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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and lost among the host — as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—The Voice of the Silence

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IDEALISM IN PRACTICE

...there are two kinds of knowledge, the real and the unreal; the real concerned with eternal verities and primal causes, the unreal with illusory effects.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY

Happy is the man who cultivates the things that are hidden and lets the things that are apparent take care of themselves.

—KUROZUMI KYO

To have the highest ideal placed before oneself and strive incessantly to rise up to it, is the only true concentration recognized by Esoteric Philosophy which deals with the inner world of *noumena*, not the outer shell of *phenomena*.

—DAMODAR K. MAVALANKAR

IN our contemporary civilization the terms "idealism" and "realism" are usually considered antonyms. Too often and too easily the ideal is considered the unreal as against the objective, which is deemed the only reality. Similarly, the idealist has come to mean the man who is impractical, the visionary chasing rainbows, the dreamer building castles in the air, while the man who believes only in the existence of the external world and whose business is to deal with the hard "facts" of sensuous experience is alone considered practical. There is some good reason for this sharp distinction between a pseudo-idealist and a pseudo-realist. For a narrow and utilitarian outlook is as deficient as a vague and sentimental idealism. M. R. Cohen has rightly put it when he warns against "near-sighted positivists who call themselves realists (because they do not see the full reality) and the lazy dreamers who call themselves idealists (because they do not grapple with basic ideas)." However, these are extremes which exaggerate defects. And the antithesis is not fundamentally correct. The fact is that the modern man has yet to learn the true meaning of reality.

Even without considering the philosophical implications of the question, it should not be difficult to perceive that this contrast between the idealist and the realist is not altogether accurate. In actual life the two are so closely related as to be inseparable. Can any building be erected or any bridge constructed without the co-operation of the designer, the architect and the builders? Every monument incorporates the dreams of the designer, the data of the architect and the labour of the actual workmen. Both the idealist and the realist must combine their efforts and are helpless without each other. Neither of them can afford to isolate himself.

And in every man both these aspects exist potentially, and both soon discover each other in men who are sincere and disinterested. The honest "realist" determined to seek and face the full reality will soon be led to the recognition that ideals are both indispensable and powerful factors in the shaping of men's lives. Similarly, a genuine "idealist" will discover that idealism in practice calls for the sternest of disciplines, self-discipline, and for the most impartial evaluation of the objective world.

However, of the two the "ideal" must be given supremacy over the mere "practical," for the ideal precedes its visible manifestation and gives the directive to one's line of conduct. All great men of action whose work has been beneficent and constructive have also been true idealists. This was strikingly so in the case of Gandhiji, whose success in the sphere of practical action can be directly traced to his ideals. He himself recognized this to be so and in one place he has defined human life on that basis. He says that "faith in one's ideals constitutes true life, in fact, it is man's all in all." To him ideals, although boundless and thus seeming to recede farther and farther away as we advance, were nevertheless "closer to us than our very hands and feet because we are more certain of their reality and truth than even our own physical being."

Behind this concept lies the recognition that the "ideal" belongs to the ever-existing, to the sphere of the eternal reality, while the objects of sense are but fleeting shadows and therefore less "real." From this follows the proposition that the idealist is the only truly practical man and that the materialistic realist lives most impractically because divorced from the values of the Eternal Spirit. There is far more to man than his outward and mortal body, and far more to life than material pursuits and worldly interests. Ideas and ideals are mightier because more real than concrete objects, and they it is that rule the world. The acceptance of an ideal can transform an individual and revolutionize a whole world.

Let us then not fight shy of being idealists. Let us set up as high an ideal as we can respond to and strive incessantly to realize it, that is, to

make it *real* to ourselves, so real that it can be incorporated into the very fabric of our being and become the basis for daily life.

And of all ideals none is more dynamic than the "reality" of the oneness of all life and its logical corollary, the Brotherhood of Man. Let the realization of the Brotherhood of Humanity become the ideal in the inner consciousness and let man endeavour to make it "real," and slowly but in all certainty his outward life will reflect it.

As this is being written comes the report of a remarkable pronouncement by the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru. Delivering the Convocation Address at the University of Delhi, the Prime Minister declared that "if we lose sight of the spiritual element probably the disintegration of society will proceed in spite of all material advance."

This is profoundly true. Awareness of our deeper selves is necessary, as it alone gives true vision. We must behold heavenly ideas and try to shape human affairs in accordance with these ideal patterns. Mere utilitarian projects will not bring understanding or happiness. What appears "impractical" to the materialist, namely, the denial of self, is in reality the most practical; for it opens the mind to a larger dimension which reveals the greater Self and paves the road to peace and good will. Without it all efforts will be vain and result in increasing conflict and confusion.

In sober truth, then, none of us can afford to do without idealism. While walking firmly on this earth, our gaze must travel beyond and above it and contemplate the wonder of the starry firmament. Robert St. John defines the idealist thus:—

> Being an idealist means having a dream of what life on this crazy planet of ours *could* be like, and then seeing how much of that dream in our lifetime can be translated into reality. It means reaching for the stars. Of course, you don't always capture a star. But many times you come back with a bit of star dust in your hands.

May we dream high and bold dreams and translate them into action! May we reach for the stars and return from our flight to the sphere of Eternal Truth with that star dust that will shed its light upon the path of works!

NAMRATĀ

THE COSMIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE BARDIC SCHOOLS

[MYSTERY surrounds the Druids of Britain and of Gaul, some of whose lore was echoed by the Celtic bards, but such are the similarities between what is known of their teachings and of the once universal Wisdom Religion that it is not surprising that Pliny should have called them "*Magi.*" The author of this article, "**F.C.**," has drawn mostly upon an English and a French source for her data — Rolleston's *Myths and Legends of the Celtic Race* and *Chroniques des Grandes Époques* by Commines. Her suggestion of a connection between the philosophy of the Druids and that of the certainly more ancient Megalithic builders of the so-called Druidical remains like Stonehenge has more to commend it than the hypothetical affinity with the early Hebrews. The charge, moreover, of human sacrifice sometimes levelled against the Druids accords ill with their noble philosophical and ethical teachings. Rejecting the imputation to the Druids of a savage spirit, Mr. W. Arthur Peacock quoted the following from the old Bardic teachings in his article on "Druidism" in our July 1932 issue: —

> The three foundations of piety : active justice, perceptive truth and energetic love.
> The three necessities of goodness : knowledge, consideration and happiness.

— ED.]

MOST religion and mysticism is fundamentally of Eastern origin, and it is interesting to note how a similar basic conception of truth runs through faiths and philosophies widely separated by time and national idiom. Remembering this, anyone even superficially acquainted with Gnostic thought is little surprised to find traces of the same teaching in the maxims of the ancient Celtic Druids.

When Julius Cæsar landed in Britain he invaded more than a mere temporal kingdom, for his arrival signalized the eventual downfall of the religious system of the Druids.

Britain was the centre and stronghold of this mysterious philosophy of whose origin even less is known than of its practice. It was a cult which at that time dominated Western Europe and it is believed that the wandering Megalithic peoples carried it with them on their varied journeyings, and imposed it on the Celtic tribes whenever the two races came in contact.

Of the Megalithic tribes, too, little is known, but it is possible that they originated in Northern Africa, and it is significant that wherever their monoliths and cromlechs are found scattered over Western Europe, there, in the past, Druidism flourished, and such monuments are rightly identified

with Druidic worship.

The first school of Druidism, it is said, came into being beneath the oaks of Mamre, soon after the death of Abraham, and it is likely that the Bardic philosophy was fundamentally an offshoot of early Hebraic teaching. Oak trees were always held in great reverence by the Druids, and to the Hebrews they seemed to have a similar significance, according to the books of the Old Testament.

Abraham set up his tents under the oak trees on the plain of Mamre, and the early Hebrews obviously attached importance to the tree as a religious and social symbol.

It is recorded that Abraham built a tabernacle beneath an oak tree, and there performed sacerdotal rites; he also planted an oak grove in Beer-Sheba, and raised another altar beneath the oaks of Moreh. Jacob, later in history, hid the renounced gods of his household and the earrings of his family beneath the oaks of Shechem.

Unfortunately, for interest's sake, the Bardic traditions were taught orally, in the Greek tongue, which the Druids had learnt from an early settlement of Greeks in these islands.[1] The Bards committed nothing to writing in their schools, thus surrounding their teaching with an impressive aura of power and mystery. Yet, in spite of the difficult nature of their instruction, fragments of their thought persisted in Wales, where the Bardic Order had more of a continuous existence than in any other part of the country.

Towards the end of the sixteenth century, a Welsh scholar in Glamorgan, Llewellyn Sion, compiled two volumes of Bardic philosophy from knowledge in his possession.

These books, called "*Barddas,*" are full of interesting material, and, although some historians have regarded them with scorn, they cannot be lightly dismissed as of no authentic value, and their account of Druidical philosophy may, indeed, be reasonably correct.

In many ways the Bardic concepts are similar to those of the Gymnosophists and Brahmins of India, the Magi of Persia and the Chaldeans of Assyria.

The Bards believed in an all-powerful Trinity. Their God, Achari, created the world under the administration of three perfect beings: (1) Bramba—Penetration, (2) Breschen—existing motive force, (3) Mahaddin—the great Lord, destructive power.

They believed in a doctrine of a succession of worlds, and recognized

[1]According to Julius Cæsar, the Druids' instruction was entirely oral, but they had a written language for other matters, for which the Greek characters were used.—ED.

two primary existences: God—the force of creative energy—and the principle of destruction, or spiritual death and dissolution. According to their teaching, in the beginning there were two planes of being, God and Annwn, the latter being identified with Chaos, or the great Void.

Organized life came into being when God pronounced the mysterious Word, and then Manred was created, consisting of indivisible particles of matter with the spirit of God contained in each. The Druidic design of existence was illustrated by three concentric circles.

The inner circle was "Abred," the stage of evolution and effort; the second circle typified "Gwynfyd," or Purity, in which life triumphs over the forces of evil and dissolution; the third circle was called "Ceugant," or Infinity; this circle was represented by no visual circle but by rays like those of the sun, which was considered to be the abiding place of God alone.

A form of Catechism used by the Druids in the examinations for Bardic degrees has many interesting points in comparison with similar teaching in other religious philosophies. The Catechism is in the usual style and seems to stress the theme of recurrent life:—

Q. Whence didst thou proceed?

A. I came from the Great World, having my beginning in Annwn.

Q. Where art thou now and how camest thou to what thou art?

A. I am in the Little World, whither I came having traversed the circle of Abred, and now I am a Man, at its termination and extreme limits.

Q. What wert thou before thou didst become a man, in the circle of Abred?

A. I was in Annwn the least possible that was capable of life and the nearest possible to absolute death; and I came in every form and through every form capable of a body and life to the state of man along the circle of Abred, where my condition was severe and grievous during the age of ages, ever since I was parted in Annwn from the dead, by the gift of God, and His great generosity, and His unlimited and endless love.

Q. Through how many different forms didst thou come, and what happened unto thee?

A. Through every form capable of life, in water, in earth, in air. And there happened unto me every severity, every hardship, every evil, and every suffering, and but little was the goodness or Gwynfyd before I became a man....Gwynfyd cannot be obtained without seeing and knowing everything, but it is not possible to see or to know everything without suffering everything....And

> there can be no full and perfect love that does not produce those things which are necessary to lead to the knowledge that causes Gwynfyd.

The Maxims of the Druids are startling in their blending of savagery and flashes of real insight into the profundities of truth. A belief in ritual human sacrifice and in the possibility of the transmigration of souls was mutable in the faith, but the firm conviction of a joyous immortality was the greatest characteristic of the Druidic religion. So strong was this belief in a continuing after-life that the classical writers recorded with astonishment that the Celt would lend money on the promise of repayment in the next world—and for this reason also his courage in battle was phenomenal.

In so far as one can judge from the slight evidences remaining to us of Druidic teaching, it would seem to hold much to give cause for thought and for the assumption that it originally contained valuable gems of wisdom of a high and inspiring order—although it suffered contamination with the passage of time and was eventually lost in that same obscurity which so successfully protected its original precepts from a fierce and widespread laity!

F.C.

DRUIDS. A sacerdotal caste which flourished in Britain and Gaul. They were Initiates who admitted females into their sacred order, and initiated them into the mysteries of their religion. They never entrusted their sacred verses and scriptures to writing, but, like the Brahmans of old, committed them to memory; a feat which, according to the statement of Cæsar, took twenty years to accomplish. Like the Parsis they had no images or statues of their gods. The Celtic religion considered it blasphemy to represent any god, even of a minor character, under a human figure. It would have been well if the Greek and Roman Christians had learnt this lesson from the "pagan" Druids. The three chief commandments of their religion were:—"Obedience to divine laws; concern for the welfare of mankind; suffering with fortitude all the evils of life."—H. P. BLAVATSKY: *The Theosophical Glossary* ("Druids")

FREE WILL

[We may gain much from **Shri J. M. Ganguli's** pricking with a fine needle at our notion of our free will. It is too true that we flaunt our slaveries to many forces as our precious personal freedoms. And yet, ought not the glimpse in Shri Ganguli's last paragraph to be pursued otherwise than he does? If we *are* parts of the whole, true reflections of its essence, can we not understand in a deeper light the Sages' insistence that in us also are the freedom and bliss which are the nature of the All? We dwarf the great Cosmic Intelligence, the Demiurgos, sadly if we think that it cannot maintain a harmony out of our million queer strivings, simply by letting the full nature of our choices become manifest. This manifestation is our self-made Karma. No mortal man is master of his fate—but by being its pupil he may become immortal, and realize in himself the freedom of the Whole.—Ed.]

