



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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RELIGIONS AND RELIGION

In this issue we print a provocative article by an eminent Indian nationalist who is also a liberal-minded Christian. Dr. Bharatan Kumarappa writes on the defects of Christian missions and missionaries in India, and suggests certain reforms with a view to making their work useful. It might be pointed out that what is said about Christian missions and missionaries equally applies to all agencies and agents of every proselytising creed. Again, the weaknesses and claims of nonproselytising creeds such as Brahmanism or Zoroastrianism are as baneful, howsoever different they may be in their effects on the moral and social order in India.

The article does not raise what appears to us to be a fundamental question:—

Is there a necessity for any organized separative religion to persist as a competitor of other creeds in any part of the globe?

We hold the view that Religion is necessary for the well-being of man. Religion illumines the mind, unfolds intuition, and unites man to man. But this cannot be said of any organized religion, which, whatever its name, narrows the mind, engenders blind belief and fanaticism and divides man from man. Once an Adept spoke of the churches as anti-Christ and the same may be said of every organized religion. Because of the evils of the latter, Religion has come to be regarded—and not only in Soviet Russia—as an opiate. We are not overlooking the fact that the Soviet authorities primarily "took up the fight against religion as an integral part of the economic liberation of the working classes."

In sober truth, one of the pressing needs, perhaps the most pressing need of our civilization is Religion. Not a new religion; the world has been hitherto sufficiently cursed

with the intellectual extinguishers known as dogmatic creeds. What is needed to-day is freedom from the extremes—atheism is one, sacerdotalism is the other. Masses cannot be freed from the grip of these two monsters but a large number of individuals can free themselves.

To-day the individual needs the aid of some living power, some energy which would enable him to drive the engine of existence without injury to himself and to others and through it gather the experience which would not only sustain his whole being but unfold it to its full capacity. The True Religion alone can provide that power. The human individual suffers from his attempt to follow two religions—one, the creed into which he is born and bred or into which he has been converted and second, the impulses and the principles, good and bad, which he follows mostly unconsciously and which form his real inner religion. The result is compromise at every turn—between the sacred and the secular, between the urge of the flesh and the voice of conscience, between belief and reason, between concrete thoughts and vague intuitions, between personal affections and altruistic aspirations. The pressing need of the individual is a philosophy of conduct and of action which would reduce this conflict to the min-

imum, and bring about an integration in himself.

The occidental as well as the oriental needs this integrating influence of true Religion. Therefore to try to buttress the tottering churches and temples is not rendering real service to our civilization. That which is true in the outworn creeds is crushed by the debris of rites and ceremonies, of blind belief and exclusive claims; the priest has elbowed out the prophet and the latter is allowed by the former only to enchant the worshipper from a long distance. As the magic, used to invoke the sages, is that of the priest, no response comes. No, the old creeds should be allowed to die their natural deaths. An attempt should be made to present the soul-satisfying philosophy of the old Sages. That religious philosophy or philosophical religion offers a way of life for the intelligent man and woman of to-day. Its fundamental principles can well form the basis of action and conduct and these may be tabulated simply thus:—

- I Everything existing exists from natural causes.
- II Virtue brings its own reward, and vice and sin their own punishment.
- III The state of man in this world is probationary.

THE ÆSTHETIC OBJECT AND THE ÆSTHETIC EMOTION

[C. E. M. Joad's philosophical thinking is leading him to appreciate more and more the Indian point of view on many subjects. The following article is an example. —EDS.]

In October 1933 there appeared in THE ARYAN PATH an article of great interest by Venkata Rao, describing some of the contributions made by Indian philosophers to the theory of Æsthetics. The article, which is mainly devoted to the views of Anandavardhana and his commentator Abhinavagupta, was disconcerting to the European reader by reason of its demonstration of the extent to which views which are fondly supposed to have originated in the West have been anticipated by the thought of Indian philosophers. The general psychology of emotion popularised by McDougall, the theory of the nature of the poetic emotion sponsored by Matthew Arnold, and the account of the æsthetic emotion which appears in the work of Ogden and Richards are definitely foreshadowed by these thinkers, whose philosophy is almost completely unknown in the West. It is however, the account of Rasa, the æsthetic experience itself, which I found most illuminating, and which I propose to develop in this article in the light of the theory of Æsthetics which I have derived mainly from Plato.

The æsthetic experience, Mr. Rao points out, is wholly *sui generis*. This is not to imply that it is not distinguished by certain

recognizable characteristics. It is, for example, disinterested, in the sense that it is not concerned with our personal advantage; it is detached, in the sense that it is unrelated to and cannot be resolved into the emotions aroused by life; and it is transcendental in the sense that it is felt, for something which transcends the world in which we pass our every-day life, and which I should call "reality," using the word in a sense to be defined below. Æsthetic experience is also an end in itself:—"It is not" says Mr. Rao "a means to anything else. It is a form of creative joy characterized by complete forgetfulness of self and absorption in what Abercrombie calls 'pure experience'".

It is also, I should like to add, persistent in its effects. By this I mean that, whereas most of our pleasures arise out of the satisfaction of need, with the consequence that, when the need is satisfied, the pleasure fades and the organism returns to normal, that is to say, to the state which preceded the need and the pleasure of its satisfaction, the pleasure of æsthetic experience confers a permanent enrichment upon the whole being. We are literally different beings after the experience of listening to great music greatly performed—different and richer. Nor does the

difference fade. The experience leaves its hall-mark upon our being, with the result that we bring to our next hearing of music a sensibility which is finer and more receptive.

This, I take it, is part of what Plato meant when he included æsthetic experience in his category of "pure pleasures". Most pleasures, Plato pointed out, are relative to and dependent upon a preceding state of need or want. Needing or wanting is painful, and the mere fact of the cessation of the pain brings pleasure. Thus the pleasure of the convalescent recovering from an illness is dependent upon and conditioned by the illness which preceded it; and, since the occurrence of the pleasure is actually dependent upon and conditioned by the pain upon which it has supervened, it is an impure pleasure in the sense that it is infected with that upon which it depends and with which it is inseparably bound up. But there are certain pleasures which are not dependent upon need or want, and which do not arise from the satisfaction of desire. Our pleasures in a spring morning, in the feel of cool water upon the heated skin, in the acquisition of knowledge, or in the exploration of nature are of this type. They are not dependent upon the pain of want or upon the solicitations of desire. Plato, therefore, called them "pure," since they contain no admixture of pain to mar their enjoyment. Now æsthetic pleasure

is pre-eminently of this type.

There is one other psychological characteristic of æsthetic experience which is implied rather than directly stated in the work of the two Indian philosophers to which I have referred.

Æsthetic experience involves a fusion of a number of different faculties, a fusion which I should say, is an integration of the personality at a new level of consciousness. It is, alas, true of most of us that in normal experience we are bundles of different faculties and desires rather than completely integrated persons; faculties which are at war, desires which conflict. We desire something, let us say, of which the moral sense disapproves, representing the desire as a temptation to which it would be wrong to yield. The intellect, moreover, has calculated the consequences of indulging the desire in terms of pleasure and of risk, and concluded that the risk is too great to justify the pleasure. But the soul contains what Plato calls a "spirited element" which cries shame at the poltroonery of the intellect. "You can only be young once," says spirit.* "Take your pleasures while you can and face their consequences." Thus intellect and morality are found in alliance against spirit and desire.

This, no doubt, is an extreme case. Nevertheless, self-division and self-conflict are the normal experiences of the average human being. Hence the importance of æsthetic emotion in lifting us tem-

* I am using the word spirit in Plato's rather technical sense for the spirited element in the soul.

porarily out of the selfish little pit of vanity and desire which is the everyday self. As Venkata Rao puts it in the article—

We are lifted out of ourselves into a serene world. The cycle of ignorance, self-interest and activity in which our ordinary life is lived is broken into for the time being, and we are introduced into a *unique form* of experience different from the usual.

But to describe the æsthetic experience is not enough. We want to know what causes it. "Emotion" as Mr. Rao points out "is only the stuff or material of art. For, all expression of feeling is not art." For my part I should go further and insist that since all feelings are felt for something, since all emotions are aroused by something, and since, further, we have agreed that the feeling and the emotion which we call æsthetic are unique, what arouses the feeling and evokes the emotion must itself be unique. And so it is, for in admitting that æsthetic emotion is transcendental have we not agreed that its object is nothing less than reality itself? But the phrase "reality itself," while it may denote the ultimate object of æsthetic experience, is too vague and lacking in content to throw light upon the immediate æsthetic problem which is, broadly, why it is that certain forms, colours and sounds when arranged and combined in certain ways move us profoundly, and move us in the peculiar manner which Mr. Rao and I have described, while a different arrangement of the same colours, forms and sounds moves us not at all? Why, for example, can the

simple statement of the theme of a Bach Fugue thrill us to ecstasy, while the notes which constitute the theme when played at random, or, it may be, in the reverse order, succeed in producing only dissonance or dullness? If I may venture a criticism, it is in its treatment of this problem that I find Indian æsthetic theory, so far as it is summarized in Mr. Rao's article, defective, for, broadly speaking, the treatment is non-existent. Rich in its analysis of the æsthetic experience Indian philosophy seems to tell us very little about the æsthetic object. As so often, it strikes the Western reader as unduly subjective in its treatment. Preoccupied with the soul, it overlooks the world.

Yet, clearly, it is not any and every object that causes us to feel æsthetic pleasure. I doubt, for example, whether æsthetic emotion has ever been aroused in anybody by the window strap in a railway carriage. It is only *objects belonging to a certain class* which are normally regarded as the appropriate objects of æsthetic value. These objects are, therefore, distinguished by a certain property, the property, namely, of being able—able, presumably, under certain conditions—to produce a peculiar emotion in the mind of a trained and adult person when it is brought in contact with them. Now, this property cannot thus belong to æsthetic experience since it is its cause, nor is it a property of the relation between the experiencing mind and the object, since it is only because the property charact-

erizes the object that the relation comes to be. It must, then it is clear, belong to the object itself. What account, then, are we to give of it?

Plato's view, broadly, was that behind the world of sensible things, imperfectly manifested by them, and overlaid and distorted by the sensuous material in which it appears, lies the world of "pure Form". This world he called "the world of reality," since it was endowed with perfect and immutable being, while the world of which our senses make us aware, he called the world of "becoming" which since it is imperfect and continuously changing owns a reality of a different and inferior order. The relation between the two worlds is not described by Plato as satisfactorily as one could wish. Sometimes Plato speaks of it as one of "participation"; "sensible things" he says "participate" in the Forms. Sometimes as one of imitation; the sensible objects copy or imitate or approximate to the Forms, as closely as the sensuous material of which they are compared permits. In general, however, Plato thinks of the world of Form as the cause of the existence of the world of sensible things, and as conferring upon them such qualities as they are perceived to possess.

The artist (for the sake of simplicity, I am confining what follows primarily to the graphic arts, that is to say to the work of the painter and the sculptor) is one who, in virtue of his capacity for vision, is able to disentangle the element of Form which is also the element of

reality from the sensuous material in which it is overlaid, but in which it is, nevertheless, latent. By virtue of his craft he then embodies in the work of art that element of Form which his vision has discerned in natural objects: embodies and emphasizes. The function of the artist is, therefore, less that of the creator than of the discoverer and the midwife; the discoverer, since he discovers something which the duller vision of the ordinary man misses; the midwife, since he brings it to birth by embodying it in his work. The function of the work of art is to throw up into high relief the Form which is latent in sensible objects, so that those of us who are not gifted with the artist's vision can see in his rich art those combinations of significant Forms which he has first discerned in natural objects.

Thus the peculiar characteristic of æsthetic objects is their embodiment in pre-eminent and pre-eminently visible degree of that element of reality which underlies and informs the sensible world; and they do this by reason of the artist's skill which enables him to drag the element of Form from the setting in which it is normally embodied . . . obscured, and to throw it into relief in combinations of paint or stone or sound.

It is because of the element of reality which it embodies that art is said to be "eternal." The Form of artistic expression changes from age to age, but the feelings that great art awakens are the same in every age. The Forms of art are inexhaustible, but they all

lead along the same road of æsthetic emotion to the contemplation of the same ultimate reality. It is for this reason, too, that the historical approach to art with its controversies over the sources of the work of particular artists and their influence on their successors is irrelevant to æsthetic appreciation, and that it is not necessary to know how, when, or by whom a work of art was created, in order that the vision of the reality which it imperfectly reveals may be enjoyed. Art, on this view, is a window through which we gaze upon reality; the panes vary from age to age and sometimes they are bright and sometimes dim, but the view which they offer is eternally the same.

And since art enables us to glimpse a reality which lies outside the realm of which we are normally aware, the emotions which it arouses are not of this world. Æsthetic emotion belongs to a world of its own, and is both unanalysable and unique. It is for this reason that we speak of the quality of remoteness in art. Æsthetic emotion is emotion felt not for this world but for reality, and for so long as the vision which it vouchsafes endures, we are shut off from interests which this world begets. Our anticipations and regrets, our hopes and fears, are alike arrested. It is as if we were enabled for the moment to escape from the stream of life and, forgetful of the turmoil of want and desire, of striving and seeking which makes up our daily experience, to be at peace upon the banks.

Some have held that the æsthetic emotion which we obtain from works of art is an emotion of the same kind as that felt by the mystic, and for the reason that it is felt for the same object. But, while the mystic's vision of reality is direct and is achieved by the contemplation of the mind without the aid of the senses, the artist's is indirect, since he uses, and uses of necessity, sensuous objects as a medium in which reality is seen and through which it is approached. The mystic's vision, moreover, is continuous and prolonged; the artist's is tantalisingly brief. Thus æsthetic emotion is at once the most satisfying and the most unsatisfying of all the emotions known to us; satisfying because of what it gives, unsatisfying because it gives so briefly, and, in the act of giving, hints at greater gifts withheld. Two points must be added in order fully to bring out the comparison between these views and those summarised by Mr. Rao. First, there is no suggestion in Plato that either the creator or the appreciator becomes one with the reality he apprehends.

In the æsthetic process the relation of the mind to its object remains one of contemplation. The artist discerns reality and assists us by embodying his vision in a work of art to discern it too, but the relation of knower and known is never transcended. In no sense, when I am appreciating a Bach Fugue do I become it. I do not even, except in a very metaphorical sense, enter into

communion with or lose myself in it. Æsthetic experience, in fact, and I think Plato is right in this, is felt for something which just because it is perfect cannot be human or akin to the human. Enjoying it we forget self, and admire something which is not only other than self but other than spirit. I doubt whether in the last resort the affirmation of the spiritual nature of all reality by Indian philosophy would permit this view.

Secondly, Plato in the Symposium makes specific mention of a form of Beauty which alone among the Forms can be apprehended in the sensible world as it really is. Art, on the view which I have suggested is a window through which man glimpses reality. But it is a window specially

directed upon that element of reality which is the form of beauty. Can Beauty be regarded as a separate and distinct element in the real? By Plato, yes, since except for an unrepresentative passage about the Form of the Good in the *Republic*, his reality is a pluralistic one. But given the Absolute Spirit which Indian philosophers affirm as the heart of the world, we are precluded from the acceptance of a reality which is an assemblage of separate reals? Hence, I doubt if Indian philosophy can legitimately speak of a Form of Beauty; it can only affirm that reality possesses an æsthetic or beautiful aspect. The issue here is that between a Monism or a Pluralism, and on this issue I must confess myself a Pluralist.

C. E. M. JOAD

[The above article was sent to Mr. M. A. Venkata Rao whose essay it discusses. While writing to us Mr. Venkata Rao points out that Indian æsthetics do not omit the treatment of the objective forms of beauty. In Hindu Music, the classification of Ragas provides a complete inventory of objective forms, in terms of Rasa; in painting and sculpture too, æsthetic objective forms have been recognized. In literature, "the problems of structure such as Exposition, Complication, Crisis, Resolution and Catastrophe, supposed to be the achievement of last century, are all set forth far more thoroughly in *Dhvanyaloka* by Anandavardhana."

Then, absorption or identification of the finite individual with the absolute Reality does not imply its extinction or annihilation. "Advaitin formulates his view of Moksha as a state of perfection which connotes the conservation of all that deserves to be conserved in the finite individuality." Plato's "Idea" is not a thing having value but value itself. In the view of Mr. Venkata Rao, Plato does not speak of the Absolute as *possessed of or having* the three forms of truth, beauty, or goodness but Plato's Absolute signifies the Fullness of Reality which reveals itself in the three supreme forms.—EDS.]

CHRISTIAN MISSIONS IN INDIA—A CRITICISM

[**Dr. Bharatan Kumarappa**, comes from a well-known Indian Christian family. He received the Bachelor of Divinity degree graduating from the Hartford Theological Seminary, U.S.A. While turning away from Christianity of the orthodox type, Dr. Kumarappa remains a liberal-minded follower of Jesus, and in this article gives his reactions to the work and policy of Christian missions in India.—EDS.]

Adverse criticism which does not proceed out of animosity but out of genuine concern for the subject criticised is really more helpful and constructive than mere praise. In fact, criticism by one who thinks highly of an institution, but who finds that it has either gone astray or fallen short of what is required of it, is a duty. It is in such a spirit that this article is written.

I conceive the aim of Christian missions in India to be the spreading of a knowledge of the teachings and life of Jesus, so that those who have not heard of him may be thus drawn to follow his example. The emphasis is certainly on conduct. What matters is not intellectual allegiance to a creed or formal membership in an organisation, but a change of heart, showing an uplift in conduct. Jesus himself said: "Not he that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father."

This being so, what kind of example did Jesus himself set for people to copy in practice? His whole ethic was summed up in "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul and with all thy might, and thy neighbour as thyself". His gospel was a simple one. It had nothing

to do with creed or dogma beyond the simple assertion that God was a Father, loving and holy, who expects love and holiness of His devotees. Jesus himself illustrated this by a life of loving communion with the Deity and a life of loving selfless service of humanity. This appears to form the core of Jesus's message. Christian missions have to be, and will be, judged accordingly.

Regarding communion with the Divine, it is obvious that Jesus regarded it as something inward and spontaneous. We do not hear much of this from him, as is only to be expected. But we find that when Jesus wanted specially to discover the will of his Father, it was either in a garden all by himself as in Gethsamane, or in the wilderness, or on a hill-top as in the Mount of Transfiguration. This would imply that for the communion of the soul with the Spirit, he felt that no formality was required—no priest, no church, no ceremony or ritual—only the soul face to face with the Deity. What light does this throw on the elaborate organisation of Christian missions, its priestcraft, its organised modes of Church worship, its ritual? All these are not really essential for the one who would

commune with the Deity. There is no gainsaying the fact that membership in a community of like-minded people has its use, but it is not essential and ought not to be required of those who would follow Jesus.

