeenth-century German mystic as of Wordsworth's own teaching. The affinity between them is important because it emphasises the essentially mystical quality of Wordsworth's deepest experience. Some twenty years ago Mr. Arthur Beatty demonstrated the close relation of Wordsworth's doctrine and art to the associationist school of Alison and Hartley. But, convincing as much of his argument was, it undervalued the mystic in Wordsworth. Mr. Stallknecht assents to all that was valid in Mr. Beatty's book but reveals depths in Wordsworth which transcend the shallow realm of Hartley's philosophy. The truth is that Wordsworth's creative experience surpassed Hartley's sensationalist theory of knowledge as essentially as it did Godwin's rationalist ethics, although both could be co-ordinated with it. Nature meant to him something altogether more inward than the phenomenal world known to the senses or the analysing mind. Certainly there is ambiguity at times in his use of the word "Nature," but for him, as Mr. Stallknecht writes, the most important "fact" of Nature is the "unity of all," or "the one life within us and abroad." Elsewhere he remarks that for Wordsworth, as for Whitman, "Nature is an object of experience, an object which encompasses every particular concrete thing of which the poet may be aware. It is the matrix and the concrete environment both of the poet's mind and of the concrete thing which he loves to describe." Nature was thus for him not merely a beautiful or awesome spectacle but a power that unified all the variety and multiplicity of experience, a divine imagination eternally creating both through material forms which were vital images of its being and through the poetic mind which expressed humanly a kindred activity, Man, therefore, and the world which was external to his senses were essentially united in a power that ruled them both. And Nature herself was a community of mutually dependent objects of which man, as uniquely conscious subject, was one. Hence the "sentiment of Being" which Wordsworth felt to spread

> O'er all that moves, and all that seemeth still,
> O'er all that, lost beyond the reach of thought
> And human knowledge, to the human eye
> Invisible, yet liveth to the heart,
> O'er all that leaps, and runs, and shouts, and sings,
> Or beats the gladsome air, o'er all that glides
> Beneath the wave, yea, in the wave itself
> And mighty depth of waters.

Later this sentiment deepened for him into the "pulse of Being," felt everywhere,

> When all the several frames of things, like stars
> Through every magnitude distinguishable,
> Were half confounded in each other's blaze,
> One galaxy of life and joy.

The Wordsworth who experienced this—and we cannot doubt the authenticity of his vision—was a Nature-lover in the sense that Plotinus was, and, even more, Boehme. For such minds the act of imagination was a dual act in which man and nature mutually participated, or, as Wordsworth put it,

> A balance, an ennobling interchange
> Of action from within and from without,
> The excellence, pure spirit, and best power
> Both of the object seen, and eye that sees.

Just as, to quote Mr. Stallknecht, "there is a mutual interpenetration of objects and the eternal universe within which these transitory objects subsist," so it is with the purest creative mind of the poet. Such poets or mystics are "creators and receivers both." They are passive, not merely through being

sensitive to the forms of Nature, but imaginatively to that "element of Nature's inner self" which is itself the divine imagination. They are thus awakened and enriched by the objects which they assimilate. But they also creatively act upon what they receive, completing in their own particular consciousness the imaginative act of which the natural world is the perpetually changing form. Thus, as Mr. Stallknecht writes, Nature and man "participate in one activity, and it is wrong to suppose that the self is the only source of energy. The world makes a claim upon the subject, and the subject in turn seeks to possess its world." And it only truly possesses it when it re-creates it and in doing so is re-created itself.

Such analysis of creative experience is inevitably external to the mysterious unitary act it attempts to define through its dual aspects. Even Wordsworth's poetic terms, "the sentiment of Being" and "the sense of Eolian influence" can only suggest the reality in which subject and object are rooted, and, through imagination, can be reconciled. But Mr. Stallknecht goes as far as the philosophic mind, aided by mystical intuitions, can, to define its nature.

And in later chapters he examines the causes and significance of that change in Wordsworth which has been so often lamented and was first heralded by his removal of stanza six of his first published draft of the "Ode to Duty," a change from a philosophy of imaginative faith to one of self-defensive morality. There is not space here to enter deeply into this difficult and complex problem. The change was not as complete a recantation as some censorious romanticists have insisted. But it was a recoil from a faith in which desire and reason, imagination and conscience, were conceived as being unified in a creative and entire humanity, to an outlook in which they were in conflict, while the conflict was only to be appeased, not resolved, by orthodox Christian piety. Wordsworth's declension in middle life into such an attitude suggests not only a failure of nerve but also some defect in his original conception of Nature.

The romanticist often fails, as Mr. Stallknecht suggests, to be imaginative enough. And Wordsworth's imagination, if it did so fail even in his creative prime, would seem to have done so through insufficiently realising that the divine principle transcends altogether the Nature or images which it informs, that the eternal mind is and is not the unity of the world. It is, to quote from the *Kena Upanishad* "That by which all things are manifested and *which is not Itself manifested by anything.*" Through that conception alone, when it becomes the root principle of all temporal experience, can a man be truly unified in Nature through being eternally at home in That which is beyond Nature. Lacking such a home, as Wordsworth himself lamented in his "Intimations" Ode, even the sublimest poetic participation in the divine drama of the natural world is subject to the seasons of decline, the failure of spiritual vitality, the relapse into warring dualism, which heralds the death of every natural organism.

Mr. Stallknecht does not explain Wordsworth's poetic decline quite in these terms, but his discussion of it and of the whole involved problem of reconciling duty and desire, of reaching

a state in which what we most deeply will is also what conscience or self-knowledge approves, of realising, in short, the freedom of creative love, is deeply interesting. Altogether, his book, which includes, too, a chapter on the moral of *The Ancient Mariner* and the affinities of Coleridge's thought with Wordsworth's, and also their differences, particularly as reflected in Coleridge's "Ode to Dejection," is a work of high importance, not only for the Wordsworthian, but for all who value the findings of the poetic mind as the ground of all real philosophic and religious thought.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

Civilization and Ethics. By ALBERT SCHWEITZER. Third Edition, revised, (Adam and Charles Black, London. 15s.)

After seventeen years a third English edition, this time revised by Mrs. Charles E. B. Russell, is available to a world which may or may not need it. The content is familiar enough nowadays: that the meaning of life and the meaning of the world cannot be reconciled, and that, on the contrary, ethics is a "constant, living and practical dispute with reality." To get thus far, Schweitzer makes a strenuous excursion through the whole gamut from Socrates to Haeckel. This occupies three-quarters of the book; to read it is a valuable experience in that it ratifies intuition and makes us realize what we knew before. The book concludes with a foretaste of another book not yet written (or at any rate not yet published in England), *The World-View of Reverence for Life.* The "basic principle of ethics" is defined as "devotion to life resulting from reverence for life"; and it is suggested that in the constant practice of "reverence for life" men's craving for some kind of unity (hitherto wrongly directed to the impossible reconciliation of "life" and the "world as it is") may be satisfied, a channel hacked out for their energies to flow into, and the necessary contraries established without which, according to Blake, "there is no progression."

True and admirable though these final chapters are, they contain nothing that has not been said with greater virility before. Why did such a wordy marshalling of elemental and eternal wisdom need such a terrific preamble? Many people, women especially, live or try to live by this "reverence for life": simple people, schooled only to instinctive human decency, in love of earth and each other; people warmed by the tattered remnants of a Christian ethic which survives the orthodoxies which have tried to wear it and failed. "Reverence for life" may be new in the realms of philosophy proper; it is as old as Homer among the common people. And even to that more complex entity, the "common reader," Schweitzer's closing chapters may seem but sounding brass and tinkling cymbal after the sharp experience of the "reverence for life" which thrusts at us out of the pages of Shakespeare, Blake, Keats, the Russian and English novels of the nineteenth century and—Schweitzer's own African books.

