

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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BROTHERHOOD OF COLOURS

In the unending, universal battle for ideals, the developments in South Africa represent a *débâcle*. The whites' resentment of Indians' presence in the country of the blacks is of long standing. The South African mentality has not changed much since 1909, when a Natal Commission of Inquiry found indentured Indian labour essential for several industries but "the evidence was practically unanimous that the Indian was undesirable in Natal other than as a labourer."

Unable to oust the Indians bodily, they early turned to prejudicial legislation, imposing handicaps on Indian immigration and trading. The offending act extends the duration of the Transvaal Land Alienation Act and includes Durban City in its scope, with certain modifications. It provides that the Union Government may extend the Act, if it thinks fit, to other places in Natal. As the Rt. Hon. Dr. M. R. Jayakar remarked, "the arrogant implication of the bill was that no Indian, how-

ever good and able, was fit to live with any European, however low and fallen he might be." In other words, the bill is a blatant proclamation of colour prejudice, despite the plea of necessity urged by the Prime Minister, Field Marshal Smuts.

The explanation is plain. The long-standing desire to oust the Indians has been powerfully reinforced by the British Empire's absorption of the unashamed racial effrontery of Hitlerism. These two factors have a psycho-philosophical basis into which it may be worth while to inquire.

It is a psychological law that a desire long held must out, sooner or later. Desire generates force. You can conceal for a while the fact that water is boiling by plugging up the spout of the kettle, but at last the lid will blow off. The only way to prevent it is to cut off the heat that makes the water boil. The only way of safety where desires are concerned is to examine them in the light of spiritual principles and to

resolutely crush those found unworthy. If Field Marshal Smuts—the author of the philosophy of Holism—had done so could he have come forth as a champion of this unjust legislation? In 1929, as Rhodes Lecturer at Cambridge, he is reported to have said that he subscribed to the conception of inter-relation of colour, complete uniformity in ideals, absolute equality in paths of knowledge and culture, equal opportunity for all who strive and equal administration for all who achieve.

None would challenge General Smuts's sincerity. Why has he not lived up to those principles? Ideals are vapours unless they are applied. Even a philosopher has to try to put in practice the truths that he perceives if he would not have them fade away.

The United Nations were sincere too in repudiating Hitler's master-race ideology. Their absorption of its virulent poison was a matter of magnetic attraction. For we attract by hate and not only by love. One of the dangers of dwelling upon evil is that of drawing it to ourselves. Only he whose hand is without a wound can touch poison with impunity. And that condition was not met by the whites in South Africa, as their succumbing to the poison proves.

The world is heading towards the horrors of a Colour War and to fan anti-racial feeling today is a crime. If the holocaust comes, posterity cannot hold the South African legislators guiltless. It is significant that Native Representatives in the Union Parliament have been vigorous in their defence of the voteless Indians. Sir C. R. Reddy warns pertinently:—

The most ominous feature of this racial legislation is the shadow it casts on the idealistic future for the world and all races promised by the Allies as the result of their victory.

If racial feeling cannot be kept in check when every consideration of prudence dictates rising above it, what can the coloured races expect when the threat of immediate disaster is removed? White arrogance and coloured submissiveness cannot avert racial conflict. Only genuine good-will can, not only tolerance but a will to justice that will revolt against such affronts to human dignity. Let us hope that the verdict of the future will not confirm Lin Yutang's recent words in *New Masses* that "the war has forced a vision of true brotherhood of mankind but we are not big enough to see it"!

April 24th, 1943.

KING VIKRAM, THE GLORY OF UJJAINI

[Dr. Bhabani Bhattacharya is the author of *Some Memorable Yesterdays* and writes in this article about a subject of topical interest—King Vikram, who stands as symbol of an age of ancient glory that shines like a beacon across the centuries that stretch between his day and ours.—ED.]

The riddle of the Vikram *samvat* that has just started (by other calculations, completed) its two thousandth year will never be solved unless there comes to light some startling new record embodied in stone. All we know is that it had its origin in 57 or 58 B. C. in Malava land of which Ujjaini was the capital. However, tradition—the temple of race memory that is less perishable than stone—strangely ascribes the *samvat* to a monarch who lived four centuries later, Chandragupta II, Vikramaditya. A lesser Vikram—many kings have styled themselves the Sun of Power—might have started the era, though there are reasons to believe that in 57 B. C. Azas I, a Saka chieftain, was Malava's ruler. And then the era is said to commemorate the expulsion of the alien Sakas from Ujjaini, a feat performed, we know, by none other than Chandragupta II.

Tradition paid its ultimate homage to one of India's greatest Emperors by building round him a web of romance, a cycle of legend, and ascribing to him an era that had begun long before. What if in this telescopic process it made mock of historical time? Chronology can well become an obsession! What matter if an event of prime national

importance was hung, like a decoration, to the glittering name of one who deserved this unique honour never to be repeated?

That might have been the unresolved secret of Vikram *samvat*. Or it might not.

Vikramaditya himself was more than an individual, more than Chandragupta II; he was a symbol of the spirit of his times. The earth-image of Chandragupta II dwindled into ash; the symbol lived on in mystic lore.

A brief glance at his historical roots would make vivid the great fruit-gathering of his age that has had such an imaginative hold on the later Indian mind.

Vedic India, Aryanized, settling down from nomadic life, ceased to pour out its spirit to the beauty and wonder of the gods that were Nature, and found increasing self-expression in deep speculative thought, centred on the shackling chain of birth and death and rebirth and, beyond the chain, the One Ultimate Reality. It is a far cry from the simple songs of the *Rig-Veda* to the wistful brooding "What good to me is that which shall not win me immortality?" and the restful realising, "*Tat tvam asi.*" Rishis like

Yagnavalkya and Kapila loom large through the mists of time—towering figures, as great in their way as the Buddha himself. The Upanishads multiplied, building up philosophic values through mystic introspection, a spiritual heritage that cast an aureole of glory around Brahmanism for all centuries to come.

And the Buddha rose, and he gleaned the old truths and added to them his own creative vision. "One thing alone I teach, O monks—sorrow and the uprooting of sorrow." And he taught the secret of Nirvana. But, radiant through his mystic revelation was his ethical ideal: love, compassion, non-attachment. A tide of spiritual hunger swept over Brahmavarta. Saffron-clad Buddhist monks began to walk the land, feeding the great hunger, spreading the message of the Enlightened One. Onward to Asoka! Buddhism became the national religion and developed international significance. Indian culture, having journeyed over the sunlit Vedic heights and absorbed their dazzle, pressed on to the summit of a second great peak, where it was humanized, softened with compassion, with Ahimsa, with reverence for the earth-forms of life.

Not the least of the social values of the new "heresy" was its equalitarian spirit, and the concrete expression of that spirit in the uniformity of judicial procedure, abolition of the Brahman's immunity from the hand of justice.

Brahman reaction came fast. As peace and good-will, the ideal of

Mauryan moulding, bent, broke, under the hammering of foreign invasion, the Brahman priest Pushyamiitra Sunga wrested power from the king's trembling hands, exchanged *sāstra* for *sastra*, and made war on the Yavanas (Greeks), even as earlier Brahmans had fought the troops of Alexander the Great. (The story of the Greek invader Menander who threatened Pataliputra and was subsequently converted to Buddhism by Nagasena is recorded in the Pali work *Milinda Panha* (Questions of Menander) which gives a vivid account of the Greek king and his dialectic disputations with the Buddhist teacher. The inscription on the Besnagar Pillar—"The Greek Heleodorus adopted the Hindu religion and erected this monument in honour of the deity Krishna-Vasudeva"—records Sunga's conquest of the invading Greeks not in the military sense alone. The Greeks settling down in the land they had hoped to conquer became Indianized and were assimilated in Hindu society. This was the beginning of the process by which Hinduism grew into an absorbent of startling capacity. The early signs of this cultural fusion appeared in the realm of art. Hellenic ideals lent their lines to the so-called Gandhara sculpture. Now the figure of Sakyamuni, depicted for the first time (In previous sculptural portrayal of the Buddha's life symbols such as the Bo-tree, the Lotus, footprints, the Wheel of the Law and so forth told of the presence of the Blessed One), had the curious composition

of a Greek Apollo in semi-Indian garb.

New tides of invasion, sweeping with relentless fury, broke the power of the Brahman rulers of Magadha, Sakas, Pahlavas, Kushanas. Yet the feet of intellectual progress never faltered. Two great harvests were ripening side by side. One, the Buddhist, produced *Saddharma-pundarika* and *Milinda Panha* and the works of Asvaghosa and the brilliant Brahman bhikshu Nagarjuna. The other, the Brahman, bore the sustaining crop of the Epics, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*—perhaps a thousand years passed between their seedtime and their harvesting—and the *Mahabharata's* glorious appendix, the *Gita*, with its comprehensive philosophy of life.

In the secular sphere, out of the dark waters of endless war rose Kanishka, a Kushan soldier who became a great Buddhist, while, inspired by a sense of inquiry, he showed his interest also in Hinduism and in Zoroastrianism. The two significant features that marked the Kanishkan age of transition were, first, that Hellenisation of Indian culture reached the top of the inclined plane and was soon to slide downward, and, secondly, that Buddhism made rapid strides deep into China, and there began close cultural communion between China and India. The Hindu concept of Bhakti coloured the Buddhist craving for Mukti and the two faiths edged nearer each other than ever before.

So the scene was set for King Vikram, symbol of a great renaissance comparable to the age of Pericles in Greece, the T'ang régime in China, the Elizabethan age in England. Religion and literature—two aspects of one spiritual impulse—had prepared the mind of the people for an Awakening. Leadership alone was needed. And leadership came. The Gupta kings, the greatest of whom passed into legend as Vikramaditya (though he was not much more responsible for the renaissance of his age than were Queen Elizabeth and even King Li Shih-min for theirs), flung the foreigners, the Western Satraps, out of their wedge in Malava, won the country back its long-lost peace, unity and benevolent administration, and Vikramaditya performed the *Asvamedha* ceremony to establish his status as King of Kings.

The Noble Eightfold Path had served its historic purpose as an instrument of the Crown. A new orientation was needed to preserve the face of Aryavarta from the ruthless assault of barbarian hordes. And the inspiration came from the *Gita*, from the utterance of Krishna: "When unrighteousness prevails I am born among men." Sword in one hand and the *Gita* in the other (even if the *Gita's* endorsement of the violence of war is more apparent, more symbolic, than real) Chandragupta II made war on the greed-ridden aliens who imperilled his country's freedom, concluding the task so valiantly started by his

father Samudragupta. But for the military prowess of these two monarchs, there would have been no political unity in Aryavarta, and the forces working for a new life, a new golden age, would have been in vain.

The nerve-centre of the new life shifted from Pataliputra to Ujjaini, "painted ornament of India, earth's fair cheek," with its history of a thousand years. Here Asoka had ruled as viceroy before he assumed the crown of Magadha. Here three great trade-routes met, and all the streams of art, religion, culture. Here, under Vikram's enlightened statesmanship, the "Nine Gems" cast their radiance, among them the poet Kalidas, the astronomer Varahamihira, the lexicographer Amarasinaka, the architect Amara-
visha.

Kalidas in his *Cloud Messenger* has made vivid the fulfilments of a people who had known centuries of storm. His ecstatic account, with its emphasis on beauty and material splendour, is well supplemented by the calm narration of a strange traveller from China, Fa-Hian, who made a pilgrimage to the land of his Master. Driven by his urge, the brave devotee had passed out of Central China into the perils of the Gobi Desert and the hardships of crossing the Himalayan heights. Across Khotan and the Pamirs and Gandhara into Purushapura (Peshawar). Down the Land of the Five Rivers. Mathura, Kanauj, Kasi, Kushinagar, Pataliputra. At Pataliputra he stayed for three years,

learning Sanskrit. Wonder filled his eyes as he saw the majesty of Asoka's palace, five centuries old. Though his account was based on his absorbing quest of Buddhist manuscripts and relics, he turned his eyes occasionally on the masses of the people. They, he said, "vied with one another in the practice of benevolence and righteousness." "Throughout the land the people abstain from taking life and drinking wine, and there are no wine-shops in the market places." The criminal law was mild. Corporal punishment was seldom inflicted. The capital penalty was almost unknown. Buddhism and Hinduism flourished side by side. The King was a *Paramabhagvata* (Inscriptions also make use of this epithet as well as Maharajadhiraja-Sri-Bhattaraka, while his coins describe him as Vikramaditya, Vikramankya, Sinha-Vikrama, etc.), a devout worshipper of Vishnu and His incarnation Krishna; but there was religious liberty for all, respect for every faith.

Fa-Hian, however, seems to have had no vision of the historic forces that were now making for the extinction of Buddhism in the land of its origin. Many Brahmans had entered the sangha as monks, holding deep within them the legacy of the Hindu tradition. The Mahayana school was a compromise that carried a toxin of self-elimination. On the other hand, Hinduism with its marvellous resilience had absorbed many elements of Buddhist teaching and adopted the Enlightened One

as one of its own gods, one of the ten avatars, so that Buddhism became a single point of light in a vast lit chandelier, and was needless as a separate entity, untenable.

And all this while Pali, the old vehicle of Buddhist thought, was yielding ground to Sanskrit, the sacred language of the Brahmans. The development of Sanskrit through the perfection of its grammar set the pace of the classic age of Hindu literature. The works of Kalidas were but the keystone of a great arch that curved in immortal splendour.

The great efflorescence found further form in the evolution of the six Darshanas, systems of philosophy. While some parts of them were fixed on the high plane of theory, other parts descended and soaked into the lives of the people, into their thoughts and traditions and culture.