Therefore conversion, in the sense of becoming baptised and gaining admission into a Church, is unessential ; and yet, this is the main plank in the programme of Christian missions. It is thought by missionaries in general and their Home Boards abroad that mission work is to be gauged by the number of converts made. Educational and medical missionaries will protest against this and say that their work is educational or medical and not evangelistic. I am convinced that if they do not convert and baptise it is not because they think it is unnecessary, but because they find no one wishing to be converted. Conversion, in the sense of giving up one's former religion and becoming a member of a Church is a consummation devoutly to be wished by all missionaries. This has led to intolerance towards other religions; if you desire to make converts from another religion your attitude to it cannot be friendly. This will be stoutly denied by missionaries, but I am sure that if the sympathy and tolerance which is to-day adopted be genuine, their attitude toward other religions could not be to supplant them by their own faith, as is their aim, but rather to seek to influence them in such a way that these religions will undergo an inner revival and

transformation if they need to. What is above all necessary is not adherence to this religion or that, but the free and natural realisation by the human soul of the Infinite Spirit. If it is felt that a particular religion does not effect this, the truly friendly attitude will not be to get rid of it, which is what conversion necessarily implies, but to influence it by the free interchange of views resulting from real religious experience.

The principle Jesus laid down in regard to other faiths, if at all he was concerned with them, is the one which the modern missionary speaks most about but practises least. It is contained in Jesus's words "I am not come to destroy but to fulfil". The fulfilment of Hinduism must not be sought elsewhere than in a full development of all that is highest and best in Hinduism itself. If Christianity had anything to teach Hinduism, and I believe it has, the lessons of Christianity would have to be assimilated by Hinduism and incorporated into it. Only then can Christianity regard itself as not supplanting or destroying Hinduism but fulfilling it. Conversion which aims at supplanting Hinduism by Christianity is anything but a fulfilment of Hinduism. Strict conformity to the principle of Jesus, above cited, requires preaching the gospel to non-Christians with genuine love for the non-Christian faith, and therefore not with the intention of supplanting it. The missionary's task, if he feels he has found truths which do not exist for the non-Christian, should

be to influence these faiths in the light of these truths in order to reform them, not to supplant them.

If I have written at such length on conversion it is because conversion is the main plank in the programme of Christian missions. But the test of whether a religion has fulfilled the task of bringing the soul into direct communion with the Deity, such for example as Jesus experienced, should in the last analysis alone suffice to justify or condemn a religion. Is the Christian Deity so petty as to refuse communion with a soul unless it approaches Him in one and only one way, *viz.*, through Christianity? And this *a priori* argument is supported by abundant *a posteriori* evidence in the religious literature of India, where the Hindu saint experiences inexpressible bliss in mystic realisation of the Infinite. God-consciousness and God-intoxication such as we find in the Bhakti literature of Hinduism are hardly to be met with in the same degree elsewhere. And even on the intellectual and philosophical side, Indian religions have always acknowledged a series of *boddhisattvas* (enlightened ones), *siddhas* (those who have attained their quest), *jinās* (those who have conquered), *jivan-muktas* (those who have found freedom). If then we have such a cloud of witnesses who not only sought but *found* in non-Christian faiths the pearl of great price, for which they gave up their all, how can the Christian missionary think that for any non-Christian religion to fulfil its pur-

pose of leading the soul into communion with the Infinite, it is necessary for it to pass into Christianity? If it is replied that the Deity revealed Himself to all men prior to the time of Jesus, but after that time reveals Himself fully only in and through Jesus, and this is a line of thought not unknown in missionary circles, we can only answer that it is contradicted by the religious experience and lives of many non-Christians even at the present day. "By their fruits ye shall know them," said Jesus in regard to those who are his true followers, and it has been announced even from Christian pulpits that Gandhiji, a non-Christian, is the closest approximation in our own day to Christ. He leads a Christ-like life, fasts, prays and seeks guidance and support in all his great undertakings, and who will say that this is not religious experience? If one is so ungenerous as to say that in Gandhiji's case it is self-hypnotism, how can one at all prove that it is not self-hypnotism in the case of Christians also, and even in that of the Greatest Christian? In this, as in many other matters pertaining to religion, Christians might learn a little more tolerance than they have hitherto shown, and only when this happens will the gospel of Jesus attract non-Christians to the life and teachings of the Master instead of repelling them as it does when presented by the bigoted and the narrow-minded.

Jesus wandered from place to place carrying neither purse nor

scrip, and not knowing where to lay his head, preached and ministered to the needs of the people. This example is in accord with Indian religious traditions, and invariably the Indian mind looks for such absolute renunciation of wealth and comfort in one who aims to be a spiritual leader. In contrast to this, what does the non-Christian find in the homes of missionaries but luxury and comfort? The missionary's bungalow and the Collector's bungalow are the largest in most towns. The missionary and the Collector are usually in small towns the only two who possess cars. The missionary's drawing room with its carpets, sofas and cushions impress the visitor with pomp and grandeur, the liveried servants strike terror into him. The dining room with its exhibition of crockery, glassware and silver dazzle the eye; the bedroom with its softly matted cots, bedspreads, mosquito nets, wardrobe, mirror, dressing table and what not, does not bespeak one who does not know where to lay his head. The clothes of the missionary are as the Indian sees it the same as those of a British Collector; also he goes away to the hills for the summer, and once every few years to Europe or America. That being so, it is not surprising that the life of the missionary as seen by the Indian does not seem to him to speak of the lowly Nazarene. The missionary's service might be greatly appreciated but his religious influence will be practically nil; and if he has come to India on a religious mis-

sion, this is not a matter which he can treat lightly. It may be a hard saying that he must give up his all if he would follow Jesus. It may be easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle. But Jesus said: "He that taketh not his cross and followeth after me, is not worthy of me." To all this the answer will be that the missionary is used to a particular standard of life, and if he goes below a certain minimum his health and consequently his work will suffer. The argument is forceful so long as one is on a materialistic plane. But materialism in practice is not what one expects of a religious leader. Jesus said—

Take no thought for the morrow, what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink or wherewithal ye shall be clothed.... Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you".

If the missionary's religious influence on those around him is practically nil, may it not be because he has sought too much to save his life by guarding against discomfort and poor food? All this cold calculation about the minimum requirements for health and efficiency argue lack of a living faith in the programme of Jesus.

A missionary who preaches a gospel of love towards his fellow-men must not only practise it by sharing his goods with those around him, but also love and seek to promote, in so far as it is good, what the people hold most dear. What has moved us most deeply within the last few years as a nation is undoubtedly political

freedom. The average missionary's attitude to it has been one of apathy and indifference, if not one of open hostility. Missionaries sometimes outbeat British officials in their conservatism in political matters. Even if missionaries do not openly take sides with the people against the Government (for some of them have to undertake to refrain from all political activity), humanitarian considerations demand that in case of police excesses on a non-violent people, they should raise their voice in protest, not on political but on religious and moral grounds. When, on the other hand, one finds British and American missionaries British or Whites first and Christians next, one loses all faith in the genuineness of the religion they profess. Jesus's mission was primarily to the poor and the oppressed, but the missionary's sympathy appears to be with those who exercise authority. A religion which allies itself thus with the State, and especially a State which is at war with the people, will soon find that it has lost its soul and therefore its influence on the people. At any rate the aloofness and indifference of missionaries to the soul-stirring struggle of the nation for political freedom appear to the Indian to reveal a lack of real love for him.

Besides, the missionary in few cases makes himself one with the people amongst whom he works. He adheres to his own customs and modes of life, which estrange him from the people. For this rea-

son neither he nor the people feel at home or natural in the presence of each other. He hardly ever lives in an Indian home as a member of the family. The Indians are a hospitable people and would be glad to entertain him provided he would adapt himself to their way. They would even be willing to put themselves out for his sake to provide him with the conveniences he requires, but often their resources are limited and they are afraid he may be uncomfortable. His mode of life is thus an obstacle in the way of the Indian knowing the missionary and of the missionary knowing the Indian. And the result is that their relationship to each other is thoroughly artificial and affected. This is a serious matter which the missionary must ponder over and correct if he really wishes to exert religious influence over the people.

His adherence to his own mode of life has not only estranged him from the community he serves, but has also prevented him from partaking of Indian culture and civilisation and understanding it aright. The consequence of this has been that he has no real knowledge of, or genuine sympathy with, the culture of the people, and thus his influence has been decidedly detrimental to indigenous cultural development. He has superimposed on those on whom he has influence *viz.*, Indian Christians, his own culture, and has made of them a kind of hybrid community aping the customs and manners of the West and out of sympathy with the habits and traditions of their

own people. In this way he has not only cut himself off from real contact with non-Christians but also prevented Indian Christians from having any contact with them. And to-day when India is striving for unity, Indian Christians stand aloof as a separate community and even allow themselves to be classified with Europeans and Anglo-Indians. Can the missionary absolve himself of the responsibility of having set up this stumbling-block in the way of national progress?

In illustration of how the missionary's adherence to his own habits and culture prevent him from exerting any religious influence on non-Christians, I may point to Church-worship as at present carried on. The music is exotic and sounds strange to a non-Christian ear, and even when there is an attempt to have one or two items of Indian music, it is of a low order and causes nothing but a smile on the face of the non-Christian visitor. The clothes of the congregation range from European to Indian with all kinds of weird intermediate combinations. The walking into the Church with shoes not only by the missionary but also by the Indian Christians is revolt-

ing to the religious sense of the non-Christian. The furniture in the Church suggests to him a cinema or a theatre and not a place of worship. The result of the whole on the average non-Christian is that of a variety entertainment, and fails to stimulate in him the necessary religious response.

Similarly, in the moral realm, the missionary fails to realise how revolting meat-eating is to vegetarian Hindus. It appears to them as immoral and contrary to religion as cannibalism appears to the missionary. The height of irreligion is reached when the missionary eats not only meat but beef, the flesh of the Hindu sacred animal. The habit fills them with abhorrence.

If the Christian missionary would be successful he must have genuine sympathy with the people, their traditions and their culture. His mission cannot be other than the mission of Jesus, which was to fulfil, not to destroy; his one purpose, the purpose of Jesus, to reveal in his life, in however small a measure what Jesus revealed so abundantly. This will suffice to draw all men to Jesus, the Great Example.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

[The day of organized religions is done. What the world needs is a way of life—a philosophy which offers nobler standards of living; one such method is described in the article which follows.—EDS.]

WHY I TRY TO BE A BUDDHIST

[J. F. McKechnie tells his own story in the following article.—EDS.]

Some months ago in the pages of this magazine, a lady told its readers why she was not a Buddhist. The article moves me in turn to tell them why I am trying to be a Buddhist,—and have been so trying for the last thirty years. I say deliberately, “*trying* to be a Buddhist,” because—to adapt Emerson’s *mot* about Jesus—there never was but one Buddhist, and he died at Kusinagara two thousand five hundred years ago.

I try to be a Buddhist because I cannot help it, because I cannot do otherwise—the one sound reason for following any course in religious matters. I happen to have an adult mind. And the adult mind gets very weary of its limitations once it discovers them. I discovered mine—or at least some of them—thirty years ago, since when my cry has been that of Lawrence Sterne’s skylark: “I want to get out, I want to get out.”

As I searched through philosophies and religions, one after the other, at last I heard of one of my fellows who had “got out” and had told *how* he got out. He said that others might “get out” the same way. I looked into that way of his, and it seemed to me to be good and likely to lead to what it promised. It appealed to me because the advice it presented was not so very different in its earlier stages from what good men all the world over have given their fellow-men

to follow if they wish to be really happy. It seemed sound and “commonsensical” and promotive of comfortable and friendly relations amongst fellows. It advised me not to kill, not to steal, not to lust, not to lie and not to use intoxicants; and it gave a reason for refraining from these acts which fully satisfied my intellect. It said that they were all, at bottom, more or less emphatic modes of *self-assertion*, hence, acts that would keep me a prisoner of my personal ego-consciousness for a period exactly in keeping with the extent and intensity of my practice of them. In other words, it told me that if I seriously wanted to get out of the limitations of personal egotistic consciousness, I ought to drop such actions, for they were of the sort that would keep me bound for as long as I committed them. So I started out to follow this advice and found that it made me happy and free from care, and a fairly welcome companion to all my fellow-men whom I encountered on life’s journey.

But this advice went a bit further than simple recommendations as to my conduct towards my fellows: it told me to observe *a certain way of behaving toward myself*. In plainer language, it told me to look out for, and avoid, certain ways of thinking, certain ways of feeling, on the ground that these too were only so many modes

of self-assertion and therefore, so many things that, indulged in, would keep me longer from "getting out."

These recommendations were fairly simple and obvious in their first beginnings, being just recommendations to avoid the states of mind that led to the self-assertive external acts already advised against. But they went further, very much further. I was advised to pay deliberate attention to all my thoughts and words and deeds, that these were just happenings in the stream of all the general happenings that make up a universe, that they were of precisely the same quality as these other happenings, and not to be distinguished from these others by attaching to them the idea that they were done by an "I" while the others were not.

I found this very difficult to do: I find it very difficult to do now. I have to keep on practising and practising at it every day, all the time, and not at all succeeding always in what I want to do, what I am advised to do. I cannot always remember. Still I keep on, for I feel sure that this is a certain and straight way to "get out." Nay, I think I may say that I *know* it is. For just once, for a brief second or so, I believe I did get out of my cage, at least—shall I say?—got my

head between the bars so that I had a clear, unobstructed view, of free open space, in a word, of liberty. It was the best thing that has ever happened to me. It was something so inspiring that I should like to have it happen again and again, to never stop happening!

So the upshot is that now I go on taking the advice of that fellow man of mine who died over two thousand years ago at Kusinagara, practising the outward conduct he prescribes and the thought-control he recommends. For I do not know anything else which holds out such promise as this, of helping me to get out of the chafing confinement of my ego-consciousness altogether some day, if only I go on long enough following this road. Even as I have done for the last thirty years, I shall keep on trying to be a Buddhist, I shall continue trying to heed the advice of the Buddha as to my thought and conduct, for the next thirty years, for the next thirty thousand years if need be, till the bars of the cage are finally left behind for ever. For I am perfectly sure that they will be if only I go on as I am doing, giving heed to the Teaching of the Teacher.

Homage to Him, the Blessed One, the Exalted One, the Perfectly Awakened One!

J. F. McKECHNIE

The world needs no sectarian church, whether of Buddha, Jesus, Mahomet, Swedenborg, Calvin or any other. There being but ONE Truth, man requires but one church—the Temple of God within us, walled in by matter but penetrable by any one who can find the way; the pure in heart see God.—H. P. BLAVATSKY

THE HINDU ZODIAC

I.—THE ANTIQUITY OF THE HINDU ZODIAC

[**Professor Arthur Beer**, is known for his researches into the astronomical significance of the Zodiac of the Qusayr' Amra, for his work on Astronomy and Astrophysics at the universities and the institutes of Berlin, Breslau, and Hamburg. He is now stationed in Cambridge.—EDS.]

The problem of the origin and evolution of the Hindu zodiac in its various forms raises questions of history, astronomy and philology. As it has been said by a modern investigator, a great page of history will have been opened for us to read when this problem has been solved in full. But on the other hand it must be admitted that up to the present the whole history of the zodiac is very obscure.

What have we to understand by this zodiac problem? Each reader knows the usual modern definition of the zodiac as being an imaginary zone of the heavens within which lie the paths of the sun, moon and principal planets, and which is bounded by two circles each nine degrees from the ecliptic and divided into twelve signs. Each of these signs is marked by a constellation, the names of which are well known. Each sign is to be understood as a geometrical division extending through thirty degrees, counting from the spring equinox in the direction of the sun's path through them. The first sign is Aries, and it starts therefore at the point of the equator at which the sun crosses going north. One month later the

sun is in Taurus, the next month in Gemini, and so on.

Thus—and this is the important point—there is a westward movement throughout the whole series of signs, due to the effect of the precession of the equinoxes (the conical motion of the earth's axis), to the extent of one degree in seventy-two years. Therefore the constellations of to-day do not coincide in position with the signs of the same name compared with the observations of, for instance, Hipparchus who first discovered the precession about 125 B. C. In this case the discrepancy is as much as the entire breadth of a sign: for instance to-day the sun while it is in the sign Aries passes the stars of the constellation Pisces. In this way it is possible to find the means of calculating the antiquity of old astronomical systems.

All the constellations of the zodiac have come down to us from remote antiquity. And so the apparent solar, lunar, and planetary motions through the zodiac "promises to provide us with an important clue as to its origin". (S. H. Downey in *Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society of Canada*, Vol. XXV, 1931); and as

R. A. Proctor says in his *Myths and Marvels of Astronomy* :—

If we could determine the origin of these zodiacal figures, their exact configuration as it was first devised, and the precise influence assigned to them in the old astrological systems, we should have obtained important evidence of the origin of astronomy itself.

A very thorough study of Hindu astronomy we owe to G. R. Kaye in "Memoirs of the Archæological Survey of India, No. 18, 1924". Following for a moment his conclusions, we have first to remember that the chief phases of the Hindu astronomy are connected with the Vedas, the Vedāṅgas and the medieval text books, or siddhāntas. Vedic astronomy is more of the unscientific order, the Vedāṅga astronomy is formal but crude, while the astronomy of the later siddhāntas is on the whole of a very high intellectual order. Kaye has developed the more important items of the evidence that illustrate these phases, and draws attention to the relationship of the Vedāṅga astronomy to the current thought of the time, the exotic astronomy of the later period, the controversy regarding the antiquity of the Vedas, the evolution of astrology and the astronomical deities of India.

In the Jyotisha Vedāṅga and similar works there is no mention of the planets and their motions, while the contrary is the case with popular works of the same period. Assuming that the Vedāṅgas, Jātakas, the epics and Purāṇas overlap chronologically, the whole period, as a matter of convenience, may be taken as extending from

400 B. C. to 400 A.D. There are thus two conclusions, which follow from this assumption; either that the more advanced astronomical ideas displayed in these popular works are late additions or interpolations; or, on the other hand, that the knowledge of astronomy indicated in these popular works was much in advance of that exhibited in more formal works. The first conclusion is hardly likely, as the references are much too many and varied to be explained away, and the manner in which the terms are used certainly does not indicate interpolation. The second conclusion is thus the only tenable one, and from this one is led to the deduction that the Vedāṅga astronomy was of the traditional order, and that the professional astronomer of the times must not have been with the times but behind them.

Very important also seems a second point. About 450 A.D. the West gave Hindu teachers a new astronomy to expound; and not being obsessed by tradition like their ancestors they were in a sufficiently receptive state of mind to benefit by the new knowledge. Thus a "golden age" dawned for India, an age which coincided strangely enough with the "dark ages" in Europe, "where a bigoted hierarchy discounted the inestimable gifts of the heathen Greeks. India welcomed and assimilated as much of the Greek teaching as could reach her; but from Alexandria to Ujjain was in those days a long journey, and the transmission of knowledge was hindered

in many ways, so that finally the Greek knowledge was received in India in a somewhat frayed condition."

