

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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GREAT IDEAS

[Gandhiji's assassination has naturally taken people's minds to the heroic death of Socrates, who was given the hemlock in 399 B.C. Between the teachings on non-violence of the two Martyrs, there is a resemblance. The scholarly world is generally agreed that Socrates was born in this month of June. It is appropriate, therefore, to reprint here the following from Plato's great dialogue entitled "Crito."—ED.]

Socrates: Again, Crito, may we do evil?

Crito: Surely not, Socrates.

Soc.: And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the morality of the many—is that just or not?

Cr.: Not just.

Soc.: For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?

Cr.: Very true.

Soc.: Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another, when they see how wide-

ly they differ. Tell me, then, whether you agree with and assent to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premiss of our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For this has been of old and is still my opinion; but, if you are of another opinion, let me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind as formerly, I will proceed to the next step.

Cr.: You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind.

Soc.: Then I will proceed to the next step, which may be put in the form of a question: Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or ought he to betray the right?

Cr.: He ought to do what he thinks right.

THE CASE FOR THE PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

[Prof. H. D. Bhattacharya, who makes out here a strong case for the modern world's need for philosophy, has for many years headed the Department of Philosophy at Dacca University, where he is Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Provost of Jagannath Hall. He presided over the Lucknow Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1944 and has been President (1945-1947) of the Indian Psychological Association. He is undertaking editing work for a new and revised edition of *The Cultural Heritage of India* for the Ramakrishna Mission.—ED.]

It would be idle to deny that Philosophy is still regarded in many quarters as equivalent to obscurantism, undue optimism or else calm resignation, flight from reality, unpracticality (sometimes to a ludicrous extent) and indifference to worldly happenings. Coupled with these in the popular concept are the ungainly features of intellectual conceit, social aloofness or shyness, excessive introversion and incapacity to understand and appreciate the beauties of nature and the values of social existence. With his head always in the clouds and dabbling in things unseen, the philosopher has no eye for the events that constitute the process of the universe or the elements that go to the making of nature and its variegated show. Unnecessarily sceptical about matters of fact and unduly dogmatic about things supersensible, cautious and critical to a degree, raising a dust and then complaining that he cannot see, a philosopher is an object of pity, if not of scorn. Where a robust faith would have been a

blessing and enabled him to adjust himself to his physical and social environment, the canker of doubt and disbelief saps his strength of mind and makes him hesitant and ineffective.

All these limitations follow, it is urged, from a mistaken sense of personal capacity. A wholesome conviction that there are limits to human knowledge and even to human presumption would have curbed much useless thinking and needless speculation. If philosophers had possessed the humility of Socrates and taken pride, not in their ability to know all things, but in their knowledge that they did not know, they would have been spared much futile thought and they would have concentrated more on the practical side of human existence and devoted themselves to social good. To be an *ignoramus* does not mean to be an *ignorabimus*—to try to gain the utmost knowledge within permissible limits may involve a tacit belief that certain spheres are beyond the boundaries of knowledge but it does

not necessarily betoken an attitude of despair regarding the possibility of knowing anything at all. Just as a child knows much less than an adult and yet knows something, so also we may gain greater insight into the nature of things as we advance in civilisation; but to this we must tag on a proviso that human capacity has its limits and omniscience is for ever denied to man. When, therefore, the philosopher claims to be the spectator of all times and places and arrogates to himself absolute knowledge, he is forgetting his own finitude—with that initial ignorance he is attempting to pose as omniscient. A salutary sense of human limitation is the only corrective of that supercilious attitude which is responsible for the contempt into which philosophy has been brought by its professors.

