THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly, and lost among the host—as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XVI JULY 1945 No. 7

THOREAU AT WALDEN

4th JULY 1845

[Events of deep intellectual and spiritual significance appear small to men of affairs. It is an aspect of Maya. A century ago Thoreau, the pioneer of Civil Disobedience in the U. S. A., celebrated Independence Day by commencing to live his hermit life at Walden, of which **Mr. Hugh Harris** writes.

The article refers to Thoreau's love for the *Bhagavad-Gita* and the influence the book wielded over his mind. In his excellent biography of Thoreau, the man "who believed in doing what he wanted," Henry Seidel Canby has a true thought to offer on this point:—

'The wise man...seeketh for that which is homogeneous to his own nature.' This is the dominant idea which Thoreau took from the 'Bhagavad-Gita.' His sardonic humour, his passion for nature as an experience, his indignation with the stupidities of the state—all these would have been heresies in the eyes of a pundit. The Yankee did not become an Oriental. He took the idea he needed, became a twice-born Yankee, but remained a Yankee still. And because he was a Yankee, he put his idea to work on the great problem of the restless American race, the problem of the choice of a career. The guidance of the 'Bhagavad-Gita' came after his resolve to go to Walden pond, but Walden provided a solution in exact accord with the principles of the great book, and of this Thoreau was well aware.

This month is doubly appropriate for the appearance of this article—Thoreau was born on 12th July 1817.—ED.]

Twenty miles from Boston in the State of Massachusetts, U. S. A., is the picturesque and historic village of Concord. It is celebrated as the place where hostilities started in the American War of Independence. In literature it is even more famous as the home of Emerson, Hawthorne, Thoreau and other writers of the Transcendentalist movement. The influence of their ideas radiated from this New England centre throughout the world, but they in their turn had been inspired by currents of thought that reached them from Europe and Asia. The

year 1845 marks a focal point in this interaction of spiritual forces. Then it was that Thoreau began his experiment at Walden. Now, by way of tribute a century later, I should like to recall its particular significance in the history of India's association with the West.

Henry David Thoreau was born at Concord in 1817, the son of a local pencil-maker. A formative influence in the shaping of his character was his close friendship with Emerson, in whose house he lived from 1841 to 1843. Emerson had abandoned the profession of a clergyman, and was seeking for a wider philosophy of life than that afforded by his Puritan environment. The teachings of India and the Orient greatly contributed to Emerson's spiritual development. Examples of his indebtedness are his essay on "The Over-Soul" and his poem "Brahma." His friend Thoreau, like the other Transcendentalists grouped around Emerson, shared his interest in Eastern ideas as conducive towards a saner and truer outlook on the world.*

In March 1845, on the shore of a small lake in the Walden woods, over a mile away from Concord, Thoreau began to erect a hut. He quickly built and furnished it unaided at a cost of twenty-eight dollars. On July 4, 1845—to celebrate Independence Day after his own fashion—he went into occupation, and there he lived alone for two years and two months. While in this retreat he never remained in merely selfish seclusion; he constantly went into Concord, he never locked his door and his visitors were many. His object was to find spiritual refreshment by direct contact with Nature, away from the industrialism and machinery of Western civilisation. He desired to assert the innate dignity of the human soul against the materialistic claims of modern society.

Throughout his life Thoreau kept personal Journals of extraordinary interest. During his sojourn at Walden he edited his records of a voyage that he and his brother had taken six years previously in a boat of their own making. These were afterwards published under the title of *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers*. The Journals that he wrote while at Walden went to make his even more famous book, *Walden; or Life in the Woods*. I propose to give some quotations from both these works, as evidence of their outstanding worth and in the hope that readers will be induced to peruse these delightful volumes at first-hand.

Thoreau contemplated Nature with a wise passiveness that owed

* Incidently Amos Bronson Alcott's name should be mentioned as that of another friend whose mind was moulded very considerably by the *Gita*. In his interesting *Sheltering Tree*, H. H. Hoeltje mentions: "But most profoundly interesting of all was his reading in Oriental literature, especially the *Bhagavad-Gita*. This poetry and philosophy of the Orient seemed to him superior to if not transcending greatly all other literatures. It was intellectual, serenely pure, and spiritually sane."— ED.

much to the Indian teachers whose works he studied in his retreat. He writes in *Walden*:—

Sometimes, in a summer morning, having taken my accustomed bath, I sat in my sunny doorway from sunrise till noon, rapt in a reverie, amidst the pines and hickories and sumachs in undisturbed solitude and stillness, whilst the birds sang around or flitted noiseless through the house, until by the sun falling in at my west window, or the noise of some traveller's wagon on the distant highway, I was reminded of the lapse of time. I grew in those seasons like corn in the night, and they were far better than work of the hands would have been. They were not time subtracted from my life, but so much over and above my usual allowance. I realised what the Orientals mean by contemplation and the forsaking of works.

Here is another passage from the same book, which reveals a community of spirit that overleaps the boundaries of place and time:—

In the morning I bathe my intellect in the stupendous and cosmogonal philosophy of the *Bhagavad-Gita*, since whose composition years of the gods have elapsed, and in comparison with which our modern world and its literature seem puny and trivial; and I doubt if that philosophy is not to be referred to a previous state of existence, so remote is its sublimity from our conceptions. I lay down the book and go to my well for water, and lo! there I meet the servant of the Brahmin, priest of Brahma and Vishnu and Indra, who still sits in his temple on the Ganges reading the Vedas, or dwells at the root of a tree with his crust and water-jug. I meet his servant come to draw water for his master, and our buckets, as it were, grate together in the same well. The pure Walden water is mingled with the sacred water of the Ganges. With favouring winds it is wafted past the site of the fabulous islands of Atlantis and the Hesperids, makes the periplus of Hanno, and floating by Ternate and Tidore and the mouth of the Persian Gulf, melts in the tropic gales of the Indian seas, and is landed in ports of which Alexander only heard the names.

Both *Walden* and *A Week* are full of references to, and quotations from, the sacred books of India. In *A Week* a third part of the chapter entitled "Monday" is devoted to a sympathetic exposition of Hindu thought. In particular he praises the *Bhagavad-Gita* and refers to the noble efforts of Warren Hastings which had led to its translation by Charles Wilkins. After quoting passages from this translation, Thoreau proceeds:—

It deserves to be read with reverence even by Yankees, as a part of the sacred writings of a devout people; and the intelligent Hebrew will rejoice to find in it a moral grandeur and sublimity akin to those of his own Scriptures....*Ex oriente lux* may still be the motto of scholars, for the Western world has not yet derived from the East all the light which it is destined to receive thence.

Thoreau relates that he also greatly enjoyed the *Dharma Sastra* (Laws of Manu) in the translation of William Jones. It had proved an ideal book for reading on his boating

expedition :—

It makes such an impression on us over night as to awaken us before dawn, and its influence lingers around us like a fragrance late into the day. It conveys a new gloss to the meadows and the depths of the wood. Its spirit, like a more subtle ether, sweeps along with the prevailing winds of a country, and the very locusts and crickets of a summer day are but later or earlier glosses on the *Dharma Sastra* of the Hindus, a continuation of the sacred code. As we have said, there is an orientalism in the most restless pioneer, and the farthest west is but the farthest east.

The entertaining fables of the *Hitopadesa,* translated by Charles Wilkins, also much appealed to Thoreau because of their "playful wisdom."

Such were among the books which Thoreau read at Walden, and which in his writings there he recommended to his contemporaries. Oriental literature was at that time little known in Europe and America, and Thoreau made the following suggestion :—

It would be worthy of the age to print together the collected Scriptures and Sacred Writings of the several nations, the Chinese, the Hindus, the Persians, the Hebrews, and others, as the Scripture of mankind....Such a juxtaposition and comparison might help to liberalize the faith of man. This is a work which Time will surely edit, reserved to crown the labours of the printing press. This would be the Bible, or Book of Books, which let the missionaries carry to the uttermost parts of the earth.

A century ago, this must have seemed a quite fantastic proposal, but Providence was already promoting its accomplishment. That very year, a young unknown student in Paris—Max Müller—conceived the ambition of publishing a text and translation of the *Rig-Veda.* "It was in 1845," he tells us in his preface, "when attending the lectures of Eugène Burnouf, that my thoughts became fixed on an edition of the *Rig-Veda.*" Max Müller came to England, settled down at Oxford, and struggled with his task for thirty years, contending against poverty, neglect and detraction in a manner truly heroic. Subsequently, he edited "The Sacred Books of the East," translated by various scholars, in fifty volumes, and published by the Oxford University Press. This great work enabled the Western world to have a first-hand account of the Hindu, Zoroastrian, Buddhist, Muslim and Chinese scriptures. So did Thoreau's dream come true.

In his *Walden* (at the close of the chapter entitled "The Village") Thoreau describes with fine feeling an episode which occurred during his sojourn in the woods. One summer afternoon in 1845, while walking from his hermitage to the village cobbler's to fetch a shoe, he was arrested and put into jail, because he refused to pay his poll tax. His refusal was intended as a protest against the country's maintenance of the institution of Negro slavery. He spent but one night in jail, the tax, much to his disgust,

being paid by one of his aunts. How delightful is his conclusion of the matter: "I obtained my mended shoe, and returned to the woods in season to get my dinner of huckleberries on Fair-Haven Hill."

Thoreau's account of this episode was afterwards elaborated in his famous essay *On the Duty of Civil Disobedience*. This essay came, in 1907, into the hands of Mahatma Gandhi. It greatly influenced his adoption in South Africa, and subsequent transference to India, of the policy of *Satyagraha*.

At Walden, Thoreau came to know beasts, birds and fishes with an even more extraordinary intimacy than did St. Francis of Assisi. He returned to his native village refreshed and invigorated to play a man's part among his fellows. In 1859, he was the first American to make public utterance in defence of John Brown, after the arrest of the abolitionist hero. He spoke in the vestry at Concord, against the protests of his townsmen, having to ring the bell with his own hand, and to open the door with the key which the frightened vestry-man had dared neither to give nor to refuse him and so had left where he would find it. Such was the flame that was kindled from Walden.

HUGH HARRIS

VILLAGE HEALTH

Indian Village Health by Dr. J. N. Norman-Walker is an informative small book published by the Oxford University Press for the Indian Village Welfare Association, now in its second edition. Written from the public-health standpoint it is designed primarily for officials and others interested in village improvement, but the latter group should include all men of good-will. The Appendix contains practical plans.

Avoiding technicalities, it deals with the causes of the more dangerous epidemics which from time to time scourge India, and with preventive measures and control. The author shares the views of medical orthodoxy but it should be obvious to the most ardent immunologist that the practical preventive measures he outlines, if taken, will suffice—and none will be the losers but the serum interests. Those measures involve improved sanitation. It may be possible to play on superstition to bring about reforms. The Mosaic code smuggled in sanitation in ritualistic practices. Dr. Norman Walker tells of the quick control of louse-spread relapsing fever in one infected area when the people "were persuaded that the gods would remove the epidemic if all would shave and burn their hair as a sacrifice." Educational propaganda is more consonant with human dignity and human progress. But as Dr. Norman-Walker truly writes,

> work on village sanitation, the control of epidemics and education will be vitiated unless the villager is put in a position to increase and improve his diet.

Which brings us back—as most analyses do bring us back—to the basic need of a remodelling of India's economic structure.

PH. D.