In his *Arctic Home in the Vedas* (Bombāy, 1903), B. G. Tilak writes:—

The astronomical statements found in the Vedic literature supplied us with far more reliable data for correctly ascertaining the ages of the different periods of Vedic literature. These astronomical statements, it was further shown, unmistakably pointed out that the vernal equinox was in the constellation of Mṛiga or Orion (c. 4500 B. C.) during the period of the Vedic hymns, and that it had receded to the constellation of the Kṛittikās or the Pleiades (about 2500 B. C.) in the days of the Brāhmaṇas.

Tilak's position was strengthened when it was found that H. Jacobi (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 1909-1910) had independently arrived at the same conclusion.

Although Kaye remarks that Jacobi is one of the most learned of the European orientalists, he feels compelled to reject some of his conclusions, especially that one asserting that portions of the early texts were indeed composed some 4500 years before the Christian era. He puts forward his own suggestion that the "nakshatras" formed, at least in some cases, merely a relative scale whose initial point was an equinox or solstice.

In this connection we have to remember that in Hindu astronomy the path of the sun was not so important as the path of the moon. Therefore in the last phase of the later Vedic times one distinguished 27 or 28 of these "lunar mansions,"

the previously mentioned nakshatras. They formed a scale, the natural one of the stellar groups which the moon encountered along its path through the heavens. The name "nakshatra" originally connoted stars in general but later took on the particular significance of the stellar groupings in the moon's path.

There is no regularity in distribution in these constellations, and there is also some irregularity regarding their number. But the arcs which they characterise are invariably 27 in number. This number 27 denoting the various divisions of the zodiac goes back right to the roots of Hindu tradition, and the evidence seems to prove that this system of nakshatras is indigenous.

So the nakshatras appear to us as 27 or 28 groups of stars plotted out on the ecliptic in a manner similar to the western zodiac. The Rig-Veda gives no complete list of the nakshatras, but it mentions at least three of these lunar mansions, also called lunar asterisms. Complete lists are given in the Atharva Veda, the Taittirīya Saṁhitā, the Kaṭha Saṁhita, the Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, etc. It is interesting to point out that all these lists agree generally but that only the number of nakshatras varies between 27 and 28. Of the more modern texts the Jyotiṣa Vedāṅga and the Sūrya Siddhanta imply 27, and the Sūryaprajñapti, the Brāhmapuṭasiddhānta and the Sūrya Siddhānta imply 28. These numbers suggest for Kaye a connection with the sidereal month, but

in the early texts the only month referred to is of 30 days duration, and even in the later works the synodical month is divided into 30 tithis. The Arabic *Manāzil* and the Chinese *Sieou* consist of 28 asterisms and the Chaldean scheme has the same number. The reader may also consult on this point with interest the papers of J. B. Biot in the *Journal des Savans*, 1840, and of L. de Saussure "La Symétrie du Zodiac Lunaire Asiatique" in *Journal Asiatique*, Sér. 11, T. 14, No. 1, 1919.

There has been some considerable discussion and not a little heated controversy concerning the possible connections between the Hindu nakshatras and other systems. These discussions throw much light on the antiquity of the Hindu zodiac. Sir William Jones wrote in his very definite manner:—"I undertake to prove that the Indian Zodiac was not borrowed mediately or directly from the Arabs or Greeks" (see "Works" IV). But afterwards he confessed that he found it practically impossible to find a Hindu astronomer who could name in Sanskrit all the constellations Jones pointed out. H. T. Colebrooke (*Asiatic Researches*, Vol. IX, p. 323), however, inclined to the belief that the Indian and Arabian divisions of the zodiac had a common origin. Jones thought that they had not, despite the proof adduced by Colebrooke that the coincidence was too exact to be the result of chance. Colebrooke argued that it must have been the Arabs who adopted with slight variations a division of the

zodiac familiar to the Hindus. Colebrooke also differed from Jones in regard to the stars constituting the asterisms of Hindu astronomy. Jones only stated a conjecture founded on a consideration of the figure of the nakshatra and the number of its stars, compared with those actually situated near the division of the ecliptic to which the nakshatra gave name. It would thus appear that he was not aware that the Hindus themselves placed some of these constellations outside the limits of the zodiac. In the face of the available evidence, there can hardly be any reasonable doubt that the nakshatras are native to India just as the asterisms of the *Sieou* are to China.

But it is interesting to note in passing that, though it is a traditional belief that India supplied the Arabs with their astronomical knowledge, it is equally probable that the Arabs were thus inspired to obtain their further knowledge from the Greeks. And thus, later, this knowledge was passed on by the Arabs to the Europe which formerly had rejected it.

There is no uniformity in the naming of the Hindu signs of the zodiac, and there is evidence of foreign influence. Greek communication is obvious in the names "Two Faces," Gemini, and "Lion's Tail," Leo.

And there is also no definition of the positions of the nakshatras in the heavens in the early texts. No evidence is offered even up to the time of Varāha Mihira in the sixth century A.D.—the *Pañchasiddhāntikā* of this time only gives the posi-

tions of seven asterisms with very little accuracy. Indeed the identifications with certain stars or constellations are all more or less modern, and as Kaye points out, apparently the nakshatras never were completely identified by Hindu astronomers. About 1000 A. D., however, the initial point of the Hindu sphere was marked by the principal star of the nakshatra Revati which was identified with *Zeta Piscium*, or by some authorities the initial point was perhaps some ten degrees west of *Zeta Piscium*.

An important indication of the remote antiquity of the Hindu lunar zodiac is shown by the following comparison of the original series with those of later times: *Kṛittikā*, the constellation "Pleiades," was the first in the primitive series. All the early lists of the nakshatras begin with *Kṛittikā*, which, if really equivalent to the Pleiades, marked the vernal equinox about 2300 B. C. This position could not have been possible at any rate after 1800 B. C. The *Jyotisha Vedāṅga* puts *Śravishṭhā* first, while the *Mahābhārata* substitutes *Śravaṇa*; the *Sūrya Siddhānta* gives *Aśvini* first, while the *Sūryaprajñapti* begins with *Abhijit*. These form two groups—*Kṛittikā* to *Aśvini* and *Śravishṭhā* to *Abhijit*, separated by about one quarter of the ecliptic. (See Kaye, *loc. cit.*, p. 24).

The change from *Kṛittikā* to *Aśvini* just mentioned seems at first to be an astronomical one, inspired by a knowledge of the effects of precession. But there are objections to this explanation, and

Tilak (*loc. cit.*) and F. F. Fleet (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society etc.*, 1911-1915) suggest that the original order was either a ritualistic or an astrological one. Tilak records that it is stated by Garga, who lived c. 548 B. C., that for ritualistic purposes *Kṛittikā* was first, while for the calendar *Śravishṭhā* was first. But Fleet in one of his latest papers wrote:—

I hope to revert to this matter in a paper in which I shall show that the *Kṛittikādi* list has no basis in the fact that the sun once came to the vernal equinox in *Kṛittikā*, but belongs entirely to ritual and astrology.

But as Kaye points out, another possible explanation lies in the various practices in different parts of India regarding the commencement of the year.

We cannot conclude this discussion more appropriately than with Kaye's view, that in all countries, in the early stages of intellectual development, the connection between astronomy and religion has been intimate. For India the history of this connection is particularly interesting. In comparatively late times an exotic astronomical cult tended to obscure the historical development; but the cult never became predominant and the scheme of astrology was altogether subordinated to the spirit of Hinduism. It is impossible to elaborate these themes in the present discussion, but it will have served its purpose if it draws a little more attention to these interesting topics and the important part they have played in the progress of civilisation.

ARTHUR BEER

II.—SOME OBSERVATIONS SUGGESTED BY Dr. BEER'S ARTICLE

[Dr. V. V. Ramana-Sastrin, lives "a retired life of learned leisure in the midst of my library, away from the hustle of town-life." He has specialized in the literature relating to Saivagamas and edited *The Agamic Review* from 1896 to 1915. He has also written a monograph on the history of Indo-Greek astronomy and astrology richly documented from Greek, Latin and Sanskrit of which languages he is a keen student; he is also acquainted with Hebrew, Arabic and Persian.—EDS.]

The first impression that one gets on reading Dr. Beer's article is that it is out to make no distinctive contribution to the age of the "Hindu zodiac" which Dr. Beer takes to mean the "Hindu lunar zodiac." But a closer scrutiny of the article shows it to be scissors and paste, pure and simple, *viz.*, a deftly dove-tailed assemblage of clippings from the late Mr. George Rusby Kaye's *Hindu Astronomy* (Calcutta, 1924), and hardly anything else. Of the first four paragraphs of the article, which may be said to introduce the subject, the first three are ostensibly Dr. Beer's own, being in the nature of a tame outline of the zodiac of signs, and the how of its displacement from the zodiac of constellations, while the last is a budget of thin quotations from Downey and Proctor. Of the remaining fifteen paragraphs, twelve are extracts from Kaye, more often implicit than not, and three, a rehash of either his ideas or those of the authors he mentions. The reader would do well to compare patiently in succession the fifteen paragraphs, which form the pith and marrow of Dr. Beer's article, with pages 95, 96, 32, 96, 22, 3, 4, 96, 23, 24 and 96 of Kaye's book, in order to bear me out. One

has thus to pit oneself against Kaye rather than against Dr. Beer, in appraising the worth of the averments that find a place in the article.

I was much in touch with Kaye when his book took shape, and he was courteous enough to call attention to a paper of mine on page 129. This paper had appeared, two years before, in the *Classical Review* (London: John Murray), having been addressed, amid a discussion of some special lines of internal evidence pointing to the living hold which Greek astrology had upon the Indian mind of the Indo-Greek period, to the interpretation of a Greek passage, excerpted in one of the parts of the recondite *Catalogus Codicum Astrologorum Graecorum* (Bruxelles: Henri Lamestain), a passage that seemed to clinch the accuracy of the Indian presentation of an important doctrinal convention of Greek astrology. But Kaye would not, or could not even if he would, profit by my paper, as he was sufficiently at home neither in Greek nor in the contents of Greek astrological classics.

It is perhaps not known to many that Kaye was not a genuine Sanskritist either by training or

by culture. He had of course a working knowledge of mathematical astronomy and related branches of study, sufficient to stand him in apt stead, in making intelligent use of the results of the investigations of others into the history of the development of ancient mathematics and astronomy. He was an indefatigable compiler, could flick, for his own use, the cream off the most ponderous and musty tomes in his ken and had an instinct not only for ferreting out the most curious and varied bits of information on subjects of study that interested him, but also for marshalling and displaying them all, in his own ingenious way, so as to make the maximum impression upon, or attract the maximum notice of, the public. He went in for writing to learned, out-of-the-way journals of Italy, America and Germany, but the staple of his contributions, however enjoyable each time, was ever the same in substance. He had considerable leisure as an employee of the Indian Government in the Educational Department, first as a teacher and then as an inspector in the U. P., and finally as the personal assistant to the Inspector-General of Education, Simla, and he turned that leisure to valuable account. He died not long after 1925, and was unaware of the astronomical implications of the revolutionary finds at Boghas-Koi and Mitanni and at Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa.

In the light of the above account of the mental get-up of Kaye, it will be easy to see that we have to deal in his typically Anglo-Indian find-

ings with just such hide-bound repercussions of western Indological research as easily square with his almost sworn predilection for assigning a comparatively late date for the dawn of the Indian astronomical conscience, and ignoring quietly every evidence to the contrary, on the convenient score that it is imagined from mere sentiment. But, all the same, his book was not subjected to any serious criticism when it came out, for scholars looked askance at it as in the nature of a facile hotchpot. And yet, it will be neither fair nor useful to criticise it at this late hour because of Dr. Beer's pirating it, since, for one thing, the views put forth in it do not hold the field. I shall confine myself therefore to a few general observations—a discussion of facts and theories on which they rest, being outside range of a non-technical presentation.

To begin with, let me give a sample of the accuracy of knowledge and depth of prejudice evinced by Kaye, by quoting the following from his book, leaving the interested reader to form his own opinion as to what to expect out of it in the long run:—

It may be explained that a Brāhmaṇa or religious manual, or a Sūtra or collection of rules are attached to each Veda; and that the Brāhmaṇa is further divided into three rather vague orders of which the Vedānta or Upaniṣad is chiefly concerned with theosophical speculations. (p. 8.)

Bhāskara is the only conspicuous figure in the second sub-period which extends from about A. D. 700, and his importance has been somewhat "exaggerated". (p. 9)

Kaye takes no notice of the fact that the extant Vedic *corpus*, which only represents the surviving remnant of a canon, originally fixed by a so-called "Veda-Vyāsa," is, for that reason, not to be treated as perfect; and that his canon was merely what he was able to rescue from out of a still larger volume of Vedic literature that, in his time, had irretrievably disappeared in part, and was tending to disappear in part; and that the received arrangement of the canon was the result of the considerable shuffling to which he subjected the rescued fragmentary material, in order to introduce into it a certain factitious uniformity of plan and scope. No Orientalist seems to remember this point when undertaking to analyse philologically or semantically odd chips of the Vedic *corpus* and extracting therefrom astronomical or chronological information: for, hymns or passages separated by millennia in age, and consequently reflecting widely differing celestial phenomena, may exist quietly side by side, without exciting the least suspicion: he must interpret what he finds without caring for the consequences.

It is again a modern triviality to assume that when a man has explored all the astronomical or chronographical references to be found in the Vedas, he will be in a position to speak definitively as to the length and breadth of the astronomical learning of the period which is covered by them: a reader of the Greek Testament is by no means expected to take its mention of the magi's sighting of Jesus's

"Star in the East" and there being led by it through all the vicissitudes of a long journey to the crib at Bethlehem, as a measure of the Greek astronomical learning of the time. For an estimate of the real astronomical knowledge of Vedic Indians, we must come by books addressed to the secular learning of their day: but such books have obviously gone to ruin in the efflux of time, though the Vedas have managed to hold their own by the singularity of their importance and the special manner of their preservation. There are however distinct references in the Vedas to the parallel existence of secular astronomical learning and professional astronomers, but the references are now and then marred by intense acerbity, as, evidently, the higher interests of astronomical learning which have for their object the fearless study of celestial phenomena, and those of a ritualistic cult implying a belief in mythical cosmology, cannot cohere. And, so, in the astronomical references found in the Vedas we merely touch the frayed religious fringe of a secular astronomical culture, of the full extent of which we can have but the vaguest conception. Sometimes capital is made out of the extant literature on the Vedāṅga-Jyautiṣa in order to anathematize the inaccuracy of the astronomy and the method of reckoning as taught in it, and to aver that they form the quintessence of the finished astronomical culture of the Vedic age. It is a mistake to do so. The extant Vedāṅga-Jyautiṣa, being in the

nature of a short-cut, designed exclusively for the use of the non-astronomical ritualist in formulating and regulating his sacrificial calendar, is based on a religiously enjoined, conventional system of religio-astronomical, if not pseudo-astronomical, reckoning, employing conventional time-measures, and it has therefore nothing in common with the true astronomical learning of Vedic India.

Hipparchus was not the discoverer of the precession. This phenomenon was well-known in India and Babylonia thousands upon thousands of years previous to the days of Hipparchus. He was perhaps the first to assign a value of the amount of annual precession. But even that value was far from accurate. Ptolemy refined upon his value only to get 36 seconds of arc in longitude, which again was considerably behind the truth. The Vedic Indians observed the phenomenon of precession of both the colures and of the pole, and periodically changed their asterismal and zodiacal scales in conformity with any observed change in the asterismal location of either colure, regard being had to the nature of the solar ingress, whether equinoctial or solstitial, which opened the year. To so shift the scales periodically and use the shifted scales as fixed ones till they are once again shifted on account of a further change in the asterismal location of either colure that opens the year, is really making a practical use of a knowledge of the phenomenon of the precession for

periodical calendaric reform. The *kṛttikādi* asterismal scale, *cum* the vernal ingress of the sun in *kṛttikā*, which finds mention in both the *Taittirīya-Samhitā* and the *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa*, points to the time when the equinoctial colure passed through the Pleiades, which must have been about 4500 B. C. The *Vedāṅga-Jyautiṣa*, though employing both the zodiacal and the asterismal scales, makes use of the year opening with the sun in *Śravistha* about its winter solstitial ingress, which shows that the date of its present redaction cannot be later than 1750 B. C. Patañjali, who was certainly pre-Hipparchian, refers in his *Yoga-sūtras* to methods whereby both polar and colural precession may be observed in ways that are peculiar. Both Garga and Parāśara make pointed statements as to the positions occupied by the summer solstitial point thousands of years before their respective dates. The phenomenon of the precession will thus be seen to have been quite familiar in pre-Hipparchian India.

If my remarks about the received Vedic canon which is the work of the so-called Veda-Vyāsa be kept in mind, it will be easy to see how, for different but perfectly cogent and sound astronomical reasons, we are forced to date a portion of the *Taittirīya-Samhitā* (vii, 4, 28) at *circa* 7000 B. C. and a portion of the *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa* (iii, 1, 5) at *circa* 5300 B. C. In this connection it may also be noted that the *Rksamhitā* (i, 105 and vii, 103) takes us to about 5000 B. C., the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* (ii, 1, 2) to

3500 B. C., and the *Maitrāyaṇīya-Upaniṣat* (i, 4) to 3200 B. C.

No one can deny for a moment that the study of astronomy and astrology received a fresh impetus in India from the time Indians first came into living contact with Greeks somewhere about 550 B. C., when under the Persian empire founded by Darius, the Ionian Greeks of Asia Minor, swarmed largely in Sindh, the Panjab and Afghanistan (Gāndhāra) as state-paid officials of the "Indian Satrapy". Then, there was the invasion of Alexander; the Hellenization of Indian culture; the establishment of a Greek centre of influence at the Court of Čandra-gupta after he married the daughter of Seleucus Nicator; the dominion of the Indo-Greek, rather Indo-Baktrian, kings in North-Western India, of whom Demetrius, Euthydemus and Menander were the most illustrious; the apostolate of the Asokan Buddhist missionaries who travelled to all the Hellenistic Countries then in power; and lastly the freedom of social and intellectual intercourse between the ruled Indians and the ruling Greeks or half-Greeks. All these factors contributed to put the Indian intellect in a favourable situation for saturating itself with the best Greek learning in Astronomy and Astrology of both the pre-Hellenistic and the Hellenistic periods. The Indians were primarily indebted to the Greek makers of Astronomy and Astrology of about the second century B. C., and before. The fixed zodiacal scale of the Greeks (though in vogue in India

previously in a way) came to be formally accepted in Hindu Astrology and Astronomy at about 274 B. C. This was the time when the fixed asterismal scale beginning with *aśvini* was equated to the fixed Greek zodiacal scale, and the segmentation of the solar zodiac into the 108 *nakṣatra-pādas* adopted. But there never seems to have been a time when the Greek fixed zodiac of Constellations was put in requisition for strictly uranographic purposes. Kaye is totally wrong in thinking that Greek teaching reached India only in 400 A. D., and that, in a highly degenerate condition. There is evidence to show that Indo-Greek authors wrote in Sanskrit from the second century B. C., down to the second century A. D., with a facility of expression and grace of diction which were marvellous. When the Greek zodiac, along with the Greek astronomy and the Greek astrology, was admitted to full citizen rights inside the circle of Indian culture, India had not been without an indigenous solar zodiac and indigenous astronomy and astrology. But in the surging flood-tide of fashion which had an overpowering mania for everything Greek, the indigenous elements were absorbed into the imported Greek culture, beyond recognition. This was the time when Garga could speak of the culture of Greeks in astronomy and astrology as superb. But eventually the Greek food underwent thorough assimilation in the Indian body, becoming converted into its very life-blood.