Civilization and Ethics extracts the obvious from the world's wisdom and pays it homage with magnificent con-

viction. But it is a book for scholars: a map to lead them out of labyrinths of their own making. For most of us, it is the musician and doctor who went into the African jungle who matters. The saint inspires; the philosopher chills.

J. P. HOGAN

A Daughter of Han: The Autobiography of a Chinese Working Woman. By IDA PRUITT. (Yale University Press, New Haven. $2.75; and Oxford University Press, London. 18*s*. 6*d*.)

Few autobiographies can claim to tell either the whole truth or nothing but the truth, but here is one which at least approaches that ideal, for frankness is its key-note throughout. It is the life-story of Ning Lao T'ai-T'ai ("Old Mistress Ning"), taken from her lips and pieced together by Miss Ida Pruitt, with whom she used to have conversations three times a week for a period of two years. Born in 1867 at a coast town in Shantung, she was married at an early age to a man much older than herself who turned out to be a confirmed opium-smoker—she refers to him half affectionately as "my old opium sot." He not only failed to support her, but eventually kidnapped his younger daughter and sold her to another family.

Thus began an unceasing struggle for the bare necessities of life, aggravated by the plight of her remaining daughter, who also had the misfortune to marry a good-for-nothing husband. For some time she was reduced to begging or peddling in the streets; then she worked as a servant in different households, both Chinese and foreign. Her experiences are related in simple, straightforward language, which reveals her as an untutored soul, yet not lacking in shrewd common-sense, stubborn, independent and transparently honest. More than once she admits that her temper was bad, and confesses to "anger in the heart" when she makes scathing remarks about her relations. The wife of a missionary by whom she was employed is described as "very exacting and not always just." Having been told by chapel-goers that her people were breaking the Sabbath, this lady "asked me not to sew on Sundays where people could see me. And I asked her why, if their God was one that could see everywhere, it should be wrong for me to sew in one place and not in another." After this, it hardly surprises us to learn that Lao T'ai-T'ai steadily refused to become a convert: "I saw around me those that were baptized and those that were not. There did not seem to me to be any difference in their character or their actions."

Evidently a difficult person to deal with, this outspoken peasant woman; and yet the innate goodness of her heart appears in many acts of kindness and self-sacrifice which she does not seem to regard as anything out of the ordinary. Thus, she tells us how she nursed her aged father-in-law during his last illness after her worthless husband had made off with all the money in the house. The oil in the lamp gave out and could not be replaced, but although there were also two children to look after, she continued to sit tending the cholera-stricken patient as best she could in the dark until he died. On another occasion, when she happened to discover that a neighbouring family was in lack of food, she took what

little money she had put by and bought ten loaves of bread for them.

Apart from its personal interest, this book is well worth reading for the light it throws on social conditions in China and the life of its working classes —their poverty, superstitions and quarrels, their neighbourliness and complicated family ties, their cheerful resignation under the blows of fate. This is how Lao T'ai-T'ai sums up her philosophy: "Life is like a game of chess. The paths laid out must be followed. Destiny cannot be forced. If it is forced there is always trouble." The last time Miss Pruitt saw her old friend was in 1939, when the heavy hand of Japanese domination was tightening its grip upon the people. The end of her story remains untold, but we may be sure that it was played out to the last with her usual stoicism and courage.

LIONEL GILES

Ethics and Language. By CHARLES L. STEVENSON. (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. $4.00 or 26*s.* 6*d.*)

This work purports to be a study in ethical methodology and presses the claims of analysis of the "flexibilities of language" as a prolegomenon to enlightened ethical enquiry. If analysis, says the author, be insufficient to establish how science should be used in ethics, it can at least clear the way to a conclusion. Ethical judgments, according to him, have an emotive rather than a strictly logical basis and so in a sense we may say that our moral judgments are neither true nor false. But this does not mean that "they are to be made capriciously, in ignorance of one's self, or of the nature and consequences of the object judged." It would, however, be "more accurate to say that an ethical judgment *can* be true or false," though "its descriptive meaning may be insufficient to support its emotive repercussions." Ethical methodology in the circumstances should bring out

> the interplay between emotive and descriptive meaning, dispelling the impression that a moralist must be irrational or dogmatic, and indicating the general circumstances under which ethical argument can be resolved by scientific means.

The above is a brief summary of the author's main conclusions. In a chapter entitled "Some Related Theories," the author refers to Dewey, Russell, and others as having propounded theories very similar to his own though also differing from his in many respects. The author dismisses the deductive methods of the transcendentalists and metaphysical moralists as "transscientific" and "other-worldly" and therefore not worth serious consideration. The right way, according to him, is the way of the empiricist and the analyst, who alone can lay a solid foundation for a sound ethical philosophy. Only by analysis of the various uses of language, descriptive as well as non-descriptive, can we discover the factors operative in our moral agreements and disagreements.

After the way the author has discoursed on beliefs and attitudes, and on descriptive and emotive meanings and persuasive and logical arguments, the reader would naturally look for some sort of *logical* refutation of the deductive method and not a mere dogmatic rejection of it. And yet nowhere in the work is any reason given why the metaphysical method should be avoided except that the

transcendentalists speak a "Babel of tongues." But the author's own references to Dewey, Russell and others shows that the empiricist is no freer from this particular failing than the metaphysician. If unqualified uniformity be the real test of sound philosophy, there should be only one philosophy or none.

SUSIL KUMAR MAITRA

Kāma-śuddhi. By V. RAGHAVAN. Sanskrit. (Reprinted from the *Amṛta-vāṇī*, Bangalore)

This is a play in one act; and its theme, as indicated by the title, is the purification of connubial love. The old Indian attitude towards this form of love was of two kinds. Some thought that, because it can so easily become sensuous, the only course for a wise man to adopt was to turn away from it once for all. This ascetic ideal is, for instance, the lesson conveyed in the *Buddha-carita*, an epic poem by Aśvaghosha (first century A. D.). Kāma is figured there as Māra or Death, and the poet describes how he was completely frustrated in his efforts to lure Buddha away from his spiritual quest. But such extreme asceticism was by no means the prevailing ideal of life in ancient India; it was transforming love rather than eliminating it—the cleansing of the lamp instead of putting out the light. That is the message, for instance, of Kālidāsa's epic, the *Kumāra-saṁbhava*. Here also love suffers frustration, but it is only love as an impulse of the moment. It is soon revived in a thoroughly purified form; and the poet shows, in his masterly way, how such sublimated love is the very life and light of the world.

It is love in the latter sense that is the theme of the present work; and, by a happy play on the word *Ananga* (one of the names of Kāma in Sanskrit), which may also be taken to mean "not ancillary," the author represents it as the *supreme* value of life. The style is reminiscent of Kālidāsa's epic; and the plot aims at artfully explaining the reason for the discomfiture of Kāma as narrated there. Most of the characters that appear here are allegorical, like Love, Passion, Spring, Virtue and Wealth; but the reader hardly feels that they are abstractions, the handling of the subject is so realistic, and the dialogue is so lively throughout. Dr. Raghavan is well known for his wide acquaintance with Sanskrit literature and criticism. The present publication shows that he is endowed with the poetic gift as well.

M. HIRIYANNA

Pair Dadeni or "The Cauldron of Rebirth." By JOHN COWPER POWYS. (The Druid Press, Ltd., Llanybri, Carmarthen, Wales. 2*s*.)