RELATION BETWEEN MATTER AND MIND

[We bring together here the views, upon a much debated problem of more than theoretical interest, of an American educationist, **Mr. William H. Roberts,** and of **Shri P. Nagaraja Rao** of the Benares Hindu University, translator into English of *Vādā Valī* and author of *Schools of Vedānta.* Our readers' attention is invited to the appended Note by **A Student of Theosophy.**—Ed.]

I.—COMPONENTS: A WESTERN THEORY

Of Humpty-Dumpty the legend runs that after his accident the forces of an entire kingdom proved unequal to the task of reassembling him. How long the effort was continued is not, so far as I am aware, a matter of record. For various reasons that I hope will become apparent in what follows, I feel that the narrative ought to be continued in some such strain as this :—

A wise man fed him to a hen,
And soon he sat on his wall again.

All this really does have a bearing upon the very important question of the meanings of "matter" and "spirit" and the relation of "mind" to "body." The world—that is, the world philosophers talk about—suffered a calamity very like Humpty-Dumpty's, when Descartes split it into "matter" and "spirit." Of subsequent events it is neither legend nor whimsy but sober history—and history, it has become apparent in our own day, is frequently anything but sober—that the intellectual forces of many kingdoms and republics have been labouring in vain for about three hundred years to bring the two portions together.

Descartes did his work so thoroughly that the task seems hopeless. Who was it that first perpetrated the witticism: "What is mind?" "No matter." "What is matter?" "Never mind." Better than many a long philosophical treatise the jingle makes it plain that the problem of matter and spirit or of mind and body arose in the first place and continues to torment us, because we have accepted definitions of "matter" and "spirit" or of "body" and "mind" that render them mutually exclusive. What definitions sunder so drastically at the beginning of discourse, no logical ingenuity can subsequently reunite. We need some philosophical counterpart of the hen in the continuation of the legend to fit the fragments once more into a functioning whole.

We must acknowledge, moreover, that the attempts to bring body and mind or matter and spirit together have been only half-hearted. They have not really been attempts at synthesis. Instead they have sought to suppress one term or the other. Depending upon the term retained, we have been offered systems of

materialism or idealism. Philosophers have gravely assured us that mind is only a particular structure or activity of matter. Other philosophers have just as solemnly insisted that matter is only a peculiar constellation of ideas. In the kingdom to which Humpty-Dumpty belonged, the philosophers probably divided into schools upon the question whether the yolk of an egg was really the white in some disguise, or the white was really the yolk somehow misunderstood.

A curious irony intrudes itself into the discussion at every turn. If mind is only matter, or matter is only mind, both "mind" and "matter" must mean exactly the same thing; and neither can mean any mind or matter with which we are at present acquainted. If we insist upon cramming all the diversity of matter and mind—and that means the entire universe—into a single conceptual carry-all or suit-case, it is a matter of very little importance which term we select for a label. Whatever the word may be, it must *mean* everything in the carry-all.

Words, like suit-cases, it is true, may be stretched to accommodate the new meanings. But, as is true of suit-cases again, there are limits beyond which they cannot stretch and retain their original significance. "Matter" and "mind" have always stood in contrast. That contrast has been a large part of their meaning. If we enlarge, or expand, or enrich our understanding of "matter" until it can include "mind," it must be plain that we shall end with a very different "matter" from that with which we started—*so* different that we cannot fairly call it "matter" any more. In the interests of clear and honest thinking we ought to replace it with some other term. Perhaps the hyphenated "matter-mind" may serve. If we begin at the other end and try to conceive of a mind such that its "ideas" can possess the properties of "matter" or "things," we can no longer retain the mind with which at present we are acquainted. We shall be driven to devise some such term as "mind-matter." Obviously there is nothing to choose between "mind-matter" and "matter-mind."

To make this reasoning more concrete, let us suppose that we are all convinced idealists. Berkeley's arguments have carried complete conviction. We have decided that there are no "things." There are only constellations of ideas. This new insight seems an almost overwhelming illumination. Then one night, just as we are about to hold a meeting, one of our number stumbles over a chair in the dark hallway. We rush, of course, to assist him. As soon as the pain has in some measure subsided, we sit down together to discuss the occurrence, as good idealist philosophers ought. It soon becomes apparent that our colleague has been so unfortunate as to have a painful difference of opinion with God! He collided, it

is plain, with a divine idea! As soon as we turn on the light, we share the divine idea.

Such considerations lead us to observe that there are at least two kinds of ideas. Some are plainly enough " only " ideas. Others exhibit all the inertia, resistance, coercive power, and " general cussedness " of " things. " They are so exactly like " things " that they are certain to deceive any but the very elect. If we resolutely persist in our endeavour to distinguish between the two kinds of ideas, we discern all the characteristics of " matter " reasserting themselves. Some of our ideas, at least, are very definitely material.

The materialist, however, is no better off. Large aggregates of matter, much like ourselves in general appearance and behaviour, buy life insurance, work long hours in laboratories, preach gospels of Behaviourism, Socialism, or Eugenics that will save a lost and suffering world, and sometimes even sacrifice themselves in most unbiological fashion for ideal causes. A strange madness seems now and then to seize upon matter. That which before seemed movable only by some form of *con*cussion is strangely agitated by rational *dis*cussion. In short, it acts just as we would expect it to act if it were " spiritual. "

One attempt at compromise I think we are justified in regarding as no more than philosophical curiosity. Philosophers give it the forbidding name of *Epiphenomenalism.* Consciousness is acknowledged as an interesting fact of a kind fundamentally different from anything material. Conscious experiences may be described with great zest and detail. But it is asserted that they are determined at every stage by purely physical or chemical processes. For scientific purposes they are as superfluous as the smell that follows an automobile. They neither drive nor steer the mechanism. But surely we must either deny the reality of conscious states or processes altogether or acknowledge them as genuinely causal factors. Bradley has shown us, it seems to me, that *Epiphenomenalism* is perhaps the one theory of mind-body relationship that can be definitely refuted.

To " explain " an event is to describe its relationships to other events in some larger process. A particularly gratifying state of affairs obtains logical reasoning from known characteristics of the process or system. The event, we say then, is implied in the process or follows necessarily from it.

Materialism, then, confronts a dilemma. If we mean by " matter " any material substances with which we are at present acquainted, it is plain that any properties of which we are at present aware are wholly inadequate to " explain " conscious experiences. It is impossible to deduce from anything we know about carbon, nitrogen, or oxygen, or electrons and protons, any actual behaviour or experiences of ourselves or our acquaintances.

On the other hand, let us assume that some day we shall be able to deduce human experiences and behaviour from what we shall then know about electrons—or such elemental entities as may then be in fashion. Again we confront the parable of the suit-case. If we are able to take anything out of the suit-case, it is because we have previously put just that into it. In the fire mist of primordial nebulæ, in the structure of electrons, in the structureless ether, in Space-Time, or in whatever may then be serving for the last term in men's quest for origins, we shall have to make provision for human thinking, play, love, hate, and worship. "Matter" we may say once more will be very different then from anything we know at present. It will be at least as "psychical" as it will be "material."

Either materialism or idealism, it may be worth while to point out, is readily reversible into its opposite. Handcuffs that link a prisoner to a policeman link the policeman no less securely to the prisoner. The leaf is as necessary to the root as the root is to the leaf. Any argument that spiritual activity is only an incandescence of "matter" can be reversed to prove that matter is only frozen or congealed "spirit." Hegel long ago showed us that an effect determined its cause as truly as the cause determined its effect.

Is it possible that Descartes' error lay in mistaking adjectives for nouns and transforming qualities into substances? Is it possible that "matter" and "spirit" may both be fictions—at least as Descartes defined them—while "material" and "spiritual" may yet be serviceable, indeed indispensable, adjectives denoting contrasting qualities that it is important to distinguish within a complex that includes both? "Matter" and "spirit," if we view them so, would have for our thought of reality as a whole somewhat the same significance that the meridians of longitude and the parallels of latitude have for our thought of the earth. Better yet, we may compare them to the perpendicular axes in analytical geometry, that amazing product of Descartes' genius. They may, that is, supply a frame of reference for the location, description and control of the real events with which we have to deal.

Unlike the lines of longitude and latitude, however, "matter" and "spirit" are not imposed upon things and events in a fashion wholly arbitrary. They are rather *limits*, more or less clearly to be discerned in the processes with which we have to deal. No "spirit" of which we have any experience is ever "pure." Matter, we may suspect, is never "mere." The most "spiritual" activity must make some tracing upon "matter" if we are ever to perceive it at all. And ever since Leibniz it has been philosophically respectable to regard the simplest material processes as rudimentary spirituality. There are important differences, though, between the

thinking of a philosopher, the pain of a toothache and the weight of a stone. Reflection upon such differences leads us very naturally to conceive of limits—in the one direction, of pure thought or consciousness and, in the other, of mere filling of space. Events suggest the limits they never actually reach, very much as any hyperbola defines the asymptotes that it forever approaches but can never actually touch.

If we think of "matter" and "spirit," then, as ideal axes constituting together a frame of reference for the description of the universe within which we live and move, we may speak of the material and the spiritual (or mental) *components* of the events or processes we may wish to discuss. A number of advantages result. Some of them seem important.

We are free, it follows at once, to describe *either* the mental or the neurological process in any sequence of experiences with which we may be concerned. Which we may choose, will depend upon the purpose of our investigation or discourse. In idle revery it seems as though consciousness might well be merely attendant upon the play of nervous impulses through the brain along the lines of least physical resistance. In reflective thinking, or in the moments of artistic creation or mystical experience, we seem to see physical or chemical processes subordinated to logical, æsthetic, or religious meanings. That neurological processes are in action throughout such experiences, no one would wish to deny. But it must be obvious that the most detailed description conceivable of such processes would fall short of describing the experiences. To describe them or to make the sequences intelligible we are compelled to employ "mentalistic" terms.

It becomes clear, in the *second* place, why we can give either a behaviouristic or a mentalistic explanation of experience or behaviour, why neither account can be complete, and why neither need exclude the other. A process that is neither wholly spiritual nor wholly material, that is, not exactly parallel to either axis, must yield projections at every instant upon both axes. These changing projections will each supply a continuous and consistent narrative that can be studied in as great detail as any one may wish.

In the *third* place, we see the rationality of utilizing both physiological and the more distinctly psychological means for the control of experience or behaviour. Psychiatrists, of course, have long made use of both methods for the treatment of mental disorders. Physicians who are not psychiatrists are coming increasingly to recognize that serious physical ailments, particularly gastro-intestinal difficulties and many of the allergies, may develop from severe mental conflict and may resist the best of medical treatment until the conflict is resolved. We hear again and again the insistence that it is imperative to treat "the

whole man," if one wishes to effect a basic cure. That means that we must work with both the material and the spiritual components of his behaviour and experience, whether the disorder we wish to remedy be physical or mental.

The old insoluble problem of interaction, *fourthly*, seems to have been wholly unnecessary and indeed false. The *components* that I have urged we should substitute for the substances, are not two entities essentially independent. They are distinctions *made by* a contemplating mind *for* particular purposes *within* a complex that is no more altered by *such mental analysis than the surface of our earth is altered by* the lines of latitude and longitude on our maps. Components of a process are not brought together only occasionally and in purely external relationships. They interpenetrate continually. Neither can ever be found by itself—in complete "purity" or "mereness." Yet they can be distinguished as we can distinguish length and breadth in a rectangle; and each qualifies and enlarges the other at every point.