The standard books which have now come down to us from the days of Āryabhata and Varāhamihira on the subjects of astronomy and astrology did not, as Kaye imagines, suddenly spring into existence after a long interval of prior, uncouth silence. These books, although not the best of their kind, are as their authors plainly tell us, based upon those of others; but what these latter books were like we have no means of knowing in the absence of even a trace of them. It is manifest they are lost, and with them, a whole line of books connecting them with the period of the inauguration of the Indian renaissance under Greek auspices. Though Kaye makes no mention of it, the mismatched celestial co-ordinates employed by Varāhamihira and his successors under the names *druvaka* and *viksepa* are a legacy of ancient Greeks. That astronomy and astrology had attained an enviable state of advancement at the hands of Brahmans is admitted by the classical authors themselves, notably Megasthenes, Philostratus, Strabo, Lucian and some others.

Further, everything that India received in the first flush of her passion for the Greek learning in astronomy and astrology, was by the land-route, from the Ptolemaic Egypt and the Seleucid Syria, and Kaye is sadly wrong in thinking of the middle of the fifth century A. D. and the sea-route, in that connexion. The star-lists, along with their "false" longitudes and latitudes, which the Hindus of Menander's time ought to have received through Greek teaching, and enshrined in books compiled by them must, along with the books containing them, have met the same fate as that of so many other valuable books written by Sanskrit-knowing Greeks and Greek-knowing Indians of the Indo-Greek period.

With these observations I shall stop for the present, as a more intimate discussion of all the historical, scientific and cultural questions so summarily decided with an *ex cathedra* air by Kaye, cannot be attempted here in the course of a sketchy threading of what, after all, is a mere *causerie* in disguise.

V. V. RAMANA

THE PATH OF THE SOUL IN SUFISM

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Before the rise and development of Sūfism, orthodox Islam had taught that within man was a Divine spark, for God had at the beginning breathed into him of His own Spirit, and there was therefore a real affinity between God and the soul of man. Sūfism, on the basis of this conception, developed the doctrine of a close relation between God and the human soul. The soul included the higher part, the spirit or heart, the "rational soul," containing the inmost essence of man (*sirr*). This, as al-Sarrāj (*ob.* A. D. 988) says, is the "secret shrine of God Himself, wherein He knows man and man can know Him."* This higher soul, previous to its existence in a body in this world, had dwelt in the Presence of God and had been one with Him. It has, therefore, the power to perceive spiritual realities. al-Ghazālī says of it:—

Man possesses two eyes, the outward and the inward, the former concerned with the world of sense, the latter with the invisible world, and this he possesses because he is a partaker of the Divine Nature, and so there is within man a power of apprehension, which seeks the highest, even God Himself.

But the power to apprehend depends on the purity of the soul. Here in this world it is joined to a lower part, the carnal self (*nafs*)

ruled by passion, which is the seat of all evil, and exercises a downward drag on the higher soul. So the purity of the spirit becomes defiled, "that fair countenance has been disfigured by the darkness of sin," it is veiled from the apprehension of Reality by egoism, sensualism, error of all kinds. The process of removing the veils, of eliminating the evil, and effecting the purification which will enable the soul to become conscious of its own Divinity, is what the Sūfis call the Path, the way of inward ascent, which will lead at last to the reunion of the soul with God.

The Sūfis themselves constantly speak of this as a Way (*ṭarīqa*), a journey from the false self into the real self, which is one with the Creative Truth, that is, the One Reality. The "traveller," says Maḥmūd Shabistari, in the *Rose Garden of Mystery*, is the one who is acquainted with his own origin, who is aware of the Divinity within him, and who seeks to become "pure from self as flame from smoke," so that he may die to self and live a new life in God. God alone can guide men on the Way, and therefore man must attend to the promptings of Divine grace and light within his own soul, but the need for co-operation with the act of Divine grace is always upheld

* Kitāb al-Luma 'p. 231.

by the Sūfis in their teaching on the following of the mystic Path. Spiritual meditation, by which the mystic can apprehend the guidance and help of God, is to be combined with vigorous asceticism, by which the soul can be purged of self-will, self-consciousness, and all those human passions and creaturely conditions which are a means of separation from God.

The journey is marked out by a number of "stations" (*maqāmāt*) which constitute the ascetic and ethical discipline of the seeker, and indicate the degree of progress attained by the mystic in the Path of God, and he must perfect himself in each, fulfilling its obligations and acquiring the virtues proper to it, before passing on to the next station. This stage of the Path corresponds to what is known to Western mystics as the "Purgative Life," and belongs to the sphere of practical religion. These stations are succeeded, or accompanied, by a similar series of psychological "states" (*aḥwāl*) which belong to the inner life, denoting spiritual experiences, graces received, which are the gift of God alone, and do not depend upon the mystic's own striving; and these correspond to the "Illuminative Life" of Western mysticism.

The first step on the way is repentance (*tawba*) which is really acceptance of the Path, a turning towards God and away from all else, when the traveller puts behind him all worldly attractions, shakes off all human and material ties that fetter him, and realises

what is the Goal of the quest, towards which he has set his face. Dhū al-Nūn (*ob.* A. D. 859), and others of the Sūfis, distinguish between repentance due to fear of Divine punishment, and repentance due to shame on account of the Divine Compassion.

The repentance of fear is caused by the revelation of God's Majesty, the repentance of shame by the Vision of God's Beauty.

Dhū al-Nūn also declared that repentance was of three kinds, the common kind, which was repentance from sin; that of the elect, which was repentance from neglect, and finally, that of the saints, which was repentance, *i. e.* turning away, from all save God. This meant forgetfulness, even of sin; for remembrance of sin, that is, of self, is a veil between the soul and God.

The novice who had thus set foot on the Path normally betook himself at this stage to a spiritual director, under whose guidance he underwent a long process of training and guidance as to the way to follow, but there were some Sūfis, such as the woman Rābi'a of Basra (*ob.* A. D. 801), who attained their aim without any such guidance, who found the right ascetical and psychological discipline for themselves, who trod the Path to its appointed end, and there found what they sought.

The first station after Repentance was Abstinence (*wara'*) and this, Ḥasan al-Basrī, one of the earliest Sūfis, declared to be the root-principle of religion, since he held that its opposite, "desire,"

(*tama'*) was the chief source of the corruption of the soul. Closely akin to this "station" was that of Renunciation (*zuhd*) the abandonment of all that distracted the soul from God, leaving the hand free from wealth and the heart from desire. Of renunciation, also, the *Ṣūfīs* taught that there were three kinds, the renunciation of what was unlawful, which was common; the renunciation of what was lawful, a more special type; and finally the renunciation of all save God, and this was the renunciation of the gnostics, the renunciation, not only of the temporary pleasures of this world, but of the hope of reward in the next. "The sign of true *Ṣūfī*," said al-Qushayrī, "is that he is indifferent to this world and the world to come."* Renunciation involved Poverty (*faqr*). Of those who are poor for the sake of God al-Sarrāj writes that they are the richest of all the creatures, for they dispense with the gift for the sake of the Giver. Poverty, to the *Ṣūfī*, meant not merely lack of material possessions, but indifference to both wealth and poverty. It meant self-stripping in the widest sense, and the merging of the personal will in the Will of God, until the mystic attained to complete self-loss. To a friend who asked her what a man should do in order to come near to God, Rābi'a replied, "He should possess nothing in this world or the next save Him alone."

Patience and Gratitude were also stations on the way, representing the passive and active sides of the

same virtue, acquiescence in all that was destined to come to the mystic on the Path, whether benefits or misfortunes, and acceptance of such, not only without complaint, but with thankfulness. The first stage is to leave off complaining, which is the stage of the penitent; the second is to be satisfied with what is decreed by the Divine Will, and this is the stage of the ascetics; and the third is to accept with joyful gratitude whatever befalls, and this is the stage of the true saints, the "friends" of God. "Gratitude," said Qushayrī, "is the vision of the Giver, not the gift." Trust in God and dependence upon Him (*tawakkul*) followed upon the stations which had gone before; it meant being contented with God and His provision, and so finding rest from the troubles of this world, engendered by anxiety on account of means and subsistence. Dhū al-Nūn taught that such trust meant that the seeker should no longer be influenced by worldly motives or anxieties, but should bring the self into obedience to God, and take from it the power of controlling its own destiny: the *Ṣūfīs* should be as "little children in the bosom of God." al-Ghazālī makes such implicit trust a test of faith in the Unity of God, for since He is the Sole Cause and the Only Agent, and all His acts are the result of perfect goodness and wisdom, then what need has the servant to be concerned with his own interests, for all that is destined for him must be for the best?

The final "station," in the view

* *Risāla*, pp. 74, 75.

of most of the Ṣūfīs, was Satisfaction (*ridā*), and of this al-Muhāsibī (*ob.* A. D. 857), one of the greatest of all the early Ṣūfī teachers, has much to say. It is two-sided, for human satisfaction is linked up with the divine satisfaction and depends upon it. Muhāsibī says:—

Human satisfaction, is tranquillity of heart in regard to Destiny and equanimity of soul in regarding events, whether the Majesty of God or His Beauty be manifested therein. It is all one to the true servant, whether he be consumed in the fire of the Majesty of God or illuminated by the light of His Mercy and His Beauty, since both alike witness to God, and whatever comes from Him is good. When the servant sees God's choice and chooses it for himself, he is delivered from all anxieties, for satisfaction means deliverance. There are those who are satisfied with the gifts of God and the happiness these bring, and those who are satisfied with affliction and trials, and there are also those who are satisfied simply with being chosen, and this is love, for those who are satisfied with being chosen by the Beloved are His lovers, whose hearts dwell ever in His Presence, who are detached from the creatures and the fetters of the "stations," and their souls have escaped from all existences and have attached themselves to God.*

So Satisfaction is the last of the "stations": it begins with effort on the part of the self, but in the end it means escape from striving, for it has become a mystic "state".

The mystic "states," as we have seen, may follow the stations or may be experienced at the same time, for they belong, not to the outward life of asceticism, but to

the inner life of the soul. In attaining to the stations, the soul has been purged of the grosser sins of the self and the senses, but the "states" represent a still more subtle process of purification, affecting thought and feeling, and are experiences sent by God to encourage the soul in its ascent. Among them the Ṣūfī writers include Meditation, Nearness to God, Fear and Hope, Love and Longing, Fellowship, Tranquillity, Contemplation and Certainty. Of these Meditation (*murāqaba*) means a process of self-concentration, when the mystic keeps a close watch upon the thoughts, lest evil suggestions should hinder him from thinking of God. The meditation of the gnostics, the power for which comes from God, enables them always to concern themselves with God and to fix their minds upon Him. On the "states" of Fear and Hope the Ṣūfīs have much to say. One of them observes that the man who fears rightly fears his carnal self more than his enemy. Fear, says another, is like a lamp to the heart, making it see what is good and what is evil, and godly fear leads a man to shun what is feared, because it is evil. He who truly fears anything flees from it, but he who truly fears God, flees unto Him. Fear, to the Ṣūfī, was no mere dread of material consequences, but of separation from God, and Dhū al-Nūn says on this subject that the fear of Hell-fire is to the fear of separation from God, like a drop which has fallen into the bottomless sea. In

* *Kashf al-Mahjūb* pp. 219 ff.

proportion to the mystic's nearness to God is his fear of being cut off from Him. Hope, too, is concerned not with rewards, material or spiritual, for the Sūfī's hope, says al-Sarrāj, is in God alone, and he hopes for nothing from God except God Himself.

Hope and Fear and Love are bound up together. "The lover" said Dhū al-Nūn, "does not pour out the cup of love until fear has made his heart ready." Love is the greatest of the mystic "states" and the most essential to the progress of the soul if it is to attain its goal; and this, like all the states, is a gift from God, who has enabled His servants to love Him. It is linked up with the states of longing (*shawq*) and intimate fellowship (*uns*). Love, says Muḥāsibī, is a strong yearning, the heart's remembrance of the One yearned for, and its expectation of the state of union. The love of the mystic is that pure love in which is no defilement, which thrusts out from the heart all baser affections until all is in God and to God. Love of this type leads to ecstasy and to the consciousness of the nearness of God, and of the soul's communion with Him. "Drink the wine of His love for thee," says Dhū al-Nūn, using the mystic symbolism of the poets, "that He may intoxicate thee with thy love for Him." That close fellowship with God which results from love, he describes as "the joy of the lover in the Beloved," a radiant light to the soul, and by that light the lover is enabled to look upon the Beloved and to know

the rapture of contemplation (*mushāhada*), when the seeker is face to face with the Sought. The heart of the worshipper is the real sanctuary, said Muḥammad b. al-Faḍl :—

For the true sanctuary is the place where contemplation is, and only that one to whom the whole world is the trysting-place where he draws near to God, and a place of retreat where he holds communion with Him, knows what it is to be the friend of God.

From that one who contemplates God in his heart all else is hidden and the self passes away into nothingness in that Divine Presence and there remains naught in the heart save God alone. "So God, revealing Himself in His Majesty, causes the carnal souls of His lovers to pass away, and, then by the revelation of His Beauty, gives immortality to their hearts." To the mystic, then, filled with love, and rapt in expectation of what God will reveal to him, is granted the Vision of the Divine Beauty. "It begins with flashes of light," says al-Qushayrī, in a vain attempt to describe that mystic experience, "then it appears as rays of light and then as the light shining forth in its full splendour." But in truth the unveiling of the Divine Glory is among the unspeakable things which it is not fitting, nor indeed possible, to describe, as al-Ghazālī reminds us. None should attempt to share that experience with any to whom God has not chosen to unveil Himself.

The seeker has attained through sight to certainty, and now has passed beyond the "stations" and

the "states" and has entered the higher sphere of the mystic Gnosis, that direct knowledge of God which comes only by the illumination and the revelation of God Himself. This is the final stage of the Path, for the traveller is now in sight of the Goal. The real meaning of Gnosis, says al-Hujwiri, is to know that all belongs to God. When ignorance has come to an end, the veils vanish and this life, by means of Gnosis, becomes one with the life to come. Gnosis comes from the Light of lights, and the soul of the gnostic now knows itself to be one with that Primal Essential Light and knows that it shall be joined with it once more, as the spark returns to the flame and is absorbed in it again.

So the traveller reaches the end of the journey, the soul passes away from itself, from all sense-impressions, from all creaturely knowledge, and attains to the annihilation of the personal self (*fanā*), which Suhrawardī states is the end of travelling to God. Jāmī said:—

The end of worshipping God is that the worshipper should pass away in worship from worship, and be absorbed in Him Whom he worships, and this is the state in which perishability perishes. (*fanā al-fanā*.)

Mortality is ended, but in dying to itself, the soul is reborn to a new life in God, and immortality has begun. Immortality (*baqā*), says Suhrawardī again, is the beginning of travelling in God, for the soul has now entered upon the Uni-

tive life in and with God. Hujwiri wrote:—

This is the perfection attained by the saints who have left behind them the toil of conflict and are free from the fetters of the "stations" and the vicissitudes of the "states" and whose search has ended in discovery. They have come to know all the secrets of the heart, and of set purpose have become annihilated to all desire, and having thus passed away from mortality, have attained to perfect immortality."

The gnostic who has attained is fitly described by some Sūfī writers as the "*wāqif*" (the one who stands still), for he desists from seeking and passes away into the Sought; he has no longer thoughts of "otherness," for him all apparent and transient values have been changed into their real and eternal values. "Now," Ibn al-'Arabi says, "'Thou' art 'He' and thou seest all thine actions to be His actions and all His attributes to be thine attributes, and thine essence to be His Essence." So the line of distinction is obliterated. From one point of view the One Reality is the Creative Truth, from another, He is that which is created, but the Essence is one and the same. The Path of the Soul has brought it to the end of the journey, through knowledge of itself, to knowledge of God, the Ultimate Reality, and so to the realisation that knower and Known are one, and that God is not only One, but One in All and All in All.*

MARGARET SMITH

* In addition to the Arabic and Persian authorities quoted, cf. also R. A. N. Nicholson, "*The Mystics of Islam*."

THE NATURE OF THINGS

[In this story **Théophilus** brings out an important fact of occultism. There is a time when a man comes to know that his mind will carry him no further. There are neutral and critical states which human consciousness encounters in its progressive awakenings. In its development through the instrument of mind it faces insoluble problems ; either it must fall back and admit itself defeated or it must find a vehicle superior to the mind and go through what to the mind is a thick, impenetrable wall. This superior vehicle, or, if it be preferred, state of human consciousness is Intuition. For most at the present stage of evolution, it expresses itself rarely and as a feeling—a kind of feeling. The deliberate unfoldment of this faculty of intuition, sometimes called pure and compassionate reason, is the basis of the Life of the Spirit or of Occultism. To be deliberate and wide awake in one's own consciousness cleansed of all emotions which colour and tarnish clear vision is the aim of the aspirant to Occultism which is the wisdom hidden behind all objects and events. Real clairvoyance is not seeing the invisible but understanding the visible, which understanding penetrates to the core and kernel of objects and events and perceives their very soul.—EDS.]

“ Civilisation has ever developed the physical and the intellectual at the cost of the psychic and spiritual.”

The Secret Doctrine II. 319.

This was the third day of frost and fog. An anticyclone of unusual extent stretched from central Europe to Greenland with its centre over the British Isles : and at Greenwich the barometer stood at 31.06.

Under this crushing weight of still air, London's vast output of smoke had had no way of escape. For two days it had hung as a black pall over City, West End and Suburbs. The streets had been clear of fog. Traffic had run normally by artificial light. But for more than forty-eight hours that immense scab of houses which disfigures seven hundred square miles of earth had not been blessed by a single ray of daylight.

And on this third day, the pall had descended into the streets, and traffic was almost at a standstill. In the early afternoon, the hills north and south of London had been

slowly enveloped, and by five o'clock the steadily falling bank of fog had settled down into the basin of the Thames. After that, the streets became almost impassable. The pervading umber cloud was so dense that the range of visibility was limited to a few feet. Beyond that was nothing but a mystery of darkness out of which approaching shapes loomed suddenly near at hand.

Through this turbid murk, the immense motor traffic of central London had become locked in one enormous jam. Buses, vans, cabs and private cars could do no more than jerk spasmodically forwards a few yards at a time, as the peering driver or his walking guide—conductor, van-boy, or footman—saw the tail-light ahead of him melt into the darkness.