"Something is happening," writes Mr. Powys, "to the whole human race at this dreadful hour and in the midst of this appalling darkness and confusion. Something is happening down under the ground, and yet not so very far down underground." What is it?

In this pamphlet he sets out to answer that question in his own characteristic fashion, and, whether or not we agree with his conclusions, he is certainly of the tribe of poets whom he describes as odd fish swimming in

an imaginative element which is much nearer reality than the speculative ether in which philosophers disport themselves. It is not necessarily so. For philosophers can be as much diviners in their element as poets in theirs. Mr. Powys himself enjoys, at times illicitly, the best of both worlds. But, even when he ties the imaginative to private mental caprice, he is always suggestive; in attributing, for example, the historic change coming over the human race to the passing of the world from the influence of *Pisces* to that of *Aquarius* he has authority behind him. But his interpretation of the characteristics of *Pisces* and *Aquarius* is somewhat narrowly his own and calculated to support the bias he has always shown towards the earth-pole of spirit and against the heavenly. He writes, for example, of the Renaissance that it was "a change *from above* not *from below*; therefore it was abortive. The great Mother miscarried." But she will equally miscarry if humanity now abandons itself to a change that is from below, but not also from above. The "divine Ground" embraces and transcends both. Mr. Powys's old tendency to be so enamoured of the dark powers that he defies the powers of light persists, but if he errs in emphasis, much that he writes here of the mystery and necessity of a rebirth of Western Civilization, particularly in relation to modern Russia, the Star spirit of the Greek genius, is original and penetrating.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

Empire. By LOUIS FISCHER. (Dennis Dobson, Ltd., London. 2*s*. 6*d*.)

This small book is a plea, in the interests of world peace, for the elimination of empires. We are given the stern warning that unless the problem of colonies is solved future war cannot be avoided. We are shown how empires "militate against peace" and against "economic progress and economic stability." The peace settlement must fail unless it be seen "as a task in economic reform, spiritual regeneration, self re-education, political change, and international organisation."

That these reforms must centre very largely round India is now beginning to receive recognition. Louis Fischer has made a careful study of India's problems and although this book was published before the momentous developments of 1946, it is not for that reason out-dated. It contains much that can be of great value in helping to dispel world ignorance of Indian politics. The Indian States, the author describes as "one of the shrewdest devices of imperialism"; and dealing with the subject of Hindu-Moslem disunity he shows how "those who stand to gain from the divisions feed the divisions."

The author's brief reference to the Hindu religion displays a superficiality unworthy of him. The *whole* of Hinduism is based upon one fundamental principle—that this universe is in essence an impersonal unity the nature of which is Existence, Knowledge, Bliss, Absolute. Those who would know India intimately must understand this. Religion is a science which the scientific West will easily grasp when it is tired of wars and empires. And in this science will be found the key to the confusion of science now prevailing in the West.

IRENE R. RAY

Tolstoy and His Wife. By TIKHON POLNER. (Jonathan Cape, Ltd., London. 10s. 6*d*.)

This book, now translated, was written before the famous Tolstoy book called *The Final Struggle* which gave a day-to-day account of Tolstoy and his wife throughout 1910, ending in his flight and his death. It is a terrible story. They both wrote diaries, sometimes two diaries on the same day—one being particularly reserved as totally private. They would quarrel, then retire—and *write it down*. These diaries do not make a good advertisement for the married state as obtaining in the West. But far more of the truth about marriage is mirrored therein than is comfortable.

This volume is billed as being written by "a close friend of Tolstoy." We know these close friends of the great, who turn up on paper years afterwards. He offers us no new light, no revealing phrase of the eye- or ear-witness. Nevertheless, his book contains some interesting matter, especially in relation to the "proposal scene" between Tolstoy and the artful young girl who was to become his wife. It is important to hold before one's mind the picture of the impassioned lover determined on possession (though much alarmed at his own desire) over against the picture of the old man who wrote "Only husbands learn to know their wives and only when it is too late. Only husbands see behind the curtains. That is why Lessing insisted that all husbands say: There is only one bad woman and she is my wife. In the presence of others, women—especially when they are young—pretend so skilfully that no one can see them as they are." Never has the conflict between the sexes been more poignantly illustrated than by these two mortals.

It is hard not to take sides in this case. The tendency is for men to feel with Tolstoy and women with his wife. Tolstoy wishes to escape from his wife, and many will feel that the only pity is that he dilly-dallied and agonised about it till far too late—for she had become a demon. But it must never be forgotten that wives, for the most part, are what their husbands make them. The beautiful young Sonya Behrens turned into the shrew and the harridan known to us as Countess Tolstoy. But he made her like that. That was the real tragedy—of this, as of so many marriages.

JOHN STEWART COLLIS

Studies in Indo-British Economy Hundred Years Ago. By NIRMAL CHANDRA SINHA, M. A. (A. Mukherjee and Co., 1, College Square, Calcutta. Rs. 5/-)

This is a well-documented study of a depressing chapter in India's economic history. The drainage of capital resources, European rivalry in the field of banking and finance and the decline of indigenous industries, at once a cause and an effect of the collapse of the country's trading classes are all blamed for the stunting of enterprise. Coincidently, the conditions in India, high rent, famine and unemployment were driving the coolies from their homes onto the European plantations in India and to the Colonies. The little book throws some light on the interweaving of economic patterns on the world loom, and also on the complex of problems which the Indian National Government has inherited from the many years of exploitation.—E. M. H.

CONTEMPORARY WORLD OUTLOOKS

[We bring together here four more of the summaries by **Mr. R. L. Megroz** of the recent topical series of lectures on Contemporary World Outlooks, organised by the British Institute of Philosophy at London. The first summary appeared in our December 1946 issue. Those published here cover the lectures on "The Marxist World Outlook" by Prof. H. B. Acton of the University of London; "The World as 'Process'" by Mr. Sydney E. Hooper, M.A., Editor of *Philosophy*; "The Theistic World Outlook" by Mr. D. M. MacKinnon, M.A., of Oxford University; and "The Choice of a World-Outlook" by Miss Dorothy M. Emmet, M.A., of the University of Manchester. This completes the Series.—ED.]

THE MARXIST WORLD OUTLOOK

Professor Acton said that a world outlook implied a systematic account which, by showing the place of man in the scheme of things, claimed to indicate the purpose of his life. A world outlook was thus a theory of the world linked with a theory of human conduct. A theory of the world was often called a metaphysical theory, and a theory of conduct an ethical or moral theory. The classification and criticism of world outlooks seemed to the speaker to be a fundamental part of philosophy. Philosophy indeed would hardly have existed distinct from Science or Poetry, but for the tendency to attempt some explanation of the world as the theatre of human endeavour. When Kant referred to "the inevitable problems of pure reason," about "God, Freedom and Immortality," he was referring in a summary way to the fundamental philosophical task of analysing and criticising world-outlooks, a task that might be undertaken even by those philosophers who did not believe that any world-outlook was or could be adequate.

The civilised religions, since they sought to show how human conduct fitted in with some Divine Plan or Cosmic Conflict, could not have world outlooks. It was very misleading to look upon religions and world outlooks as the same thing, as some people did. In ordinary usage, religion involved belief in supernatural beings, and conduct regulated in the light of that belief. But according to some world outlooks, *e. g.*, that of Spinoza, there were no supernatural beings, while according to others, *e.g.*, Epicureanism, beings might exist that deserved such a description, but human conduct need take no account of them. Marxism was such a non-religious world outlook.