Painting, too, drew colour from the new life. Some of the finest works of Ajanta, a great stride forward from earlier specimens, belonged to this period. E. B. Havell has written :—

Hindu artists reshaped the crude imaginings of the Gandharan school according to the traditional concepts of Brahman Philosophy. The divine Buddha was no longer portrayed in the guise of an Indo-Roman monk but as the Buddhist counterpart of Siva, the perfect Yogi of India, or as an avatar of Vishnu. Thus Buddhism outwardly and inwardly was transformed by Brahman thinkers.

Nalanda, the great University of this age, remained like Ajanta a stronghold of the Buddhist Way.

But even as the artists of Ajanta revealed Hindu ideals in their creative striving, the monks under the tiled roofs of Nalanda, passing on their knowledge to eager pupils from all over India and from abroad, conveyed in their teaching many basic elements of Hindu philosophy. The Vedas, indeed, ranked high in the Nalanda curriculum.

The intellectual tide of the times, it must be noted, reached over beyond philosophy and literature, beyond painting and sculpture, into the colder realms of medicine and science. The decimal system of notation, Algebra and Chemistry were early fruits of Hindu investigation, passed on into Europe many centuries after by Arab scholars. The process of transmission, however, had its start in the age of Vikram and was directed toward the South of Asia and the Far East. A repetition, in a way, of Asokan times, but on a more comprehensive scale, for the era was like an enormous vase that was brimful, overflowing. Ananda Coomaraswamy has rightly claimed :—

Almost all that belongs to the common spiritual consciousness of Asia, the ambient in which its diversities are reconcilable, is of Indian origin in the Guptan period.

The people of India today, torn and unhappy at the close of two thousand years of their oldest samvat, cast wistful eyes upon their past fulfilments, upon the golden age of Asoka and the golden age of Vikram, and these splash them with wonder and lend them their dreams.

BHABANI BHATTACHARYA

JUSTICE

[E. F. Carritt, the author of numerous volumes on philosophy, has made a valuable contribution to the study of justice, on which he writes this article.—ED.]

I have been asked to say "What, in my opinion, are the most important principles of philosophy which would help in the building of the new social order even now going on."

I think philosophical principles have little weight in the balance against the needs or even the passions of men. If the scale is to be turned against either of these, our one hope must be in an appeal to the morality of plain men, to their justice and their conviction of human brotherhood. Philosophy cannot teach us our duties; it cannot offer any motive for doing them; in no way can it affect many persons directly or at once. Its only aim is to define and clarify what all men dimly know. But if it can do that, and if the definitions and clarifications of the study can slowly seep into the confused babble of parliaments and the market-place, it may serve plain men as a defence against sophistry. For since men's needs and passions do not always despise the feeble aid of fashionable philosophisms, philosophy need not be so modest as to refuse an antidote.

For what it may be worth, then, I suggest that the service which philosophy might do political controversies today is to call them back to old and simple recognitions of justice and of the rights of man; his right

to liberty, which implies equality, his right, in Kant's odd phrase, to be trusted as an end and never as a means only. To this we must be called back from that idolatry—nationalism, imperialism, racialism—which would limit our duties to our own pack, or still more monstrously to a State, ambiguous whether actual or ideal, which is above morality and is indeed the Great Leviathan, the mortal God, *der Gang Gottes in der Welt*.

Moral philosophy may usefully remind us today that over against the servile absolutism of Hobbes stands the personal independence of Locke, over against the cloudy rhetoric of Burke, now piously cosseting his own nostalgia, now cynically counting on the like sentimentality in mankind, stands the blunt challenge of Tom Paine, against the communal hedonism of Rousseau the straight moral law of Kant, against the rationalised mysticism of Hegel's power-philosophy the good sense of a Maitland and an Acton.

Let me illustrate these allusions by parallel passages. Hobbes says:—

Whatsoever (the sovereign) doth, it can be no injury to any of his subjects—because the law is the public conscience by which (they have) already undertaken to be guided.

To which Locke replies :—

Wherever violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however coloured with the name, functions, or forms of law.

Rousseau postulates a General Will which is not the will of all, nor perhaps of anyone, and is always right and conducive to the "general good," so that whoever does not submit to it may fairly be "forced to be free"; Kant holds that we must further the ends, that is the happiness, of every rational being.

Hegel developed this mysterious entity into the objective or absolute Will, definitely distinguished from our actual wills, and careless of the happiness of any individual men. It would be what was usually meant by the Will of God were it more beneficent and if he had not held that it manifests itself fully in the course of the world and in the might of the State. It is only, he thinks, in obedience to such absolute power that man's true freedom and virtue lie, for to suppose that freedom means doing what you would choose, or morality in doing what you think right, is, for Hegel, a crude and trivial error. Man's private morality and immorality alike are all shaped to its own great ends by "the cunning of the Idea," which had produced the Prussian state, as Burke thought that the "divine tactic" had produced the British constitution. And since there is no power above States, they can, as Hobbes also thought, have no obligations to

one another. War is justified, the might of a State is its right.

This at least is the interpretation of Hegel's Philosophy of Right and Philosophy of History which has been accepted and defended by his followers. F. H. Bradley wrote :—

The striving for a positive morality of one's own is futile and in its very nature impossible of attainment; in respect of morality the saying of the wisest men of antiquity is true, that to be moral is to live in accordance with the moral tradition of one's country.

Bosanquet wrote :—

The state is the guardian of the whole moral world, but not a factor within an organised moral world. Moral relations presuppose an organised life, but such a life is only within the state, not in relations between the state and other communities.

Justice for Bosanquet belongs to the unreal world of "claims and counter-claims" and is, as Rousseau also thought, below the notice of the General Will. Professor Reyburn says: "Moral responsibility is an abstraction."

The ancestry of this state-idolatry is plain: Burke had said :—

The state is to be looked on with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature.—Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact, sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical

and all moral natures, each in their appointed places. This law is not subject to the wills of those who by an obligation above them and infinitely superior, are bound to submit their will to that law.

Nor is the progeny of the doctrine less clear after a century and a half:—

The state is not merely a guardian preoccupied solely with the duty of assuring the personal safety of the citizens,—it is also the custodian and transmitter of the spirit of the people, as it has grown up through the centuries in language, in customs and in faith. And the State is not only a living reality of the present, it is also linked with the past and above all with the future, and thus, transcending the brief limits of the individual life, it represents the innermost spirit of the nation.

And again:—

The nation is an organism endowed with purposes, a life and means of action transcending in power and duration those of the separate individuals or groups of individuals which compose it. It is a moral, political and economic unity which realises itself completely in the State.

These are translations respectively from a speech on International Conciliation by Mussolini in January 1935 and from the Fascist Charter of Labour, 30th April 1927. I think this must have been written by Gentile, a close student of Hegel, who appears to agree with that master that a modern philosopher is properly a servant of the State. It is easy to see how apt such a theory is,

whatever the intentions of its authors, to be a weapon in the hands of totalitarians, imperialists and warlords. It maintains the divine right of rulers to rule wrong. But already, fifty years before Burke, it had been exposed in anticipation to the dry irony of Hume, even more mordant than Voltaire's:—

That the Deity is the ultimate author of all government will never be denied by any who admit a general providence and allow that all events in the universe are conducted by an uniform plan and directed to wise purposes.—But since he gave rise to it, not by any particular or miraculous interposition, but by his concealed and universal efficacy [Burke's "divine tactic," Hegel's "cunning of the Idea"], a sovereign cannot, properly speaking, be called his vicegerent in any other sense than every power or force, being derived from him, may be said to act by his commission. Whatever actually happens is comprehended in the general plan or intention of Providence [Hegel: "The real is the rational"] nor has the greatest and most lawful prince any more reason, upon that account, to plead a peculiar sacredness or inviolable authority, than an inferior magistrate, or even an usurper, or even a robber and a pirate. The same Divine Superintendent who for wise purposes invested a Titus or a Trojan with authority, did also, no doubt for purposes equally wise, though unknown, bestow power on a Borgia or an Angria. The same causes which gave rise to the sovereign power in every state, established likewise every petty jurisdiction in it, and every limited authority. A constable, there-

fore, no less than a king, acts by a divine commission, and possesses an indefeasible right.

I think then that the greatest service philosophy could today do to politics would be to recall them from the misty idealisms of General Good or group-self-realisation to the old and plain realities of justice and the correlative rights of men.

It may be objected that it is not so plain what the rights of men are. And it must be allowed that their supporters have exposed themselves to criticism by making them at once definite and abstract:—the indefeasible right to life, for instance, in abstraction from the situation. But it is always the situation which gives rise to rights and to correlative obligations. We may have to sacrifice one man's life to save two, still more often his claims to nourishment, to amenities, to leisure, when there is not enough of these things to go round.

The rights of man may, I think, be reduced to the one fundamental right of equality, which Aristotle saw is a kind of justice, the right to have his claims, arising out of the situation, impartially considered. Nothing, said Bishop Butler, is plainer vice than to judge that fair and equitable to another, which we should condemn as harsh and oppressive to ourselves. We all know in our hearts that every human being has the claim to be treated equally until very good reason has been shown to the contrary; and a good reason is not fear

or favour, affection or distaste, colour or race, but only that the satisfaction of his claim would preclude the like claims of others. When even liberty is plausibly spoken of as the fundamental right, it is clear that we mean *equal* liberty, so much liberty as will not interfere with the like liberty of others. That is perhaps why liberty of speech is one of the least questionable rights, since, when it is not inflammatory and does not intrude upon our privacy, it can hardly prevent any man from doing what he will. Equal liberty is indeed fundamental. And liberty means not the power of doing right (which is often only a matter of probable opinion), but the power of doing what you will, without physical coercion or fear (in the last resort) of physical coercion from other men. This is approximately Maitland's definition and the only one, I think, which begs no questions.

The other most famous right, the right to property, is closely connected with the other two. It is a right to a particular kind of liberty, the power to consume or use such objects as you will without coercion or threats of coercion. What property a man can claim depends, as Locke saw, mainly on three conditions: What he has earned, whether there is as much and as good left for others, and whether he can use it to advantage of life. His liberty to use goods must not preclude the like liberty of others. And the equality of rights to such property seems

to involve approximate equality in the amount of property. The more a man needs something the more is his liberty, or power of doing what he will, restricted by laws against appropriating it. The rich are little incommoded in their liberty by laws against theft. The more property approaches a desirable monopoly (the extreme case being a monopoly of water) the more it infringes equal liberty. A law dividing the drink equally might diminish each man's liberty, but equally and much less.

Hume said: "Whenever we depart from equality we rob the poor of more satisfaction than we add to the rich" and "Property when united causes much greater dependence than

the same property when dispersed." Harrington said: "Equality of estates causes equality of power, and equality of power is liberty." Godwin briefly stated a position often attributed to later authors:—

It is only by means of accumulation that one man obtains an unresisted sway over multitudes of others. It is by means of a certain distribution of income that the present governments of the world are retained in existence. Nothing more easy than to plunge nations, so organised, into war.

Matthew Arnold said, "Seek Equality"; for as Acton has told us "All power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely."

E. F. CARRITT

FOOL INDIA !

Mr. P. Derrick presents a ready-made solution for the Indian question in a letter to *The New English Weekly* of 3rd December 1942. What he proposes is "to give India the form of independence under an Emperor of her own as a pledge for complete independence as soon as possible." This Emperor, he suggests, may be chosen from among the Indian Princes who "have long been accustomed to nominal independence." The choice is to fall on "one of the less prominent of these, preferably a *young* ruler, able and enterprising and noted for his wise and constitutional rule." Such a gesture, Mr. Derrick believes,

might well capture the imagination of the Indian masses to whom the name of independence without the substance might mean more than the most solemn promise of the substance without the name.

A poor compliment to our intelligence, in spite of India's disillusioning experience with solemn promises!

Knowledge of the measure of "independence" which Princes in India enjoy and of the administrative abilities of most of them would have brought Mr. Derrick down from his grand vision of a united India under "a less prominent" yet "noted" Prince as Emperor. Mr. Derrick fails to tell us how progress from nominal independence under a nominal Emperor towards complete independence and federated government is to be achieved.

India has become a subject about which any nonsense can pass into print in the West. And unfortunately the darkeners of counsel by words without knowledge are not confined to casual correspondents of hospitable weeklies.

WHAT IS BEAUTY?

[The title question raises as many difficulties as Pilate's mocking query, "What is truth?" *Quot homines, tot sententiæ!* But just as Truth itself is, unaffected by men's affirmations or denials, so there is Beauty that transcends opinions. That Beauty is not ill defined in Dr. K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar's phrase as "the balancing, harmonizing and unifying quality of the subject." But that definition is as valid for Goodness or for Truth—another demonstration that the three are one.—ED.]

We use the words "beauty" and "beautiful" rather too freely in all sorts of connections. A beautiful scene; a beautiful woman; a beautiful experience; a beautiful statue; a beautiful building; a beautiful wound (yes, even that!) etc. Again: the beauty of the female form; the beauty of holiness; the beauty of childhood etc. Like "lovely" and "nice," the words "beauty" and "beautiful" also are in danger of losing their meanings altogether. In the face of this promiscuous use of these two words, we have certainly a right to ask the questions: Does "beauty" mean anything in particular? Is there a common quality in all the things enumerated above that entitles us to apply the word "beauty" or "beautiful" to them all? In other words, can a definition, however wide, be found that embraces all these instances?

Let us consider in detail a few examples and strive towards a workable definition of beauty. Firstly, a song; say, a good specimen of Karnatak music in Hamsadwani *raga*. Rendered well, the song comes to the hearer as experience that

moves him profoundly. Presently, even as his senses are enthralled, his intellectual faculties are alert at the same time; he listens and he also thinks; he responds to the music, he enjoys it, he even starts judging it. *Pallavi, anupallavi, charanam*, they come one after another, and they all differ from one another; the very repetitions are repetitions with a difference. The sequence of sounds, the sequence of ideas, the alternations and the repetitions, these give the song ample variety. And yet the song is a unity—a splendid unity—and not a chaotic congress of meaningless sounds. The trilinear co-ordinates of *sruti, raga* and *thala* fix the song securely in the realms of harmony. We have thus a sort of balance effected in the song between order and variety, between unity and diversity.