It is indeed true that a distinction can be drawn in this regard between those who make extravagant claims on behalf of human capacity and those who acknowledge its limitations. Those that thought that men were only a little lower than the angels and were made in the image of God naturally extolled their reasoning capacity and believed that the gate of all knowledge was open to the persistent knocker. According to them, mysteries existed only to be solved. The classic taste refused to admit that Reality was not rationally articulated or that human reason was not governed by the principles that ruled the articulations of Reality. Once, therefore, we got

an insight into the nature of the operation of our own reason we should know the nature of things absolutely, for both were identical in their essential character. Man was himself a sample of reality—he could find within himself all the information he wanted regarding the nature of reality. No wonder, therefore, that some philosophers should have built up a world-system by a close analysis of their own thought-system. Ignoring Bacon's warning that Nature was to be interpreted and not anticipated, they laid down certain *a priori* rules which they were confident Reality would follow in its evolution and articulation. They thus went to the length of enunciating a philosophy of nature based on *a priori* speculations in the fond hope that since Reality was governed by rational principles it was bound to conform to the laws of human thinking. Unfortunately for them, Reality refused to follow their neat scheme, the contingent and the irrational claimed equal share with the necessary and the rational in its operation, and the obvious limitations of human knowledge were forcibly brought to the cognisance of philosophers. Poetry has its own place in the scheme of human learning, but it cannot take the place of science which deals with hard facts. So also the philosophies of Plato and Spinoza, Śankara and Hegel are delightful in their daring characterisation of the nature of the Ultimate; but to hope that they would tally with facts as observed by us or en-

able us to guide our lives in this stern world of facts would be fatuous.

The other class of philosophers, therefore, attempt to keep closer to facts and start with the assumption that men are a little above the beasts and that, just as in animals the element of reason is very much at a discount, so also in men sense is far more important than reason in determining the nature of things. Woe unto him who forsakes the sensible in favour of the supersensible! There would have been much less bickering and much less bootless quest of truth if philosophers had been more modest and recognised their affinity with the beasts which live by their senses and are guided by their instincts and impulses. Let us confess that the only essences of things are their character-complexes—the groups of qualities revealed to our senses, and let us not pry into the hidden nature of things which is for ever beyond our gaze. Plato complained of worldly people as only playing with shadows—let us confess that these shadows are the only substances that we can know. Let us take pride in the fact that, starting as animals, we are able to look before and after, to conserve our past and to anticipate our future. That we have been able to go beyond biological heredity and establish a social heritage is an achievement of which we, as human beings, can be legitimately proud.

By discovering laws, forming concepts and planning ideals man has outstripped the entire animal creation and in a way conquered the ravages of time.¹ But in this he has not pretended to go beyond experience in any true sense, nor has he claimed to have reached the stage of finality or necessity in any of his conclusions. Probability is still the guide of his conduct and harmonious living the ideal of his existence. The adjustment of internal relations to external ones is, as Spencer pointed out long ago, the objective of all knowledge and action. It is obvious that there is scope for relativity in this procedure, for the environment may change and the animal may evolve new powers—in both cases a reorientation would be needed to regain the lost harmony. Life has to be run on pragmatic considerations though the instrument of adjustment will naturally vary according to the stage of evolution and the kind of environment to which adjustment is desired.

The Philosopher's case is that this admission is to be pushed relentlessly to its end. Even admitting that things sensible form the touchstone of reality, scientists themselves, who have slavishly followed the empirical or experiential method of enquiry, have been impelled by the necessities of their own logical thinking to transcend the sensible and to discuss things supersensible. Our

¹ See the writer's presidential address before the Indian Philosophical Congress, Lucknow, 1944, on "Conquering Time." (*The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XX, No. 3, October, 1946)

astronomical beliefs are not in line with our sense-experiences—the size, position and date of the luminaries of heaven are astronomically, not visibly, fixed. Things in the gross seldom give an accurate idea of the ultimate constitution of the universe; in any case they are not self-explanatory. Mathematics is playing an increasingly important rôle in the determination of the nature of things, even though it has meant a jettisoning of much in them that is of great human value. Sound, colour, taste, smell, temperature and all the other secondary qualities that make up the enjoyable aspects of nature disappear in the process of mathematical treatment, and even touch has no meaning in the subatomic, or even the atomic, world, though extension is supposed to persist somehow as an assumption or a presupposition.