Marxism as a theory of the world was known as Dialectical Materialism. As a theory of human purpose it was scientific Socialism. It was the official world outlook of the Soviet Union, where it was taught in schools and universities. The speaker thought that the more important translations of Marxist philosophical works received quite inadequate notice in English periodicals. There were, however, some good English Marxist works, such as T. A. Jackson's *Dialectic* and Professor Haldane's *Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences*. Marxists, when they called themselves Dialectical Materialists, meant first of all that they believed the material world existed independently of anyone's perception of it, which was what philosophers today called

Realism. The possibility of doubting the independent existence of the material world arose when we reflected on the illusions of sense, such as perspective distortions, mirror images, or the effects of disease or drugs, and concluded therefrom that we did not immediately perceive physical objects themselves but rather their effects on us.

In a crowded and rapid review of Marxists' theories of perception and the nature of the world, the speaker compared and contrasted some ideas of Engels, Marx, Lenin, Stalin and others. The most sustained discussion of perception from the Marxist stand-point, he said, was in Lenin's *Empiricism and Criticism*, published in 1908. It was to be feared, however, that we could not find in Lenin, Marx or Engels any satisfactory account of perception. Marxists had also given little attention to the question of how sensation was related to material things, though they maintained that mind arose out of matter. The Marxist would stress that materialism was in full agreement with natural science.

The speaker thought the contemporary religious apologist unnecessarily chary of meeting Positivists and Materialists on their own ground. There was nothing absurd in scientific attempts to support some components of religious beliefs. Religious apologists today tended to regard the appeal of miracles as materialistic in some derogatory sense. It seemed to the speaker only reasonable for defenders of a religious world-outlook to rejoice if they could obtain evidence that miracles occurred. On the other hand, Professor Haldane had expressed the view that there was no reason why the materialist should reject the possibility of such phenomena as telepathy or survival of the soul after bodily death, though it would have to be decided what sort of evidence was necessary. The Marxist view was that if a soul were discovered it would of course be matter, though outside our cognition, for matter to the Marxist was objective reality. Materialists were not always Atheists, however, but they believed the gods were material. A feature of Marxist philosophy was the stress laid on science as a unification of theory and practice. Our theories were proved correct when we could make things and turn them to our purposes. Observation and experiment were practice in a sense that sitting thinking was not. And we really understood things when we made and used them. Hence the Marxists stressed the relation of science to industry.

They also contrasted Dialectical Materialism with the mechanical materialism of the eighteenth century which, according to Engels, failed to take account of chemical and biological operations. In its account of how novel types of entities (including life and consciousness) came into being, Dialectical Materialism was closely related to the theory of emergent evolution propounded by such philosophers as Lloyd Morgan and Samuel Alexander. Evolutionary changes, according to the Marxists, occurred through a process they called the negation of negation. Suppose "A" to be opposed by "not A." If "A" was succeeded by "not A," then "Not A" in turn would be succeeded by "A." But this "A" would not be merely the first "A." It would be the opposite of a "Not A" which had already replaced the original

"A." It would have developed a new characteristic. So development took place, in this Marxist theory, in a kind of spiral, one change indicating the given change of affairs, and the second change re-establishing the first in a more developed form. The lecturer then quoted from the Bible (1. Corinthians, 15) to show the similarity of St. Paul's dialectic. (Your reporter wanted to call out: "It is also in the Theosophical doctrine!")

After a further review of Marxist criticism of the scientific method and its insistence on the examination of natural phenomena including those of society, in all their actions, the speaker came to the views of the scientific Socialists. Marxists from Engels to Stalin had said that if materialism was accepted as a general philosophy then its application to the social sphere was obvious, and historical materialism followed from the other materialism. But historical materialism was, broadly, the view that technology was the prime-mover of social changes. It seemed to the speaker such a view might be denied by a philosophical materialist and asserted by an idealist, *i. e.*, the two things had no necessary connection. This, however, was not the Marxists' main argument for historical materialism. Marx held that man had been subject to material or social influences upon which his happiness depended, and so he put forward his plan to change these conditions. Robert Owen had shown how faulty government and industrial arrangements caused misery and crime. The Marxists objected to his approach to the problem, which implied reformers outside society who like gods could put it right. Reformers being necessarily in society, how could anyone want to try to reform it? The pre-Marxist philosophers forgot that social conditions were changed by men. The Utopian Socialists slurred over the means for putting into effect their admirable schemes. It became necessary to ask why such schemes, reasonable though they might be, provoked laughter and opposition. There must be some force in society, according to the Marxists, which accounted for an outburst of Utopian theories and also prevented their being put into practice. Marx and Engels said that all members of society were subject to social forces, but not all changes in society were practicable—only those were which could be linked with a sufficiently powerful social agency. Here the contribution of Marx and Engels to the problem seemed most valuable when compared with the rival contemporary statement of Comte who had suggested setting up a spiritual power that would unite society.

The Marxists argued that men produced their means of subsistence, which involved using their hands and, later, such tools as they could devise. Thus they came into contact with one another in ways which work determined. As they worked with others so their life would be affected. If people changed their way of getting a living, then consequential changes were inevitable because they would find themselves in different situations which would call for different conduct. Opponents pointed out that it was possible for the laws of society, its morality, to be made more subtle by thinking. Or some thinker might invent a device to improve methods of production and so demonstrate the power of thought over production. Marxists did not contest

this type of argument. While the means of production formed the basis of society, a superstructure of thought was not inert: it interacted. The socialists' primary aim had been to set up a form of society free from the industrialists of the prevailing economic order. Their opponents said that these could not be removed because their existence was rooted in fundamental elements of human nature. Socialists said this indicated a wrong view of human nature. Men would, for instance, work for the public good. Marx, however, did not take part in this discussion.

The moving force for transformation of society arose from the industrial system itself which, according to the Marxist, required for its working a proletariat which would decide to control it. So the way to get a new social order was to work with the proletariat to that end. It was thus assumed that there were social ends towards which events moved, even though no one deliberately aimed at producing them. The Marxists also thought that they knew what the general course of social development would be. But such confidence was not justified. We could assess its value in the same way as we assessed the confidence of any scientist, by seeing how his experiments came off. In Russia the existence of a social state, though not yet a communist order, had been proved possible, but that was a long way from a new world order of society for mankind. The Marxists' account of long-term social progress remained a guess, though as such it had played its part in making history.

Marx had taught us not to regard ourselves as outside society; who then were "we" that by our knowledge of social laws could control it? Comte thought the social scientist should control the rest. The Marxists wished society to understand and control itself. Some, however, would claim to understand, and like, what occurred. Others would not think it desirable. So a struggle would arise. The speaker thought the Marxists seemed to have given far too little thought to the moral problems involved in the movement towards a classless society. Any morality that transcended classes tended to be denied, but though Marxists argued that different classes had different moralities there were two different opinions: (*a*) that classes did not recognise the same moral principles and (*b*) that the same moral principles were recognised but opinions differed as to action in accordance with them.

It did not follow that class struggles must be fought out to a finish, if this meant that neither party had any obligation to the other. The resort to war required justification in terms not only of the existence of the opposition but of a reasonable forecast of the outcome. A weakness of the appeal to force was the assumption that men could associate and have no moral relationship. Nevertheless, concluded the speaker, the Marxists clearly were right in maintaining that to preach moral generalisations about love and fellowship could have little effect on the moral problems of our time. It was not so important to tell us to love our neighbours, as to tell us how we could do so.

THE WORLD AS "PROCESS"

In a closely packed lecture on the abstruse and very coherent philosophy of "Process" Mr. Hooper tried to help those who had not studied Whitehead's metaphysic by selecting four of his fundamental concepts and offering some explanatory remarks on them. These concepts were: (1) Creativity; (2) Actual Entities or Occasions; (3) Eternal Objects; (4) God. It is only fair to the lecturer to remind readers that I have to condense his summary still further, and his warning should be borne in mind that these concepts are as closely interrelated as various parts of one picture.

