

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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THE MENACE OF INFANTILISM

There are few graver threats today to the higher values of life, if not to civilisation itself, than the carrying over of infantile attitudes into adulthood. Instinctive predilections and unreasoning prejudices are natural to the child and therefore are excused, even accepted sometimes with amused tolerance. But there is nothing amusing in the infantile adult. He is a walking menace to world peace.

What are the characteristics of infantilism? The assumption that one's prejudices are sacrosanct, unchallengeable. A refusal to face facts. A fixed determination to have one's own way regardless of propriety and feasibility. Failure to see that one's own good or that of one's group is intrinsically no more important than the good of others. Ignoring the fact that results follow causes as inexorably as the wheel of the wagon follows the hoof of the bullock.

The unspoilt child is free of skin-colour consciousness, but a marked

manifestation of adult infantilism is race prejudice. From the facile assumption that the brown and yellow peoples are inferior has resulted imperialism abroad and injustice at home in countries of mixed population. The difficulties of the Colonies and of India differ little from those of the Negro tenth of the population of the U. S. A., and they are intimately connected. Pearl Buck brings out that relation in her articles and speeches published recently under the title *American Unity and Asia*. She deplores the persistent refusal to see the connection between the coloured Americans and the coloured peoples abroad.

And she sees infantilism very plainly for the menace that it is. Earnestly she adjures her countrymen to rid themselves of the "juvenility which feels frightened to know lest it be proved inferior."

We are too naïve. We must somehow grow up. The world that presses upon us is not a world for the very young. It is a world where adult wis-

dom is wanted and where knowledge is essential....We must cease to be ignorant and local-minded....We have to double and triple our normal rate of growing. We have to get rid of a lot of childish prejudices and false prides and fears....Today millions of people in the East look to us. But they will not look to us long if we are not big enough for them. They are wise and they are old, and they have been learning what the West has to teach. But it has not been enough.

There has been growth, but it has been lop-sided. Mental advance has outstripped moral perception and emotional control. Most Americans would concede in the abstract the superiority of democracy and justice over fascism and exploitation, but mention colour and the line is drawn. The coloured man is not conceded rights to the same treatment as the white. Men and women of the white race must face their bias against colour and be on their guard lest that tendency to unfairness work to the world's undoing. Cruel as Nazism is, Pearl Buck warns,

and dangerous as it is to civilization, it is less cruel, and it may be even less dangerous in the end, than the sort of democracy which is not real enough or strong enough to practise what it preaches.

The new world after the war will need new people to inhabit it. New minds for old. Liberal minds for narrow ones. Friendliness for prejudice. For nothing is surer than that the white races will "have to

learn to deal on terms of absolute equality with coloured peoples." Well for them, well for us all, if the lesson is self-taught and not enforced by blood and agony.

Pearl Buck's five-year-old was once preparing, her mother said,

to paint on a huge sheet of blank paper. She paused a moment. "What is it?" I asked her. "Don't you know what you want to paint?" "I do know," she said. "But I want to make it big, and so first I have to think big."

Is not that after all the solution? To take the world view. To see all peoples not as coloured or white, men or women, Hindus or Muslims, Christians or Jews, rich or poor, but as fellow-men. If the war has indeed become, as Pearl Buck charged at the Nobel Anniversary Dinner in New York on 10th December 1942, "only a war to save European civilisation," its basis cannot be changed too soon.

We of the West never seem able to realize that in the East there are civilisations far older and as great if not greater than Europe's civilization. Shall those not be saved?

They are eminently worth saving. No doubt of that. But the danger which infantile racial attitudes hold is not a danger to this civilisation or that. Civilisation itself might well go down in the world-wide colour clash to which such attitudes unchecked bid fair to lead.

THE THEATRE

ITS RÔLE AND ITS FUTURE

[**The Rev. Hugh Ross Williamson**, former Editor of *The Bookman* and the author of several books and a number of plays, including *The Seven Deadly Virtues*, sees it as the rôle of the theatre to "examine the abiding problems of good and evil in the light of the *contemporary* applicability of myths." He foresees increasing differentiation between the fields of cinema and stage. The son of a Nonconformist minister, Hugh Ross Williamson has always been interested in theology and was recently ordained as a clergyman of the Anglican Church.—ED.]

The theatre, essentially, is religious. This does not mean merely that it had its origins in religion, but that its function is to interpret the mystery of life in terms of myth and ritual and, by so doing, to effect a *katharsis* in the participants.

The word "participants" is used advisedly instead of "spectators." The audience "assists at" a play in the same way (though not, of course, in the same sense) as a congregation "assists at" Mass. There is a participation, a vital interplay between the living actor and the living spectator, which is entirely lacking in a cinema. A theatre audience undergoes an experience different in *kind* from that of a collection of people watching a film. For the cinema is, in a profound sense, dead. It does not invigorate like a stimulant, but debilitates like a narcotic: and its connection with the "living" theatre is one of superficial resemblance, not of organic evolution.

It is important to remember this distinction in any discussion on the

future rôle of the theatre; for the new phenomenon makes any parallels with the past misleading. The theatre has to function in a "cinema civilisation"; that is to say, it has a permanently victorious rival in the field of popular amusement. A touring company in a provincial town can never hope to compete with a "star" film at even the smaller of the local cinemas. And a whole generation has arisen which is "cinema minded," to whom the theatre is an anachronism.

To the true theatre, this is an advantage, for it means that it has become released for its proper task. It need no longer "tickle the groundlings," for the groundlings go elsewhere to be tickled. In so far as it remains a species of "popular entertainment," it functions not as a theatre but as a "try out" department of the cinema. And even here, the divergent techniques of cinema and theatre will lessen the liaison. In the early days, the film might be a "photographed play": but it is so no longer; it is easier to

film a novel than a play, whose strict construction makes it, usually, unsuitable for film development.

As with the author, so with the actors. A film "actor" need not be an actor at all: he need only be "photogenic" and conform to the popularly acceptable type of the moment. The actor's ability to sustain a part continuously before an audience and the film star's ability to photograph well in disconnected snippets in a studio are, again, gifts different in *kind*; and it is becoming increasingly obvious that actors do not find their Mecca—except financially—in films.

Thus the line of development of the theatre, the true theatre (for this is not concerned with that side of theatrical entertainment which might be called the "leg-show" and should more properly be considered in an essay on "Sociology and Sex") would seem to be determined by the existence of the authors who want to write for something other than the mass-mind; actors who want to act and audience whose sensibilities do not shrink from but, rather, urgently require *katharsis*. And this points to a return to a "religious" theatre.

The mark of entertainment is that it "invents" stories; but the function of the artist—and, above all, of the dramatist—is to interpret myths.

No Greek tragedian made up out of his own head the plots of his plays. His greatness and his "originality" lay in the underlying

philosophy by which he interpreted plots with which his audience was as familiar as he was. And this is the only "originality" that art admits. All else is merely the cleverness of a detective writer—and as ephemeral. (This truth has been epitomised in the rule of the dramatist: "Never surprise your audience, but only your characters"—of which a classic example in the English theatre is the "screen scene" of *The School for Scandal*.)

Not only in the work of Æschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, but in Shakespeare and Racine and in the plays of our greatest living dramatist (whose masterpieces *Man and Superman* and *Saint Joan* are specifically interpretations of myths) is this apparent.

Nor is the reason difficult to understand. The limits of a play make it imperative that a great deal of knowledge should already be possessed by the audience. There is no space—as there is in a novel—for an elaborate preparation in background and character-drawing. If the *idea*, through the medium of "character in action," is effectively to be communicated, no unnecessary time must be spent in elaborating the character and no distraction must be provided by unexpectedness in the action. From the opening moment of the play everyone knows that Œdipus is going to discover his incest and parricide, that Cæsar is going to be murdered, that Joan is going to be condemned to the stake. There is no escape for any of them.

The problem of the dramatist is to explain why, in terms which shall at once satisfy his audience and open to them a new and profounder vision of Heaven and Hell—or good and evil. And this cannot be done if there is ambiguity in the terms of reference or disagreement as to the proper ending.

If the dramatist were to invent a character who should inspire a nation, lead an army and finally be betrayed and burnt, the audience might legitimately question the credibility of the action or the probability of the fate and so be distracted from the dramatist's intention. But the historicity of Joan immediately makes the question not "Will she be burnt?" or "Should she be burnt?" but "*Why* was she burnt?"—and from that *donnée* on both sides, dramatist and audience can follow the proper line of development.

This, of course, raises a further question of terms of reference. In an illiterate cinema-civilisation, there are no terms of reference such as were accepted in ages of culture or are still accepted by the cultured minority in the present age. The day has gone, apparently for ever, when it was safe to assume even in the House of Commons that the simplest classical tag—which is the shorthand of the educated—will be understood. Worse still, there is no standard of objective truth: there are only the postulates of convenient propaganda. Therefore, for a dramatist to seek to arrive at a vision of

Truth in the context of accepted myth is to remove him at once from all direct contact with cinema-civilisation. In the immediate future—and possibly for many years to come—the theatre must go into further and further seclusion if she is to preserve the life that is in her for the sake of future generations.

Long before the war, of course, the beginning of this process was apparent—at least in England. The only theatre in the true sense was to be found in the small private ventures or provincial "high-brow" repertories. "Shaftesbury Avenue" had become a synonym for popular inanities of the "try-out-for-the-films" variety. Only at the small "non-commercial" theatre—or in occasional seasons at one of the theatres subsidized by a patron of the arts—could one find plays written intelligently for an intelligent audience. At some of them would be found great actors, practically "giving" their services for the pleasure of being allowed to act again after financially necessary spells in a film studio.

It seems probable, in a world exhausted by war, hag-ridden by propaganda, with all values in the melting-pot, and a general debasement of standards due to an increasingly machine-dominated "civilisation," that this tendency for the theatre to become a small, almost esoteric, art-form must increase.

There is, however, all the difference in the world between going into the wilderness and retiring into

an Ivory Tower. The one involves an heroic effort for the good of the whole community: the other suggests an elegant withdrawal from the conflict "where the immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat." It is the difference between sanctity and cynicism, however much a despair at modern conditions may lie at the heart of both.

And here, again, the religious parallel is relevant. As the Church in the Dark Ages (and, to a certain extent, in the present Dark Ages) could only nourish the life entrusted to her by isolating herself in scattered communities, so today the theatre, so akin to her, is forced into the same course to preserve its life-giving integrity.

But it does so in no spirit of tired surrender, for in its heart is the life which will be needed to revivify civilisation when the death forces of the mob-mind and its standards have spent themselves. This life it must guard and develop by the exercise of its own function—the continuance of dramatists, actors and audiences in the production of plays worthy of the great tradition which runs from Greece throughout the world.

And, in practice—because actors, authors and audiences are also, willy-nilly, involved in the cinema-civilisation—it is continually modifying the very forces which it cannot

(and should not attempt to) control or capture. To compare one of the less vulgar films of today with its equivalent fifteen years ago is to be aware of this.

Thus the question "What part will the theatre be called to play in the reconstruction of the ideas of the future civilisation and how can play writers bring about good-will and enlightenment among the masses?" can be answered briefly in terms which will not be liable to misunderstanding. The theatre cannot speak directly to the masses. Any attempt to do so would be, in the present circumstances, for the theatre to abdicate her true function and to make a disastrous compromise. Nor is the theatre called upon to enunciate *new* ideas. It must be content with the old eternal verities. But it can and must examine the abiding problems of good and evil in the light of the *contemporary* applicability of myths. The stories are the same, the principles are the same, but the context is different. The dramatist is both the liaison-officer between the centuries and the prophet of the present, as well as the conserver for the future. And, in love with posterity, he will accept with equanimity that in his own time a prophet is without honour: nor will he find the wilderness of uncompromise an unfruitful habitation.

HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON

EXTRACTS FROM A RELIGIOUS COMMONPLACE-BOOK

[These intimate reflections from the pen of **Prof. D. S. Sarma** have a spiritual message of their own. Professor Sarma is no stranger to ARYAN PATH readers, who will recall his valuable commentaries on the *Bhagavad-Gita* which appeared serially in THE ARYAN PATH in 1940. Professor Sarma's own translation of the *Gita* is in wide use and he is the author of several other valuable books, including the *Gandhi Sutras* and *What Is Hinduism?*—ED.]

In religious life knowing and being are one. Man as man cannot know God. It is only by eliminating his creaturely qualities and acquiring divine attributes that man can progress in his knowledge of God. It is only by becoming divine that one can know God. God can never become the object of knowledge, as He is the eternal subject.

* * *

We have to strive with evil and fight every inch of our way in the world. This is our moral life. But in religious life there is no evil. When we rise every day in meditation to a higher level of consciousness and learn to see with the eyes of God we find no good and evil, no pleasure and pain. These opposites exist only from the point of view of man. Just as in the world, to the eye of science, there is nothing high or low, good or bad, beautiful or ugly, so to the eye of God all is Truth, Life and Bliss. He is perfection in every way. And the nearer we approach Him in spirit, the less are we troubled by the shadows of the world, the less are we appalled by the myriad forms that evil takes here—filth, disease,

ugliness, ignorance, error and sin. Therefore let us have the zeal and the courage of the crusader in the visible world of men, but at the same time let us have the peace and the blessedness of the psalmist in the invisible world of spirit.

