

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XV

JUNE 1944

No. 6

THE FRONTIERS OF THOUGHT

It is the nature of frontiers to change. But at a time like this the rate of change is faster. Frontiers as boundaries between political units of general cultural parity are shifted back and forth as moves on the international chess-board, by which the human pawns are put in better or in worse positions. Of greater symbolic significance, however, is the frontier between a settled area and a ruder hinterland, such as the U. S. A. had until recent years. For long the wilderness represented a safety-valve for society, offering free scope to the adventurous, a refuge for the malcontent, a chance for the diligent to improve his station. Conflict of interests and demand for *Lebensraum* arise only when limits of expansion have been reached and there is pressure, real or fancied to be threatened, on the means of subsistence.

But limitations to physical expansion fortunately set no barriers to the advancing mind of man. This is a period pre-eminently of mental

change and flux. Long-accepted social and economic patterns are being challenged, ethics called upon to justify themselves, old sanctions flouted. Orthodox moulds of thought are breaking from the pressure of the new ferment. The old tacit assumption that our concern is with the visible and the tangible alone has been rudely shaken and with it the sense of stability that rested on it. Psychological research, so long cold-shouldered by the orthodox in science no less than in religion, is bringing out disturbing powers and capacities in man that call for a complete readjustment of outlook upon life. A mental need that is becoming as insistent as the body's demand for food, is for synthetic knowledge, for an ample frame, religious, scientific, philosophical, that shall have room not only for all facts now known but also for those adumbrated by the recent work on the frontiers of thought. We must, like Oliver Wendell Holmes's chambered nautilus, leave our "low-vaulted past"

and build "more stately mansions" for our souls.

Analysis has been rightly called the thought-form of our age. The achievements of modern science—and they are great indeed—rest largely on it. Hypotheses there have been and are, or all the facts of science would be a jumbled heap. That, they are not; but, lacking an all-embracing synthetic philosophy, they are a wall of bricks with no cement to bind them.

In the modern industrial system, parts are made by many different workers, perhaps in widely different places, but those in the assembling-plant must know the place of each part in the finished product. Scientists in different lines are like the isolated makers of the parts, the only real significance of which is relational. The need for correlating efforts has been widely recognised and workers use each other's findings to a great extent. There are national research councils, national academies of science that cut across the boundaries between scientific fields and international associations of specialists that cut across national boundaries, but so far there is nothing in the scientific world that compares with the industrial assembling-plant.

Specialisation is often in the interest of efficiency and, especially in stable conditions and in normal times, the specialist, be he scientist or artisan, often considers getting on with his task more important

than seeing its relation as part to the whole. But conditions are not stable nor are these times normal. The world is advancing, in the person of its intellectual leaders, on the frontiers of thought. And the frontiersman cannot specialise too narrowly; he has to be a man of many skills and of broad vision. We are going forward, out of the familiar into the wilderness that looms portentous on the borders of the known. An outline map is greatly needed to make a cosmos out of seeming chaos, a map such as the ancient scientists evolved and handed down, an outline map to fill in which each new discovery can help.

There is no place on the frontiers of thought for the devotee who is not also a scientist and a philosopher, no place for the philosopher who is not both a humanitarian and a man of science, no place for the scientist who is not also a mystic and a lover of his kind. None of these specialists can clear a way through the confusion for the millions who are stumbling after them. Only an all-embracing synthetic philosophy of life, embracing man and nature, can make advance on the frontiers of thought harmonious and safe. For only when the interdependence of man and man and of man and nature are recognised will ethical practice overcome its present dangerous lag behind our intellectual advance. A complete science of philosophy and a complete philosophy of science are what is needed—and the two are one.

CHRIST PRINCIPLES IN THE NEW ORDER

[Mr. John Middleton Murry believes that there will be no real world-order, only continuous anarchy, until Christ's warning is accepted that takers of the sword shall perish by it. This was a simple statement of the law of cause and effect, unexceptionable but after all a negative approach to true non-violence, the positive dynamism of which Gandhiji has stressed in our day as Christ did in other contexts and all great teachers have.

The conviction that violence does not pay is ethically in the class with the acceptance of honesty as the best policy. Both are dictated by self-interest, that worst of bases for a stable world. For what has proved bad "policy" today may seem tomorrow to be worth a trial. What Mr. Murry aptly calls "the frenzy of national separatism" is only the shadow of individual selfishness reflected large on a Gargantuan screen. And if there is one lesson more than another that the world might have learned in the between-war years, it is one in the mathematics of internationalism, namely, that self-interest, like zero, can be multiplied by any number without affecting the result. The self-interest of ten nations is nothing but self-interest still; never a common interest in the commonweal. And *that* is what we need in international relations as in individual life,—a mutual interest in each other's good, a recognition that the good of all alone can mean the lasting good of each.—ED.]

The Germans, riding the first great wave of their conquest of Europe, proclaimed a "new order" for Europe. Many Europeans believed in their promise, which may not have been wholly insincere. They longed for unity instead of discord in Europe, and hoped that the Germans might create it.

Their hopes have been bitterly disappointed. It looks as though the Germans have failed. Yet, if their attempt is viewed soberly, in the light of history, it is surprising that it did not succeed. They believed that the political unity of Europe could be created by military conquest. They had plenty of excuse for their belief. The German Reich itself had been made a unity by

Bismarck's policy of "blood and iron": the United States of America themselves had achieved unity only at the cost of a terrible civil war. Nay, even the United Kingdom of Great Britain had been welded together by military conquest. As far as the evidence of Western history went, force had been by far the most potent instrument to forge political unity. There was very much more to be said for the Nazi idea of making Europe a political unity by a short sharp war than its opponents cared to admit.

Nevertheless, it has probably failed. There are, I think, two main reasons for the failure. One quite material. Hitler made the colossal blunder of attacking Russia, imme-

diately the Nazi conquest of Europe was complete. It is amazing that, seeing that the one conspicuous failure of the policy of European unification by force—Napoleon's—had come to disaster by an attack upon Russia, Hitler should have repeated the blunder. Instead of being able to devote the great energies of Germany to the mighty task of making European unity a reality, he compelled them to be wasted in a struggle with the Russian colossus. No doubt he sincerely believed that Soviet Russia was rotten through and through; but this, as the event has proved, was a purely *a priori* conviction. That Bolshevism was all subhuman savagery was an article of faith with Hitler, as indeed it was with all the ruling classes of Europe. The only difference in this respect was that Hitler believed that he had a definite mission to *écraser l'infâme*.

The second cause of the Nazi failure, though connected with this, is of a different order. We pass to it when we ask ourselves the question: What would Germany actually have done in Europe, if Hitler had not been tempted to divert its energies to the conquest of Russia? France, under Pétain, was definitely willing to accept the accomplished fact of her defeat. Were the Germans capable of making real friends with France? It is difficult to say what would have happened if the Germans had not been compelled to make intolerable demands on France because of the war against Russia.

If Germany had been generous to France, if all the French prisoners had been released, if the oppressive drafts of forced labour had not been required, the story might have been very different. The great majority of the intellectual leaders of France were prepared to advocate a genuine Franco-German friendship, if only the Germans would behave accordingly.

Everything depended in fact on the Germans' being able to emerge from the hypnotism of war: to believe in fact that war had meaning and purpose only as the instrument of peace, as, as it were, the grim but inevitable midwife of necessary change. For we have to remember that the problem of peaceful change, to some extent solved within the national societies by the invention of democratic government, has never come near to being solved in the relations between nations. A German statesman was quite justified in believing that the unification of Europe, admitted by all thinking men to be necessary, could be achieved only by force of arms, because the individualistic and jealous nations would never freely consent to the limitation of their independence which unity required. But the essential condition of using war for this purpose was not to forget the purpose. The moment unity had been achieved by conquest, the war-instrument had to be thrown aside, and unity by force changed to unity by consent.

Probably the Germans in 1940

were incapable of this. They had been so powerfully indoctrinated with the worship of brute force—Hitler himself had risen to power by its means—that war had become for Germany an end in itself.

It is here that we reach the diabolical paradox which is at the heart of the world-situation today. Military force, in order to be adequate to its purpose of making possible major political changes in the relations between nations, which are incapable of change by peaceful means, has today to be so colossal that it absorbs the whole energies, material and spiritual, of the nations waging it. They have, if they are to wage total war with any chance of success, to become war-minded through and through.

To keep in mind the purpose of their war-making, which is not the defeat of the enemy, but a new kind of peace, is a psychological impossibility. Propaganda, which represents the enemy as absolutely evil, is a necessary means of keeping the people active in the service of the modern war-machine. When the war has been won, it is impossible to undo this unscrupulous indoctrination. Peace requires that the victors should make friends of the vanquished. This demand cannot be satisfied. The peoples have been taught to hate one another. And, although the hatred cannot be maintained for many years, for it does not survive the renewal of personal contacts, it endures long enough to make a just peace

impossible.

Thus the nature of total war—which is a new kind of warfare that only highly developed industrial nations can practise—appears to be such that the war-method is inherently incapable of achieving its object: which is a juster peace than existed before. The problem which confronts humanity is to discover a method of making changes in the relations of nations other than by war. Changes in the relations between individual persons incessantly occur, by peaceful means, in any ordered society. A becomes rich, B becomes poor, C purchases an estate from D, who uses the money to start a business. These are the commonplaces of existence in the domestic society. But to make analogous changes between nations by similar methods is rare indeed.

In the abstract, the solution is obvious. Let the nations become members of a supra-national society. But the difficulty is just as obvious. Nations are not really like persons. They are infinitely less numerous, for one thing. There are (I suppose) at the outside 100 nations in the world. There are few nations which do not include at least a million people. Thus within a nation there are infinite gradations between the extremes of wealth and poverty, of power and impotence. Every single person in a nation great or small is surrounded by a whole group of others who are roughly his equals. It is no great hardship or humiliation to obey the law. But there are no

such gradations between the wealth and power of nations. There are a handful of Great Powers—five at the most—perhaps a dozen moderately powerful nations—and the rest are in point of power insignificant. The idea that the Great Powers should be required to obey the Law is felt by them to be intolerable. That is why no supra-national Law exists—for what is called international law is merely a fiction. Only the Great Powers could make it, and nothing—except a moral consciousness which nations as such cannot possess—could prevent them from breaking it.

Therefore, I believe that the idea of a society of nations is a chimæra, unless it is clearly understood that in such a society nations will cease to be nations. A society of sovereign and independent nations is quite simply a contradiction in terms—that is almost a truism; but it is not so clearly realised that a society of nations which are no longer sovereign and independent would not be a society of nations at all. It would be a new nation, just as the Union of Soviet Republics, or the United States of America are a single nation.

One day, no doubt, there will be a world-nation. The possibilities of total war are too devastating to make any other alternative finally possible. Changes in the relations between nations will be replaced by changes in the relations between individuals, or classes. The world-citizenship which the Stoics dreamed of will at last be realised. Whether the brotherhood of the Children of

God which Christ dreamed of will also be realised is another matter. Common citizenship is at best only a half-way house on the way towards brotherhood. But even that half-way house is at present far away.

The one great nineteenth-century conception which transcended the separateness of nations was that of the Workers' International. It supplied the moral dynamic for the Russian Revolution; but now that the Revolution has "succeeded," it has been openly abandoned. The U.S.S.R. is now nominally a federation of Republics, but it is, in fact, a modernised version of the old Tsarist Empire. The U. S. A. has united people of many different nations; but they emigrated as individuals. The British Empire—as Indians know to their cost—is a commonwealth only in so far as the British and European settlements are concerned.

Nowhere has the barrier between nations been effectively broken down by any new political institution. Great claims are made for the Christian Church as a supra-national institution. But they are hollow. The Christian Church remains a supra-national institution only in pure theory, because it has long since lost all supra-national authority. Indeed the national separatism of Europe historically arose from the overthrow of the Christian Church as a supra-national authority.

So the tremendous problem confronts us in all its naked horror today. The Church and the Inter-

national proletariat have alike failed to overcome, or even to curb, the frenzy of national separatism. The proposal now put forward is for a permanent alliance between the U. S. A., the U. S. S. R., and Great Britain, to keep the outward peace under the shelter of which a new society of nations shall be organised. To me (I confess) the idea appears wildly Utopian, in view of recent experience. I find it hard to imagine this titanic triumvirate holding together for any length of time, and still harder to imagine it disinterestedly keeping the peace of the world. I can only hope that the event proves me wrong.

Such hopes as I have are two. One is a hope for Europe itself. Out of its present ordeal of suffering may arise a combination of the two impulses that have failed to curb nationalism: the universalism of Christianity and that of the International proletariat. That combination requires non-violent revolutionary action in the masses. I think this is possible. Indeed, I am sure that the masses will never achieve the freedom of which they dream until they have abandoned the idea of revolutionary violence.

Under modern conditions they may learn this lesson fairly quickly.

If Europe could thus overcome the extremity of its own anarchy it would be an example to the world. But it is more than possible that this example will not come from Europe at all, but from the East. In that case the East will teach the West the true meaning of Christianity. For the West, it seems, is as far as ever from realising that Christ's great word: "They that take the sword shall perish with the sword" is true. I think there will be no real world-order any more—but only a continuous anarchy—until that truth is accepted, in the struggle between classes and the struggle between nations.