If we think of "matter" and "spirit," *fifthly*, not as two distinct substances but as ideal limits suggested by the characters of observed events and serviceable for the description and control of these events, our emotional attitude toward "matter" is likely to undergo a profound change. We shall lose all fear of attempts to link material, especially physiological, processes with the activities we have been accustomed to call "spiritual." On the other hand, we shall be convinced of the futility of all "reductionist" theories, those strange arguments that would lead us to believe that mind is *nothing but* body, and consciousness is *only* movement. Physiological—or, more generally, material—explanations of experience and behaviour, we shall see, are plainly the tracing of the projections of those processes upon an axis selected for the purpose of providing just that sort of explanation. There can be no objection to such undertakings. No intelligent person will underrate either their intrinsic interest or their practical value. Confusion and harm can result only if such projections are offered as complete descriptions, or as the only descriptions that have legitimate value or scientific interest.

Finally, and this may be the most important of all, we may be led to reflect that our world may have more dimensions than the two we have been considering. It may even be that some very different frame of reference may prove both more illuminating and practically more serviceable. The exploration of new dimensions of being, and experimentation with alternative frames of reference, ought to keep metaphysicians happily busy for many years to come.

William H. Roberts

II.—A HINDU VIEW

Almost all the systems of philosophy in East and West have in some form or other faced the time-honoured problem of the relation between Mind and Matter; on the nature of their solution depended their philosophical labels. In India the different philosophical systems, significantly called *Darśanas*, originated under the pressure of practical needs, arising from the presence of moral and physical evils in life. Aware of the imperfections of life, their formulaters sought to attain a state free from pain and finitude. They are not merely views of life, but also ways of life.

This is the distinguishing feature of Indian philosophical thought, as becomes clear where we contrast it with the prime motive of most philosophical systems of the West. To Western thinkers philosophical systems are exercises of the intellectual faculty. They do not want to taint the pursuit of Truth with theological, ethical and religious considerations; they want to pursue Truth for its own sake. F. H. Bradley states that philosophy "seeks to gain possession of Reality, but only in an ideal form."[1] J. S. Mackenzie observes that the mission of philosophy terminates in the quest rather than any actions that may follow it.[2] In a celebrated passage in his autobiography R. G. Collingwood describes the typical European ideal for the philosopher:—

> The Oxford philosophers were proud to have excogitated a philosophy so pure from the sordid taint of utility, that they could lay their hands on their heart and say it was of no use at all—philosophy so scientific that no one whose life was not a life of pure research could appreciate it and so abstruse that only a whole-time student and a clever man at that could understand it. They were quite resigned to the contempt of the fools and the amateurs.

Indian philosophical systems did not believe in Truth for Truth's sake, or art for art's sake. Everything was for the sake of the termination of misery and the realisation of spiritual experience. This pragmatic outlook in the plenary sense of the term was the motive force of all the Indian systems.[3] Every problem was seen against this background.

The realisation aimed at by all the Indian systems was in some form or other the true nature of one's own self. This is overlaid by factors and materials that do not belong to it. Hence the confusion of *saṁsāra*. The Not-Self is not clearly distinguished from the Self. That is why the Self feels all the misery. The

[1] *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 12.

[2] *Ultimate Values*, p. 26.

[3] "The Indian Conception of Values." By M. HIRIYANNA. (*Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. XIX, Part 1938, pp. 10-24)

See also his Presidential Address before the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1939, on "The Message of Indian Philosophy." (*Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 16, pp. 14-28)

different systems of Indian philosophy represent different stages in the solution of the relation between the Not-Self and the Self. The same is expressed in metaphysical language as the problem of the relation between Mind and Matter, and in psychological language as the relation between Body and Mind.

The common-sense view accepts the dualism between the Not-Self, *i. e.*, Matter, or the external world of objects, and Self, or the Spirit of man. This dualism is man's first reflective finding. The Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga and the Mīmāṁsā systems and the theistic schools of Vedānta, of Ramanuja, Madhva etc., hold the view that the Not-Self or Matter or the external inert world is in sharp contrast to the Self. They posit eternality and beginninglessness for both the Self and the Not-Self. Theistic systems have erected a supra-personal God as the director of both Matter and Minds, which are described as dependent substances. The Nyāya school held such a view. But it did not posit, like Descartes, a moment-to-moment interference of God for securing the interaction of body and mind.

The realistic systems of Indian philosophy have posited an interaction between Matter and Mind as natural. This they were able to do because they endowed Mind with the capacity to use Matter for furthering its interests. The dualism between Matter and Mind was not rigid. One was subordinate to the other, though not created by the other. Both are uncreated, but one, *i. e.*, Matter, has the capacity to serve the Mind as its instruments. Both the categories (*tattvas*) *cit* and *acit* (Mind and Matter) are dependent on Iśvara. The dualistic and theistic systems bridge the gulf between Mind and Matter, by making Matter the supreme instrument and medium for the religious life and service to humanity.

Other systems, like the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsā, do not abolish dualism, but exhort the individual to mark off the Self from the Not-Self and not to be beguiled by the blandishments of Nature. The Sāṅkhyan Puruṣa realises that he has nothing in common with the workings of Prakṛti, and that he is purely a witness. All that he witnesses is external to him and belongs to Matter, which he is not. This realisation ends misery and grief.[1]

The Sāṅkhyan dualism of Spirit and Matter may not appear a very profound solution to the upholders of philosophic unity like Śaṅkara. None-the-less its dualism has certain merits which are absent from Western concepts.

To the Sāṅkhyan, Prakṛti or Matter is a continuous and unitary entity. Its evolution affords experience and finally release to the Puruṣa. Interaction between Matter and Puruṣa is

[1] Ishvara Krishna's *Sankhya Karika* exhorts us to seek the way of terminating the threefold ills of life.

impossible here, but still the system posits the presence of the Puruṣa as indispensable to the evolution of Prakṛti. It also makes a bold attempt to explain the interaction of Puruṣa and Prakṛti without contact, with the help of examples from nature.[1] These examples are not satisfactory, but still they are not without speculative interest. In Sāṅkhya we have the boldest attempt to retain dualism, along with atheism, and on top of it all to explain a contactless interaction between Mind and Matter on a naturalistic basis. The most impressive attempt is made here to combine a scientific explanation with a dualistic metaphysics.

But a complete and thorough solution of the problem is given by Śaṅkara and the Advaita thinkers who preceded and succeeded him. They considered dualism of Matter and Mind only a theory of the first glance and not the product of considered philosophical thought. It is a philosophical half-way house and not a completed journey.

In the history of philosophic thought the distinction between subject and object had come to stay as a permanent feature. Some thinkers of East and West have retained the dualism and declared that the subject cannot be explained intelligibly in terms of the object. They have also held that the objective world of matter cannot in any way taint the subject. In their anxiety to secure the purity of the Self, they left the dualism as insurmountable, though of course they did assert the superiority of the Self over the Not-Self. Some solipsistic Advaita thinkers, in their craze for logical consistency, denied the reality of the objective world and reduced it to an illusion and thus did not accept dualism at all. Such an attempt amounts to explaining away the problem, not explaining it.

Śaṅkara took his stand on the apparent dualism of Mind and Matter, subject and object, but he never accepted this distinction as insurmountable. By his authentic religious experience and on the strength of the testimony of other seers, with a powerful and convincing dialectic, he points to a state of consciousness which is beyond the subject-object distinction, and the Matter and Mind dualism. In that state of consciousness or experience the distinctions do not stand out but are synthesised. The fundamental intuition at which Descartes arrived, after the searching application of the principle of doubt—*Cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore I exist)—is not for Śaṅkara completely satisfactory. Descartes identifies the Self with only one aspect of experience, *i. e.*, the experiencer. Thinking is existence for him. But Śaṅkara identifies the Self not with one aspect or other of experience but with experience as a whole. The subject-object distinctions arise where the experience is lived through. These are distinctions in it and not of it.

[1] *Ibid.*, v. 57.

If such a position is not accepted we cannot in any logical manner transcend the dualism between Matter and Mind, or between the Self and the Not-Self. The Self can know the external world because there is some kind of unity between the Self and that world. As Prof. S. Radhakrishnan observes, " Reality and existence are not to be set against each other as metaphysical contraries. "[1] The monistic vision of the Upaniṣadic seers of India has been a progressive analysis of experience in the light of the supreme spiritual experience.

In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* there is the illuminating dialogue between the sage Varuṇa and his son Bhṛgu. Bhṛgu after great intellectual effort wants to know the Supreme. Varuṇa tells him that Brahman " is that from whence these beings are born, that by which when born they live, and that into which they enter at their death ; try to know that. This is Brahman. "[2] Bhṛgu progressively identifies Brahman with matter (*annam*), life (*prāṇa*), mind (*manas*), self-consciousness (*vigñāna*) and lastly understands it as *ānanda, i.e.*, bliss.

The fact that everything that is, is an aspect of Brahman is not an intellectual construction for the Hindu mind but an intuitive realisation. Till the moment of that realisation the distinction serves the purpose of the Spirit. The distinction is not unreal or illusory, nor has it an independent reality of its own. It is used by the Spirit for its progress. The external world, Matter (*annam*) is the food of the Spirit. The world of Matter is transformed by the spiritual experience of man, and not cancelled. The Upaniṣadic statement *sarvaṁ khalvidam Brahma* (All this is Brahman) is the true monistic vision which reconciles the dualism.

Prior to this experience the dualism is real. Its relative reality is not denied. But the sharp distinction between the two is surmounted by positing the unity of purpose and making Matter or body or the external world an instrument for the Soul in its pilgrimage to perfection. The world is not so much denied as used up. Viewed from this angle, the sharp distinction between Matter and Mind vanishes and their interaction becomes intelligible. Indian philosophical systems begin with the view that Nature is external to man and pass on to the view that Nature or the external world is dominated by Spirit. If that domination is possible Nature cannot be alien to spirit. It must be of the nature of Spirit and identical with it. It is this truth that makes us no banished strangers in this universe but akin to the Spirit. This is the basis of the charter of Hinduism : " That thou art " (*Tat tvam asi*).

P. NAGARAJA RAO

[1] *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, p. 31.
[2] *Taittiriya Upanishad*, III. 1.

III.—A NOTE ON THE ABOVE

The relation between Matter and Mind or Spirit (both the above papers use the last two terms interchangeably) is one in which the layman as well as the philosopher should feel interest. In recognising that "Spirit" and "Matter" may not be independent realities but components of that which includes both, Mr. Roberts draws measurably close to the Advaitic view expounded by Shri Nagaraja Rao. But Spirit and Matter are more than intimately related components of "a complex that includes both." Their fundamental *identity* was a basic concept of Indian philosophy from time immemorial, as is well brought out by Madame H. P. Blavatsky's modern restatement of the ancient Teachings, which resolves convincingly the apparent duality.

Spirit and Matter are the two States of the ONE, which is neither Spirit nor Matter, both being the absolute life, latent....Spirit is the first differentiation of (and in) SPACE ; and Matter the first differentiation of Spirit.

To "Spirit," she writes, is to be referred "every manifestation of consciousness, reflective or direct" (and also of the "unconscious purposiveness" of Western philosophy) as evidenced in "the Vital Principle and Nature's submission to the majestic sequence of immutable law." "Matter," simply put, is "the aggregate of objects of possible perception," physical or supersensual, for there may be forms of matter more tenuous than those which the instruments of science can discover, wedded to other forms of energy than those which modern science knows.