* * *

Christians pray, "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." It is possible to read a profound mystic meaning into this sentence. God's will is not usually done on earth, because there is opposition to it in the shape of self-will permitted by Him. Each creature has its own will. This formidable array of self-wills in the world not only fight among one another, but each in its own way opposes the will of God. The duty of those who lead high ethical lives is to surrender their self-will and to become the instruments of the divine will as revealed to them in their conscience. "On earth" means "in ethical life." For it is only here that there is conflict. But in heaven, that is, in religious life, there is no conflict. Religious life is Divine Life—the life of God in eternity, not in time and space.

There only one will exists and we partake of that life to the extent that we lose ourselves in Him. In heaven, therefore, God's will is the eternal substance, the sole and ever-existent fact. Where there is the slightest notion that there is another will in conflict with it there is no heaven there.

* * *

Life (*Prana*), Light (*Jyoti*), Space (*Akasa*), Joy (*Ananda*)—the Upanishads describe God in these terms. It should be understood that these words are used neither literally nor figuratively. Life is not used in the sense of vital breath. Light is not the phenomenon that meets our eye and conveys the impression through the optic nerve. Space is not our ordinary space of three dimensions in which we live and move. And joy is not individual pleasure or satisfaction. Also these words are not merely figurative, as many seem to think. We say, God is the life of the world, the light that dispels the darkness of ignorance and the source of purest happiness. We do not, however, understand the full significance of these words by such an interpretation. I think that every one of these words refers to a phase of mystic experience. The mystic sees with his *Jnana-chakshus*, the "uncreated light" which transfigures for him the world as well as his own being. Similarly, when he lives in God he feels the abundance of eternal life in him to such an extent that he regards the ordinary life as death. So also the feeling of

infinite which the mystic has in his moments of great experience is very inadequately described by the term *Akasa* or space. And, finally, the joy of union with the Absolute which the mystic feels is no merely individual feeling of pleasure or happiness, but a part of the universal bliss.

* * *

"Beyond good and evil"—what is the meaning of this? One can understand one's going beyond evil. If you improve your character, cultivate the virtues and remove every trace of sin from your mind, you become thoroughly virtuous and always act rightly and without effort. When virtue thus becomes your established habit, when right-doing becomes an instinct with you, you are beyond evil. But are you not also beyond good? For what you do instinctively without reflection or struggle is scarcely a moral act any more than walking is a feat to a grown-up man. It is, I think, in this sense that a religious spirit is said to be beyond good and evil. What a horrible travesty, then, it is to say that a religious spirit or an incarnation of God, because of his freedom, can take part in good or evil as he pleases!

* * *

Humility is my greatest need. It is the first step in that progressive effacement of the self which is the negative side of Yoga. I should become like the dust on the road, which is trampled upon. What if others think that I am weak or

stupid? What if everywhere I am a nobody? What if nobody takes any notice of me? My old nature growls and grumbles. But unless it is stifled there is no chance for the rebirth of the spirit in me. It is easy to give up one's sense of property and possession. It is easy too to give up one's ambitions. But to give up one's *ahamkara*, falsely disguised as self-respect, is very difficult. How many religious persons I have seen who have a high opinion of themselves on account of their religiosity or scriptural knowledge, and who want their superiority in this respect recognised wherever they go. Truly their "superiority" is their inferiority.

* * *

This student who has committed suicide has become my teacher in a way. He had deliberately planned it. He took part in all the everyday activities to the last moment, as if nothing extraordinary were going to happen. He read, he played, he ate, he laughed till 2 o'clock. Then suddenly a full stop. A grain of potassium cyanide, and instantly he was out of time. There were two sides to his soul. One was shown to the world, the other had faced the unknown for some time, wrangled with it and, finally, committed the horrible sin. His method shall be mine—partly. My superficial side is in commerce with the world. I read, I play, I eat, I laugh. But my deeper self is in commerce with a different world. I stretch my hands to the unknown. Sometimes

I see a gleam. But often it is only a promise. I too have to kill myself. But it shall be a divine killing, not a fiendish one. I can go from time to eternity, but I can also come back from eternity to time—which this poor lad cannot do. He has gone once for all with a horror on his head. And yet his sin has something to teach me. Forgive these reflections.

* * *

Every man has two careers—the outer and the inner. Very few pay attention to the latter, though it concerns their future more vitally than the former. The inner career requires as much forethought, patience and perseverance as the outer. It would be interesting to compare the crests and the troughs of the one with those of the other. It is very probable that when your outer career is at its zenith your inner career is at its nadir, because you have risen in the world by compromising with evil; and that when your outer career has reached the lowest point of humiliation and defeat your inner career has reached its highest point of glory, as your external ruin may be due to your standing up for a principle. Happy are those whose curve of external career corresponds to their curve of internal career. But happier are those who have the courage to leave the outer career to take care of itself and take in hand only the inner. And if you look at the matter closely it is also the most prudent way. For the inner career knows no defeat. There attempt

itself is success. Everything lies in our power. We leave what is in our own power and waste our time and energy on things beyond our power. Those who worry themselves about their outward career without taking thought about the inner one are like those who leave the two birds in the hand and go after the one bird in the bush.

* * *

It is said that before we enter the kingdom of God we must burn our boats. That is, all other ambitions, all other enterprises, all other interests must be given up. We must have only one ambition, one enterprise, one interest, namely, to advance in the kingdom of the spirit. Amidst all our toils and tribulations in this world we must keep the one Fire burning in our hearts, and all worldly things must be thrown into it.

But burning your boats is not enough. Have you not got still a lotus blooming at your heart? Is it not a flower of ravishing beauty? Long have you sat by the pond where it grows and counted its petals. It signifies not only beauty, but also love, art and learning. It may seem a horrible treachery or ingratitude to give this up. Often does the soul debate within itself, "Is it right to sacrifice this? O my tender lotus, heart of my heart, how shall I cast thee into the fire?" But cast you must, O Sannyasin, if you are to be a man of God. Burning the lotus is the last rite you are to perform. Burning the boats is only a preliminary. Have you the courage and the faith to do this? If you have, O young spirit, there will be other boats and other lotuses waiting for you in the new land you have entered.

D. S. SARMA

The Western world has never understood Gandhi's religion ; it is completely alien to our rational, pugnacious and materialist tradition. True, Gandhi's ideas are in accordance with the teachings of Christ, from which, indeed, they partly derive. But Western man, at least in the last three hundred years, has accepted a creed of progress through material welfare which has left no place for the mystical side of Christianity. The doctrine of atonement, the efficacy of prayer and fasting, the spiritual power of suffering—these concepts remain in the creeds, but they no longer sway lives and policies in the West. Gandhi's revival of the doctrine of voluntary suffering as a means of reconciliation and atonement now seems as odd and impracticable to us as it did to the Romans, who, in hanging Christ on a cross, thought merely to rid themselves of another Jewish agitator.

—*The New Statesman and Nation*

A MAN AND HIS PAST

[Miss E. M. Rowell, retired Lecturer in Mathematics at the Royal Holloway College of the University of London, has always been most interested in philosophy. She is the author of a volume of essays, *Time and Time Again*. It is very sound advice that she offers here.—ED.]

A man's life in the present emerges from the past; the past is cumulative, and all that a man has done and suffered and been exerts an urgent and undeniable pressure on the present, and here and now largely determines his achievement, his sensitivity and his being. In a measure a man *is* what he *was*, and there is no help for it.

And yet a man's *attitude* to the past can and does modify its reaction upon him, and there are some mistaken and damaging attitudes which it is perhaps worth while to examine.

There is first the man who tries to *fix* his past, and he is of those who have never grown up. He remembers, it may be, his achievements as a young man, remembers them with insistent and continuous emphasis, and through such harking memory his former deeds become the measure for his acts in the present and for his expectations of the future. He dwells, only half consciously perhaps, upon the remembrance that as a boy he was always top of his form, that as a young man he got a First at Oxford, or that he rowed for his College, and these things constitute for him a gauge of what he now feels to be his due, and he is puzzled and pained when none of his fellows

is interested in this early prowess, and when the present fails to put its seal on the promise of the past.

He endeavours to hold tight, to grasp those things as they *were*, when as a matter of fact they are not like that *now*, since all the proportions have changed in the intervening lapse of time. The attempt to reiterate the past is doomed to failure, for in making ingression into the here-now the past is transposed into the key of the present, and the man who hammers on the lost chord of the past strikes a discordant note which belongs neither to the gamut of past nor of present.

The past in its one-time integrity cannot be transferred to the present, and he who clings to the old forms of his past must go back himself as it were, lie among the empty pots of his former selves and forego the swift wings of the immediate.

There is a sense in which *you* can go back to the past, but in no sense can the past *as it was* return to you! For the past is subtly but really changed by transposition and such change is inevitable. There is then this change which *must* be, but there is also a change that *may* be, change due to the direct action of the present on the past.

Any real creative act in the present evokes some re-orientation in the groupings of the past; the past is, as it were, organic and complete at any moment, and, when a new fiat goes out from the present, the portions and proportions of the past are shifted ever so slightly to make room for the new thing, to respond to the new situation.

Indeed the past is in a constant state of movement, it executes a slow dance as it follows the baton beat of the present, and the figures are always changing and the pattern is always different.

And the man who goes back to a literal and stationary past is merely playing with toys and not joining fully in the creative activity of a grown man.

Secondly, there is the man who repudiates his past. Those who in early years have lived in harsh or sordid surroundings, those who in childhood have suffered from a sense of indignity or shame, are especially given to such denial of the past. They have perhaps moved right out of the shadow of their one-time suffering, and they refuse to acknowledge the facts of the old experience, and resolutely turn their minds away from the memories of those events. They may be cowards, or they may be snobs, cowards if they flinch from facing facts disagreeable to themselves, snobs if they seek to hide the "poor relations" of their past from others.

Fear is the basis of both of these reactions, fear of pain on the one

side, fear of discredit on the other.

And such fear is self-inhibiting and damaging; the fear for oneself makes one distrustful, off-putting, secretive and always uncertain; the fear of discredit induces boastfulness, pretentiousness, arrogance, and again always a sense of uncertainty. The error of the snob may express itself in all sorts of extravagancies. Perhaps the involution of style in Meredith's work, involution which grew with the years, is not entirely disconnected with a certain morbid attitude he had towards his own early status and class.

And it may be that for many of us particular mannerisms and artificialities of response are the result of such denial of reality, of the attempted suppression of that which is unacceptable or unpleasant to us in our past experience. And it is not only the collective environment of childhood or youth which works this ill; there are detached and isolated memories, "fretful infelicities" of shame or failure, which assault and hurt the soul, and this because they are evaded and avoided, because we refuse to face them.

In the last resort such suppression may work havoc in the personality, may result in the setting up of "complexes" in the subconscious mind, complexes which destroy or seriously undermine the integrity of the soul. Psychotherapy is largely concerned to break down a man's resistance to his past.

Alongside of such refusal of the past, and perhaps in some measure

associated with it, there is the error of the man who sentimentalizes his early life. In the interests of self-importance or of self-pity such a one makes the high-lights of the past more vivid and deepens its shadows, and he seeks aggrandisement or pity from his fellows by emphasis on the glorious or the pitiful of his former experience. He does not face his memories, he touches them up and restores them in a guise of a romanticism which he enjoys, and which is a form of self-indulgence.

I remember once giving a friend a description of a very troubled period in my early years. I thought she was interested and moved by my recital, when suddenly she broke in: "Oh! but you *like* telling all about this!" For a moment I was amazed and hurt; then I knew that it was true. Meredith has defined the sentimentalist as he who seeks to enjoy without incurring the immense debtorship of the thing done, and as I talked that day I was *enjoying* my past, and ignored the claim of its own forthrightness.

The cure for all these maladjustments lies in simple acceptance of the past, acceptance which engenders a certain integrity of outlook since it is based on submission to fact. For the confronting of any fact, however intolerable such fact may appear at first sight, brings with it a sense of reassurance. Doubt and anxiety and suspense and uncertainty sap our courage, but face to face with a fact and its once-for-all inevitability we say "We can take it." This is true of the present, but the same reserve of native courage is called out as we face the

facts of our past. Integrity is all! We must not invert our failures so that they look like half successes; we must not shrink from our griefs or they will dog our retreating footsteps; we must not minimize our shames and infelicities or they will pile themselves up in our subconscious mind to haunt our personality as baleful guests.

There is a strange virtue in acceptance, for acceptance is a creative act, and in and by the very act of our accepting, the past takes a different shape and becomes conformable not to our own will or to our desire but to our patience.

In "Andrea del Sarto" Browning illuminates this virtue of acceptance, for it was in and through an acceptance of the failures and disappointments and the shames of his past life, and through submission to the cousin's whistle and of all that that implied of loneliness and heart-ache in the present, that the artist was able to pronounce:—

the whole seems to fall into a shape
As if I saw alike my work and self
And all that I was born to be and do,
A twilight piece.

We who are not artists cannot perhaps see life whole, but we can see it steadily, and the steadiness of our outlook on the past may yet communicate itself to our view of the present and to our prospect of the future. Though for us the shape of things past may not be apparent, yet we may have some sense of a growing pattern as we try to accept our past without over-emphasis, without mistrust or fear.

Thus, memory of the past, of a past which is "recollected in tranquillity," irradiates the present with something of the objectivity and integral quality of the poetic vision.

E. M. ROWELL

HINDU CULTURE

[It is the Hindu Way of Life which **Shri J. M. Ganguli** describes here, rather than Hindu Culture in its broader aspect. But the two are inseparable. Many a modern, no doubt, finds the ancient rules a burden, as Shri Ganguli suggests. Let him be sure, however, that in discarding the form he keeps a fast hold on the dedicated spirit that has gone into their observance and that has kept India a living nation down the millenniums.—ED.]