At the movements when the traffic made its brief surge onwards

the streets resounded with the harsh stutter of changing gears, the clamour of shouted warnings and directions, the momentary rumble of heavy vehicles. But between those spasms of effort, there was little sound except the steady murmur of running engines, of furtive steps on the pavement and the low tones of suppressed voices. During those intervals, London seemed to be strangely silent.

When the fog had first come down, it had been the subject of much Cockney humour. The majority of Londoners, their sense of abnormal occurrence already stirred by two days of darkness, had treated it as an entertaining break in the monotony of their routine existences. The fog became for them a diversion, an adventure, an experience of which they might presently boast. But this early elation gradually gave way to a feeling of frustration and imprisonment. Long before the streets were finally cleared towards midnight, the temper of the crowd was that of impatience, annoyance, resentful anger. At the back of every mind was the thought: "I wish I were out of this."

That thought came, for example, most insistently to Arthur Howes as he stood before the window of his flat in West Kensington and stared out into a blankness relieved only by a faint blur of light from the tall lamp-standard immediately below him. It was now midnight, and it had taken him two hours to cover the two miles that separated him from the Imperial Institute

where he had been speaking to an unusually meagre audience. He had driven his own car home and had more than once been tempted to abandon it by the roadside and feel his way back by the area railings. It was the first time in his life that he had suffered that oppressive sense of frustration, of impotence, of being snared and impeded by intangible resistances that no effort of his could overcome. Never before had he uttered that random prayer: "I wish I were out of this."

He had hitherto found no cause for prayer. He had always been successful—at his Preparatory and Public Schools, at Oxford, at the Hospital, in Harley Street. He had a fine brain and a vivid intelligence; he was a brilliant writer. As a psychologist he was already ranked with Jung, and he was not yet forty. Honours and prosperity were his already, but a greater thing than these was expected from him. His book on "Personality" had come nearer to giving a scientific account of the functions of those mysterious elements in the human complex, memory, mind and consciousness, than any previous work had ever done. His many admirers believed that Arthur Howe would one day endow the world with a comprehensible explanation of the wonder of being.

And to-night, as he stood staring into the obscurity of that umber fog, it came to him that the magic key which would open the way to that final, evasive mystery was very near to his hand. He had had

a new and valuable experience that evening; and had been, he believed, on the very verge of recognising the controlling limitation that bounded the exercise of mind and free-will. His enclosure and frustration by the fog had seemed to be an allegory of something vital and vastly important which he could not quite grasp. The meaning was almost within his reach and yet escaped him, as might the substance of a dream of which he could remember only the emotion.

He had been standing at the window for nearly an hour, lost in deep contemplation before he decided that the clue was slipping from him and that the generative experience must be repeated. It was now one o'clock in the morning and the fog was as thick as ever. He would get his car from the garage and drive again through the horror of this cloaking darkness.

There were twenty degrees of frost that night, and he changed from evening dress to thick tweeds and put on a heavy fur coat. It was nearly two o'clock when, having overcome the remonstrances of the night-shift at the garage, he set out on his journey. He did not know why he drove westward, out of London. He had no thought, then, of escape, but only of renewing his experience of driving through the fog.

It seemed as if his were the only car on the road that night, and by keeping close to the kerb he was able to maintain a fairly steady speed of some ten miles an hour.

Now and again at the crossings he got down and made a short exploration on foot; but by the time he reached Kew, the fog as seen in the light of the head lamps was beginning to change colour, fading from umber to orange yellow, to grey, and at last, after he had passed through Hounslow, to a thick white mist.

And not until he was running at an easy thirty miles an hour along the deserted Bath Road, did Arthur Howe realise that his experiment had, after all, never been made. Not once since he had left the garage had he experienced that sense of confinement and frustration. The reason for that leapt into his mind without being sought. When he had returned from the Imperial Institute to his flat, he had been intent on finding a definite object within a limited time, and had been compelled to acknowledge that in attempting that task a man may be stultified and confuted by material conditions. But when he had been travelling without any specific object or time-limitation, he had been entirely free from any feeling of constraint. The deduction was obvious, nevertheless he had again that illusive sense of a vital interpretation just beyond his grasp.

He had passed through Colenbrook when he rose suddenly above the white mist that had enveloped him since he passed out of London. It was as if he came unexpectedly to the surface of a pale, tenuous sea and from the mounting land could look down

upon the spread of vast mysterious waters. Above him the circle of the full moon shone with a clear, cold light, fit lamp for the fairy-land into which he had been so wonderfully transported.

For the grass at the wayside, the hedges, the trees, everything within sight was clad in a garment of black and silver, ebony in the shadows, sparkling with hoar-frost where it reflected the serene light of the enchanting moon.

Arthur Howe stopped his car by a gate, and sat gazing out across the great sea of mist that filled the valley of the Thames. He felt as if he had been lifted above the clouds, to a realm of peace beyond the incessant, aimless struggles of mankind, out of the dingy oppressions and confinements of ugliness into a world of chaste and shining beauty. It seemed to him that he and his car were the only disfigurements in this land of silver serenity.

He had been sitting there for some minutes, leaning over the steering wheel, lost in a deep abstraction, his mind alert and yet immensely still, when the figure of a man emerged from the shadow of the field and came to the gate. His long frieze overcoat, and the short grey curls of his hair and beard were rimed with frost. He, at least, was in harmony with his surroundings.

For a moment or two, he stood silent, his left hand on the top rail of the gate, the right apparently supporting some bulky object that he carried in the breast of his long coat, and then he said quietly, "So

you've escaped?"

"Escaped? From what?" Arthur Howe enquired.

"The foulness and the murk of cities," the strange man replied. "All day I see men passing here, their eyes on the road, flying from one town to the next, with never a thought that isn't a town-thought. London, Slough, Windsor, Maidenhead, Reading, Bristol, there's always a town for them at the journey's end. No escape for them."

"Then why do you say that I've escaped?" Arthur Howe asked.

"I saw it in your face," the stranger said. "It's the look that comes when a man of your sort stays from thinking."

"Of my sort?"

"Aye, you've the look of a man that's trusted his mind, and is coming to the end of it. There's a time when a man like you comes to know that his mind'll carry him no further. He has done all he can and he can do no more with it."

"And then?"

"Then he'll either go on doing again all he's done before, or he'll find himself."

"How can he find himself?"

"By keeping his mind still and waiting for the guidance of the spirit. But it won't come to him in the towns and cities. There's such a mort of things for him to think about and do, and all the other minds about working on him, so that his thoughts are never quiet from morn to night running hither and yon like a great nest of ants. It's what cities are, great nests of ants, always busy shifting

crumbs of earth from one place to another."

Arthur Howe became aware that the magic key he had sought had been put into his hand, but the door that it would unlock led into neither laboratory nor library but into an illimitable void. He knew, at that moment, with a great certainty that his life and work as a scientist was finished. He had gone as far as any man could go in his research for the scientific explanation of being, and had come, as all science must come sooner or later, to the limitation that confines every material account of the universe. For mind can deal only with manifestations, phenomena, not with the spirit, the noumenon, since that is of a different order.

"Where did you learn all this?" he asked.

"Not from books," was the reply. "There's naught but dead knowledge to be found in books. What I've learnt, little enough it is, has come from feeling the nature of things, by living with 'em. You can't do that in the towns. There is too much rush and hurry. If you want to feel the nature of things you must keep your mind still."

It was all true. Arthur Howe knew that it was all true.

"What are you? A shepherd?" he asked.

"Aye! I came up to-night to help a ewe, but the cold killed her. Mid-February's too early, but them in the cities must have their meat out o' season, it seems. I've got the lamb under my coat. She's warm. I can feel her heart against me. We'll raise her by hand."

THEOPHILUS

It is with the advent of the divine Dynasties that the first civilizations were started. And while, in some regions of the Earth, a portion of mankind preferred leading a nomadic and patriarchal life, and in others savage man was hardly learning to build a fire and to protect himself against the Elements, his brothers—more favoured than he by their *Karma*, and helped by the divine intelligence which informed them—built cities, and cultivated arts and sciences. Nevertheless, and civilization notwithstanding, while their pastoral brethren enjoyed wondrous powers as their birthright, they, the builders, could now obtain theirs only gradually; even these being generally used for power over physical nature and selfish and unholy purposes. Civilization has ever developed the physical and the intellectual at the cost of the psychic and spiritual. The command and the guidance over his own psychic nature, which foolish men now associate with the supernatural, were with early Humanity innate and congenital, and came to man as naturally as walking and thinking.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY : *The Secret Doctrine* Vol. II, pp. 318-19

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

ALBERT SCHWEITZER ON INDIAN THOUGHT

[Lilian M. Russell worked with Dr. Schweitzer about whom she wrote in our issue of June 1932. Last autumn she acted as interpreter of his Hibbert Lectures (London and Oxford) and Gifford Lectures (Edinburgh). In the next autumn she is herself bringing out a book entitled "General Rigby, Zanzibar and the Slave-Trade". She is the only daughter of Major-General C. P. Rigby who passed much of his life, from 1836 to 1866, in India and was British Agent and Consul at Zanzibar 1858-1861.

Below she sketches the contents of a new volume by the celebrated Alsatian, warning us that "it is not intended as a review. I should not like to prejudice the chances of the book, when the translation appears, by receiving a review from some learned Indian scholar." That task will certainly have to be taken up in the interests of knowledge and in justice to Indian thought. The personality of Albert Schweitzer has a romantic attraction. A doctor of theology, a doctor of philosophy, and a doctor of medicine, well-known in the world of music he is famous also as a philanthropist and a servant of his fellow-men. To criticise his views of Indian ideas and thinkers from this article would not be fair; but it arouses sufficient curiosity, and attention of Indian philosophers is invited to the volume.—EDS.]

It will be glad news to many students in both East and West that Dr. Albert Schweitzer's latest book, recently published in Germany, is entitled "*Die Weltanschauung der Indischen Denker*" (The World-view of the Indian Thinkers). Those who have followed his work will have noticed that he has for years been deeply interested in Indian Philosophy and not a little influenced by it. As it is common knowledge that Dr. Schweitzer devotes what little leisure remains from activity on behalf of his African jungle Hospital to the completion of his Philosophy of Civilisation, there may be some surprise that he has found time to write a book on the above subject. The simple explanation is that in the course of his studies for Volume III of the Philosophy he accumulated a vast mass of Indian material—

the matrix of the turquoise which is to form a chapter of his *magnum opus*—and believed it would be useful to many who feel somewhat lost among the weighty tomes of the original scholars. He is eager to make the thought of India better known to Europeans, and this handy volume both profound and suggestive should serve his purpose well.

He traces Indian thought from its earliest beginnings, pointing out how its world-view (*Weltanschauung*) has been unswervingly based on mysticism—mysticism which is faith in the ideal of union of the human being with the Universal Spirit. This loyalty to its ideal is the strength of Indian thought. But along with its strength is also a weakness. The Brahmins introduced the principle of negation, the denial of the value of life in itself; and this

principle has embarrassed and hampered the development of Indian thought. It is this principle too that makes it so hard for Western thinkers to assimilate and sympathise with Indian Thought. Indians are wrong, says the author when they criticise Europeans for their lack of inwardness, spirituality and mysticism. They ignore the great schools of mysticism in the West, and are not aware that mysticism failed to make headway in Europe because men could not reconcile it with the reality of life in the world. What is wanted now is that Western and Eastern thinkers, humbly realising how much they have to learn from each other, should get together in spirit and continue their search for Truth on new lines. This book should help Eastern students to an understanding of European thinkers no less than those in the West, for whom it is primarily written, to an appreciation of the thinkers of the East.

The outlook of negation is so unnatural that it has been impossible to hold it consistently. Even the Brahmins have been forced to admit the necessity for a certain degree of activity. Indians are sometimes puzzled that Western peoples whom they criticise as lacking in contact with the Divine are compared with themselves so much greater in social achievements, in all they do for the poor and suffering. It is their own world-view that is at fault. If life is not a good and valuable thing which it is our religious duty to preserve and promote

and further by every means in our power, then there is no reason why men and women should give themselves to the service of their fellows. If negation were consistently followed, not a finger would be lifted to alleviate the suffering caused by famine, plague or earthquake. Dr. Schweitzer traces gradual concessions to the reality of the world and life in Indian thought, until in the views of Rabindranath Tagore the change is complete, resulting in an optimistic, altogether affirmative world-view.

Europe is engrossed in activity of all kinds; until we quite forget the main purpose of life, spiritual union with the Divine. We have much to learn from the principle of negation; and have no actual right to our easy optimism before considering this, to us, alien world-view. From the East we can learn the oneness of life and that all its forms are deserving of reverence.

In the Vedic hymns we see that men took a simple delight in life itself and at first it was only Yogis and Brahmins who thought of renouncing it. In practice, though not in theory, activity was always valued in popular Hinduism. The idea of active love was very strong indeed, in the Kural for instance. Now, reinforced by ethics, the idea of activity is winning the day and necessarily defeating the Brahmanic ideal of negation.

In his chapter (III) on the Upanishads Dr. Schweitzer points out that the Brahmanic mysticism of union and identity with the Infinite, is of quite a different nature

from European mysticism. "In the latter man gives himself up to the Infinite in humble devotion and in the Infinite is absorbed; in Brahmanic mysticism he realises with pride that in his own being he carries Infinite Being within himself."

"Compared with the Brahmanic super-man, Nietzsche's is a miserable creature. The Brahmanic super-man is exalted over the whole universe, Nietzsche's merely over human society."

The Brahmin regard for truth is magnificent. As a caste of priests, with quite exceptional nobility they actually follow the truth even when it endangers their own privileges and interests. But their mysticism has nothing to do with ethics and the Being to whom they are united in a state of ecstasy has no ethical qualities. They frankly say, "The immortal man overcomes both the thoughts 'I did evil' and 'I did good.' Good and bad, done or not done, cause him no pain."¹ (For those who remain in ordinary life the customary ideas of good and evil of course remain valid.) It is because of its ethical concept that the doctrine of Reincarnation comes to replace the Brahmanic doctrine that all souls are automatically reabsorbed into the Universal Soul.

The chapters which follow are concerned with the salient features of the Sāmkhya doctrine, Jainism and Buddhism. Of the first the author says, "The Sāmkhya doctrine is a wonderful achievement. Rarely in human thought

has a theoretical problem been so clearly recognised; rarely has a solution been undertaken and achieved with such clear judgment." By Jainism the idea of being exalted above the world is replaced by that of keeping unspotted by the world—"an event full of significance for the thought of India!" It is to this idea and to the principle of non-activity demanded by negation that the Ahimsā commandment owes its origin, not to the idea of compassion, as is so often assumed. The Brahmins must have adopted Ahimsā from the Jains, for it is incredible that the idea of not killing should have originated with them whose calling as priests required the slaughter of the sacrificial victims. Although Ahimsā did not originate in compassion, it fostered it and prepared the way for further advance, so that "the laying down of the commandment not to kill and not to harm is one of the greatest events in the spiritual history of mankind." The Jains seem to have been the first to realize that ethics know no bounds. It is due to them that Ahimsā has been preserved throughout so many centuries. It has often been taken for granted that the Buddha originated this commandment, but He only adopted it, and did not observe it so strictly as the Jains, for He did not altogether prohibit the eating of meat. What He did originate however was an ethic of compassion, limited unfortunately by the principle of non-activity. The Buddhist has to avoid the per-

* Brahad Āranyka Upanishad, IV. 4.

formance of pitiless actions, but he is not bidden to give active, sympathetic help either to man or beast. To the Buddha all life is suffering, and the only way to relieve it is by thinking—by renouncing the will to live. Thus the Buddha's "is rather a compassion of the understanding than the direct sympathy of the heart which carries within it the impulse to help." He wanted to change spiritual conditions in the world: with material things he was little concerned. By "right action" He meant only the avoidance of evil. And nearly all His teaching was addressed only to monks—to people who had renounced the world. In practice He must have often followed the dictates of his own warm heart, as when he found a monk ill with dysentery lying in his filth and with his own hands washed him and changed his bed. But that the Buddha, the preacher of compassion, in theory makes man occupied with his own redemption only, not with that of all living creatures, is a weakness of his teaching. In the later Mahāyāna-Buddhism, by a logical development, this becomes incomprehensible and so the teaching follows that the man who gains his freedom from reincarnation shall voluntarily renounce Nirvana and return to earth to strive for the deliverance of every creature that shares the unhappy gift of life. Yet, noble as it is, Mahāyāna-Buddhism is still entangled in negation and cannot become fully effective.

After an excursion to China,

Tibet and Japan, Dr. Schweitzer devotes the greater part of his tenth chapter to the 9th Century commentator, Saṃkara. The doctrine of Maya, rejected by the Brahmasutras, Saṃkara recognises as a logical conclusion of the theory of Brahman; but the world of the senses nevertheless has for him practical reality and value. Thus he becomes the great representative of the doctrine of twofold truth. He teaches the highest esoteric truth of union and identity with the Universal Brahman, and the lower, exoteric truth of the doctrine of reincarnation and a Brahman-divinity. By the higher truth the reality of the sensuous world is denied, by the lower it is assumed. But Saṃkara still holds that redemption from reincarnation depends on knowledge and faith alone, not on ethical conduct, whose only result is to procure a better reincarnation.

In the *Bhagavad-Gītā* Hinduism faces the problem not only of whether action is justifiable, but even whether at times non-ethical action is admissible. Dr. Schweitzer considers that this famous book has been very much idealised by Europeans who have been so impressed by its beauty that they have failed to note its shortcomings in the matter of ethical teaching. Love of Deity is for it an end in itself and it does not make that love express itself in action and service. Deity—who is beyond all good and evil—requires it; man must consent to engage in non-ethical activity. This is the penalty the *Bhagavad-Gītā* has to pay for

adhering to the world-view of negation !

The veneration accorded to Rāma from the Middle Ages onward is of great significance in the development of Indian thought, for Rāma, the deified hero, is an ethical god. Rāmānanda in the 15th Century teaches a devotion to him which finds expression in loving-kindness even to the poorest and most despised of mankind.

In the nineteenth century the trend of Indian thought towards the ethical gains impetus in many distinguished personalities from Rām Mohan Rai onward, who though great in the field of religion and ethics, are not outstanding thinkers, for they fail in the problem of reconciliation between life-affirmation and life-denying mysticism. They are prisoners of tradition and dare not admit advancement beyond the sacred Upanishads.

Dr. Schweitzer notes that in this neo-Indian thought the problem of winning redemption from reincarnation has quite fallen into the background, so that the fear of transmigration no longer plays a part. Union with Brahman is sought for its own sake, and thus Indian mysticism regains its spontaneity and freedom.

That Rabindranāth Tagore in the name of ethics decides for life-affirmation is a great achievement. But that he tries to read his own views into the Upanishads is a weakness. His mode of thought bears resemblance to that of

eighteenth century rationalists in that He believes that only beauty, harmony and order rule and that all unhappiness will be resolved into happiness, all disharmony into harmony. That we do not understand the universe and can never hope to understand it is far from his thought.