I have charged others with being wildly Utopian in their political schemes for a new order based on power. My own dream may appear more wildly Utopian still. I do not think it is. For I make no prophecy of the time this spiritual revolution will take to accomplish, or of the means by which it will be accomplished. I merely say that there will be no new order that will not collapse into new anarchy until this Christ-principle is accepted.

J. MIDDLETON MURRY

BUILDING NEW INDIA SPIRITUAL ADVENTURE

[**Ralph Richard Keithahn, B. D., M. A.**, writes as a friend of India and of the Indian masses, whom he and Mrs. Keithahn have been unostentatiously serving through the Rural Centre on the outskirts of Bangalore City which they were instrumental in starting. How far his attitude is from that of the orthodox missionary this article makes plain. It was, of course, written before the release of Gandhiji.—ED.]

We cannot deny our divinity or the Eternal who challenges us to vocation. Man may descend to great depths as he has done today. But the Spark within ever remains to witness at most unexpected moments to his divine parentage and calling. We may walk counter to the Laws of Eternity but thereby we break ourselves. And so every nation either builds on the solid foundations of the Natural Order, as some might call it, or it collapses, as has many a nation.

The United States of America had such spiritual foundations although it has not always been true to its calling.

Ancient India hardly knew religion as we think of it today. The word "Hinduism" was not current. Religion was interwoven with life so completely that the present departmentalisation of life would not have been understood by our ancestors. Even today the King in India, more often than not, is loyal to the Temple. In the past the noble Rishi or Priest had a large part in the court of the King. Such had great influence upon the people as a whole. Dharma, the way of

life, was God's will for man and the community in every aspect of life. Even at present, plenty of examples may be given to show how difficult it is to separate religion from any phase of life in India. That is part of our communal problem.

But modern civilisation is secular and has had wide influence upon India. Modern man makes it his chief aim to seek for material blessings. Nations seek empires: political or, more recently, economic. Religion tends to become merely a formal matter, even a superstition. And in desperation it has often sought its life by supporting that which would eventually kill it: the selfish systems of man. It has become more concerned with its own vested interests than with its Way of Life for all men at all times, in all activity. Thus man has gradually become a tool of man. A new slavery has developed. That is the significance of the Atlantic Charter: a recognition of the fact that man has been entering a new slavery!

In India the National Movement and leadership have been definitely spiritual. This is so significant for the future that it demands penetrat-

ing understanding. I recognise my own unfitness to delve into such an important field; yet I do so hoping it may stimulate more sensitive minds and hearts to serious contemplation on what is happening in India and to a consecrated service as we usher in the New Order.

Creative Truth is our foundation. The National leadership centres in Gandhiji; our National Movement in the programme of the National Congress. I proceed from that starting-point. Gandhiji has made it clear, again and again, that his life and programme were absolutely impossible unless founded upon a "living faith in God." But he also had to face science and its children! At that moment God became Truth. Truth was God. Gandhiji is not so simple, however, as not to recognise that there is Truth Absolute. And That he worships. But his life is also an "experiment with Truth." He seeks realisation of his vocation: that of being a co-worker with God or Truth. And thus comes the second aspect of Truth—the relative aspect. Gandhiji and his intimate followers claim that Truth has no vital significance unless we attempt to realise it daily in every phase of life. It is a primary law which cannot be destroyed. We may not live in accordance with it but the Law ever remains. And so Gandhiji's life becomes an open book. He will permit no secrecy as the battle for Truth is carried on. He demands the scorching light of publicity that every bit of falsehood may be

purged from his life. He is the first to do penance when he recognises that he has not been true to his God.

Truth is a rigorous Master. Gandhiji even considers it dishonest to have two unessential chairs when his neighbour has none. He condones no hypocrisy in any action of life. How firm he was with Kasturba, his noble and courageous partner, when she entered the Jagannath Temple at Puri, which would not allow Harijans to enter its precincts! Gandhiji does not recognise a Temple as such when it bans a part of humanity from its halls! It would be dishonest for him to enter and recognise that as a Temple of Truth. Thus Truth becomes our Faith and our daily pilgrimage. *When the nations of the world are carrying on enormous campaigns of falsehood—when so much of modern national life, even in India, is built on falsehood, then the Way that India has chosen for herself becomes all the more significant. No National worker can afford not to ponder on this profound foundation of our New India.*

Gandhiji proceeds from the principle of Satya (Truth) to that of Ahimsa: "Most active love." His strength, to a very large extent, has been due to the fact that he takes the fundamentals of his own great heritage and applies them to the glaring problems of the New Day. And as Truth is universal so these basic principles are found in every land although with different expres-

sions. Thus Gandhiji's universal challenge! Gandhiji does recognise evil in the world. He is a realist if ever there was one. He knows that the world is not heaven! And although he would be faithful to his God, he knows that such faithfulness demands detached suffering. We cannot live by ourselves. We must love our neighbour if we are to realise universal happiness. Hence, I *must* see to it that my brother, wherever or whoever he may be, receives his divine inheritance. But as Love is the only way to realise Truth I must suffer and thus realise my neighbour's good. The Cross principle is recognised in life. The Cross on Calvary becomes not an idol to be placed on our altars and worshipped but rather a fundamental part of daily living. Revolution is produced through the self-purification which is the only real revolution. Again, Gandhiji recognises Love as Absolute—God. He also recognises his own love, as expressed, as something less than Love Divine. But just as love has growingly become a workable method in the home and ordinary processes of life, so it must become a part of the relationship of group with group, nation with nation. Through active love to Truth!

This brings us to the Satyagraha technique. As Gandhiji found himself facing the tremendous problems of Mother India: the problem of political dependence; the problem of an exploiting modern civilisation; the social and religious problems of his people, [he realised that if a

successful struggle was to be carried on, effective methods needed to be developed, just as violence had its own methods. There was much experience to build upon, for the Satyagraha method had been known to India for centuries. But it had been developed on very limited lines. No one seemed to think that it might also be used on a community, national or world-wide scale. That is the unique contribution of Gandhiji from the days of South Africa, when he had to face the injustices of the White Race until today as he sits in the Aga Khan's bungalow, the prisoner of those who claim to fight for the Four Freedoms!

Satyagraha builds itself upon "the ancient law of self-sacrifice"; it is "conscious suffering for the cause of Righteousness"; it is a structure over which the tide of creative love may flow; a way of life that makes full use of the strength of the spirit. It is a plan for self-purification and for mass-purification; yea, also for the purification of the enemy. It is "sweet but insistent reasonableness." It is "uncompromisingly truth-guided deliberate choice and intention."

Satyagraha is utter self-effacement, greatest humiliation, greatest patience and brightest faith. It is its own reward.

It is a way of life for all. It is a life-giving substitute for the terrible method of mass violence which we find so rampant in the world today. And because it is self-suffering it immediately rids one of all the

hypocrisy that again is so common in modern warfare, when all try to justify themselves by painting the enemy totally black! The method of Satyagraha opens our own lives to the sunlight of Truth and the Satyagrahi is the first to admit his errors. The Satyagrahi must exert self-control, self-restraint, and live a life of simplicity. He must be absolutely fearless, with a living faith in God. And this sacrifice is but a development of the old concept of Yagna. This is essentially religion. And he who worships and would be true to his God, or he that loves his Nation, must consider it seriously.

Again Gandhiji delved deep into the experience of his own people and drew forth Swadeshi, another eternal principle: "The law of laws"—"pure service of one's neighbour." Each man is to be loyal to his own near-by surroundings and thus the distant problem is solved automatically. The ideal of non-possession and non-stealing is very much a part of this principle. Here are my real problems. I cannot play with them in the village. Every action of mine will be known—almost my very thoughts! Also, the unit is small enough so that I can be certain of at least limited success. When the late Dr. A. E. Holt of the University of Chicago was Visiting Professor of the Sir Dorabji Tata Graduate School of Social Work he pointed out that India reversed the working principle of modern civilisation. The latter made the village serve the city and exploitation resulted. Gandhiji

makes the village the centre of his civilisation. Then any centralisation of such villages would be primarily for the service of the unit. This limits exploitation and makes service the ideal. Again, we are building on a solid spiritual basis, caring for the needy and his problems at our very door.

The economic programme for attaining economic freedom not only centres in the village but it is built on fundamental laws of Time. Man must do his "bread-labour" daily.

Bread-labour is a veritable blessing to one who would observe non-violence, worship Truth, and make the observance of brahmacharya a natural act.

In the Sabarmati and Sevagram Ashrams all have had to do all labour. Servants were not countenanced. The priest would have to clean the latrine, etc.! There must be no room for any to think that his own profession is better than that of another. All must feel their unity in manual labour. Sacrificial spinning made the spinning-wheel the symbol of "bread-labour" and of sacrifice—a symbol of the machine as the servant of mankind. Co-operation becomes real with service at its centre. Labour and natural resources are used to bring the necessary material blessings to all in the village. Again, we are working with religious and universal principles.

The National Constructive Programme aims at social justice. It has its own vital social reform aspects. Naturally all this has its religious import. The Harijan must

be treated as an equal and have an equal opportunity with his brother. The Temples must be open to all. Women must be treated as co-partners in life. For they are best able to practise non-violence. It is their own way of life in the home. Children must have an education that will truly train for life and so Basic Education is formulated. All this is based on what Jesus called the second law of man—loving one's neighbour. And if men are the children of God, then certainly a fundamental part of any religious life is to give due recognition to the needs of one's neighbour.

In this connection we come to another very important emphasis in Gandhiji's life and programme—respect for all religions. Again, he brings an old experience of India to bear on modern problems. I doubt whether even a few of us are aware of the vital importance here of Gandhiji's contribution to the future relationship of religions. Naturally the missionary religions have found it difficult to understand the underlying truth that Gandhiji is driving at. One must know the man and his religious life to appreciate how fundamental is this humility in his own religious life and at the same time his own deep respect for any devout religious experience that brings man closer to his Maker. Gandhiji does not claim equality for all religions in the sense that all are alike. Rather in the sense that all are a search after Truth are they divine and of Truth. Gandhiji

challenged me to find a better word than "equal" and I must admit that I have not been able to do better. It remains for all of us not to be troubled by words but to search earnestly for the truth that lies hidden in this challenge to respect all religions.

Thus as this programme builds self-control and self-sufficiency in one's own life, naturally it builds for Swaraj, self-rule, everywhere, including the Nation. For Gandhiji the struggle for Swaraj on a national basis becomes a great pilgrimage. It has been very difficult for the modern mind to understand the saint as a "politician." But when one is loyal to the basic principles of India's religious development then it is never a surprise to find the Rishi in the Court. In fact, it is his duty to be there, at least from time to time—his duty to be there or the duty of the Ruler to seek him out wherever he may be. Perhaps never in the history of the world has a struggle for freedom been so much a religious pilgrimage as that of India. And India will not realise her true destination unless she appreciates this fact fully.

The call is for religious pioneers. The above is but a suggestive outline. Limitations of self and space have demanded a very superficial presentation of the great National Awakening of India. But I hope enough has been said to convince the reader that in this approach the secret of India's "New Life Movement" is to be found. That

done, my task is complete. For then it is the duty, more, the privilege of each soul to make his own pilgrimage along with crores of brothers and sisters. It is his duty to spend hours with Truth in quiet meditation, that he may know his true vocation. It is the challenge to most of us who will read these lines to tear ourselves from the false concepts of modern civilisation and to begin to think in accord with our own great tradition. Where that tradition has been false we must ruthlessly put such falsehood aside. But I maintain that just as Gandhiji has found the richest gems of Truth in his own past so also we shall find the best setting for modern adventure within our own rich and pioneering culture.

However, we must never be satisfied with sitting at the household shrine or making our offering at the Temple altar! One evening as I came away from Devakottai the bus was stopped and some made their coconut offerings at a wayside shrine. Later, as we sped on our way in a train, some sceptic was ridiculing the worshippers. "Such an offering is but a symbol of the clean heart. But if your hearts are black what is the good of offering the pure-white coconut?" Yes, how right he was! The religion of the private life must express itself in our work for our village and our Nation. Then our gift to humanity

will be pure and true. When our sacrifice on the altar of the temple is real then there will be noble sacrifice of life for mankind. For truly it is man's experience that Divinity is ever suffering for humanity! If we are loyal to our divine vocation then also our lives must be essentially a sacrifice. There can only be real satisfaction in life, real integration of life, when we are loyal to this basic principle, that we must live for each other.

Ghaffar Khan lies in prison but the frontier is non-violent. A Gandhiji lies in prison and the conscience of all the world is uneasy. Kagawa is restricted in Japan and seeds of New Life are being sown there; that great Negro scientist, George Washington Carver, has but recently passed from our midst, but his life of suffering and simplicity and goodness has touched white America! Is it not here that we have the secret of "a just and durable" New Order? And is it not here that India must not only be true to its own great past but also to its own great present? Is it not here that India must make its own precious gift to humanity? And does not the Eternal call you and me today to the greatest pilgrimage of Truth that Humanity has ever known?—call us to be Pioneers of Life—Experimenters with Truth?