I was agreeably surprised the other day to hear a friend, whose education in England and well-placed official life in this country had, at least apparently, somewhat influenced his natural outlook and turned him to Western ways, say that he had told one of his race-proud European friends that it was not necessary that Indians should exist for providing all advantages and the means of subsistence to the Europeans, as perhaps many of the latter thought. It was rather for the Europeans to live for the maintenance of those in whom the ancient culture of the Hindus lived and through whom it flowed in order that the flow might continue and spread in the world.

What he meant was that the Europeans and their culture had little of lasting value to give to the world, whereas Hindu culture had a mission for the world, a mission for the human soul. He was speaking with visible feeling, which affected the small group he was talking to. "But is it not a pity that the modern educated Hindus themselves are unappreciative and disregarding of such a culture of their own?" I interjected, to draw him out further.

"No; good must always prevail in the end, and even though one may live and behave otherwise one is internally seldom without respect for the good and for the man of principle, who follows his traditional culture in his life and practice."

Perhaps he was right,—at least to a great extent. The reaction from blind adoption of Western ways to an awakening of appreciation of their own culture may have started in the educated Indians. But I doubt to what extent, along with that reaction, the realisation is also coming of one important and essential thing about Hindu culture, namely, that its prescriptions and enjoyments, its taboos and prohibitions, the rites and ceremonies specified for performance by different individuals, its rules of self-discipline in eating, sleeping, talking and other activities of daily life, and its positive instructions regarding the various activities of life—that these have practical significance which cannot be disregarded. Even if such realisation tends to grow with increasing wisdom and experience, it is likely to be impeded for many by the outlook and mentality which the strong influence of Westernism in their life

and education has developed in them.

Those taboos and injunctions, those rules of conduct and positive and negative prescriptions regarding our day-to-day living, thinking and acting,—they are without sensible meaning and impose an unnecessary restraint on individual convenience, discretion and freedom of action,—that is what they say and think.

“Is it necessary, for instance, that I must get up at a certain hour in the early morning, take a bath, remain without food and drink and do my *puja*, which I could very well do leisurely while resting comfortably on a sofa after a hearty meal?”

“What do I gain by depriving myself of this and that article of food, or by abstaining from dishes prepared by anybody and served in any manner, in a hotel or elsewhere that may suit me?” “What spiritual advancement can come if I repeat some particular name or mantra or perform some religious ceremony, and that too in a specified manner?”

Thus in various ways they argue against whatever Shastric taboos and enjoyments inconvenience or do not suit them. They have little faith in them and care little to examine them thoughtfully. So little do they reflect over them that it never strikes them that if things which to them appear so obviously silly and meaningless had been really so they would have so appeared to those ancient sages also, for whose wisdom and philosophy they are beginning to feel regard. Not only did they not so appear to those sages, but

rather they in their wisdom saw great value in them, and so prescribed them in detail.

The human mind is constantly pricked by the strong and insatiable *indriyas* (organs of sense and of action), which incessantly provoke desires and impulses. How to keep them checked and how to thoroughly master them—these problems engaged the serious consideration of those who, unlike the moderns, were able to realise that such control and mastery over the distracting *indriyas* were essential to enduring happiness, to spiritual growth and to human progress to man's divine destiny.

That the kind of food we take, the pure or impure mentality of the person who prepares it, the manner in which it is served and the mood in which we eat,—that all these go to determine whether it will produce the *satvic*, the *rajasik* or the *tamasik guna* in us, was known to them. That to rise before dawn in the *brahma-muhurta* and to sit in meditation, to have an early-morning bath, and to perform *puja* and religious ceremonies in the cool freshness of the dawn with pure body and mind, undistracted by the news, the work and the activities of the day; to abstain from luxurious living which stimulates the senses; to shun unwholesome company and evil sights and pictures; and to pass the day in self-control and discipline;—the supreme value of all these they had learnt from mature experience.

Most careful psychological observers that they were, they were aware

of the fickleness of the mind under the stimulation of the *indriyas* and also of the fact that the mind gained in strength through disciplined living, observance of *sanskars* and principles, religious practices and scrupulous adherence to wholesome and traditional rules of living. Those rules and principles were not merely to be followed mechanically, but with faith and reverence, without which they lost much of their usefulness and efficacy.

Behind all such prescribed practices was the ever-present reminder that all our acts and doings were to be for a divine purpose. When we sit down for a meal we must see that it is as purely and cleanly prepared as is necessary to make it worthy to be offered to God ; we ourselves must be scrupulously clean bodily and unexcited mentally ; then we must reverentially offer the food to our deity and thereafter take it as the deity's *prasad*, not for the satisfaction of craving but for the preservation of our body which is to be the means and the vehicle for discharging divine duties and high spiritual purposes.

Nothing we do should we do with the mere idea of seeking impulse satisfaction and sense pleasure, for that idea only makes our impulses and our senses run wild ; but with the remembrance and the realisation of an ulterior noble object and divine purpose. In eating and drinking, in performing duty and in self-maintenance, in dealing and behaving with others, in the sex relationship be-

tween husband and wife,—and in every physical and mental activity the above remembrance and realisation were enjoined by the great, infinitely wise Rishis of old. Lesser intellects than they may not be able to comprehend the significance of such injunctions, but what great folly to belittle and to discard things through the practice and observance of which those great seers had their supreme realisations !

Indeed, they had so clearly perceived the efficacy of those rules of conduct and living, prescribed differently for different professions, aims, ages and *ashrams* that they faithfully observed them in their own lives, even in advanced stages of spiritual development. It was prescribed, for instance, that a *sanyasin* should take shelter only under a tree and never under a roof. Even the great Sankaracharya so strictly followed the rule that when Mandan Misra invited him to be his guest he refused and passed the night under a tree. He who had attained the eight *sidhis*, who could comprehend and interpret the *Brahma-Sutras*, did not argue with himself as we would have done, "What harm could there be if I passed a night in a house instead of under a tree or ate some delicacies offered by my host ?" Therein is the infinite difference between the Acharya and the proud, thoughtless and convenience-seeking intellectuals and rationalists of today.

It was through the reverential observance of disciplinary and tradi-

tional rules of conduct that Sankaracharya and other Rishis became what they were, and it is through the light-hearted disregard of such rules that many moderns have become the intellectual and spiritual degenerates that they are. That subservience to those rules and rites takes away liberty of action and cripples independence of judgment and discretion is a fallacious and self-deceptive argument. For real liberty comes through the mastery of the *indriyas* and judgment and discretion are corrected and deepened when they are not clouded and influenced by unruly and distracting impulses.

There is indeed no road to complete and supremely happy freedom of the mind except through the absolute subordination of the *indriyas*. The great *Mukta-Purusas* of old, who prescribed the various rules of living and thinking, had realised that through personal experience. If those Purusas are drawing the

appreciative attention of people who have begun to react thoughtfully to the wasteful, unhappy and shallow tendencies of these days, those people should have also the good sense and the wisdom to accept respectfully the authority of those saints in regard to the mode of living, acting, eating, sleeping, thinking, etc.

Hindu culture and philosophy cannot be truly appreciated and comprehended merely by reading and understanding the dictionary meaning of the Shastras, but after *chitta-sudhi*, as has been repeatedly stressed in the Shastras themselves. That must be borne in mind by scholars, thinkers and appreciators of Hindu culture and philosophy. Hindu culture and philosophy are to be lived and practised in the daily routine of life, ardently, faithfully, rigorously and reverentially, and then progress can be made through them towards the achievements for which they stand.

J. M. GANGULI

After the war, then what? Will the overthrow of Hitler and the Japanese warlords amount to anything? Will the accomplishment of that, and only that, be worth this war's horrible cost? Of course not. Their overthrow would at best do no more than clear the ground—clear the ground upon which slowly we may begin to shape the fabric of a world order conceived and built according to those principles of justice and human consideration which alone could make it fit to last. That kind of world cannot be created by men still stupid and truculent with the hangovers of deliberate hating. It will require men whose souls have been big enough to keep sober in a maddened time.

—WALTER RUSSELL BOWIE,

(*The New York Times Magazine*, 31st January, 1943)

THE WORLD'S CHILDREN

[Miss Elizabeth Cross, pleading here for an overdue fair deal for the child, warns pertinently against the "growing failure to appreciate the value of family life."—ED.]

Now that we have, at last, become conscious of the fact that today's children are tomorrow's citizens, there is some danger of complacency. So much has been written and spoken about education, child psychology, child welfare and many other grand-sounding studies that we are apt to think that all is being done that can be done for all children.

This is a complete fallacy, for this much-vaunted child-study reaches only a minute percentage of the population and in the majority of countries children are still being brought up on the hit-or-miss system that has made such a failure of many adults today. It is useless for the conservative to say, "What was good enough for my parents is good enough for me, in the matter of child care," for it is, quite obviously, *not* good enough or the world wouldn't be in such a mess. People as a collectivity make the world, and it is high time we had people of a lot better quality in order to make a better-quality world. Keep right on bringing up children in the horrible old traditions of competition, exclusiveness and greed and you are making quite sure of perpetuating present evils.

However, there are even larger and more fundamental troubles to be

considered than the failure of our present educational system. (A failure, by the way, not based upon ignorance, but upon a peculiar vicious circle which deems it necessary for children to jump through examination hoops in order to qualify for jobs that have nothing to do with the examinations!) A bad educational system might, possibly, be circumvented by a wholesome and enlightened family life, but at the moment this is also a rarity and likely to become even more rare. What is more, instead of regarding boarding-schools as, occasionally, necessary evils, they are to be made available whenever possible to a still larger section of the public. Thus, instead of making sure, as we do today in spite of ourselves, that a large proportion of our citizens have a chance of growing up in the healthy atmosphere of a family, where there is some balance between the sexes and some realisation of the outside world, we are to increase the number of boys whose life is bounded by other boys' interests and of girls who are influenced at their most impressionable age by spinsters. The co-educational boarding-school is the only possible establishment that might be a substitute for the right kind of family, and that is extremely difficult to organise, and also could

be quite unnecessary.

In addition to the growing use of boarding-schools (often by parents who could perfectly well look after their children themselves), we must face the problem of the genuinely homeless children who are being brought up in various charitable or government-aided "homes." These establishments are, on the whole, run with every care and are beyond reasonable criticism. They do their best for the children entrusted to their care and certainly a good institution is far better than a bad private home with relations who do not know or do not care how to treat a child. However, it seems to be a bad principle for any nation to countenance institutional care for children, particularly for babies. Babies and young children, in particular, need a mother or a mother substitute if they are to thrive physically and psychologically. In the most up-to-date babies' homes it is a recognised thing that the child will flourish best when given the animal affection, the general nursing and play that all mothers, animal and human, give to their young. This is difficult, if not impossible, with a number of babies and children, although the best institutions do their best to divide the children up into small groups in the care of a "house-mother."

What is really essential is the realisation of the right of every baby to its mother (or to a suitable substitute in case of death or other serious cause). At the moment the

official policy appears to be a desire for a rising birth-rate (or the country will be an old-folks' home before long), but the Government does nothing whatever to encourage home life or the care of children by the mother. Women in the services, if married, are permitted to leave to take care of their babies (up to the time of writing), but the mothers of illegitimate babies are deprived of these and continue, later, with their duties. This is no place to discuss the ethics of such a case; I am merely interested in the babies. It is no affair of any baby whether it is legitimate or not, but every baby needs a mother and it is high time the Government realised this and made some more humane plans to meet the situation.

The above remarks, of course, apply only to the British Isles, but throughout the world there is a growing failure to appreciate the value of family life. This break-up of the family is being accentuated by the war, but it had begun long before the actual outbreak of hostilities. At the moment, in Russia, there would seem to be something of a swing back from their early lack of interest in family life, and although women have complete right and freedom to work, and have the provision of nurseries and clinics for the care of the children while they are at work, yet they normally have every opportunity for keeping their children in the home with them. Likewise over-easy divorce is no longer encouraged and a more stable

family life is likely to be established.

It does seem clear, however, that throughout the world, as the more enlightened section of the public begin to take a lively interest in child welfare and so agitate for extra care and benefits for children, such as free milk, medical care and so on, a large number of parents become more and more desultory in their care for their own children. The essentials of life are free and begin to be valued less and less. It is a sad reflection on humanity that what is received without a struggle is considered worthless. It seems somewhat apparent, however, particularly when extra essentials for the children's well-being, such as vitamin extracts and cod-liver oil, obtainable free in some cases, are not even collected but go begging. It seems incredible that such careless parents exist, but they are common.

In addition to a growing carelessness of parents, we also get a complete divorce, in some cases, of child and home, partly due to the many "movements" that governments introduce, hoping to benefit the child. For instance, many children of fourteen or so have no free time at all for their parents' company. They are at school all day, they belong to this club, to that Youth Movement, have extra hobbies at school and so on, and only see their parents at the evening meal, having the midday one at school.

What is needed, far more, surely, that so many separate movements

and clubs, is the provision of recreational faculties that could be enjoyed by the whole family, men, women and children. The world is in far greater need of a pooling of interests, rather than an intensification of differences. For instance, all families enjoy parks and playgrounds, swimming pools and theatres. Each town and village would do better to spend its energy and leisure in making a communal centre, where health, recreation, music and dancing, hobbies and hand-work, could be contributed to and enjoyed by the whole family, than in getting the women into one little band, the boys marching off to some other meeting and the girls to yet another.