Secondly, poetry: Why is a line like "Here in her hair the painter plays the spider" or "All the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand" considered to be beautiful? The first of these embodies a suggestive metaphor and the second is a telling antithesis; and the "beauty" that we associate with the lines

should therefore be largely an emanation from these figures of speech. "Painter" and "spider" are very dissimilar things; but they have one thing in common—the ability to weave beautiful patterns, be they a woman's golden locks on the canvas or a mere web in the bathroom. Similarly, one would suppose that a stray breath of Arabian perfume would suffice to sweeten Lady Macbeth's "little hand." But no! the little hand is so fully implicated in crime that even Arabia's vast store of perfumes cannot sweeten it. The wages of sin is putrefaction, death; and all the perfumes of Arabia will not help one to evade them! Thus, metaphor and antithesis alike thrive on parallelism of one sort or another. In metaphor or simile, agreement in two seemingly dissimilar things is posited; in antithesis or contrast, disagreement in two seemingly similar things is posited. And suggestive metaphor or antithesis is beautiful because in these figures of speech a balance is effected between the similar and the dissimilar.

Thirdly, a whole poem: say Keats's *La Belle Dame Sans Merci*. The first three lines contain eight syllables each, the last line contains only four; and this is so with every stanza. Haven't we here at once order and disorder? The rhythms and the rhymes also illustrate the same principle of balance between order and disorder. Moreover, the poem begins with a picture of desolation; in the course of the poem we experience the emotions of wonder,

wild surmise and exhilaration; we touch the very summits of ecstasy, only too soon to fall once again upon the bleak regions of despair. The wheel has indeed come full circle and we can see clearly the balance effected in the poem between the rainbow colours of our aspirations and the starved lips of our disappointments; and the poem—sound, sense and form—is thus a little thing of beauty, a joy for ever.

Fourthly, a poetical tragedy: say Shakespeare's *Macbeth*. It was Hazlitt who first explained how the principle of contrast is subtly worked out in the play. We have vivid contrasts as we turn from the witches on the heath to the court of King Duncan, from scenes of crime to the prattle of Lady Macduff's son; himself soon to be done to death; the day is fair and foul, says Macbeth, and the witches say in chorus, "Fair is foul, and foul is fair"; the world of the Duncans and the Malcolms and the Macduffs impinges on the world of the Macbeths throughout the play; Macbeth himself is a living contrast to Banquo, to Macduff, even to Lady Macbeth; he is himself, he is Evil, and he is pitted against the moral order. The play is thus a collocation of contraries and contradictories, signifying the diversities and the enormities of life; and yet *Macbeth* is a vivid and glowing unity, no mere hotchpotch. The shifts in action and in language, the accentuations and the contrasts, the diversities and the enormities, all radiate towards a centre—the Macbeth

microcosm; and this centre holds the play together, gives it the radiant beauty of form and significance. A tragedy like *Macbeth* not only enables us to contact evil and pain but also to perceive the streaks of new light that jerk out of the abyss; we not only see the fact of division but also infer the possibility of ultimate reconciliation in terms of good. In Mrs. Una Ellis-Fermor's words, a great tragedy represents

a balance between conflicting pictures of the universe, of man's condition and destiny...evil is not glossed over or treated as unreal, but the ultimate transcendence of good is revealed rather in terms of a transvaluation of values than by an attempt, far less convincing to most of us, at a direct denial.

Once again we realize that beauty is but balance effected between the claims of unity and diversity, of happiness and sorrow, of good and evil.

Fifthly, a human group: say, an old woman with her grandchild sitting on her lap, looking trustfully into her care-worn and rugged face. The woman is no more beautiful, not in a physical sense; she is but intently gazing at her little granddaughter—gazing, as it were, into the future. The old woman shuddering at the thought of the splinters of her maimed and broken past—the tiny chip of innocent flesh, luxuriating in her rosy visions of the future. This very antinomy binds the two together, because trustfulness and welling love make the child and the

woman an unbreakable unity. Age and youth; ruggedness and beauty; knowledge and innocence; an accumulated regret for all the yesterdays and an eager hope for all the tomorrows: these, even clear opposites such as these, are yet balanced in this human group, whether it is met with in actual life or only encountered in a picture gallery. Here too beauty would seem to lie in the balance effected between apparently dissimilar things. Even in larger groups—a group photo, a public meeting, etc.—it is always possible to discover the beauty of form, form that balances, in Mr. Roger Fry's words, "the attractions of the eye about a central line" in the group, the line being something analogous to the fulcrum of a balance.

There is no need to multiply these examples. As Gerard Manley Hopkins has shown, in his thoughtful Platonic dialogue on Beauty, even a stray leaf—beautiful in its seeming simplicity—will be seen, on closer scrutiny, to owe its beauty to the persistence of this principle of agreement in disagreement, of balance between apparent opposites. A leaf; a tree; a garden; a seascape; a landscape; an attitude; a cycle of significant movements; a sudden, sharp jet of melody; a succession of them purposively held together; a momentary spasm of happiness; an experience extending over a considerable period, marked by sudden transitions, and yet modulated to an underlying harmony: all these, in

their lesser or greater degrees, may be beautiful things, and always for the same reason.

What is "beauty," then? It is, essentially, an experience—it is, as D. H. Lawrence puts it, "something *felt*, a glow or a communicated sense of fineness." Presently, the meddling intellect starts analysing

and discovers that beauty is, after all, the result of the balance effected between seeming opposites—a sort of metaphysical equation. In short, beauty is the balancing, harmonizing and unifying quality of the subject, a quality to which man ever pleasurablely responds.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

INFLUENCE OF INDIA

The historian's need of the universal approach is the Rev. Leslie Belton's theme in "The Deep Roots of History." (*The Hibbert Journal*, January 1943) The true historian is concerned with the deeper currents which guided the course of events only less than with factual veracity. His record of the decline and fall of civilisations derives much of its significance from his assessment of the why and the wherefore. In the final analysis, all true history has a basic continuity. It is a reflection of that unity of life in which Mr. Belton recognises "a central doctrine of Indian religion."

Specifically, Mr. Belton insists that "the stream of civilisation flowed *through*, not *from* the soil of Palestine and Greece." The latter, like Rome, are but "links in a chain reaching back to the diffusing dawn of civilisation in the valleyways of the Indus, the Euphrates, the Tigris and the Nile,

or wherever the sources of civilisation are finally found."

He cites the resemblances between the Homeric and the Indian epics, the inexplicability of Orphic esotericism except on the basis of Indian influence, the suggestions in Plato's dialogues of Upanishadic thought, the close affinities between Neo-Platonism and the Vedantist system. All these cannot but shake the common Western assumption that "every noble aspiration, every ethical insight, every seminal idea had its birth or its fullest and finest expression in Palestine or Greece."

The great wave of creative civilisation moved Westwards from India, the Mother of Cultures, under conditions which modern history is but dimly visualising. In history every cause is an effect and every effect a cause and a historian who loses this larger perspective does not tell his tale well.

DIET AND DESTINY

[Mr. H. Ryner makes out here a case for dietary reform but he puts his finger on an even greater need when he traces much of our present discomfiture to general reluctance to think. After all is said and done, what a man eats is of vastly less importance than what he thinks and feels, desires and speaks.—ED.]

"Truth is the greatest thing that man may keep."—Chaucer.

As I am writing this essay, we are in the midst of a catastrophic war, the outcome of which cannot be foreseen. Unleashed are the grim forces of Hell: evil, of evils most evil!

What compensating good is there to arise from the sufferings? There will be plentiful searchings of heart. There may even eventuate a reevaluation of values, a consummation much to be desired. There may be a quickening in the otherwise slow march of intellect. The new world called into existence may somewhat redress the balance of the old. What a heedless race we have been, to be sure! We failed to see our tokens. Not one web was too paltry to catch our modern brains. Our affairs are now in a prodigious tangle. Religion has lost its hold on us. We allowed our faith, together with morality, to be torpedoed, in the holy name of science—a half-baked science—on promise of worldly boons as substitutes for the moral ideal. Blinded with learned dust, we shifted our former allegiances from religion and wisdom to the varsity chair. The professor became our new Infallible,

wherefore it has come to pass that we are now cursed with a "scientific," instead of a theological, obscurantism. We are only tardily realising that modern biological science is merely one peculiar and imperfect way of looking at facts, the personal equation obtruding itself withal. Vain, however, is all learning, unless it be attended by wisdom. Wisdom is ever justified of her children. Science, forsooth, is not by any means as trustworthy! Again we shall have to learn to distrust "Infallibles." We could soon do without them, did we not shirk the duty of thinking for ourselves on various vital matters. Alas, we find thinking too irksome a process! And it is this deficiency more than any other which is at the root of our present discomfiture. Our remedies, "oft in ourselves do lie"; but how prone are we to forget this grand fact and to turn, instead, as soft, meek noodles, to pretentious hirelings, hoping that they may stitch and botch our diseased flesh. Shakespeare allocates to Brutus—the last of the Romans—the power of rehabilitating himself quickly from any disorder that might have arisen.

How many are there who could

honestly boast that they are truly healthy? Not one in twenty thousand! We are all too content to linger in precarious "sub-health" and to miss real health and the concomitant degree of alert intelligence, the two great blessings of life. Instead of applying intelligent self-help, we are constantly looking out for charlatans, men supposed to give us absolution from our sins for a small fee. And we regard them as "Pardoners," possessed of much the same Divine Rights as those once presumptuously claimed by the Stuarts. No one thinks of ever challenging these pretenders. We are too docile for initiative and for revolt. What an injudicious, disease- and doctor-ridden crowd we constitute! How content we are to be underlings and to put up with a life of mere ephemerals! We are inured to distress, used to aimless behaviour. We are tolerant of great evils, with a train of "Remorse and Sorrow and Vindictive Pain." The Devil himself we should fail to scent out "even though he had us by the very throat." The result is that nothing can we call our own but death. We employ healers who cannot in the first place heal themselves, and, the greater their ineptitude, the more we pay and honour them. Reason stands aghast!

We prefer such turpitude to a life of energy and self-reliance, though these might render us free and masters of our destiny. Without health, however, life is not life at all! We forget that it is the worst of the

delusive medicines we use that one kind of drug subsequently makes another, more futile, necessary. Well has it been said that "War slays its thousands, Peace its ten thousands." Whilst there are still plenty of men willing to go forth valiantly in war-defence of their homes, there are few ready to fight our more insidious internal enemies, who decimate us in times of peace. Our belief in custodians is vain so long as the question remains unanswered: *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* We thus let our women and children die without a single hand being raised in their defence.

We choose our very Health Ministers from amongst those who are incapable of ministering even to their own needs, or who, maybe, have a vested interest in disease. We sold our moral inheritance for the blandishments of a materialistic mushroom science, fondly believing that all its sand was radiant pearls. We forgot that "*Science sans conscience n'est que ruine de l'âme.*" We were deaf to the groans of a tortured lower creation, suffering agonies under our parasitic depredations, with the result that the conscience of the world is sick and corrupt. In our selfishness, we took to gross flesh-eating, with the result that we became veritable bundles of morbidity, marked increasingly by indiscriminate thought and by incomprehension. Our progress was backward. The lowly insects, in their famous social states have learnt the cardinal lesson that in the main-

tenance of their vast populations they succeed best by increasingly relying—as cultivators, not scavengers—upon a vegetarian fare. We, however, failing in such prudence, went along the opposite, the carnivorous pathway of life, as though destined to be Nature's scavengers, which is far from being the case. We became flesh-eaters, this involving a luxuriant but degrading parasitism. Unindued with sanctity of reason, we made beef or pork our staple diet, never mind the why and the wherefore, never mind the consequences. We now have a shattering Nemesis to face. The mechanical successes of science dazzled us, as did the skill of physicians and surgeons, though they merely patch us up—*enfermer le loup dans la bergerie*—which is not at all the same as Real Cure. We foolishly gave priority to science and put the Holy Book on the shelf. We die in ten thousands while our savants try to satisfy their academic curiosity. Our case now stands thus: "*Disce aut discede*": Learn or depart! We are as prone to shower congratulations on quacks as men were in the unregenerate days of the tribe of the Fausts:—

Our med'cine this, who took it soon
expir'd.

"Who were by it recovered?" none
inquir'd.

With our infernal mixture, thus, ere long,
These hills and peaceful vales among,
We rag'd more fiercely than the pest;
Myself to thousands did the poison give,
They pin'd away, I yet must live,
To hear the reckless murderers blest.

It is in such wise that Satan, who

has his *locum tenens* in high places, ever gets those who constitute themselves the hindmost. "'Tis my vocation, Hal, 'tis no sin for a man to labour in his vocation."

How does it come about that mankind is so greatly given to suicidal traits? Is there perhaps a pathology with a Nemesis underlying the calamity? How would a change of heart do as a remedy? *The Daily Telegraph*, on November 16th, 1939, stated that the German army was virtually on a vegetarian diet. Soya beans were reported to form its staple food. Soya-bean extracts were supplied to replace fat and eggs, and were added to the ten basic foods: barley, noodles, flour, potatoes, rice, preserves, peas, lentils, cabbage and turnips. When fresh vegetables and potatoes were scarce, vitamins were added to the available food in the form of yeast or tomato extract.