RALPH RICHARD KEITHAHN

INTERPRETATION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

[Dr. P. T. Raju of the Andhra University, author of *Thought and Reality: Hegelianism and Advaita*, expressed his views on Indian Philosophy in the chapter on that subject in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute's *Progress of Indic Studies, 1917-1942*. In the article which follows he defends his ideas on philosophical progress. He shows us Fundamentalism and Modernism arrayed against each other in philosophy as they have been in the West in the religious field in recent years. Steady advance in understanding of Truth there must be, and often it is from the clash of conflicting opinions that new aspects of truth are revealed. There is no doubt that adequate knowledge of modern Western philosophy can be of great help in the correct evaluation of the philosophy of ancient India. In the passage of time, meanings become stereotyped; and stereotyped meanings are the foes of clear-cut concepts and incisive thought. Centuries-old formulations may get worn smooth, like old coins, and be none the worse for reminting. The value of the gold is unaffected by the mint-mark. *However much human understanding advances, Truth remains unchanged*. And in that recognition seems to lie the peaceful resolution of the conflict. We believe that the claim, to which Dr. Raju refers in passing, that every new philosophical theory has been anticipated in our ancient Indian philosophy, could be substantiated. "Modern speculation cannot get out of the circle of ancient thought."—ED.]

It is nearly a decade since I wrote in THE ARYAN PATH (June 1934 and February 1935) on "The Need for Reorientation of Indian Philosophy" and "The Outcry against Comparative Philosophy." If absence of adverse criticism is due to lack of sufficient interest, I might have to say that not much notice was taken of the second, though, following Sir S. Radhakrishnan and some others, a very large number of articles have of late appeared in India in which comparisons are freely made between Indian and Western philosophy. But even in the very beginning the first article had a critical reception. Without making special mention of the

article and its author, one writer questioned the advisability of re-orientation, stating as a reason that those who made the attempt did not know Indian philosophy at first hand. Another writer criticised the article on the ground that it spoke of philosophical progress, whereas progress was impossible and inconceivable for Indian philosophy. Yet, in spite of these suspicions and criticisms, both comparison and reorientation, it is very heartening to note, are in progress, and writers are commended and their work is valued just for these characteristics, to discredit which attempts are being made. Authors very much appreciate forewords by eminent

men, in which it is mentioned that "Relevant comparisons are made between Indian and Western philosophers," "Parallels are drawn between Indian and European systems" and so forth. A method of scientific treatment is evolving. Articles have appeared on theories of judgment, evolution (*parinama*) etc., which are definitely reorientations. And an orthodox gentleman, Professor P. N. Srinivasachari, included specifically the topic of the need for reorientation in one of his latest books. Seeing the recognition which the Advaita has received in Western countries, the followers of both Ramanuja and Madhva are eagerly reorienting their philosophies. All this is a sign that Indian philosophy is still living, not dead and neglected. The sign of life is active resistance and bold assimilation; it is not passive indifference and timid retreat, which are signs of life's decay.

If we believe that, in order to keep pace with scientific and social development, progress of Indian philosophy is essential for cultural growth, and if for that progress again we feel that the Indian philosophy should be brought into line with the Western, it is not prejudicial and outrageous to suggest that interpreters of Indian thought should be well equipped with the knowledge of both Indian and Western philosophy. For a long time there has been the criticism—both fair and unfair, and it is not easy for the ordinary man to distinguish between the two in philosophy—that some of the interpreters of Indian thought have no acquaintance with it. But few

stressed the other side, namely, that the interpreter should be equally acquainted with Western thought. But in regard to such acquaintance some of the worst prejudices have voiced themselves. It is astonishing to read that discipline in Western thought is a disqualification in the interpreter, who should therefore deliberately keep himself ignorant of Western thought! Study of Western philosophy, it is said, produces prejudices against Indian philosophy! Sometimes also an appeal is made to the sentiment of patriotism to discredit useful work.

It is difficult to understand why this attitude is growing strong in the minds of a few—indeed very few, though vociferous—Indian scholars. But one important point concerning them is that they are pure Sanscritists who, probably very proud of their Sanscrit philosophy, have kept themselves at a distance from Western thought and its developments. On the other hand, even Sanscritists, when acquainted with Western thought, are adopting a different attitude. Whatever conclusion may be drawn from this inductive consideration, the criticism of the first group seems to be of a sweeping and hide-and-seek kind, for they do not show where a scholar with first-hand knowledge of the Indian philosophy has been misled by his acquaintance with the Western. Unless they give a sufficient number of instances, their remarks, whatever be their position as Sanscrit scholars, will be empty. It is possible that even one without knowledge of Western thought may misunderstand Indian philosophy; and their list should exclude such possibilities.

The reasons behind such an attitude

may be both logical and psychological. It will not be of much use to take special note of the latter, except to warn against one of them, namely, the tendency in some to build up a theory out of their defects—a tendency which is closely akin to what psychoanalysts call rationalisation. So far no logical and philosophical reasons have been advanced by these writers which have been strong enough to prove their point. It is said that the Advaita has already reached the high-water-mark of philosophical speculation—has not the author of *Sarvadarsana-samgraha* traced the logical growth of philosophical thought from the materialism of the Charvakas to the absolutism of Sankara?—and that further progress is inconceivable. But did not Hegel contend that philosophical progress in the world culminated in his system and yet is not Western philosophy progressing? Do the Visishtadvaitins and the Dvaitins accept the claim that the above work represents the logical growth of Indian philosophy? Even if they do accept it, does philosophical progress mean only a march from materialism to absolutism? Absolutism is to be found even in Plato's theory of the Good, and still philosophy has progressed since Plato, since Hegel, and it will progress even after Whitehead. And what are the factors conditioning this progress? This group of writers does not seem to have given thought to this question or to the arguments advanced by men advocating philosophical progress. On the other hand, they indulge in sweeping remarks, sometimes even personal attacks, and surreptitious appeals to patriotism and the past glory of India. Ancient

India was glorious, but what is her present position? Ancient Indian philosophy may be great, but how far has it entered the progressing philosophy of the world? As well exhort Indians to fight tanks and aeroplanes with bows and arrows: did not the Raghus and the Kurus fight with them? Take the example of Indian history: why the present attempt to rewrite it?

What is philosophical progress? It is the continuous intellectual reconstruction of our outlook, which runs parallel to our scientific and social progress. The reconstruction may be absolutism, monism, pluralism, or dualism. It is a mistake to think that once absolutism is reached philosophical progress ceases. Even accepting that absolutism is the highest, the eternal duty of the philosopher is to interpret in terms of his absolutism the ever-changing conditions of human life. Such interpretation gives unity to our life, to our thought and action. How is such interpretation possible? Did our ancient philosophers give such interpretations? And are their interpretations of life readily applicable to our present problems? The answer is invariably, No. That is why we have to reinterpret their philosophy and extract the logical principles. This type of work we call reorientation. Even patriotism that is sincere and prudent and does not shut itself from the actualities around us should welcome such work. If such work is useless, we have to conclude that men like Dr. Bhagavan Das have been wasting

their time.

But why all this controversy? Those who so deprecate Western thought may give up attempts at interpretation and even exposition of Indian philosophy in English. But they will not. They will write in English, but they preach against studying Western philosophy, without which one finds it difficult to understand how a philosopher can express his ideas in English. To present Indian thought in English means expounding it through Western philosophical concepts. It would be useful to make a list of the mistakes which writers on the Indian philosophy without acquaintance with the European have made in their writings, though one who made the attempt would be inviting wrath and creating enemies. But without any personal discourtesy it should be possible to point out, in the interests of the subject, at least a few, so that the importance of a sound knowledge of Western thought could be brought home. It is not an exaggeration to say that there are Sanscrit scholars who have not understood the sense in which the term "Absolute" is used in Western philosophy. The reason cannot certainly be their inability to understand the word, for its general connotation is not so very difficult. And mere voting cannot decide which English technical terms should be used as equivalents of the Sanscrit ones, for the former are already being used in specific senses and giving a new meaning will result in

conflict and confusion. Hence in the interests of philosophy itself it is as necessary to point out misinterpretations due to lack of sufficient knowledge of Western thought as to point out misunderstandings due to lack of acquaintance with Sanscrit philosophy. Either one must give up writing on Indian philosophy in English or he must make himself quite familiar with Western thought. Self-sufficiency does not belong to this world.

One cannot appreciate this prejudice against Western philosophy, particularly in scholars who have adopted at least Western methods of exposition. Even the critical editing of Sanscrit texts has been learned from the West. In expounding a system the arrangement of the contents into the life of the original author, the origins of the system, its later developments, its logic, metaphysics, religion, ethics and so forth, is adopted from Western models. The method of historical criticism is undoubtedly borrowed from the West. If so, why fight shy of Western philosophy and forgo the advantages of a more useful logical understanding?

It is of course said that Western philosophy is an intellectual construction, whereas Indian philosophy is a process of life. It would be unfair to pass this remark on everything of Western philosophy. The observation is true only of those systems which are nothing more than intellectual constructions. But ever and anon we hear the note

of warning sounded by men like Muirhead that philosophy developed into a sort of mathematics unconnected with life will end in fiasco. The idealistic systems of the West are philosophies of life as well. None can justly accuse Plato and Spinoza of playing with bloodless categories, but most of the later Naiyayika writings are easily open to this criticism. If philosophy is not an intellectual construction, it will be no philosophy: only it should not be a mere intellectual construction. Even Sankara, Ramanuja, and the other great acharyas have given intellectual constructions, which are schematisations to satisfy the demands of intellect. Each has his own theory of creation, an evolution of the material world from the Brahman or the Prakṛti, an epistemology, a cosmology and so forth. Even those modern interpreters with a bias against Western thought are endeavouring, in dividing their exposition into so many topics, to present a construction which would be intellectually satisfying. Hence their objection is not really so strong as to support their contention.

It is also said that Indian philosophy has its own method of interpretation. But what is it? In what way does it differ from the Western methods? And have the champions of the Indian method avoided the Western? To the last question no one can come forward and answer that he has effectively followed the Indian and avoided the Western. Does the Indian method

mean the seven *lingas* or clues accepted by Sankara and the other acharyas for determining the meaning of the Upanishads etc.? But this method is laid down by them not for interpreting Indian philosophy in terms of Western concepts but for systematising the utterances of the Upanishads, the *Bhagavadgita* and other works which are accepted as the basis for philosophical construction in India. Or is the method meant also to apply to the interpretation of Indian philosophy? Even then, what difference does it make? Are the Western methods opposed to it? It is a rule for systematisation (*samanvaya*), and as all philosophy, Indian or Western, must be systematic, its validity must be accepted by all. Hence to say that Indian philosophy has its own method of interpretation seems nothing but uttering a shibboleth.

Again, it is pointed out as a great blunder of many writers that they have not considered the fact that Indian philosophy arose out of yoga or mental discipline. Let us clearly see into this objection and determine how far this oversight, even if it is present, vitiates interpretation. Does it mean that the interpreters are not yogins? But it is as difficult to prove that the interpreters are not yogins as to prove that the objectors are yogins. However, this meaning is irrelevant to our present point. Unless a yogin comes forward and demonstrates how his interpretation would differ, it will remain valueless. Supposing it is recognised that In-

dian philosophy has its source in yoga, what difference does it make to the systems of cosmology, logic, psychology, epistemology and so forth? Is it necessary to practise yoga to understand Sankara's or Ramanuja's theory of illusion? Hence this objection seems both vague and vain. Further, is the evidence decisive that Indian philosophy started in yoga and not in nature worship? And whatever be the origins, does not our interest lie in the full-fledged systems? When we are tracing the historical growth of systems it is a mistake not to mention their origins, but not when we are discussing the dialectical interconnections between the concepts of a system. And who have taught us even this historical method?

Yet there is a peculiarity of Indian thought that we have to note. Every Indian system preached or stressed some type of yoga, the *jnanayoga*, the *karmayoga*, the *bhaktiyoga* and so forth. But every system tried to incorporate all, giving of course prominence to one or the other. But this feature generally makes no difference to the logical structure of the systems. Hence non-mention of these yogas does not result in misinterpretation.

None of the objections, therefore, to the advocacy of a sound knowledge of the Western philosophy in the interpreter of the Indian stands examination. The least that may be said of them is that they are vague and sentimental. Comparison

and reorientation are necessary for philosophical progress in India, though unfortunately some of the comparisons which have appeared of late have been superficial and misleading. The tendency has grown of discovering every new cosmological and psychological theory like Holism, Hormism, and Emergent Evolution in our ancient philosophy. But this fact cannot be cited against what is advocated here, because these discoverers include also those Sanscrit scholars who are almost strangers to Western philosophy. However, it is natural that mistakes would be made; but if they are discussed and pointed out they will not be repeated. Only, one must have the courtesy to tolerate honest and academical criticism. In the West philosophy is becoming divorced from life through the sheer desire of aping mathematics and constructing intellectual systems; in India it is losing touch with life by deliberately closing its eyes to the changing conditions. Yet it is only in Western philosophy that we find a ready clue for bringing our philosophical outlook to bear on the problems of the present. This is due to what is generally called the emancipation of the concept, by Socrates, from sense and concrete experience, which marks the difference between the Greek philosophy and the Indian—a difference which is generally exaggerated. However, no longer do we find those conditions when every man performed his duties according to his caste and every twice-born could retire to the forest

and get the king's protection. No longer do we find those conditions when every philosopher could think only of the Brahman unaffected by the fall of empires and the agonies of nations. Now he will be asked: Can your concept of the Brahman show a way out of these difficulties? The answer, Eschew the world and retire to the forest, is no longer appreciated. And no ancient Indian philosopher thought of any other answer. But these questions were raised in Western philosophy and answered. We have to know how

and adopt that method.