There is, of course, much talk of raising the school-leaving age after the war, but it is time that public opinion (and that means parental opinion) was roused *now* concerning the work these adolescents are doing. The children, boys and girls, who leave school at fourteen are now, and usually have been, thoroughly exploited. There are regulations concerning the hours they may work, but these regulations are extremely difficult to enforce and it is only the parents who are able to see that the children have sufficient rest and sleep after work. On the whole the boys and girls from fourteen upwards plunge immediately into a physically adult life. They work about eight hours a day, they smoke and often drink (it is very difficult to judge the girls' ages in the public-houses when

they all paint their faces), stay out late and are usually over-tired. The blind-alley jobs they are in have no interests for them and it is no wonder that they spend so much time and money dreaming their leisure away at the cinemas. The new youth movements are an attempt to train them for the better use of leisure, but they do not get to the root of the matter, which is the tragedy of unsuitable work.

To be perfectly blunt, the larger number of children that leave school each year (excluding those in Russia, which is making an effort to avoid this blind-alley system), are merely little slaves, often paid extremely well in money, but bored and becoming increasingly useless by reason of their dislike of work in general. The fortunate few know what they want and start learning a chosen job, the rest merely drift from one job to another, never learning anything properly and becoming, too often, unemployed and unemployable except in war time.

There is no reason whatever why some children should not leave their academic and formal schooling at the age of fourteen and join some improved system of apprenticeship in which they will work and do, and learn by doing, and also continue some theoretical training. There are many children who will never reach any high level of performance, but all need protection from stupid and soul-destroying work for which they can see no reason. Those who have

no capacity to become anything more than very simple machine-minders must be guarded from exploitation, and their leisure time helped by the family centres mentioned before. The others who are capable of increase in skill and capacity should not be held back by having their time wasted in drudgery.

Much can be done by legislation but more can be done by private determination. There needs to be a revival of family pride and a determination that every child shall have a fair chance. Parents need to know what the State is offering and how to make use of the advantages that exist now and also how to take care of their children themselves.

If by some means Government aid could be given, particularly to those parents who really care about their children (which should be, of course, all parents), and some encouragement to those who wish to establish a settled home, rather than pass on their responsibilities to institutional care, then all children would benefit. Institutional care should be reduced to the minimum and a carefully supervised scheme of adoptions encouraged, in order that every child should have a real home life. It is a fundamental law of nature that the young should be cared for by the parents and it is extremely fool-hardy for any of us to try to circumvent this. Bad homes have always existed, but that is no reason for the abolition of the home.

Rather let us aim at helping suitable people to become parents and so provide happy homes. A good home and conscientious parents can do more for a child than any number of

Government officials, and far more cheaply! So let us help the parents and the children at the same time and the future of the State will then take care of itself.

ELIZABETH CROSS

ART IN SOCIETY

The Rt. Hon. Dr. M. R. Jayakar's remarks in his presidential address at the recent Silver Jubilee celebrations of the Art Society of India embody succinctly the function of art in society. He offered also some constructive suggestions as to its proper development. He defined the true function of art as "the raising of human sentiments above the ordinary level into the regions of ethereal idealisation." Dr. Jayakar cited Emerson's definition of the function of art: "to give to pots and pans the grace of our romance." Art should be brought into every home but the artist should not stoop to the tastes of the multitude in quest of either money or popularity. The responsibility of educating the public to appreciate high art lay on the artist himself, as also that of keeping art free from debasing influences. The days of royal patronage being over, the artist was thrown back upon the people. He faced the double task of maintaining the integrity of high artistic tradition while retaining the popular

sympathy on which he depended. He must succeed where the cinema had failed—or at least had never cared to think whether success was worth achieving—in creating a healthy public taste for the sublime in the beautiful.

Art, to deserve the name, must serve its first purpose—ensuring delight by raising the level of thought and feeling—and then only achieve its secondary purposes if any. Babu Rajendra Prasad once declared: "It is real literature only if it raises mankind to higher levels of life." The definition holds as good for art.

Communalism has invaded even the domain of art and Dr. Jayakar's criticism in that respect deserves emphasis. The appeal of all good art is universal. It goes straight to our hearts without any inquiry as to the artist's caste, creed or colour. What can support communal notions like that of Jain or Parsi arts and crafts except a desire to exploit narrow sentiments for commercial gain?

GITA AND ANUGITA

[S. N. Tadpatrikar, who is on the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute staff, writes about the little known *Anugita* which H. P. Blavatsky describes as "a very occult treatise."—ED.]

The *Bhagavad Gita* has since ancient times had an unparalleled hold upon the public mind in India. A vast literature has grown up around it. There have been scores of imitations as well as of commentaries. Recent closer contact with the West has given fresh impetus to its study. So great indeed has always been its popularity that it has quite eclipsed another, considerably longer, philosophical dialogue also found in the *Mahābhārata*, known as the *Anugita*.

An old commentary contains a clue, worth following up but so far untouched upon by any scholar, as to the possible relationship between the two discourses. It is put forward in connection with Śloka 73 of the last adhyāya of the *Gita*, in which Arjuna says to Kṛṣṇa :—

"Gone is my bewilderment; through your grace, O Achyuta, I have attained to consciousness. I now stand free from all doubts and shall do your bidding."

Commenting on this śloka Abhinavagupta, a great Kasmiri savant of the tenth century, remarks :—

Thus by the words "Gone is bewilderment etc.," it is suggested that Arjuna has become ready to fight, but has not properly attained the knowledge of the Brahman which latter supplies the necessary scope and motive for the teachings of the *Anugita*.

It seems strange that this note has not received the notice which it deserves, because it gives due importance to the "Uddeśa" and the "phala" of the *Gita*, and tells us something about the *Anugita*, to which we now turn.

The prefix "Anu-" means "after" and thus justifies the place of this dialogue in the *Mahābhārata*. While the first *Gita*—or may I call it the "original" as compared with all others of the type?—is part of the Bhīṣmaparva, in which the great fight begins, the *Anugita* forms part of the Aśvamedhikaparva, which comes after the Sānti and the Anuśāsana, which last records the death of Bhīṣma, the first Generalissimo of the Kaurva armies.

The name *Gita* in this latter case is justified by analogy, in that the first is a dialogue between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, while this *Anugita* also purports to be a dialogue between the same two persons. But the analogy between them ends there. The number of adhyāyas and ślokas differs widely in the two. Whereas the first *Gita* has 18 adhyāyas and 700 ślokas—or 45 more according to some computations—the *Anugita* has 36 chapters and 1051 ślokas.

But it is the peculiar context in which this *Anugita* is set that relates

itself to the first *Gita*, and we now turn to the particular occasion which brings about the dialogue between Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa and ultimately gives its present form to this "After"-*Gita*.

King Yudhiṣṭhira, with the blind Dhṛtarāṣṭra and others, had returned to Hastināpura, while Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna had gone to Indraprastha, where they had stayed at ease for some time. The fight having ended and peace having been restored throughout the country, Kṛṣṇa now wanted to return to his own place and asked Arjuna to broach the subject to King Yudhiṣṭhira and to obtain his consent. There was now nothing that necessitated longer the presence of this great benefactor of the Pandavas, and Arjuna had to say "Yes" to Kṛṣṇa's proposal and to prepare himself for the parting, when, as if something had occurred to him suddenly, he said: "I now remember that, when the fight was yet to begin, you, O Keśava, gave me certain advice and showed me your divine form. But alas! I have forgotten all the details and only a faint memory remains! I am eager to hear all that again, and you, Madhava, speak of going to Dvārakā shortly!"

Kṛṣṇa embraced Arjuna fondly and replied, "I had given you the eternal secret, Dharma incarnate! It is most unfortunate that your mind could not maintain its grasp. It is now impossible for me, too, to give you all in full detail. I was then in a yogic state and could reveal to you

the mystery of the Great Brahman. I shall, however, repeat to you an old story in the same connection, whereby you would reach the ultimate goal by applying yourself to the subject." And then we have a "purātana itihāsa," the "old story," from the mouth of the Lord.

Thus begins the *Anugita*. The old story refers to a Brahmana who had come to Dvārakā from heaven and, upon being questioned by Kṛṣṇa told him about "Mokṣa Dharma." This philosophy runs over four adhyāyas and in the concluding lines we have an assertion from Kṛṣṇa himself: "Then, too, while in the chariot, you heard even this much," referring thus to the occasion of the first *Gita*.

The second section of the *Anugita* includes fifteen adhyāyas, and is in the form of a dialogue between a Brahmana and his wife; and at the end of this section we have Kṛṣṇa saying that his mind was the Brahmana and the Buddhi was the wife referred to in the section.

The third section opens with a direct question from Arjuna: "Tell me about Brahma, the great principle to be known," and in reply we have from Kṛṣṇa another "purātana itihāsa," an "old story" in the form of a dialogue between the teacher or "Guru" and his pupil. And again, at the end of this section, Lord Kṛṣṇa states, "Even this is what I told you when the time for fighting had come. Now bear this in mind."

Then recurs the subject of the Lord's departure for Dvārakā, and Arjuna says that they both will go to Hastinapura to see King Yudhiṣṭhira and to obtain his consent to Kṛṣṇa's proposal. And with this ends what is now called the *Anugita*.

We thus see that although Kṛṣṇa expresses his inability at first to repeat the philosophy of the *Gita* as originally imparted, yet in the three sections constituting the *Anugita* we

have at least two sections where the Lord himself asserts that the knowledge revealed therein is exactly what was given in the *Bhagavad Gita*. The temptation, therefore, to go deeper still into this *Anugita* to see how far these statements are in agreement with the facts is irresistible. I propose in another article to examine carefully the contents of all these three sections and to compare them with our *Gita*.

S. N. TADPATRIKAR

INDIA'S ANTIQUITY

To those convinced of the antiquity and the wide expansion of greater Indian culture Herbert W. Krieger's discovery in the Philippines of cultural influences from India will be no matter for surprise. His recent publication, the fourth in the Smithsonian Institution's War Background Studies, is *Peoples of the Philippines*. Neither the latter-day influence of Islamic culture nor that of the Chinese traders has been as profound as that from India. Though Hindu or Buddhist architectural remains are not found in the Philippines, the impact of Indic culture, extending perhaps over more than two thousand years, has been strong. The art of metal working is characteristic of Indian influence and such decorative motifs as the lotus and other Hindu cult representations are found. Significant also are the many words of Sanskrit origin in the Tagalog and other dialects and the similarity of the Philippine alphabet in use when the

Spaniards discovered the Islands, to that of the Hinduised Javanese. Mr. Krieger quotes Dr. Pardo de Tavera as saying that

the words which Tagalog borrowed are those which signify intellectual acts, moral conceptions, emotions, superstitions, names of deities, of planets, of numerals of high number, of botany, of war and its results and consequences, and finally, of titles and dignities, some animals, instruments of industry, and the names of money.

This cultural influence emanating from India "introduced ideas and knowledge of varied types, enriched the language and radically changed fundamental religious beliefs." In the probable absence of direct maritime contacts with India it is possible that these cultural influences were carried slowly and piecemeal through Java and Borneo, but

there is no tribe in the Philippines, no matter how primitive and remote, in whose culture of today elements of Indian origin cannot be traced.

SPIRIT VERSUS MATTER

[**William Bashyr Pickard**, former Colonial administrator in Uganda, has written several books, including *Layla or Majnun* and *The Sage of Mount Noh*. He writes of non-violence as one knowing violence at first-hand, having served on the Western Front in the last war and been wounded in action.—ED.]

I came before him humbly. His grey hair flowed in waves like a woman's to his shoulders. His beard was silver. His eyes were serene and clear as of the deep sea.

I looked towards him, but for a time could not speak. His presence was stillness—the peace of an ultimate attainment. My question vanished from within me as the lace of cloud before sun and wind.

Yet he had divined my thought.

“Speak,” he said. “Silence should be of fullness, not of dearth; of knowledge, not of stifled question.”

“Tell me,” I said, “about spirit and about matter.”

He said: “The unseen is the true reality. Matter is but as the shadow, an opaqueness before the sunshine of life.”

I said: “This truth is beyond me. Can it not be expressed in simpler terms?”

The light of a smile of great sweetness danced in the deep of his eyes. I felt the cloak of affection flung about me.

He replied: “The house is desolate without the inhabitant. The body is pitiful, a flower of sorrow without the life spirit. Between a live body and a dead body can you

weigh the difference? Is not the matter of the same substance, the difference alone the unseen? Yet which is truest reality? The life or the substance? The body, which is seen and heavy, or the spirit, which is unseen, which animates?”

I pondered for a moment; then I asked: “Are not giant tanks and bombs reality?”

Not a ripple disturbed his serenity.

He replied: “They are but implements; they are not reality. They create not themselves. Invisible life must fashion them. Invisible life must manipulate them. Invisible life, if necessary, will destroy them, or they will perish by disintegration of matter.”

I was silent; then I asked: “The present world conflict—is not that the conflict of spirit against matter?”

Unmoved he replied: “Nay, the power is to the spirit; matter hath no power wherewith it should strive. In a battle of giants, though mountains be uprooted and be hurled as missiles, giant wages war against giant, not against mountains or the substance of mountains. So the present conflict is of spirit against spirit, of good against evil, of human love against human hate, of liberty against oppression, not of man

against tank or of tank against tank, for, of itself, the tank hath no power or volition."

So I asked: "Is there, then, no conflict of spirit against matter?"