Spirit and Matter however, are not independent realities but "the two primeval aspects of the One and Secondless," the two poles of the same homogeneous substance, the root-principle of the universe, one pole of that infinite Ocean of Light being "pure *Spirit* lost in the absoluteness of Non-Being, and the other, the *matter* in which it condenses, crystallizing into a more and more gross type as it descends into manifestation." "Matter is Spirit, and *vice versâ.*"

The caduceus of Mercury figures suggestively the relation between Spirit and Matter. Its rod conveys the same idea as the trunk of the Hindu Asvattha (the tree of Life and Being), which at every new period of manifestation grows from "the two dark wings of the Swan...of Life."

The two Serpents, the ever-living and its illusion (Spirit and matter) whose two heads grow from the one head between the wings, descend along the trunk, interlocked in close embrace. The two tails join on earth (the manifested Universe) into one, and this is the great illusion.

Edison more than fifty years ago expressed a fundamental concept of the Eastern teaching when he declared :—

I do not believe that matter is inert, acted upon by an outside force. To me it seems that every atom is possessed

by a certain amount of primitive intelligence.

There is no Matter without Spirit, no Spirit without Matter, in the manifested world. As Madame Blavatsky puts the ancient teaching, "It is only through some molecular aggregation or fabric that Spirit wells up in a stream of individual or subconscious subjectivity." In cosmos, in the evolutionary process, the operations of Spirit and Matter, like the centripetal and centrifugal forces, produce harmony and preserve equilibrium.

The whole of antiquity was imbued with that philosophy which teaches the involution of spirit into matter, the progressive, downward cyclic descent, or active, self-conscious evolution.

The evolutionary cycle, in other words, represents "a descent of Spirit into Matter, equivalent to an ascent in physical evolution; a re-ascent from the depths of materiality towards its *status quo ante*, with a corresponding dissipation of concrete form and substance up to...what Science calls 'the zero-point,' and beyond."

Spirit and Matter are equilibrised in Man, who is their creature and a manifestation of them in his periodical appearances in a physical body—their son, in one sense, as is the manifested Universe itself. The Mind of man, the emanation of the very essence of pure divine Intelligence, is at this stage of the evolutionary cycle the link between Matter and Spirit in him, as cosmic energy is the link between Matter and Spirit in Nature. Man, as the manifested Deity in both its aspects, spiritual and material, good and evil, "is himself the separator of the ONE into various contrasted aspects," the apparent contrast arising only partly from the various degrees of differentiation of the latter and partly from the grades of consciousness attained by man himself.

From the stand-point of the human thinker, therefore, Matter may be described as "the sequence of our own states of consciousness," and Spirit as "an idea of psychic intuition."

A STUDENT OF THEOSOPHY

A complete science of metaphysics and a complete philosophy of science are not yet even conceived of as possible; hence the ancient wisdom by its very vastness has escaped recognition in modern times.—W. Q. JUDGE

NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

[**Dr. Hermann Goetz** writes here with his customary perspicacity of a conflict of ideologies of recurrent intensity but perennial pertinence. The thoughtful reader will find in this article by our esteemed contributor a valuable clue to the contemporary maze.—Ed.]

Our time is torn between nationalism and internationalism. Both are accused of being the very roots and causes of the present bloody world catastrophe, both are preached as the dispensation destined to save mankind from a repetition of the same cataclysm. Through the whole last century nationalism had been accepted as a healthy sign of social progress, the correlate, in the field of international relations, of growing economic and cultural self-assertion and of democracy. Today it has become an orthodoxy on the defence, demanding terrible sacrifices for its ideals and not less bloody victims for its interests. But today it is also denounced in the name of humanity and cultural progress. The proletarians accuse nationalism as an instrument of middle-class capitalistic exploitation. The middle classes deride internationalism as the mentality of slaves without personality, crushed by the social and cultural domination of self-assertive, nation-conscious foreign rulers. And yet it is today just amongst the most highly cultured persons, philosophers, scholars, artists, that we find the most prominent opponents of nationalism, in the very name of culture and the dignity of man which nationalism claims to defend.

Helpless victims whose convictions nobody had ever cared to know have fallen and are falling by the hundreds of thousands. Jobbers and cheats are, as always, fishing in the troubled waters. But so many genuine martyrs have likewise laid down their lives everywhere, honestly convinced of their own ideal, whether nationalism or internationalism, and of the disastrous consequences of a victory of the opposite ideal, that we are not justified merely in dismissing them as fools or fanatics. Too many of them have been able to examine and to judge, at least within the limits of our traditional standards of knowledge and outlook. It is, thus, evident that the nationalism defended by honest nationalists is not the same as that denounced by internationalists, and that the internationalism praised by proletarians and cultured individuals is not the same as that hated by nationalists. Even more! The two types of internationalism are not identical. The proletarian would condemn that of the latter as bourgeois, and the scholar and artist will probably find that of the proletarian too similar

to certain aspects of that nationalism which he hates. Indeed, proletarian internationalism can change into nationalism, as we see at present in Soviet Russia, and the political anti-nationalism of the highly cultured can go hand in hand with a pathetic love for the cultural traditions of his mother-country.

Thus, it seems that nationalism and internationalism are not absolute ideals but attitudes bound to certain social standards: Proletarian mass internationalism, middle-class nationalism, the internationalism of highly cultured individuals. Are they not rather phenomena connected with certain cultural levels? For what has been said of proletarian internationalism is likewise true of primitive society. It has its patriotism, but a patriotism restricted to the village or the district, beyond which it remains unorganised or can be united by any fascinating military or religious leader without the least regard to ethnic or cultural principles. And, on the other hand, these political phenomena have their counterparts in the religious field. The primitive will accept the demons and godlings of other villages and tribes; even if he refuses them acknowledgment within the domain of his hereditary protectors, he will venerate them whenever he enters their domain or meets their worshippers at a fair or on other common ground. The higher civilizations, however, develop exclusive religions growing more and more intolerant. But again the saints and mystics tend to see the common Divine ground in all creeds, and old civilizations amalgamate the warring churches of the past into a tolerant syncretism. Indeed, it is not a problem of cultural type, but of general human age and maturity. Children, if not spoiled or frightened, mix freely and are easily united for collective action, in spite of individual small egoisms. Grown-up youth becomes assertive and conquering; manhood tends to become dominating and exclusive. But mellow, mature age can again be kind and tolerant.

These parallels are not merely accidental. They are bound together by common experiences, needs and expectations, and dissidents from these stages are forced to accommodate themselves or to join other, more congenial societies if they cannot rise to the rôle of leaders towards a new social level.

The child and the primitive man are preoccupied with the fundamental necessities of life. Their egoism is restricted to their immediate needs, the toys of the child, the farm and village of the peasant, the homes and the comradeship of the factory workers. Beyond that, all men are brethren, all have common interests and expectations. Beyond that, there is a great unexplored material and intellectual world to be discovered and won. A world rather of dreams, imperceptibly changing into the supernatural, into the symbols of a very old, poetic and deep wisdom. The primitive nationalism

will never grow beyond the family, the village, the industrial community. Whenever the primitive accepts the nationalism of the middle-class type, it is by translating it into his own terms. This is possible as long as nationalism is a healthy growth. But when nationalism grows hectic and dogmatic, the simple man can no more assimilate all those strange theories of nation, race and "culture" which are beyond his outlook. He sees the sacrifices demanded by a ruling class which he does not understand, he sees the victims, whom he regards as his brethren. He feels himself the exploited fool, grumbles, rebels. Thus if a leader arises appealing to his dreams, personifying his symbols, he will rise, without regard to race or nation, in the name of that dream and that ideal, and develop tremendous energies, destructive as well as constructive. From the view-point of mass psychology, there is no difference between the Cimmerian hordes of Gog and Magog, the Scythians, Huns and Hephtalites, the armies of Abu Bakr and Omar, the Almoravides and the Mahdi, Jenghiz Khan and Bolshevism. All of them have the same international enthusiasm, collectivistic spirit and overwhelming energy. But all these movements, overrunning and assimilating the old-established nationalities, after some time themselves became and become new nations or even imperialist states, with a new ruling and leisured caste.

This internationalism has nothing of the characteristics which nationalism fears and despises. And even when it turns nationalist, it has nothing of the exclusiveness and xenophobia of the latter. The foreigner is received as another convert, and assimilated into the growing community. Only when the new nationalism itself begins to grow old, when its first international phase has already become a no-more-understood legend, do xenophobia and exclusiveness creep in, as in, *e. g.*, the Mayflower aristocracy and the Ku-Klux-Klan in the U.S.A.

The internationalism hated by the nationalists is of a different type. It is the internationalism neither of the proletarian nor of the highly cultured, but of the broken and the subjected. It is purely negative, not a belief in a brotherhood of mankind, or a comradeship of proletarians or tribesmen, but a negation of all human bonds beyond the narrowest family circle: Every man for himself, and the devil take the hindmost! It leads to unscrupulous egoism, shameless exploitation of the weak and toadyism before the mighty. It sticks to its own national traditions not in love or understanding but by sheer inertia or desire for social differentiation. It surrenders at the earliest opportunity before the civilization of the ruling class, not from understanding or appreciation, but in the hope of rising into the ruling caste, or at least of being tolerated by it as the link between masters and slaves. It is the social disease of all

colonies, subject nations and countries under foreign cultural domination. Thus it had been in the Assyrian, Israelite, Phœnician and Roman Empires, in sixteenth-century France, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Germany and in the Spanish viceregal provinces in America. Thus it still is in the Near and Middle East or India, in China under the Japanese and was in the Quisling classes of Nazi-occupied Europe. Thus it has been the scourge of small nations surviving as such links between the rulers and the ruled, making many of them vain and overbearing, and thus attracting public hatred on the whole community, whether Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Copts, Maronites, Parsis, Jains, Brahmins, Anglo-Indians, colonial Chinese, Creoles and others.

The natural reaction against it is a vehement nationalism. But it is not the strong, healthy nationalism of growing peoples. That always is tolerant, broad-minded and very assimilative. Though it can occasionally develop xenophobia, this is never more than a temporary phenomenon born from a crisis not of the nation, but of some class, *e.g.*, the poor whites in the Southern States of the U.S.A., or in the South African Union. But as the healthy nation grows, it can reabsorb those restive groups. It is too strong, its vitality and hopes cannot be endangered, it rather needs more and more human and cultural material to build up its dream of a world of tomorrow, in the same way as healthy young men want to learn, make friends, share their experiences, never fearing that their sparkling energy would be the poorer by inspiration received from or given to others, or by successes shared with friends. Egypt in her glorious days of the eighteenth and nineteenth dynasties absorbed innumerable Syrian, Cretan and Libyan "fashions" (including the "Indian" sun cult of Akhnaton). The Persian rulers of the Achæmenian Empire assimilated Egyptian symbolism, Babylonian script, art, astrology and even Greek influences. The Roman imperialists adopted Greek civilization, Egyptian and Asiatic cults, Syrian philosophy, Indian mysticism. The Scythian Kushanas took over Greek and Indian art, Greek, Buddhist and Iranian religion. Gupta and Pallava-Chola civilization in India have been enriched by innumerable, yet completely assimilated foreign influences. The Ottoman Turks absorbed Iranian and Byzantine civilization. The England of Shakespeare received the strongest French, Italian, Spanish and Flemish population influx and cultural inspiration. Today the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. take over whatever they can from a declining Europe. And all of them were or are on the way not towards denationalization, but towards their most splendid heyday in history.