If still the objectors persist, my only reply is: Time is without end and life is a perpetual striving. As Whitehead says, its nature is progress; apologetic defence of the past is a sign of decay. Whether one likes or not, life and therefore thought and action adjust themselves to the changing conditions. If philosophical progress is opposed, it will not be long before Indian philosophy, for being antiquarian, will find a cosy corner in the archæological museums and libraries of the world.

P. T. RAJU

WORLD EDUCATION

The part which education for peace should play in avoiding future wars is sketched in *Education and the People's Peace*, recently published by the Educational Policies Commission (Washington 6, D. C.). The authors put it forward as "a venture in idealism," rightly holding that in times like these idealism may be most intensely practical. International supervision of educational policies is really no more drastic a proposal than the International Labour Office. If there is any international body after the war, an educational agency may well form a feature of it.

Nations have demonstrated their unfitness to educate their youth without supervision. It is proposed here that the educational systems of different countries shall be subject to systematic study, to determine whether their trend is detrimental to the maintenance of peace. Experience has

shown that international interchange of professors and university students is not enough. Peace education must go down to the elementary and secondary schools to reach the masses.

Curiously, so strong is the Commission's faith in the power of education to develop knowledge and attitudes conducive to peace that it is fearful of isolated efforts. "Psychological disarmament," it insists, "like military disarmament, is effective and safe only when it is universal." This is the weakest link in their chain.

One of the most commendable features of the policy outlined is its complete impartiality. All nations are to agree to refrain from teachings dangerous to world peace. All alike are to be subject to supervision by the international agency.

As a permanent policy, the United Nations should not ask any of the defeated nations to submit to any educational appraisal which they are not prepared equally to undergo.

A more temperate proposal or one better fitted to serve as model for the peace negotiations in more than one field it would be difficult to find.

WHITHER INDIAN CHARITY?

[The prevention of poverty is still its soundest cure, as **Mr. John Barnabas** recognises here, but we cannot reverse the clock; wide-spread poverty is here, and its amelioration cannot be put off till social justice obviates the need of alms. Charity is no new-comer to India, as Mr. Barnabas brings out. An efficient approach to any large-scale problem in our modern world, however, involves organisation, the pooling of efforts and resources—and charity is no exception. Organised charity and trained case-workers' methods are a great improvement on the sentimental giving that too often demoralises, but the human touch must not be lost. Social work is no profession for the heartless man or woman, and the Charity Organisation Society worker has to be on his guard lest long familiarity with misery should blunt his sympathies.—ED.]

Centuries ago an ancient Hebrew raised the question: "Am I my brother's keeper?" Through the centuries the question has repeated itself and the course of "Charity" has been to a considerable measure the trend of the answer to the question. The term denotes in common usage both a quality of thought or feeling and a mode of conduct with reference to those visited by misfortune. "Charity" or love represents the principle of the good life. The term was first applied to the extension of social obligations beyond the immediate circle of kinship. A casual study of almost any religion shows that both the sentiment and the practice of charity acquired the sanction of religion very early in history. To a charitable person is attributed the triple merit of personal virtue, religious duty and social utility. Its motivation throughout history has constantly reflected this inter-

twining of personal, religious and social sanctions.

So far as the individual is concerned, charity stands for a "mood or habit of mind and an endeavour." Such a mind it is that eggs one on to social and personal endeavour. Inasmuch as there is a close relation between the mind and the effort, we find that where the habit of mind is not gained, where the mind is not disciplined in the very desire to be charitable, there the endeavour fluctuates and is to that extent purposeless. In so far as the mental habit has been gained, the endeavour is founded on an intelligent scrutiny of social conditions and gained by a definite purpose. Thus

in the word charity religious and social associations meet, and thus regarded the word means a disciplined and habitual mood in which the mind is considerate of the welfare of others individually and generally, and devises

what is for their real good, and in which the intelligence and the will strive to fulfil the mind's purpose.¹

In religion-ridden India, charity is regarded as one of our inherent, hereditary virtues. It is presumed that a religious person must be a charitable one. Charity is one of the channels into which religious enthusiasm flows unhampered. Added to all this, it has the stamp of antiquity. In the West too there was formerly that close relation between religion and charity. But with the growth of industrialism and the advent of the industrial revolution the practice of charity became a social necessity. The religious urge was there; but the emphasis gradually slid over to the social aspect of one's life. I am not suggesting that at any time in the history of charity there was a clear distinction between charity as a religious duty and charity as a social function. Intertwined as they were, it is possible to assert that at different periods, in different countries and among various peoples the types of benefits have generally reflected the changing social standards of communities.

Ancient writings among all peoples abound in references to the twin duties of care for the aged, widowed and orphaned members of the family group and help for guests, wayfarers and strangers. Among primitive peoples the helping of wanderers and beggars assumed something of the nature of a com-

munal rite linked with religious observances.

In ancient Rome and Greece the fact of citizenship was the basis of the right to relief. The State itself experimented with a variety of poor-relief schemes, supplementing private charity and not replacing it, with a view to conserving the unity of the state by strengthening its economically weakest members. Here was a "group-protection basis" for charity. One might even say there was the political basis for a socio-religious activity. But, on the other hand, the religious aspect of Hebrew charity, like the family life in which it was nourished, had pre-eminently a social significance which, because of the nature of the group, often transcended political or territorial boundaries. Both in the individual and social attitudes and acts the desirability of mercy was emphasised, in addition to the duty of righteousness and social justice. It is interesting to note that the Christian emphasis upon personal immortality and the importance of life after death tended to prompt charity more for the benefit of the giver with a view to storing up merit for his eternal life after death, than for the social benefit of the receiver of such charity. At the same time it must be recognised that the respect for personality emphasised by Christianity, the idea that every human creature was an individual with an immortal destiny, gave warmth to fraternal feeling.

¹ *Three Thousand of Social Services.* By C. S. LOCH.

The ultimate utility of an action, even when it has become a habit of mind and is prompted by the religious instinct, is to be judged by the motive of that act. Let us very briefly analyse as far as possible the motives that prompt charity in our country. In such an analysis we are studying the practical expression charity takes, that of alms giving. We are not thinking of charity as an abstract virtue. Judged on that basis it appears to me that there are six general reasons for alms giving.

The purely *religious reason* is the dominant one. Practically every major religion enjoins alms giving as a religious duty, and the followers of practically every religion believe that, in giving alms, they are laying up for themselves treasures in heaven.

The practice of giving alms has the further *sanction of custom*. In India alms giving has so long been associated with the superior class, though very wrongly, that begging is quite an honourable profession. Alms giving and the virtue of pity have been celebrated themes of Hindu mythology. Thousands of people give alms for no other reason than that it has always been done. Charity is a custom.

The *personal reasons* for alms giving are many and varied. Some give simply to experience the glow of happiness which is associated with the doing of a good deed. For others the thanks and blessings of the recipient are an adequate reward.

In many cases alms giving satisfies the ego of the giver. Not a few wealthy persons find themselves troubled by the obvious inequalities in life and find at least some comfort for a troubled mind through giving charity to beggars.

It is a wide-spread practice to give alms in the hope of personal gain. A man loses money in the share bazaar or at the races. He goes to the temple to pray that he may recover his losses, and on coming out of the temple tosses a few coins to beggars in the hope that this will help him to attain his ends. A wife who desires a male child will give alms for the furtherance of her cherished end. It is also common for the relatives of a deceased person to distribute charity shortly after his death, with the end in view of lightening the gravity of his sins.

The blessings of the beggar appeal to certain fundamental human wishes. "May you live long," appeals to the universal desire for self-preservation. "May you have many children," is a direct appeal to the wish for progeny. "May you enjoy prosperity," is an expression of the universal desire for security.

There are a large number of people who give alms merely *out of pity*. The emaciated baby, the mutilated body, the blind and the lame exercise a wide popular appeal.

Others give *out of fear* of the curses of beggars. Few ignorant people are able to resist those beggars who come to the home

bearing an image of a goddess and threatening, or a leper beggar who approaches them for alms; they get rid of them as quickly as possible by giving them alms.

There are some who simply toss a coin without thought. For many people, pice have no value; when received in change they are simply regarded as a nuisance and got rid of at the earliest opportunity. They may be described as the *careless givers*.

In studying these motives it is apparent that the welfare of the receiver is very seldom the direct motive. On the contrary, the general idea more often seems to be the benefit of the giver.

But is that the reason why India should practise charity? Do we have any adequate philosophy of charity? Did ancient Indian practice and teaching pass on this motive for charity to posterity? It is obvious that Indian charity today is contrary to the *Gita* philosophy:—

But alms given to one who does nothing in return, believing that a gift ought to be made in a fit place and time to a worthy person, that alms is accounted pure. That given with a view to receiving in return, or looking for fruit again, or grudgingly, that alms is accounted of passion. That alms given at unfit place and time, and to unworthy persons, disrespectfully and contemptuously, that is declared of darkness.¹

The idea that charity is to be given for the benefit of the recipient, in order to safeguard the heritage of the living, and not for the selfish personal gain of the giver is to be found in the teachings of practically every religion.

The ruling motive of every Hindu making an endowment is a religious one, namely the acquisition of pious merit or the removal of the effects of sin with a view to happiness in this world and in the next.²

But Manu calls upon each wealthy man continuously and sedulously to “consecrate pools or gardens with faith...and with riches *honestly* gained.”³ Again, according to Manu and Parasara, *Dana* is the chief *Dharma* of the *Kaliyuga*, and might be, according to Devala, of four kinds, perpetual, ample or pure, desirable and occasional, and would comprehend the endowments of temples, *Annasatras*, *Dharmashalas*, hospitals, schools, tanks, wells, ponds, free education and the like. Ancient examples of religious charity show that their purpose was not always confined to the construction of temples of gods or maintenance of their worship but extended very often to include the maintenance of temples of learning or means of relief of human suffering in connection with the temples proper. It was felt that the service of man was another mode of serving and worshipping God.

¹ *Bhagavad-Gita*, XVII. 20-22.

² *Hindu Law of Endowments*. By SARASWATI. P. 29.

³ Manu IV, 226.

It is clear beyond doubt, therefore, that ancient Indian charity had a religious basis, but was emphatically for the social good; it was not for the benefit of the giver. Whatever good came to him as a result of such charity was unpremeditated.

I have already dealt with the motives and the results of individual indiscriminate charity. Both our motive and the results thereof are unworthy of the noble act of charity. At present our charity does not preach the gospel of noble citizenship. Our conception of charity is not allied to any wider conception of citizenship. Our charity is not one which endeavours to help the fallen, strengthen the feeble-hearted and lift the pauper out of degradation. It is rather a thing that shifts and changes with our religious and social differences. It is like the light of torches, carried by a hurrying crowd, which move as they move, and which flare and flicker, as the wind blows gently or in gusts, or as the torch-bearers step slowly or quickly. In a social world such as this we have to give a new expression to charity.

Our trouble then is not that we are uncharitable, but that we are not charitable in the right way. That is in the sphere of individual charity. Let us for a moment consider the condition of charitable endowments, and of individual temple charities. The riches of the temples through the centuries are proverbial. The

accumulated wealth in them is the money of the poor man also. It is estimated that Shri Badrinath Temple in Garhwal has an annual income of Rs. 135,000; Bharat Mandir, Rishikesh, gets about Rs. 20,000 per annum; Shri Rangji Temple in Brindaban in Muttra has an annual income of Rs. 200,000; Govindji Temple in Brindaban has an income of Rs. 25,000 annually. And these are considered, by authorities who know these temples, to be an underestimate. The income of all temples in the United Provinces is estimated to run to more than two crores of rupees. Rai Bahadur Pandit Shyam Behari Misra, deploring the use these vast funds are being put to, writes:—

Almost the whole of this vast income derived from well-intentioned and devout Hindus, is spent upon maintaining the pampered and mostly debased and immoral *Pandas*, priests and the like, while a very small fraction of it is expended on maintaining and improving the religious and charitable objects for which the whole of it is really meant, or on any other desirable object. It is not only improper, but positively sinful, to allow the present state of affairs to drag on any longer, and drastic steps for its immediate improvement are urgently called for.¹

Thus we see that our individual charity is indiscriminate and does not benefit those whom it is intended to or should benefit. Our accumulated charities are being hopelessly misused. What then should we do?

¹ *Report of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Committee, U. P.*, p. 68A.

There is a significant passage in the same *Report*, which points the way out :—

The sovereign under the Hindu Law was the upholder of *dharma* in his capacity as the Danda or the executive authority....The temple inspired and sustained private piety; private piety thus strengthened was stimulated into gifts; the constant stream of gifts called for arrangements for their proper administration which thus gave the people an opening for public service and scope for self-rule.

The present indiscriminate charity must yield place to organised charity—so organised as to give the maximum benefit to those in need of help. The social history of the West tells us clearly that

social disorganization, augmenting the need for charity, coincided with the decline of the old religious sanctions of private giving and the depletion of charitable resources both religious and secular. The stage was thus set for the intervention of the national state as the body to administer public relief. Public relief was at first more of an enforcement of law than a charitable act.