When we talk about free will—and that we do quite often, whenever some vagaries in human conduct are to be explained consonantly with some conventional belief—we seldom pause to think what we mean by it. We just take the doctrine as true, because so many people say so, and also because it is an essential prop to some basic religious beliefs. Many people, therefore, are not only disinclined to question the hypothesis of free will, but even consider it improper and irreligious to do so. But does free will really support or does it rather contradict the fundamental tenets of their religions?

Such religions start with the assumption of a God who can answer doubts and give us consolation in grief and distress. To uphold that idea several other assumptions have to be made regarding him and his powers and qualities. Of such assumptions human free will is a very important one; for without it so many ideas and beliefs about God go by the board. He is not simply the Lord and the Creator but is also All-Virtuous, All-Benevolent, All-Merciful; hence, when a man commits a wrong, a sin, and the question is asked, "Why did the All-Virtuous Creator give him that sinful inclination?" there can be no answer unless free will is accepted. The man's will was free, and for what he did of his free choice God cannot be held responsible. Free will is thus essential for supporting faith in such a popular God, or rather for justifying several of the attributes with which we make up a picture of him in our wishful thinking.

"Don't you believe in original sin?" That question throws further light on the frantic effort made by those who want to hold to their idea, or rather to the idea infused into them by some theological doctrinaires. If

there was no original sin, they have no explanation of misery and suffering; for God cannot have caused these. Rather do they say that if he is prayed to he gives comfort and relief to the sufferer. If we ask how they arrive at original sin or the origin of Creation, and the conditions prevailing then, they have no answer except that it is in the scriptures. Must such presumptuous reasoning based on scriptural authority be accepted, even if, when I look around, I see and realize how childish it is for man, who knows hardly anything beyond his immediate present, to dogmatize on conditions in the remotest past?

The confusion and fallacies into which we get entangled are due to our proceeding deductively from an idea about God which was itself conceived and developed as a straw to grasp at when the ocean of life tosses us too roughly. It is surer and more reasonable to go back inductively from the present to the prime cause. For that a close study of the present with an open mind, unprejudiced by any conventional theory or belief, is essential. Our experiences are all of this life, and our inferences and conclusions should rest on them. Though varied they show at least one thing, that into matters which really count free will scarcely enters at all. Our birth and death defy it; Nature contemptuously treads on it, and makes us play any odd part in its own plan, which we do not understand. Tremendous forces, over which I have not the slightest control, wreak ravages, changing and transforming me in a thousand ways, in pursuance of what purpose and subject to what law I cannot imagine, but surely not in obedience to my will. Not only does my physical growth and development, my very existence, depend entirely on outside forces and their operations, but my mind's inclinations and workings also are prompted and generated by them.

Will and inclination have been distinguished. It is said that the will controls inclination. An inclination may come, but it is for me, that is for my will, to decide whether that inclination is to be overcome and suppressed. But experience tells that the intensity of the inclination brings the will round to conformity with it. When it is said that the will can change inclination, it is not considered that the change may be due to a change of mood caused by bodily and external physical effects. When inclination ripens into desire and desire hardens into will, that gradual transformation is hardly perceived, much less acknowledged, because of our always strong egoistic disposition. We seldom pause to ask, How is it that our will, if it is free, changes with changes in physical conditions—changes in weather, season and climate, changes in environment and association—and, very markedly, with age and experience?

Perhaps it would be argued that it is not the will which changes with or depends on those changes, but only the inclination which seeks endorsement from our free will. That is the answer which comes to the question from all authoritative quarters; but the impulsiveness and vehemence with which the answer comes leave cold one who, in spite of having been taught the same tune, quietly looks into the question in the light of varied experience. Impulsiveness suggests absence of reflectiveness and a mere outpouring of what has been taken on trust from others' thoughts; while vehemence is the result of dogmatism, accompanied by impatience at anything that is out of alignment with accepted beliefs and preconceived ideas. But in considering freedom of will one's mind and outlook must also be free from prejudices and preconceived notions.

What is meant and understood by "will"? If it be that which decides our actions, no matter after what consideration or as a result of what sort of discriminating judgment, then it will be seen that this deciding element in an action is, as said above, the creature of external conditions, not necessarily the outward physical changes caused by Nature, but also environmental factors, different upbringing, teaching, social or religious traditions, etc.

When, faced by the same circumstances, two persons will to take different courses, a simple explanation that the individuals had free will, unconditioned and unrestrained by anything, does not carry conviction to a mind that is in quest of the fundamental causes, which may, from behind a screen, determine conduct. Walking through a green valley, one may will to shoot down a beautiful bird for his home museum while another may shudder at his friend and will himself to store deep within his ears the sweet melody that the bird leaves behind in its flight. Here the wills of neither are really free in any sense; they are preconditioned by the individuals' social and environmental pasts. It may be submitted that the one who aims his gun at the bird is free to change his mind. But if he did change it there would be greater force in saying that the change was due to the reaction he saw in his companion than in crediting him with a free will which changed his erstwhile inclination. The only feeble answer will be that the man was not *compelled* to change his mind by his friend's attitude; if he changed, he changed it of his own free will. That is not convincing, because it was obviously the other man's behaviour which told on his inclination, and the intensity of the effect may very well have decided.

The confusion in the insistence on free will is mainly due to misconcep-

tion of what feedom implies. In an absolute sense it should mean complete independence of any exterior cause; but without an exterior cause no impulse can come. Impulses, acts, feelings and, for the matter of that, will, whatever you may mean by it, are all reactions to external events. Interdependence is as inevitable as absolute independence is impossible. To the extent of that interdependence any freedom of will must be restricted. And a further restriction is the condition of the person reacting to the event. Between two such restrictions, which cannot be defined and limited, little is left which deserves the appellation of freedom.

Let us look at the picture of man, and watch him from a distance without drawing him into a discussion about his ways and doings. He is born in pain; he cries in helplessness; he rises and grows in accordance with the faculties he has inherited and been given by education, and according to the conditions he is placed in, without his will having any say in the matter. See how his inclinations, tendencies, desires and impulses obey and follow his physical conditions, his sickness, his weak or good health, the weather and the season, and even the changes from day to night. What he wills to do in winter he does not in summer; what he seeks in daytime he does not think of in the night; in every way he shows that what is called his will is formed by causes and conditions external to him and outside his control. If he becomes an academician or a theologian and gives discourses on free will, that can be traced to various subtle effects and influences having worked outside and also within his physical body, as much as the history of a sailor who says he loves the sea, of a drunkard who says he drinks of his own will, or of a poet who pities me because I do not have the will to write poetry as he has, can be traced to different causes which have worked on them to make them think as they do.

When a man dilates on free will he is actually confining himself within the very low dome of his conceit. If he looks out beyond it he will be amused at his ridiculous fancy. What is he, indeed, in the midst of the tremendous force sweeping in the universe, and of what significance can his play of will be in the plan and structure of the great purpose to which that terrific force is working? For even a twinkling of an eye I cannot steady myself in space, through the cold void of which I am dashed, whereto I do not know. Not for a moment can I hold up the rushing traffic of events and happenings around me to take my breath. I have no control over the working of the machinery inside my body, whose growth, decay and development go on, not to my like or dislike, but to the signs and dictates of laws and effects which I cannot challenge. I cannot keep myself an extra minute longer at my mother's love-warm breast by

postponing my physical growth. Even when I become conscious—or, rather, over-conscious—of my own will, I cannot will to have a moment of ecstasy held in my hand longer than the stern laws of Nature allow. My softest feelings and tenderest sentiments are swept away by them as indifferently as the pangs of misery and the slaps of disappointment. If my will worked, would I allow that? Yet, I am told that I command my feelings and will the actions which provoke and raise them. Strongly gripped in the jaws of yesterday and tomorrow, my little present, wherein I am asked to exercise my will, offers it little scope to function. If I could exercise it within such a slight scope, I would not, for that hurts my sentiment and offends my dignity. To be put into a little cell behind thick bars and then to be graciously told that you could walk about freely, and that when the jailor pushes in dry bread and a jug of water you have the liberty and the free will to chew the bread and to drink the water when you like and in whatever way and order you choose—well, if that gives you satisfaction and establishes you firmly in your convictions, I would not hurt your feelings and mortify your sense of self-importance. But I would rather return with indifference the offer of such a freedom and such a free will to the kind giver, and closing my eyes would resign and submit myself to his power.

Can free will indeed get any nook for its play and shelter in the gigantic rush and bustle of the vast and stupendous world, where the minutest hole and corner are occupied by something or the other which plays ceaselessly in the harmonious working of the surrounding Whole? Any discord rung in by the fancies and frolics of free will will grate against the Wheel of that Whole, and so must be crushed if it ever appears. If man's imagination, which in a dizzy exaltation makes him think that he has the will and the power to control and direct at least the things which affect him, had been directed instead to probing into the depth of the mighty mystery of which he is also a manifestation, he would have derived a more blissful satisfaction from a realization of his own equal importance in Creation with that of any other part, big or small, than he can get from the fanciful idea, pricked at every turn of life, which makes him imagine that he holds and wields a will and power which may shape his own course through the universe. It will be a sight for the gods to see when every man steers his course as he wills, and the Creator looks on frustrated in his plan and purpose!

J. M. GANGULI

MAX MÜLLER

[**Shri B. Natesan** writes with loving appreciation of Max Müller, whose "Sacred Books of the East" opened a new cycle in the history of modern civilization. In making available to the Western world the exhaustless treasury of Oriental thought and practice, Max Müller has won the gratitude of all friends of human brotherhood. We have great pleasure, therefore, in publishing this sketch of his life and work as a tribute to his memory.—ED.]

"WHAT an extraordinary man is Professor Max Müller," wrote Swami Vivekananda after a visit to the Professor's house and the Bodleian in Oxford. "The Professor was kindness itself. He also accompanied us to the Railway Station and all this he did, because as he said 'It is not every day one meets a disciple of Ramakrishna Paramahansa.'"

And for one who had never set foot in India Max Müller's interpretation of the Sage of Dakshineshwar was compact of wisdom and discernment. It was his article in the *Nineteenth Century* that for the first time opened the eyes of Europe, not only to the wisdom of the East, but to the living embodiment of that faith which illumined the darkest recesses of thought and of lore to which the genius of Sri Ramakrishna and his simple utterances bore eloquent testimony.

> And what love he bears towards India [continued the Swami], I wish I had a hundredth part of that love for my own motherland. Endued with an extraordinary and at the same time intensely active mind he has lived and moved in the world of Indian thought for fifty years or more and watched the sharp interchange of light and shade in the interminable forest of Sanskrit literature with deep interest and heartfelt love till they have all sunk into his very soul and coloured his whole being.

Friedrich Max Müller was born at Dessau in the Duchy of Anhalt on December 6th, 1823. His father Wilhelm Müller was something of a poet and the famous Mendelssohn was his godfather. But neither poetry nor music claimed his interest. When Max matriculated in 1841, Professor Brockhaus of the University of Leipzig induced him to take up Sanskrit. Bopp at Berlin turned his attention to philology, while Schelling inspired him with a love for metaphysical speculation. But destiny had other plans for him. He came to Paris in 1845 and was soon under the spell of the French scholar Eugene Burnouf, who taught him Zend and started him on the track of enquiry into the science of comparative religion. Burnouf was

interested in research in Buddhism and the Vedas. Stimulated by his ideas Max decided to edit the entire text of the *Rigveda* along with the bulky commentaries of mediæval savants. It was a bold decision for a young scholar of twenty-two who had to live on the money he earned by copying manuscripts for others. But undismayed by hardships and difficulties the young enthusiast set off for England, where he found a fatherly friend and helper in the Prussian Ambassador Von Bunsen, who at one time had himself hoped to be the first editor of the *Rigveda*. When Max in his twenty-third year came to London with the object of publishing the text of the *Rigveda*, Von Bunsen, with Professor H. H. Wilson, was able to prevail on the East India Company to undertake the enormous cost of the publication and to grant the editor an adequate allowance for the duration of the work.[1] Von Bunsen introduced the German scholar to Queen Victoria and Prince Albert and to the Oxford University. The printing of the *Rigveda* at the University Press obliged him to settle down at Oxford, where he spent the rest of his life in study and research. Oxford became the centre of a new culture which was to have far-reaching influence on the thought and fortune of successive generations. For since then Indology has become a fruitful source of study and research in that great centre of learning. The first volume of this monumental work came out in 1849 and the sixth and last volume twenty-five years later in 1874.

The publication of the *Rigveda* was an event of great significance for Europe and India alike. In Europe it opened the gates of a new knowledge very similar to the Renaissance which gave an impulse to the revival of arts and letters under the influence of classical models at the end of the Middle Ages. But the impact in India was instant and profound. And Max Müller was fully aware of its far-reaching effects.

> If I may be permitted to say [he wrote later] that the editing of the *Rigveda* heralded an entirely new era in Sanskrit research in Europe, yet in India it naturally caused an even greater stir. After all this was their (the Hindus') Bible, which so far during the three to four thousand years of its existence had never yet been edited. Attempts were made in various places to set a religious ban on my Veda alleging that it had been written by a *mleccha* with cow's blood. But the book proved

[1] That a trading corporation mainly interested in making money should have been prompted to this act of generosity is easily explained. "At that time," says Mr. Alsdorf, "critical voices were insisting that the outmoded system of governing India by a trading company should be abolished — as was actually done a few years later — in favour of direct administration by the Crown. To the East India Company, struggling to maintain its existence, the edition of the *Rigveda* presented an opportunity to prove the excellence of its administration of India by showing that it furthered also cultural and scientific interests."

stronger than its enemies; it was indispensable and eventually those who had at first sought to ban it acknowledged it. The late Dr. Haug sent me a detailed account of a Brahmin meeting at Poona at which the Brahmins at first had a non-Brahmin read out my edition of the Veda as they did not want to touch the book, but in the end all of them corrected their manuscripts according to my text which has been fixed at the far distant University of Oxford.