This news may have left many unconcerned; but it was none-the-less important. Provided the Germans will draw the proper moral from their experiment, they will no doubt find that a vegetarian dietary is the ideal diet for man. And it seems to me the conversion of the Germans to vegetarianism is a paramount need of civilisation. It might make up for the lack of Latinisation which makes them lag behind other European races, due to the one-time German Pyrrhic victory of the Teutoburger Wald.

Let it be said that vegetarianism is still as uniquely capable of regenerating a race as it was in the days

of the Exodus, when the great Jewish Fuehrer took the Children of Israel in hand, removing them from the depraving flesh-pots of Egypt, to rehabilitate them upon the manna of the desert flora. Once the Germans are duly "de-porked," they will be the sooner enfranchised, too, and re-humanized—another case of redemption. It is not by any means that German vegetarianism had to wait for the war. Mr. A. Pitcairn-Knowles, a keen student of Continental food-reform, tells us that food-reform is effectively preached in Germany and that amongst the popularisers are many qualified doctors of medicine.

But why are the English almost deaf to words of truth and soberness on matters of this kind? Alas, by custom most live, and not by reason! And these beef-eaters *pur sang* have a heart of stone. To regenerate them it would be necessary to give them a heart of flesh. Hence, too, the vegetarians amongst us must make it their task to debunk a science framed by men who but mystify what is clear and confound what is intelligible, *i.e.*, by men stultified by a toxic dietary and by a futile academic jargon. Such men as these are possessed of a grim feeling, inclining them ever towards pessimistic and suicidal thoughts and to cynicism, so that they talk jestingly about food-reform and profanely about religion. What science should be is "organised common-sense." It was common-sense that made Shelley exclaim: "I conjure

those who love happiness and truth to give a fair trial to the vegetable system."

Let no one suppose that the German army need be any the poorer for the absence of roast beef and other succulent viands, so long as its diet is sufficiently drawn from the vegetable kingdom. On the contrary, health and strength may be improved in the end by such food-reform. I speak from forty-five years of experience when I say that a vegetarian diet involves not the slightest forfeiture of stamina, but yields, on the contrary, an all-round gain in power. This to me, as to many others, is an irresistible conclusion.

One may predict that, in matters dietetic, Necessity, that well-known mother of inventions, will enforce reason and in time turn man's pain to glorious gain. Our scientific high-brows, addicts to the flesh-pots, have hitherto arrogantly misled us. For many decades they inveighed against vegetarianism. Now they show an auspicious eye by the side of the drooping eyelid. They prophesied falsely. Their half-baked science was not at all felicitously inspired. As a result, Reason has been tottering on her throne. It is now, fortunately, dawning on a few that, as Mr. Herbert Morrison, M. P., Chief of the London County Council, stated, "the roots of war lie deep in our present ways of living" and that "we have the chance now to dig some of them out."

Not very long ago, a leading scientist stated that our European

nations were so incurably wedded to the flesh-pots that they would prefer waging wars for the reduction of population to the acceptance of vegetarianism, even if they might thus escape perpetual warfare. Were it not time this evil old mood were now overborne by better inspirations? It should be clearly understood that our present infelicitous mode of feeding involves a fatal lapse into a very unedifying biological phase, to wit, parasitism—a departure from the norm of life which ever entangles an organism in the train of Nemesis, so that it is penalised by sore degradation:—

This sickness doth infect

The very life-blood of our enterprise.

Europe presents today a vast encampment of parasitic races—“highly fed and lowly taught”—exhibiting, to my definite knowledge, abundant stigmata of degeneracy. As we lived in the eyes of nature, so do we also perish! Better we perish than degenerate into rank parasites!

“The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars.

But in ourselves, that we are underlings.”

It is the mark of the predatory

creature that it turns totally unmoral, unscrupulous and indiscriminate in its ways of life. Withal, predatory species universally exhibit the unerring malignant trait of cannibalism, to a greater or a less extent. In a carnivore pack, any weakness in a member is as an incentive for the others to pounce upon and to devour it. Are not our European Powers now going the same acherontic way of life? What is there remaining of our higher values? A searing account could be rendered of our profligacies. For several decades have I protested against our barbarian pseudo-science, its cue borrowed from the semi-civilised German professor, with its anti-ethical bias and its sadistic barbarities—vivisection, vaccination, and other abominations—aimed at meriting Heaven by making earth a Hell. I urged that we should never have toed the German line. The danger now is that all learning may be “cast into the mire and trodden down under the hoof of a swinish multitude.”

H. RYNER

THE HURS AND THEIR POETRY

[The Hurs have come into considerable prominence of late, especially on account of the execution of Pir Pagaro. The writer of this article, **Aslam Siddiqi**, M. A., says—"By profession I am a translator." He is now engaged in writing a book on Moghul Princesses.—ED.]

The Hurs have acquired widespread notoriety by their activities in Sind. Even the use of tanks, aeroplanes and paratroops did not succeed in annihilating them. The jungle that they used as their base of operations had therefore to be set on fire.

Their boldness, their spirit in courting death for the cause they hold dear and their courage in facing enormous difficulties and remaining undaunted call for an explanation other than that of mere fanaticism. As is well known, they defy law in order to bring pressure to bear on the Government to release their religious leader (Pir), Sibhattullah, popularly known as Pir Pagaro.* Much of their fool-hardiness may be due to the strong leadership of the Pir but more is due to their own character.

Before analysing the Hur character, let us briefly state who these Hurs are. They are members of a brotherhood which came into being about seventy years ago. Pir Hazbullah Shah, an ancestor of Pir Pagaro, was involved in a case of murder about 1865. His khalifa, Ghulam Nabi Laghari rendered him invaluable service in those hard days, in recognition of which the

Pir conferred upon him the title of Hur. This khalifa thereupon began to organise a brotherhood, the members of which came to be known as Hurs. Its fundamental principles are fanatical loyalty to the Pir, fraternal treatment of all the members, never to act against but to co-operate with and help one another. Their loyalty has assumed so exaggerated a form that they can no longer be considered Muslims. They have gone to the extent of building mosques facing towards Kingri, the Pir's residence, and of declaring a visit to Kingri to be as good as the Haj pilgrimage. Their fraternal treatment has eliminated the traitors among them and has given them an efficient intelligence service. They mainly belong to Balochi and Sindhi tribes but as the organiser was a Laghari, a member of a prominent Baloch tribe, the organisation is thoroughly Baloch in character.

In order to gain an insight into the Hur character which has been partly brought out by their present struggle, we have to turn to their poetry which portrays them most faithfully and vividly. The literature of a nation constitutes its autobiography and this is partic-

*Subsequently sentenced to death by a Martial Law Court and executed.—ED.

ularly so when it has not developed so much as to put written words to uses other than recording its history and expressing its ambitions. Balochi poetry mainly consists of ballads which narrate various wars, fought between different tribes. Many of them deal with the thirty years' war that broke out between the Rinds and the Lasharis. Others record raids, horse-races and various tribal wars. The Hurs are so thoroughly steeped in warfare that they cannot describe their beloved even without mentioning weapons of war.

*Sara Phonze ki shai theghen bahokhen,
Bisat azh ashik jana guzokhen.*

(Her nose is like a sharp sword, a blow from which takes her lover's life.)

Zulf zivih-buren theghenthai.

(Her locks are scimitars which cut through my armour.)

The Pir figures prominently in their poetry. Numerous references made to him show how Pir-ridden the Hurs are and what status they assign to him. The Pir's help is sought in beginning any work.

*Nishto khanan yad Pira wathiya
Pir Alam Shah, Husain Shah Waliya.*

(Let us halt and remember our Pir, Pir Alam Shah, and Wali Husain Shah.)

The Pir looks after the conscience of his followers and frowns upon their failures.

*Sar-de sherani kar-ath
Pir buta rastghara
Dragul baure mazara.*

(They gave up their lives in a lion-like fight, and were not ashamed before the face of their Pir, the tigers of Mount Dragal's snows.)

Unlike the Persians, who always observe the order of precedence of spiritual leaders, the Baloches quite

blasphemously place the Pir above all.

*Yad khanan Pir nau-bahara
Hardame malik sachara,
Shaha mardan kirdagara
Panch-tan pak, chyar yara!*

(Let me call to mind the Pir of the fresh spring-tide, the Lord always true, the King, the creator of men, the five pure ones, the four Companions.)

Despite all their admiration for the Pir, it is strange to find that the Hurs have no conception of even the elements of Islam. For instance, they believe that if the Pir offers prayers and discharges other religious duties, all of them are relieved of such obligations. This strange belief has led to stranger notions.

*Name Allah hardume mar-en bandaghi,
Nen man parhean, nen namazi rosh lie.*

(My service is ever to the name of Allah, though I neither offer prayers nor keep fasts.)

The taking of revenge is as sacred to them as to the pre-Islamic Arabs.

*Heti ber mani shahi en
Main baladh kilat zedhani.*

(A warrior's revenge is dear to me, on those who attack my lofty fort.)

Here is a strange plea for revenge.

*Sohav Lashari shawan dani dil pha jan
Gwashta Dilwasha ghussave, "Sharoe mani
Phar wadhi kirdaran Baloch lajji na-bi,
Gosh gunaskaran ki jihan hamchosh gushi."*

(Their guide Dilwash Lashari, who was then heart and soul with them, cried angrily, "I am the avenger, a Baloch cannot be put to shame before his own tribe, the ears are offenders if the world says so.")

The following brief story known to all of them shows their keenness on taking revenge and also giving protection to those who seek their shelter. Some boys were chasing a lizard which ran into the house of Bibari. She thereupon asked the

boys to leave it alone, for it was her refugee. They paid her no heed and killed the lizard. She called her husband and said to him, "If you do not take revenge for the lizard, I am your sister and you are my brother." He replied, "Have patience. I will so act that the ground will be full of blood, sixty corpses lying on one side and fifty on the other, all gathered together for the lizard's sake." The ballad ends thus:—

*Omara naskhe ishta pha kaula
Hongiven Balacha phava hona.*

(Omar—the husband—has left a memory for keeping his word, the Balach, his tribe, the avenger of blood.)

Loyalty to the leader is very much insisted upon.

*Baki malami phrushtagant,
Yar sangatan-i ishtagant,
Sharmigha nindant ma meroan,
Murdar haramana warant,
Shi guda amira zindagh-ant !*

(The other cursed cowards fled, and abandoned their friends and companions. They shall sit with shame in the assembly and feed on carrion and unlawful meats, because they remained alive after their leader was slain.)

Generosity is very much appreciated.

*Man bashkaghe band na ban,
Band biaghe marde niyan !
Harchi ki khai azh kadhira
Sadh ganj be-aiv dara,
Ziran pha rasten chambava
Buran avo kharch sava,*

*Ni bahv khanan go hadhira
Nelam khanan pha phadha.*

(I will not be stopped from giving. I am not a man to be stopped. Whatever comes to me from the Creator, a hundred treasures without blemish, I will seize with my right hand, I will cut with my knife, I will deal out with my heart, I will let nothing be kept back.)

These are some of their characteristic features. In conclusion we may note their dash too.

*Thego arjala naptena,
Man dosti lura savzena,
Dai bi kadana zivirena,
Zar-ziven raha aman dai,
Jukhta bandi pha gahviya,
Goa go raha pharezi ! . . .*

*Dasta man gware phirenan,
Thegha man sava bhorenan,
Chonan ghut-khanan katara
Biroth dan birjaka radhena,
Rasten dast mani hone bi !*

(Sharpen my sword, my diamond-like lightning blade, my friendly green-flashing sabre; sharpen it on the harsh whetstone, temper it to an edge to cut silver; gird on my sheath for the slaughter; both hilt and edge are fasting.)

I will cast my hand upon his neck and break my sword upon his head, and so transfix him with my dagger that it will sink in up to the trusty hilt and my right hand will be stained with his blood.)

Hamayun used the Baloches against the Suri dynasty. A similar use could perhaps even now be made of them.

ASLAM SIDDIQI

WHAT CAN INDIA TEACH?

PHILOSOPHY AS DARSANA AND SADHANA

[P. Narasimhayya, M.A., PH.D., now retired, was the Head of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Travancore.—ED.]

Is it any wonder that, at a time like the present, thoughtful men and women among all nations should ask whether there is any hope of mankind's ever becoming *human*; and whether those studies known as the *humanities*, philosophy, religion, art and ethics, have any practical value in curbing the abuses of science which are daily deepening the hells of human barbarity?

Where are the effects of the teachings of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel? What has resulted from the martyrdom of Christ, the sacrifices of Buddha and Muhammad, the teachings of a Sankara, a Kabir or a Lao-tse and of the lives of the millions of men and women in humble stations who have faced the Inquisition and the fanatic's sword without flinching, praying with their dying breath for peace on earth and good-will to all mankind? The strength of spirit for which they stood is now robbed and harnessed by the very evils against which they fought. Pseudo-philosophy, made up of race hatred and greed, and robed in the glittering ideology of nationalism, has usurped the throne of true Wisdom.

In a series of addresses delivered under the auspices of the British Institute of Philosophy on the deeper

causes of the present war, British leaders of thought diagnosed it as the inevitable eruption of an evil ideology deliberately built up by the suppression of rational philosophy. Professor Adams observed that it was due to the decay of spiritual and moral values; and Dr. Gilbert Murray, that it was the result of the herd instinct being developed for evil. Dr. Matthews, Dean of St. Paul's, urged:—

We have not clearly made up our minds on the question, What is man? There is no more fundamental problem than the nature of man and his true good, and on our answer to it depends the kind of civilisation we shall try to create.

Sir Richard Livingstone observed:—

Twenty-two years ago an earlier generation were determined that the Great War should end war.... Today, twenty-two years later, we are engaged in another war involving brutalities which no one would have dreamt possible in 1914.... Naturally war fills our eyes at the moment.... But, what of the civilisation itself?... Is such a civilisation worth saving?... If the test of any society is how far its life embodies the great trinity of Goodness, Truth and Beauty, ask whether our society comes well out of such a test.... We understand how to control everything except ourselves.