According to Whitehead, *Creativity* is the ultimate notion concerning reality, the notion of the activity of the Universe at the base of all things. Although present everywhere it is always conditioned by its own creatures —the actual entities of the world. We may think of Creativity as pluralizing itself into an infinite system of interlocked modes. The modes are the "occasions" of Nature, which is the "stuff" of the world. So we come to:—

Actual Entities or Occasions. Whitehead rejects Descartes' notion of the Universe as three types of substances: mind and matter, and God, the creator of the two other substances. Descartes defined substance as that which was capable of existing by itself, needing nothing but its own nature in order to be. Whitehead denies that the entities of the world are substances because there is nothing that "requires nought but itself in order to exist." Not even God is so self-contained and self-sufficient. All actual entities, including God, need other beings as constituents of their existence. According to Whitehead, the world is not made up of substances but rather of a plurality of "processes." These are the ultimate entities of the temporal world, and he called them "actual entities" or "occasions"—the real things of which the world is made. As a process, an actual entity is a growth from phase to phase, ending in a definite achievement. The process is a way of bringing various elements into a real unity, and this is accomplished by a genuine creative synthesis. This growth from phase to phase is called "concrescence" and the result of the process, a concretion. A concretion is a specific mode in which many diverse elements have been brought together to function as constituents in a new unified whole or individual. What we commonly call a "thing," such as a molecule, a stone, a tree, an animal, or even a human mind, is to be regarded as a "nexus" of occasions, or as a "society" with a certain type of ordered relationship....Each occasion or actual entity, said Whitehead, is a "unit of experience." Each must be regarded as a monadic creature, and thought of as a mode of synthesising the world. An actual entity is said to "house" the entire world in one unit of feeling. The world consists of an infinite number of occasions, each expressing its own perspective of the universe. When a novel occasion or actual entity comes into being, it synthesises in a novel way all the antecedent occasions of the world, so that a new point of view is attained. But, instead of concentrating on the achievement, we have always to remember that an actual entity is both process

and achievement.

Actual entities or occasions have a subject-object structure. A given occasion is a prehension of the other occasions of the world in respect of certain of their relevant aspects. These are its "data," and constitute the objective side of an actual entity. Sometimes Whitehead calls these objective data the occasion's "feelings." But an actual entity is also a "subject" possessing these feelings, or entertaining these data. The implication is that there is a central factor which has experience. An actual entity therefore is both a subject experiencing, and the experiences which it owns. It must be thought of as presiding over its own becoming. The Organic Philosophy of Whitehead maintains that, apart from the experiences of subjects, there is a bare nothingness. The general creative action of the Universe is the process by which the Universe is continually being pluralised into units of experience.

Another important point is that the subject presiding over the process perishes on the "end" or "satisfaction" being attained, because there is then no further need for the subject as such. The achievement or satisfaction, however, does not perish but enjoys "objective immortality," subsequently functioning as a "potential" for a new becoming. And, not only does an actual entity synthesise in a novel way the antecedent occasions of the world, but it also prehends "eternal objects" which are an entirely different type of entity. The two types of "feeling" resulting from this twofold prehension are "physical" for the occasions of the world and "conceptual" for eternal objects. Thus an actual entity is said to have a "physical" pole and a "mental" pole. Whitehead's philosophy emphasises the significance of the various processes of integration and reintegration which take place between these two poles of the self-creative process.

Eternal Objects. These are "forms of definiteness"; they determine the specific character of any actual entity, or they determine the "kind" of feeling the subject experiences. They also relate occasions to each other. The events we commonly regard as spatial and temporal have also an eternal element and it is through this that we are able to discriminate the differences and qualities of events. In truth, observed the lecturer, the things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things that are eternal.

Plato's doctrine of "ideas" has affinity with Whitehead's doctrine of "eternal objects." Plato showed that moral and æsthetic predicates such as "right," "just," "good," "beautiful," denoted permanent changeless natures. They were not apprehended by the senses but only by thought. Further, universals such as "whiteness," "smoothness" or geometrical shapes were apprehended by thought; the senses always perceived a *particular* patch of white, or a *particular* smooth thing. Examples of Whitehead's "eternal objects" are specific colours, sounds, tastes, smells, touches, geometrical shapes. In the region of mind they are specific types of pleasure or pain, of emotion or feeling. A mountain may endure for ages but, given sufficient time, wears away and finally vanishes. A colour, say a specific shade of blue, is exempt from the ravages of time. It is eternal, coming into the world when it is wanted by

nature, and disappearing when its function for the time being is over; only to return again when its presence is once again relevant. Hence such entities as colours and shapes are different from temporal things. They are pure "potentials" and their natures are eternal. We can know these eternal objects only when they ingress into nature to give form or character to a transitory event. The function of eternal objects, then, is to provide the flux of events with forms of definiteness. When feeling is in question, it is the eternal objects which define the varying kinds of emotion. In the experience of an actual entity an eternal object would indicate "how" the subject or the actual entity is feeling or prehending the data.

The realm of eternal objects must be regarded as the realm of "alternative possibility" in contrast to the realm of "actuality." The relevance of the realm of alternative possibility in regard to the actual world is clearly evident in art and morality. In a literary romance what "might be" but is not is the very heart of the matter. And a great painting or sculpture draws aside the veil that divides the temporal from the eternal. In the realm of morals, when the prophet, urged by deep feeling, criticises in scathing language his people's way of living, he is disclosing to them finer alternatives which have their abode in the eternal realms of possibility.

Now because of the systematic relatedness of eternal objects the whole realm is prehended either positively or negatively in every actual occasion. A metaphysic of the universe must include as complementary facets both the realm of the actual and the realm of the ideal, which brings us to the fourth concept:

God. We have seen that "Creativity" is a general activity, not an entity but a metaphysical character underlying all entities, having a particular mode for each occasion. There must be a principle of Limitation or a principle of Concretion for the metaphysical situation, because the world represents a limitation upon possibility, and when we consider value we find that this depends on restriction. But there could not be value without antecedent standards to make possible the rejection or acceptance of the actual.

Whitehead called this principle "the primordial nature of God," a principle for which no reason can be given, for all reason flows from it. The primordial nature of God is "the conscrescence of a unity of conceptual feelings, including all eternal objects. In other words, He is the unlimited conceptual realisation of the absolute wealth of potentiality, not before all creation, but with all creation." As primordial, God's feelings are conceptual only, but the lack of His actuality is overcome by His "Consequent" nature which is the reaction of the physical world upon His primordial nature. Thus God's nature is completed by a fullness of physical feeling being added to His conceptual feeling: and He is now fully actual. The completion of God by His integration of the world into Himself, does not change in any way His eternal primordial nature. It remains eternally the same and is the ground upon which all order depends. Creativity without its attribute "God" would be unable to effect any ordered synthesis. Hence the primordial nature of God is at once the foundation of order and the goal of advance towards novelty.

THE THEISTIC WORLD OUTLOOK

Adopting from the first a method of illustrating rather than of explicit exegesis, the lecturer said that those who were familiar with the voluminous writings of the Danish prophet, Soren Kierkegaard, would know that at one point in his life Kierkegaard had addressed himself to one question, finding in that one question the concentration of his whole moral, spiritual and intellectual concern. That question was: How can a man become a Christian?