Both Western and Eastern philosophies are going through a period of change. The former has had to recognise that its foundations built on imagined knowledge are illusory and insecure. It needs to find a new basis for its ethical world and life-affirmation in realism. For the latter the problem is to renounce negation and adjust itself to the opposite principle. It will have to give up fantasy and poetry and make itself independent of tradition, in other words abandon all that is foreign to the spirit of reality. "The pathway from imperfect to perfect recognised Truth leads through the valley of reality. European thought has already descended into this valley. Indian thought is still on the hill on this side of it. If it wishes to climb to the hill beyond, it must first go down into the valley."

"So Western and Indian thought together face the task of finding for the mysticism of ethical world and life-affirmation foundation based on reality."

The translation of this work, will be eagerly awaited in India as in England.

LILIAN M. RUSSELL

DREAMS AND FOLKLORE

In her introductory chapter, the author says that the dreams in Old Norse literature are the only dreams of the heathen Teutonic people on record, and they include a proportion of Christian dreams. Very industriously, with detailed references to original sources, and translations of actual dreams recorded, Miss Kelchner has examined and tried to classify the themes of the old Norse dreams and to relate them with their affinities in folklore.

Obviously the material here surveyed has indirectly a universal interest: a concentrated study like this offers a kind of model of how dream material becomes a part of literature, and in its symbolism outreaches the local and temporary environment of the dreamers.

I imagine, however, that the author and the majority of her readers would attach primary importance to the light shed upon the early Teutonic people as it passed from a heathen poetic tradition to the new and disturbing Christian faith, which, as we know, was often but a veneer of conscious belief covering ancient and deeply ingrained ideas and superstitions.

As a contribution to the study of early Teutonic civilisation, Miss Kelchner has made her monograph a treasury of literary references and suggestive facts, though the difficulty of reading so closely packed a treatise is unfortunately increased by her awkward and cliché-ridden style in English. It seems a pity, too, that after the first two chapters she abandoned the English spelling of Norse names, thus making her text very difficult for any but an Icelandic scholar.

Her examination of the dreams culled from the Eddas, the prose Saga and Skaldic poetry and their relation with folklore is packed with interest both psychological and historical. You see how the restless and warlike Scandinavians in their dreams were moved usually by hopes and fears of adversity and prosperity, and how the desirable gifts varied from success over an enemy (especially during adversity) to success as a bard (generally in a prosperous time). Her chapters on "Symbolic Images in Dreams" are especially important in their general application, and as we survey with Miss Kelchner the Norse dreams of Fetches, Guardian, Spirits, Trolls and Gods, it is not possible to avoid a little mind-wandering, to find comparisons as far afield as in Mahomedan and Greek oneirocriticism, though she never goes further abroad than Irish and Scottish legends.

Yes, to me the greatest interest of the dream material here displayed is its ordinariness, its similarity with dreams of other peoples separated widely in time and space from the early Scandinavians. It is true, as the author recognises, that the dream soon becomes a literary convention, but the reality of experience persists usually and is unmistakable long afterwards. In concluding a somewhat sparse account of a well packed study, let me quote one of Miss Kelchner's most interesting generalisations:

Although the prophetic dream constitutes an effective and convenient means of welding together literary material, it is, in view of its emphasis on fate and its intense interest in the things of this world, a typical expression of heathenism; in the same way, the folklore dream, with its insistence on the life beyond the grave, is, as has been mentioned before, a characteristic product of the Christian ideal.

R. L. MEGROZ

* *Dreams in Old Norse Literature and Their Affinities in Folklore* with an Appendix containing the Icelandic Texts and Translations. By GEORGIA DUNHAM KELCHNER (Cambridge University Press, London. 10s. 6d.)

ON SAIVAISM

There appears to be an unfortunate confusion of purpose about this book: apologetics have got the better of definition. Promising to set out the characteristics of Śaivaism, as distinguished from what may be called orthodox Hinduism, the author has made his task the occasion to cover a very much wider field, and in his exposition of the doctrinal and ethical purpose of a particular sect, has incorporated a general study, not only of comparative religions, but of religion itself: its decline and its hopes of resuscitation. This is the more unfortunate in that "The philosophic part of Śaivaism has found very little place in this book, as the purpose of this work is to present only that side of Śaivaism which has a direct bearing on daily life." Since Mr. Shivapadasundaram believes: "proselytizing must cease. The public must regard it as a crime against humanity and the State and society must penalise it,"—the purpose of his work would appear to have been much better served by an historical and philosophic statement of the distinctive characteristics of Saivaism, as contrasted with other faiths, rather than by the somewhat perfervid and platitudinous advocacy of doctrinal religion in general.

Superficial glancings at the superficial absurdities of other forms of religious belief are a poor substitute for reasoned exposition either of the philosophic superiority of any particular belief, or of an historical account of how a particular sect came into being, and by what distinctive principles it maintains adherence. That English student, avid for the facts, meets with far too many doubtful generalizations of ethical persuasion such as:—

Knowledge useful only to a few cannot be good enough for a large number.

As even the most saintly man has the urge to go higher, there is no limit at which the urge

stops. The objective of the urge is therefore perfection. We may therefore define religion as the inward power which urges all living beings to strive to reach higher and higher stages, the highest being perfection.

But mere doctrines are not of much consequence to the evolution of the soul, and the view that all religions are different paths to the ultimate goal is as untenable as the belief of the bigot that his religion alone can take a soul to God, since it is the capacity of the soul that counts and not the guidance given by books.

Philosophically Mr. Shivapadasundaram stands in a very elementary class. He is capable of making the most doubtful statements with the conclusive air which only a novitiate can compass. Nowhere is this more clearly and disastrously shown than in the chapter entitled "God". Here we are presented with those dogmatic statements upon the objective nature of God that have always been provocative of Atheism in the enquiring mind. This, surely, must be intolerable to the people of a country which, more than any other, has always recognised the subjective nature of the apprehension of God, and by making its evocation of the unspeakable name a negation has acknowledged the insurmountable limitation of the Finite in any attempt to give definition to the Infinite.

The Nature of God is at once the first enquiry of the childish mind and the last apprehension of the conscious soul. Between them lies a hinterland of totally false reasoning, wherein the subject of consciousness is divorced from consciousness and made the object of pure intelligence. And there, in truth, God cannot be known. As the New Testament teaches: "The world by wisdom knew not God." Nothing is more provocative of theological doubt than the attempt to give objective finality to the conception of God. The first utterance of dogma is a challenge to common sense. And it is easy to see why this must be so;

for that which is all-inclusive cannot be subsumed by partiality, and no intellectual statement can be made which is free from the partiality of the finite mind. "It is impossible to think of the heavenly without some image of the earthly." Consciousness proceeds from the subjective, to the objective, and can proceed in no other way. That is why the conscious mind necessarily rejects dogma; for dogma inverts the order: it presents us with the postulate of God and in so doing bars the passage of the soul to its own path of apprehension. "A list of God's attributes" is the vainest of all catalogues. In vain does Mr. Shivapada-sundaram prove that the performance of miracles would be "attributing to God the human frailty of favouritism"; for what is any love but the bestowal of favour? In vain does he say of God; "Neither has He likes and dislikes";

for such a conception nullifies itself, since, humanly speaking, that which is without preference is incapable of distinguishing good from evil, the living from the dead, an ordered from a chaotic universe. Even to say: "It is just as immaterial to Him whether we worship Him or despise Him" is to assert that God is wanting in a quality of sensitivity common to every human being.

All such statements only go to show the absurdity of attempting to give objective finality to the Infinite. It is against the whole attempt—in contradistinction to the whole tendency—that theosophical philosophy stands opposed. And it matters not whether dogma proceeds from East or West—against its puerile finalities we must set our faces, knowing that religion begins in fidelity to experience and in no intellectual postulate whatsoever.

MAX PLOWMAN

KANT AND SANKAR

This book is a compendious abridgement of Professor Norman Smith's translation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* which was in itself an achievement of the first magnitude. Here I propose to examine in some detail a few of its ideas in the light of Indian philosophic method and thought. Kant's *Critique* represents a reaction as much against the empirical school of thought as against the ultra rationalist school in Western philosophy, laying thus the foundations of the Western Idealistic School in Epistemology. The salient ideas of the critique briefly stated, are as follows:—

(I) Kant believes that the *whole* of knowledge does not arise out of experience, though a part of it arises out of it. The part that arises out of experience is merely the raw material which can be transformed into knowl-

edge. He posits two *a priori* forms, Space and Time, as the necessary preconditions of perception. He further tells us that these two forms are indispensable and envelop every act of perception. Perceptions are impossible for Kant without these *a priori* forms.

(II) The perceptions of the senses within the Space-Time framework are worked upon by the understanding with the aid of a dozen indispensable *a priori* categories. These categories are Unity, Totality, Plurality, etc. They are the patterns of all thought and they are synthesised into a unity, whence knowledge results.

(III) Kant divides reality into two parts, first the Noumenon, about which we cannot predicate anything, for human reason has no applicability in that realm. Secondly, the phenomenal realm. Human knowledge is confined only to this part. The categories

of understanding and the forms of perception work only in this realm. So, according to Kant, we can only know the thing as it appears, and not the thing in itself.

(IV) Finally Kant states that though Pure Reason cannot prove the existence of God, the Soul and Immortality, we have to take them as the moral imperatives dictated by our Practical Reason. The ontological, the causal and the design arguments cannot prove the existence of God. God is a moral postulate and an ideal to be used.

Let us examine these ideas in the light of Indian philosophy, with a view to finding out in what respects Kant's epistemology has been anticipated and in what respects improved upon definitely by Sankara. Primarily to Sankara, the object of knowledge is Brahman. He posited Brahman and asserted that it was the only reality. Kant on the other hand abruptly stops with the Noumenon and fails to tell us what its purpose is. He posits the Noumenal realm to make the phenomenal world intelligible. Kant explains the relation of the phenomenal to the Noumenal world in terms of cause and effect. It is a piece of self-contradiction to introduce the category of causation for explaining the Noumenal where he himself says that it is inapplicable. Sankara's Brahman is not a mere ideal to be used like the God of Kant, but the ultimate reality to be experienced, the ground and the goal of existence. Brahman is not a mere regulative concept arising as a result of the demand of morality, but an object of spiritual experience whose existence is taken for granted on the authority of the Srutis. Sankara explains the world of phenomena as a continuous stream of illusions. Sankara with his inimitable, scientific and logical frame of mind suspended his judgment about the phenomenal world and its relation to the Noumenal. He said it is indescribable (*Anirvacha-*

niya). He was a sceptic in the sense that the human intellect cannot grasp the nature of the ultimate reality. Sankara as well as Kant are both realists in their theories of knowledge in the phenomenal realm. Sankara also posits the raw material of knowledge and tells us that the categories bring knowledge to the empirical self.

Sankara destroys the eternal riddle of epistemology, namely: If the known object is different from the knower, how does the knower come to know it? If mind is mind and matter is matter, how does mind come to know matter?—by reducing the content of all the three factors of knowledge, the knower, the known, and the instrument of knowledge to one primordial mindstuff. Sankara's solution of this riddle is definitely superior both in its framework and in its results. He does not fail to grapple with the problem, nor does his solution involve the fallacy of *petitio principii* as some ill-instructed Western critics are apt to think. Sankara's epistemology when compared with Kant's is more coherent and indisputably better articulated.

The chief defect of Kant's epistemological structure is the high place given to reason. His Reason, however, is another name for intuition. He is an intuitionist. It must be said to his credit that he exploded the sensationist psychology of his day and established an elaborate theory of knowledge. He examined the telescope before he turned it upon the stars. In the words of Prof. Ward, Kant tried to make human reason either Cæsar or nothing at all and thus spoiled a case for a constitutional monarchy. The moral law within and the starry heavens above about which Kant so often spoke are akin to the perceptions of our own Upanishadic seers. The imperfections of his epistemology do not however detract from his transcendent eminence in philosophy. Assuredly his place is among the great thinkers of the world.

Taqdir and Predestination. By MAULANA MUHAMMAD ALI (Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at-i-Islam, Lahore).

From the orthodox and theological point of view this is an interesting and a learned dissertation on fate and free will; but is full of barren discussions and unethical conclusions—a typical illustration of warped theological reasoning. The thread of argument is cut into a thousand shreds which have been woven with dexterous ingenuity into a multicoloured pattern, the effect of which is indeed bizarre. Our Maulana is trying to prove that according to Islamic teachings man is responsible for his acts and deeds—as indeed he is—but interprets quotations from the *Quran* and *Āḥadith* in such a manner that as a consequence man can get away scot free from all responsibility.

Taqdir . . . is the universal law of God operating in the case of man as in the rest of nature. (p. 3). He has no doubt created man; he *has also created the circumstances under which he lives and acts*; but still He has endowed man with a discrimination to choose how to act, which he can exercise *under certain limitations* . . . (p. 6). All men are created sinless, all men are created pure . . . (p. 18). “ . . . notwithstanding all the limitations he is free to exercise his will . . . (p. 7). ‘Death or distress is due to circumstances over which man has no control . . .’ (p. 11). Every child is born a Muslim and if he is initiated into a wrong religion, it is not God’s action, but the action of his parents or his own action (p. 23).

What a mosaic of self-contradictory statements! Quotations could be multiplied to show the fallacious reasoning. Every child is said to be “created sinless . . . pure . . . with the right impress” (p. 23). Some children show signs of intelligence, even genius, from birth, while others are born congenital idiots. Who is responsible for such terrible inequalities from birth? What have these pure and sinless souls done to merit such cruel differences if they have come into human bodies for the first time? Again, where did man incur this destiny if he is born pure and sinless? This theological confusion of thought arises from a wholly

erroneous concept of Deity, which is conceived as an extracosmic Power or “Being,” which “creates” the universe. Our author calls God the “Creator” of the universe and an “Infinite Being” and endows “Him” with anthropomorphic attributes of “mercy” and “displeasure”. How can a “Being”—a conditioned existence—be “Infinite”? In the *Quran* itself *Allah* is described as Light. Light has ever been the symbol of manifested Deity—the one principle of Life or eternal motion. Man, like all else, is an expression of this one principle of Life. In man life has attained self-consciousness, hence man has the power to choose. His will *per se* is absolutely free. If at times he finds it difficult to express his will, it is due to Karma or Taqdir, which he himself has made in the past by the wrong use of his free will. To correctly understand the doctrine of Taqdir the aid of mystic philosophy and not verbose theology is needed. Taqdir is the same as Karma, and like the Hindu doctrine is very much misunderstood.

Death or distress is due to circumstances over which man has no control. . . . (p. 11)

This is the most unethical teaching. If man were to believe that he had no responsibility for and no control over the suffering that comes to him it will not only make him bitter against the supposed dispenser of pain and pleasure but demoralize his whole life. It will tempt him to beg and supplicate for favours that none can give. There are “no privileges or special gifts in man, save those won by his own Ego through personal effort and merit throughout a long series of reincarnations”—successive human lives on earth. Similarly “there is not an accident in our lives, not a misshapen day, or a misfortune, that could not be traced back to our own doings in this or in another life”.

M. A. BARI KHAN

The Celestial Hierarchies of Dionysius the Areopagite Trans. by Editors of The Shrine of Wisdom, (London.)

Done into English from the original Greek by the Editors of the "Shrine of Wisdom" the Manual No. 15 entitled "Celestial Hierarchies", attempts to give an account of the three Triads of Celestial Intelligences which constitute as it were the spiritual connecting links between the Almighty Lord and aspiring souls. The Celestial Hierarchies are the agents of the Almighty Lord whose work they are appointed and enjoined to carry out.

While according to Dionysius the orders of the celestial beings are innumerable for us,—ten thousand times ten thousand, multiplying and repeating the very highest numbers we have, (p. 47)—the Hindu account of angels (Devatas) is restricted to thirty-three crores (Trayastrisatkoti). All theistic systems are obliged to admit the existence of a veritable hierarchy of angels to whom is entrusted the task of the governance of the cosmos for all outward appearance as a matter of fact, however much the Immanent Lord be the dynamic energiser of all. Madhva in his *Anuvyakhyana* has sketched a hierarchy of Gods commencing from Pushkara who stands at the bottom-most rung of the ladder and rising to Brahma or Mukhya-Prana who stands at the topmost rung thereof. Mahalakshmi and the Supreme Lord Narayana are *not* included in the hierarchy as they transcend and control it. The *Taittiriya-Upanishad* makes mention of a hierarchy of gods from a different standpoint. The hierarchy is reproduced in replica in our own nervous mechanism. The microcosm is just a recapitulation of macrocosm as ontogeny is a recapitulation of phylogeny. The Tattvas are so to speak the raw material of the nervous mechanism. Each Tattva has a presiding or controlling deity (Abhimani-Devata). There is the finite self. There is also the Immanent Lord (Dvasuparna-sayujasakhayau).

The strictest Vedantic quest has nothing to do with the number and the mysteries of celestial hierarchies. The Lord, in all theistic systems is to be worshipped as the Creator of the Cosmos and as the Immanent dynamic Energiser of everything in the cosmos from the meanest to the most magnificent (Tena-vina-trinamapi-na-chalati). Without His Energising not even a blade of grass will move. Devotion to this or that God who presides over wealth, or learning, or power etc. indicates a fall from the exalted Vedantic Ideal. Devotion should be directed only to the Supreme Reality and in that devotional worship the fact should not be lost sight of that He is the only Independent Power (Svatantra), and that all else is dependent on Him for very existence (Para tantra). Within the Universe of discourse determined by theological systems, hierarchies of angels may be believed to have been entrusted with this or that task, but, when a transition is effected from theology into the province of philosophy and philosophic discipline proper preoccupation with hierarchies of angels may even inhibit higher types of Yogic concentration and devotion.

An aspirant is not showing any lack or want of respect or devotion to the members of the celestial hierarchy. Life is short. There is only a little way to fly. The bird is already on the wing in the picturesque phraseology of Omar Khayyam. There is no need for him to concentrate his attention on the hierarchy in question. On the contrary all available spiritual energy should be directed to securing the Grace of the Supreme Lord which alone is the means of freedom from the ills of existence. The celestial hierarchy of Dionysius based on the New and Old Testament texts and the Hindu hierarchy (Devata-taratamya krama) grounded on Upanishadic and Puranic, and Smriti texts converge in the direction of the central purpose of indicating the Glory and Majesty of the Supreme Lord of the Universe.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Matter, Myth and Spirit. By DOROTHEA CHAPLIN. (Simpkin, Marshall, Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

Evidence has been accumulating in recent years of the spread of primitive Hindu Culture to various parts of the earth; and the book under review records the cultural affinities between Sanskritic India, Keltic Britain and Central America. The title which may be rendered as *Prakriti, Purusha* and the *Māyā* between, may seem rather ambitious; but the contents are seen to deal in general with these aspects in culture, so far as the scope of the study is concerned. Though the subject matter presented is more a series of notes than a continuous and constructive account, these studies contain a bewildering variety of material, the wonder-weaving legends of pre-history, archæology, geography, literature, medicine, astronomy, folklore, music and the arts. They show also an intuitive and intellectual sympathy which is highly essential for such a comparative study.