For this ghastly failure of our modern age to build up a fairer civilisation, it is said that philosophy also is partly to blame, with its excessive intellectual character,—as if it were no more than an intellectual jig-saw puzzle. In Indian philosophy, a different spirit has prevailed. Here it has been emphasised not merely as a *darsana* but a *sadhana* as well,—not merely as an intellectual understanding of the truth but also as a practical discipline without which the perception of the full truth is impossible.

Philosophy begins and fulfils itself in India as a practical science. It arises as the pathfinder to a better life, an “emancipated” life of true culture and through it to an enduring and universal happiness. The havoc and privations of human life are its motive-forces. The Indian philosopher is apt to brood over the pathos of finite existence and to emphasise its darker and more evanescent features. He speaks of the universe as an ocean of sorrow and pictures man as a gourd floating on the high seas and beaten about by the storms of circumstance. But this dark side of the picture does not benumb his mind and leave him sunk in pessimism. He sees in the very sense of finitude and pathos and the longing to rise above it, the promise of a higher destiny. The very sense of privation is the pull of the larger life. It is the dim nostalgia of the Infinite in the finite. Out of this, springs philosophy.

Philosophy is the search for the

fuller life, in which the blinding storms of greed grow less and less, and bloody conflicts fade away more and more. In this sense philosophy is far-sighted pragmatism. What works for the truest and highest happiness?—this is the question which gives the primary urge to philosophy and culture in India. It is not a mere intellectual effort to satisfy intellectual curiosity. It is not an abstract theory evoked by the need of logic. It begins in life's aspiration to understand the infinite harmony and develops to teach self-discipline, unfolding the joys of the deeper life. The intellectual effort is the means to the practical discipline; and the practical discipline itself the means to better perception. Both together make the Illumination of the mind, the fulfilment of the Self and the attainment of its true happiness.

Plato remarked that philosophy begins in wonder. When man wonders at the majesty of the hills and the sea, the grandeur of the starry heavens, the regularity of the seasons, the phenomena of thunder and lightning, and the mysteries of birth and death, of sorrow and inequality, and attempts to understand them, philosophy is born. The Vedic hymns express this wonder. “Who guides the seasons, sets the limits to the sea and fixes the stars in the heavens? What was in the beginning prior to the world?” they ask. This species of wonder seizes on some phenomenon or problem because of mystery inherent in it, because it is

fascinating, strange or contradictory. It is satisfied when an explanation is discovered which is intellectually and æsthetically satisfying.

Now this urge becomes deeper when the practical interest of personal fulfilment joins the intellectual and the æsthetic. He strives for a fulfilment deeper than intellectual and æsthetic contemplation. This approach naturally leads him to emphasise sterner and more vital aspects. He is not satisfied, as Leibniz was, for instance, with an onlooker's picture of the world as a beautiful mosaic or a piece of music where the discords of anguish are balanced by the chords of joy. The total effect for a transcendent onlooker may be intellectually exquisite and æsthetically beatific. But to the Indian philosopher a deeper view seems essential. He takes a practical and therefore an individual stand-point. He is not looking for a world-picture as it may appear to an outside contemplator but as it affects each individual in his own life.

But, though his inspiration is practical, the Indian philosopher does not forget that philosophy is a relentlessly critical, rational and inductive inquiry. He is tireless in his analysis of facts, arguments and counter-arguments, and proofs. Putting aside mental idleness and prejudice, he is ready to examine every subtlety and abstraction. This is the ideal of philosophy which inspires the Indian thinker, and none more than the Vedantin.

The quest of happiness leads

necessarily to the search for truth and reality. It is a happiness which is deeper and more abiding than that of the senses. Sensuous pleasure deadens the finer spirit of man and corrupts his civilisation. Beginning as the search for enduring happiness, Indian philosophy becomes the search for Truth.

Now, to be faithful to facts and to range over their whole field without neglecting any, is the scientific spirit in which Indian philosophy embarks on its quest of Truth. It is a thorough study and nowhere merely speculative. It does not weave *a priori* webs of reasoning or make dreams out of its fancy. It waits on facts, studies them and reports on them. Some individual philosopher may ignore or fail to see some facts, but he will not abjure his primary devotion to facts as the arbiters and proofs of his teaching.

This method is as scientific as physics or botany. It has throughout the free spirit of reason and scientific inquiry.

It is unfortunate that the European term "science" has become rigidly confined to the natural sciences, so that in applying it to philosophy we seem to be confusing this with them. But philosophy is scientific without being a mere natural science. Unbiased inquiry based on facts is not the monopoly of the natural sciences. The Indian term "sastra" is free from such confusing associations. Philosophy is freely described in India as a "sastra" without the least sugges-

tion of its identification with natural science. It is the science of reality, *tattva sastra*.

The Indian philosophers are never tired of repeating that the methods of Agreement and Difference (*anvaya vyatireka*) are the essential first steps to philosophic truth. "The wise man," says one Indian philosopher, "will observe the facts and discover the nature of the self even as fire is deduced from smoke."¹ Another remarks, "It is a well-recognised maxim that no demonstrable fact of experience should be dismissed on the mere ground of its inexplicability."² If theories conflict with facts, it is the theories that must go by the board. The facts remain, demanding a more and more adequate explanation. The maxim that an ounce of fact is worth more than a ton of speculation is as true for the philosopher as for the scientist. This is the vital spirit of Indian philosophy.

All philosophy is scientific in the sense that its methods build up

verifiable truth. Only in the range of its subject-matter, which is cosmic, and in the absolutely critical character of its investigation, does philosophy differ from science. And in this it is not less, but more than science. In Professor Ward's beautiful phrase, it stands apart as the "queen among the sciences." It is not *a priori* speculation any more than science is.

To what results this spirit of inquiry has led Indian philosophy in its age-long quest of Truth, it is hopeless to try to indicate in a brief summary. It suffices to note that it has built up in India a culture of the widest catholicity, embracing every genuine form of religion and morality; spiritualising and elevating art and every aspect of life; and finding its highest happiness in that great aspiration which might well be the watchword of civilisation,

From the unreal, lead us to the real,
From the darkness, to the light,
From death, to the abiding.

P. NARASIMHAYYA

¹ Suresvara. N. IV. 5.

² Sayana. T. V. T, II. 4, 3.

THE PATH OF PATANJALI

[We publish here the last of a series of three articles by **Dr. D. G. Londhe** on the system of mind-control taught by Patanjali.—ED.]

III.—THE CONSUMMATION

The essence of the Yogic method of mastering the mind consists in the gradual withdrawal of the mind from objects, in inducing a sort of relaxation which culminates in a state of de-objectified consciousness with mental modes stilled, known as Samādhi. The nearest approach to a description of Samādhi is the paradoxical phrase "waking sleep." It is subjective consciousness devoid of all admixture of objective contents.

That a settled and prolonged practice of the Samādhi state results in the storing up of enormous psychic energy is a commonplace axiom in Yogic literature. Recently the researches of Professor Berger of Jena have shown that when the eyes are shut a regular rhythm in the activity of the brain cells follows. The brain cells beat in unison only when the mind is indrawn and relaxed, as in Samādhi. Any distraction disturbs this regular rhythm. In a meditative pose, with eyes shut, a regular rhythm is set up. The vast amount of energy stored up in this state, with a regular electrical rhythm of ten per second, can be gauged if we remember that, according to Prof. A. V. Hill of London, an individual nerve can transmit about a thousand impulses a second. If a nerve impulse is an electrical phenomenon

of such a frequency, we should not be surprised if an adept in Yoga claims the power of transmitting telepathic messages over long distances.

Just as modern would-be atom splitters are experimenting with bombardment with protons and deuterons, the Yogis of ancient India were experimenting with controlling the cells of the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system. They strove to awaken the slumbering powers of the coiled-up Kundalini, identified with the vagus nerve of the sympathetic system which controls the heart, the lungs and other vital organs. Dr. Rele has suggested that many of the marvellous feats of the Yogis can be explained in terms of the voluntary and conscious control of the involuntary functions of the autonomous nervous system. Following this suggestion one can speculate upon the powers that may be developed once the conscious control of the sympathetic nervous system has been established. This nervous system man has inherited from forms of life which are more widely diffused in nature and man can therefore attain, through this channel, communion with his cosmic origin.

A study of hypnosis is likely to

throw a revealing light on the nature of the state of Samādhi. In hypnosis, the ordinary waking Ego is silenced but the hypnotic state is not to be identified with sleep. William Brown describes the hypnotic state as follows:—

Thus we produce dissociation of the power of hearing and interpreting a particular kind of sound from the rest of the mind. The rest of the mind is lulled to sleep; it is a case of partial sleep. But more than that there is an emotional element at work.¹

What is particularly noteworthy is the emphasis on the facts that hypnosis is not sleep, that it can be induced by suggestion and that in hypnosis it is possible to recover lost memories. Samādhi like hypnosis is induceable by effort, and it is a state in which ordinary consciousness is eliminated, and yet a kind of consciousness, with a heightened and purified pleasurableness and a sublimated self-awareness does remain. The adepts in Patanjali's method and technique undoubtedly experience this super-consciousness. If a psychologist well-versed in modern methods of laboratory experiment succeeds in mastering the Yoga procedure up to the stage of Samādhi, he will certainly throw light on the nature of this super-consciousness and will be able to describe Samādhi in terms of modern Psychology. Mystification and superstition in regard to Samādhi are prevalent. There is an urgent need that Samādhi-consciousness be studied by trained

introspectionists in a true scientific spirit, so that the fog of popular associations may be lifted and the experience of Samādhi be viewed in proper perspective.

Yogism proceeds on the basic assumption that mind is larger than consciousness. In sleep and in hypnosis there occurs an accurate measurement of time, as is proved by the phenomenon of the carrying out of post-hypnotic commands. This basic principle is being widely recognised in modern thought under the different concepts of the subconscious, the unconscious and the subliminal. Modern thought has failed to give a consistent and coherent picture of the human psyche, of which different accounts have been given in biology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry and psychical research.

The theory of the subliminal self as developed by Myers makes the nearest approach to the Yogic view of the Psyche. According to Myers the normal waking consciousness is but a small fraction of the integral mind of man. The subliminal self contains aspects which remain undeveloped in the individual's ordinary social and cultural environment. In the inspirations of poets and the brilliant performances of scientific geniuses there is what he calls a "subliminal uprush of faculty into the supraliminal through the 'psychical diaphragm.'" It is through the subliminal that we may come into closer mental relations with one

¹ *Psychology and Psychotherapy*, pp. 11-12.

another and with the spiritual universe.

Myers's view has been criticised on the grounds of both over-simplification and over-elaborateness, but it seems to me unavoidable to posit some fundamental and foundational part of the human psyche if we are to explain many mental potencies which ordinarily remain undeveloped. Yoga theory and praxis spell a systematic effort to lay down principles and rules for the development of these slumbering potentialities of the human mind. It is significant that Yoga nowhere makes watertight compartments of the mind. Normal and abnormal are only conventional labels for certain phenomena. Psycho-analysis only scratches the surface of the subconscious mind and enters a blind lane which does not lead us very far.

Yoga recognises the full significance of the subconscious as constantly determining and conditioning the conscious states. The stream of consciousness flows between the banks, and above the bed of, the subconscious. Yoga states that the mental modes (Vrittis) are determined by the Samskaras and that the Samskaras in their turn are produced by the mental modes. It is thus that the wheel of the Vrittis and the Samskaras moves on eternally. The Yogic concept of the Samskaras is very striking and, rightly interpreted, implies the most modern theories of the subconscious and the unconscious, avoiding at the

same time their inconsistencies and unhealthy associations. When we are told that the cycle of the conscious states and Samskaras, mutually determining and conditioning each other, moves on eternally, we are to understand the Samskaras as mental dispositions. We must avoid the temptation to interpret the Samskaras in a purely physiological sense.

Yoga refers to what is called the reviving of the Samskaras.¹ All that modern physiology tells us of memory is that the brain paths are resuscitated and thus former experiences are recalled. Neurologists give us the number of cells in the cortex as around 1400 millions—astronomical figures! Biologists inform us that each cell in man's body carries its complete heredity in the twenty-four pairs of chromosomes containing the genes, *i. e.*, the units of inherited characteristics. The single genes have been indirectly located in definite parts of some chromosomes. We cannot conceive how a single cell one-millionth of a millimetre in diameter can carry complete in itself the whole heredity of a man, extending back over centuries of generations. In a world of such marvels we need not be surprised if we are informed by Yoga literature of accredited authenticity that by a revivification of the slumbering Samskaras man may recover memories of past lives. These are stupendous things, immense potentialities, which should make us beware of a

¹ Samskara Sakshatkarana. *Vide* Y. S. III. 18.

frivolous and repellent rationalism and help us to cultivate a spirit of patient sympathy and toleration towards the vast vistas of scientific knowledge. Mankind has always been conservative in the acceptance of new truths.

Bergson regarded pure memory as independent of the brain and as of the nature of spirit. The theory of Psycho-physical parallelism as regards the relation of body and mind has failed to account for the phenomena of memory and thought-transference. Yoga claims that, by fixing the Sanyama (a synthetic term for Dharana and Dhyana) on generic concepts as distinguished from particular objects, the Yogi can get access to the knowledge of other minds. The possibility of such a power can be easily comprehended in the light of the phenomena of mind-reading and thought-transference.

In the literature of the Society for Psychical Research we come across many authenticated experiments on thought-transference and clairvoyance. These experiments clearly show that the phenomena cannot be accounted for by any of the known and established psychological theories and that some sort of direct action of one mind on another has to be recognised. Particularly interesting are the early experiments of Miss Ramsden and Miss Miles on telepathy at long distance. The more recent experiments of Mrs. Sinclair and Mr. Irwin are published in the book *Mental Radio*.