More generally, one might ask how Theism should be approached: how could a man become a Theist? This process of becoming something that one was not had been a problem since Plato. In the early books of *The Republic*, the argument was gradually generalised so that the answer indicated a form of life itself. Theism was not something that could easily be set forth. One could perhaps hope only to indicate indirectly what was involved in that process of becoming a Theist, of believing in God. Theism had to be presented as a form of life rather than as a set of propositions. Was not this to retreat from the necessity of scrutinising a doctrine? Hardly. But it would perhaps help in understanding the doctrine.

There had been, the speaker thought, no more radical critic of the very possibility of rational theology than Kant. He was prepared to argue that even to speak of God as existing was to utter a proposition devoid of objective significance. The concept of existence had significance for Kant only in the charmed circle of the subject-object relation: only when empirical observational cash-value could be assigned to the distinction between existent and non-existent. To speak, therefore, of the existence of God or of an Absolute was in fact for Kant to say nothing that could claim factual significance. Yet how much of his metaphysic was itself conditioned by his recognition that the functions of factual and of supposedly metaphysical assertion were altogether different! How much by his recognition that the nature at once of the empirical knowledge that lay at the basis of physics, and of the human concern with God, with Freedom and with Immortality, was denied if we supposed the latter to be satisfied by some extension of the former—by a treatment of those concerns as belonging to the field of the factual!

Kant recognised and bore abundant testimony to the recognition that between metaphysical assertion and factual assertion there was a great gulf that he strove to define by his famous distinction between reason and understanding. Kant recognised how relentlessly man's nature impelled him towards metaphysics, towards unconditioned satisfaction concerning his origin his nature, his destiny. On these issues Man must come to rest. Kant's aim in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was to show that these issues were not theoretical and that the attempt to treat them as such would be to deny their nature. It would be to disguise from ourselves that the concern with such issues was not speculative but touched the roots of the moral life. Indeed, one of the greatest critics of speculative metaphysics emphasised the function in the life of Man of such convictions as that of the reality of God.

But Theism demanded a more exhaustive treatment, and it could be said that the inadequacy of Kant's conception of the moral life beggared perhaps his own understanding of theistic belief. To understand Theism better we could do worse than look at the Theist. The lecturer reviewed some criticism of the seventeenth-century Hobbes and of the classical materialism, which could itself be regarded as the expression of an attitude of mind. He recalled also how Mill had rejected the utilitarian argument by saying that it was better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.

Looking at Theism as a world-outlook one had to take both the doctrine and the man—Theism and the Theist—as a complex, as the expression, however incomplete and undefined, on the level at once of intellect and of will. The old ontological arguments for the existence of God were too simple, but if we examined the confrontation of the views of Aquinas and of Anselm we might learn something concerning the traditional theistic proof....Looking back beyond Descartes to Anselm we found that something at least of the genius of that so-called proof had been allowed to escape. Anselm wrote to fortify the faith of his monks, men trained in the religious life, passed through the discipline of the initiate, dedicated to the *opus Dei*. Their whole life was integrated upon a centre. It was given a sense of direction; and it was to fortify these men, whose intellectual gifts perhaps somewhat lagged behind their spiritual capacity, that Anselm offered his proof. This took faith, most ambiguous of concepts, for granted.

However foreign Anselm's language might be for us, his method could probably be restated to show that what he commended did not involve the fallacy of treating existence as an attribute. It was only the fool, Anselm maintained, who would say that God did not exist, for he alone would approach the question as a trivial one without proper scrutiny. As was well known, Aquinas attacked the ontological proof as either invalid or unphilosophical, *i.e.*, falling outside the scope of philosophy as he understood it. Anselm would argue that we started with an idea of the Absolute and then tested that idea, disciplining it, refining it till its self-authenticating character was revealed. The argument included a readiness to take human experience as the starting-point. The proposition that things exist possessed some kind of absolute and not relative significance.

There was in Aquinas, however, a strain of agnosticism. For him the movement towards God was from below. The lecturer said he had seen an unpublished work of a young Dominican philosopher in Britain on the naming of God, who maintained that for St. Thomas our ideas only enabled us to see ourselves and our world in relation to God, but contained nothing of His being. Only indirectly could we approach One whose being transcended and was independent of our own. There was also the modern adaptation of Anselm's methods by those who, like the late F. H. Bradley, defended a metaphysic of Immanence. According to this, the realisation of contradictions was in our own mental experiences and not in the intervention of a transcendent God.

When we asked what gave transcendent Theism its starting-point, the

Thomist proofs seemed less proofs than moments in the development of a position that had been, somehow, gained. How gained? It seemed today that we had to treat the question, not as one which could be settled by the mechanism of proof or disproof, by reflection merely on the issues raised by Anselm, by Aquinas, by Kant. We had to look at the object of common concern, at a way of life....The Theist was always at a disadvantage, confessed the lecturer. One could expound the metaphysics of Absolutism easily enough. But Theism did not lend itself to metaphysical analysis. In the West it had always been that doctrine which treated the *Personal* as of primary significance, without losing sight of the necessity of understanding both the world of things and of men.

After criticising the relevant doctrines of Hegelian and Marxist philosophy, the speaker concluded that the Theist did not deny that the order which men find in Nature was discovered as the expression of intelligibility, because the Nature in question was the expression of intelligence. To uphold the world of the personal, the significance of the deeps of human life, without denying order in Nature was part of the Theistic problem. And also, without denying the world resulting from the efforts that men made to bring order out of chaos in the field of social life. A case could be made for Theism, as a conception of transcendent God, that it vindicated itself by the extent to which it opened unsuspected doors, giving men the sense of complexity in the world but never losing sight of underlying unity. It gave men the sense of Time and of Eternity. It gave them the sense of the rational and of the personal. One could not understand Theism without seeing it as a determined attempt to live in the light of a conviction that contradictories were reconciled, oppositions overcome, but not wholly by us. One must realise its readiness to face the fact of waste, and the reality and significance of choice. It said that if we chose such methods as we employed to bring the war to a speedy conclusion, that choice remained for evil or for good. There could be no going back, no turning away from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, from Hamburg and Nuremberg. The Theist endeavoured to be human, recognising the ambivalence in human life. His conception of humanity was related to the thought of the purpose of a Creator greater than himself, in whom and through whom all contradictions were reconciled. The problem of the relation of Time to God was the central metaphysical problem of Theism. The Theist took Time desperately seriously, as was shown by the significance he attached to choice; and yet he knew that he himself at every moment of his life was related to the Eternal. And this Eternal was not unconcerned with what went on in time.

Finally the speaker observed that Theism, more than any other world view, trembled on the brink of mythology. Whitehead had said that Christianity (and the speaker himself admitted that his own remarks on Theism were coloured by Christian theology) was a religion still in search of a metaphysic which it had not found, perhaps because it could not find it. But how become a Theist? He, the speaker, could not answer. Perhaps others more competent than himself would show what was involved, the mode of life to which the Theist aspired.

THE CHOICE OF A WORLD OUTLOOK

Miss Emmet said that it fell to her to ask what was meant by a world view and why it was so difficult to arrive at an agreed view. Perhaps the term itself was unsatisfactory, but the definition of the German philosopher Dilthey was helpful:—

> A complex of ideas and sentiments comprising beliefs and convictions about the nature of life and the world, emotional habits and tendencies based on these, and purposes, preferences and principles governing action which give life, unity and meaning.

She thought that if this definition was intended to cover pessimistic outlooks as well, it would have to include the attitudes of fortitude and rebellion. As for the word "world," it apparently included not only the whole physical universe, which she meant when she used the word "Nature," but also man's interpretation of himself as related to his environment in the widest sense, including his attitude towards life. Thus it went beyond such limited schemes as that implied by the American phrase "culture pattern."