Our sources of charity are not depleted. But the time has come for making an intelligent use of our charitable tendency.

Every city in India should have a Charity Organisation Society. Private, indiscriminate, personal charity must be put a stop to. Charitable donations of all kinds must be collected by this society and used for, not merely the temporary alleviation of the suffering of the

needy, but the prevention of pauperism by meeting it at its right place and in the right manner. In such an organisation of charity individual need will not be neglected. In fact more individual attention of a constructive type will be given. The usefulness of charitable institutions is increased, their injurious tendencies are checked, by the organisation of charity, for such an organisation implies methods that lead to thoroughness in relieving the unfortunate and the afflicted. The methods of charity organisation are individual work and co-operation aided by inquiry and, so far as possible, adequacy of assistance. To me it seems that charity is both the “deepest conception of religion, the motive and sustaining force of an ideal community,” and the “spirit of citizenship which would aim at making the citizen not merely live but live well.” Charity when individual and unorganised is both injurious and wasteful: when combined and organised it is serviceable.

A distinguished English social worker of the last century, Miss Octavia Hill, made the following significant statement :—

I think small doles unkind to the poor, though they bring a momentary smile to their faces. First of all, I think they make them really poorer. Then I think they degrade them and make them less independent. Thirdly, I think they destroy the possibility of really good relations between you and them. Surely, when you go among them, you have better things to do for

them than to give them half-crowns. You want to know them—to enter into their lives, their thoughts; to let them enter into some of your brightness; to make their lives a little fuller, a little gladder....My experience confirms me entirely in the belief that charity loses nothing of its lovingness by being entirely wise. Now it cannot be wise without full knowledge of the circumstances of those to be dealt with—hence the necessity for investigation; it cannot come to satisfactory conclusions on those facts unless it employs the help of experienced men—hence the need of a committee for decision.

In other words, Miss Hill recognises the necessity of placing alms giving on a scientific basis and of dealing with each case according to its own peculiar circumstances. Experience in the West has demonstrated that the streams of charity have not dried up when spontaneous individual giving is replaced by the modern charity organisation society. In fact, an intelligent systematic approach to the problem of charity has tapped new sources of supply and brought forth funds in increasing abundance. The tossing off of coppers will, when once the problem has been intelligently understood, give way to the giving of rupees.

One of the greatest of Jews, Moses Ben Maimon, known as Maimonides, as long ago as the twelfth century A. D., defined eight degrees or steps in the duty of charity.

The *first* and the lowest degree is to

give, but with reluctance or regret. This is the gift of the hand, but not of the heart. The *second* is to give cheerfully, but not proportionately to the distress of the sufferer. The *third* is, to give cheerfully, and proportionately, but not until solicited. The *fourth* is to give cheerfully, and proportionately, and even unsolicited, but to put in the poor man's hand, thereby exciting in him the painful emotion of shame. The *fifth* is to give charity in such a way that the distressed may receive the bounty, and know their benefactor, without being known to him....The *sixth*, which rises still higher, is to know the objects of our bounty but remain unknown to them....The *seventh* is still more meritorious, namely, to bestow charity in such a way that the benefactor may not know the relieved persons, nor they the names of their benefactors, as was done by our forefathers during the existence of the temple. For there was in that holy building a place called the Chamber of the Silent, wherein the good deposited secretly whatever their generous hearts suggested, or from which the poor were maintained with equal secrecy. Lastly, the *eighth*, and the most meritorious of all, is to anticipate charity, by preventing poverty....This is the highest step and the summit of charity's golden ladder.

Where does twentieth-century India rank on this twelfth-century scale of charity? Is it too much to expect India to organise charity on scientific lines and to climb "charity's golden ladder" step by step and not rest till we reach the top?

JOHN BARNABAS

CASTE IN THE MEDICAL PROFESSION

[Dr. B. Bhattacharyya, M. A., Ph. D., of Baroda throws down the gauntlet to privilege in a profession that, as he rightly observes, should have service and not profits as its key-note. Incidentally he indicts the common human failing which lies at the root of rigid caste divisions everywhere—readiness to accept blindly ready-made judgments that rest on anything but individual worth. Medical orthodoxy has its dangerous superstitions, such as approving vivisection and inoculation; and it knows how to persecute heretics no less effectively if less spectacularly than did the mediæval Roman Church. Patients may die by the thousand before unorthodox curative methods, however effective, get the mint-stamp of regularity, but professional honour must be vindicated, professional etiquette observed. “Doctors,” wrote Gandhiji in *Hind Swaraj*, “have almost unhinged us. Sometimes I think that quacks are better than highly qualified doctors.” We do not decry learning or deserved prestige, but degrees are dearly bought when the price demanded is conformity and a closed mind.—ED.]

The medical profession today excites both amazement and amusement, not only in this country but also in Europe and America. We are amazed on the one hand at the gigantic crowd of heterogeneous elements arrayed to fight disease with all modern equipment, and we are amused on the other hand at the precious little that has been achieved by that gigantic effort to break the citadel of disease and death. But the poverty of achievement has been no bar to the development of a distinctive hierarchy which carries with it all the arrogant implications of a well-regulated caste system.

Although in every department of life people are desperately endeavouring to rid society of the caste complex, a careful observer cannot fail to detect that the medical pro-

profession is fast becoming caste-ridden. The system which we had hoped would perish with the advance of civilisation and democratic ideas is raising its head again and again in new fields of life. In the medical profession there is scarcely any need for a caste system, but its presence can hardly be denied.

The castes in the medical profession are becoming increasingly exclusive, and the doctors of the higher classes are becoming conscious of their superiority over their brethren of the lower classes. Once I heard that an F. R. C. S. refused to marry the daughter of an M. D. (Calcutta) as he considered the match not equal to his status! This distinction between the different classes is not only creating heart-burning and rivalry amongst the doctors themselves, but also causing

confusion and anxiety to the public which is the real patron and employer of the medical profession.

It will not be out of place to mention that this professional class of doctors or physicians was held in rather low esteem in ancient India. The highest development of philosophic ideas and complete faith in divine dispensation took away all the importance and all the steam from the medical profession.

Doctors presumably have no control over birth and death, both of which are regulated by higher forces of nature. Even in this scientific age we have not been able to think otherwise, however much we may wish to the contrary. It is widely believed in India that planetary influences bring about disease, death or suffering, and, therefore, that it is beyond the power of the doctor to prevent them. In ancient Greece, we are told, doctors were not allowed to practise if they did not possess an adequate knowledge of astrology. Be that as it may, the doctor's duty is to try to alleviate the distress of the patient, if possible. Otherwise, he does not come into the picture at all. Why, then, all this fuss about doctors' being more scientific or less scientific only for the purpose of extracting higher or lesser fees?

It will be interesting to note that in Kautilya's time, 2300 years ago in ancient India, medical men were looked upon with suspicion, since the *Arthashastra* prescribed a law by which doctors were required to report all serious cases to the police. If

death occurred without a report, the doctor was to be punished with fine or imprisonment or both. Such a step today would at once give rise to expressions of pious horror. I do not know whether the ancients were more civilised than we, but I personally feel that even at the present day such old laws should be revived in the public interest.

Although it is a digression from the main theme of medical castes, I may again point out that even as recently as twenty-five years ago surgery as such, at least in the villages and small towns, was entirely in the hands of the local barbers. Thus the Hindus gave very little importance to the medical manipulations, and the same attitude continues even now. That is the Hindu mind.

That being so, we look askance at the importance given to doctors and patent medicines in the present day, at the empty vauntings of medical men and the gradations existing amongst them. It is a pity that instead of paying doctors for the service rendered to the public by definite cures, we are required to pay for mere treatment according to the caste of the doctor.

Let us take, for instance, such a simple thing as a headache. The person suffering from it may take a one-anna tablet or consult a doctor. The treatment begins with fees. The London M.D. charges two guineas, the M.B. two rupees, an L.C.P.S. one rupee, a compounder doctor eight annas, and a Vaid or a Homœopath

three annas or even less. According to his own ideas he goes to one or the other and pays more or less in fees, regardless of whether he gets relief or not. In disease, we forget, the essential part is the cure, and the non-essential part is the treatment which can be given by any living man on earth if the result is no consideration. I wonder whether the present-day civilisation has taken away from us the faculty of distinguishing between the essential and the non-essential!

Let us leave the headache patient to his fate. But one thing stands out pre-eminently. There is gradation among the doctors, not for their efficiency, which is essential, but for the non-essential and mysterious factor of status and qualifications. And yet we say, we are advancing!

The London M. D., the F. R. C. S., and the M. D.'s of Indian, European and American universities belong to the highest class in the medical profession. I call them the Brahmins. They dress well, move in aristocratic cars and high society, and have attractive and expensive dispensaries and nursing homes. They are generally grave, speak little and in an enigmatic manner, and do not usually come out unless given a call by a professional doctor. Apart from the question of efficiency, they are entitled to the highest fees, which may range from rupees eight to sixty-four or even more for one consultation. It is our superstition that leads us to spend these amounts for a commonplace questioning and

examination for a diagnosis. Those who would like to pay, let them pay; those who would like to receive such moneys let them receive, but let both remember that such moneys are for an experiment and not for efficiency.

In these days of world-wide efficiency, the worship offered to the doctor powerless against the effects of evil Karma appears to me to be one of the strangest anomalies of the present age. Here I would like to relate a case where a patient was suffering from continuous fever for nearly ten days. An M. D., valued at Rs. 64/-, examined him and as he left pronounced the case "obscure." An elderly gentleman who happened to be present remarked: "Sixty-four rupees for one word is rather a high price." This case was promptly cured by an un-degree'd "quack."

The second class is the Ksatriya caste and includes within its fold M.B.B.S., L.M. & S. and M.B. doctors of Indian universities. These are usually the Assistant Surgeons, physicians, bacteriologists, lady doctors and general practitioners. In Government employment their highest ambition usually is Rs. 500/- a month, although some of them are available even at Rs. 75/-. Their usual fee is from two to five rupees, and they are kind, serviceable and sympathetic. They do not use a cryptic language, but make a liberal expenditure of words, which are at once soothing and encouraging to the patient. They are the real friends of the public, but they hate

men of rival professions such as Vaid, Hakims, Homœopaths and the rest, and show the greatest displeasure at any form of non-orthodox treatment. These Ksatriya doctors dress in a mediocre fashion and move about mostly on cycles and in carriages, rarely in a car. They have an almost superstitious faith in their text-books and their empirical doctrines, and stick to them like a leech even in the face of repeated failures. Great courage indeed!

Then comes the third class, the Vaisya; they are the L.M.P.'s, L.C.P.S.'s and doctors of similar status passing out of the Medical Schools. The Vaisya doctors cannot afford to dress well, and they move about both on cycles and on foot. When consulted, they are found to be most friendly and serviceable; they will pass hours with the patient, talking, smoking and drinking tea. They do not mind giving the patient an enema occasionally or helping him with a catheter, bandages, or antiphlogistine, and rendering minor surgical help. Their charges are very moderate; they have a regard for other systems of medicine, and do not hesitate to consult a Homœopath, a Vaid or a Hakim. They resent the lower status imposed on them, and they always wonder why they are paid less than the doctors of the Ksatriya caste, although both are required to do the same kind of work. The title "Sub-Assistant Surgeon" is anathema to them.

The lowest rungs of the ladder in the profession are occupied by the

compounders, the nurses, the hospital assistants and the degreeless doctors who are desperately trying to make a living by medicine. They are the Sudras or the working-class, and have to carry out the behests of the doctors of the upper castes. Giving a sponge bath or an enema, applying the catheter, washing wounds, bandaging ulcers and the like are the regular work of this class. They mix medicines, label them, mark them, administer them at regular intervals, and in short, do everything that keeps the upper castes going. They also work as vaccinators and inoculators and do a little practice themselves, and their services are sometimes available even for a four-anna bit. The class of patients who cannot afford to pay for scientific medicine but for whom it has a superstitious glamour, generally goes to this Sudra class of doctors.

These are the four main castes amongst the orthodox profession, and as this profession is fortunate in having State patronage, it has almost the same authority as that of the Vedas. All others, in the absence of this authority, must be relegated to the fifth class of the Untouchables. This class includes advocates of other systems, such as Ayurveda, Unani, Homœopathy, Chromopathy, the Bio-Chemic system, Naturopathy, Auto-suggestion, Mantras, Mesmerism, and the rest. The indigenous bone-setters, cataract removers, extractors of poison, ghost doctors and similar experts also belong to this class of untouchables.

Doctors of the orthodox system will not attend on a case previously treated by an untouchable doctor. I can cite the example of a cancer case cured by a Homœopath, which was abandoned by a Vaisya doctor who used to dress the wound. The dressing, which ultimately proved to be a success, had to be done at home by inexperienced boys.

I have forgotten to include another class of men who either directly or indirectly help the profession, although they may or may not be regular doctors, or are practising only in a limited field. These are the Sankara Varnas or the Mixed castes. These include men of every status, high and low—specialists, apothecaries, opticians, shopkeepers, merchants, manufacturers, advertisers, wholesale and retail dealers, painters, designers, travelling agents,

brokers, and the rest whose business it is to attend to the trade side of the profession. Their number is surprisingly large, and the profits of some of them are much larger than what even the highest Brahmin doctor can dream of.