Professional psychologists and academic scientists were not at first inclined to accept the authenticity of the results of these experiments for the empirical science of Psychology as pursued in universities and laboratories. These phenomena were stigmatised as psychic or parapsychological. But recently, since Dr. J. B. Rhine of the Duke University has carried out experiments on telepathy at long distance, under strict laboratory control¹ even the academic Psychologists have had to admit that the phenomena of telepathy and clairvoyance are not parapsychological and supernatural but are perfectly verifiable within the limits of normal, empirical and experimental Psychology.

We human beings can see objects with our eyes open, but when we are told that a man can see objects even when his eyes are closed or heavily bandaged, or can see events happening at a great distance, we are at a loss to explain this phenomenon of second-sight, or "opening the gates of distance." Our eyes are so constituted that ether wavelengths between the limits of 760 and 360 millionths of a millimetre, for red and violet respectively, can stimulate visual sensations. Wavelengths longer than those of red are experienced as heat and those shorter than those of violet produce chemical action. In spite of the laws and conditions to which our optical perceptions are subject, there are persons who possess the supernormal

¹ *Vide Extra-Sensory Perception*. Boston. 1934.

power of "seeing" events happening at a great distance. Swedenborg, the well-known savant and mystic, once astonished the company at a tea-party at Gottenborg, by informing them that a dangerous fire had broken out in Stockholm. Many similar stories are current in which some persons have actually "seen" a theft being committed or a man being drowned at a distance.

Now the question to be considered is whether these powers of super-perception are inborn or attainable by effort. The Yoga system says they are attainable by the practice of intensive concentration. It is admitted that a person under hypnosis can narrate events happening at a distance. If hypnosis is a dissociation from normal waking consciousness, produced by suggestion, there is no theoretical reason why the same power should not be attained by auto-suggestion. Telepathy is sometimes compared to wireless telegraphy. It is a helpful analogy but nothing more than that. It is well for us to recognise the essentially non-spatial nature of mind. Mind transcends the limitations of geometry and geography!

In the concept of "thinking of the opposite" (Pratipaksha Bhavana) we find a very sound principle of the bi-polarity of mind harnessed to the service of practical psychology as applied to individual guidance. Here the positive character of Patanjali's procedure is in contrast with the negative character of the technique of psycho-analysis. The Yoga procedure aims at integration of personality while psycho-analysis is content with removing the repressed complex in the unconscious. Like consulting psycho-analysts, practising Yogis will prove a veritable boon to many

in their personal guidance.

It is said that by fixing the Sanyama on the form of the body, the adept can acquire the wonderful power of making the body invisible. Human imagination has always played with this power of invisibility as we know from mythology and fiction. This power appears miraculous, but a little reflection will show that nature herself has tried this device in what is called in biology protective colouration. If visibility depends upon optical conditions of light and shade, the possibility of invisibility will lie in the direction of adjustments of light and shade with reference to the background. Attempts have been made to explain the supernormal powers of the Yogis in terms of the "Sukshma Sharir," the astral body or the ethereal double. In our opinion the subject of supernormal powers has only a historical importance, inasmuch as this topic seems to be an importation from Buddhistic literature. It is significant that it is slurred over by Patanjali who warns aspirants that these powers are only obstacles, temptations to be avoided rather than indulged in.

In the highest reaches of purely psychological procedure, Yoga tends to pass into religion and mysticism. Psychology paves the way for synoptic metaphysics of existence as a whole. The individual Ego, freed from the limitations of the psychophysical personality, will merge into the cosmic consciousness. The Individual will become the Absolute. But obviously we are here passing beyond the empirical ground of psychology and therefore the concept of Kaivalya is not part of our present task—the study of the Path of Patanjali.

D. G. LONDHE

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

RETHINKING RELIGION *

Rethinking Religion is an analysis of the present shifting currents in religious thought and a projection into the future of their implications by one of America's greatest liberal ministers. John Haynes Holmes brings to the field of religious survey and prediction the matured experience of thirty years in a free pulpit. He is also widely known and respected as a progressive pacifist, an author and a radio speaker. *Rethinking Religion* is informative concerning the frame of reference beginning to emerge from non-denominational churches, but it is also unusually suggestive as a careful analysis of religion itself.

"The view-point presented in this book," writes Holmes, "is that the essence of religion is not revelation or divine disclosure, as these words are commonly understood, but experience in the realms of nature and of human nature." He calls attention to the present sweeping changes in religion's attempt to adapt itself to realities of the modern world and regards this phenomenon as "an intellectual and spiritual process which is bound in the end to be fatal to creeds, rituals, institutions....The old basis of religion is gone, or is going," he concludes, "and a new basis of religion is yet to come."

Holmes then proceeds to describe the three modern "different and mutually exclusive attitudes toward religion prevailing among men. The first, or

traditionally fundamental attitude, he characterizes as a belief that religion is intruded from without, or rather from above....The variations of this idea of religion as a divine disclosure...all involve the concept of something external, and therefore alien to man...It is the idea which underlies as a foundation the historic structure of orthodox Christian faith, both Catholic and Protestant. Yet it is an idea which is today impossible to modern thought.

Among the most important reasons causal to disintegration of dogmatic orthodoxy are scholarly Biblical criticism and an introduction to the Western world of Eastern Scriptures. Writes Holmes:—

The Bible belongs properly with the religious literatures of history—with such writings as those laboriously collected and edited by Max Müller in his stupendous library of *The Sacred Books of the East*. These books are "sacred," as the Bible is sacred, because together they deal with sacred as contrasted with secular subjects—God, the soul, immortality, the moral law.

After a brief examination of the new "religion of unbelief" or materialism, Holmes returns to his own view that religion, if it exists at all, must exist as a natural phenomenon. "For nature is the whole." In the clarification of this view-point he introduces a statement of John Dewey, that "whatever introduces perspective is religious" and holds that we should not feel religion to be a separate something which of itself lends perspective. This immediately indicates an attitude transcending creeds and denominations. Therefore

* *Rethinking Religion*. By JOHN HAYNES HOLMES. (The Macmillan Company, New York. \$2.50)

Holmes does not write as a Christian. Indeed, from the temper of his book one might conclude that the author feels a closer kinship with the broader currents of Eastern religion than with any recognized Western church.

All religions are true in the measure of their fidelity to the inner spirit of man. . . . When I saw Gandhi, of India, chanting his Hindu prayers and reading his Hindu scriptures, and walking in the footsteps of his Hindu saints, I pondered, in the spectacle of such a soul, if Hinduism is not the sublimest religion in the world. . . . If there is to be distinction between these many religions of many peoples, it must be upon the basis not of true and false, but of high and low. . . . Few religions are pure, or remain pure, except as they are made pure by the lives of those who live them. The Mahatma of India, by his unique example, has made Hinduism the noblest religion of our time.

In answering the question, "What is religion?" Holmes brings to light an interesting quotation from Albert Einstein. Says the great mathematician,

Religion is a cosmic sense. The individual feels. . . the nobility and marvellous order which are revealed in nature. . . and seeks to experience the totality of existence as a unity full of significance.

In this same discussion the question arises, however, whether Holmes does not subscribe rather fully, even though he may not himself be aware of it, to a modern evolutionary theory concerning the gradual growth of human intelligence through the "cave-man" stage to the present.

As man awakened to that intelligent consciousness which distinguishes him from the mere animal. . . there must have come a time when he felt himself overwhelmed by the vastness and complexity of the universe. . . . This "cosmic sense," as Einstein calls it, marked the birth of religion in man's soul.

Here is clearly faith in the hypothesis that the human soul, rather than being an enduring and timeless factor, is the

creation of biological evolution. In Holmes's own context, however, it should be remembered that this assumption also is without proof and subject to question.

Turning to the history and defects of church organization, Holmes makes some penetrating observations. He points out that the churches of every denomination, fully as much as state political organizations, have been instruments of "deliberate conspiracy" in the interest of darkness and oppression. Because of this, faith in religion itself has quite naturally been emaciated.

The experience of the last great war, in 1914-1918, may well have convinced all but the stoutest soul that religion offers no mere refuge from the sins and outrages of the world, but on the contrary is itself a diabolically clever device to make not only respectable but holy what would otherwise so horrify men as to lead them to revulsion and repudiation of war's smallest deeds.

Although Holmes believes that all denominational institutions must eventually disintegrate, he points out that "it is probable that the Protestant churches will disappear much faster than the far-flung parochial institutions of Rome" because Protestantism has become neither fish, flesh nor fowl.

Three interesting qualities of the "true church" of the future are outlined by Holmes as follows:—

It must be *undenominational*, in the sense that it definitely substitutes for loyalty to any single sectarian group identification with the whole body of the community. It must be free, in the sense that it recognizes the authority of no creed or statement of faith, but leaves all matters of theological opinion to the unfettered thought and conviction of the individual. It must be *democratic*, in the sense that it organizes its life on the basis of self-determination both for the group and for the single individual within the group

Other points of significance in *Rethinking Religion* centre around the fruitful discussions of the terms "God" and "Prayer." It might be argued that in these two instances a complete change of terms would serve better than redefinition. Holmes, however, chooses the latter alternative. In evaluating the significance of Prayer he insists that

prayer is not the practice of magic in the hope of miracle....Prayer...psychologically interpreted, is selection, attention, resolve... We are ourselves little centres of energy integrated with the universe which is the storehouse of energy...Around us and above us, as within us, are forces mystically akin to ourselves, but so much greater than ourselves, which fill the world. If we are to fulfil our desires and therewith achieve our prayers, we must bring them into harmony with these higher forces, as an engineer brings the designs of his construction into harmony with gravitation.

The definition of God is also enlightening, indicating Holmes's mission in constantly changing or revitalizing the concepts of Christian terminology. He approaches the consideration of God through a discussion of all activities which men pursue as "ideal ends."

These ends, however, all have a common significance and value. They are unified in their character as ideals, and in their claims upon the allegiance of men's hearts. Furthermore, the human mind, essentially co-ordinative in its processes, insists upon combining

these ideals into a single order of thought, and thus comprehending them as one. There is a unity of ideal ends, in other words, which includes and classifies and itself supersedes the various ideals which together comprise this unity. And this unity must have a name, or term, by which it may be known and definitely described. What can that name, or term, be other than the familiar word, God?

On the last and perhaps most important question of Immortality, Dr. Holmes refrains from dedicating himself to a particular theory of continued existence. He writes instead that although "mankind has not yet seen or verified an immortal life, the best minds have proclaimed it because it is necessary, though still unseen, to explain the psychic, or spiritual qualities of man's being." Without this hypothesis, he goes on to infer, all of the "observed phenomena of personality remain incredible."

The distinctive characteristic of Holmes's contribution in *Rethinking Religion* is that it actually fulfils the implications of its title, instead of attempting to plead a special case. It is a sincere, and, if the word has any meaning at all, an unbiased revaluation of all those factors in the modern religious equation which are most pertinent to the needs of the present and the future.

HERVEY WESCOTT

Japan's New Order. By GEORGE GODWIN. (The Thinker's Forum, No. 23. C. A. Watts and Co., Ltd., London. 6d.). An informative and chastening account. Japan's traditional State-worship, racial pride and fear of foreign aggression were tinder awaiting the spark. Western imperialism and racial discrimination supplied it. Westerners

taught the "barbarians" what civilisation means. Example proved stronger than precept.

In less than a century the Japanese have taken from the Western world everything it has to give save what was most worth giving.

It is their own reflection in the mirror of Japan at which the Western nations start today.

E.

AN INTELLECTUAL BOUNDARY PROBLEM *

The well-known scientist who writes this book has sought to discuss some of the problems of philosophy in the light of modern developments of physical science. He takes for granted that there is no cleavage between the two forms of approach to reality, the scientific and the philosophic. Philosophy is not concerned with man alone, but with reality as a whole; and so is science. But still their methods as well as their aims differ.

The tools of science are observation and experiment; the tools of philosophy are discussion and contemplation. It is still for science to try to discover the pattern of events, and for philosophy to try to interpret it when found.

It appears to us that this way of distinguishing science and philosophy is likely to mislead. The distinction is more radical than is generally realised. It is because Sir James fails to recognise this that he thinks that the new background provided by the science of physics has new philosophical implications, and that some of the older discussions of philosophical problems have ceased to be meaningful and so, real. He would have philosophers note these implications and define their concepts afresh.

For example, materialism in the old form can no longer be held, because the physical universe has ceased to be a matter of mere particles moving in physical space and time. Matter has become almost empty of its material content,—it has become just empty space. The trend of modern physics is towards some form of mentalism, even towards objective idealism of some sort. We are obliged to go beyond phenom-

ena which we can observe to a reality underlying phenomena which we cannot observe and which might well be mental or spiritual.

Again, causality may be true for the man-sized world, but it is not true of the electronic world. Science has enlarged the scope of study and thereby rendered this concept less meaningful today. The new physics is not opposed to some form of freedom or indeterminism at the centre of things, although it may be difficult to define this concept very exactly or beyond saying that it is a form of unconscious determinism.

Lastly, modern physics is not only averse to the particle-view of matter (since the particles are reduced to waves of radiation), but it would even seem to suggest, according to Sir James, that human individuality is fictitious in character and capable of being reduced to one common spiritual existence.

We cannot subscribe to the view that the subject-matter of science is the same as that of philosophy, or that science can give a new direction to, much less solve, the problems of philosophy. There is no such thing as a borderland between science and philosophy which may be investigated with profit either by the scientist or by the philosopher. What appears so, is really an incursion into foreign territory.