The middle of the nineteenth century witnessed a ferment among the English-educated classes in India due to the impact of Western ideas. The result of the conflict was a kind of reformation identified with the Brahmo Samaj movement founded by Raja Ram Mohan Roy, the pioneer of social and religious reform in earlier years. The reformers were quick to find fault with their age-old customs and urged the adoption of a faith and practice in conformity with their notion of progress dictated by reason and science. That was well enough so far as a few intellectuals were concerned. But a mass appeal to reform must be rooted in the soil and could only be fostered by a frank reference to the culture and traditions of the race. Whether it was Keshub Chandra Sen or Devendranath Tagore, the reformers realized the wisdom of basing their teachings on the rock of their ancient *shastras* and interpreting them in the light of modern thought. Rationalist interpretation of the theistic faith could not take them far; for people still held their ancient heritage in esteem and the reformers invariably found it necessary to refer back to the Vedas and *smritis*. It was here that Max Müller's version of the Veda came in handy. Max Müller himself was fully conscious of this need. He wrote:—

Just as the question at issue in our case was to restore the authority of the Bible in place of the authority of the Pope and ecclesiastical councils, so too, the question with which the Indians are most concerned is the authority of the Veda: and just as the first printed edition of the New Testament by Erasmus gave a strong impetus to our own reformation so too the first printed edition of the Veda has given the strongest incentive and the most powerful weapon to the founders of the Brahmo Samaj movement in India.

In fact, in a letter congratulating Max Müller on the completion of the huge task on which he was occupied for a quarter of a century, the leaders of the Adi Brahmo Samaj went on to declare:—

By your edition of the *Rigveda* at a time when Vedic literature owing to a sad fate was almost on the point of dying out in the land of its birth, you have rendered us Hindus a benefaction for which we shall always be deeply grateful to you.

It may be that the Brahmo Samaj, to the best of its lights, was striving to combine the best elements of European culture and religion with what was best in Indian culture and religion. But, as a German writer[2] shrewdly pointed out,

> in the course of time, however, the continued attack of the Western spirit, Europe's claim to cultural superiority and the political subjugation of India resulted in a movement which combined intellectual opposition against the West, cultural self-assertion and a striving for national freedom, and which, realizing the values of India's own past to an ever increasing degree, saw her salvation not in an emulation of Europe but in a return to the pristine ideals of ancient Aryan times.

Herein lies the value of Max Müller's great work. In 1875, a year after the completion of Max Müller's *Rigveda* edition, Dayanand Saraswati founded the Arya Samaj and raised the slogan "Back to the Vedas," expressly rejecting the more recent works of Vedic literature and going back to the *Rigveda* itself. It goes without saying that Max Müller's work played a very important part in stimulating the awakening of cultural, religious and national consciousness. Now that we have shaken off political subjection and are culturally free to shape our ends, we can look back to the pioneer works of men like Max Müller with dispassion and assess their rightful place in the history of Indian thought and religion.

Max Müller's other works in the field of Indology include the famous translation series of the "Sacred Books of the East," in fifty-one volumes, all but three of which appeared under his expert supervision. It is true that Sri Aurobindo and other scholars could not see eye to eye with the Professor's interpretation of certain texts; but similar was the case with Gilbert Murray's version of the Greek Tragedies. But neither Max Müller nor Murray could be outdated. Max Müller continued to be the real interpreter of the Soul of India to the West. And his *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, the *Three Lectures on Vedanta*, *Introduction to the Science of Religion* and *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature* bear the impress of his research and scholarship. In a lighter vein *Chips from a German Workshop* and *India: What Can It Teach Us?* are popular essays of no mean autobiographical interest. This last is a series of lectures held at Cambridge University for candidates of the Indian Civil Service. Here is a German Professor who had never visited India, but had deeply studied its literature and religion,

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[2] L. Alsdorf: *The India Magazine*, No. 2, 1955.

> seeking to arouse in the hearts of young Englishmen, about to go to India as representatives of British foreign rule, love and respect for that country, striving to dispel their prejudices against it and endeavouring to represent it to them as interesting in every respect, thus proving to them that a stay in India need by no means be a "spiritual exile."

Max Müller came to Oxford for research studies in Indology in his twenty-third year and died there as Professor of Comparative Philology in 1900 in his seventy-seventh. India was to him the Wonderland and he longed to visit his adopted country if only to contact the men who spoke the language and philosophy of Yajnavalkya. But he had neither the means nor the time to fulfil his dreams. Or perhaps he felt the same way as Wordsworth felt towards "Yarrow Unvisited":—

> The swan on still St. Mary's lake
> Float double, swan and shadow!
> We will not see them ; will not go
> To-day nor yet tomorrow;
> Enough if in our hearts we know
> There's such a place as Yarrow.
>
> Be Yarrow stream unseen, unknown!
> It must, or we shall rue it:
> We have a vision of our own;
> Ah! why should we undo it?

The fact is in his younger days he had not the means to journey to India and later he was tied down to his desk. And then, as he says in his autobiography: —

> The things that interest me in India are not Rajahs or Maharajas, nor even the streets of Bombay, the Towers of Silence, nor the temples of Ellora. I am interested in the few shrotriyas still alive, who know their Veda by heart and who would converse with me and shake hands with me though I am only a *mleccha*.

But Max Müller had his reward in the affection and esteem in which he was held by those whom he valued most and whose appreciation of his services was to him all that he could have wished. That was an honour he prized most — an honour to which no foreigner could have hoped to aspire. The German writer whom I have quoted at length aptly culls this breath-taking incident from one of Max Müller's own records:—

> They [the *shrotriyas*] have asked me to act from the distance as one of the sixteen priests at the performance of the Shraddhas, the funeral sacrifices; they expect me to say Vedic prayers for their departed

> fathers. They have even sent me the gifts which are due to the priest, since I am better acquainted with the Veda than their own priests, and they have also sent me the sacred thread of the Brahmin, and I am as proud of it as if it were some splendid decoration.

I shall conclude as I began with the words of Swami Vivekananda. "When are you coming to India?" asked the Swami. "Every heart there would welcome one who has done so much to place the thoughts of their ancestors in the true light." The face of the aged scholar brightened up—there was almost a tear in his eye, says the Swami, a gentle nodding of the head, and slowly the words came out: "I would not return then. You would have to cremate me there."

Such was Max Müller, a Vedantin of Vedantins, who had caught

> the real soul of the melody of the Vedanta, in the midst of all its settings of harmonies and discords, the one light that lightens the sects and creeds of the world, the one principle of which all religions are only applications.

B. NATESAN

THE IDEOLOGY OF HUMANITY

VISCOUNT HAILSHAM, in speaking at the Canada Club, London, last November, emphasized the need for adaptability and growth in relationship that alone would preserve the group of nations called the Commonwealth. His comments would apply to any aggregated unit.

"We need to diversify and enrich inter-Commonwealth relationships by new obligations and opportunities undertaken both by the old members between themselves and by the old members with the new."

This is underlined by the recent pact of union between Ghana (in the British Commonwealth) and Guinea (lately independent of France) "as the nucleus of a union of West African States." This relationship brings many new problems, but also new opportunities for co-operation.

Viscount Hailsham also suggested:—

> What the world is passionately looking for is some pattern of human behaviour less anarchic than mere nationalism, less offensive than traditional imperialism.

There are too many ideologies in the world. "But there is one ideology too little advocated. It is the ideology of humanism, the gospel of humanity itself."

Mankind pays lip-service to this ideal, but can the problem of working it out be solved, except in relationship to Deity and Nature? A word of advice given by Robert Crosbie in *The Friendly Philosopher* may help here: "Make clean and clear, first, the mental conceptions and perceptions; the rest *will follow naturally*."

AFRICA AND THE FUTURE

[In the newly liberated regions of Africa, much that is interesting is going on. In this article a young Nigerian teacher offers his reflections on the prevalent mood and on the kind of help India might give them. **Mr. A. Nwankwo Ezeabasili,** of the University College, Ibadan, Nigeria, is interested in both science and the humanities, and believes in bridging the gulf between them.— Ed.]

Two thousand years ago Cicero wrote: "There is no difference in kind between man and man...in fact there is no human being of any race who, if he finds a guide, cannot attain to virtue."

Those whom Cicero had in mind were not us, the African Negroes, but the ancient Britons who, properly guided, attained to virtue. The absolute truth of this dictum is only beginning to be realized. March 6th, 1957, the date of Ghana's independence, is the beginning of a new era in black Africa. It is the beginning of a revolution which will, by chain reaction, spread to every part of Africa south of the Sahara. There is a great awakening of national consciousness throughout the length and breadth of West Africa. The three-day conference of the RPA (African Regroupment Party) held at Cotonou, French West Africa, this July passed a unanimous motion demanding the immediate independence of Negro Africa from France and the immediate formation of a Negro African Federation, which could then negotiate with France on the basis of equality. In Kenya and the Rhodesias, the situation is complicated by the presence of white settlers, which retards the political progress of those territories. With Nigeria to follow Ghana in 1960 and Sierra Leone some time later, the whole of West Africa will soon be free. And freedom brings in its wake many difficult problems. In West Africa the problems which our leaders have to face spring from our history, right from the days of the slave trade.

The first problem is the remaking of man, the personality of man. We have known suffering in all its three dimensions—physical, mental and spiritual suffering. Other nations simply suffer defeat and colonization, but we have slavery in addition.

Many of our people wondered why we should demand independence when the colonial status is better than the situation in former days when slavery and death was on every doorstep. It took the leaders much time and energy to explain to people, even literate people. It was generally believed that the African cannot rule himself and that he must depend on the European. This view arose out of the type of education one received

in the school. If, for example, one argued in an essay that we were ripe for independence one ran grave risk of expulsion. European teachers, even missionaries, used that opportunity to propagate a superior-race theory. We were said to be the descendants of that Biblical personage Ham whose father cursed him and his children to be the servants of his brothers. One lecturer even boasted that it was impossible for an African to obtain an Honours degree in mathematics. But one of his students left the college in anger, did his M.SC. as a private candidate and is now lecturing in Mathematics, with a Cambridge doctorate.

The present African reaction to this sort of education is that we want the universities and colleges to have African heads; for they will be able to direct better the education of our children.

Another question which is receiving attention in intellectual circles is the use of schools as a bait for catching converts to Christianity. Any pagan who attends school is automatically treated as a convert, and because pagan parents are illiterate they are too afraid and ignorant to press for their constitutional rights. While this was possible in the British days when the government was in the hands of their own fellow Europeans, it does not seem that missionaries will continue to enjoy that privilege unchallenged.

The most illiterate pagan who worships in his own primitive way is, in fact, perfectly right and acting in the best possible manner for himself. He has started an attitude of veneration towards the Creator in the grossly finite way that local tradition has provided him, and I think it would be most unwise to disturb him. It would be wiser to give him sufficient education to enable him to grapple with subtler metaphysics and understand his mistake.

The net effect of this method of conversion is that Christianity has become a rain-bearing cloud bringing material benefits to its adherents. This, in turn, has led to a moral chaos and the ratio of Christians to Moslems and Pagans in the Nigerian Prison is, according to some Government statistics, 13: 9: 4. The Christians, it must be pointed out, have the smallest population in Nigeria. But the Christians' attitude to other religions is very arrogant. I was taught in school that Buddhism is an Eastern superstition and, although it was regarded as sinful to read books on other religions, I managed to smuggle into the college an old copy of the *Gita* sent me by an American pen-friend. It was from that day that I began to think twice. The African intellectual generally drifts to agnosticism or nominal Christianity.

Africa today needs the help of India, not on the material plane, but on

the spiritual. Many who do not like Christianity with its emphasis on dogmas and hell-fire, may yet find Buddhism more relevant. One does not come across good Indian books out here. In no bookshop can you find Gandhi, Tagore, Radhakrishnan or Mulk Raj Anand, but look for the latest book on talismans and you will find it. It is thus charlatans that are India's cultural ambassadors to Africa. They send magic catalogues and threatening letters to the remotest village in Africa. It is regrettable that we cannot pick up your radio broadcasts here.

These vessels of cultural contact—books, radio and films—have in fact been neglected by India because she does not realize how much Africa needs her help. I cite as an example the racial conflict in Africa. Various methods are being proposed in intellectual and political party circles for the liberation of those of our own colour who are under the heels of the white settlers. Some, and they are in the majority, think that the best way would be to form a Federation of West African States which will have a strong army, powerful radio and propaganda to negotiate from strength with the racialists. Others think that the best plan would be to approach the problem at the intellectual level by governing ourselves well and making rapid progress. This would give the *coup de grace* to the already weak theoretical foundation of apartheid. "It is obvious," declared the Action Group Party, the Western Nigeria Government Party, in a recent foreign-policy release, "that the pressure which Nigeria can bring to bear on the task of relieving other Africans from oppression will *increase* in proportion to the growth of our country in population and resources" (italics mine).

Many West Africans are not looking forward with much enthusiasm to membership of the Commonwealth or the French Union. The economic and social ties among the tribes of West Africa from Senegal to the Gulf of Guinea are stronger than any we could possibly have with France or Britain. The territorial partition of West Africa was carried out without regard to ethnical groupings. The Hausas and Fulanis occupy the northern provinces of Ghana, Nigeria and French West Africa; the Yourbas are in both French Dahomey and Nigeria; and the same applies to the Ewes of Ghana and Togoland. Could there be any greater ties than these?