Thus the caste system in the medical profession goes on merrily. Many people ignorant and wise are falling victims to it daily. Service should be the key-note of this profession, and not profits. The profession can live only if high ideals are followed ; otherwise it will perish like all evil systems of the past. For the present, however, I wish the New Caste System all victory. Victory be also to the ancient seers who could foresee the evil of caste that is deep-rooted in the human mind.

B. BHATTACHARYYA

DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDE TO LIFE

“The survival of political democracy depends on the creation of a democratic society,” declared Mr. R. H. Tawney, presiding at the last annual conference of the Workers’ Educational Association in London. And

such a society can no more be based on the rule of an intellectual *elite* over an ignorant or apathetic people than on the landed oligarchies of the past or on the financial oligarchies of today.

The creation of a democratic society involves the education of the masses

in democratic ways of life. The recognition is growing that education must mean equipment for the right exercise of social responsibilities. Reconstruction cannot be suddenly thrust on the people ; it has to take shape in their minds. Mr. Tawney rightly stressed that

the interests which unite men as men are more profound and important than those dividing nations, and that the things of the spirit, for which an educational movement stands, are of their very nature supernatural.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

PERSONALISM *

Transformation is a collection of Prose, Poetry and Plays by thirty writers but, as the title indicates, the contributors are linked by a common allegiance to a central belief, which is ably formulated by the Editors in their Introduction and by Mr. Herbert Read in his essay "The Politics of the Unpolitical."

As this is the first volume of *Transformation*, it is proposed to examine this central belief, rather than individual contributions, especially as the values proclaimed have direct relevance to modern Babel.

Briefly summarised, these are the chief tenets of this "Personalist" creed:—

(a) A new type of being is emerging out of a dying culture.

(b) All politics which do not grow, organically, from living are rejected.

(c) Personalism rejects all forms of government which ignore spiritual values.

(d) Personalism "demands a complete revaluation of all aspects of life, a complete reorientation, a complete change of heart."

It was an editorial inspiration to follow the Introduction with Mr. Herbert Read's remarkable essay, for, in it, he makes the fact plain that all current political systems are inns without a room for the politics of those "who desire to be pure in heart." In a challenging argument, Mr. Read

maintains that communism and fascism are extreme forms of democracy—that what we term democracy is a physical impossibility—that only in the sight of God are men equal.

Clearly, this rejection of all current political systems will invite the indictment that Mr. Read and those in agreement with him have deserted the arena and become detached spectators of the conflict. Mr. Read deals with this charge in the last paragraph of his essay but, even if it were admitted, it would not be difficult to show that "withdrawal" is not necessarily inactivity—that, sometimes, in the past, those who withdrew from contemporary affairs fashioned the shape of things to come far more creatively than those who battled blindly in the arena.

Mr. Peter Drucker in his penetrating book, *The End of Economic Man*, says:—

...personal religion has become the refuge of many of the best minds in Germany and Italy. Parallel with it a New Humanism has made its appearance.... These returns to the perennial intellectual and spiritual values of the European inheritance are not in themselves socially effective, creative, or productive.... But out of a similar resignation of the scholars of the thirteenth century who retired to their study in conscious abandonment of their function in society emerged the Renaissance conception of freedom and the society of Intellectual Man.... To-day we are witnessing the same phenomenon; again it should—eventually—lead to a regeneration. In his self-imposed resignation from society the individual, freed from the limitations of the concept of Economic Man, will produce a

* *Transformation*. Edited by STEFAN SCHIMANSKI and HENRY TREECE. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 6s.)

new, non-economic, social substance which he will endow with freedom.

The simple fact is that there is nothing to do in Babel—for the sane. What you do must be real—for you. It is true that political systems which do not stem from *living* lack reality. The inescapable and terrible fact about the modern world is that power is exalt-

ed over life. This, perhaps, explains why, in Alexander Blok's words, *man's entire being is in revolt*.

Transformation deserves attention if only because it is an attempt to halt the process of "atomism" which, unchecked, must culminate in total disintegration.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

ST. PAUL *

Any author who undertakes to write a novel based upon the Bible record has accepted a labour fraught with grave responsibilities. As an author he wields the powerful weapon of the written word with which he will enter the minds of thousands of people, sowing there ideas of truth or untruth. In his handling of the Bible record he can faithfully portray the spiritual truths, clothing them in words which will illustrate these truths more clearly to others, or he can yield to the subtle temptation of allowing his personal will to dominate the story and distort characters and episodes to suit his own ends, thereby presenting a false picture.

Mr. Asch has treated the Bible record with great insight and honesty, which run through his book like a shining light, illuminating its pages. The reader may give himself up entirely to the enjoyment and inspiration of the story free from the haunting doubt that it is distorted.

With a wealth of detail and local colour Mr. Asch conducts us through the daily life of the people of Palestine, Syria, Greece and Rome of nearly 2,000 years ago. Before our eyes we behold the pageant of those times

vividly unfolded as the picturesque background to the story of the early spread of Christianity. The story which is dealt with so briefly in the Bible, here leaps into the warmth of life interpreted and illustrated through the everyday affairs, worries, hopes, ambitions and loves of ordinary men and women. It takes upon itself the living reality of flesh and blood through which the reader can understand and feel a ready human sympathy for the characters who move across its pages.

After reading this book the reader will understand more easily the magnitude of the work done by the Apostle Paul and will appreciate more readily the tremendous debt Christianity owes to him. In the author's portrayal of the Apostle's character, however, one feels that a "personal magnetism" has been attributed to Paul which tends to dwarf the colossal spiritual stature and sublimity of concept which must surely have been the attributes of one who successfully completed such a work. Too much is made of his physical defects. It appears as a strange anomaly that he who could heal others could not heal himself; this will not entirely satisfy the reader who takes a

* *The Apostle*. By SCHOLEM ASCH. (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. \$3.00)

more spiritual view of the power of Christ expressed in the life and teaching of the Apostle. One feels that the author is endeavouring to explain the phenomenon of the power of Christ expressed by the Apostle, upon the basis of some magnetic power engendered in the person of Paul.

The Christian of today is apt to forget the great part played by the Jews in the early propagation and dissemination of the teachings of Jesus Christ. So often too much is made of the antagonism of the orthodox Jews to that teaching and not enough is said of the thousands who gave their earthly all in its cause, with the fervour and sincerity peculiar to their race.

This the author clarifies. At the same time he illustrates forcibly that stiff-necked obstinacy and narrow, ritualistic view-point which betrayed the orthodox Jews into rejecting their own long-awaited and beloved Messiah, and thus taking from the Jews their birth-right, to give it to the Gentiles.

It is impossible that such a book will not meet with strong critics who disagree with minor points of scriptural interpretation, or who do not like the author's portrayal of some of the characters. But if the reader can take a broad view of the story he cannot fail to be profoundly impressed and uplifted by it.

LAURENCE E. MOORE

THE TEACHER OF THE SIKHS *

It was a wise decision to let the Guru himself speak in this account of the early sixteenth-century reformer-saint. The introductory matter and the incidental narrative are unobtrusive but appropriate settings for the jewels of his thought.

The Deity to whom he preached complete devotion is the All-Pervading, the Indwelling God. He taught of Karma and reincarnation, of control of mind, of action without interest in its fruits. He extolled the householder's life, lived in purity, above renunciation of the world; rejected outer forms as valueless. It was no new revelation that Guru Nanak gave. What teaching that is true was ever new? It was as a protestant against forms and superstitions and communal exclusiveness that he came on the scene, as all religious teachers worthy of the name

have come.

Nanak's mode of teaching is more than a little reminiscent of the Buddha's. Both turn to nature for their illustrations; both use the Socratic method to good effect. But Nanak has a rich humour all his own and his gentle ridicule drives many a lesson home.

From childhood he seemed conscious of his mission and gifted with a wisdom far beyond his years. He refused to label himself Hindu or Muslim; he preached the brotherhood of man, the Golden Rule. Certainly it would ill become Christians, with their open flouting of the law of love which their great teacher preached, to marvel that the martial Sikhs trace their spiritual descent from one who advocated harmlessness in thought and act and demanded that his followers love all, even those who hated them.

Guru Nanak is a mine of wisdom.

ELEANOR HOUGH

* *Guru Nanak*. By RAJA SIR DALJIT SINGH, with a Foreword by the HON. SIR JOGENDRA SINGH. (The Unity Publishers, Gita Bhawan, McLeod Road, Lahore. Rs. 7/8)

With No Regrets: An Autobiography. By KRISHNA HUTHEESING. Illustrated. (Padma Publications, Ltd., Lakshmi Building, Sir Phirozeshah Mehta Road, Bombay. Rs. 6/8)

It is inevitable that the reader of Krishna Hutheesing's *Autobiography* should feel inclined to contrast it with the *Autobiography* of her brother, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. They are genuine autobiographies both and they are equally more than mere autobiographies. Sister or brother, the autobiographer is also the historian of the House of Motilal, the historian, too, of renascent India and her great leader, Mahatma Gandhi. Personal and public life, family and national history, all coalesce to give us works of art that are at once human documents and national testaments.

However, Krishna Hutheesing's book is slighter in bulk and is a more human and vivacious narrative than is her brother's more famous *Autobiography*. Hers is essentially a feminine book; she excels particularly in delineating the great women of the House of Motilal, though the glimpses she gives of the father and of the brother are also unforgettable. She is less austere, less restrained, less unwilling to suffer fools,

than is her brother; and she speaks, as most women do, "right on." Her narrative, again, is candid and sensitive with the embracing fluidity of love, and the mere woman, a chip of the eternal feminine as any, is never obscured by the pomp and circumstance of the highlights of political life. On the other hand, Krishna Hutheesing's prose style, nervous and delicate and effective as it is, has nevertheless yet to acquire the utter finish and marble purity and strength of Jawaharlal's.

With No Regrets is a beautiful book, and it is also a brave book. Political leadership has brought to the members of the House of Motilal little more than "double double, toil and trouble"; at the present moment, Krishna's brother is in jail; and "heartache and sorrow" lift their unwelcome heads again and again in the course of the narrative. But Krishna Hutheesing is wise enough and brave enough to "look back on all that has happened with no regrets."

The book carries a Foreword by Shrimati Sarojini Naidu and an Introduction by Dr. Amiya Chakravarty. It is also equipped with fifteen illustrations, so that it may be not inaptly described, in a double sense, as a national portrait gallery.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

Talking to India. By E. M. FORSTER AND OTHERS. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

These "predominantly cultural talks with a literary bias," selected from the B. B. C. Broadcasts to India, can be appreciated even without agreeing with George Orwell's claim in his introduction that "English, although spoken by comparatively few people, is the only true lingua franca of India."

The number of those who take to the study of English literature today being what it is, this book, which discusses a variety of interesting aspects of modern English literature, with a particular though unmentioned emphasis on literature and war wins an easy response. Eliot, Forster, Orwell, Wickham Steed, Hamilton Fyfe and Waddington are good names to attract attention undoubtedly. But the limitations of

time—for all these were broadcast—have sometimes helped to close down boring propaganda as they have, at other times, seriously handicapped a full development of the argument. The fault cannot be the writers', therefore, if most of these selections

read sketchily though interestingly. The section on propaganda needs no comment but the general section could have included some talks on some of the major linguistic cultures of India. Surely India is not interested in English literature alone!

V. M. INAMDAR

Sri Ramanuja's Theory of Knowledge:—A Study. By Dr. K. C. VARADACHARI. (Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati. Rs. 3/-)

This book is a justification of Sri Ramanuja's epistemological Realism and ontological Idealism or Spiritualism. While God is the only reality, He is gratified both by the intelligent and the non-intelligent forms of being, which together constitute His body. The relation of soul and body is thus fundamental to reality and is the only intelligible form of an ultimate unity. In the realm of knowledge, however, the finite self and the things that he knows are quite separate and independent. The relation of knowledge, unlike the relation of body and soul, is external. The author is concerned to defend Sri Ramanuja's view that all perception is *savikalpaka* and apprehends some structure or *samsthāna* of the object, however primitive; that perception is a normal and valid means of knowing; that illusory perception is not the perception of a non-existent or an unreal object but only the perception of a subordinate or an unimportant part of it; that illusory perception can be explained through causes which

we can discover in perception itself guided by common-sense; and that while all knowledge is in a sense true there is such a thing as *divya-pratyakṣa* or divine knowledge, which may be said to be the culmination of all knowledge. Consciousness is here freed from all limitations of body and mind. This is the state of *mukti*. There is no such thing as pure immediacy or pure consciousness.

The author brings out the salient features of Sri Ramanuja's theory of knowledge. But the book is not written in an attractive or a lucid style. It does not read well. It may be difficult to express Indian thought accurately in English, but the author's knowledge of this language appears to be deficient even for an Indian. There are all sorts of awkward and inaccurate forms of expression. It is also evident that the author has had very little training in philosophical thinking. No problem in the book has been discussed with clearness, method or a proper sequence of thought. The quotations from Western thinkers appear to be quite unnecessary and irrelevant. The book leaves much room for improvement in both content and presentation.