What space is in itself science is not interested in, or capable of, discussing—that also leaves a case for philosophy. Time that makes process possible and similarity of configuration, without which no comparison or generalisation could have been made and no laws of any being established, are taken for granted, or as a matter of course, by the scientist. The *why* of these things is beyond the scope of his enquiry. Similarly, the *whence* and the *whither* of things do not interest him—he is interested merely in the *how* of the world process. As for the *what*, he takes the seeming of things at their face value until forced by the ne-

cessities of thought to enquire into their being: to him appearances and essences are identical and substantiality can be reduced without remainder into its qualities, and qualities are dependent upon relations, *e.g.*, the rose appearing as red to the eye, soft to the touch, fragrant to the nose, etc., of a being endowed with sense-organs similar to those of men.

What relations are in themselves; how and why things get related or whether they were always related and, if so, why; whether being related they become something other than themselves are rather recondite questions. Similarly difficult is the problem of the constant grouping of qualities which leads us to postulate an underlying substance holding them together. As usual, the scientist quietly assumes these facts without caring to explain them. The fact of knowledge, for instance, causes no headache to him although philosophers have been sorely exercised over the problem as to how mind can know matter and what exactly is revealed of matter when we have a sensation. They have even gone to the length of suggesting that perhaps in the last analysis mind and matter are not two opposed substances facing each other but opposite poles into which an aboriginal experience, which is neither mental nor physical, breaks itself. The philosopher has attempted to establish an organic connection between different types and orders of experience and to explain their

etiology.

The philosopher has done something more. Seeing that in every field the sensible fails to be self-explanatory, the philosopher has been obliged to assume the existence of the supersensible, not in the sense in which scientists understand the term but in the sense of some ultimate principle which gives the sensible its meaning and existence. If the botanist or the zoologist feels that the physico-chemical forces do not sufficiently explain the phenomena of life, he has to assume that life is a different category from matter. If he finds later that life at its higher stages begins to be accompanied by mind, he admits the independent character of mind. But why matter should be transcended by life and life by mind and whether matter without an impulse towards life and mind ever existed in reality or whether an immanent or pervasive presence is pushing things towards a better organised and more valuable system the scientist, if he restricts himself to the domain of science, does not feel impelled to ask. Is the world process an aimless wandering of material elements in the course of which integrations and disintegrations take place but no end is aimed at or achieved? Or do all changes and movements imply an imperfection in the world-order to be remedied in time by better organisation, surer guidance, and pursuit of an ultimate objective?

It is obvious that these philosophic quests supervene upon scien-

tific endeavours and light upon unexpected problems. Why being rather than non-being? Why becoming rather than mere being? Why evolution rather than mere becoming or change? Who will answer all these obstinate questionings of the soul? It is not claimed that the answers that the philosophers have given to many of the problems raised by them have been either uniform or satisfactory; but in philosophy the raising of a problem where none seemed possible or necessary is a greater achievement than the finding of an answer. Whether the world could be reduced to mere ideas or even to illusions, or whether space, time, causality, substance, etc., could be regarded as impositions of the human mind upon the manifold of sensibility, or whether Space and Time could be hyphenated into a single Space-Time, or whether the world could be claimed to be necessary in the life of God as God in that of the world—these and kindred speculations certainly challenge the complacent attitude of the ordinary man, and the scientist is similarly startled to learn that “conservation of energy” is an *a priori* category of thought depending upon the inability of the mind to bring being and non-being into agreement by supposing that being could cease to be and that non-being could pass into being, or that no transmission of energy is possible from one object to another, as that would involve keeping energy without a support for an infinitesimal point of time as

it jumps from one object to another, which is impossible, or that the ultimates of science are only fictions or postulates of the mind, and not realities at all.

But there is not only an intellectual but also an emotional significance in the philosophic approach to a problem. We are more interested in individuals than in groups, more in groups than in communities, more in communities than in humanity at large and more in mankind than in animal creation. The greater the range of our sympathy the more dispassionate do we become in our valuations of the immediate and the individual. Things get valued against the background of the whole and against the whole of space and time, and thus a revaluation or even a transvaluation of all values takes place in the philosophic mind. As the emotional entropy reaches its maximum and all things become equal to the philosopher, he becomes detached; thus he gains equanimity and detachment through sameness of attitude to all things. He is not elated by success or depressed by failure; to him misery in one part of the world is equivalent to that in