Symbols and conventional signs, natural and man-made have been in use in all parts of the world, such as trees and plants, animals, reptiles, pillar-stones and sacred waters, which properly handled, can be roped in as an aid to archæological finds. A comparative study has enabled the writer to deal with some universal beliefs and practices such as the Fire Cult, the worship of the Cow, the Cult of Fertility, the Deluge, the Symbol of the Serpent, Worship of Ancestors etc. So far as the British Isles are concerned, these hold "another history of 2000 years' duration from the end of the Stone Age to the first Roman invasion." (p. 16) "Great Britain (*Śveta-Dvīpa*) appears to have been a meeting ground for Latin saints from an easterly direction and deified heroes from the West" (p. 138).

The book brings out the racial and cultural affinities of the Kelts, Gauls and Picts whose culture must have migrated from the Westerly direction through the land of the Mayas,

Mixtecs, Toltecs, and Anztecs, which served as a "bridge".

Even if these people were not Hindu Indians, there seems to be no lack of evidence that they drew their inspiration from *Bhārata-Varsha*" (p. 111).

India was the cradle of this culture which diffused from Meru on the chain Sumeru, a theory—I may be permitted to state—expressed years ago in my *Racial Synthesis in Hindu Culture*.

Many Hindu statements have been ridiculed in the past, which have now become established facts. (p. 74).

The sun of human knowledge rose in the East, which has always been the guide, philosopher and friend of the West. (p. 101).

A study of chapters XIII and XVIII, in special, will give a fairly good idea of the conclusions reached in the book.

This thought-provoking book (and provoking a smile from those that have their faith pinned firmly on "accepted" views) is mainly based on a co-ordinated study of names. These may serve well to bring out the relationship of ancient cultures, though much depends on the epoch-levels, historic or pre-historic that are represented by them. The very large number of Indian names met with in the British Isles and in Central America cannot, however, be disposed of as chance coincidences. To wit, Canada, Niagara, Narada, Pipil, Rama, Macara, Nila, Ahi, Ohio, Maya, Uruguas, Indu, Eiri, Dagda, Anu, Angus, Bo, Derga, Tain, Jwawl, Tara, Apoala, Aztec, Nevada, Fal, Shanny. Cali, Vracki, Malvern, Rudry, Avon and Garu, besides a host of features in culture equally interesting.

The work is not free from the defect of not knowing things first-hand, though the writer has done her best to draw her information from reliable sources. As examples may be cited the title of the Frontispiece, the origins of Shamanism, of Sarasvati and Lakshmi of Kārtikeya and Gaṇeśa (pp. 22, 34, 37, 44). Though the conclusions of the author may not find general acceptance and may even appear

fantastic to some, they surely serve to whet the appetite of those who seek to know the meaning of the immortal symbols which are found to be of

universal application; and her modest aim expressed in the Foreword must be deemed satisfied by the contents of this little volume.

S. V. VISWANATHA

Hypnotism in the Treatment of Disease: Its Scope—A Plea for Research. By B. LAYTON LLOYD, M. B., D. P. H. (John Bale, Sons and Danielsson Ltd., London. 3s. 6d.).

The author presents here some of the results of his experience as a practitioner in hypnotism, together with suggested explanations and various arguments to overcome the fears of the timid. He feels that the power of hypnotism to heal the sick and help the weak should be more widely known and used. The pity is that his conclusions about the beneficial character of hypnotism are based on insufficient data, and are therefore at fault.

He rejects the idea of "animal" magnetism, since he thinks if it exists it should affect a magnetic compass, but he only shows thereby an arbitrarily limited conception. Indeed medical science in general ignores the very existence of the exact science of the therapeutic magic, of which magnetism and mesmerism, are important branches; hypnotism is but a new substitute for old terms. It is but natural that those who work under the fallacy that the field has never been explored before should, in their ignorance, interfere with the most potent forces of nature, which heal as well as kill.

Dr. Lloyd does write that "It is misleading to say that a man *has* a subconscious mind. *I regard the mind as the man or the soul, and that he possesses a physical body*". This postulate of an inner intelligent entity is a good step from the materialistic outlook, yet it leaves out of account the real man beyond even this lower mind. Half-truths can be dangerous.

For the fact of the existence of this innermost controller, however latent its power may seem, renders any outside control not only unnecessary but positively harmful. Hypnotism in place of being a blessing may prove rather a curse that masks its real nature by giving a temporary apparent relief.

The book fortunately does warn against allowing oneself to be put to sleep by any one, especially for amusement, and states that hypnotism should only be performed by a fully qualified doctor whom one can trust. Yet even fully qualified doctors are only experimentalists in this subject and an empiric basis is not safe ground for making such decisive statements as "Going into the hypnotic sleep does nothing whatever to the patient." "The hypnotist's power over the patient" (with one exception) "ceases as soon as he wakes." "With hypnotism we get precisely the effect we desire and *no other* effects." These statements are all incorrect, though space will not permit of detailed criticisms and the responsibility for spreading them is grave. Those who really desire to learn facts are recommended to study *Raja Yoga or Occultism* by H. P. Blavatsky (pp. 123-132).

This is said in no carping spirit, for one can value the manifest desire to help men. Yet hell is paved with good intentions and it is only wise to ask that those who wish to work with the potent dynamics of human thought and will should train themselves to qualify as soul doctors before they start to practice.

W. E. W.

Village Songs of Western India: Translations from Tukaram. By JOHN S. HOYLAND. (Allenson and Co., Ltd., London. Paper 1s.; Cloth 1s. 6d.)

When a child is learning to write,
Pebbles are placed to guide him:

But when he knoweth the letters' shapes,
What need of pebbles?

And I, my friends,
I know, I know.

Pebbles are no more pebbles when they signify the shapes of letters; they are viewed in a new universe of reference. Great mystics, like Tukaram of Western India, have always used their words as pebbles signifying and symbolizing the letters of spiritual experiences; but without the proper key, *i. e.*, responsive intuition, the spiritual import of their words cannot be perceived.

The translator is utterly unable to see beyond the pebbles. But his choice of verses for translation is eminently tactical. He has created a Biblical atmosphere out of what he calls translations from Tukaram; in this his success has been remarkable:—

I am created of sin,
All sin am I. (p. 16)

My God hath sent me unto you,
I bear His brand upon my forehead,
His word I bear, and His authority,
To sound aloud His will that all men come, and live. (p. 32)

My God is like a father with his child: (p. 49)
Within our hearts Thy face is seen...
Thy likeness is reflected. (p. 68)

These lines should unmistakably point out the nature of Mr. Hoyland's approach to his subject. He has carefully read about five thousand verses of Tukaram only to pick and choose such lines as would contain Biblical images and ideas. Of course he has not hesitated to read *his* own meanings into the original verses and this should be obvious, even to those not knowing Tukaram's original Marathi tongue, from the completely Biblical tone of his renditions. Unless Tukaram had been an actual missionary we could not have expected him to echo the Bible in such faithful accents.

It is really amusing how Mr. Hoyland has refrained from translat-

ing a certain kind of verses—verses which describe God as the Impersonal Principle or God as immanent in the highest aspect of man. Such verses are not too few, and admittedly Mr. Hoyland's plan of ignoring them has been skilful. May we produce a few lines in which Tukaram has denounced the popular conception of the Deity as a person or as an image?

Who will care for all those petty gods that beg food
themselves when they are hungry?

Why should one care for hospitality from the maid
servants of the house?

He is a fool who calls them gods.

The real god is universal and immanent; meditate
on Him, says Tuka.

Verily, all of you are Immortal.

Do not own your body and then alone you can
realize the truth of my statement.

Why should we fear anything at all, when all things
are our own?

Believe me, says Tuka, that all of you are gods in
reality.

It is only he who has become God, that can realize
that others are gods.

Those who have not known this are only tale-tellers
Tuka says, Experience is required here and not words.

Tukaram achieved his spiritual progress "not with the knowledge that scriptures give". He passed through the gamut of inner development. Perhaps he did pass through the stage where the illusion of a personal god is a reality, but he quickly left it behind and arrived at a new vision of the Deity as the Law which embraces in Its impersonal sweep both the universe and humanity.

In knowing Thee, my God,
In one swift flash I know the whole universe. (p. 81)
Show reverence to humanity
Because of God within humanity. (69)

In these lines Tukaram has clearly enunciated the impersonal unity of Man, God and the Cosmos. It must be admitted that Tukaram's mysticism is not always openly impersonal, but the quotation with which this review opens gives the reasons. The awakened intuition alone can sensitively unveil his intimate symbology.

Mr. Hoyland has evidently little interest in Tukaram's mysticism as such, and his translations therefore are a bad introduction to Tukaram. But we need not blame Mr. Hoyland for his failure in what he did not mean to do.

D. G. V.

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

Spiritism and Reincarnation—The Medium Margery and Her Husband—Christianity and the Greeks: Not the son of God, but Sonship which is the birthright of every soul—The Great Conflict of Religion, Science, Philosophy: the death of organized religions and the way out.

A competent journalist—Mr. Prevost Battersby—who has devoted his more recent years to Spiritism and connected researches, has come forward with a dogmatic affirmation that it does not matter how we came here, but only “whither we are going”.* The statement, however, demands too much of our consent, even if some of us are not wholly unwilling to suffer those “proofs palpable of immortality” which rank among the chief exhibits in the Museum of Spiritism. It is open to question whether a tolerable hypothesis on life “beyond the ken” can be proffered apart from the “whence” of our previous being. The essayist under notice implies speculatively that “man came from God,” in which case—and in view of our possible return—it is assuredly most important to throw light, if ways there be, on our immemorial source and origin. But except in one rather neglected and negligible French school of psychic thought—now almost apart from experiment—there is no audible voice on origins, anywhere in the psychic forum. Reference is intended at this point to the Allan Kardec School, which is not only very old indeed, as age counts in the Movement, but

impressed its seal upon French psychic activities and on the Spiritistic doctrine of return during the life of its founder and for at least a generation subsequently. There is quite a little literature on the subject, though it is now rare in France, and there is also an old-established Review which stands high in the psychic press.† With the best intention on our own part, it is difficult to regard the Reincarnation of French metaphysics as representing more than a collective persuasion, supported solely by trance and other communications, the evidential value of which would satisfy very few at the present day. It has to be remembered also that during his own period the forceful influence of Allan Kardec is said to have silenced and driven away from his *séances* the alleged communicating spirits who denied his favoured doctrine. On the other hand, if personal survival connotes immortality it connotes also pre-existence in the logic of the subject, while pre-existence may or may not connote the fact of Reincarnation on this earthly plane. Now it happens that Mr. Battersby’s suggestive statement—which seems to have been made almost casually, and was not followed up in his

* “*Light*,” February 21st, 1935.

† “*La Revue Spirite*,” which has been in existence for at least 70 years,

paper—was succeeded presently on the part of another well-known writer and lecturer on extra-normal subjects. Mrs. St. Clair Stobart proffered her views on pre-existence to a large assembly, taking care at the outset to distinguish her theme from that of Reincarnation, the latter being much less important than the question of the soul and its dateless origin. But as Mr. Battersby passed by this pregnant subject with the “extreme flounce” of Mrs. Browning’s imagery, so is her case stultified by Mrs. Stobart, who fails to illustrate her hypothesis of Pre-existence except on the basis of Reincarnation and time-worn cases of “infant genius.” Between them they seem to portray unawares the position of Spiritism, so vague upon the past of the soul, so voluble on the unseen hereafter.

It would appear an open question at the moment whether any portion of the psychic press would feel willing to welcome a further consideration of the “Margery” mediumship, with the sole exception of the official organ issued by the American S. P. R. It continues to print accounts and analyses of thumb-print experiments, observations on alleged mis-statements of hostile witnesses,* and so forth. There is also a long report on (1) an example of clairvoyance, (2) the apport of a solid from place to place, and (3) a supposed instance

of the passage of solid matter through solid matter.† It is in connection with this report, which appears over the signature of Dr. Crandon, the husband of Margery, that we recur again to the subject of this famous medium. He affirms respecting a certain *séance*, held on Nov. 2, 1932, (1) that there were present—among others apparently—Mr. W. H. Button, President of the American Society, and Miss May Walker an English lady who is a member of the English Society and has been connected for many years with active Psychical Research; (2) that in the course of this *séance* “the light was put on and all the sitters announced that they saw what appeared to be a hand”; (3) that Walter—the manifesting personality—affirmed it to be his own hand, picking up some plaster of Paris “and taking it away.”‡ But on March 6, 1935, Miss Walker wrote§ a disclaimer, affirming (1) that, to the best of her knowledge and belief, but in the absence of her notes on the sitting, she saw no supernormal hand and bore no such witness; (2) that no materialisation of any kind took place in her presence at any Margery *séance* and (3) that she could not have failed to remember such an event. Whether Mr. Button concurs on his own part remains to be seen; but there is little doubt that we are confronted by another of Dr. Crandon’s manifest inaccuracies, which have helped materially

* “*Journal*” December, 1934, pp. 324-333.

† *Ibid.*, February, 1935, pp. 36, 37.

‡ *Ib.*, pp. 37-51.

§ “*Light*”, March 21st, 1935, p. 183. (see p. 5)

to discredit the cause that he is naturally so anxious to defend. Meanwhile it is just to add that Miss Walker's position with regard to the Margery mediumship remains as it was since 1927, namely, that it exhibits genuine telekinesis and that the direct voice is also supernormal.

It is certified by the President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford,* that Christianity is neither a "cancellation" of Hellenism nor a declension therefrom, but is its development and completion. The chief reason is that "God is a conclusion to the Greek," but to the Judaic-Christian He is "the main premise". From this point of view Christianity had "a survival value" and "possessed something which the world needed and which Hellenism lacked." That something was a belief in the "direct divine revelation" of a "vividly personal God," Whose nature was revealed by His Son "taking the form of man and leading a human life on earth". Now we are invited to regard this view as a middle path between two others, being (1) that of some early Christian Apologists, for whom "Christianity superseded and annulled Hellenism," but this is untenable; (2) that Christianity is a deviation from "the true line of world progress"—which lies through Greece—and that its noble and beautiful prospects are only a mirage. The *via media* is that of the Christian

Church, in the persons of the Doctors of the church, from St. Augustine onwards. We are told further that the Judaic-Christian conception of the personality and fatherhood of God "placed Religion in the centre of life" and "drove the invisible world into the foreground"; that it filled man with the sense of an ultimate reality "behind the shows of life," insisting that the things which are seen are temporal and that the unseen are eternal. Here, as it seems to us, are aspects of the Great Subject; but something has escaped, and this is the living essence. That Mystery at the heart of things to which our author makes one allusion is not the personality of God, but God abiding within us and so alone attained. It is not merely one only Divine Son taking the form of man, but that Sonship which is the birthright of every soul leading its life on earth. It is not alone that there are things unseen which are eternal, but that these things are within us. This it is that enlarges "the Greek conception of man" and emphasises "the place of Religion in life". Is there not haply as if it were a Church, within the Church, which "holds this view"? Some of us may have heard voices and seen records that seem like those of its Doctors. And fragments here and there, floating down the centuries, do even now hint in no uncertain tones, though in other symbolical forms, that Greece also knew.

* *The Hibbert Journal*, April, 1935, pp. 356-370, s. v., "Christianity and Hellenism," by Sir Richard W. Livingstone.

The oft-repeated story of a "conflict between Science and Religion" is reviewed by Sir Herbert Samuel* on the basis of an affirmation that it "has thrown the modern world into the state of intellectual confusion in which it finds itself." Whether the confusion in question is referable to this one source is the first point that arises, especially as Sir Herbert himself opens the study under notice by stating that "the whole structure of our mental and material life" was shaken "like an earthquake" by the Great War. Professor Whitehead is quoted also concerning Religion and Science as (1) "the two strongest general forces" which influence men, (2) concerning the future course of history as depending upon the decision of this generation respecting the relations between them; and (3) on the fact that "they seem to be set one against the other." This being the state of the case, we are led next to the immediate consequence, it being understood that Religion, all over the course of human history, has been the chief agent in promoting morality. It has "lighted up morality," in the opinion of that most delightful of Victorian false prophets, Matthew Arnold. The result is (1) that "the ancient buttress of morality is weakening"; (2) that "we see a growing divorce between Religion and daily life"; (3) that "the hold of the creeds upon conduct has been loosening"; and (4) that the

influence of Churches, Temples, Synagogues, Mosques, and so forth is very different from that which they exercised even a century ago. All this is old enough and has been familiar to most of us since we left the preparatory schools. But what of the remedy proposed? It is this only, that upon Religion and Science "there lies an obligation to find the method and the means whereby they shall draw together."† There is, however, at its value something that is called Philosophy, though its influence "has sometimes been harmful" and though it turns out after all, at its worst—in Fichte, in Hegel, in Nietzsche—to be included "among the principal causes of the unrest in the modern world."‡ In Britain it has "moved upon other lines"—not however particularised. Here and elsewhere it may "even now be on the eve of furnishing to the world that broad guidance for lack of which it wanders bewildered."§ Religion may co-operate powerfully and Science "succeed in pointing the paths along which man should move," the great encouragement to hold this rather nebulous faith being that man is now for the first time conscious of "what he is doing and where he is going".** It is of course possible that Sir Herbert is defining here, almost unwittingly, his own position; and in this case it is like that of Goethe, who, according to Matthew Arnold—had come to see his way. Otherwise, no more preposterous

* *The Contemporary Review*, March, 1935, pp. 256-268, s. v., "Philosophy, Religion and Present World Conditions".

† *Ibid.*, p. 261.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 264.

** *Ibid.*, p. 268.

statement has been made of recent times on the age in which we live, and of which, in a cooler moment, Sir Herbert himself has said in this same paper, speaking as the new generation: "What kind of world is this into which we have been born?" He makes no attempt to answer; and an answer on behalf of Europe would be yet more difficult since the date on which he asked this question. As regards his remedial measures, there will never be a real *rap-prochement* between official Religion and Science till the Religions have revised their Creeds, which none of them is likely to do, in the West or East, so long as they remain official instituted systems. Remedial Philosophy, on the other hand, is the last hope and the fondest. Sir Herbert has counter-defined the State, against Hegelian doctrine, as "nothing other than a collection of men and women

who have organized themselves for purposes of joint action." He adds truly that "apart from them there is nothing". And what is Philosophy but the accepted findings *pro tem.*, of X, Y and Z, about which those who differ have always waited patiently till the next fashion of thought has come to weed them out? Meanwhile the unfailing successions of X, Y, Z have never saved the world, and they never will. Individually it can be saved only from within by the finding of that Christ who is called by many names in different quarters of the world. Externally, on the other hand, the "good time coming" of Charles Mackay is that which every man of goodwill can help forward; and we hold no doubt whatever that Sir Herbert Samuel, working by his personal lights, has done and is still doing his personal best in this desired direction.