Democracy is taking root for the first time in black Africa. There are sceptics who doubt the value of an adult franchise conferred on adult peasants and illiterate classes, who, it is felt, are in no position to use the vote effectively. Our experience during the recent elections to the Federal and Regional legislatures is that it is women and the "backward peasants" who are most active in exercising their rights. This is a most heartening

feature of African democracy. The masses have realized the power that has been placed in their hands and have awakened to their rights, and they take democracy seriously.

The human spirit is reviving. Gone are the days when initiative was low, when we expected humanitarians to come to our aid. In Nigeria today you see an optimistic people bustling with vigour and activity. There can be no truer saying than that "Varuna helps those who help themselves." People don't want to wait for their community development at the expense of their regional governments. They carry it out themselves. Community development work offers scope for local leadership and patriotism. In Eastern Nigeria, for example, the spirit of self-help is now at its height in a matter of two years.

From 1955 to 1957 the various communities have built 1,376 miles of road, 11 Bailey bridges, six Ensby bridges, 39 postal agencies, 24 post offices, 139 village halls, 45 maternity homes and innumerable schools, colleges and wells.

It is the extent to which India realizes the role she can play in our legitimate struggles that will be her most precious contribution to our development of the only kind of progress which matters: the flowering of the spirit.

A. NWANKWO EZEABASILI

A NATIONAL LANGUAGE FOR INDIA

"WHAT should be the requirements of a national language?" asked Gandhiji in the course of his presidential address at the second Gujarat Educational Conference, held at Broach, on October 20th, 1917. And he answered that it should be easy to learn for Government officials; usable as a medium of religious, economic and political intercourse throughout India; the speech of the majority of the inhabitants of India; easy to learn for the whole of the country; and that in choosing this language considerations of temporary interest should not count. He then went on to argue that "no other language [could] compete with Hindi in satisfying these five requirements." However, he maintained that

> knowledge of English is necessary to us for the acquisition of modern knowledge, for the study of modern literature, for knowledge of the world.... As things are, we have to learn English even if we do not wish to. English is an international language.

These and other basic thoughts of his on the subject are contained in the timely booklet *Hindi and English in the South*, published recently by Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, and edited by M. P. Desai.

G.M.

THE DOCTRINE OF KARMA

[**Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao** gives in this article an outline of the doctrine of Karma. He dwells with special warmth upon its moral value, and defends it well against misinterpretation as a form of fatalism.— Ed.]

All the philosophical systems of India, with the exception of the Cārvaka (the Indian materialistic system), believe in the doctrine of Karma in one form or another. The doctrine is simple in its conception but full of implications. It is a part of the Perennial Philosophy, countenanced by the record of the general spiritual inheritance of man.

Karma is the moral Law of Causation. It declares that man's will is free, and that he is responsible for all his actions. Nothing that man does is private. Bergson writes that what we do depends on what we are; we are in some measure what we do; and thus we are creating ourselves. We are the architects of our fortune and misfortune. "The fault...is in ourselves and not in our stars." Human suffering neither arises of itself nor is it unavoidable. What we sow, we reap. Men do not gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistle, as the Christ bade his disciples note. St. Paul cautions us: "Be not deceived, whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap." The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* states that

> a person consists of his desires, and as is his desire, so is his will, and as is his will, so is his deed ; and whatever deed he does, that he will reap.[1]

Many of the Indian philosophical systems do not admit the existence of God, but they never demur to the doctrine of Karma. They find the Law of Karma enough for them. Gautama the Buddha gave the Law of Karma great importance. Śaṅkara regards man as superior to the animal world on the ground that he has the power of knowledge and the free will to act as a responsible agent.[2] Man is described as the image of God in Christian theology because, in all creation, man alone has the two qualities of the Lord, namely, intelligence and free will. The doctrine of Karma affirms this responsibility of man. If man is not made responsible for his acts, it is not right to punish him. The old *Garuda Purana* observes:—

> No one gives joy or sorrow.
> That others give us these is an incorrect notion ;
> Our own deeds bring us their fruits.
> Body of mine ! Repay what you have done !

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[1] IV. 4. 5. *cf.* Plato : *Laws* (Trs. by A. E. Taylor): "For as a man's desires tend, and as is the soul that conceives them, so and such, as a general rule, does every one of us come to be."

[2] *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya*. Memorial Edition of Śankara's Works, Vol. VI, p. 71.

Moral reprobation and approbation lose all meaning if man is not responsible for his action. But once a man accepts that he is responsible for his actions, he does not feel bitter at the outcome of his deeds. His realization makes possible a spirit of willing acceptance, without railing against God or outcry against divine injustice. Inequalities in status, talent, fortune, etc., can all then be regarded as absolutely just since each gets his reward for his action. Karma leaves no room for bitterness or jealousy of others' possessions. It offers us confidence that we can make what we like of ourselves through effort. There is no dark destiny that governs us blindly and makes sport of us. We are the masters of our fate and the captains of our soul. Such self-confidence helps us to live the good life. It rouses and strengthens a sense of moral responsibility.

It is strange that, in face of the great implications of the doctrine of Karma, the late Professor Keith should have written, "The conception of Karma...is essentially fatalistic, and fatalism is not for a normal mind a good incentive to moral progress."[3] For, in fact, the doctrine states that the universe is not a chance-world. It is moral to the core and is not *a-moral* as some Rationalists think. The moral law that governs the minds and morals of men is reflected in the outer laws of nature. According to the Law of Karma man may have fortitude in reverses, for a good cause can never fail or come to grief. "Never to an evil place goeth the doer of good," says the *Gita*.

The problem of evil has made many reject the existence of God. The critics find that a benevolent and omnipotent God is inconsistent with the existence of evil in the world. If God permits evil in spite of his power to rout it, he is malevolent; if evil exists in spite of his goodness, he is impotent. The Law of Karma saves God from this dilemma. He is not the creator of evil. Evil is the result of man's free will to choose either the right or the wrong. Śankara meets the reproach that God is partial in the dispensation of the goods of life and that he is cruel to some (*vaiṣamya* and *nairghṛnya*) by pointing out that it is in accordance with the *karma* of the individuals and not the whim of the Lord:—

> The position of the Lord is to be looked on as analogous to that of *Parjanya*, the Giver of rain: For as *Parjanya* is the common cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants, while the difference between the various species is due to the various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods, men, etc., while the differences between these classes of beings are due to the different merit belonging to the individual souls. Hence the Lord,

[3] A. B. KEITH: *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and the Upanishads*, p. 596.

> being bound by regards [to merit], cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.[4]

Thus the problem of evil is no problem for the believer in Karma. It results from wrong exercise of man's free will, and can be overcome by human effort. Evil is not ultimate. It is a challenge and an opportunity for man's moral effort. The doctrine of Karma does not mean a record is maintained in some book and we are punished according to it after our death. The universe itself is moral, and the working out of the moral law is no external judgment dealt out by some external Judge, waiting till we die. The Greek dramatist Euripides, in a fragment of the lost *Melanippe*, writes of the impossibility of this:—

> Dream you that man's misdeeds fly up to Heaven
> And then some hand inscribes the record of them
> Upon God's tablets; and God, reading them,
> Deals the world justice? Nay, the vault of Heaven
> Could not find room to write the crimes of earth,
> Nor God himself avail to punish them:
> Justice is here on earth, had ye but eyes.[5]

The doctrine of Karma affirms the dignity of man. Man is not "a lump of flesh and bones, controlled by conditioned reflexes, social pressure and economic laws." He is not powerless to rise above the forces that envelop him. But let us understand the process rightly. Every deed that we do leads to two results. First of all we have the direct consequences of the act, pleasant or painful. Secondly, the act leaves some mental impression, propensities (*vāsanas* or *saṁskāras*), in the soul. The consequences cannot be averted: they are the necessity element in Karma. But the evil tendencies we may resist with moral effort.

The doctrine of Karma, therefore, is not to be treated as a form of fatalism. A man's actions are, of course, partly determined, but not by any cosmic caprice. They are determined by the dispositions of the self. The ancient sage Yājñavalkya in his *smṛti* points out that Karma does not mean mere fate. He says:—

> Fortune comes to a person who is as energetic as a lion, but cowards think that it is a gift of fate; let us overcome this fate by our power and make all possible personal endeavours; no blame will attach to us if our best efforts do not succeed. The truth of the matter is that success in

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[4] Śankara's commentary on the *Vedanta-Sutras*, II. I. 34. Translation by George Thibaut. "Sacred Books of the East," Vol. XXXIV, Part I.

Cf. St. Paul: *Romans*, XI. 22: "Behold therefore the goodness and serenity of God."

[5] Quoted by S. Radhakrishnan: *The Principal Upanishads*, p. 114.

> life depends on both our present personal endeavours and past deeds, which now appear as Fate or destiny. Just as a chariot cannot move on one wheel, so fate [*daiva*] without personal effort cannot lead to success.[6]

In this way, the doctrine of Karma reconciles freedom and necessity, and does not conflict with progress. It acknowledges no liquidation of moral effort. The effort is carried into the next birth and perfected in a number of lives. Reincarnation is the corollary to the doctrine of Karma.[7] For Karma is not a mere doctrine of retribution: together with reincarnation it makes a picture of spiritual continuity and growth. The *Bhagavad-Gita*, the great scripture of devotion, does not belittle moral effort. In two celebrated verses it exhorts us:—

> Let a man lift himself by himself, let him not degrade himself; for the Self alone is the friend of the Self and the Self alone is the enemy of the Self. For him who has conquered his lower self by the higher Self his self is a friend, but for him who has not possessed his higher Self, his very self will act in enmity like an enemy.[8]

The conditions of life may be determined, but the conditioning agent is free in his acts. The denial of Karma takes the heart out of human effort and lowers man to the level of the machine. Goethe, who knew life abundantly, declared: "He is dead even in this world who has no belief in another."

P. NAGARAJA RAO

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[6] *Yagnavalkya Smrti*, V. 349–51. The translation of the passage is the late Professor Hiriyanna's.

[7] See S. RADHAKRISHNAN: *An Idealist View of Life*, pp. 286–7, for the history of the doctrine.

[8] *Gita*, VI. 5, 6.

ALFRED NOYES (1880-1958)

[OUR READERS need no introduction to **Mr. Derek Stanford**, the well-known literary critic, who has several times graced our pages. In this summing up of the late Alfred Noyes's work he writes gently but discriminatingly of the strengths and weaknesses of one not of the highest order of writers, yet the author of much that is lovable.—ED.]

IN ALFRED NOYES—lecturer, poet and prose-writer, who died in his seventy-eighth year on June 28th, 1958, in the Isle of Wight—there existed two strains of mind seldom discovered together. The first was a vein of popular imagination, responsible for such justly famous lyrics as "The Barrel-Organ," "The Highwayman," "Dick Turpin's Ride," and "A Song of Sherwood," as well as for less felicitous but none the less rousing narrative compositions in the manner of *Drake* (1908) and *Tales of the Mermaid Tavern* (1912). The second strain was one of scientific curiosity, and led to the three-volume epic *The Torch-Bearers* (1922-1930), in which the poet celebrated the great figures of European science: Copernicus, Galileo, Newton and others. It was also, in part, from this vein that he wrote, after entering the Roman Church, two works of unusual apologetic: *The Unknown God* (1934) and *Voltaire* (1936). Here, with a deal of originality, he tried to show how the scientific spirit had reached to certain conclusions consonant with the Christian Nicene Creed. Science, he suggested, was opposed to religion only in so far as it adopted a positivist temper foreign to its true workings. The agnosticism proper to the scientific spirit was essentially one of openness and wonder. Noyes's line of thought was bold and new, and, being outside the Scholastic tradition, was not immediately recognized as valid. Its tactical virtue was that it took up the argument for God's existence at a point where secular philosophy had left it, whereas the more traditional Catholic thinking tended to write off post-Renaissance theories as so many graceless aberrations. Noyes, by a novel insight, was able to indicate affinities between the perennial philosophy and the cogitations of Victorian agnostics. In Chapter Two of *The Unknown God* Noyes demonstrates how Herbert Spencer was forced to posit a First Cause (infinite, absolute and independent) in accordance with the notion of God formulated by the early Christian Fathers. Aristotle had maintained that philosophy begins in wonder, and it was this element, this resonance of surprise and inquiry, which Noyes was equating with the scientific state of mind. It is only when science ceases to wonder and takes to delimiting dogmatism that it conflicts with the religious spirit, which all too often makes the same mistake.

By the majority of casual poetry readers, Noyes is probably best remembered for those pieces which have thrilled innumerable classrooms with their rhythmic refrains and dramatic compulsion. His early poem "The Highwayman" combines these two qualities to a hypnotic degree:—

> The wind was a torrent of darkness among the gusty trees.
> The moon was a ghostly galleon tossed upon cloudy seas.
> The road was a ribbon of moonlight over the purple moor,
> And the highwayman came riding—
> Riding—riding—
> The highwayman came riding, up to the old inn-door.

There are few poems of this century which have served as the basis of a film-script, but "The Highwayman" was one of them. The polychromatic properties of visual imagery and violent action make immediate appeal to the cinematic mind:—

> Back, he spurred like a madman, shouting a curse
> to the sky,
> With the white road smoking behind him and his
> rapier brandished high.
> Blood-red were his spurs in the golden noon;
> wine-red was his velvet coat;
> When they shot him down on the highway,
> Down like a dog on the highway,
> And he lay in his blood on the highway, with a
> bunch of lace at his throat.