But it is different where nationalism is on the defensive because it is hemmed in either by foreign domination or by an international

development clashing with its traditions, an increase of economic, political, military and scientific demands with which it can no more compete. Then nationalism becomes exclusive, dogmatic, xenophobian, intolerant. There is no open road towards the future and, therefore, no national development towards it, elastically adjusting itself to the perpetually changing conditions of life. There is an ideal; but the ideal lies far away in the past, a picture of gone glory to be restored in a conscious and diligent "Renaissance." The heirs of this glorious past feel themselves the elect of the Lord, a higher race endowed with spiritual virtues raising them over their apparently more successful neighbours or conquerors. Nay, the very misfortunes of the Elect are regarded as a vindication of their superiority and a sign of their final victory. Thus, the past shapes the future. Religion becomes the monopoly of a priestly or literate hierarchy. The documents and traditions of that past are carefully collected, restored or adapted to new needs. The careful fostering of manners and customs, especially with regard to food restrictions and dress, is carried to ridiculous lengths. Where new techniques, methods or forms of organization are accepted, it is only for the purpose of using them as instruments of this "Renaissance."

All the late phases of human civilizations offer ample examples of this dying cultural nationalism, generally in a succession of renaissances losing more and more the contact with their glorious models in the past until finally they are so far decomposed that their best traditions enter into a new, fertile synthesis with another civilization, or are swallowed up by some new revolutionary start.

For politically this late nationalism is a failure, living by sufferance in the still unassimilated vacuum between the rising powers of the future, or going down in horrible catastrophes where a reckless heroic fanaticism tries in vain to make good for the lack of assimilative and constructive strength. For an exclusive nationalism renders assimilation and genuine growth in harmony with the needs of the times impossible; ideals shaped by the past are incompatible with adjustment to a modern, larger-dimensioned world. Egyptians, Assyrians, Jews, Byzantines, etc. have been classical examples in the past; Ireland, Nazi Germany and Shintoist Japan are such in our own days. The self-destruction of modern Germany and Japan is but a repetition of the similar self-destruction of the Jewish nation, ending in the destruction of Jerusalem by the Roman Emperors.

The religious counterpart is the aging churches, petrified in mighty hierarchies and imposing sanctuaries with strong vested interests, a dogma buried under laborious rituals and theologies whose deeper sense only the Elect can interpret, intellectually exclusive, intolerant.

It is age, but not mature ripeness.

It is the age of the broken and the petrified, of those bitter old men hating God and the world, who after a successful life are no more able and willing to adjust themselves, who obstinately try to impose with a cruel tyranny their waning authority, their queer habits and ideas, petrifacts of an already forgotten past, until they die forgotten, or end in some catastrophe, to the relief of their fellow creatures.

Yet the wisdom of mature old age is different. It, too, has found its form. But this form is not merely a petrifact of superannuated time-bound customs and ideas. It has grown from the accidental to the essential, from the fashions of the day to the eternity of God. Even where it sticks to dear old forms, it does so in the consciousness that they offer only one possible way of self-expression amongst the immense wealth of creation. It enjoys this wealth, it offers its kind fatherly, motherly, support to those many struggling life efforts around it. It knows that the eternal value of all those efforts lies not in their accidental, often foolish aims, but in the creative instinct, the divine urge connecting man with his Creator. It has grown from the individual to the cosmic life. This maturity of the individuality has its religious counterpart in the saint mystic who, though tending to be loyal to the religion into which he is born, knows behind the tine-bound forms and tradition the deeper cosmic urge, the absolute Divine vision. This maturity has its political counterpart in the minority of cultured internationalists who turn against the hectic excesses of a dying nationalism.

Like the proletarians, like the philosopher and the saint, they are driven into opposition by the injustice and the immorality which are the products of a dying nationalism. For whatever reforms a nation inspired by the past will in a temporary effort attempt, it falls back into stagnation, spiritual, political, social, economic inequality, priest and scribe rule, dictatorship, slavery of the masses. The poor, excluded from the wisdom of the guardians of the past, but burdened with all the duties, will no more understand why they should bear all this. They become immune against propaganda and go over to another healthy nationalism or revolt in the name of a hope-inspiring mass internationalism, germ of a new nation.

But the cultured understand, they know not merely the tradition handed down from a glorious past, they are in communion with the living spirit behind it. They know that this tradition is only one possible form of cultural self-expression and they realize that this form has become a caricature of its original, a dead shell killing the living spirit. They know that neither individual nor national culture is an ideal as such but a bar to the general effort towards absolute perfection, erected by the inherited individual or collec-

tive shortcomings (necessary correlates of virtues). They know that for this very reason all conscious aspirations towards an individual or national culture are condemned to failure and must be sacrificed, whereas all aspirations to the highest perfection as such develop personality, individual as well as national. An aspiration towards general perfection, however, cannot know individual or national prejudices; it must accept all the many existing forms as parallel efforts, with the same rights, though with a thousand different accents of quality. Thus they are tolerant and understanding. A healthy national development, creative and assimilative, they will accept as a natural, though a less conscious expression of their ideals. A cramped dying nationalism must needs drive them into opposition. As national reformers they always fail. But it is they who mitigate the horrors of nationalist or ecclesiastic intolerance; it is they who save the remnants of a chastised people, it is they who hand down the really valuable heritage of culture, it is they who again build bridges over estrangement and hatred, it is they who lead mankind from cynicism and arrogance, ossified traditions and fanaticism back to simplicity, justice and the living faith in God and man. Christ was crucified because he refused to be the leader of a dying nationalism, in order to preach the kingdom of Divine love to all men of good-will.

Thus nationalism is the normal form of political life, but this form changes its content periodically. For the conditions of a healthy growth of mankind change with every invention which alters man's control over his surroundings, and man himself changes for the better or the worse as a hard life breaks or steels him, or as an easy life develops or effeminates him. Thus all the existing forms of nationalism earlier or later come in conflict with the changing conditions of life. Creative and assimilating, they become exclusive, xenophobian and conservative, and finally die. Then they are assimilated into new developments, rising new nationalist or internationalist proletarian movements. Internationalism is the exception, but a necessary link between old and new national traditions. Proletarian internationalism is the intermediate amalgamation stage between the low cultural levels of primitives and of proletarian outcasts of dying civilizations on the one hand and a new nationalism with a future on the other. Cultured internationalism is the link between the warring nations and civilizations, transmitting the cultural heritage of mankind, but it is also a forlorn hope, the most noble, but also the most tragic of all political ideals.

H. GOETZ

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE SEER OF PONDICHERRY*

Sri Aurobindo's personality is for most people filled with awe and mystery. This is enhanced by the fact that he is not seeable by anyone except once in a few months when he gives his *darshan* to a select number of people. Who is this mystery man? What does he do? What is his origin? What were his early life and history? What were the influences that have gone to the shaping of his thought and activity? What are his achievements? What is it that is distinctive of them? What is his place in Indian politics? These and other questions which arise in the minds of most of us are answered clearly and well in this book.

One of the merits of the author—and to my mind what should be an indispensable qualification of any one who sets out to portray the life and work of another—is that he is an ardent admirer of Sri Aurobindo. It is love which begets understanding, and our author brings plenty of it to bear on his subject. Therefore one feels that he can be trusted in what he has to say about Sri Aurobindo.

What is striking in the life placed before us in this book is the entirely Western influence under which it was brought during early childhood and youth, and as against this the altogether Indian turn which it took later. One has known of plenty of Yogis, but none like unto this one. Brought up in a Westernised home by a father who, like many of the last century, was greatly fascinated by the culture of the West, sent to a European Convent in Darjeeling as a child of five and then to England for fourteen years, from seven to twenty-one years of age, young Aurobindo started life in India fully versed in Greek, Latin, French, German and English, with an intimate knowledge of England and its culture, but a stranger to the thought and life of his own country. It is exhilarating, however, to see the Indian nature of Sri Aurobindo gradually rising over his Western accretions and asserting itself. It would make a most instructive psychological study to trace the factors responsible for this complete change over from being a young Cambridge graduate, a product of the best English home, school and university life, writing Greek, Latin and English verse like any gifted English undergraduate, and then, in striking contrast to all this, his taking to Yoga, Indian Philosophy and retirement from association with his fellow-men like the rishis of old. The author has not interested himself in this question, nor perhaps could he with the material available to him. It is only if Sri Aurobindo himself discloses to us in an autobiography how this change came about in his life that we shall fully know the facts. But as it is unlikely that Sri Aurobindo will hereafter find time for writing his own life, it would be well for his biographers to try to collect this information as best they can, for it is of the greatest

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* *Sri Aurobindo.* By K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR. (Arya Publishing House, Calcutta, Rs. 8/-)

importance to Educational Psychology.

The author, being a Professor of English, writes with great knowledge and appreciation of the excellence of Sri Aurobindo's poetry. His partiality for this side of Sri Aurobindo's contribution is evident throughout the book which is scattered from beginning to end with verses from Sri Aurobindo. Dr. Iyengar is in his element when analysing the technique of Sri Aurobindo's poetry, and pointing out the charm of his craftsmanship and his affinity in this respect with the great poets of Europe. He devotes three chapters to surveying in detail the poems of Sri Aurobindo written between 1893 and 1908 after he returned to India and during the greater part of which period he was Vice-Principal of Baroda College. During this period, Sri Aurobindo had learnt Bengali and Sanskrit, as well as Marathi and Gujerati, had mastered the Indian classics and had begun to write poems on Indian classical themes and to produce English translations of great Indian masterpieces, giving them a unique flavour of his own. The author points out how in all this Sri Aurobindo displays a remarkable command over English sound values and a beautiful precision in language as well as originality in using his material to express his own thoughts and experiences.

Not merely so, but it would seem that the Indian classics, like the Upanishads and the *Gita*, as well as in modern times the teachings of Ramakrishna and Vivekananda had a revolutionary effect on Sri Aurobindo. He turned to Yoga and Philosophy to which he had had an aversion in his college days at Cambridge. Here again, however, he was not content with merely taking over bodily what he found but gave it a new interpretation and meaning. Perhaps owing to his fourteen-year stay in England during the most impressionable period of his life, he disliked any negative philosophy, which taught fleeing from the world and seeking salvation for oneself in solitude and retirement. During the period of its decline, Hinduism tended precisely to such an end. As against this, Sri Aurobindo, in line with Ramakrishna and Vivekananda, preaches an activist gospel—a call to live the Divine Life amongst fellow-men and to strive to establish the Kingdom of God here and now. He goes further still and teaches that it will not do merely to attain God for oneself but that, to put it crudely, we must bring Him down to earth so that all men may live the Life Divine. Men should transcend their human limitations and grow into the fulness of the Godhead. Even their terrestrial life should assume a Divine character. We must not escape from life to reach God but transmute this worldly existence till it becomes a temple of the Deity. Sri Aurobindo's philosophy is therefore positive. It does not prescribe a series of negations and denials, but is a philosophy of affirmation and of hope.

Further in Sankaracharya's philosophy, Maya or Ignorance is employed as a principle to explain the appearance of the multiplicity of the world as over against the unity or non-duality of Reality. But then, Maya or Ignorance, when thus distinguished from Reality as its opposite, becomes itself an insolvable problem, a thing which refuses to be explained in relation to the One without a second. Sri Aurobindo cuts the Gordian knot by

regarding Ignorance as no such rigid principle, beginningless and capable of creating the unreal world. For him ignorance is but a name for imperfect knowledge. The supreme is "Truth-consciousness, creative of a true universe, but with mind acting in that universe as an imperfect consciousness, ignorant, partly knowing, partly not knowing." Reality is a whole spiral of consciousness. At the bottom consciousness exists in a very imperfect form. At the top it exists in the form of knowledge. So Ignorance is not an ultimate. It represents the descent of consciousness, and thus arises on the way and will also disappear on the way when consciousness reascends. It is thus neither beginningless Maya nor Original Sin, to be dreaded and despaired of. As Ignorance is thus only a stage in the descent and ascent of consciousness, it will be and can be outgrown. It is but a preparation, a strategic retreat that facilitates the fulfilment of the Divine purpose. It is not a curse but an opportunity and a challenge for putting forth effort and achieving knowledge.