G. R. MALKANI

Sri Venkatesa-Kavya-Kalpa, Edited by D. T. TATACHARYA, Siromani. (Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati, Rs. 4/-)

The inaugural number of the Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Series issued under the general editorship of Prof. P. V. Ramanujaswamy contains a number of deeply devotional prayers in Sanskrit dedicated to Lord Sri Venkatesvara and His Consort Sri Padmavati. These have been got ready for publication by Pandit D. T. Tatacharya. It is sad to record that most of the important editorial work had been completed by the late Dr. M. Krishnamacharya, who was Director of the Institute and in that capacity had carried on and organised splendid research. It is gratifying that the present Director and Curator have continued the work and traditions of Dr. Krishnamacharya whose *History of Sanskrit Literature* is an unsurpassable classic.

The first part of this work contains four prayers; the second, which forms the major portion of the volume, contains thirty-four. The third part contains some Tamil stanzas (*Sadagopagatha*), with the Sanskrit commentary of Rangaramanuja.

The prayers have all been composed by classic authors and reveal a remarkable psychological surrender of the entire personality to the Lord, in whose praise the spiritual yearnings of the

writers' hearts have so spontaneously poured.

When every prayer of these classicist devotees is a finished work of art in itself, it would seem invidious and withal needless to single out this or that composition for especial commendation. Yet I would draw attention to "Dayasataka" and "Srinivasagunakara," which contain the basic quintessentials of a theistic approach to the Lord of the Universe as the only sympathetic saviour of sinning souls struggling in the whirlpool of metempsychosis. I would further commend the prose-prayer "Lakshmi-gadya" which, in that particular style of composition known only to Sanskrit, constitutes a stirring, serene and harmonious succession of syllables and sense. These Gadya-prayers are usually chanted to the musical tunes known as "Arabhi" and "Devagandhari" and they make a special appeal to the ear of tyro and trained alike.

While the editing has been accomplished with commendable care and selective judgment, it is rather regrettable that typographical errors have been allowed to creep in. The title on page 46 is an amusing case in point. The Editors are to be sincerely complimented on the publication of the work, which is bound to be useful to a large section of devoted worshippers of the Lord on the Tirupati Hills.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

The Ethical Philosophy of the Gītā. By P. N. SRINIVASACHARI, M.A. (Sri Krishna Library, Mylapore, Madras. Rs. 2/-)

This work embodies the author's lectures as Reader of the Madras

University. In a critical survey on Western lines of the religious and ethical philosophy of the *Gītā*, he closely follows the commentary of Ramanuja, the exponent of Visistādvaita Vedānta. Commentators divide the eight-

een chapters of the *Gītā* into three equal sections, each dealing with a group of related topics. In the preface, the author indicates what, according to him, are the topics treated in the three sections. These bear no obvious resemblance to the division according to Yamunacharya, the Paramaguru of Ramanuja, who has epitomised the teaching of the *Gītā* in his *Gītārtha Sangraha*. This divergence, however, is only apparent and is due to the author's intention to present the Visistādvaitic interpretation of the *Gītā* in a form that will appeal to the modern student of religion and philosophy whose outlook is influenced by Western methods of approach to such topics.

In the introductory chapter the author remarks that "the *Gītā* is difficult to understand though it looks easy in its apparent simplicity." It is no doubt true that many passages in the *Gītā* are apparently simple but there are couplets in it so enigmatical that they have taxed the ingenuity of many a commentator in interpreting them so as to agree with his own school of thought. Almost every writer on the *Gītā* starts with a particular theory of the Self (*puruṣa*) and

his interpretation of the *Gītā* is determined by this theory. The Visistādvaitic concept of *puruṣa* is clearly stated by Professor Srinivasachari in the following words:—"There are three different *puruṣas* recognisable in the *Gītā*:—the *kṣara* or mutable in nature, the *puruṣa* embodied in *prakṛti*; the *akṣara* or the immutable *puruṣa*, the silent self freed from *prakṛti*; and the *uttamapuruṣa* or Supreme Lord."

Man's activity must have for its goal the attainment of *atmananda*, the inner joy of the Soul. One becomes an *atmaraman* not by inaction, but by right action. Right action leads to *Jñāna* (knowledge) and *Bhakti* (loving devotion to the Supreme Lord). To the aspirant for self-realisation duty is a divine command and its performance is divine service.

Regard all your actions as determined by *Bhagavan* or God as the ultimate subject or *karta*. *Gītā* iii. 30 (P.N.S.).

The book is to be welcomed as a valuable addition to the literature on the *Gītā*. The author's reputation as an exponent of the Visistādvaitic Vedānta, a reputation already high, is enhanced by the present work.

B. VENKATESACHAR

Sati Kasturba: A Life-Sketch with Tributes in Memoriam. Edited by R. K. PRABHU, with a Foreword by M. R. MASANI. (Hind Kitabs, Hornby Road, Bombay. Re. 1/4)

The flood of spontaneous tributes which Kasturba Gandhi's recent death evoked is a phenomenon worth analysing. The fact that she was the devoted wife of the greatest man in the public world today and that so many sympathised in his bereavement does not

explain it altogether. Nor do her sacrifices for her countrymen abroad and for her country's freedom, both creditable and inspiring as they were. Nor does even the pathetic circumstance of her having died in prison.

It is as a symbol that her memory is hailed and the homage paid is a triumphant affirmation of traditional values in a world which has largely set them at nought. The power of the humblest life lived by principle stands

vindicated in the extracts which make up this unsensational life-sketch, as also the Indian woman's self-effacing service. Not only wisdom but goodness

is justified of her children !

Appropriately, the profits of the book all go to the Memorial Fund to benefit the womanhood of India.

E. M. H.

Deluge. By SHANTI JAVERI. (Author, Shanti Bhuvan, Choupatty, Bombay 7. Rs. 3/-)

This is a discussion play, the central theme of which is the misdoing of man in the name of science, religion, politics, peace and all the rest. We are presented with contemporary types, imagined as dead long ago, but hovering in eternal restlessness for destiny unfulfilled. We come across their points of view that make up the contemporary chaos and rush toward self-annihilation without an alternative.

There is hope for the New Man, the author implies, but not until the old mischief is undone. Not surely until Man realises that he has a destiny to fulfil other than meeting a violent end. Not until he unlearns his philosophies of race prejudice and political hatred and accepts man as his brother.

In a play like this characters sag and shrink into marionettes with viewpoints tacked to them unless the whole is held up by a Shavian brilliance of dialogue. The author's attempt has promise.

V. M. I.

The Schools of Vedanta. By P. NAGARAJA RAO, M. A., with a Foreword by SIR S. RADHAKRISHNAN. (Bharatiya Vidya Studies No. 2, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. Rs. 2/-)

Lay readers who have had their interest piqued by references, so frequently met with, to the *Shad-darsanas* or the six schools of Indian philosophy, will feel indebted to the author for this clear exposition of their points of superficial variance and the still more significant points on which they openly agree. The differences are of terminology; fundamentally the ideas of the six schools are complementary when

not identical.

All of the *darsanas* recognize the possibility of liberation; all accept philosophy as less a view of life than a way of life; all demand detachment from self-interest in action; all view the universe as a purposeful moral order and all accept Karma and Reincarnation as the mode of human progress.

All of the systems are sympathetically presented here, but Shri Nagaraja Rao makes no secret of his predilection for Advaita with its central doctrine of the identity of Brahman and the individual self.

E. M. H.

Talk for Food : A Farce in Frustration. By S. GOPAL and V. ABDULLA. (Shakti Karyalayam, Madras. As. 10)

We have in India today all-party conferences, and no-party conferences; press conferences and food conferences. We have communalists who would divide India and others who would unite it before either would raise a finger to relieve hunger. We have comrades who endlessly swear by the people and princes who pathetically cling to imaginary paramountcy. We have vanquished advocates arguing still and idle worthies releasing pom-

pous platitudes. Above all we have Western journalist birds of passage who report the gods to be O. K. in Whitehall and all quiet and happy in dying India. All this against the background of imprisoned hope makes facts look farcical.

If the cross section of contemporary Indian public life presented in this playlet may rightly be described as a "Farce in Frustration," the credit goes not so much to the authors' sense of humour as to their sense of realism. India today is Talkistan.

V. M. INAMDAR

CORRESPONDENCE

OBSCENITY IN LITERATURE

I have read with interest Mr. Aslam Siddiqi's article in *The Indian P. E. N.* for August 1943 and that of Prof. P. S. Naidu in *THE ARYAN PATH* for December. The following paragraphs are penned to supplement the interesting discussion which followed in the latter journal for March 1944. Professor Naidu's approach has been psychological and rather technical while that of Mr. Siddiqi has been practical. I do not propose to criticise their views but only to reinforce their arguments from the view-point of an ordinary reader. Mr. Siddiqi indicts specifically two writers, one of whom, it is alleged, has not only produced obscene literature but also defended it, demanding why, if temples and mosques may be written about, brothels may not be. The present writer is no student of Urdu literature and is not in a position to read the particular

stories which provoked Mr. Siddiqi's protest and the successful prosecution of the publisher. But since the question of obscene literature is common to all Indian literatures, the difference being only one of degree, and since the question is or ought to be the concern of everyone who would keep literature free from demoralising influences, the following remarks will be on obscenity in literature in general.

Mr. Siddiqi in his argument against obscenity in literature seems willing to hurt but afraid to strike. His argument only amounts to this: that because the world's great literature and great literary geniuses are free from that taint, the moderns also should not soil their hands with it. And if some great writers have occasionally indulged in undesirable writing it is because of necessity, *i. e.*, to relieve the tedium of sententious moralising. Scrutiny

will reveal that in both these arguments Mr. Siddiqi is playing into the hands of the opponent, who will justly retort that he openly refuses to be bound down by the tradition and the practice of earlier writers. Tradition, the opponent will say with some justification, is no authority and he may add that if tradition, which is after all only hardened convention, is going to restrict his freedom, he will have nothing to do with it.

But obscenity in literature has to be opposed not because it is contrary to the practice of earlier writers or because it goes against the general tenor of the great literatures of the world, but because the accepted practices and conventions and traditions have sound reasons behind them, because obscenity is an undesirable thing in itself. The defence of the advocates of such writing therefore has to be met with a more shattering refutation than a mere appeal to past practice. That refutation is to be found in the unquestionable need for a sane and moral outlook in literature as in life.

The defenders of this undesirable kind of writing generally argue in two ways. They say firstly that literature which has its roots in life and aims at its accurate portrayal cannot be properly so called if some aspects of it are to be deliberately avoided simply because those aspects happen to be ugly reminders of class prejudice and social selfishness; that literature must encompass the whole of life, cruel as well as kind, beautiful as well as ugly. That is what is meant when it is argued that if writers can expatiate upon temples and mosques there is nothing that should make writing about the houses of sin taboo as is commonly claimed.

Secondly, on the side of method, if realism is good and necessary, it is good and necessary either way, *i. e.*, for the description of what is wholesome as well as of what may not be wholesome. There can be nothing wrong, they argue, in a writer's dwelling on the uglier aspects of life. What is obscenity after all? they ask, and answer that it is a prudish concept of a self-devised and self-righteous code of moral right and wrong which makes a thing obscene or its opposite purely on the strength of personal predilections. Since the progressivist trend in contemporary literatures has always been to question accepted standards of judgment and facilely to place all responsibility for social evils on the conservative elements in a community, these writers believe that a literature which flinches at the exposure of unwholesome things is not literature at all but only idle romantic escapism. Thus with presumptuous arrogance and false philosophy they start on an expedition towards, not life, but hell on earth.

Let us admit at once that literature has to deal with the entirety of life which is ugly as well as beautiful. The case of those who would devote their talents and energies to descriptions of unpleasant aspects of life could readily be allowed if literature could be utterly divorced from ethical implications. Not that every piece of writing always is or must be actuated by deliberate motive or virtuous purpose, but it cannot be denied that every piece of writing is the expression of its author's outlook. Consciously or unconsciously, that outlook implies values in life which invest literature with what significance it has for life. The moral

validity of that outlook, therefore, in respect of its effect and influence upon the ordinary reader, is a vastly significant factor which goes a long way in earning for that writing the judgment of the discriminating public which will also be the judgment of posterity.

Needless to say, literature is great to the extent that it has power in it to influence humanity towards what is ultimately good, beautiful and true. What goodness or truth or beauty can one find in an orgy of perverted sex relations which cannot but be unhealthy, in the squalor and the wretchedness of brothels which cannot but fill one's mind with disgust? It may be asked whether, just because those aspects of life are unhealthy and wretched and disgusting, we are to shut ourselves away from them in complacent virtue, in literature as in life, and leave the sufferers to their misfortune? No. But a vital distinction has to be made. If a particular author is unquestionably moved by the social injustice which makes the wretchedness and the squalor possible and also has in him the ardour and the necessary constructive outlook, helpful in remedying the unfortunate state of affairs, then perhaps, he will be entitled to attempt the theme. But even then, he need not keep in his shop window all that may be unbeautiful if he can achieve his purpose by suggestion and allied literary devices. An author, just for the reason that the cesspool is a dirty reality in life and that therefore literature has to reckon with it, need not dive into its depths and lay before his audience all that he comes across in his misdirected expedition. It is not merely unnecessary but positively dangerous, as much for the reader as

for the writer himself. The question, therefore, is always one of motive as well as of method. The pure motive is its own justification for handling the theme and devises its own methods. But the method must always be governed by the strictest needs of the situation; that deserves to be emphasized. Suggestion, restraint and reticence must be the writer's watchwords. That is how writings like Alexander Kuprin's *Yama the Pit* escape being obscene despite their relentless realism of detail.