But in this immediacy there were dangers which only a poem in balladic style, with a strong rhythmic sense, could successfully overcome. Chief of these pitfalls was the poet's proneness to a kind of romantic oversimplification. With a limited theme, as in "The Highwayman," this could result in conservation of strength, in stark, rapid, graphic narration, but where the canvas and cast were larger, as in the long poem *Drake,* the complexity of historical conflict was reduced to the level of a boys' tale by Henty. Noyes, at the time of composing this poem, was writing as a fierce anti-Catholic, and his view of history is as narrowly partisan as that of the pan-Protestant nineteenth-century historian J. A. Froude. Even more so is the lack of psychological subtlety apparent in the *Tales of the Mermaid Tavern*—a description of Elizabethan literary life in its, often vicious, hours of pleasure-seeking. Noyes was well enough informed as a scholar to know that the dramatists and poets of the day were, for the most part, a wild, abandoned crew. This he admitted, but seemed determined to invest them with some idealistic "silver lining." His account of

Marlowe's death in a brawl is very much an instance of this. Instead of the unscrupulous cad of genius, we are shown a spirited, high-minded young man momently undone by a wicked courtesan. Noyes had, one may say, the Public School prefect's view of history.

In pin-pointing Noyes's strength as a poet, we are driven back to his use of rhythm as the means by which he gained his best effects. The changes and refrains of "The Barrel-Organ" display this gift in its simplest expression:—

> *Come down to Kew in lilac-time, in lilac-time, in lilac-time ;*
> *Come down to Kew in lilac-time (it isn't far from London!),*
> *And you shall wander hand in hand with love in summer's wonderland ;*
> *Come down to Kew in lilac-time (it isn't far from London!).*

These lines are hackneyed in quotation as any "popular favourite" must be; but they have an easy sentimental appeal (and a happy lack of over-niceness) which only a poetry for the people can afford. Half of the attraction of Noyes's rhythm belongs to that of the music-hall in its palmy days before the Great War killed it. The rhythms of English poetry since 1918 have been esoteric. Their beat has been that of a lonely pulse, not of a vast community. And when (as in Eliot's *Sweeney Agonistes*) a poem employs vulgar turns of speech to an emphatically rhythmic end, the intention is clearly ironic and reductive. He is not affirming, but criticizing, the current and swing of ordinary living. But Noyes, like Kipling, posited this, these un-self-conscious conventions of enjoyment. And if he has not Kipling's artistry—his felicity of phrase and firm hold on the colloquial—his verse still retains a public inflection, an accent of the crowd, not the solitary person:—

> So it's Jeremiah, Jeremiah
> What have you to say
> When you meet the garland girls
> Tripping on their way?
> All around my gala hat
> I wear a wreath of roses
> (A long and lonely year it is
> I've waited for the May!)
> If any one should ask you
> The reason why I wear it is—
> My own love, my true love, is coming home to-day.

We find it in James Thomson's "Sunday up the River" and "Sunday at Hampstead." In terms of artistic mastery, this popular rhythmic speech of Noyes occupies a place between that of George Sims's Cockney ballads

and Kipling's more memorable use of the demotic. With the all-too-infrequent exception of such a piece as MacNeice's "Bagpipe Music," modern poetry lacks this note. (Most of Auden's attempts in this vein—"Refuge Blues," for example—strike one now as meretricious, their relationship to colloquial rhythm suggesting that of the modern dance lyric to the lyric of the music-hall song.)

Noyes's most ambitious work is undoubtedly his *Torch-Bearers*, but few contemporary critics would consider it his best. The medium he chose for this long celebration of scientific research was blank verse, a measure he never handled so well as rhymed verse with a lilting lyric metre. Sometimes his employment of it is rough, sometimes flat, and sometimes diffuse. Here, as a representative passage, is the opening of the poem; Noyes's first impression of the great Observatory on Mount Wilson near Pasadena:—

> At noon, upon the mountain's purple height,
> Above the pinewoods and the clouds it shone
> No larger than the small white dome of shell
> Left by the fledgling wren when wings are born.
> By night it joined the company of heaven
> And, with its constant light, became a star.

Readers of the "Pylon Poets" of the thirties will remark the absence of imagery derived from machinery, science and engineering. The Observatory is described in terms of the facts of natural history (*e.g.*, the dome like the wren's empty egg). But, with its ornate non-stream-lined description, much of the poem suggests a research laboratory housed in a building with neo-Gothic battlements. Most of us nowadays acquaint ourselves with science through its popularizing literature; and we can, if we choose, regard *The Torch-Bearers* as an impressive feat of such wonder-baiting journalism in verse. Wordsworth certainly envisaged a time when science, familiarized by usage and reference, should—in the transfiguration of the poet—become a "dear and genuine inmate of the household of man." Perhaps that time has not yet come. Perhaps the daily reference to atomic science, with its vast destructive possibilities, makes it not a friendly but an alien element to the human imagination. However we may look upon the relationship between poetry and science, Noyes's poem stands as a large-scale venture in proclaiming a close *liaison* between them. Those who do not think it succeeds can at least point to no superior endeavour.

DEREK STANFORD

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

"A TREASURY OF ASIAN LITERATURE"*

THIS anthology is drawn from standard translations of the classical literatures of Arabia, Iran, India, China and Japan. It is divided into four sections, not by region but by category—Story: subdivided into Parable, Prose Fiction and Epic; Drama; Song: with subsections entitled "Of Man and Nature," "Of Man and God" and "Of Sacred and Profane Love"; Scripture: Confucian, Taoist, Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic. A feature of the collection is the length of some of its extracts. It includes, for instance, the whole of the first edition of FitzGerald's *The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam*, and an episode from Arthur Waley's famous translation of Lady Murasaki's *The Tale of Genji* running to more than thirty pages.

India receives a fair share of the available space, with Sir Edwin Arnold's metrical version of *"Sāvitrī,"* an episode from the *Mahabharata*; a large extract from the same translator's version of the *Bhagavad-Gita*; the whole of Monier-Williams's translation of Kalidasa's *Shakuntala*; an abridged version of George Keyt's rendering of the *Gita Govinda*; several chapters of Max Müller's *Dhammapada*; and a few stories from Lanman's *Panchatantra*. It is, however, to be regretted that room could not be found in the "Song" section for a short representative selection of Hindu mediæval devotional lyrics. Nicol Macnicol's fine translations in the style of the metrical psalms of his native Scotland (*Psalms of the Marāthā Saints*, Calcutta) and Tagore's translations of Kabir would have provided an excellent sample of a very important and beautiful branch of Indian literature which is here quite unrepresented. But in view of the limitations of space there is no real ground for complaint in Mr. Yohannan's selections from Indian literature.

It is evident that India has been less well served by English-speaking translators than most other regions of Asia. Nobody in this generation has been able to do for Indian literature what Arthur Waley has done for that of the Far East, or even what Professor A. J. Arberry has done for the literature of Islam. The efforts of Sir Edwin Arnold were meritorious in their day and here and there rise to true poetry, but, with their deliberate archaisms and involved constructions, they are of an age and not for all time. Monier Williams's *Shakuntala* is faithful to the words of the original, but completely uninspired, and fails to convey much of the play's poetic quality on the one hand and the liveliness of some of its dialogue on the other. Perhaps the best translation from Indian literature in this book is George Keyt's *Gita Govinda*, but this contains several annoying infelicities (*e.g.*, "Make pleasant conversation now and make complacent speech like drops of nectar falling from your face, the moon"—p. 331), and fails to give any inkling of the incredible mellifluousness of the original. However, if none of the Indian translations rises to the level of FitzGerald's version of *Omar Khayyam*, none descends to the bathos of James Atkinson's translation of Firdausi, which was written in rhymed heroic couplets at a time when this standard metre of the eighteenth century was

* *A Treasury of Asian Literature.* Edited with an Introduction and Commentaries by JOHN D. YOHANNAN. (Phoenix House, Ltd., London. xx + 487 pp. 1958. 30s.)

already becoming dated. The modern reader is left completely cold by such attempts at conveying the pathetic as:—

> Now keener anguish rack'd
> the father's mind,
> Reft of his son, a murderer
> of his kind;
> His guilty sword distained
> with filial gore,
> He beat his burning breast,
> his hair he tore....

Only very dimly do the glories of Persia's national epic penetrate this obfuscating verbiage. A new translation of the *Shahnamah*, or at least of its finest episodes, is very badly needed, to convey something of the splendour of one of the greatest works of the world's literature to the English-speaking peoples.

No doubt some purists will question the utility of this book, declaring that it is impossible to convey any sound impression of the literatures of Asia in so short a compass, and that it is almost sacrilegious to try to do so. We do not agree with this verdict. All efforts at popularization, however elementary, serve a useful purpose if they are honest and scholarly. This volume, giving as it does lengthy extracts from standard translations, amply fulfils both requirements.

Many of the readers of Mr. Yohannan's anthology will previously have read no more of Asian literature than FitzGerald's *Omar Khayyam*, and many of the works from which extracts are given they will not even have heard of. If Mr. Yohannan, in the space at his disposal, can give no more than a vague and general impression of the literatures of Asia he does at least show that they contain much that is valid for the contemporary world; that they are as varied in form and content as is human nature itself; and that the men and women of ancient and mediæval Asia had experiences which the modern man of the West can, at least in some measure, share. Hence Mr. Yohannan deserves the sincere thanks of all who love literature and who work for mutual understanding between East and West.

A. L. BASHAM

This is My Philosophy: Twenty of the World's Outstanding Thinkers Reveal the Deepest Meanings They Have Found in Life. Edited by WHIT BURNETT. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. xix + 378 pp. 1958. 25*s*.)

There could be no more difficult work on which to pass judgment than this from the pens of "Twenty of the World's Outstanding Thinkers," for there is no common feature in their various contributions on which a judgment can be based. Reading this book is like listening to disjointed snippets of clever conversation at a literary cocktail party and failing to hear the end of any of the remarks. The only feature which these brilliant conversationalists seem to have in common is that they are all men of mature years; their ages when added together come to 1422 years and this means that their average age is over seventy!

Each contributor has written on the subject in which he happens to be most deeply interested, and this being so the topics discussed are continually changing. Few of the writers are professional philosophers; one is an architect, another a psychologist, another a biologist, another a theologian and another is a medical missionary; and all of them have attained the very highest level of eminence in their respective professions. Three of this very mixed team are writers and two are nuclear physicists, so that we need feel no surprise that the team rarely plays together as a whole, but almost always as independent players.

It has often been remarked that books on philosophy tell us more about

the character of the philosophers in question than about the subject with which they are dealing, and this statement applies with particular force to the book which is being reviewed. All of these men are well known to us and each makes his characteristic contribution to this symposium and in his customary style. Lloyd Wright, the architect, writes with characteristic fire and ebullience; Bertrand Russell with his usual dignified and restrained pessimism. Albert Schweitzer with kindliness and modesty; J. B. S. Haldane with implicit confidence in science and Jean-Paul Sartre—the youngest of the team—with the quiet resignation of a man who has by now been thoroughly conditioned to living in a condemned cell.

In order to read a book of this nature with any comfort one must choose one's author for the day, read what he has to say and then close the book until the morrow. The process is then repeated. Reading in this manner, we may avoid confusion and learn much from this book, for there is no doubt that Mr. Burnett, the editor, has collected an astonishing galaxy of talent. The following are the contributors: Bertrand Russell, J. B. S. Haldane, Aldous Huxley, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Frank Lloyd Wright, Karl Jaspers, Jean-Paul Sartre, Jacques Maritain, William Ernest Hocking, Salvador de Madariaga, Lewis Mumford, Albert Schweitzer, G. M. Trevelyan, Carl Gustav Jung, Pitirim A. Sorokin, Werner Heisenberg, Ignazio Silone, Reinhold Niebuhr, Gabriel Marcel, S. Radhakrishnan.

KENNETH WALKER

Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma. By H. V. GUENTHER. (Buddha Vihara, Risaldar Park, Lucknow. 405 pp. 1957. Rs. 10.00)

For students of psychology, Buddhism presents an excellent field of inquiry: centring its attention on man, his mind and its potentialities, it is essentially psychological in its orientation. But comparatively little exploration into this aspect has hitherto been attempted, and it is happy therefore that a well-known scholar has given us a treatise on this subject. Dr. Guenther has been a lifelong student of Buddhist subtleties, with a talent for research; and a work from his pen certainly commands our attention.

A cursory glance at the book is enough to convince the reader of the author's erudition and equipment. The material for this book has been drawn from Pali, Sanskrit and Tibetan sources; the book purports to present a connected account of the Abhidharma metaphysics as preserved in the Pali tradition, as well as in the works of Vasubandhu and Asaṅga. The psychological conceptions of the Theravāda, Vijñānavāda and Vaibhāṣika schools have been explained in detail, and with illustrations. The normal functional aspects of mind and the supernormal meditative processes have come up for detailed discussion.

For the arguments of the Theravādins, however, the author appears to have relied exclusively on the *Atthasālinī*. One is surprised that such important Abhidharma tracts as *Paṭthāna*, *Vibhaṅga*, *Kathāvatthu* and *Milindapañhaṁ* have not been consulted or referred to. This omission has engendered a certain confusion in the exposition of the Pali standpoint. For instance, from the author's accounts of *ekaggatā* and *sati* (pp. 89 and 100) one hardly makes out the distinction between them. And in explaining *hrī* as self-respect and decorum (p. 114 fn.), the author ignores its real psychological import: it means an *indecision* in regard to the performance of an action involving a conflict between desire and approval (*cf.* Ledi Sayadaw's *Vipassanādīpanī*). A more serious error has

crept in as regards *diṭṭhimāna* (p. 128): it is certainly not "opinionatedness" or conceit; the concept signifies ego-involvement and over-estimation of positively cathected objects. In the Abhidharma we do not consider objects and events in their conventional connotations; we treat them in terms of abstract processes and ultimate constituent factors.