Reality, according to Sri Aurobindo, is a spiritual evolution from matter to Life, from life to mind, from mind to supermind, from supermind to Sat-Chit-Ananda. This growth cannot be effected by aspiring man alone; his endeavour to forge ahead in the evolutionary scale must be met half-way by a corresponding descent of consciousness, which takes possession of him and achieves a new integration of his whole nature.

> The two movements...are the two ends of a single consciousness whose motions, now separated from each other, must join if the life power is to have its more and more perfect action and fulfilment, or the transformation for which we hope. (*The Riddle of the World*, p. 16)

But a mere transformation of an individual here or an individual there is not enough.

> The individual change will have a permanent and cosmic significance only if the individual becomes a centre and a sign for the establishment of the supramental Consciousness-Force as an overtly operative power in the terrestrial workings of Nature, in the same way in which thinking mind has been established through the human evolution as an overtly operative power in Life and matter. This would mean the appearance in the evolution of a gnostic being or Purusha and a gnostic Prakriti, a gnostic Nature. (*The Life Divine*, II. 1021)

When this will be, we cannot tell. But Sri Aurobindo hopes that the date of the supramental descent is not far off.

This in short is the dynamic philosophy of hope which Sri Aurobindo has to offer to the world, and which our author ably expounds.

At a time when the world is full of darkness and confusion, Sri Aurobindo speaks like one who knows and has seen the Light and the Truth, not like one who is feebly groping with the aid of the mere intellect. And yet it is not all mysticism and poetry, for he shows the road to Ramrajya, the new Heaven and the new Earth and describes in detail the stages through which we have to pass. He is a Seer and Prophet of our new age.

Having said this, we have not said all. For Sri Aurobindo, besides being a poet, a philosopher and a prophet, took an active part in politics for a period of about four years, from 1906 to 1910. His politics was of the extreme type which had little use for moderatism and the making of petitions on bended knee. He was not a

votary of non-violence, nor was he a red revolutionary engaged in secret conspiracies and in the throwing of bombs. His views were expressed pungently in his journals, at first the *Bandemataram*, and later the *Karmayogin*, and the *Dharma*. The very titles of these last indicate the religious tendency which was gaining ascendancy over his mind, and finally drew him away from politics altogether, and made him bury himself in retirement in Pondicherry over things of the spirit.

Such in outline are the main aspects of Sri Aurobindo's life and work that our author puts before us. A criticism that suggests itself is, Is Sri Aurobindo justified in living thus in seclusion when his fellow-men are in dire distress and need his help and guidance? Tagore said, and truly, that God is not to be found in the quiet of the sanctuary or by the counting of beads. He is where men toil and bear the heat and the burden of the day. Gandhiji, believing likewise, is wearing himself out in service of his fellow-men, especially the poor and the downtrodden. When called to action by his friends, Sri Aurobindo replied that the true basis of work and life is the spiritual, a new consciousness to be developed only by Yoga. This being so, it was necessary to know how this consciousness could be brought down, mobilised, organized and turned upon life, how our present instruments—intellect, mind, life, body—can be made true and perfect channels for this great transformation. Till he had obtained mastery of this secret, he said, he was determined not to work in the external field of men and affairs. He would build only on a perfect foundation. This he stated several years ago. Since then, the sands of Time have fallen fast. Sri Aurobindo is already past seventy-two years of age and is still in retirement. One wonders when hereafter he will be able to plunge into the world of action to guide his fellow-men.

Moreover, one inclines to doubt if ideas hatched in solitude will be of much use in everyday life. Ordinarily thoughts relating to action spring up and develop in the course of battling with ever-changing problems. Each step taken brings up new situations which require fresh handling. As Gandhiji, the man of action, in the words of John Henry Newman, often proclaims, "I do not ask to see the distant scene. One step enough for me." One step successfully taken guides us to the next. If, on the other hand, we wish to see the whole way before we launch on it, it is not unlikely, as seems to be the case with Sri Aurobindo, that we shall never reach our goal. Sri Aurobindo himself in his younger days detested running away from life and indulging in solitary meditation. He preached a dynamic gospel of active service of fellow-men. And yet his own life has been that of a recluse.

Thought and quiet we certainly need, as against the modern tendency to rush madly into action, but not thought entirely divorced from action. Sri Aurobindo also, it is true, meant his thought to be but a preparation for action, a laying of the foundation for the edifice of action he hoped to build. That no one can quarrel with. But of what use is it to lay the foundation so deep and strong that there is no time to build on it? The foundation surely is not an end in itself. When then is the action to come? Yes, when? What has Sri Aurobindo achieved for his

fellow-men in the realm of practical life? The wolves are devouring the sheep; can the shepherd still say, Tarry yet a while? The crying need is for a prophet who, fighting against all obstacles, will lead his people into the Promised Land, not one who will merely sit on the mountain top and enjoy a distant view of it. No doubt Sri Aurobindo knows what he is about and believes that he is doing the very best possible. Nevertheless ordinary men who are eager for results in the world of affairs cannot be blamed if they are a little impatient with his all-too-great absorption in solitary thought. Thought is all right in its place. But too much of it is paralysing. Hence it is perhaps that no movement, not one, for improving the lot of men or for national regeneration, has gone forth from Pondicherry.

Prolific in literary output, but barren of practical service, Pondicherry, the home of Sri Aurobindo's Ashram, seems much like a fig-tree which is covered with an over-abundance of leaves but which bears no fruit. Even if we exempt Sri Aurobindo himself, because of his age, from the test, it is only when the members of the Pondicherry Ashram go out into the world to inaugurate a new era among men that we shall be in a position to assess the true worth of Sri Aurobindo's life and teachings. For by their fruits we shall know them. But so far there is no sign of any such eventuality. Nor can we expect it when the Master himself has not given the lead.

The author has done his task well. He writes with clarity and distinction, touches on all aspects of his subject, and holds the interest of the reader throughout. The book is well worth reading both for its matter and for its manner. It contains a few pictures of Sri Aurobindo and the Pondicherry Ashram. The printing and the get-up leave nothing to be desired.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

CONSCIOUSNESS *

This book, originally written by Mr. Saksena as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of London, is a competent and comprehensive survey of the entire field. He has raised many important issues which are discussed in Indian Philosophy and he has kept the book free from confusion with Western thought. The whole atmosphere of the book is Indian. It is only in the last chapter, where he has summarised his views, that he has very briefly contrasted Indian with European thought on the subject. This chapter is in a way the best chapter of the book. It is more direct; and it does not, like the other chapters, lead us through a catalogue of views of different authors and different schools. This appears to us to be a defect of the book. In the effort to make the treatment exhaustive, the another has failed to keep up interest in his presentation. Most of the discussions will be readily intelligible only to those who have already first-hand acquaintance with

* *Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy*. By S. K. SAKSENA. (Nand Kishore and Brothers, Benares. Rs. 7/8)

the originals, and not to outsiders who make their first acquaintance with the subject in this book. Some of the forms of expression too are unusual, if not also, as it appears to us, inaccurate. There is a good deal of overlapping of ideas in the different chapters, and the general presentation leaves much room for improvement.

The author is quite faithful in his exposition of the views of different philosophers, and his evaluation of those views is in general correct, almost orthodox. His stand-point is that of the monistic system of Advaitism. But some of his views in this connection will not be acceptable, as it seems to us, to those who have made a special study of that system. His notion of the self-revealing character of consciousness or "*svaprakāśatva*" is not quite correct. He thinks that "all cognitions are self-cognised as soon as and when they arise." Again he says, "To be self-revealed is not at all to be revealed as an object,...but is an action by itself and unique." This view will not be generally endorsed. The author confuses, time and again, the notion of "*aparokṣa*" or immediate intuition with the notion of "*svaprakāśa.*" He says, "Self-luminosity of consciousness means immediacy of consciousness." Again, "The absolute consciousness is immediately intuited because it is self-luminous. It is called '*Brahmānubhava.*'"

The author thinks that transcendental consciousness cannot be known directly, but only through the method of *adhyaropa* or false superimposition. This is not correct. False superimposition is not a method of knowledge. It is just a fact, the fact of ignorance and error, that has veiled the truth from us. This error can only be dissipated through discrimination or "*neti, neti,*" which thus alone can lead us to the knowledge of the truth.

Mr. Saksena is vacillating and uncertain about the philosophic strength of the Advaitic position which he generally seeks to defend. The principle of Maya, according to him, is "just either a convenience of absolutism, or an indication only of the unsatisfactoriness of the dualistic hypothesis."

> Avidya does not solve the difficulty, strongly suggesting that the difficulty is logically insoluble, and is a necessary feature of the limitation and the finitude of our minds.

If this is true, and we have recourse finally to the limitation of our understanding, then any system is as good as any other, provided it is internally self-consistent. If the riddle remains essentially insoluble, and merely changes its form, we are left with the irrational statements of different system-builders and their claims to mystic intuition. This, in our opinion, is a misunderstanding of the true Advaitic position, and of the fundamental notion of Maya. Maya is not a name for an insoluble and ultimate mystery, but for the complete solution of that mystery. The author, in his concluding remarks, lays emphasis upon "*sādhana*" or some kind of spiritual discipline, and considers intellectual grasp of reality as merely a stepping-stone to it. In our opinion, it is just the other way. The thinking process, with a view to the knowledge of Brahman, begins when the *sādhana* or the purification of the mind has ended. The intellect is our only means of knowledge, and when it has reached the truth, it has become intuitive.

The concept of consciousness is the central concept of Indian thought, and Mr. Saksena has certainly done some useful spade-work in making available in English the views of different authors and different schools in a reasonably connected and readable form.

G. R. MALKANI

Folk-Tales of Mahakoshal. By VERRIER ELWIN. (Oxford University Press, Indian Branch, Bombay. Rs. 15/-)

The true significance of Verrier Elwin's works derives from the make-up of his own personality. He is a superb ethnologist, who has mastered the technique of the study of man as a social creature set in the ancient framework of his customs and traditions and environmental reactions. Verrier Elwin is as superb an artist, who understands man as an imaginative being, fetterless, beating illumined wings. Happily, the scientist in Elwin is never at cross-purposes with the visionary, for in the vase of his mind truth blends with beauty and beauty becomes one with truth. No wonder that he who has given us *The Agaria* has also created for us *Phulmat of the Hills*. An intense human sympathy lights up all his writing, and it is not hard to understand how, by virtue of this gift, he, a Westerner, could dedicate himself for over a decade to the backwaters of Indian life, gripped by an urge to learn, and no desire to teach and reform, missionary-fashion.