any other part, including his immediate neighbourhood. The renunciation that the Yatis (wandering mendicants) practised was born of detachment from localities and personalities. The stoical indifference to personal pleasure and pain, the endeavour to go beyond good and evil and extreme sensitiveness to the misery of any creature both proceed from the spirit of detachment from and sameness with all creatures, including oneself. The first person singular number has been the greatest obstacle in the way of realising impartiality and indifference—to know this self and its failings, to cultivate the art of self-discipline, to practise self-expansion on a cosmic scale through sympathy and service, and to make others, with whom the self is identified, understand themselves through precept are some of the objectives of a philosophic mind. To discover and disseminate life's meaning and life's ideals in the context of the whole and to present a blue print of reality on which men might plan their lives may be said to sum up the philosophic approach to the universe.

H. D. BHATTACHARYA

A NATURALIST LOOKS AT SIN AND REDEMPTION

[The plea for harmlessness which the American naturalist **Dr. Alexander F. Skutch** makes is in line with the best thought in India, ancient and modern. The Buddha put succinctly the thesis here presented, some 2500 years ago. In the "Canto of Flowers" in the *Dhammapada* we read: "Just as a bee, having collected honey, flies away, in no wise injuring the colour or the fragrance of the flower, so let a Muni (Sage) dwell in his village."

This essay throws new light upon the cryptic saying in the *Book of Job*: "For thou shalt be in league with the stones of the field; and the beasts of the field shall be at peace with thee." Right use but not abuse of Nature's bounty must be the way to harmony and sympathy between man and his younger brothers in the lower kingdoms. The abjuring of cruelty in our dealings with them, ending the blood-sports which rightly our author strongly condemns, would not only betoken greater reverence for life, it would also be a step towards greater justice and mercy towards our fellow-men.—ED.]

The sense of sin, or the feeling of inherent guilt in living, has troubled many of the most devout and pious of men. The Hebrew theologians invented a myth to explain the origin of sin, but to the student of Nature it seems sufficiently obvious without any myth. It is simply that no creature can exist without doing harm to other living creatures. This is the essence of sin, and so long as we continue to live we cannot escape it.

Daily we destroy living beings to serve as the food without which we must perish. We do least evil in this direction when we eat fruits, which are made to be eaten; they are the plant's enticement or reward to those who disseminate its seeds, and fail of their purpose unless they are eaten. But even if we could limit our diet strictly to fruits, the

world is so full of hungry mouths that in eating fruits we deprive other creatures that need them, thereby doing harm to living beings—which is sin. And when we kill to eat, our sin is so much the greater.

Not only in filling our insatiable stomachs do we sin. The warmer parts of the earth so teem with life that we can hardly take a step without crushing or maiming the ant and the worm—the devout of certain religious sects of India always carry a broom and sweep the way before themselves, to avoid trampling the humble beings that swarm in the dust. The lamp by whose light I write attracts many a small winged being that foolishly quenches its tiny life in the flame. The land that I occupy, the fields that I sow, were taken away from wild creatures that as prior occupants had a better right

to them. And, since competition is always keenest between the members of the same species, each of us occupies a place in the world that but for us would be taken by some other man, who might well make better use of it than ourselves.

In the sense in which we now use the term, even plants are sinners. Hardly one of them attains any considerable stature without crowding out, overshadowing and starving for light or water other seedlings which had started hopefully to grow up beside it, and might have displayed their blossoms in the sunlight if the ruthless competitor had been absent. Each larger tree must count by hundreds or thousands the poor victims of its spreading boughs, which have deprived them of the light that is the life of green things. Perhaps the only plants which exist without sin are those of extreme hardihood which grow high up in the mountains on the edge of the eternal snows, where nothing else can survive. Yet even here it is likely that a number of seeds fell into the same crevice in the rock, where there was room for only one or two to reach their full development; and the hardier ones crowded out their weaker neighbours.

Thus neither we nor any other creature can exist without daily and hourly committing the kind of sins that all our best moral teachings and all our laws are directed against—injury to our neighbours, which in the larger sense are all other living

things. This is the original and ineluctable sin. Is there no redemption from it?