But this does not take away the essential merit of the book. Here for the first time we have a comprehensive attempt at a comparative study of the major Abhidharma schools. It is indeed pleasant to note that, although as philosophical disciplines the various schools of Buddhism differ widely, there is such a remarkable agreement between them as regards the psychological conceptions. The author's treatment of the Path from the standpoints of Theravāda, Vaibhāṣika and Vijñānavāda (Ch. V) brings out this major truth lucidly. The author places the students of Buddhist psychology under a deep debt of gratitude by the rich collection of valuable references from multitudinous sources: I have personally profited immensely therefrom. Dr. Guenther's book marks an improvement over that of Mrs. Rhys Davids, and reminds us of the brilliant treatise of Lama Anagarika Govinda. That this is a definite contribution to the subject is indubitable; with a greater sympathy for the Theravāda tracts (I mention this in reaction to the author's remarks on p. 270, footnote 1), it could have gained in richness and precision. Let us hope that the eminent author will answer this need soon. It must, however, be mentioned that the get-up of the book is rather poor, with numerous printing errors. Such an excellent work as this deserved a much better physical form.

S. K. RAMACHANDRA RAO

The Ancient Library of Qumrân: And Modern Biblical Studies. The Haskell Lectures 1956-57. By FRANK MOORE CROSS, JR. (Gerald Duckworth and Company, Ltd., London. xvi + 196 pp. Illustrated. 1958. 21*s*.)

It is less than a dozen years since the chance stone-throw of a Bedouin shepherd opened up one of the most remarkable archæological discoveries of all time. Already hundreds of books and articles have been written about the Dead Sea Scrolls, and countless deductions drawn and argued. Of the greater part of all this the value is doubtful, but not of this excellent study by Professor Cross of Harvard Divinity School. Here we have a considered and up-to-date account written by one of the chosen team of experts now at work on the site. He has good reason to sound a word of caution, for he knows how little of the total task has been achieved and how much remains to be done. It is not yet time to draw firm conclusions, but at a moment when Qumrân studies are entering on a new phase, it is possible to trace the outlines of the patterns beginning to emerge.

Here, then, we have an authoritative account of the discovery of the ancient library, long buried in the desert, and of the Essene community which left it behind as they fled from the Roman armies. Already sufficient material has been ordered and interpreted to give firm opinions about this Jewish sect and to indicate the importance of its literature for the text of the Old Testament and for the study of Christian origins.

In view of the many hasty and ill-considered judgments on the relation of the Scrolls to Christianity, we can be grateful for the full treatment in the final chapter, and the new light thrown on the New Testament background by the language, doctrines and institutions of the Essene community. Professor

Cross is careful never to go beyond what the evidence allows, but he is able to show, on the one hand, that there is good hope for the solution of many of the cruxes of New Testament study, *e.g.*, the date of the crucifixion; and on the other hand that there is no reason for fears that the foundations of the faith are being shaken. This is underlined in a moving postscript on the Essene faith and the Christian Gospel which distinguishes *idea* from *event* and so exposes the proper ground of the Christian claim to uniqueness.

MARCUS WARD

Our Universe. Translated from the original Bengali of RABINDRANATH TAGORE by INDU DUTT. (Meridian Books, London. 106 pp. 1958. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Rabindranath Tagore was a poet to the depth of his being. Whatever he wrote was permeated with poetry. Even when he wrote on subjects dry as dust, his writings pulsated with the rhythm of poetry. He had that infinite sense of wonder which stopped at nothing. This made him versatile. All the same, his way of looking at things was all his own. It was this quality combined with the breadth of outlook which made him tower like the Himalayas among his contemporaries of the Indian renaissance.

Translating him into any Western language is an arduous and thankless task. The qualities which characterize Indian languages tend to fall flat with Western readers. The imagery, the style and the philosophy, which integrate our languages, are different from those which distinguish Western languages. Indu Dutt is to be congratulated for achieving a remarkable success in translating in a style which is native to English and yet retains the charm of the original. Her task was an unusually difficult one. *Our Universe* is not a literary book in the usual sense of the term. It is the description of a poet's discovery of science for himself, which discovery he wants to convey to a new generation.

Tagore was a great educationalist. Although brought up on a literary tradition he perceived early in life that one could not ignore science in this modern age. He sought, therefore, the knowledge for himself. Having acquired it, he sought to pass it on. The result was *Our Universe*. It is more than an ordinary description of the universe for popular use. In describing scientific ideas he invests them with a poet's tenderness of feeling. Take for instance his way of describing the composition of light:—

> Man has not only looked upon light as the conveyor of the stars' existence, he has also managed to find out the substances that mingle in its composition, tearing them as it were from the very heart of light.

Scientists and laymen alike can derive pleasure from reading this charming book.

SUNDER KABADI

Thoughts and Aphorisms. By SRI AUROBINDO. (Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry. 89 pp. 1958. Rs. 2.00)

Sri Aurobindo, a Rishi of our own times, has given us quintessential metaphysics in *The Life Divine* and nectarean poetry in *Savitri*. He has also thrown off sparks of creative thought that blaze the trail and guide us along the pathways of the Spirit. *Bases of Yoga* was one such collection; and *Thoughts and Aphorisms* is another. It is a series of constellations rather than a blazing Sun; and while the dazzle is seemingly intermittent, the result is steady illumination.

The book is divided into three Parts: *Jnana* (Knowledge), *Karma* (Works),

and *Bhakti* (Devotion). "They say," writes Sri Aurobindo, "that the Gospels are forgeries and Krishna, a creation of the poets. Thank God then for the forgeries and bow down before the inventors." Isn't the Crucifixion "a greater truth than the death of Cæsar"? While exhorting us to feel and love the God of Beauty and Good in the Ugly and the Evil as well, Sri Aurobindo also wants us to shun all "lowness, narrowness, and shallowness in religion, thought, and experience." Our goal should be the Superman

> who can rise above this matter-regarding broken mental human unit and possess himself universalized and deified in a divine force, a divine love and joy and a divine knowledge.

Right knowledge leads to right action. The *Karmayogin* tries to reach Beatitude, "Supreme Good." One should be wary and tread one's path carefully, all the while dedicating all service to God. The last step is the bliss of God-love, the glory of surrender to the Divine. Right action weds true knowledge, and pure devotion is born; and God himself comes to us to bear us in his loving embrace.

This slender book of less than 100 pages cannot be summarized or commented upon: as well count or analyze the stars in heaven! But start anywhere, probe deeper and deeper, and the still centre must be reached at last.

PREMA NANDAKUMAR

India Changes! By TAYA ZINKIN. (Chatto and Windus, London. xii + 233 pp. 1958. 25*s*.)

From time immemorial travellers and commentators have found in Indian diversity what they sought. During the period of British occupation of India, such visitors multiplied. The result was not very happy. In books produced by them a new myth was created. It was the myth of subhuman India, an India incapable of doing anything — an indolent India. As for the future, well, there was no future for India. A small minority of visitors, however, did take a different and more realistic view. But their voices were subdued and lost in the drum-beatings of Katherine Mayos and Beverley Nicholses.

Since Indian Independence a new phase has begun. All the traditional picturesqueness and subhumanity of India is still there to be found at will. But travellers are not interested in it any more! They have discovered something else. Incredible as it may seem, they have discovered that India has a future. Consequently, contemporary writings on India tend to be forecasts of the future. There is also another twist. All such forecasts are made solely in the context of cold war. As such they are preoccupied with the problem of India becoming Communist. India by herself has almost ceased to matter for cold war protagonists except as a possible partner on one side or the other.

It is, therefore, with some relief that one turns to Mrs. Taya Zinkin's book. She has lived for a long time in India. She has tried her best to understand the people. She has a perceptive mind and a lively style which combine to make for enjoyable reading. Yet *India Changes!* is a disturbing book. With all her wit Mrs. Zinkin fails to convince us. Her wild generalizations consume each other. After reading the book one is left with the impression that it is a mere collection of essays lacking cohesion.

The most serious objection to her book, however, is her peculiar approach to problems. It is remarkable that the only people who are not criticized by Mrs. Zinkin are the top-ranking civil servants. They are not only singled out for reiterated praise but, according to her, the only hope of achieving any-

thing lies in them. Her view of Indian problems is very much the view of a top-grade bureaucracy. Although she has travelled widely in India and lived in the villages, in the last analysis she measures changes in India by what happens at fashionable parties in Delhi:—

> Only ten years ago, the educated modern Indian kept his religion hidden in a corner of his life; today he casually and openly goes to the temple and he fasts; he is no longer on the defensive. Then he always ate with knife and fork; now, if he feels like it, he eats with his fingers. The extraordinary strain that keeping up with the West must have been is startlingly evident at parties in Delhi, where old friends describe their latest trip to the great South Indian temples. Before the war they would have vacationed at France's Cote d'Azur or England's Lake District.

At times Mrs. Zinkin is so carried away by her own notions and style that she loses all sense of proportion or reality. Here is a typical example:—

> Electricity! Imagine a village that has never had electricity! What a revolution in the phenomenon which hums along the wires, shines in the little bulb that keeps the night at bay, and brings water to the earth's surface as if by magic, thus relieving bullocks and giving women free time! Electricity is the spirit of the loom, the grinder of the grain, the bringer of news, the enemy of fear and darkness.

It is characteristic of Mrs. Zinkin's confused sense of values that she sings of a religious revival in high society and of the withering away of religion in village society in the same breath. Mrs. Zinkin protests too much.

SUNDER KABADI

The Broken Mirror: A Collection of Writings from Contemporary Poland. Edited by PAWEL MAYEWSKI. Introduction by LIONEL TRILLING. (Random House, Inc., New York. 209 pp. 1958. $ 3.50)

For twenty years after World War I, a resurrected Poland lived an uneasy life; and for another twenty years, Poland has suffered the ravages of total war, territorial reshuffling, Communist domination and Stalinist regimentation. After Stalin's death there has doubtless been some renewal of life, and this is reflected also in literature. Mickiewicz is of the dim past, even Sienkiewicz belongs to yesterday. But how about the condition of letters in present-day Poland? We are free to take *The Broken Mirror* as an answer to this question. The Stalinist pressure has been providentially withdrawn, but not yet the habit of submitting to external pressure—as sometimes the body remains bent nearly double even though the load is lifted. Even when freedom comes, people are often afraid of the responsibilities of freedom. How comfortable is conformity, how peaceful is sleep—and death!

In the seven significant pieces of fiction, drama and critical or biographical prose here brought together, we can observe the first fumblings of an awakening literary consciousness, hear the groans and sighs of regret, the hisses and grunts of protest, and even the tentative affirmations of a new faith in freedom. Tadeusz Rozewicz, the poet, writes with great power on the "lost" generation, the reign of death, the crash of values: "all of us post-war people . . . we all have been poisoned; the dead and the living." Wait, then, for the Phœnix-hour, when simple fellow-feeling will be possible, when brother can embrace brother—not have to play Cain to Abel. Kazimierz Brandys's "The Defence of Granada" is, in fact, a probe into the recent past. The damage has been great, yet "after the greatest losses there always remains a thing greater than any of them—a thing that is continually reborn and is never lost." Zbigniew Herbert's "The Philosophers' Den" is a dramatic presentation of the last days of Socrates with a Marxian slant, and so the real

aim of the play is to throw light on contemporary problems of belief and conduct. Wiktor Woroszylski regrets, not the Revolution, but the subsequent recession, the loss of faith, the tame surrender to "the pressure of a pseudo-Party scholasticism," the soulless regimentation, the "emotional atrophy" of the Stalinist days. Pawel Hertz, however, argues that not the *régime* but the individual writer was to blame: "there was no danger of any kind for the artist . . . no danger except silence." If the writer is denied freedom of thought and expression, he could at least preserve a dignified silence instead of lustily parroting the official cry. The last two selections are also preoccupied in their different ways with the Polish writer's predicament today. One thing is clear: the bleak winter is over for good, and the first leaves of spring are becoming visible at last.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

An Analysis of Knowing. By JOHN HARTLAND-SWANN. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 141 pp. 1958. 15*s*.)

Anyone given to puzzling, with Alice in Wonderland, why "I say what I mean" is not the same thing as "I mean what I say" will be truly fascinated by Mr. Hartland-Swann's discussion of the verb "to know." The reviewer's difficulty is that she is robbed of all decisions. If I say the thesis is resourceful or well argued or surprisingly lucid, considering that it deals in abstract philosophy — if I say anything at all more than "it seems to me" or "I am inclined to think" — I shall, by implication, be prefixing any such statement with "I know." I shall therefore be doomed to thrash out the question of whether I know *that* or I know *how* the book is what I say it is; and whether these are but two aspects of the same kind of knowing; and I shall be challenged as to how far I am justified, logically, in making an "I know" statement at all.

We may claim to know, the author shows us, when we only believe in accordance with the partial evidence or the dominant opinion; we can know through experience or through trusting the experiments of others, and rashly conclude that knowledge of the past includes that of the future. We get into peculiar difficulties when it comes to knowing a person; for this seems to indicate a variety of recognitions and relationships not always interdependent. Finally, Mr. Hartland-Swann arrives at the most teasing, long-standing problem of all knowing: Do we know that objects exist in the world apart from our perceptions? I say "finally," because his ultimate discussion: Do we know that other people have minds? seems to be answered by Shelley — "speech created thought" — just as thought may emerge in writing. But *I know* such arguments are not close enough for philosophy, even though Mr. Hartland-Swann mercifully prefers "common-sense" views to the quibbles of those philosophers who deal only in "sense-data" and will not admit the existence of a table.