He replied with a radiant gladness of speech: "Nay, to the understanding there is no such conflict. It is but a shadow of ignorance. To the rightly aware, spirit is unassailable. Matter, but a patient, faithful servant. In the world, the spirit uses the things of the world, the material substances of the earth, to build its habitation and to express the desires and aspirations of the human soul. In this there is no antagonism. Is there antagonism between the artist and the colours he uses to paint the picture, to express his meaning upon the canvas, to give expression to his inner self?"

So I asked: "If, then, there is no essential elemental conflict between spirit and matter, what actually is materialism?"

He replied: "Materialism is to love the shadow rather than the substance, to consider the gross and inanimate rather than the inner and living reality, to dwell in the deception of the shadows rather than in the rays of the light of life, which is reality, wherein is no darkness."

I rose from his presence. A weight seemed lifted from my mind. I felt emancipated from an incubus.

Yet one last, parting question came to my lips. Could humanity share in my elation? Could humanity be brought to the freedom of truth, to recognize matter as but the servant of the spirit, not as the overlord of all human civilization?

So I asked: "What hope for humanity against the million armies of materialism?"

And he replied: "Eliminate force: do nothing by force; for violence and oppression shall perish from the earth."

W. B. PICKARD

VANITY

International Women's News (London) for November has a serious paragraph on "The Fluffy Curl," apropos of the statistical showing of 179 accidents in 1941 due to women's hair becoming entangled in moving machinery. The Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories for that year is quoted:—

Unfortunately the modern style of hair-dressing does not lend itself to the hair being carefully covered, and in spite of much advice from Inspectors and others the fluffy curl still protrudes. Even after having had a minor scalping accident, the same girl was found again without her cap but maintained that she preferred to have an accident rather than to look a fright.

So far official counter-propaganda has not offset effectively the influence of the illustrated magazines and fashion papers. The ideal they present is not

the woman worker suitably costumed and coiffed but "the lady" with her elaborate "hair set" and fashionable clothes which would be a hindrance at work. Any detached observer must deplore the folly that wilfully risks permanent injury or death rather than sacrifice feminine charm during working hours. The slogan of a great paint-manufacturing concern, "Save the surface and you save all!", is the working motto for the superficial everywhere.

As Shrimati Tarabai M. Premchand well brought out in a review in our March 1943 issue, India has to thank Gandhiji for bringing home to many the realisation that woman's beauty no less than her strength lies not in her exterior aspect but in her capacity to work and to sacrifice.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

INDIA AND THE "HISTORIC PROCESS"*

It is somewhat worrying to English readers, when they seek enlightenment on the political struggle in India, to find that Indian writers on the subject say so much about politics in general and so little about India. Prof. N. Gangulee's book on a "Constituent Assembly for India" is a case in point. Of its 267 pages, 150 are devoted to studies of the parts conceded to "Constituent Assemblies" in a series of "revolutionary situations" in the Western world, beginning with the English Revolution of the seventeenth century and ending with the abortive revolution in Spain a few years ago. The survey is a work of great—though rather too specialised—industry, and its purpose is to present contemporary Indian demands for a national and sovereign Assembly in a light of historic inevitability. In this aim Professor Gangulee is not unsuccessful although his interpretation of these revolutions is doctrinaire and over-simplified, taking too little account of the great diversity of motives that they embodied and preparing us for a perspective of the Indian problem which is so narrowly constitutional that it gives the reader hardly any feeling of Indian realities. This is the more regrettable because the case is presented with moderation and fairness and will command the agreement, in principle, of much British opinion: but it will not fortify this agreement with confidence in the concrete situation, for it

does not help the reader to grasp what is distinctive in the Indian problem and in the community whose sovereignty is postulated.

Professor Gangulee might reply that his book is limited in scope to discussion of the constitutional problem; and he has done his best, in several previous books, to enlighten readers of English upon economic, agrarian and other aspects of Indian life. One should never criticise a book for what it has not attempted to do. But the conception of a national constitution so clearly depends upon the understanding of some national being which is in need of that expression that it is most disquieting to receive, from Professor Gangulee, the impression that he thinks it depends solely upon a "historical process" or an economic evolution exemplified by a number of remote and very different peoples. If this conception of nationalism is—as sometimes alleged—characteristic of Indian nationalist thinkers, it is a matter for grave misgiving. For the merely revolutionary and historical conception of sociology is rapidly passing out of date in the West, and its uncritical imitation in the East could only lead to still worse disillusionments. Fascinated by the ideological simplification of Marxist economic analysis, Mr. Gangulee has not even been careful to study its revision in the light of recent history. Of the causes of revolt, for instance, he can write:—

* *Constituent Assembly for India*. By N. GANGULEE. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 16s.)

Sooner or later, there comes a point when conditions have worsened so far that men will continue in the old way no longer and in desperation they exclaim " Give us liberty or give us death."

But this is by no means a general truth, though it was assumed in early economic-socialist doctrine. It is, on the contrary, when a class finds its conditions of life improving that it most often seeks more power in the state. Politicians wishing to gain power over the proletarian masses who, being insecure and weak in cohesion, are the most susceptible to state-socialist propaganda, have more success in instilling revolt when the standard of life of that class is rising than when it is falling.

For it is not true that men seek liberty in the abstract: they seek to go on doing more securely the thing they have become accustomed to do, or else to do that, plus something more to the possibility of which their way of life has awakened them. " Liberty " is a word with which it is often possible to assume leadership over men in the mass, simply because each individual can fill it with the idea of his own enlargement. And there are, it is true, some societies in which people actually have large liberties—that is, they can do or refuse to do many things without molestation by each other or by their government. But where this happy condition exists we cannot trace it so much to their successes in revolutionary politics as to their having a free spirit. A free spirit is a grace that comes to a people from its observance of *dharma*. *Dharma* means, in practice, a responsible way of living centred in the service of a religion, though it is possible for a certain degree of observance of *dharma* to survive in the hearts and the mental habits of a people for a

generation or two after this religious faith and practice has been given up: but in that case their liberty contracts, as their relations become more legalistic or mechanical, less customary and spontaneous.

How far Professor Gangulee identifies liberty with economic security—as Marxian ideologues so commonly do—is not quite clear; but he accepts the economic revolutionary view of history so completely that he regards the U. S. S. R. as the nearest political approximation yet made to liberty, democracy and equality, with an uncritical eye for such facts as that of its ruling class numbering less than 2 per cent of the population, or the disparities in wage and salary incomes, which are greater than those found in any other industrialised state. He even says of Russia:—

The sources from which lack of unity and resistance to a National State arise and create confusion have been overcome by democratic alliance between the workers and peasants.

One would like to know how he squares that verdict with the treatment of the peasants, say between 1929 and 1932! This is, one fears, the old story; the Marxian theorist cannot face the fact that the U.S.S.R. is a technocratic empire of the greatest possible disciplinary severity; he must always refer to it as the home of prosperous liberty and equality, for if it were not so he fears his theories would be discredited.

The very real interest of the Russian technocratic empire for Indian nationalists is that it has established (or rather maintained, for it existed before) a political unity between many different countries, races and religious groups, and a political sovereignty for all India

would present problems similar in that respect though probably more complex. The Soviet work was accomplished by a small minority who had a passionate belief in the Western ideals of history as revolution, economics as technical progress, and of culture as human self-realization, and it seems to Professor Gangulee that an Indian minority might be able to lead the more numerous but territorially poorer peoples of India in the name of similar ideals. This may be true. It has been proved in several countries that, in contemporary world-circumstances, a minority can (at least for a time) enforce these ideals upon a people with the aid of modern propaganda technique. They can, not because the people like it. It removes too many landmarks and upsets too many accustomed ways of life, to be popular. But people are defenceless against machines owned and managed by a merchant class, and still more powerless when the machines are owned by the political class. As Professor Gangulee quotes from Pandit Nehru: The conception of a National Assembly

is a dynamic one. It does not mean a body of people or a gathering of lawyers, who are intent on drawing up a Constitution. It means a nation on the move, throwing away the shell of its past political, and possibly social, structure and fashioning for itself a new garment of its own making. It means the masses of the country in action through their elected representatives.

Not shape, but motion, is evidently the leading idea. Now motion must be towards something, and from all that Mr. Gangulee has to say it appears that the end and aim would be mere technocratic efficiency. In default of an end, the means would become the end, not because technocracy is the

Indian idea, but because it is now the line of least resistance, and is all that Professor Gangulee or anyone else can prescribe in conformity with economic progress and Western Revolutionism. One cannot help asking—in that case why India? “Why waste time on anything so meaningless as a nation and not go straight for universal world technocracy?”

The ideal of all Indians that Indians themselves should discharge the sovereign responsibility for India's government is of course wholly legitimate, and where Professor Gangulee is simply maintaining this thesis against the present rule of the Paramount Power, he is at his best. The spirit and tone of his advocacy are particularly commendable when he is demonstrating the disadvantages of the foreign financial hegemony and the complication of the communal question by the temptation it has offered to British administrators to “divide and rule.” Here also, however, we are given evidence that certain British officials have consciously played with this divisive idea, but we should have learnt more if we could have had some specific Indian experiences of it in operation. On the financial issue, too, the case against the present bank rule needs more definition from the stand-point of Indian needs.

Professor Gangulee rejects the idea of Federation, with or without Dominion status in the Commonwealth, and even if, as Mahatma Gandhi himself thinks possible, the way to Indian autonomy must lie through civil war, it is not for a foreigner to say it should not be achieved. But what is hard to accept in such a picture as this of Professor Gangulee's, is that it in no way suggests a political system that shall be an

expression and extension of the actual Indian Community. It appears rather to be an intellectual generalization about progress, drawn from the history of many Western nations, applied to all the Indian peoples in the belief that it will make them into something new, united and altogether better. But, to one whose life has been spent chiefly in psycho-social studies, it seems clear that Nationalism, to be successful, must be a movement that is not only expecting a future but respecting a past. It is not only going somewhere, but from somewhere. It has confidence in its future because it has faith in its past, indeed, it will have just as much unity in its future as it has faith in its past, and no more. That is what disquiets me; one would not know, from reading Professor Gangulee's very legalistic book, that India had ever in the past produced a great statesman. One would barely gather that India (probably the most

religious people on earth) had any religion, except for allusions to an allegedly overrated and out-of-date communal question. Instead, we behold India as the field for realizing a Western historic process which is said to have culminated in Russia.

No doubt Western political forms, as well as Western technology, will leave a permanent impress on the future life of India. But as the movement for Indian freedom and integration takes its true shape, we should be able to perceive, through any systems borrowed from the West, the forms of India's local and traditional loyalties raised to a higher power, not overridden and suppressed in obedience to imported theory. We saw something of that in the Gandhi movement. And in the books and theories, too, which accompany such a movement, we expect to find some reflection, at least, of the wisdom of the traditional builders and architects of Indian society.

PHILIP MAIRET

PROFESSOR JOAD'S SPIRITUAL ODYSSEY*

Dr. Joad's attitude towards religion has always seemed anomalous. A self-styled agnostic, reacting against the strait-laced Christianity of his childhood years, he has devoted his considerable talents to philosophy and politics, indulging now and again in polemical encounters with upholders of Christian orthodoxy. A rationalist, his outlook on religion has been critical, sometimes hostile, yet faintly questioning, his very hostility betraying an underrunning doubt that the rejected

world view might in substance be true after all. Intellect smothered the suasions of the "soul." Yet, tilt as he might, and with justice at times, against the pundits of the Church, his philosophy accorded more closely with the views of his adversaries than with those of his narrower rationalist friends. For Dr. Joad was (and is still) a Platonist, and as such opposed to extreme subjectivist doctrines since he acknowledges the absoluteness of Values. This position he sought to

* *God and Evil*. By C. E. M. JOAD. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

reconcile with adherence to the Bergsonian gospel of Creative Evolution which allows of an animating principle in the universe, a Life Force within the evolutionary flux, rather than a self-subsisting God.

With this amalgam philosophy Dr. Joad is now dissatisfied. How, on this view, he asks, can we account for "higher" and "better" forms of life as distinct from forms of life that are later in time? Thus the moral problem emerges: is evil a mere by-product of evolution destined to disappear when Life reaches a more advanced stage of development? Assuredly not: evil is relevant, real, pervasive, so disastrously obtrusive, affirms Dr. Joad in this, his latest book, that "one can only conclude that what the religions have always taught is true, and that evil is endemic in the heart of man." To this surprising conclusion does this self-confessed amoralist come, a conclusion which, combining with the implications of his value-philosophy, constrains him to examine anew the evidence for the existence of God. To this examination the greater part of this closely-reasoned book is devoted, treating in turn of the arguments against theism and of the arguments which now induce its author to at least a tentative acceptance of the theistic claim. Dr. Joad's avowal can best be indicated in his own words:—

There is a world of values real and eternal, which is other than and outside the world of evolving life. Of this world we may achieve knowledge which is intuitive in character and cannot be demonstrated by argument or communicated to those who have not shared the experience on which it is based. The view that the values are the expressions of an underlying unity has seemed to me to possess considerable antecedent plausibility, and, if such a unity be granted, it has seemed

reasonable to suppose that it is that of a person, a person with whom human beings can make contact in religious and mystical experience, and with aspects or expressions of whose nature they do make contact in moral and æsthetic experience.

Let it be said that elsewhere in his book Dr. Joad carefully safeguards the idea of the personality of God against the disastrous ascription to the Divine Being of qualities all too human. If God is a person, he adds, "His personality can be at most only one aspect of the whole that He is," an admission which at once makes his view-point more concordant with Eastern Monism. Incidentally, he is disinclined to believe in the conservation of human personality, and on this point favours the Eastern view (as he calls it) that "at death our personalities are merged with God, so that our separate *egos* cease to exist."