The present volume is the first of several which will assemble in English translation specimens of the type of literature that exists in the minds and on the lips of the aboriginal tribes of Middle India, having been handed on by word of mouth from generation to generation. These 150 tales of varied pattern, collected by Elwin during his long residence in the Maikal Hills and Bastar State and in the course of his lengthy tours in the wilder hills and forests, reveal the eternal story-teller in the dimly known Gond and Maria and Pradhan and many others, even though they are not always of autobiographical interest or interpretative value. In this collection they have been arranged in twenty-six separate groups, according to their dominant motifs, such as "The Quest for Love and Treasure," "Kings and Battles," "Domestic Tales," "Romantic Tales." The stories are delightful phantasy. Some are escapist. The English rendering is simple, clear, radiant. The translator has set himself the ideal of self-elimination, for thus alone could he be true to the original and avoid the pitfall of introducing new concepts and fancies unrelated to the thought of the people. "I have tried to treat all the stories as if I were translating poetry, that there should be no extra words, no fresh images, no alien ideas."

And he does not assign himself even for a moment the rôle of a heavy-browed censor and omit "the rough, coarse, indecent humour which so vividly characterises the speech and thought of the villager." A number of the stories will, in fact, startle all readers and shock many of them. The collection of folk-tales has long been regarded in India as a suitable pastime for the clergy and for English ladies. This has meant inevitably that the stories recorded are only those fit for clerical or lady-like ears. Many previous collectors of Indian folk-tales have admitted that they pruned off whatever seemed improper and objectionable and unfit for "ears polite." *Folk-Tales of Mahakoshal*, it must be stressed, records a lot of material that would be considered improper. It is no book for a prude.

Two features add greatly to the value of the work; an Introduction, outlining the history of the collection of Indian folklore; and a Bibliography, which, I believe, is the most comprehensive list of its kind.

BHABANI BHATTACHARYA

The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi. Compiled by R. K. PRABHU and U. R. RAO. (Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, Indian Branch, Bombay. Rs. 3/-)

When Gandhiji described his autobiography as the story of his experiments with truth he was not indulging in rhetoric. He was making a plain statement of fact. The title sums up his life and work. A pursuit of truth through life, a striving for perfection of moral conduct, more through living the life than through thinking or preaching about it, are basic facts which mark out both the goal and the striving. None who knows Gandhiji can doubt therefore that striving for moral perfection as pursuit of truth is not an intellectual process divorced from practice but that it is the more difficult process of slow inward realisation. Thus it is that truth to him is a matter not of intellectual acceptance but of inward proof and conviction. Again, truth to him is not a fixed but a dynamic and evolving concept which develops with enlarging mental and spiritual horizons. When his critics charge him with inconsistencies and evade understanding his life and work by conveniently regarding him as an enigma, they do not realise the wide-as-the-world foundation of his philosophy. By no means does he claim that he has realised the truth nor is he unaware of the limitations that beset the quest. It is this recognition which makes compromise the basic feature of his striving. Life has to be accepted but has to be boldly fought through towards the goal. In this Gandhiji represents the quintessence of Indian culture.

Prophets would not be prophets if they were not born in a world unprepared for their message. Gandhiji's non-violence, however much sneered at as an idealist's dream, has not merely the sanction of sages like Buddha and Christ but has the support of humanity's basic desire for peace. His non-violence is not a prescription for the times. It is a step in the spiritual progress of humanity. Its rejection is humanity's own death warrant. It removes the conflict from the physical to the spiritual plane.

It would be presumptuous to attempt summing up Gandhiji's teachings in a short review. Not even a book would be enough as the editors of this beautiful volume have rightly recognised. His writings on diverse subjects, here collated, cannot fail to inspire the conviction that his slightest utterance harks back to fundamentals of life's meaning and purpose. That probably is the first step in understanding the great man in our midst. The compilers have rendered a distinct service to the country and the world in placing in their hands what can appropriately be called a modern Upanishad.

V. M. I.

Mohammad and Teachings of Quran. By JOHN DAVENPORT, edited by MOHAMMAD AMIN. (Re. 1/8). *Some Moral and Religious Teachings of Al-Ghazzali.* By SYED NAWAB ALI. (Rs. 2/-) (Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore.)

Mohammad and Teachings of Quran is a handy abridgment by Mr. Mohammad Amin, in the author's own words, of the life of the Holy Prophet of Islam, written and published in 1869 by Mr. John Davenport, an English gentleman who later embraced Islam, and of his two other books, *Koran* and *The Beauties of the Koran.* (By-the-by, the name of the "abridger" on the jacket as author is misleading.) This work consists of four parts: a short, unvarnished sketch of the Prophet, the original writer's interpretation of the message of the *Quran* in the light of his own understanding, some salient extracts from that sacred book and a sheaf of opinions on the latter ranging from Napoleon Bonaparte's to that of George Bernard Shaw. (The last part was unnecessary, on the principle that "good wine needs no bush.") The beauty of the book, however, lies in its freedom from the fanatical frenzy of a new convert. As such, it has an appeal for followers of other faiths than Islam. Two of the Prophet's sayings may be quoted here as they are apposite for the times through which we are passing:—

> To God belongeth both the East and West, therefore whithersoever you turn yourselves to pray, there is God, for He is the omnipresent, the omniscient.
>
> The world is supported by four things only: the learning of the wise and justice of the great, the prayers of the good and the valour of the brave.

Al-Ghazzali, who lived in the eleventh century, did for a detailed exposition of the doctrines of Islam what Origen compassed in respect of Christianity. He found "in the moral and the religious experience, a more immediate avenue to real knowledge." He is credited with having written more than sixty books, of which three occupy till this day a high position: *Maqasid ul Falasafa* (Aim of the Philosophers), *Tahafat ul Falasafa* (Refutation of the Philosophers) and *Ihya-al-Ulum-id-Din* (Renovation of the Science of Religion). *Some Moral and Religious Teachings of Al-Ghazzali* is based mostly on the last of these, being made up of select passages pertaining to the Nature of Man, Human Freedom and Responsibility, Pride and Vanity, Friendship and Sincerity, the Nature of Love and Man's Highest Happiness, the Unity of God, Love of God and its Signs, and Joyous Submission to His Will. Towards the close there are a few extracts from his *Minhaj-ul-'Abidin* (The Path of the Devout).

In his analysis of the above attributes and accomplishments or aims of Man, Al-Ghazzali shows unmistakably his skill as a "physician of the heart." Hence it sounds as fresh as the survey of many a modern psychologist in the field of human behaviour. For example, here are seven causes of pride: (*a*) Knowledge, (*b*) devotion, (*c*) pedigree, (*d*) beauty, (*e*) strength, (*f*) wealth, and (*g*) kith and kin. His approach is always

> the lifting of the veil from before the eyes of the heart, so as to see the mysterious relation between man and his Maker and to be filled with a sense of awe and reverence in the presence of an omniscient holy Being who pervades the universe.

G. M.

Invisible Anatomy. By E. GRAHAM HOWE. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 10s. 6*d.*)

This is a curious book. Its author's purpose, it is clear, is to perform a service to the many (one in nine, according to a pre-war survey made by the Tavistock Clinic) who are sufferers from nervous instability or some type of that wide range of disorders rooted in emotional disturbance which are lumped together by medical psychology under the heading *Hysteria.*

Hysteria is a Protean disease; and this is a Protean book. Instead of doing as Freud (whom he does not altogether approve) did in his *Studies of Hysteria,* that is, present his clinical material in a straightforward manner, Dr. Howe has decided on a method which one feels can only have the result of wrapping up in mystical form what would be better said quite simply.

It is not possible to consider his treatment, with its references to rhythms and so forth and its strange and confusing diagrams, without thinking of how other medical writers have handled the same sort of material. For example, the late Dr. Stekel, who produced a whole series of books designed to help the sufferer from these emotional disorders and never with any resort to the strange word-conjuring which Dr. Howe employs.

Dr. Howe is best when presenting his case histories, because case histories are the stuff of life and consequently interesting. But here he has not very much to illuminate the reader's mind and, inevitably, one thinks of the sort of brilliant interpretation which the late Professor Adler was wont to make. (*Vide* his interpretation in the Case of Madame X.)

That the author has a rich personality and is imbued with a desire to help the many who suffer in these ways is clear; and this attractiveness comes to the reader through the curious presentation of his theme, one that will leave many a seeker after help and enlightenment in the dark as to the author's meaning.

One could wish that when next Dr. Howe sits down to write he would discard his Oriental flavouring, his trite diagrams, and come to the point with more directness. For his diagrams do not always illustrate his meaning or even fairly give pictorial presentation to the ideas it is their object to clarify.

The greatest essential truths of our psychic being are amenable to simple literary expression, indeed, clarity of statement provides for the writer who lapses into obscurity a test for the assessment of his ideas. Obscurity may be a cloak for the absence of lucid thinking.

After reading these pages it is not possible to put any label on this psychiatrist, and only inferentially can one form an opinion as to where he stands. He tells us he goes some part only of the way with Freud. It would be interesting to know in whose company he does travel. Or does he travel alone? Or is his a psychological Coat of Many Colours?

A curious book, marred, for all the author's basic humanity, by a quite unnecessary obscurity of presentation.

GEORGE GODWIN

Some Problems of Historical Linguistics in Indo-Aryan. By S. M. KATRE. (The University of Bombay. Rs. 2/4)

This book comprises the Wilson Philological Lectures delivered by Dr. Katre during 1940-41 under the auspices of the University of Bombay. The lecturer has selected the topics of the verbal bases and the nominal stem-formation in Indo-Aryan for specific treatment. To the former he has devoted two of his six lectures and in justification of his choice of subject the lecturer states that "...these (verbal bases) alone provide for us today well-assembled and properly sifted material for a historical approach to linguistics. " By discussing the subject of nominal stem-formation in a scientific manner Dr. Katre has rendered valuable service to its study, for this subject had not been given due attention by scholars previously.

In his introductory lecture Dr. Katre emphasizes the necessity of studying Linguistics in its historical aspect. The importance of this fresh approach has been ably demonstrated by the learned lecturer with the help of some concrete examples. Thus he rightly rejects the derivation suggested by Paul Thieme of Sk. pūjā-<*pṛñcā—, since it presupposes certain phonetic changes which are far ahead of time and thus militate against the principles of Historical Linguistics.

In the concluding lecture we are introduced by Dr. Katre to the study of a novel branch of Linguistics which he styles " Synonymics. " This science —which will unfold to us, when properly studied, the development of vocabulary, the geographical and temporal currency of a given word and the changes introduced in its significance—is of singular importance to India where the current languages have been deeply affected by mutual borrowings.

In giving expression to his desiderata Dr. Katre has pointed out the necessity of bringing out various types of critical publications and it is to be hoped that competent scholars and Institutions will pay serious attention to the fulfilling of this need, for the lack of such works constitutes the difficulties which the lecturer himself must have felt in the pursuit of his research.

M. A. MEHENDALE

Song of the Gipsymaiden. Translated by MANJERI S. ISVARAN. (Shakti Karyalayam, Madras. Re. 1/-)

The lady and the Gipsy maiden of this old Tamil song here rendered sensitively into English are symbols. Who else could be the nameless visitor, ageless and deathless, from the Land of No Desires, " remote to the vision of the disputing dualists, " but " the imperishable essence of the Mind "—the ray of the eternal Divine? And who else could be the lady but the spirit of human hope and faith, willing and aspiring? Of the Unmanifested One and the manifested many the Gipsy maiden sings with a simplicity that is characteristic of India's literature of the unlettered, which frequently conceals behind a thin veil of allegory or symbolism an understanding often lost to the educated in their traffic in sophisticated phrases.