SYLVA NORMAN

Methodology of the Major Bhāsyas on the Brahma-sūtra. By P. D. CHANDRATRE. (S. B. Garda College Research Publication, Navsari. 248 pp. 1958. Rs. 6.00)

This is an abridged form of the author's PH.D. thesis accepted by the Gujarat University, and, in the author's own words, the thesis developed is:—

> . . .the key to their methodology lies in the proper evaluation of their basic position that realization of the highest reality is identical

with integrated self-experience, and the way to such experience lies through the guidance of the ancient and indigenous tradition of mystics and intuitive philosophers, and not through intricacies of logic and mutually interdependent arguments. In order to substantiate this thesis I have given the exposition of the various constituents of *Vada*, the outward form of the method of the Bhasyas and attempted to set these constituents in their proper place.

It is a questionable proposition that the *Bhāṣyas* follow the methodology of *Vāda* as explained in the Nyāya system. Even granting it, we fail to see how an account of *Vāda* methods on the one hand, and the exposition of differences between *Bhāṣyakāras* (the authors of *Bhāṣyas*) on the nature and number of *pramānas* on the other, can substantiate the thesis. There is some confusion in trying to rate one *Bhāṣyakāra* higher than another after admitting the commonness of their methodology. One looks in vain here for an indication of the influence of Buddhist thought on the methodology of Śaṅkara. One misses altogether the historical outlook which would account for the growing importance of polemics and formalism in the works of later *Bhāṣyakāras*. There is nothing much here presented for the first time and the claim on top of it all that the method adopted by the *Bhāṣyakāras* "serves the purpose of an ideal philosophical method" is disconcerting. One wishes that more were said about the title of the book than elementary things about Nyāya and other *darśanas*, with which several chapters are replete. None the less, the book will be found useful by students of Vedānta for the well-arranged material from original sources on the subject of *pramānas*.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

Meister Eckhart: Selected Treatises and Sermons. Translated from Latin and German with an Introduction and Notes by JAMES M. CLARK and JOHN V. SKINNER. (Faber and Faber, London. 267 pp. 1958. 21*s*.)

Meister Eckhart is commonly recognized as one of the greatest of all mystical teachers on account of the boldness and profundity of his thought and the vividness with which it is expressed. Yet hitherto the knowledge of his authentic teaching on the part of English students has been imperfect. As a result of the work of German scholars it is now known that Pfeiffer's edition of the German sermons and treatises (published in 1857 and translated into English in 1924) is defective, containing much that is spurious or doubtful. It is the great value of the book under review that it gives us a selection of material which can be thoroughly relied upon, including a translation, now made for the first time in English, of eight Latin sermons and extensive extracts from two Latin commentaries.

In recent years attempts have been made by Roman Catholic writers to show that the Papal condemnation of propositions drawn from Eckhart's writings was based on misunderstanding, and that Eckhart was in fact entirely orthodox in his outlook. The Latin sermons and treatises, addressed to learned theologians, are certainly lacking in the qualities of challenge and paradox so often found in the German writings. The Eckhart they reveal is far more the scholastic theologian than the mystic. The mysticism of Eckhart, which is the ground of his living interest, is far more clearly represented in the German works.

The present volume contains three German sermons and three German treatises: "Talks of Instruction," the "Book of Divine Consolation" and "On Detachment." (The student should also consult Professor Clark's anthology of the German sermons published by Nelson in 1957.) The Latin writings included here contain nothing of Eckhart's

characteristic doctrines — so abundantly represented in the anthology — of the identification of the soul with the only-begotten Son of God in the mystic union, and the uncreated essence of the soul. Yet even here there are occasional glimpses of the truths familiar to the mystic. Thus Eckhart declares that "God is in the innermost depths of every being" (p. 208) and that "the essence of the soul is remote from the kingdom of this world, since it is in another world . . . above intellect and will" (p. 195).

SIDNEY SPENCER

Slavery. By C. W. W. GREENIDGE. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 235 pp. 1958. 21*s*.)

The author, Secretary and Director of the Anti-Slavery Society of the U.K. and a member of the U.N. Committee of Experts, is often asked whether there are still slaves and whether there is need for his work. In this book, he gives the answer with horrifying precision and clarity. He writes to set out the facts in the hope that his readers will be moved to support the anti-slavery movement.

The facts are that, apart from all the secondary and metaphorical uses of "slave," human bondage in its four main classical forms is a pressing problem in *our* world. Chattel slavery is rife in Arabia. Debt bondage and peonage exist in Asia and South America, respectively. In Africa non-consenting women are sold into marriage. In the Far East children are sold by their parents to be exploited as drudges or worse. These facts are set out objectively and the evidence given. One of the saddest chapters describes how in Islam, with such a potential of freedom, the sacred pilgrimage itself is being used by slave traders.

Having surveyed the facts, which make their own case for his plea, Mr. Greenidge looks back to the history of the fight against slavery from the seventeenth-century charities for the Christian victims of the Barbary Corsairs to proposals even now before the United Nations.

> The immediate need, as with other forms of slavery, is to secure the passing of necessary legislation wherever this is lacking, and, most important, the setting up of efficient machinery of protection. It is a melancholy fact that even this may prove insufficient until economic conditions are sufficiently improved to make the practice less necessary. But the very act of attempting to stamp it out draws attention to the economic problem and promotes a more humane, and productive, solution of it. It is certain that without vigorous measures, even if material standards of living go up, no custom that has struck deep roots in a society is likely to be broken. (p. 116)

The implications of this are considered in a final chapter: "What Remains to be Done." There are appendices giving the full text of the Brussels document of 1890; the Slavery Convention of the League of Nations, 1926; and the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of the United Nations which thirty-two member states had signed up to the end of 1956.

No one can read this book and remain under the illusion that slavery belongs to the bad old days. The way forward calls not only for governmental action but for that of individual men and women who have no right to *enjoy* their freedom while these conditions remain.

MARCUS WARD

A LETTER FROM LONDON

[**Shri Sunder Kabadi** writes gravely in this letter. Many all over the world will grieve at Britain's also falling under the moral shadow to which modern civilization's courses in our present cycle have led. It is not that good men or right ideas have altogether departed from our world: they must be brought to bear. The natural leaders of the masses — those that can lead their thinking, not necessarily the possessors of wealth or power — have either become corrupt themselves or allowed themselves to be brushed aside from their post of guard.—ED.]

London, November 20th, 1958

FOR a considerable time now thoughtful sections of the public have been greatly distressed by the steady increase in crime of all kinds, especially among the young. The attacks upon coloured people in Nottingham and London by hooligans showed that the spirit of lawlessness was taking new and even more unpleasant forms.

An equal measure of anxiety has been felt in regard to the extension of prostitution and accumulating evidence that large numbers of young men were living on the immoral earnings of women and very young girls. But probably what has most shocked most people is the disclosure of a great increase in drunkenness. Mr. R. A. Butler, the Home Secretary, has appointed a committee of inquiry.

What the committee appointed by the Home Secretary will mainly consider will be the rise in prosecutions for drunkenness, but that is only one aspect of a larger evil. That evil is the general increase in the consumption of intoxicating liquor among all classes, especially by young boys and girls. Until just before the war it was a rare thing to see a young girl in a public house, and few girls would go into a public house unless escorted by a man. Today girls walk into public houses alone as they would enter a teashop. Moreover, groups of girls resort to public houses to spend hours drinking together.

It is quite common now to meet girls of seventeen or eighteen who could tell you of all the public houses in a large area or along some main road from the heart of London to a village outside.

It is easy to identify some of the causes of increased drunkenness. The main cause is the higher wages earned by the mass of people, especially young people. Young boys and girls leave school to start on from £ 5 a week to £ 10 a week. One would suppose that the parents would exercise some control upon the use of money by their teenage children, but they do not even call upon them to pay more than a nominal sum for their board and lodging at home. The apparent reason is that the parents themselves are earning high wages. A more subtle factor is a curious mentality in the older people which has developed, and that is the idea that they should not interfere with the free use of their money by the young people.

That is a direct consequence of the education in the schools. In the schools the children are educated upon the principle that they should be allowed to do as they please, even in the choice of the subjects that they should study, and it is inculcated into the parents that the same freedom should be given to the children at home. It is now openly admitted that parents have become afraid of their children and shrink from inflicting any form of punishment for wrong-doing.

At the same time, as cases in the courts show, there is evidence of children being treated with savage brutality by their parents. Little or nothing is, of course, heard of the millions of good and happy children, enjoying the love

and care of good parents.

Mr. Butler has expressed a view, which is strongly held in very wide circles, and that is that the present state of things will not be altered until the use of the cane is restored in schools. Prompt and sharp punishment for misdeeds in schools, they contend, is the only means by which boys and girls can be taught respect for the law and consideration for others.

What is wanted is not merely respect for the laws but also consideration for others, which has been described as the first mark of culture. No society could possibly afford a vast police force for the enforcement of a multitude of laws. Moreover, people who suffer injuries cannot always find the time or the means to resort to the courts of justice.

The decline in honesty in the past twenty-five years is incredible. There was a time in this country within the memory of all people over fifty years of age when personal property called for only the minimum amount of care. Today it is the mere truth to say that one can hardly take one's eye off any personal property without immediately losing it. Everywhere, apparently, there are people ready to lay hands upon any unattended property.

Integrity in monetary transactions was the distinguishing characteristic of life in this country twenty-five years ago. Today trickery is wide-spread. What is most disconcerting is the decline of standards of integrity and conscientiousness in the professions. It is no longer possible to trust to the observance of any standards of professional conduct in any profession. Adherence to such standards is the rare exception and by no means the rule.

There appears to be a general conviction that it is possible to get out of any situation by merely telling a lie. One is met at every turn in every grade of society by the regular and systematic use of falsehood. The most obvious and flagrant fabrications are put forward in order to explain away failures to perform an obligation, inefficiency or fraud. In short, it is believed that one could get away with almost anything by merely telling a lie.

All this is not explained away by the system of teaching in schools or the abolition of punishment in schools. The source of the corruption in British society lies at the top — among the leaders in every sphere of the life of the community. There is no regard for the truth anywhere. In days gone by it was the rule that, whether in religion, politics or any other matter, persuasion should be sought upon the basis of an accurate statement of facts, the use of sound reasoning and the exercise of eloquence — that is to say, by an appeal to high moral principles. All that has been supplanted by a single device — propaganda. And propaganda, as it is understood and practised today, is the skilful employment of varying degrees of falsehood.

The Churches, instead of combating this evil, are resorting to it in order to attain their objective, which is the mere increase in numbers of their followers. The Archbishop of Canterbury has just provided an example of the kind of propaganda by means of which the Churches are seeking to combat the decline in religious beliefs. On Sunday, November 16th, the Archbishop said in his sermon at Hatfield:—

> Today there are two moral orders, unrelated to each other and often in direct conflict. They are the moral order of the Christian faith and the order of the world founded on confessed agnosticism and selfish interest.

Dr. Alec R. Vidler, of King's College, Cambridge, has, in a letter to the London *Times*, answered the Archbishop by pointing out that he has known many confessed agnostics, and he has not found that they are in general more selfish than Christians. He makes the acid comment:—

> I am sorry that the Archbishop's experience

has in this respect been less happy than mine, though it has no doubt been more useful for purposes of Christian propaganda.

The growing social and moral evils which now afflict the British people will not be mastered until and unless examples of high standards of truthfulness and honesty are set by people in the upper ranks. One clear source of popular corruption is the systematic use of falsehood in politics. Democracy is corrupting itself.

SUNDER KABADI

LEAVES FROM A PARIS DIARY

[**Shri Baldoon Dhingra** writes this month of a physician's unusual but interesting ideas. In using the word *prana*, to indicate his friend's conception, Shri Dhingra has already suggested a parallel with Indian thought. Theosophy has much to say on *prana*, the vital principle whose condition gives life and health or the reverse.—ED.]

I HAD A TALK the other day with the French physician about whom I once wrote in these "Leaves." The Doctor prefers to remain anonymous — he actually took me to task for having mentioned him the first time. Doctor X is mainly concerned about propagating the positive approach to health and right living rather than seeking any publicity for himself. He firmly believes he is at the most a humble instrument of the divine.

Dr. X insists at all times that right education and right health are today of inestimable importance. It is for this reason that the other day Dr. X joyfully, almost excitedly, drew my attention to a passage from a recent speech by Shri Jawaharlal Nehru:—

> It is clear that in the last analysis, it is the quality of the human being that counts. It is man that builds up the wealth of the nation, as well as its cultural progress. Hence education and health are of high importance so as to produce that quality in human beings.

Dr. X much prefers to call his own system (for he is a fruitarian and vegetarian) the way of non-violence. I asked him what he meant by the medicine of non-violence. According to him the medicine of non-violence is a synthesis of all therapeutics. It produces a soothing effect on the sick organism and by natural processes helps to bring vital harmony and equilibrium to the whole system.

Dr. X next talked about what he calls oscillo-therapy and reminded me that we in India have known from the mists of time about the great power of *prana*. This is the vibratory manifestation of every form of energy. Modern scientific research shows that matter becomes an electric or electro-magnetic *prana*. This energy always deals with corpuscles, or electro-magnetic vibrations, and acts in such a way as to bring about a harmonious relationship in the patient's mind and body. It does not shock one particular part to cure another. Thus it has a high moral purpose and its object both from the outside and the inside is educative — an education for mental health. Dr. X hopes that some day there will be a World Centre of such healing, and where better than in India, where Gandhiji experimented and himself practised "non-violent" medicine?