A. E. WAITE

Occultism pure and simple finds the same mystic elements in the Christian as in other faiths, though it rejects as emphatically its dogmatic and *historic* character....For, we say it again, the surname Christos is based on, and the story of the crucifixion derived from, events that preceded it. Everywhere, in India as in Egypt, in Chaldea as in Greece, all these legends were built upon one and the same primitive type; the voluntary sacrifice of the *logoi*—the rays of the one LOGOS, the direct manifested emanation from the One ever-concealed Infinite and Unknown—whose rays incarnated in mankind. They consented to *fall into matter*, and are, therefore, called the 'Fallen Ones.'

—H. P. BLAVATSKY,

The Esoteric Character of the Gospels.

CORRESPONDENCE

TWO INDIAN PHILOSOPHERS

[Dr. D. M. Datta, author of *The Six Ways of Knowing* read a paper at the last session of the Indian Philosophical Congress at Waltair of which the following part examines the influence of two modern philosophers. Dr. Datta wrote in our March issue on "Contemporary Indian Philosophy".—EDS.]

Sir S. Radhakrishnan, as Dr. Tagore once observed, is one of the few Indian scholars the springs of whose mind have not been crushed by the load of scholarship. With this vitality of mind, he combines a width of outlook and interest, a quick apprehension of fundamental issues and a wonderful power of expression. All of these together have contributed to his success as a philosopher and won him wide recognition. Even as early as his *Reign of Religion* he was trying to choose his own place among the different schools of the ancient East and the modern West and was beginning to incline towards the idealism of the Upanishads. This book is unique. Comparative studies by Indian writers nowadays consist in the critical consideration of Indian in the light of Western philosophy. The object of such enquiry is "How do we appear to the West?" "What does the West think of us?" Critical as such an attitude is, it is still a self-forgetful and diffident one. The vitality and the superior self-confidence of Radhakrishnan has enabled him to rise above this inferiority complex and to see how the West appears *to the Indian eye*, if an Indian looks at the West from his indigenous point of view, in the light of Indian ideas. It is a pity that few have followed him in this work. The importance of this spirit of enquiry from the Indian point of view for the development of modern Indian thought cannot be exaggerated.

Professional philosophers, whose minds move along the fixed grooves of technical, official philosophy, will scarcely look to poets for philosophy.

That Radhakrishnan's unfettered mind ranges far beyond conventional grooves is proved by his *Philosophy of Rabindranath*, in whom he finds the unconventional expression of India's own philosophic vision.

Radhakrishnan is essentially a philosopher of life and his catholic outlook is as wide as life itself.

It is natural, therefore, that his style is so unconventional, his language so forceful and dynamic and his appeal so wide. This explains also the synthetic character of his philosophy. Indian culture and Western civilization, the ancient ideals and the modern achievements, Absolute Perfection and biological evolution are all fused together in one organic philosophy. Finally, the Absolute of Radhakrishnan, which elusively alternates between the Pure Being of Sankara and the Concrete Absolute Spirit of Hegel, is intelligible only as the playful freedom of the Absolute Life.

It is a point of pride for us that the philosophy of Radhakrishnan has been given such a rousing reception in the West—recently, in addition to innumerable reviews, an independent treatise on his philosophy has been written, Joad's *Counter Attack from the East*. But it is also a pity that we are not paying sufficient attention to it to see how far he deserves the fame the West is showering on him and whether he offers any new line of work which can be followed for the modern revival of philosophy in India.

In the philosophy of Sir S. Radhakrishnan and that of Professor K. C. Bhattacharya there is a fundamental unity, both upholding the Vedantic

conceptions of the world, soul, freedom, intuition and God, and therein leaning towards Sankara. But there is a striking contrast also between them in style, method and underlying attitude. The style of Bhattacharya is as stiff as that of Radhakrishnan is simple. The peculiarity of Bhattacharya's style is that though his words are simple and mostly non-technical, yet his sentences do not easily yield their meaning. Another point adding to the difficulty of understanding is the total absence of references and allusions which could enable the reader to perceive him in historical setting and understand him by comparison. It would be a great mistake to suppose his thought devoid of historical connections or his reading not wide. Though his ideal of study appears to have been, "How much have I understood?" rather than "How much have I read?" his reading is sufficiently wide and up-to-date not to miss anything vital in general knowledge and philosophy. As a student he distinguished himself by passing with great credit in *three* honours subjects and as a teacher he moved freely from English, History, Economics to Philosophy, where he ultimately settled down.

A number of very competent scholars, specialists in ancient Western and Indian philosophy or contemporary philosophical movements, who have intimately discussed their own subjects with him, know him to be one who has profoundly assimilated fundamental truths, who can throw new light on a good many subjects and can trip a specialist even in his firmest conviction by quietly analysing it and unostentatiously presenting the many alternative possibilities. It is only in such intimate discussions that he lets one peep into the historical background of his theories. His reluctance to connect his views explicitly with those of other thinkers is partly due to his diffidence to express the correctness of his statement of others' views, but mainly to the fact that by temperament he views his own theories as well as those

of others in logical rather than historical or genetic perspectives—as so many *possible* theories. Apart from the justifiability of this attitude, it has always been a potent obstacle to the intelligibility and the recognition of his views and has stood in the way of their benefiting others.

But in spite of the stiffness of his style it is rash to jump to the conclusion, as is sometimes done, that he is an obscurantist or meaningless hair-splitter. His writings, like those of the many classical Sanskrit philosophers, tax intellectual patience and perseverance—qualities which unfortunately are disappearing fast from the majority of modern scholars. Sir S. Radhakrishnan once declared, in summing up a lecture delivered by Professor Bhattacharya at the Calcutta University, "To criticise his views is to understand them and to understand them is to think over them again and again."

Bhattacharya seldom sits down to put his views on paper unless somehow pressed to it. His earliest work, *Studies in Vedantism*, written under the stimulation of the Premchand Roychand scholarship, contains much close, solid thinking and shows the high mental calibre which he possessed even as a student. This book remained the only work to his credit for about twenty years, during which he only read from time to time some short papers, at the Calcutta Philosophical Society, then particularly active.

It is in these short papers that his philosophical views took definite shape and were made accessible to the members and a limited circle of outsiders. Most important among these are "Some Aspects of Negation," in which he sought to express the fundamentally different logics of negation underlying different schools of thought and the manifoldness of truth; "The Jain Theory of Anekantavada," in which he interpreted in a strikingly original and profound manner the Jain theory of manifoldness of truth and supported the view that truth is objectively

manifold; "The Place of the Indefinite in Logic," in which he put forward a strong plea for the objectivity of the irrational. In addition to these and a few other papers he took part in a symposium on the conception of the Absolute along with Dr. P. K. Roy and Dr. H. Haldar. These papers mark him as a deep analytical thinker who can assign the exact logical place to the chief metaphysical theories of the East and the West, and on everything has something to say which is impossible to brush aside as unimportant, but is equally difficult to accept, chiefly because it takes us beyond our common standpoint to the presuppositions of our ordinary thought. All these isolated papers have an internal connection based chiefly on theories of the indefinite, of negation and of the manifoldness of truth, which are the logical keynotes of his philosophy.

It is only during the last few years that Professor Bhattacharya has stepped out of a comparatively secluded intellectual life to join the corporate philosophical body, the Institute of Philosophy at Amalner, as its Director. This marks the beginning of a new and most useful period of his career as philosopher, both because he *has* to state, discuss and defend his views in discharge of his official duties and because he has to formulate them intelligibly and acceptably to the society of philosophers who are not easily beguiled into any conviction. Thanks again to the authorities of this Institute, the most important statement of his views, expressed as lectures to the Institute, has been made available in a book, *The Subject as Freedom*. When one has gone arduously through the first few pages, he finds that after all Bhattacharya's philosophy is not an unintelligible collection of paradoxes but that there is a system behind his mind, and once its outline is grasped the rest is not difficult to follow.

To state his views fully is to expand each pithy sentence of his to a page and we can only state here in a dogmatic way some of his fundamental

propositions. His philosophy is indebted most to Kant, among Western thinkers, and to the monistic Vedanta, among the Indian schools. This is only to recognise that his conclusions resemble those already known views; for to follow his arguments one has to toil with him through logical mazes all his own. His originality lies in his compact, irresistible logical chain of arguments.

Though Bhattacharya is at bottom an idealist he prefers realism to cheap idealism which begins by denying the objectivity of perceived objects and establishes the existence of the self by direct introspection. Following most of the realistic writers like Alexander, Moore and Russell he distinguishes the object of consciousness from the consciousness of objects and does not believe that the one can be lightly dismissed as reducible to the other. Again, he does not believe that either knowledge or the subject of knowledge can be made the object of any privileged introspection and therefore can be so easily established to be true. He therefore agrees with the modern behaviourists that the psychology of introspection is a pseudo-science of the mental life, which, he further points out, mistakes the different aspects of the known-ness of an object for mental states; and he also holds with them that the objective method of the study of behaviour is a more candid and legitimate enquiry than the so-called subjective one.

But if the subject cannot be caught by introspection as an object how can it be known or believed in? The reply to this he gives in various ways. The most obvious is that the subject is primarily known as the speaker of the word "I". To the possible objection that the subject can then be said to be known as the object meant by "I," he replies that though the subject is understood through the word "I," it is not known as the *meaning* of the word:—

A meaning that is conveyed by a word must be intelligible to the hearer as what he

himself would convey by the word. . . The word *I* as used by a speaker is not understood by the hearer to convey what he would himself convey by the use of it. (*The Subject as Freedom*, pp. 2-3)

To reinforce this primary argument he asks, if the subject, the "I," be said to be known as an object, *i. e.*, as what is expressed or communicated by the word "I," what is it that expresses and what is the process of expressing? Besides, he points out, the reality of what is meant, that is, the object of knowledge, "can always be doubted and so the object is not known with the same assurance as the subject that cannot be said to be meant. There may be such a thing as an illusory object." The self-manifestness of the self is not like that of an axiom which is accepted because the attempt to deny it ends in self-contradiction, because in the case of the self *there is not even the possibility of such an attempt*. This insight into the real meaning of the self-manifestness of the self is at once profound and original.

But by far his most characteristic argument in favour of the subject is that the subject is what remains by its own right on the denial of the illusory object. In the denial of the illusory, in a judgment implying the correction of an error, the subject dissociates itself from the object, feels its distinctness from the object in a peculiar way and realises its freedom from the object and the fact of the objectivity of the object being dependent on its free relation. (The possibility of the unreality of an object in every case means only the possibility of the object being reducible to the subjective.)

Denial of the objective world is impossible, Bhattacharya holds, as long as appearance is there, but assertion of it is unreasonable in the face of its dependent objectivity and possible unreality. Idealism is therefore, a faith though not yet an accomplished fact. And "this faith has to be cherished and there should be a subjective discipline to get rid of the persisting

realistic belief". Here, in his view comes in the necessity of the spiritual discipline (Vedantic Sādhana one may call it), which is nothing but the attempt to realise the subject as free. This attempt should be directed to all the ways in which the subject relates itself to objects and appears thereby to be fettered to them.

There are stages in the realisation of the subject's freedom. The bodily subjectivity is first felt to be dissociated from the extra-organic objects; then psychic subjectivity from the body viewed by it as an object; then the spiritual subjectivity from the psychic states viewed as objects. At every stage the feeling of the freedom of the subject is achieved by realising the dependence of the objectivity of the object and the corresponding free relation of the subject that relates to it. He observes:—

The elaboration of these stages of freedom in spiritual psychology "would suggest the possibility of a consecutive method of realising the subject as absolute freedom, of retracing the felt positive freedom towards the object into the pure intuition of the self." (*The Subject as freedom*, p. 43).

This is a short sketch of one of the most important aspects of Bhattacharya's views, showing how Western and Eastern thought blends together into a constructive philosophy. But his philosophy, though not yet fully expressed in writing in every aspect, has a comprehensive scheme in which logic, psychology, epistemology, ethics and religion have all well-connected places and deserve careful study.

There are two fundamentally different attitudes or methods in philosophical thinking which explains Bhattacharya's position and distinguish it from Radhakrishnan's. The one is illustrated by modern scientific philosophy of the West which attempts to piece together the up-to-date scientific theories like evolution and relativity and raises on them grand metaphysical systems. The other is illustrated best by the philosophy of Kant, which attempts to analyse the given through

reflection upon its different aspects and implications. The first is a kind of synthetic imagination which is more allied to the poetic than to the scientific imagination, because it is beyond verification and its perfection is of an æsthetic value. The other is an analytic reflection which does not aspire after system-making. Radhakrishnan's synthetic philosophy follows the first line, while Bhattacharya's analytic philosophy follows the second. Kant's view that the mind can know about nature only what it has itself imparted to nature and his distrust of the dialectical use of reason underlie Bhattacharya's philosophical attitude.

The future development of Indian

philosophy, if it is to be an adequate solution of the problems that the modern Indian mind philosophically faces, cannot be achieved by the logic-tight segregation of Indian and Western ideas but by a thorough assimilation of both. In this direction the only two adequate and comprehensive attempts are those of Sir S. Radhakrishnan and Professor Bhattacharya. They supply the initial capital in which ambitious Indian thinkers can profitably interest themselves and add to the development of modern Indian philosophy by interpretation, criticism, modification and opposition—in ways whereby philosophy has always flourished.

D. M. DATTA

Mr. BERESFORD ON REINCARNATION

Mr. J. D. Beresford's article dealing with Reincarnation, in the March issue, had my particular interest. Though I am a Ph. D. (Chemistry and Botany), earning part of my living through science pure and applied, yet I am one of those Westerners for whom the doctrine of Reincarnation is not "a matter of scientific or philosophical discussion, but one of settled conviction from the moment I first heard about it."

The doubt Mr. Beresford feels, however, seems hardly in proportion to the importance of the doctrine involved.

Mr. Beresford himself agrees that, after all, his doubts have little weight in view of the fact that "he can find in his own philosophy nothing that is not consonant with the doctrine of Reincarnation". I might suggest for his consideration that here he touches, perhaps, unwittingly, on one reason for the difficulties mentioned in his paper. Is it not typical for most of us in the West to have a philosophy *of our own*, and judge any and everything that is placed before us on this basis of our already existing opinion?

If the attraction to Reincarnation is not yet an inner certainty but so far developed as in the author's case, why not forget for a while all of this previous knowledge, which in reality is made up of personal convictions, and put aside the tendency towards *separateness in thought* to which all of us in the West fall prey consciously or unconsciously, day after day? Originality is one of the prerequisites for success and esteem in our society; let us have the moral courage to be a disciple, within to say, "Thus have I heard." If one from free will, without bias, honestly and by strong search, tries to contact this great Law and its twin Karma—doctrines humanity needs most desperately—to definitely understand them, and then to illumine his mind in terms of this Teaching, the ordinary prejudices and head-learning will lose their hold and the inner conviction will become clear. "Once teach them that greatest of all Laws, *Karma* and *Reincarnation*, and besides feeling in themselves the true dignity of human nature, they will turn from evil and eschew it as they would a physical danger."

Leyden, Holland.

W. C. DE L.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“—————ends of verse

And sayings of philosophers.”

—HUDIBRAS

A Minister for Peace who should have equal standing with the Minister for War, a Peace Office with funds at its command equal to those of the War Office—these revolutionary proposals are the contribution of Dr. Maude Royden to the vexed question of international relations. She offered them on March 15th in *The Daily Mirror* (London) under the caption, “If I Were Dictator.” They were intended for England but might equally well apply to other countries. Of course no one will take them seriously for a moment—that is characteristic of the modern mentality. We shall not attempt a debate as to whether or not they are intrinsically reasonable; but mention them as significant of the increasing trend of thought towards organization for peace and the deliberate fostering of mutual good will and friendship among peoples.

The realization is gaining ground among the thoughtful everywhere that an effective will to peace will never appear spontaneously in our selfish and self-centred world. The first number of the annual *Bulletin of League of Nations Teaching*, recently issued, is an expression of that growing conviction. Two articles in that volume, one by M. Jean Piaget, Director of the International Bureau of Education, and the other by Prof. José

Castillejo of the University of Madrid, deal specifically with education for peace.

M. Piaget recognizes national egocentricity as a barrier to peaceful collaboration among nations but seems to acquiesce in it as inevitable. We cannot surmount it, he implies, but we can in a measure circumvent it by showing that self-interest calls for a mentality adjusted to embrace international relations. He sees national self-interest as the safest foundation for international education—convincing the individual that the effort to understand others is “necessary for his own existence and for the expansion of the particular ideology he upholds.” He specifically disavows a universal outlook as a practical aim of international education.

In the international sphere, any real effort towards psychological adjustment, even if it is inspired by selfish and purely national considerations, leads to a method of mutual understanding and discussion which, in the long run, promotes the growth of an international spirit.

The possibility is as remote as that of gathering figs from thistles. Unless the motive is disinterested, the result will be superficial and inadequate. To enter sympathetically into another's hopes and fears is an achievement of unselfish imagination, for it means

putting oneself mentally in that other's place and trying to see things as they appear to him. This is impossible unless we abandon our own intense preoccupation with ourselves. Prejudices and predilections must be laid aside, as a spectacted person must lay aside his glasses if he would see through a microscope.

The international point of view can never be attained so long as the nationals of each country cling tenaciously to their separative views, however freely they may recognize that other views exist. The egocentricity of a nation is fatal to an international outlook and as menacing to international peace as selfishness in the individual is to domestic tranquillity. Mr. Piaget's appeal is, in effect, to enlightened self-interest. But however enlightened, self-interest it remains. It is not by pandering to the weaknesses in human nature that an international point of view can be produced, but by showing how those weaknesses can be overcome.

The concept of unity must be impressed upon the plastic mind of youth throughout the world. In the larger view of history as the evolutionary journey of mankind, every conquest of mind over natural forces, every victory of ideals over self-interest, is the triumph of all. From the standpoint of the corporate unity of humankind, all wars in their true light are warrings among the members of a single body. Mankind is the unit and all divisions

among men, whether political, social or religious, are as artificial as they are arbitrary and impermanent. Teach the individuals of all countries to look upon themselves as cells in the body of the race, and they will regard international collaboration as natural and inevitable.

Prof. Castillejo's recommendations are practically constructive. He would present ideals of mutual respect and tolerance by teaching even the younger children that "the variety of human types and conflicting interests" are "elements in our existence which are not only compatible but indeed indispensable for the progress and well-being of mankind." He would have children in secondary schools study the fundamental problems which have occasioned conflicts among peoples:—

By making an objective study of such conflicts and doing full justice to the opposite point of view, it is possible to arouse in young people a feeling of confidence in themselves and of hope in the union of mankind which will place justice above all other considerations.

At the university, Prof. Castillejo would have the elements of the problem dealt with scientifically on objective and universal lines, with the formation of a world conscience as an ultimate objective of such training.

We submit that an international outlook is not a Utopian dream but a practical objective which may legitimately be hoped for from international education along right lines.