Sir James makes much of the three-fold distinction of nature into the man-sized world which is perceived through our sense-organs, the electronic world which does not form "a replica on a minute scale of the phenomena of

* *Physics and Philosophy*. By SIR JAMES JEANS. (Cambridge University Press. 8s. 6d.)

the man-sized world," and the phenomena of the world of nebulae. Whatever the differences between the three divisions, science is committed to a study of what can be observed and is thus reducible to sense-data of some sort. No regularities can be noted, and no predictions made and verified, unless we have to do with sensible objects which can be observed. But if that is so, matter cannot be eliminated from any picture of the physical world; for in the end, matter may be more, but never less than, our images of matter or what we call sense-data. To say that matter itself is reduced to empty space is really to say not only that there is no matter, but also that there can be no possible content for the study of science.

Science is nothing if it is not a study of "physical phenomena," which is another name for matter. There is a further limitation. This study is quantitative or mathematical, not qualitative. Science can only measure or calculate in order to predict. When the mathematical formulæ which govern the occurrence of phenomena have been found, the business of science is over. We have got knowledge which is in a way quite certain. The other business of seeking to understand the working of nature through some known model or picture is a different matter. It is here that there is most marked progress, and we can say with modern physics, that no model can ever be satisfactory or give us an exact idea of the inward working of nature. All these models are subjective and do not carry us very far. They are purely conjectural and so mental. We can never know the exact truth of things, but only the drapery in which the truth

clothes itself. Such are the limitations of any scientific approach to nature. Science can have nothing to say about any spiritual basis of things, about freedom, etc. It must study matter alone or—what is the same thing—the world of phenomena.

Philosophy does not seek to study the phenomenal world. If anything, it seeks to know the reality behind the phenomena. In any case, philosophy, unlike science, is not interested in the object as such, but only as the object forms part of our experience. It is this experience that is the concrete datum for philosophy, and not the abstract object. But if that is so, the subject-matter of philosophy is from the very start something spiritual and not material; for experience is nothing if it is not of the very stuff of spirit. It is because the object forms part of experience that it becomes possible for us to go beyond it to an underlying reality which is spiritual in character.

This approach to reality is certainly not through any technique of science, and it has no relation whatsoever with scientific investigations. It is purely a matter of analysis and interpretation of experience as such and as a whole. A philosopher accordingly need not be a scientist or seek the aid of a scientist. He has an independent sphere of work and an independent method. All his data are given him in his own experience, and no data are left outside which may surprise him or disprove his conclusions in the end; and his method is no other than that of spiritual reflection and rational interpretation. He has no use for any inductive methods of science or probable reasoning as it is called, or for the purely deductive methods of logic. Philosophy is a super-science in this

sense, a science which has nothing in common with physical science. It is more truly a science of the spirit, for it studies the part which thought and more generally spirit plays in the construction and in the intelligibility of the phenomenal world to us. It is here that we can give some sense to freedom or to the spiritual basis of reality.

The book is very well written. The latest developments of physical science are explained simply and without technicalities. It will be found most interesting and illuminating to the lay reader who makes no clear-cut distinction between science and philosophy

and who is prepared to learn what science has to say on matters generally regarded as philosophical. Sir James does not claim that modern physical science solves any of the problems of philosophy. Nevertheless his treatment is likely to create some confusion inasmuch as it gives the impression that science can give us information which will put philosophy on the right track and philosophical discussion of certain problems on better lines. It appears to us that it does nothing of the sort. It can at best echo as not being contrary to known facts of science what we can *only* reach through a different kind of rational study.

G. R. MALKANI

THE MESSAGE OF SANKARACHARYA *

The Self understood as a distinctive superphysical or supersensuous entity has been the basic or foundational concept of all systems of Indian thought. It is therefore no wonder that in an avowedly monistic or absolutistic system like that of Sri Sankaracharya all doctrines, theories, hypotheses and explanations reveal an inherent centripetal movement towards the nature of the Self as identical with the Supreme. Though later system-builders have not hesitated to criticise the Acharya's *absolutism and monism*, there has always prevailed striking unanimity of judgment about the unparalleled brilliance of Sankara as a metaphysical craftsman. Not-

withstanding the by no means inconsiderable output of scholars, European, American and Indian, the life and the philosophy of system-builders like Sankara form permanent themes which contain an implicit invitation to researchers to discover and expound something new. I do not, therefore, believe that there is any need to justify the publication of these volumes.

The *Atma Bodha*, a beginners' manual (*Prakarana*) by Sankara, contains in a nutshell the essential truths of Advaita which have been elaborately established with philosophic argumentation and dialectical metaphysics in the *Upanishads*, the *Brahma-Sutras* and the *Gita*. The text runs to sixty-

**Atma Bodha* of Sri Sankaracharya, with a Rare Sanskrit Commentary, English words-meaning, Translation and Explanation and a critical Exhaustive Sketch of Sankara's Life, Works and Philosophy. Edited by P. N. MENON, B. A., B. L. (Indian Classics Series No. 2. The Scholar Press, Palghat, Malabar)

Upadesa-sahasri. A Thousand Teachings. In Two Parts—Prose and Poetry. Translated into English with Explanatory Notes by SWAMI JAGADANANDA. (Sri Ramakrishna Math, Myslapore, Madras. Rs. 2/8)

eight stanzas and the commentary in Sanskrit (almost word for word) is strikingly simple and illuminating.

Stanzas 3 and 38 proclaim to modern researchers that they should not whittle down or adulterate the pure monism and intellectualism of Sankara. The former emphatically declares that all action programmes, political, economic etc. are downright error-ridden. The latter as emphatically repudiates the modern view of a Yogi as a social or political worker freely mixing in society.

In the interests of impartial investigation of these ancient classics, and of the maintenance at a high level of rational research, I have to make one or two comments. Regarding the classification of Sankara's works, the author of the Introduction has followed Dr. S. K. Belvalkar, who appears to have suggested that some works attributed to Sankara are indisputably his, some are doubtful and some cannot have been written by Sankara. I am afraid that this cut-and-dry classification will not do. *There is obvious danger in Western canons of literary criticism being applied to the ancient classics by way of standardisation or rough-and-ready mechanisation.* Modern research has up till today proved nothing in the light of which some works may have to be rejected definitely *as not composed by Sankara.*

Secondly, reference is made in the Preface to the "pure monotheism" of Sankara. It is a misnomer to call Sankara's system monotheism, pure or other. He admitted the validity and the working advantages of the Hindu Pantheon which was and is even today purely polytheistic. Sankara's devotional prayers and hymns are

addressed to not one but many deities and thus Sankara subscribes to polytheism, at least for religious worship, with the metaphysical reservation that these deities belong to a lower degree of reality. Sankara's system is *Monism* or *Absolutism*. It is not monotheism.

Thirdly, it is regrettable that philosophical terms have been loosely used. For instance, Ramanuja's system is described on p. xliii as "qualified Monism," but, on p. lxvii, as "non-qualified monism." The matter has long been settled. Ramanuja's "visishtadvaita" is *neither qualified nor non-qualified monism. It is not monism at all.* Ramanuja admits three foundational entities, Chit (sentient), A-chit (non-sentient) and Isvara (The Supreme). So Ramanuja is a pluralist.

These comments would not touch the general excellence of the volume, on the publication of which the Editor should have the congratulations of all interested in Indian philosophy and in the message of Sankara's *Atma Bodha*.

The *Upadesa-sahasri* is in two parts; the prose part contains three sections; the verse part, nineteen. There are not exactly a thousand teachings; in the Sanskrit figurative embellishment, the term "Sahasri" means only *many*.

The message of the *Upadesa-sahasri* is the Oneness of Existence, knowledge of which is the only means of liberation from the meshes of transmigration. I desire to emphasise a truth to which sufficient attention has not been drawn, so far as I am aware, by European or Indian authors who have critically expounded this work before. It is customary to speak of the dizzy heights of Advaitic oneness which one in a million peradventure can hope to scale by means of the metaphysical, concep-

tual and ethical ladder, but, in this manual, the Acharya has summed up the quintessence of Advaita for popular understanding. Sankara appears in this work as an expert psychologist. He has developed the doctrines in an ascending order of difficulty and complexity, patterning his teaching to secure from his pupils the maximum of understanding response.

There is another aspect of the Acharya's method which unmistakably anticipates modern psychology. In order to secure the greatest advantage with the least endeavour, psychologists suggest that theories extraordinarily difficult on account of their abstruse nature should be taught straightway as if they were the easiest of comprehension. The Acharya writes "*Poorvam-upadiset-atmaikya - pratipadaparah-sruteeh,*" i. e., he counsels that Smriti texts which proclaim the oneness of Atman be first taught. This would excite students' intellectual curiosity as experience would show that the *finite* self, suffering from the countless ills of existence, can never be identical with the *Infinite*, free from all such ills. Then would commence the course of Advaita instruction with emphasis on the unreliable character of workaday experience and with indications of the final goal. Such is the plan pursued in the prose section, which is in the form of a dialogue between teacher and pupil.

The concluding section embodies a dialogue between the *mind and the*

self. Modern European and American psychology does not discriminate between the two, but that mind and self are disparate entities has been an age-long postulate of Vedantic psychology. It is on account of the multilateral energising of the *mind* that the *self seems to suffer*. Mind is the source of all secular and spiritual mischief. At the dawn of true insight, the self triumphs over the machinations of the mind.

Swami Jagadananda's translation is generally accurate and interesting, but, making all possible allowance for difficulties inherent in any attempt to express technical philosophical Sanskrit terminology in English, I may point out that in more contexts than one, the rendering could have been better. The term "Pari-sankhyana" is translated "Repetition." Its correct connotation is either *aid or help to right understanding* or a *carefully considered statement*. I am afraid the rendering of the entire stanza commencing with "*Chaitanya-bhasyata—*" and ending with "*anu-bhavo-bhavit*" (p. 96) requires refashioning. There is hardly any justification for changing the voice and rendering "*sishyam-pricchet*" as "disciple is asked."

Though some good editions of the *Upadesa-sahasri* are available, Swamiji deserves the warmest congratulations of students of philosophy in general and of Advaita-Vedanta in particular on the publication of Sri Sankara's striking manual on modern lines.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Magadha Architecture and Culture. By SRIS CHANDRA CHATTERJEE. Illustrated. (University of Calcutta)

The author of this finely produced and finely illustrated book is, after Havell, the most passionate champion of the revival of Indian Architecture according to its finest characteristics and traditions. He has been ceaselessly working for the foundation of a New School of Indian Architecture to resuscitate its past glories and achievements as a vital contribution to the progress of Indian culture and civilization.

The current trend of hybrid or ultra-modern architecture pursued by Indian architects gives a poor account of the creative genius of India.... Traditions should be the legitimate basis of all modern and future styles of Architecture in India.... India should be free both culturally and politically. ... Universities and Municipalities should join hands and save the architecture of India from threatened extinction.

Echoing these eloquent words of the author one might well ask: "*L'art, dans l'Inde, sera-t-il ou ne sera-t-il pas Indien?*" To this, very varying answers have been given, in connection with the revival of Indian Pictorial Art. Architecture is a psycho-social adventure, not a mere means of devising a "machine for living." It is a living art, changing as the world changes, reflecting the customs, the manners and the way of life of a people. Does India today stand where it did in the Gupta Period, or in Mauryan times? Could we build today a Chinese pagoda

in Piccadilly Circus or transfer the silhouette of the Kailasa Temple from Elura to Hornby Road? Yet such things have happened and Sir John Soane thought that a church or a house should look like a Greek temple. And nineteenth-century England is full of illustrations of offices and places of business actually designed in the classical style. Temples and monuments may continue ancient traditions, but could or should a modern insurance building ape the façades of Buddhist shrines? Yet Mr. Chatterjee might answer that we have in ancient architectural practices enough traditions on which to model our civic buildings.

Unfortunately, the title of the book is very pretentious, and presents the author in the rôle of a scholarly antiquarian, notwithstanding his own protest: "I am not a technical scholar." Yet such a modest apology does not cover the violence done to the history of Indian Art, owing to a total lack of perspective. A consistent, homogeneous or continuous "School of Magadha Architecture" is something unknown to historians of Indian Art. Yet Mr. Chatterjee's bad archæology should not impair his good cause, the development of Indian Architecture, which he is championing with so much justifiable fervour and passion. For Indian Architecture is a glorious heritage of culture, not only of India but of the whole world.

O. C. GANGOLY

Indian Pageant. By F. YEATS-BROWN. (Eyre and Spottiswoode (Publishers), Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

This book is bad history and worse propaganda. Major Yeats-Brown sets

out to review the "Indian pageant" of five thousand years—from Mohenjodaro to the present day—in a slim little volume of 186 pages, out of which 84 pages make a pretence of providing a

tabloid history of fifty centuries, while the rest of the book can only be described as a laboured and not very subtle apologia for British rule in India—with all the usual clichés about the Blessings of British Raj intact!

To this reviewer at least there is no more offensive type of Englishman than the patronising "friend of India" who claims "to love India as much as I love my own country," who waxes eloquent about the "great philosophies," "great art" and "ancient religions," misquotes Ramkrishna with approval, talks about the Indians' mystical "sense of beauty and a sense of the world unseen," and then blandly concludes that the solution of India's manifold problems lies in its vivisection into Pakistan, Hindustan, Rajasthan and a Sikh State—with, of course, the British lording over all of them! "The British have no need to apologise for their presence in India," says Major Yeats-Brown. "They are fulfilling a necessary function, and will continue to do so, while handing over to those

who live in the country the control of their own internal affairs, and indeed external affairs, provided they do not conflict with the safety of India as a whole." The perfect Amery touch!