It might be said that our world outlook was ultimately determined by social, temperamental and psychological factors beyond our control. So we would have no real "choice." There were real difficulties in the view that metaphysics was a kind of science of being that could command agreement. Nevertheless there were real considerations that could be taken into account in coming to a world outlook, that might not be demonstrable logically and yet would not be merely the expression of our socially and temperamentally determined attitude of mind.

The layman generally held some midway view and was distrustful of the word "metaphysics." He felt there was something fishy about the science of pure being, and was disturbed if told that his notions of truth and falsehood did not apply to his beliefs about the world. We could perhaps turn for help to considering the possibilities of the kind of synoptic philosophy which Professor Price had called the search for synoptic clarity. A sign of the present demand for it was the objection to over-specialisation. But we had also become distrustful of airy generalisations, and, once one started being synoptic, one was bound to talk about various things of which one knew very little. Specialisation had made standards of knowledge more and more exacting, hence the tendency to concentrate on the safer ground of established but limited knowledge. So we had to beware of the Scylla of Positivism, and the appeal to empirical matter-of-fact, on one side, and the Charybdis, on the other side, of deep-seated temperamental attitudes of mind. Our world outlook might turn out to be a kind of ideology, ultimately derived from our social or psychological heritage. So it might be said that we must stick to our piecemeal enquiry into matters of fact.

The view known as Thomism, or neo-Thomism, was an example of a questionable claim to be a science of being, for it always came down to some very general statement equivalent to "Being is what it is." But the doctrines of Spinozism on the other side were equally wanting in finality. Neither of these alternative ways of looking at the world could be made conclusive as against the other. Did we have to admit that it was possible

to demonstrate what being was and that it existed by logical necessity, as Spinoza would, or could we say with St. Thomas that some transcendent ground existed? Could we, with what Professor Alexander called "natural piety" quietly accept being, and then go on to consider other things?

It was often argued that the world as a whole could never be an object of consciousness. We could study a limited number of things that fell within our experience. If we tried to extend our enquiry from these objects and to say something about the nature of the world as a whole we had to assume that something like our own cosmic views held good universally, or else we had to say something so general that it told us nothing at all. It was obvious that we could not treat the world as a whole in the comprehensive way that the scientists treated objects of study. Perhaps it was better, then, to consider world outlooks as interpretations.

Raising again the question of alternatives, the speaker referred to the belief that in the study of historical conditions a world outlook could be deepened. She thought that no metaphysics which had not come to terms with that possibility could make headway. Metaphysicians had to recognise the truth that that kind of relativism contained.

Now in dealing with empirical evidence there was a discipline of accuracy. It was possible for people to agree on certain ascertained issues even if one could not be free of all presuppositions. This might be one of the correctives to prevent a world view from becoming a world ideology, *e. g.*, as in Germany, where the traditional accuracy of research had been jettisoned to bring it into line with such conceptions as that of racial biology. One could not, however, necessarily disprove a world view merely by pointing to facts that did not square with it. What happened under such criticism was that you ultimately realised that you were turning to special pleading for your outlook. You realised that you had to make a change in your fundamental convictions. This was a judgment of conscience. The relationship between empirical fact and the wider schemes of interpretation was difficult.

We could not yet really speak of a unified scientific view of the world. Moreover, no view could be adequate which ignored forms of experience such as the ethical, the religious and the æsthetic. There were certain world views which achieved unity by leaving out such characteristics. This suggested another test. Would the view stand up to a close scrutiny of its fundamental concepts? How often were world outlooks drawn up in terms of loose concepts, analogies and metaphors, *e. g.*, "dynamic," "evolution," "field," "pattern," "dimension."

Another corrective against our view being mere ideology was a genuine concern for Truth and Reality. The speaker believed there was a real dividing line between those who said their world outlook was an expression of a conditioned attitude of mind and those who were trying to make it express Truth. This aiming at Truth was not the same as "verification." The sense of obligation to Truth could still support belief when "verification" was not possible. This was only a recognition of the situation in which we human beings were continually placed towards

things that concerned us most, as in morality—when we had to act according to our lights and do our best.

Reality also was a large word. It meant more than "the totality of all that is in the case."... We distinguished between those who were trying to make some sort of unity out of our experiences, and those who started from our experience but held that we were also trying to interpret reality other than ourselves. Our world outlooks were partial and incomplete but the fact that we could be critically aware of these limitations meant that we could to some extent transcend them. The recognition of obligation seemed to be the point of stability which different world outlooks could hold in common. At least we could find a common point in the centrality (not the same as infallibility) of conscience, as recognised by responsible thinkers.

In different world outlooks a more explicit unifying principle had been sought in different ways. The procedure was usually to take certain concepts that expressed relationships within given limits and extend them. You selected some unifying principle, saw it as a clue for a wider interpretation of experience. But we might find our real diversities strain and break our principles when these were applied. Then, like some of the theologically minded, we could not talk of any question in science or politics except in theological terms. Possibly Freudianism was another example of the conviction that our world outlook was possible only by some kind of selective simplification.

Certainly we could get nowhere without simplification, concentrating on things that were more important than other things. One test of importance was the effect on other events and ideas, as of Copernicus' notion of the motions of the earth. Finally there was achievement as an element which made a contrast with triviality. Achievement on a sufficient scale was what we called "greatness." The achievements of excellence—in character; in products of the imagination—in art and literature; the actions which shaped decisively man's life and society—in these importance included a measure of achievement. No world view could stand, said the speaker, that did not sustain our sense of the importance of these things. But a world outlook should be not only interested in human beings; it should try to see them in relation to the non-human universe. It had to express the sense of Man's dependence on greatness other than his own achievements, it had to sustain our sense of our importance without "self-importance."

R. L. MEGROZ

ENDS AND SAYINGS

" _____ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

The venerable Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, who died November 12th, left, in the Benares Hindu University, a monument which will endure long after his political career and his personal orthodoxy are forgotten. He was not the first to dream of a great educational centre which, in a world gone mad on modern methods, would uphold the traditional values of Indian learning and culture. But he was not content only to dream. He matched his vision with a will that overrode all obstacles.

In the name of his country and his vision, he gave up his lucrative lawyer's practice to take up, figuratively speaking, the begging-bowl. He did not lay it by until he had more than a crore of rupees, to make it possible to start his national university on a worthy scale. Not all the donors shared his great enthusiasm, but the reluctance or indifference of Prince and business magnate melted away in the fire of his faith.

The institution came into existence in 1915. He served it as Vice-Chancellor from 1919 to 1939 and, since, as its Vice-Patron and Rector. He did not neglect in his plans what modern education had to offer. Chemical, Industrial, Engineering and Mining studies have been fostered along with Philosophy and other lines more closely related to the Indian tradition, but the Benares University stands as an upholder of Indian values and the Indian way of life.

The tribute paid by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, a modern with a different outlook, is a tribute not only to the late Pandit Malaviya but also, by implication, as the *Indian Social Reformer* points out, to the national cultural heritage for which he stood. "India," Sir Tej truly declared, "loses in him one of her most trusted leaders and Hindu society its pillar of strength."

Diagnosis and prescription were both embodied in the address of Sir S. Radhakrishnan, chief Indian delegate, before the first plenary session of UNESCO at Paris on November 22nd. The world today is divided not only by the distinctions of race and of place, to which he pointed, but also by the numberless distinctions based on sex and creed and caste, economic and social status etc. Good-will, he rightly declared, was not enough to create and maintain world unity. Amiability has its place but something more than well-wishing is necessary to sound relations between man and man. Men may wish the lower orders well. The dignity and value of the individual man had to be emphasised, Sir Sarvepalli said.