V. M. I.

CORRESPONDENCE

CHILDREN'S "HOMES"

All who have the well-being of children at heart, all who truly desire to improve the condition of these boys and girls in Homes, Institutions, Residential Homes etc., should read Lady Allen of Hurtwood's *Whose Children?* recently published at 1s. by Simpkin Marshall, Ltd., London, and then...see what steps can be taken to remedy the evil.

I have had personally some experience of these homes, and can vouch for the truth of such statements as the following:—

1. ...children under five years who are kept sitting still in rows. They have nothing to handle and there is no conversation.... The Matron has said "We like them to be quiet."

2. ...going for walks in outsize prams with the toddlers running alongside. *They were the most dismal and backward set of infants I have ever seen.* They wailed, and never smiled, or showed interest in anything. Their noses ran, and they were fat and lethargic. They compared very unfavourably with the children of a *very* poor family I also used to visit, who were cold, dirty, and undernourished, but whose feckless parents were fond of each other and their ever increasing litter. *Those* children were thoroughly alive and friendly and interested....

3. In a Home for children of three years not one of the children could talk. The matron said "They do not need to talk, everything is done for them."

4. It was a common thing for boys to be dressed in girls' knickers when they wet their beds.

5. At bath time the children were treated like so many little bundles—scrubbed thoroughly in water and handed over to be dried by a second person, then over to a third and so to bed....It is impossible for a child to have any sustained attention or conversation, let alone affection, from the grown-up.

6. ...when I approached a child to adjust hair or collar, the child raised his arms over his face and crouched as if expecting a blow.

Lady Allen's survey covers children in Homes, Institutions, and Residential Schools. All of it makes tragic reading. The evil has been shown, and now it requires men and women of courage and vision to supply the remedy and effect the cure.

The great difficulty will be to overcome official smugness, self-complacency, inertia and red tape. The larger the administrative body the more self-deluded it appears to be. It looks at costly buildings, good food, adequate clothes, and fails to see the soul-rot underneath.

We would urge all to read this short but poignant pamphlet, and having read...to ACT.

C. B.

[The brochure of which our correspondent writes above should give the Indian enthusiasts for Western models in the social service field, as in every other, much food for thought. It may be freely granted that not every children's institution in the West can possibly deserve the condemnation so richly merited by those to which the *critiques* quoted from that booklet apply. The fact remains, however, that even an ideal Home with a capital "H" can never take the place in a child's life of the warm sympathy and

human interest provided even by a home far from ideal. The Western craze for "efficiency" overreaches itself when division of labour is carried to the fantastic length of having a poor human mite scrubbed by one attendant, rubbed down by another and bundled off to bed by a third! Human beings are individuals and to treat children as one would parts in an assembling plant is an affront to human dignity. Under such treatment and without the individual affection which children need as flowers need the sun, how expect that they will develop normally?

The best social workers in the modern West do have the ideal of individual attention—in children's institutions of the cottage type—though by "hireling shepherds." But organised charity at its best can never obviate the need for genuine neighbourly sympathy and help—for personal interest in the welfare of those who suffer and efforts to relieve that suffering.

India has been an apt pupil. We doubt if anything in the West can excel in physical bleakness some of the children's Homes already instituted here by well-intentioned individuals. The child waifs must be rescued from the streets, but Homes on the Western model are not the solution. The findings of Lady Allen of Hurtwood deserve earnest consideration by Indian social workers and by all concerned with children's welfare.—ED.]

HISTORY

The responsibility of those who write and teach history is a corollary to the value of historical studies which is brought out in the English *Historical Association Publication No. 131*. Thucydides observed over two millenniums ago that history repeats itself; a knowledge of the course of past events can help in the solution of present problems. The sense of a continuing pattern, of "a vision of mankind on the march," to which Mr. D. C. Somervell points in this brochure, is another of the great gifts of history. Another still is the inspiration value of great lives, barely mentioned in this symposium, not surprisingly, because our historians in general seem to attach less weight to the examples of the truly great than to the conquests of an Alexander or a Napoleon.

"Wars Are Won in History Books" proclaims Prof. Henry Steel Commager of Columbia University in *Magazine Digest* for December 1944. They are also made there, largely, and sometimes lost there too. For history can be abused for nursing ancient grudges, whether the factual record is accurate or not. There can be no doubt of the historian's need for accuracy. But even true statements can be wrongly used. Old wrongs may have to be recorded if the truth be told, but the tone of the account and its treatment in the class room may determine its effect. We need to recognise our own shortcomings as nations or as men and to dwell more on the redeeming features of those who have sinned against us, whether in our fancy or in reality. The hereditary feud is only the more foolish and potentially disastrous for being on the international scale; and brooding over grievances is no less dangerous to mental health for nations than for individuals.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"____________ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

In ancient days, when spiritual vision penetrated beneath the shell of matter to its living soul, the preoccupation of our great ancestors with cosmic ultimates did not make for inability to cope with practical affairs. This is witnessed by the socio-economic system that has survived, unaffected by dynastic change, through millenniums, while civilisations all around this country rose and fell. It is witnessed also by the triumphs in architecture, in engineering and in art that have come down to us. But underlying these, sustaining them, has ever lain the synthesising genius of the philosophy that has come down to us undimmed.

And India does not lack among her living sons those capable of handing on the torch. Among the modern Indians who have followed the traditional Indian bent to metaphysics, none is more justly distinguished for clear and cogent thinking than Prof. M. Hiriyanna of Mysore. Some of his most striking work has been in the form of essays, several of which, in addition to thoughtful review articles, he has contributed to THE ARYAN PATH. Outstanding among them are "Types of Indian Thought" (September 1934), "Karma and Free-Will" (January 1935) and "Art Experience" (January 1941).

Professor Hiriyanna's *chef d'œuvre, Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, was hailed by the late Max Plowman, who reviewed it in our pages in April 1933, as "a work of humane learning and religious insight." Reflection on India's "age-long record of spiritual achievement" won from him the tribute with which he closed that review article, that "it is India's highest title to the world's regard today that she is still the living witness to the inalienable unity of philosophy and religion."

Professor Hiriyanna was recently named Chairman of the Research Committee of the new Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute at Madras. We are gratified to learn also of the move to honour him with a Presentation Volume, for which several scholarly papers have already been contributed. Sir S. Radhakrishnan, a fellow savant of distinction, heads the Committee, which has our cordial good wishes for its highly commendable project.

Few of our living scholars have made a more constructive contribution to the appreciation of India's past culture than has the widely known Professor Radha Kumud Mookerji, who for over twenty years has headed the Department of History of the Lucknow University. Dr. Mookerji is the author of many books, classics in their field, which deal with both the secular and the intellectual activities of ancient India.

Not the least of his well-authenticated claims for credit too long withheld from our great ancestors, concerns the democratic ideal, that proud crown-

jewel of the modern age. He has claimed—and proved from the *Rig-Veda* itself,—oldest of all known records—that the entire ancient polity was consistently in terms of definite democratic ideals, from the self-governing village communities, which have for ages constituted the backbone of Indian culture, up to the checks which the concept of Dharma placed upon the King's authority.

The sumptuous 500-page first part of the Presentation Volume, *Bharata-Kaumudi*, (The Indian Press, Allahabad), Studies in Indology in Dr. Mookerji's honour, and the recent institution at the Lucknow University of a Lectureship in his name prove that the sentiment of gratitude for scholarly achievement is not among the vices of our modern India.

Shri J. C. Kumarappa writes in the opening (April-June) issue of *India and World Affairs* (Calcutta) on the importance of the village in the country's economic structure. He brings out that modern planning, product-based, accepting money, not as means, but as an end, jettisons human and ethical values which the earlier indigenous economic system safeguarded.

Directly or indirectly, planning today is indeed inspired by the profit motive while the earlier rural economic system was basically functional. Society was divided into classes based upon certain social obligations whose discharge was compensated by satisfaction of economic needs. The village lived as one joint family where each member worked according to his ability and aptitude and received according to his needs. It was a compact economic unit whose functional social planning guaranteed real enjoyment of much more than the four freedoms. Indian rural economy, reared on cultural values, on co-operation in every branch of activity, made for plain living and high thinking.

Production-centred planning, as Shri Kumarappa makes plain, aims at stimulation of artificial demand and a false higher standard of living without reference to basic values governing peaceful life. Shri Kumarappa enunciates a basic truth that must underlie all social and economic planning when he says:—

> In the measure in which man departs from the ways of nature he generates violence. Education of the young must be calculated to teach them this need for our conforming with nature.

It must bring out the best in them and allot them a function which will serve nature. They must be taught through crafts and activities which will bring them into direct contact with the Great Mother.

That no workable economic plan for India can leave the lakhs of villages out of the picture goes without saying. Shri Kumarappa insists on making the villages the centre of the plan, with large-scale industries operating only to supplement the artisan's work. Is it not worth attempting, as he urges, to resuscitate the villages, to revitalise their old systems, which ensured not only economic stability but also social peace and well-being?

"The Battle of the Educators" in the U. S. A. is vividly reported in *The Saturday Review of Literature* for 3rd February by President Harry D. Gideonse of Brooklyn College. The traditionalists insist that the best that has been thought and written (in Judæa

and the West) must form the core of education. The progressives put the emphasis on subjects that they claim can best relate the student to the modern world. It is encouraging that the need for clarifying educational objectives is felt and that these include :—

> To use intelligently and with a sense of workmanship some of the principal tools and techniques of the arts and sciences.
>
> To live with others, with imaginative sympathy and understanding and to work with them co-operatively and justly.

We share President Gideonse's relief that the academic nihilists, who were extolling power above moral values in pre-war pronouncements, write thus no more. He defends education against the indictment of Walter Lippmann, who has traced the moral callousness and derelictions of our times to " an academic system in which the study of moral wisdom has been abandoned. " Education truly cannot be held solely responsible for the present moral chaos, but President Gideonse agrees that more than an intellectual education is necessary.

> To know *in general* is as easy as Aristotle indicated ; but to know the *when*, the *wherefore*, the *whereunto*, and the *how much*—this, as Aristotle concluded, is the final test of a wise man.

We cannot meet the challenge of the post-war years with " an empty shell of democratic verbiage that covers a moral vacuum. "

Mr. Henry Seidel Canby suggests editorially, commenting on President Gideonse's article in the following issue of *The Saturday Review of Literature*, that the controversy is one of procedures rather than of theories. All, he believes, will agree that the cultural inheritance must be perpetuated and that " this core of inherited beauty and wisdom " must be vitally related to the " environmental climate of the modern age. " He points, however, to the difficulty in getting teachers " of such calibre that a core education is really taught...fully developed and fully educated men and women with a capacity for leadership. "

" Menander's Mirror " also has some reflections on " Master and Pupil " in *The Times Literary Supplement* of 31st March. A real schoolmaster is "teaching people to think for themselves and to express themselves," caring more for " education, in the word's true and individualistic sense, than for instruction. " He stands before a class but his concern must be " with the private mind; he must uncover the explosive mixture and drop his spark into it. "

All that is best in the system of the great English universities, it declares, springs from the " faculty of looking always ' inside the pupil himself, ' of drawing him out, of enabling his particular talent and so, in the true sense, of educating him." This is harder for humbler schoolmasters to practise. Hindering factors named are large classes, " the habit of adjusting the speed of the convoy to that of the slowest ship " and " the bleak pressure of utilitarianism." Regimentation is another, including compulsory games.

True education so defined will, it believes, be harder still in the future, and even in the universities themselves. We must, it warns, combat those tendencies that threaten in the coming world to " raise up between master and pupil barriers that neither has the spirit to penetrate. "