As a historian, the author of *Bengal Lancer* must rate very low. He still seems to believe that the pageant of history is the procession of Kings and Queens, conquerors and emperors. It would be futile to expect from him a history of the people who, more than rulers and potentates, ensure the continuity of civilisations. And, of course, it would be a heresy to suggest to a conservative like him that there is such a thing as the economic basis of historical development.

It is, indeed, difficult to view this volume seriously. It is little more than an expensive and pretentious propaganda pamphlet, with an attractive and colourful dust-cover, produced with the obvious intention of appeasing the disturbed conscience of Britain and America.

K. A. ABBAS

Victory or Vested Interest? G. D. H. COLE AND OTHERS. (George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London. 5s.). These essays, based on lectures delivered under the auspices of the Fabian Society, ask a significant question. G. D. H. Cole thinks that the war's being fought as it is, under the institutions of private capitalism, means that the profit motive must and does impede efficiency and production. Inevitably, so long as outright nationalisation of industries is not achieved. Harold Laski believes that this war is rooted in unwillingness to achieve democracy at home, inasmuch as the fundamental character of economic power since 1939 is unchanged. Exigencies of war production have only strengthened capitalist interests; the present compromise between *laissez-faire* and planned capitalism can yield neither coherent nor well-directed production.

The present mental climate, he believes, is suitable for the organisation of a revolution by consent. Francis Williams thinks that though theoretically democracy is a great equalitarian creed, in general practice "inequality is its chosen wear." The public-school tradition fostered an insular clinging to privilege and property and made permanent sacrifice of economic power unthinkable. What is needed, he avers, is willingness to make social justice the criterion. George Orwell is convinced that today's capitalist democracy—sustained on parasitic economy—must either change or perish. Mary Sutherland discusses the many problems connected with the economic status of women.

Before war-leaders talk of democracy and make promises, they will do well to read this slim volume.

V. M. INAMDAR

Evenings in Albany. By CLIFFORD BAX. (Eyre and Spottiswoode (Publishers), Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

Clifford Bax, playwright, poet, essayist, has written this book of musings because he was happier in his rooms in Albany than in any other of his London dwellings. His Ivory Town was Albany—that private estate in the heart of London's West End, with its arcade, "The Rope Walk," connecting Piccadilly with Burlington Gardens. He no longer lives there (there was a little matter of a bomb) but in Cambridge: yet his heart, one feels, has never left Albany and these essays are like his retreat itself, a reminder of a lost age.

So bravely does Mr. Bax wear all his tastes, if not all his heart, on his sleeve that it is impossible not to respect him. His elegant and eclectic nostalgia for the past and his almost complete immunisation from the influences which have dominated his contemporaries may evoke wonder in some breasts, though not (except, perhaps, among the very young), anger. He cannot believe that "Ezra Pound, D. H. Lawrence, Arnold Bennett, Aldous Huxley or even Bernard Shaw would stick in the memory of Englishmen if Wilfrid Scawen Blunt and Meredith himself were already authors whom nobody perused." He has never "cared for Eliot." He is completely out of touch with even the middle-aged

The Art of Discipline and Leadership or How to Maintain Discipline and Attain Leadership. By ABUL HASANAT. (The Standard Library, A, Dacca. Rs. 2/4 or 3s. 6d.). Such books have a limited appeal. Not because of their supercilious tone but because the reader willing to be so advised can often enough advise himself. And no advice

poets like W. H. Auden. He thinks that in his day there has been only one Englishman "whom we ought to call a 'great' writer"—Thomas Hardy. For him the "golden days" are the Tudor epoch. His admired architecture is of that period: old English music from Byrd to Purcell his favourite music (not forgetting "Greensleeve"). Of course he likes cricket.

He tells a story of John Drinkwater (whose name may possibly stand as an epitome of all that was wrong with English Literature in the "*entre deux guerres*") which is worth recording. Drinkwater said on one occasion: "You remember that I adapted Mussolini's play about Napoleon?"

"I remember it, yes," replied Bax, "I saw it."

"Why," said the poet, "must he threaten to conquer Abyssinia?... It may not do any good, but yesterday I sent a long telegram, advising him to abandon the whole project."

This anecdote is relevant, perhaps, to Mr. Bax's belief that there are two kinds of artists, those who by temperament paddle along the main stream and those who, at the risk of ending up in backwaters, principally desire to get away from the main stream and, in consequence, paddle themselves down any unmapped creek.

Artists, however, are apt to be neither democratic best-sellers nor dilettanti of the Ivory Town.

HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON

can be so effective as that which comes from within. Neither discipline nor leadership can be developed without self-help. But this common-sense manual, containing numerous practical suggestions, can help its readers to discipline and leadership as much as imposed rules ever can.

V. M. I.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“ _____ ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS

Apropos of the phenomenal recent development in television the Editor of *Science and Culture* observes truly in his April issue:—

A fifteenth century man if he were to visit the Earth to-day, would ascribe it to magic, or to occult powers! But a patient reading of the story of this achievement would show that there is nothing supernatural in it.

There can, of course, be nothing *supernatural, i. e.*, miraculous. None would deny science due credit for this great achievement but the bestowal of that credit does not demand the disparagement of occultism, to which the Editor proceeds. He pooh-poohs as “unfounded and based on fancy” such claims, for instance, as “ability to foretell weather and future events from examination of livers and intestines of sacrificial animals or flights of birds or from combinations and positions of stars and planets (astrology)!”

Magic rests on laws of nature, no less than modern science itself, as will be apparent from the following definition:—

A thorough familiarity with the occult faculties of everything existing in nature, visible as well as invisible; their mutual relations, attractions, and repulsions; the cause of these, traced to the *spiritual* principle which pervades and animates all things; the ability to furnish the best conditions for this principle to manifest itself, in other words a profound and exhaustive knowledge of natural law—this *was* and *is* the basis of magic.

Would not the Editor be willing to admit that there may be laws unknown

to modern science that may have been well known to ancient scientists? The unanimous testimony of mankind is said to be an irrefutable proof of truth; and about what was ever testimony more unanimous than that for thousands of ages among civilised people as among the most barbarous, there has existed a firm and unwavering belief in magic? As Madame H. P. Blavatsky has written:—

In the days of old, when prophets were not treated as charlatans, nor thaumaturgists as impostors...the study of magic, or wisdom, included every branch of science, the metaphysical as well as the physical, psychology and physiology in their common and occult phases, and the study of alchemy was universal, for it was both a physical and a spiritual science. Therefore why doubt or wonder that the ancients, who studied nature under its double aspect, achieved discoveries which to our modern physicists, who study but its dead letter, are a closed book?

“Ethical Principles and Political Action” is a stimulating theme. Prof. L. Susan Stebbing brought home some hard facts in reference to “the common good” of all mankind at the Symposium on that topic reported in *The Ethical Societies' Chronicle* for December 1942. She stressed what the facile well-wishers are prone to overlook—that the good life is not possible for all without sacrifice on the part of some. The price has to be paid.

Slum-dwellers can be moral beings in the sense of doing their duty, acting

conscientiously, loving and being loved, but "men are capable of being more than moral" in that sense.

They need, for the full development of their spiritual capacities, to learn and recognise and love what is beautiful; they need opportunities for solitude in which alone mind and spirit can grow. . . . If we are serious in wishing to build a world in which "the common people" shall have the best that can be achieved, sacrifices must be made by those who now have the greatest opportunities. . . . the giving up of something it is good to have but the having of which is incompatible with the best that can be secured for others.

It comes down really to the sincerity of the belief in brotherhood and to the question of values, of whether the privileged prefer a clear social conscience to luxuries and æsthetic refinements. Evolution demonstrates that an organism can be altered and improved by changing its surroundings. This is no less true of man. Mental and spiritual faculties are often almost dormant under conditions of physical wretchedness. And those at the opposite end of the social scale who live lives of careless indifference, material luxury and selfish indulgence cannot evade responsibility for the condition of the poor. The neglect of social duty by the rich is most intimately related to the stunted and arrested development of the under-privileged. Mankind is one and to hold back the development of any of its units is to put obstacles in the way of the advancement of the race.

Ralph Tyler Flewelling's article "The Present Opportunity of Philosophy" in the January 1943 *Hibbert Journal* contains a welcome recognition that since modern scientific invention and the present war have annihilated physical distance, the time has come

for the planners of the post-war world to proceed on the basis of one "unifying principle of life." This principle he sees in the sanctity of the person, universal in its scope and application.

In science this sanctity is the right of private judgement, in politics it is freedom for highest self-expression, in education it is the universal right to knowledge, in religion it is the validity of the inner voices of the soul.

Everyone agrees that should the emerging new world be only a replica of the old, all this contemporary travail will have been in vain. "We are reading in trailing pigments of fire and blood the indisputable message that all men are neighbours," and we cannot as in other days move out of the neighbourhood.

The importance of neighbourly sentiments must be emphasised at the risk of seeming trite. They are a necessary corollary to a profound conviction of humanity as one indivisible unity, and unless they are accepted as the basis of future reordering, the old, narrow, nationalistic and provincial antipathies will revive sooner or later. Men of different races and religions, different colours, philosophies and superstitions all have their future at stake in this huge conflict. Unless these superficial distinctions are put down by the higher realisation of moral values, the prospect cannot be inspiring. Man directs his own progress and nothing can goad him forward better than the consciousness of individual moral responsibility and of the spiritual potentialities of the race.

The Fabian Society Colonial Bureau sponsored a conference on "A Charter for the Colonial Peoples" on the 1st of last November. The particulars have

recently reached us. The speeches of Mr. R. Sorensen, M. P., and Mr. Creech Jones, M. P., ought to be read by every Imperialist.

It is the stand-point that determines the assessment of Colonial questions, Mr. Sorensen brought out. A Conservative M. P., distrustful of his concern for the Colonies, had asked him suspiciously if he had interests there. He had! "What company?" "The human company." The question and the reply typify the traditional approach of self-interest and the democratic approach of disinterested altruism. "Do we or do we not believe that human beings themselves are valuable?...Do we really believe Colonial subjects are as important as we are?"

Research has not proven that the mind inhabiting a black, brown or yellow skin is by that pigmentation inferior to a mind inhabiting a white skin. It may be difficult to prove either way but in any case we had better not talk of the inferiority of coloured peoples until they meet on equal terms with white. Give both essentially the same nourishment, education and status and then we might begin to talk about some human groups being inferior. We should then find wide variations of capacity, temperament and merit, but of this I am certain, we should find these variations confined to no one class or race but horizontally affecting all.

Mr. Sorensen faces facts. Much of the criticism of the Nazi *Herrenvolk* theory, he pointed out, "fails precisely because in greater or less degree we practise it ourselves." He pointed to the irony [the term is far too mild] of neglecting education in the Colonies and then urging wide-spread illiteracy as evidence that the Colonial peoples are unfit for political responsibility!

Mr. Creech Jones pointed to the colour discrimination "in wide areas of our own colonial empire," and the

rejection in some Colonies of the paramountcy of the colonials' own interests. He observes truly of Lord Croft's smug remark in the House of Lords, that "In our wisdom and at our time, we shall lift the Colonies into full self expression,"

I submit it is just this wooden attitude of complacency and blindness to events, this patronising paternalism which does infinite harm.

The Conference adopted a resolution demanding the application of the Atlantic Charter to the colonial peoples and the formulation of a special Charter for British dependencies. This would call for, *inter alia*, the immediate abolition of colonial status and the ending of economic exploitation and for responsible government "at the earliest practicable moment." Brave words, but how many months since they were spoken?

"Nearer and Nearer the Precipice" is the title of Virginius Dabney's article in *The Atlantic Monthly* for January. Extremists among American Negroes, he complains, "are demanding an overnight revolution in race relations." Even the fairly moderate National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People "now is not only for 'absolute political and social equality,' but it has declared war on all forms of racial segregation." Mr. Dabney admits that "there is no denying, of course, that the Negro is confronted by many forms of unfairness, injustice, and oppression." But he warns that if an attempt is made forcibly to abolish segregation throughout the South, violence and bloodshed will result. . . . Only impractical idealists will contend that deep-rooted feelings and attitudes acquired over centuries of usage, can be suddenly done away with.

“Centuries of usage” do not mitigate evil; they deepen it. In the Southern States especially segregation is firmly entrenched, in schools, churches, cinemas, public vehicles. Even the National Army has separate Negro units. The only defect the defenders of segregation will concede is that *equal* facilities are not so far provided for Negroes. But *segregation itself is a sin against human brotherhood.*

Mr. Dabney mentions that the agitators are claiming that unless all discriminations against the American Negro are instantly brought to an end, the cause of the United Nations in China, Malaya, Burma, India, and the Middle East will be damaged.

Will be damaged? The coloured races have few illusions left. At best the ending of such discriminations—of which, alas, there seems no likelihood—would go some way to counteract damage already done.

It appears from K. L. Little's article in *The New Statesman and Nation* for 19th December that the British Isles have their own colour problem. The forlorn and apathetic coloured colony segregated in Bute Town, a Cardiff

appendage, is hopelessly handicapped under normal conditions in the quest of work, due to colour prejudice, and is quite without social or recreational amenities. It is a “Challenge to Reconstruction,” as the title suggests but a challenge still to be met with any effectiveness.

In *The Nation* for 2nd January Reinhold Niebuhr mentions the revelation in Shridharani's *Warning to the West* “of the depth of Oriental resentment against the pride of the West.” Dr. Niebuhr sees it as probable

that even if we succeed in solving every other vexing problem in international relations, we shall probably not solve the problem of ethnic friction in time to save the world from further catastrophe.

But is even the smallest effort being made to solve it? We have not seen the *Warning to the West*, but we have sounded a repeated warning in these pages. Folk wisdom says, “Beware the anger of a patient man!” Clinging to colour prejudice today suggests nothing else so strongly as a man holding fast to a stick of dynamite with an already lighted fuse.