Yet Dr. Joad disregards (shirks would be too harsh a word) the full implications of Eastern thinking on these matters he discusses at such length. For example, the problem of evil and the suffering which evil involves troubles him acutely. So intractable did he find it, in earlier years, that he was forced against the brick wall of dualism. There must be, he thought, a principle of evil as well as a principle of good, a Devil as well as a God, if the fact of suffering was to be adequately explained. Hence—since dualism is an uninspiring creed—his former irreligion. Hence, too, his re-examination, under the impact of war, of the theist's claim.

How explain God *and* Evil? That is his problem, as of many others before him. Unity there must be, but how make it philosophically presentable in face of the facts? Dr. Joad

has recourse to the mystics and notes the unanimity of their testimony of the reality behind the world of appearance; he dallies with the idea of an "inner self" which expresses and is itself an expression of a univereal consciousness; finally he reaches the conclusion that simple goodness is the best attestation to spiritual truth. By their fruits we know them:—

The strongest argument for the existence of a reality which is in some sense the true home of man's spirit... is the testimony of the lives and characters of the thousands who have believed in it and have lived in accordance with their beliefs.

But the problem of evil, metaphysically conceived, is still unsolved, and curiously the questing author casts no glance at an answer of the East which might tell him that evil and suffering, having no part in Divine Being, are consequences of the world-movement (in which Joad himself discerns purposiveness) which provides, so to speak, the stage for human pilgrimage through life upon life in the ascent from ignorance to Spiritual Knowledge. The doctrine of reincarnation might at least be considered in a book of this kind.

Truth to tell, Dr. Joad seems somewhat ill at home in Eastern modes of thought as his references to Buddhism, and to Zoroastrianism also, occasionally reveal. Obvious, too, is his lack of acquaintance with Christian authorities, though, as he avers, where Christian doctrine is backed by metaphysical arguments his writ as a

philosopher entails the privilege of judgment. (This is true, but his argument would gain in strength were his knowledge wider and his sources more authoritative.) It is here, in his final chapter assessing the Christian claim, that Dr. Joad invites the censure of critics who might else have welcomed a prodigal hastening home to Christian orthodoxy. Rejecting the soft option, yet recalling his cautious acceptance of the religious view of life eclectically gleaned from the historic religions, he marshals his evidence against credal Christianity with courage not unmixed with diffidence. The claim for Christ's unique status in the universe he characterises as "topographically parochial"; the Athanasian Creed with its implication that Plato and Socrates are damned seems to him incredible, and no wonder; the doctrine of Heaven and Hell, as originally presented, he finds repellent. Jesus was "perhaps the best man who ever lived." But he was a man, and of him, too, some challenging things are said which traditionalists will find as disquieting as Joad finds the anti-intellectual bias in Jesus himself.

To sum up: Dr. Joad has reached no abiding haven; his mind pitches and tosses still upon the sea of controversy and self-questioning. But his course is now set. Contrite, and humbler than of yore, he voyages on, with his new-found conviction for guide. The Odyssey continues.

LESLIE BELTON

INDIA AND INDIANS*

It is perhaps a little unfair to review at one time books which, even while India is the subject of all of them, are by writers as differently gifted as these; it is hard for Mr. Raman and Lord Lytton to hold their own with one of the best creative artists of today. Admittedly they would never put themselves in competition with Mr. Forster, and certainly each of them attempts nothing beyond his own field; but what emerges from a reading of these three books—and their very ill-assortment provides the basis for the revelation—is the fact that unless we are prepared to be *imaginative* about India and the problem of India, unless the West is prepared to see India, as Blake said, through the eye rather than with the eye, and to regard her as a creative artist regards his material, we shall never break the dead-lock in which the relations of India and Britain are held. By implication, Mr. Forster does break the dead-lock; in his hands, the “problem,” the “relation,” are live things capable of change. Lord Lytton and Mr. Raman, however, by implication undo Mr. Forster’s work; their attitudes can only bind the dead-lock faster. That Mr. Raman is himself an Indian; that Lord Lytton has spent much time there, seems to make no difference. It may be that Mr. Forster has lived in India hardly at all, it is even conceivable that he has never been there; the fact remains that it is he who, because he carries within

himself the artist’s vision, knows India and Indians.

Mr. Raman’s introductory chapters on the geography and early history of India are admirable; if the latter is superficial, that must be accounted for by lack of space. But as his review of the development of the relation between India and Britain progresses, it becomes increasingly depressing. No getting away from it: there is something false about the attitude of the East when it becomes Westernized; and this false quality leads to the assertion that Gandhi is a great man but immediately finds it necessary to qualify the assertion; it leads to pride in the industrialization of India, to a pathetic boast that the export of millions of sandbags for Empire war-purposes is an indication of India’s advancement; finally it leads to a clamour of war-mongering and the further boast that India is “the Arsenal of the East.” Poor India! If this is the attitude of her sons, how can she hope for freedom from foreign domination? For it is not in India’s essential nature, it is not predisposed in her soul or the history of her soul, that her greatest achievement should be in becoming “the Arsenal of the East.”

Lord Lytton’s book is distinctly tedious. It is doubtful whether long quotations from speeches he made during his term of office as Governor of Bengal, and equally long extracts from memoranda sent home at that

* *India*. By T. A. RAMAN. (The World To-Day Series. Humphrey Milford, The Oxford University Press, London. 3s. 6d.)

Pundits and Elephants. By THE EARL OF LYTTON. (Peter Davies, Ltd., London. 15s.)

A Passage to India. By E. M. FORSTER. (Everyman’s Library, J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London. 3s.)

time, are of vital interest; neither speeches nor memoranda are particularly distinguished: the utterances of a conscientious Englishman trying so hard to be tolerant of Indians for not being Englishmen too, that toleration often overreaches itself and shows a vague bitterness and self-righteousness beneath the surface. The chapters on sport are a little more lively, but it may be doubted whether the activities of British sportsmen in India contribute very heavily to Anglo-Indian understanding. The book is scrupulously fair, heroically conscientious, but only a really imaginative vision of the actual situation, a vision which was neither "Indian" nor "British," could redeem it from sterility. Two pages on prison reform do humanize its aridity a little.

Meanwhile, Mr. Forster's *A Passage to India* needs little comment; it is already accepted as one of the best novels in the English language and perhaps the best of all novels about India. While it lacks the firmness of

construction of *Howards End* and is a little less perfectly a novel than that book, it remains a model of what novel-writing should be and a pure joy to read. He is in the most profound sense impartial; Indians and British are alike stupid, lovable, magnificent in their common humanity. It has the subtlety of James, the poetry of Meredith, and that particular quality of amused and charitable objectivity which is Mr. Forster's own. On its very last page is the summary, indeed the solution, of the Anglo-Indian "relation," of "the problem of India." It is to this piece of fiction, so full of the signs and symbols of truth, that those who wish to know something about India should turn; by comparison, Mr. Raman's facts are far removed from the truth; and Lord Lytton's careful and statesman-like reporting tells us no more of that truth, for it succeeds only in asking Pilate's question about it.

R. H. WARD

Ālambanaparīkṣā and Vṛtti. By DINNAGA, with the Commentary of DHARMAPALA. Restored into Sanskrit from Tibetan and Chinese versions and edited with English Translations and Notes and with copious extracts from VINITADEVA'S Commentary. By N. AIYASWAMI ŚASTRI. (Adyar Library, Adyar, Madras. Rs. 3/8)

This is an important contribution to Buddhist scholarship of a lost work from Chinese and Tibetan sources and for this we must express our best thanks and congratulations to the author as well as to the authorities of the Adyar Library for publishing it.

The extracts given from Vinītadeva's Commentary, which are but an English translation of the Chinese translation from the original work of Vinītadeva's Commentary, will be found very illuminating. The Commentary of Dharmapāla will also be of great help in realising the full significance of the idealistic philosophy of Dinnāga in his *Ālambana Parīkṣā* consisting of eight verses only, with short annotations or vṛtti on the same by Dinnāga himself. We already know much of Dinnāga's views from the account of them in *Tattva-saṃgraha* and its Commentary and also from his *Pramāṇa Samuccaya*.

Diñnāga, as may well be remembered, raised a great logical storm against the school of Nyāya as propounded by Vātsyāyana, and Uddyotakara wrote his famous *Vārtika* in order to refute the views of Diñnāga. Diñnāga's criticisms have been referred to in various works on Indian Philosophy by Kumāri Śāṅkara, Vācaspati, Miśra, Śālikanātha and others. We have an excellent account of the idealistic philosophy of the Buddhists as propounded by Vasubandhu in his *Viṃśikā* and *Trimśikā*, which have been published with the Commentary of Sthiramati. The present work is a brief examination on the nature and status of objectivity in perceptual knowledge and it propounds the view that there are no external objects and that the objectivity in awareness is both initiated and experienced internally. The philosophy of Buddhist idealism has been elaborately explained in Dr. S. N. Dasgupta's *Indian Idealism* and Dr. Sātkari Mookerjee's *Philosophy of Flux* and this is certainly not the place for us to deal with that philosophy. The present work, *Ālambana Parīkṣā*, contains but little that is new though it cannot be gainsaid that in the Commentary of Dharmapāla and Vinītadeva some new points of interest have been stirred up.

As I possess no knowledge of Tibetan or Chinese, it is not possible for me to say how far the restoration has been successful. But I must note one point with regret, that the learned editor has marred his work of editing Dharmapāla's Sanskrit Commentary by putting long strokes of full-stop in the midst of connected sentences which often would create unnecessary difficulty in understanding the texts. I also regret to say that the translation of Dharmapāla's

Commentary has not only been unduly free but, if I may say so, very inaccurate in many places as well. Some errors seem to have crept in also in the translation of Vinītadeva. To take one instance, on p. 45, the word "*pratiniyata*" has been translated as "differently affected." The real meaning of the word is "restricted" or "limited" to each and every object. As for the translation, I venture here to offer a translation of a few lines in Dharmapāla's Commentary on p. 21 beginning with the words "*tatra svayūthyā*" and ending in "*asamskrītat*" on p. 22, with which the translation of Mr. Śāstrī could be contrasted, comparing the text:—

There (on that subject) people of our party (Buddhists) say that the fivefold consciousness arises depending upon *rupa* (form) and the eye, as others imagine. This we gather. Others think that awareness of object turns to one direction (*i. e.*, the external); for this reason it is improper to think that consciousness belongs to mind; not having one direction of turning (they are) acknowledged as being awarenesses of apparent existence like a chariot and the like. Though the mental awareness becomes endowed with form depending on the object within its scope, yet it also takes an awareness devoid of form also and that which is not within its scope. The form is the well-known "object" which is invariable with the awareness associated with the eye etc. Therefore it (mental awareness) cannot attain its dignity. Moreover, the reality of an apprehension due to knowledge from constant association, is beyond the scope of logical assailment being established as visible objects, and for this, this truth here can only be realised by and through the knowledge of audition (of instruction), thinking and meditation. So, it is concluded that there is no such object on which the mental awareness has to depend (for the following reasons):—

- (1) It is unable to condition its own series;
- (2) The past and the future conditions not

having any reality, they are as if devoid of structure.

This, I hope, will show where the translation of Mr. Śāstrī is rather wide of its mark. The printing, binding and

paper of the book are indeed excellent and the present publication has well kept up the traditional good name and prestige of the Adyar Library.

SURAMA MITRA, SHASTRI

Marriage and Family in Mysore. By M. N. SRINIVAS. Foreword by N. S. SUBBA RAO. (New Book Co., Bombay. Rs. 7/8)

This book deals with rites and beliefs centering round the institutions of marriage and the family of Kannada-speaking Hindus of Mysore State. Though a good part of the work is based on data in L. K. A. Iyer's *Mysore Tribes and Castes* and in E. Thurstone's *Castes and Tribes of South India*, an attempt is made to look at the same material from an important point of view neglected by these writers, viz., from that of interpreting the significance and the *rationale* of the various customs and rituals of the groups concerned. The author has also tried to supplement this material by his own personal findings through questioning some of the Kannada caste leaders, and by some investigation into Kannada folklore and fiction.

We congratulate the author on his scientific approach. There is a genuine desire to face facts as presented in a social *milieu*, free from preconceived theory, and thereafter to discover their meaning inductively, even though this meaning happen to go counter to already known theories. Factual data concerning customs and rites connected with bride-price, marriage-restrictions of endogamy, exogamy and other special prohibitions; kinship terminol-

ogy and its significance, the maternal uncle's rôle in marriage, the choice of bride and bridegroom and their ages, marriage rites proper, the position of the widow and her marriage, sex-ethics, naming the child, death-rites, the position of women, the mother-in-law/daughter-in-law conflict, etc. are marshalled here to give a picture of the basic institutions of the selected community. It may not always have been possible for the author to look at his data with the same objectiveness and detachment. For instance, his interpretation of the custom, prevalent in one section of the Kannada community, of paying the bride-price to the girl's father, is that this was a consideration for the transfer of ownership of the girl. But what adequate reason can be given for the similar custom, prevalent in another section of the community, of paying the bridegroom-price to the bridegroom's father? On the whole, however, the work shows generally the author's desire to keep himself above bias. Along with this, occasionally, suggestions are also made towards improvement of social conditions in the community.

It would have greatly facilitated reading if the Kannada terms used had been spelt with the proper diacritical marks of accentuation. The price seems rather high.