But Dr. X told me this does not mean there should only be one type of medical treatment in the world, for he recognizes that there are people of all kinds with their prejudices and preferences. What he would like, however, is to make it possible for people all over the world to have readily available the necessary facilities to choose the kind of treatment they want. Perhaps the WHO may initiate such a venture. But Dr. X is convinced that a "Centre of Non-Violent Medicine" should be created,

in India, where all forms of belief and attitudes are not only tolerated but encouraged to grow and flourish. I am not certain how Dr. X's proposal will succeed, but I have seldom met a man who has so much faith and idealism. And, what is more, Dr. X has no desire whatever to be its creator or founder or director.

When I saw Fabbri's *La Bonne Soupe*, a play full of sex and savoury speech, I was amused by the clever handling of dialogue and *décor*, though I came away a little wearied because there was so much ado about nothing. But then I quite realized that much of contemporary French entertainment is meant to provide stuff for argument. The French theatre is a theatre of ideas, and the French literary mind accepts this in full willingness. Therefore, it does not let a play or a film get it down. Thus films like *En Cas de Malheur*, a version of one of Simennon's novels, or *Les Amants et Les Tricheurs* are all treated with ease and naturalness. They touch one lightly but cannot and do not penetrate into the inner layers of one's consciousness. So the film or play becomes a subject for discussion, an intellectual exercise. And young and old in France, no matter how daring a play or film, argue with astonishing frankness about every aspect of the spectacle they have witnessed. The French, I suspect, waver between reason and heart, between Descartes' *Discours sur la Méthode* and Pascal's *Pensées*. In one, reason is the purest state: in the other, Pascal cautions, "*Raison, humiliez-vous*"; for, he says, "the heart has its reasons which reason does not understand." Thus one cannot separate the intellectual adventure of Descartes from the spiritual adventure of Pascal; for the French mind tries to reconcile opposite tendencies — realism to idealism, thought to sentiment.

BALDOON DHINGRA

THE KNOWER AND THE KNOWN

RELATIVITY is one of the meeting-points between Modern Science and Indian Philosophy, observed Professor B. Venkatesachar, an eminent scientist and former Director of the Indian Institute of Science, while speaking on "Modern Science and Indian Philosophy" at the Indian Institute of World Culture on December 4th. Fundamental changes in scientific ideas of time and space were introduced by Einstein and other scientists between 1905 and 1908 and subsequent discoveries in the realm of science have confirmed his postulate about relativity. With the downfall of classical Newtonian physics emerged the new or modern science, recognizing that the subject-object distinction was itself only relative. Classical science had kept the observer out of the field of observation; but modern science accepted that the observer was part of observation and the seer was part of the seen. Modern science, however, proceeded from the circumference of reality to the centre, while Indian philosophy, especially the Upanishads, proceeded from the centre of reality to the circumference. *Atman*, the observing Self, was the centre of the observed phenomenon. Ordinary men could see only aspects of reality but a spark of the Supreme Seer is reflected in each man and it is possible for him to rise to the higher planes and to see reality more wholly. Modern science, by placing the seer in the centre of phenomenon, has really helped to bring its knowledge to the same point, at least in one respect, as that of ancient Indian philosophers, who reached the knowledge "by which everything becomes known."

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"————ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

On the occasion of the birth centenary of Acharya Jagdish Chandra Bose, it is appropriate to review the progress made by a century of scientific advancement. It is a century crowded with events, political, economic and social, and riddled with two great World Wars, which leaves room for doubt whether an increase in materialism provides or can promise a particularly auspicious destiny. This was voiced by Prime Minister Nehru in inaugurating the Bose birth centenary celebrations in Calcutta, when he declared that the problem of the age was that, in spite of its spectacular achievements, science had brought the world to the brink of disaster. According to a report in *The Hindustan Times*, he said:—

> The world had arrived at a turning point. They had got to add something to their thinking, to their approach to problems in order to get out of this big tangle or perish. This something else could only be described as the spiritual value—not in a narrow way but in the broader sense of the term. A bridge between modern science and spiritual quality was, therefore, necessary. This scientific and yet spiritual approach had been the characteristic of the highest Indian thought.

Urging that the problem can be solved only if the scientific approach was linked with the spiritual approach, he felt

> Jagdish Bose had that approach. He did not know whether he did it deliberately or consciously—nevertheless he tried to bring about a "marriage" between the two.... The science of Jagdish Chandra Bose had spiritual quality. Einstein also had the same quality of mind but he was horrified by the results of his own discovery and wished he had been only a carpenter and not a scientist.

The Prime Minister remarked that the particular line in which Jagdish Bose showed his greatness was rather typical in one way of the modern age and in another of India. It was a kind of marriage of ancient Indian philosophy with modern scientific knowledge. Referring to the comparative nature of philosophy and science, he said:—

> Indian philosophical thought was essentially scientific. Vedanta was based on experiments of human feelings. But the danger was that we adopted the philosopher's jargon but not his mind. We in India, however unworthy we may be, are the inheritors of this great thought. Of course, great men of other countries have also thought in that way. But I am talking about Indian thought, because we are today travelling in the realm of science. We are making progress and we are bound to make progress. We, as inheritors of this great thought may, therefore, succeed to some extent in bringing about the marriage between the two, which would have happy results for both.

The Vice-President, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, also pleaded for the blend of science, art and religion, if civilization was to survive, and in the course of his memorial lecture at the Bose Institute the same day, he said that there was no opposition between science and religion, that there was opposition only between science and superstition. Paying a tribute to Acharya Bose, he observed:—

> In him was a harmonious blend of science, art and religion. The institute, which he founded, is an illustration of his integrated outlook. It is not merely a laboratory but a temple. The working table is an altar. The speech which he made on the occasion of the dedication of the institute to the nation is a remarkable utterance which makes us thrill with emotions of our past glory and inspires us to greater activities in the future, with a firm conviction that despite all obstacles, truth would prevail. He established his eminence as a pioneer in the border regions of physics and physiology.

The great achievement of Acharya Bose was that he was amazed to find the boundary lines between physics and

physiology vanishing and points of contact emerging between realms of the "living" and the "non-living." Inorganic matter was found to be anything but inert; and a common reaction seemed to bring together metal, plant and animal under a general law, the doctrine of the ancients which Madame H. P. Blavatsky had expounded even as early as 1888 in her monumental work, *The Secret Doctrine*.

Like Shakespeare's, Kalidasa's plays and poems have been translated and minutely studied in many countries and appreciated by successive generations, however different their outlook. Students of European classical literature have wondered at his versatility and, ever since the first translation of *Abhijnana-Shakuntalam* in 1789 by Sir William Jones, foreign tributes to Kalidasa's genius have been constant. The week-long Kalidasa Jayanti celebrations, organized for the first time on a national level, were appropriately inaugurated by President Rajendra Prasad at Ujjain.

Rightly did the President emphasize that Kalidasa's achievements should not remain confined within the four walls of our colleges and universities but become a subject of popular interest throughout the country. The world recognition given to the poet has imposed on the people of India, he said, a heavy responsibility to do honour to the life and literary creations of Kalidasa. Referring to the fact that his plays have been translated into nearly all the major languages of the world and recognized for their literary excellence, he observed:—

> Gratifying as all these developments are, one feels somewhat unhappy that in the country of his birth Kalidasa has not yet been given the place to which his genius and the great Indian nation are entitled. To be sure, the plays of Kalidasa are not mere text books. Nor are they merely a source of recreation or acquiring knowledge. His works are a veritable link in the chain of India's intellectual, mental and literary development. Let the people of his country understand this and adopt in their national life the ideals of patriotism, national unity, goodwill towards all and high æsthetic sense embodied in his works.

Though Kalidasa was an epic poet, he was first and foremost a playwright. The Ujjain celebrations should increasingly become a festival of the theatre; for no tribute could be more acceptable to a poet who held the drama "a visual offering to the gods."

The President said that the high place that Shakespeare occupied among the English-speaking people should belong to Kalidasa in India and remarked:—

> As Indians we can legitimately feel proud of Kalidasa and his great works, but let us not forget that on account of his rare genius and the excellence of his poetry he is often looked upon as a citizen of the world. When the Western countries had their first contact with India in the modern age and some Western scholars studied Sanskrit, it was Kalidasa's works which gave them the norm for adjudging Indian culture and literary traditions. It will be largely true to say that the people of India who were getting somewhat indifferent to this literary heritage, began feeling proud of Kalidasa and other prominent literary figures as a result of this reappraisal of our literature by Western scholars.

The acute nature and various ramifications of the colour problem can nowhere be better seen than in American labour organizations. Mr. Will Chasan in *The Reporter* of May 1st, 1958, has critically examined it under the title, "American Labour Attacks its Own Segregation Problem." The topmost labour leaders, like George Meany, are bent upon banishing racial discrimination from the folds of American labour. None the less, the task is doubly difficult on account of "segregation within integration" as Mr. Chasan puts it. He observes:—

> The whole situation in the South is endlessly complex.... In most Southern factories,

the practice has been to employ white workers in production jobs and Negroes as janitors or in other unskilled and inferior jobs. If a plant employs, say, six hundred white production workers and fifteen Negro janitors, the union is apt to organize all of them into one local. This makes the local biracial, or integrated, but it leaves a great deal to be desired. "What we have in the South... is segregation within the framework of integration."

Again, outer pressure against racial prejudices is not enough. The "inner man" must be awakened within the white racially prejudiced person as well as the Negro. Tolerance and charity are needed in dealing with this emotionally charged problem. A philosophy like Theosophy offers a positive solution. Let the individual see that the ideal of brotherhood is based on the *fact* of spiritual homogeneity, and practise it in his own life. Only then will the race and colour prejudices as well as prejudices of other kinds vanish.

The colour problem is still with us. In an article on "Negro Housing in America — Challenge and Response," issued by the Council on Race and Caste in World Affairs, New York, Mr. Ralph Lee Smith has spotlighted the intricate nature of the Negro housing problem in America. He considers housing the key to other problems pertaining to race and caste. It is true in principle that, by living together, the white and the coloured people can develop brotherliness. But how to make people free from colour prejudice? There are laws to abolish segregation and to punish those who practise colour-discrimination. But mere outer changes in social life by means of legal provisions will not deliver the goods. The changes must have roots within. The belief in the one family of man, the brotherhood of man, the unity of mankind and the one world has to be developed by appealing to the good in man. In every one of us, there is good and evil. It is our approach to appeal to the good so that evil practices born of colour and caste prejudices may be abandoned. In this article Mr. Smith has rightly underlined the good work being done, though on a small scale. Let those of us who work for the unity of mankind broadcast those activities which are against colour prejudice. Let us give our full moral support to the people fighting against prejudices of all kinds. Mere condemnation or criticism will not do. Make the change of heart possible by being good and doing good to those who are victims of their own narrow nature.

Benjamin Muse, "a former Virginia legislator with long and honourable experience in race relations," has discussed the problem of integration in the "Black Belt" of the U.S.A. in a very thoughtful article reprinted from *Harper's Magazine* by the Council on Race and Caste in World Affairs, New York. Mr. Muse has been able to examine the problem of desegregation in schools dispassionately and objectively. He points out the emotional nature of the problem and how it is being exploited by rowdies. There is an economic aspect of the problem as well. In the Black Belt economy, the Negro is of utmost importance. The American Negro is gradually becoming the Negro American. But to hasten the process of desegregation in schools and integration in general by mere legal means is a dangerous step. The people as a whole must also be emotionally prepared to accept integration. This will take time, and require a programme of community education. Let us not leave the reader with the impression that we are endorsing "delaying tactics." We want complete integration of the Negro in the Black Belt. We stand for Universal Brotherhood. But the methods must avoid producing bitterness and violence.

A good and right end must be approached by a good and right means. Whatever disabilities may be lifted from the Negro's shoulders by the law, we feel that the essential colour problem cannot be solved by coercion. It can be solved only by co-operation, good will and mutual understanding.

Noise is not only the most impertinent form of interruption but also a disruption of thought, declared Schopenhauer, and the modern scientist agrees with him by observing that not only does noise directly disturb the functions of hearing, but, still more, indirectly adds to the burden of modern mankind through its physiological effects on the brain and on the whole human organism. Urging the need for a general and systematic effort to suppress superfluous noise, Professor E. Grandjean, M.D., of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, in an article in *The Statesman* (Delhi), writes:—

> Numerous experiments carried out in various laboratories have furnished convincing evidence that noise interferes with the psychic functions as well as the activity of muscles which are directed from the brain. Convincing proof has also been furnished that by noise the rapidity and precision of reckoning and typing is diminished, the power of concentration reduced, and the time of reaction prolonged. Wherever these facts have been taken into account by factories, an increased productivity has been achieved.

Doctors tell us that the human life-span may be shortened by as much as ten years when nerves are frayed by noise. Numerous are the diseases to which man is subject in this technological age, despite the advancement in medicine. Professor Grandjean, describing the physiological effects of noise, says:—

> Men who have long been exposed to intense noises may be affected by a temporary increase of the blood pressure, acceleration of the activity of the heart, accelerated metabolism, or decrease of the activity of the digestive organs, increased pressure in the brain, and a feeling of greater physical strain in the muscles. All these reactions combined are an alarm signal of a general reaction of the whole organism caused and directed by the increased strain on the system of vegetative nerves (sympathicotony). The growing frequency of such reactions and alarm signals increases the number of cases of heart trouble, disturbances of the vascular system, ulcer of the stomach, and many more of these widespread diseases.

The fact that people are able to work in noisy surroundings, especially in great urban cities, is no proof that acoustic disturbances do not affect the human capacity to concentrate and to think; for, by constant habit, the amount of nervous exertion caused by the strain of noise is not noticed. Scientific observations have convincingly proved that noise is always an unpleasant and disagreeable sensation and man has to expend extra mental concentration in order to isolate himself from the noise and to shut his ears against the distraction.

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

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