Human life has become all too cheap and human happiness at best a pawn upon the board when diplomats are playing for high stakes. The coming

into being of UNESCO bespeaks the recognition that, as Sir Sarvepalli pointed out, science and culture have a rôle in bringing men together. Learning to appreciate our fellow-men and to see things from their point of view may awaken the will to justice. But acting justly means self-discipline, the chief ingredient in Dr. Radhakrishnan's remedy, but the factor oftenest overlooked by the world planners. "My own country believes," Sir Sarvepalli said (and it is true, however much some recent actions of the few belie it) "that if we are to create and maintain peace, peoples of the world must impose discipline upon themselves."

There is no lack of recognition of the need for discipline—of other nations, peoples, ideologies and individuals. The recognition of the need to discipline ourselves, which is the true *Swaraj*, depends primarily upon acceptance of "a philosophy of life devoted to the establishment of spiritual values." He called for its creation; we would rather say, its rediscovery.

The subsequent election of Sir Sarvepalli as Chairman of the Executive Council of UNESCO was a tribute to the views which he expressed, an earnest of the hope for India's lead out of the present labyrinth.

The materialistic outlook fostered by most modern education has borne its bitter fruits. Rani Laxmibai Rajwade, writing in the November-December *Rural India* on "Religious Education in India" points out that now, when India's new educational system is on the anvil, is an opportune time to introduce an ethical and religious element in the schools. Are the additional millions to be educated under the new plans to be given the stone of a materialistic bias for the bread of truth? Rani Laxmibai Rajwade recognises sectarianism as "the curse of our national life" but also rightly holds that a sound ethical and religious foundation is indispensable to a well-rounded life. She finds the solution in the underlying unity of all religions and their identity in ethical and moral code. The State cannot evade its responsibility by pleading neutrality, she writes. It has a duty to interfere "when religion is used as a cloak for preaching a hymn of hate and to fan the fire of fanaticism." A man's personal religion is his own concern; his ethics concern all. She therefore calls for the compiling and the country-wide promulgation of an ethical code based on the principles common to all faiths.

A comparably broad stand is taken by "Priyasishya" in his "Notes by the Way" in the Christian weekly, *The Guardian* of Madras, for 21st November. He declares that

> a common religious teaching of inspirational type will be an improvement over sectarian religion on one hand and no religion on the other.

He fails, he says, to understand the "'My religion or nothing' attitude taken by some of our educationists."

To a common ethical code we would add the teaching of the lives of all the great religious teachers, and the impressing on the teachers of the nation of their own responsibility by way of example. "Moral education," Whitehead wrote, "is impossible without the habitual vision of greatness."

A warning that if the industrialisation of India took the form of centralised industries the end could only be

India's turning imperialistic was given by Shri J. C. Kumarappa, Secretary of the All-India Village Industries Association, speaking at Madras on 30th November. Only "public utility industries," he said, ought to be nationalised. The production of such indispensables as food and cloth should be decentralised, which meant, in effect, a scheme for the development of cottage industries with village self-sufficiency the aim. In the present era of over-centralisation of industry, when greed for raw materials and markets has demonstrably contributed to international friction, such a warning may be necessary as an offset to an exaggerated trend. Decentralisation has much to commend it. By all means, let the country be dotted with small factories in preference to congestion and other disadvantages of manufacturing plants in great cities.

The self-sufficiency of each village can, however, be accepted as an ideal only up to a certain point. Whether for a village, a nation or an individual, complete self-sufficiency is a lower aim than a harmonious balance between self-dependence and interdependence, in which each unit shall produce what it best can, each served for all the rest by all the rest. The traditional village organisation itself should teach this lesson.

Let us not assign wrong causes. Imperialistic exploitation and economic rivalry are rooted not in specialisation of function but in ignoble and self-seeking aims.

M. R. Masani, speaking at Jamshedpur December 4th, saw the present choice as being, "not between socialism and capitalism, but between decentralised economic democracy and highly centralised totalitarianism." The press reports that "though a socialist, the speaker found it difficult to believe that, at least in the present century, collectivism could be reconciled with democracy."

The centralisation of political and economic power in a few hands must lead to dictatorship and exploitation of the masses.

India, he implied, had to find a way to avert the repetition of the "Russian disaster." He urged a *via media*—a co-ordinated economy in which State, co-operative and free enterprise should all find place.

None but the trafficker in human souls can fail to rejoice at the step taken by the Government of India after consultation with the Provincial Governments in prohibiting the smoking of opium throughout British India. The Finance Department (Revenue Division) Gazette Extraordinary of November 20th permits opium smoking only to existing addicts and to them only on medical certificates.

In fulfilment...of their international obligations and in their earnest desire to co-operate in weaning mankind from a pernicious habit, the Government of India now feel that the prohibition of opium smoking is desirable, despite the practical difficulties in the way of its full enforcement.

It is unfortunate that the desire to help wean mankind from a pernicious habit is not always strong enough to overcome the greed for profits from a soul-destroying trade. International public opinion has now set its face against the opium evil with good effect. But the coddling of the liquor interests continues to be upheld in the sacred name of revenue, let the human costs be what they may. That and other evils

must await the further awakening of the public conscience in India and throughout the world.

Dr. J. C. Chatterjee, in his address as Chairman of the Inter-University Board of India, meeting at Jaipur on December 3rd, arraigned the present attitude towards Universities "as factories for the production of graduates." Universities, nay, the whole modern educational system, cannot escape a share in the responsibility for this attitude. It is rooted in the false conception that the aim of education is not to train character and to unfold the natural aptitudes, to produce free and unprejudiced minds, but to increase the factual content of the student's mind so that he can pass examinations. The principal function of the Universities, Dr. Chatterjee declared, should be

> to produce leaders of men who would influence and guide national thought, rid themselves of the cancer of communalism and by example and precept free our people from a malady which, at the moment, threatens to rob the nation of the fruits of freedom.

Men of all creeds and classes, seeking knowledge, met in the Universities, whose responsibility it was to fuse different ideals, ways of thought, of action and of speech in "a complete whole, beautiful in symmetry and proportion." But the new orientation from within must first come. Then only will there be hope for respectful recognition of the Universities in their ancient rôle of "seats of learning and research," where knowledge is pursued for its own sake. Then only, too, will there be justification for the complete freedom from outside control for which the Chairman pleaded. But the crux of the problem is the correct evaluation of educational aims.

The materialistic claim that "trial and error" is the method of all advance, even throughout the field of human thought and enterprise, was vigorously challenged by Prof. Narayan Rao A. Nikam at the Twenty-First Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress. In his presidential address before the Logic and Metaphysics Section, he repudiated the idea that the historical process is "nothing else but a never-ending series of trial and errors," any more than, with its "immense wastefulness," it can be called "a march of God upon the earth." Leaving aside the question of the method of organic adaptation, "Is it suggested," he demands, that "Man has no prevision of Truth and Value, that we have lighted upon these only by the way?" He points to the persistence of effort which makes history, as a proof that the historical process is more than a series of trial and errors. But, even if it be a trial and error process, he declares,

> it is at least admitted that we have reached a stage when it is *consciously* developed; this must mean that we have moved away from its preliminary gropings to the stage of an awakening; although the distance between this and the Final Stage of good is an immense stretch of futurity, Time is *finite*, because our efforts will outlast its apparent endlessness, and is not otherwise; the final good is therefore attained some day; while the greatness of our errors and the evil we endure because of them, must give us some slight foretaste of the greatness of the good which exceeds in an infinite measure all the evils by which we have attained it.