P. H. V.

Geographical Factors in Arabian Life and History. By SHAIKH INAYATULLA, M. A. (Punjab), PH. D. (London). (Muhammad Ashraf, Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore. Rs. 4/8)

The influence of geographical and other environmental factors on the life and culture of a people can be hardly disputed. The working of external elements in the growth of a culture may easily be exaggerated, however, by those who take a mechanistic view of life and nature and who seem to require only matter to create the world. We may then be wise and sober enough not to overvalue the operation of any such factors to the detriment of other more vital forces. It is the same with the working of the body on the life of the spirit. Who will be presumptuous enough to deny the influence of the body on the spirit? Even an idealistic thinker of Hegel's standing, who is generally taken to task for spinning out his great system from the abstractions of rational thought, freely admits the working of geographical factors in his survey of World civilisations. But it will be supreme folly to let the spirit sink into the status of an epiphenomenal entity without an autonomy of its own. We then freely give all their due to the physico-geographical factors without for a moment assigning to them any decisive rôle in the life of the individual spirit or its objective manifestations in religion, language and society.

Dr. Inayatulla seeks to understand and interpret Arabian life from the stand-point of human geography. Naturally for an appreciation of

Arab literature and life we must know the *milieu* in which they have developed and flourished. The first and introductory chapter is devoted to a historical survey of the environmental interpretation of history and culture. It is a pity that Dr. Inayatulla does not deal exhaustively with the limits and confines of any such interpretation. Anyhow the social institutions and economic structure of Arab life, the diet and costumes, in fact all the elements of national existence that are susceptible to environmental influence, are lucidly dealt with and scrupulously scrutinised in this volume. The intriguing question whether any deterioration of climate in the past is to be held responsible for the political stagnation and lethargy of the Arabs is discussed with commendable restraint. But sometimes the author fails to appreciate the natural confines of geographical and external interpretation.

To attribute the great dissemination of Islam to the geographical position of Arabia shows ignorance of those rational and irrational factors which go to the making of a religion and which ultimately explain its success or its failure. Why and how it becomes possible for a religion to live and work in the sacred precincts of human spirit cannot be decided by any reference to the principles of human geography. Dr. Inayatulla's copious references to the work of European and Arab writers show fine scholarship and we hope that his book will be read with interest by students of Arab literature and life.

S. VAHIDUDDIN

An Unknown Land. By VISCOUNT SAMUEL. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

Utopias, originally the first love of poet-philosophers, have latterly become the refuge of *soi-disant* prophets, successful novelists and tired or retired politicians. Plato, Sir Thomas More, Bacon and Hobbes are still caviare to the general. But Wells with his scientific millennium, Hitler with his new order, Roosevelt with his oceanic charters and Beveridge with his complete plan (decent funerals inclusive) are looked up to by the pathetic millions waiting for a sign in the sky, and very naturally cheated for their patience with the siren strains of some wandering voice—over the radio. But the remarkable thing is that the more we are disillusioned, the more eagerly do we plan our Utopias bigger and better than ever!

In *An Unknown Land*, Lord Samuel conforms to type in some respects while varying dexterously from it in others. Picking up the loose threads scattered in Bacon's *New Atlantis*, he gives us a remarkably colourful and compact picture of an ideal commonwealth, cloistered somewhere in the South Pacific, in which the scientific and industrial civilisation of the West has triumphantly "arrived," by avoiding all the wrong turnings which have contributed to our undoing in the last two hundred years. The result is that the Bensals, as the inhabitants of the happy island are known, have achieved a state of society which is socialistic and individual, anarchic yet orderly, pacific without dullness, cultured but classless, active with plenty of leisure, rationalistic but deeply religious.

All these marvels are said to be the

product of Science rightly pursued and wisely applied. By a process of "Suturization" the young are endowed with bigger brains, and their education then fits them to become "planet-conscious." The mysteries of the atom have been tracked down to sub-atomic levels, power is inexhaustible and free, and every school-boy knows that the universe is spaceless and timeless. Science and philosophy have embraced over a novel and delectable conception called "ambience" which transcends ether and all its tricks. Lord Samuel has evidently heard of our concepts of Adwaita and Dwaita, but puts them to unexpected uses in elucidating the "metaphysic" of the Bensals. One of their *sutras* is that Mind is Life, and life mind, and both float in "ambience" which is immanent and transcendent. Space, time, matter and mind are expertly juggled with, and the resultant is anything from a unity to trinity, deducible entirely from scientific experiment.

More prosaically, the Bensals live as members of a club rather than as anything else. A hierarchy of three sits at the top to co-ordinate progress in all fields, and to reconcile it with their scientifically evolved central idea or principle. And to crown all, one of the Bensal high-brows solemnly assures us that they are neither dull nor bored nor unhappy.

But there is an unfortunate, and perhaps an unintended, anticlimax in the concluding chapters. Philosophy and fantasy give place to satire which, though straining to be well-bred, achieves nothing more than an uneasy facetiousness. Under cover of a description of the inhabitants of the islands adjacent to Bensalem, we get cari-

catures of Russia and Germany as chiefly responsible for all the troubles of Europe. The allegory wears thin, history is twisted too much, and only England comes out as more sinned against than sinning. When it is remembered how, at other times, English susceptibilities were even more violently outraged by the Catholic monster with its Spanish protégé, or the unspeakable Frenchman, the present indignation against Germany at least fails to convince. Lord Samuel might

have remembered Burke and resisted the temptation to indict a whole nation. He is however more consummate in insinuating praise of England and the English by making a foreigner pat them on the back. One of the Bensal intellectuals is ready enough to assure us that whenever England (which means the world) is in trouble, it is invariably started by the other fellows! This may be very comforting, but hardly true.

P. MAHADEVAN

Critical Thoughts in Critical Days. By F. L. LUCAS; *Marcus Aurelius.* By JOHN LYTH. (P. E. N. Books, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 2s. each.)

When people talk about inspiration in literature they are inclined to think of poetry rather than prose. But if we want an example of something which comes only by inspiration, and cannot come by any amount of care or deliberation, we must point to the epigram. Hence its rarity. Few things give more delight or get us further in so short a compass. Mr. Lucas commands the epigram. An example while he is on Donne—"...as if there were anything easier for a writer than to be difficult, or more difficult than to be easy." The scheme of this short work is to pass in parade literature from Homer to the present day which holds our attention during these critical days. The essay gathers strength, pace and brilliance after leaving the Nineteenth Century behind and approaching our own times through the Twenties, when mad intellectuals, self-appointed poets who wrote in blank prose, biographical debunkers, Nature haters, hollow men who did not wish to be filled, private-

language specialists, plungers into the kingdom of hell within and unconscious of their own Unconscious, Surrealists who made "a procession of asses with the wings of bats, of jabberwocks necklaced with entrails and riding on grand pianos," all made it clear that England was ready for Munich and ripe for Nemesis. The book is only fifty-five pages long. But not many books of five hundred pages can give such good value.

The other P. E. N. volume under review consists of some of Marcus Aurelius's sayings put into verse. His famous reflections are all sound, broad, enormous truisms and platitudes about the imminence of Death, the ruthlessness of Time which make our petty vanities and ambitions look ridiculous, and so on. Admirable but dull; and we are confronted again with the problem of how it is that Marcus Aurelius ever attained his immense reputation. It is to be feared that it is because he was an Emperor. Mr. Lyth's translation leaves this problem where it was before. But as against the above generalisation I would like to quote one stanza which might have been written yesterday about the Idle

Rich. It also shows Mr. Lyth at his best :—

Dost thou fear hunger? Nay, but thou dost
dread

Humiliations poverty may bring,

With none to hasten at thy beckoning.

Thou wilt not starve whilst thou canst earn
thy bread—

But must have slaves to watch thy every
breath

And wait on thee as one sick unto death !

JOHN STEWART COLLIS

A Hindu View of Culture: Essays and Addresses. By K. GURU DUTT, Mysore Civil Service. (Srinivas Electric Press, Mysore.)

This collection, covering a wide range of topics, is so packed with thought and learning that it is not possible to condense the contents. The central idea may be stated in a few words. It is that a wrong view of life is mainly responsible for the evils of our age. The excessive claims made on behalf of Science and its achievements have led to an overestimate of material civilization and a corresponding tendency to depreciate the higher values of life. This tendency has been taken advantage of by Power-Politics to let loose on the world forces of destruction which threaten civilisation itself. The remedy lies in a culture based on an ideal of life which recognises the value of human personality and its claims to harmonious development.

Such an ideal is presented in the Hindu conception of *Purushartha*, with its fourfold aim of *Artha*, *Kama*, *Dharma* in its social aspect and *Moksha*. The Hindu ideal of life recognizes that a reasonable measure of satisfaction of instinct is essential. The first two aims accordingly stress the importance of the material basis of human life. The pursuit of these two aims is subordinate to *Dharma* or social duty. The performance of social duties, in turn, by developing the altruistic emotions, prepares the way for *Moksha*.

It is common ground between Hindu philosophers and Aristotle that only the discharge of social obligations qualifies a man for the life of contemplation. The Hindu philosophers insisted that the aspirant after *Moksha* should submit himself to a course of training known as *Sadhana*. It began with the restraint of the senses, but its ultimate goal was "emotional and intellectual equilibrium—*Samatva*—which allowed wisdom to shine forth of itself by making the mind a transparent medium.

In his striking address on "The Aim of Education," the author says :—

In Hindu psychology the collective Unconscious was called the *Avyakta*, the individual unconscious more or less corresponding to *adrishta*. When the Indian mentality characteristically referred to the insufficiency of conscious endeavour and held that the fruits of action depend on *adrishta*, it was not so much a weak resignation to fate as a wise acknowledgment of the part played by the unconscious in the affairs of men. *Adrishta* was not considered as arbitrary or chaotic in its workings but as comprising the individuals' *vasanas* or *samskaras*, the subtle relics and memories, the psychic counterpart of all activity and feeling, of motion and emotion. The operation of causation in this field was explained by the doctrine of *Karma*, the ultimate and logical expansion of what in its limited application is today called the law of psycho-genesis.

His book is a genuine contribution to the understanding of this idea and amply repays perusal. His gift of lucid presentation compels attention.

N. NARASIMHA MOORTY

Alvar Saints. By SWAMI SHUDDHANANDA BHARATI. (Anbu Nilayam, Ramachandrapuram, Trichy Dist. Paper Re. 1/8, Cloth Rs. 2)

“Who were these Alvar Saints?” The author aptly opens his work with an answer: “In Tamil Alvar means one who has taken a deep plunge into the ocean of divine consciousness.” These saints, twelve in number, are stated, according to Vaisnavite tradition, to be the incarnations of so many members of Visnu’s own entourage. They lived between the seventh and ninth centuries and their teachings ultimately culminated in Sri Ramanuja’s philosophy of *Prapatti*—complete surrender. Irrespective of sex or caste, these Saints attached themselves to the sacred shrines like the one at Sri Rangam; we find among these Bhaktas kings like Kulasekhara, the author of the popular stotra *Makunda Mala*, warriors like Nila, most learned Brahmanas, as well as illiterate low-

castes, men and women, losing themselves with equal fervour in their devotion to the Supreme. The Varakari Saints of Maharashtra, attached to Vithoba of Pandharpur, as also numerous other saints would show how this land has brought forth, from time to time, adequate means to maintain its mystic tradition of great R̥sis of the past.

The book certainly makes interesting reading, but it is not meant to be read once and cast aside. The author has himself established, as stated in the Foreword by Dewan Bahadur K. S. Ramaswami Sastriyar, “kinship of mind and heart and soul with the Saints”; he would have the reader follow this blameless path of Bhakti. The author, in addition to the popular Mantra “*Aum Namō Narayanaya,*” has given us a clear indication of yogic practices while giving the life of Saint Nammalvar.

S. N. TADPATRIKAR

Science in Soviet Russia. By SEVEN BRITISH SCIENTISTS. Ed. by JOSEPH NEEDHAM and JANE SYKES DAVIES. (C. A. Watts and Co., Ltd., London. 1s. 3d.).

Soviet science has made a contribution to human welfare that far outweighs on the constructive side its helping to make Russia’s effective resistance possible. As these competent essays bring out, scientific developments in post-revolutionary Russia have been stupendous. To many a scientist elsewhere the conditions of research must seem idyllic. The achievements have been remarkable. For example, the underground gasification

of coal has obviated much underground labour in mines. But the most spectacular results of human interest are those reported by Dr. Ruscoe Clarke. Recognition of the bearing upon public health of food, housing and sanitation, hours and conditions of work. Increased leisure, opportunities for physical development, sickness benefits, pensions, maternity allowances. Free health services available to all. Free passes to sanatoria, rest homes, health resorts. No wonder tuberculosis cases have decreased by over 80 per cent. ! Soviet research is distinguished by co-ordinated planning and utilitarian and altruistic aims.

H.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“ _____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS

Was the white man's much-boasted abolition of cannibalism in the South Pacific Islands an adequate offset to the diseases he imported and the disturbance he created in their self-sufficing economy? The question is suggested by a short note entitled "White Men Seem Stingy" which appears in the much delayed *Science News Letter* of 28th November 1942. With the white shadows lengthening in the South Seas, the community that prided itself on giving, took its first lessons in an intensively competitive system. Its members learned to solicit more than they gave. The missionaries injected, in the name of thrift and industry, a selfish concern for self and one's family, completely undermining the kind of communal life they led. Outside contacts, and particularly the coconut-oil boom after the last war, killed the incentive for indigenous industries. The glamour of imported articles made them dependent and the importation of foreign labour wrote *finis* to economic and social self-sufficiency. Hit hard by the depression of 1931, however, the natives returned to their industries.