The issue may further be clarified with particular reference to one aspect of life which has provided the ground of difference between the traditionalists and the progressives and that is the troubled question of the treatment of sex in literature. Naturally sex has been a subject which has enticed many a young writer to dangerous pitfalls. Such a writer is always sure of popular appeal, since a large section of the reading population takes to reading as a means to while away an idle hour and such stuff makes absorbing reading.

Moreover, only a very small percentage is capable, spiritually speaking, of realising the harm which salacious writing can do to the reader's mind. Many, though convinced of the moral horror of turning inside out an aspect of life that gains beauty by reticence and restraint, are sure to be enslaved, for the moment at least, by the thrill and the excitement which such writing provides in ample measure. And whenever saner minds attack such writers it is usual to find them entrenching themselves behind the works of writers like D. H. Lawrence and James Joyce. Why, they demand, if works like the former's *Lady Chat-*

terley's Lover and portions of the latter's *Ulysses* can be not merely tolerated but acclaimed as great writing, should other writers who attempt to be equally bold and "realistic" have to face the critics' fire? The argument looks sound but is fallacious. Lawrence is a writer very easy to misunderstand and often misunderstood. One can say without hesitation that if a writer of obscene stuff can quote Lawrence in his defence, he is doing injustice to himself and also to Lawrence.

This is not the place to enter into an explanation of Lawrence's philosophy of sex or the motives which actuated his most discussed novels and stories. But none will deny that Lawrence's was a crusade against an intellectual hypocrisy that undervalued an important aspect of life. His novels and stories glow with the heat and light of his convictions. What strikes the reader there is not salaciousness but the travail of a tortured consciousness and a mind agonised by the beauty, the power and the mystery of sex. All Lawrence's writings are in one sense therefore *personal* and for those who do not agree with his convictions, on which he built his stories and novels, there will be little really interesting or valuable in the long run. Moreover, even Lawrence's philosophical outlook and his crusading ardour could not altogether justify his occasional violences and the temporary ban on some of his writings only indicated the danger

of going too far on the road he travelled. The road is dangerous not because it may get the author and the publisher into trouble but because of the increasing chances of one foul and perverted sensibility contacting and contaminating many others.

For the discriminating reader who can pick out the grain and discard the chaff there may be little harm, but to the inexperienced adolescent who is fascinated by sex and its attractions and who naturally depends upon books for his knowledge of such things, the danger is really incalculable. The baser side of it is more likely to occupy his mind and claim an attention which it does not deserve. When all the psycho-analytical jargon about the libido and the rest has not been able to explain away the mystery that surrounds sex, a perverted account of this fundamental relation is likely to create more disgust than awe, more ugliness than beauty. That is why it has been rightly said that books which, like Joyce's *Ulysses*, give the reader the impression that sex is grubby through and through are meanly blasphemous. The problem of obscenity in literature is the problem of literary hygiene with this difference, that in the case of an unclean book the contamination has the added danger of spreading simultaneously to vast populations. An obscene book is a universal peril.

V. M. INAMDAR

Bombay.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“_____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS

The release of Gandhiji from prison on the 6th of May is not a small and isolated happening; it is a major move of the world war, an event that may well have results more far-reaching than many a spectacular campaign. Lord Wavell by this act of justice, belated though it is, has won for the Allies a victory of outstanding importance on the moral front. It is a symbol, this release of Gandhiji, a symbol and a promise of ultimate release for India and also for the world.

Defeat after defeat upon the moral front has largely cancelled out for the Allied Nations their achievements on the well-fought field of battle in the sky as on the water and on land, on the Continent of Europe as among the scattered isles of the Pacific. Professions negatived in practice work against, not for, their makers. So an impregnable position morally must form the groundwork for a lasting victory by force of arms. The avowed defenders of Democracy staged a retreat that was far from being strategic when they locked up Gandhiji, who in the eyes of almost all the world stands as the Force of Peace personified. His good-will, which flows out to all, they could not alienate, but certainly they missed a golden opportunity in failing to secure the active friendship and co-operation of this great lover of his fellow-men and of the cause of liberty.

Now Gandhiji is sick. His very sickness is a symbol, too. For India is

sick; the world is sick—sick of coercion, sick of injustice, sick of violence. These sicknesses will never yield to homœopathy. *Similia similibus curantur* does not apply to moral sufferings. Justice alone can cure inequity; freedom, coercion; and compassion, hate.

Gandhiji's sickness is regretted far and wide. But the grounds of his release are less important than the fact that he at last is free. The man of Non-Violence is free now to advise, to instruct and to inspire, his country first and then—through India's heeding of his words—a war-sick world.

“Democracy is for the unafraid,” proclaims Chester B. Hines in the Winter 1944 *Common Ground*. Fear, he declares, leads people to be cruel, vicious, furtive, dangerous, dishonest, malicious, vindictive. “They destroy the things of which they are afraid, or are destroyed by them.”

Dictators are afraid; Mr. Hines points out that their attempts to enslave the world are an expression of that fear.

Only cowards seek to destroy “minority” groups, courageous people are not afraid of them.

The cowardly few are not dangerous in themselves. But fear is alarmingly infectious. Mr. Hines finds frightening the spreading of fear, among white people, of those of darker skins. They are beginning to realise how greatly they are outnumbered by the darker

peoples and a fear that has been largely subconscious is breaking out.

Dedicating life to the proposition of upholding the superiority of one's own race is a barren calling. The white race has long dominated and exploited other races. Is not the professed "fear" of those races largely fear of having to give up that exploitation? The notion of supremacy and the claim to prestige are hard to lay aside. But

when the white man banishes his fear, he will banish with it all the bugaboos of race; and he himself will for the first time be free.

In "Ethical Revaluations," the editorial in *The Ethical Societies Chronicle* for March, Mr. A. D. Howell Smith recalls Emerson's dictum that in moral science we are still only "at cock-crowing and the morning star." Conventional taboos, differing with place and time, hedge all men in and discrimination is needed between the meaningless and the significant. Mr. Smith overlooks the Ariadne's thread of universality which can lead us out of the labyrinth—that single system of morality which all great teachers have proclaimed. Great men have taught us morals; their pigmy successors, manners.

Mr. Smith recognises the imperative of conscience, ignoring which lowers our moral tone and dims our moral vision and heeding which tends to our moral betterment and clarity. But he insists that "we cannot really achieve morally for ourselves unless we achieve morally for others.

Our involution in the lives of others is such that nobody can escape responsibility for social evils, though the scope of such responsibility must vary from person to person.

Individual morality is total. Without all-round moral advance, isolated virtues carried to exaggeration become vices. Thrift overdone too often has degenerated into miserliness, courage into foolhardiness, generosity into prodigality, kindness into sentimental mushiness.

The good man who can see no farther than his own moral rectitude may be a public menace,

and often the more sincere and persistent his goodness the more extensive is his power for mischief. Good Pope Innocent III was a greater danger to morality itself than immoral Pope Alexander VI, whose vices injured far fewer people than the other's fanatical virtues.

That the mind of the scientist plays an important part in controlling the behaviour of the variable factor he may be observing is suggested by the findings at Duke University at Durham, N. C., in the U. S. A. An article which John J. O'Neill contributed to the *New York Herald Tribune* for 27th February reports the findings of Dr. J. B. Rhine and his associates which seem to point that way. Experiments with extra-sensory communication or telepathy and extra-sensory perception or clairvoyance both seemed to justify belief in human powers beyond those recognised by modern physical science. From these they have gone on to tests of precognition and psychokinesis, or mental control of an event as it is happening. Statistically valid and scientifically acceptable results are claimed to have been achieved in both, though doubtless many substantiating experiments lie between these and general acceptance of the findings. If the scientist's mind does, as suggested, affect his experiment, the fact would go far to explain the baffling but

not uncommon phenomenon of a single investigator's getting results that seem *bona fide* but fail to be confirmed by subsequent investigation which follows his technique.

More important still, the results of the Duke University experiments, Mr. O'Neill suggests, may make personal immortality scientifically plausible.

If the mind is different from the physical brain system, it could have a different destiny, could perhaps be independent, separable, unique.... Is it not then provocative, to say the least, to discover certain capacities of mind that appear to operate beyond the boundaries of space and time within which our sensorial, bodily system has to live and move? Here surely, if ever, "hope sees a star."

The claim is often put forward that the universal and impartial nature of scientific inquiry promotes human collaboration and human understanding above the narrow distinctions of nation and race. Dr. Curt Stern in an article "The Journey, Not the Goal" in *The Scientific Monthly* for February admits that this is little more than a pious hope. The international congresses, he says, offer proof of the possibilities of co-operation as also of the fact of its absence. More than fifty different nations join in discussion and diversion and the hope of civilised co-operation seems materialising. Yet, when it comes to questions such as upholding national prestige, choosing the next venue of the congress, etc., narrow nationalism too often is to the fore.

That is not the whole picture, as Dr. Stern admits. Side by side with pettiness at such sessions goes the expression of sincere sentiments of desire for general human understanding and mutual help in all civilised

endeavour. National jealousies and honest joining of hands go together. Perhaps it is the little men who stand upon prestige. Certainly, as Dr. Stern observes,

The comradeship of the great has always disregarded artificial boundaries of space and even those of time.

The relation of alcohol to traffic accidents as well as to physical fitness is engaging increasing attention in the West. *The National Temperance Quarterly and Medical Review* (London) for February reports a special course offered last summer by Yale University in the U. S. A. on some of the modern scientific findings in relation to beverage alcohol. From that country also comes the report of an examination of 100 drivers involved in traffic accidents, in which alcohol was found in the blood of 46.6 per cent. A check test of 100 drivers stopped on the road showed no alcohol in the blood of 87.9 per cent.

This bears out the point made by Major Thomas Macleod, O.B.E. (late of the R.F.C. and R.A.F.) in a lecture reported in the same issue. He emphasised the cumulative action of alcohol and its effect on the accuracy of visual judgment, upon which traffic safety, on the roads or in the air, so largely depends. In concluding he urged

that in the post-war world when speed will be an increasingly accepted factor it was even more imperative that the human factor should be more dependable, and that human dependability could not be reconciled with the inefficiency produced by the drink habit.

The great need for an adequate indigenous pharmaceutical industry has been underlined by the situation brought about by the war. Many important medicines are unavailable or

procurable only at prices beyond the reach of the ordinary man. India with her wealth of medicinal plants should not be thus at the mercy of circumstances beyond India's control. The Fourth All-India Pharmaceutical Conference which met at Calcutta on April 8th and 9th urged upon the Government the taking of all necessary steps to make India self-sufficient with regard to all essential drugs.

Interesting in this context is Vice-President Wallace's vigorous condemnation a few months ago of the exploitation of physical suffering. In a speech at Chapel Hill, N. C., on the 12th of December 1943, he declared that the coming peace

must smash for all time international monopolies on vital medicines and other elements necessary for fighting disease. Power to condemn millions of people to suffering because they cannot buy health at monopoly prices must be eliminated. We must not allow special privileges here or abroad to stand in the way of the struggle against disease.

A mistake of many to whom the idea of a vegetarian diet appeals is to rush into vegetarianism without adequate study of dietetics or the provision of the necessary protein elements to take the place of meat. When they fall ill too often vegetarianism is blamed instead of their own unwisdom.

Few men have done more than the late Dr. John Harvey Kellogg not only to popularise a meatless diet in the West but to make it safe. The meat substitutes such as peanut butter and protose which he invented in his long life of over ninety years have helped make Battle Creek famous throughout the world.

The January issue of *Good Health*, the official organ of the Race Betterment

Foundation which he formed, reports an interesting point in connection with his discovery of the process of preparing cereal flakes.

Experiment after experiment had proved unsuccessful. One morning when he awoke, after a particularly discouraging series of experiments the night before, he felt sure that the difficulty was solved. He declared that his subconscious mind had worked out the formula while he slept. He went to the kitchen, prepared some wheat and put it through a roller... While he turned the crank, an assistant scraped off the flakes with a large knife and placed them in the oven to bake. The result was as fine flakes as have ever been made since. This was the beginning of the breakfast food industry.

A wealth of garnered folk-wisdom finds expression in the old saying: "Give a dog a bad name and he'll earn it." The great German conductor Bruno Walter amplifies it in a letter to his fellow-exile Thomas Mann, which the latter quotes in *The New York Times Magazine* for 19th March. The comment was inspired by Thomas Mann's radio broadcast to the German people. The sixty-seven-year-old maestro writes:—

I am particularly moved, of course, by the belief in and appeal to the better side of the German people, which inspire these talks. I fancy I know something of education. I know that my second bassoonist will play better if convinced that I believe he can. There is no surer way of making a man thoroughly bad than by telling him that he is hopeless. However depraved the majority of Germans may be, summary condemnation makes so many Hitlers of them. We could shorten the war, prepare the peace and pave the way for a new and better Europe by a solemn declaration of our faith in a better Germany.

The psychology is sound, the warning apt.