The islands were free from syphilis, tuberculosis and the so-called children's diseases before the white man came. They have them all now. Measles killed a third of the Fiji population in 1875, the year after Britain annexed the islands. Truly, great are the blessings of civilisation!

The black man has now grown accustomed to the strange, stingy habits of the white man.... But everything considered, anthropologists usually agree that the white man has taken more from the Pacific isles than he has given.

From what colonial area has he not?

That the democratic way of life will ultimately prevail and that it is the only social way that can work well is the belief expressed by Mr. Donald K. Adams of the Duke University. "You cannot socialize people by fiat." In "A Note on Societies" (*Character and Personality*, September 1942), Mr. Adams approaches the question from the psychological stand-point. He correctly analyses the essential feature of the democratic way of life—the long-run identity "of... individual interests or goals with the group goal." The recognition of this leads to a common desire to place the interests of the community above those of self.

That this means for the individual a certain measure of self-denial supported by intelligent appreciation of the community's needs is plain enough. But if the commonweal is to be achieved, a major section of the community, or preferably the whole of it, must make this self-denial willingly for the realisation of a higher ideal. Mr. Adams contends that a sense of possible general frustration almost always is capable of inspiring in the minds of all thinking persons the need for thus

identifying personal interest with that of the community.

He gives a telling illustration. Young children playing marbles are authoritarians. They hold the rules in great sanctity—but they do not obey them. Older children choose their rules but keep them, realising that the game itself depends on their doing so. That is the democratic way. Mr. Adams observes:—

Until each of the players in the international marble game perceives that he spoils the game, *for himself* as for the community, with wars or economic barriers, we may expect the latter to continue. If and when we can see far enough, it will be found that there is no more incompatibility between nationalism and humanitarianism than there is between being a good citizen of a family and being a good citizen of a nation. But we shall not be able to see that far until we are forced to by hard necessity.

A harder necessity than the one the world is now experiencing need not be waited for. Will the world open its eyes?

What does the concept of nationality basically mean? That in effect is the question which Mr. John R. Swanton asks himself in his brochure on *The Evolution of Nations*. (Smithsonian Institution War Background Studies No. 2.) He makes a brief but illuminating study of the characteristic rise and decline of nations, ancient and modern. Some have grown through a voluntary aggregation of smaller units—yielding federal republics like Switzerland and the U. S. A. Others have spread out from a small nucleus through compulsion and conquest. Racial affinities, geographical factors and linguistic unity can all have their due share in consolidating contiguous units but they can-

not by themselves make a nation. And some States display governmental homogeneity despite racial admixtures and differences and linguistic diversity. Mr. Swanton observes that in voluntary consolidations a common interest binds the people together more effectively than even “consciousness of kind.” That higher interest he defines as “a common love of liberty and of the free expression of the cultural life.”

Nationality in becoming—as it has already become—a narrow creed defeats the very purpose for which it came into existence. “Freedom at the expense of another is not freedom.” Groups of people did not choose to belong to a larger group for nothing. Collective security and welfare were the aim. A State exists for the benefit of its people, and “national” sentiment which thwarts collective happiness is worse than valueless. Mr. Swanton sums up the position excellently when he says:—

We shall be untrue to our inheritance and to what the world expects of us if we fail to maintain the ideal—and the fact—of freedom in all its aspects and if we fail to make personal worth and social service the measure of value between man and man instead of race, language, culture, or descent. There are differences among us brought about by those factors and it would be folly to ignore them or attempt to ride roughshod over the prejudices connected with them, but we must strive continually to exalt human values at the expense of accidents of birth or condition and occasions for friction between the various elements in our population will grow less and less and our unity become greater and greater. Justice toward all and the happiness of all must be our personal as well as our collective concern.

What libraries can do for democracy is the subject of an article entitled “Not Ready for Victory” which Pearl

S. Buck wrote for the American Library Association. (*A. L. A. Bulletin*, February 1943) The failure of Versailles she attributes to the lack of understanding of what events meant and of what peoples were like. The necessary knowledge for the understanding of our times has always been there, in books, but none has guided the average man to it. A great responsibility rests upon librarians who, Miss Buck emphasises, are not "custodians of books. They are or ought to be guides to books." They have been giving the public books which they want to read—and that mostly is escapist literature—and not what they *ought* to read.

It is the duty of public libraries to try every possible means to awaken the mind of the average people and to persuade, startle, and compel them to the realization that upon the average person depends the success of democracy.... That the mass of our citizenry is today so ignorant of other peoples, so unable to comprehend the meaning of the events which have taken place and are taking place, is an indictment of and a challenge to our librarians.

The schools take care of educating young children. The librarians have to educate the community. Their work is not done "until they have books in the hands of readers and until they have the contents of those books in the minds and thinking of citizens." Unless the libraries take upon themselves this teachership of the community, the same old short-sighted ideologies will prevail, making the recrudescence of war inevitable. That is what makes real peace seem only an impossible hope. Only the spread of knowledge and of awareness of individual responsibility such as adequate library activities can make possible, will prepare the world for peace. Rightly does Miss Buck observe:—

Our people are not ready today for victory. We do not know enough to make an intelligent peace. We do not know enough to avoid another war.

Can there be a greater indictment of modern civilisation than this, coming as it does from one of its leading and noble minds?

Speaking in the latter part of May at the annual function of the Shiksha Sadan, New Delhi, Shrimati Renuka Ray, member of the Central Legislative Assembly, warned that literacy in itself might be a danger instead of a blessing and that mere adult literacy would not do. The newly literate, she said, might prove an easy tool in the hands of propagandists who would exploit his ignorance. An adult who had learned to read and write might be "functionally illiterate," unless he had also learned to think for himself. Such an education as would help him develop his thinking powers was even more important than refresher courses and circulating libraries. "Education for life" should be the slogan for those who took up the work of adult education. Not less important was the point which Shrimati Renuka Ray stressed, that this education must also reach the mothers of the generation that will inherit India tomorrow. Educationists in India should learn from the failure of the Occidental civilisation in which many communities are very highly educated. Who dare say that Germans are not educated? Experts and specialists have elbowed each other for long. Britain and the U. S. A. are educated but their moral sense is not so powerful as their logical reasoning and mental manœuvring. The Eastern saying conveys a great truth—"Ignorance is bet-

ter than head-learning with no Soul-wisdom to illuminate and guide it."

Mr. B. J. Wadia, the Vice-Chancellor of the Bombay University, presided at the Buddha Jayanti celebrations in Bombay on the 19th of May. He refuted effectively, without referring to it, the recent charge that our Indian masses are childishly susceptible to display and pomp. Childlike they may be, but they are no more childish than the rest of us.

It is not quite fair to contrast the still-birth of the Emperor Akbar's *Din Ilahi* with the triumphal course of the Buddha's teachings. The difference between the two proponents went far deeper than the superficial contrast in their state. But there is no doubt that the Buddha's great renunciation did weight his words so that they sank into his hearers' hearts.

Would Buddha have created that impression if he had preached his new doctrine from a palace? The man whose hands were destined to wield the sceptre took up the beggar's bowl, put on, instead of robes of State, the dusty saffron-coloured robe. In India it is the ascetic who is the centre of mass appeal and not the nobleman in his palace.

Mr. Wadia saw the secret of the great following of "the living Sannyasi of the day, Gandhi," in the simplicity of his life and character. Would he, he asked, have drawn those millions towards him if he were even sitting as a Professor in some College and preaching to people what he himself perhaps did not practise?

The great Russian Leader Stalin has evinced not only political sagacity but a sense of justice to all humanity in disbanding the Comintern, to thus

"free the national Communist parties from obligations arising from the statutes and decisions of the various Comintern Congresses." For a healthy development of political socialism each country and each people must be left free to evolve its own socialism. No group of socialists worth that name would compete on any plane with another group. It is necessary, however, that an international organisation with a proper programme for educating the world-public in socialistic ideals and facts be brought into existence, and whose first task should be, as Prof. Harold J. Laski pointed out, "formulating issues which the international socialist movement will confront at the end of the war." It is well known that there is more than one school of socialism and definite modes of building a socialist state need study and discussion. What contribution can India make to enrich such study and discussion? Are there roots in our historical soil which need to be nourished and revived?

Professor H. J. Paton makes some excellent points on "Justice Among the Nations" in the November issue of *Philosophy*. His thesis might be thus epitomised: The recognition of the need for justice is deep-seated and wide-spread. "Justice can be no respecter of persons or of nations." The law of duty must be universal, binding upon all men in every relation to all, whether acting as individuals or as representatives of a nation. Moral justice demands the establishment of legal justice. The strictest demand for international law could be satisfied only by a world state. At present we lack the community of ideals necessary

to the successful working of such a state, but some international organisation is necessary to make and enforce laws aiming at even-handed justice. Too great rigidity will defeat the object. Change of circumstances and of ideals may make even a formerly just *status quo* unjust and an unjust *status quo* cannot be indefinitely maintained.

Professor Paton disposes unceremoniously of that most pharisaical claim of the imperialists to a "*mission civilisatrice*." He concedes to every state an equal right to develop its own civilisation but to none the right to spread its ideals otherwise than by precept and by example. Even in common action of all nations to help "backward" peoples he sensibly doubts whether "a complete change of system with all the difficulties of a new language, would be a help and not a hindrance."

Professor Paton has a higher regard for British colonial rule, and for the sincerity of its professed aims than we think the facts warrant. But he enunciates another important principle apropos of British and German rival colonial claims:—

The main determining principle of justice must be, not the interests of Great Britain or Germany, but the interests of the colonial people themselves.

India would ask nothing better than the application of those principles. It would strike off her shackles at one blow, and that today, with no hope-mothering "tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow," while India's noblest burst their hearts in vain.

The isolation of too many present-day scientists is one of several important points brought out by Dr. Charles

E. Kellogg who writes on scientists' responsibilities under the caption "The Scientist and Social Polity in the Democratic State." (*Scientific Monthly*, June 1942) He deplores the overdoing of clique formation among scientists. "Societies for chemists, for geologists, for botanists, for economists, for anthropologists" carried too far, he warns, become pressure groups for "self-interests and self-glorification" and lead the young scientist away from other branches of knowledge and other values.

Knowledge unrelated to any purpose involves a waste of effort in its acquisition. Sometimes, as needs no demonstration, it may become positively dangerous.

The need can hardly be overstated for a synthesis of scientific research and social values, for the sake of both. The method of science, its distrust of panaceas and its insistence upon examination and criticism are indispensable to sound social planning.

The great need today is for the organization of attacks on the broad problems of great social significance so that our best and most detailed scientific knowledge may be used and the principles of science properly applied in respect to other principles.

We welcome therefore the trend which Dr. Kellogg reports for the classical scientist's static concept of order and system to give way slowly to "a dynamic concept, in which the *relevancy* of fact is as important to truth as fact itself." Such a dynamic concept represents a definite approach to what seems to us the true position—that the criterion of interest and value in any scientific fact should be the degree of its potentiality of moral results and the ratio of its usefulness to mankind.

Ever since the outbreak of the present war much is being talked and written about the evolution of a new world order in which democracy will be the principle governing political and social life. It is often said that one war sows the seed for another, and it is almost an accepted fact that the inequitable dispensations of the treaty-makers of 1919 were primarily responsible for the subsequent political developments, culminating in the present crisis. If all were convinced of the genuineness of the proclaimed aims of those who hope for a better world order to emerge out of the present chaos—to provide all with equal opportunities for happiness—and that attempts were being made in that direction, then Fabian Society publications like *A Letter to a Student* by Margaret Cole, *A Letter to a Woman Munition Worker* from A. Susan Lawrence and *A Letter to a Doctor* by Dr. Brian Thompson would have no purpose to serve.

The first considers the view-point of the disillusioned student who feels frustrated and gloomy about the future and answers his apprehension that the democratic way of life which is promised to evolve out of the new planning will in no way differ from the old order. Mrs. Cole makes the important point that people must first *know* what they want and have the *will* to achieve it. It is government for the people and it is up to them to have what they want.

The criticism implied in these *Letters*, however, clearly suggests which way contemporary political and social thought is tending. Complete eradication of class distinctions may not be an immediate possibility but socialism is in the wind, or at least an insistence on

social justice. Proper distribution of wealth and of opportunities for development are the prime conditions of such an order and if schemes such as the nationalisation of the medical profession and its working under State control should materialise, one would feel that some steps—concrete proof of verbal protestations—had been taken to adjust the varying levels of social life. For the realisation of such a new order, it is not necessary that the classes forgo all the amenities of life in favour of the masses. The emphasis should be upon attempts to raise the common standard of life and opportunity instead of trying to bring down the rich to walk shoulder to shoulder with the less fortunate. The injustice involved in the present disparity must be recognised, but a dull and lifeless mediocrity is not the solution.

“Guild Socialist’s” *Letter to a Shop Steward*, in the same series, puts forward the familiar arguments of Fabian Socialism and urges that “in the interests of victory, the war industries should be run as a public service, and run without any regard for private profit.” It also advocates the strengthening of the position of the shop steward as the spear-head of labour’s drive for an effective voice in the control of industry,

a control which involves the worker’s demand to be treated as a partner in industry, and not merely as a hired hand.

The latter is a just demand for a condition indispensable to effective industrial organisation, no less than for the relations of mutual respect which should prevail among all men *qua* men.