To a naturalist, it seems that the only redemption from the sin inherent in living is through becoming something more noble, more worthy to exist, than those other beings which we must deprive of life in order to continue to live ourselves. Unfortunately we have only our own human and fallible standards of what is worthy and noble; yet we must make use of the best we have, with the faith that these standards spring from the depths of Life itself.

Consider a great tree with massive trunk and wide-spreading boughs, which imparts majesty to the whole landscape, seeming to gladden the earth with its presence; which offers a grateful shade for men and beasts and birds, and safe concealment for their nests amidst its foliage; which at the due season brightens all the surrounding area with its blossoms, and later satisfies many a hungry mouth with the largess of its fruitage; whose massive limbs provide firm support for many a graceful fern and many a bright-flowered orchid plant. We know that as it grew up and spread out its branches the great tree unavoidably overshadowed and suppressed neighbouring saplings and plants of other kinds, yet we feel that, in being the kind of tree it is, it has in large measure expiated the crimes inherent in its manner of growth and development.

Consider a bird brilliant in plumage and melodious in song, that delights the eye and soothes the ear, that brings life and joyous movement into the the woodland which without it would be solitary and gloomy. We know that to sustain life the bird must each day devour a great number of hapless insects and other small creatures; yet we feel that the bird is so much more beautiful, so much nobler than its victims, that by being such a bird it redeems itself of the sins which it must continue to commit so long as it lives.

Men, with their extensive and varied requirements of food, raiment, housing, transportation and entertainment, must come into competition with a great variety of other living beings as well as with each other. The most considerate and the gentlest of them can hardly avoid being great sinners against their fellow creatures. Even the hermit in his lonely cell can scarcely live free of sin. We cannot hope to become majestic in stature and fruitful like a tree, or so beautiful and songful as a bird. To redeem ourselves from sin we must strive first for intellectual and moral nobility, "to become beautiful in the inner man," as Socrates expressed it. We must pass through life diffusing good-will and kindness to all creatures rather than hate and destruction. So in a measure we can compensate for the evils inseparable from our mode of life. The redeemed soul of man is as a beacon of truth and gentleness and intellectual

light amidst the rude unheeding forces of the universe.

From a more material aspect, there is much that we can do to mitigate the injustices we must commit against other living creatures in order to survive ourselves. If we would eat, we can hardly avoid clearing the land, destroying the original vegetation, and driving out, for eventual destruction, the animals that long dwelt upon this land. We can in part expiate this sin against Nature by so treating our land that we conserve and even augment its fertility, so that it may support more living beings than previously; but if we abuse and wear out good soil, our sin is unmitigated and beyond redemption.

We need lumber for our dwellings and public edifices and sin against the forest to obtain it. If we ruin and destroy the forest in our lumbering operations our crime is past all pardon; but if we cut with moderation and good judgment, so that the woodland may continue to produce timber and perhaps even produce it at a rate greater than in its natural state, we atone for our sin against Nature.

Where we set our houses we make a little desert of an area where formerly wild creatures dwelt happily; but we can compensate for our misdeed by surrounding our dwellings with trees and shrubbery that provide food and shelter for the birds. Although we cannot live without committing misdeeds, we

can do much to compensate for them and to relieve ourselves of their oppressive weight.

To participate in any sport or amusement which inevitably causes pain and suffering is a sin for which I see no redemption. A recent report estimates that during the past hunting season in the United States of America five million water-fowl were left crippled—in addition to about four times that number killed. Is it not pathetic to know that in a country which enjoys greater resources of food, and amusements more extensive and varied than any other people has ever known, multitudes of men spend their leisure in a way that causes so stupendous a total of misery and suffering? One wonders that the hunter can enjoy his supper and his sleep for thinking of the creatures which must pass through many days of agony to pay for his few hours of rough pleasure. The truth is that he does not think. No thoroughly cultured man has ever hunted for sport. Many whom the world accounts wise and good have been hunters, but there have been great deficiencies in their education and tremendous blind areas in their spiritual horizon.

To live justly calls for cultivation of both the head and the heart—for exact knowledge as well as right feeling. To manage our agricultural lands, our forests and our waters so that they will yield us the things indispensable for life, without becoming impoverished, requires a vast

amount of scientific investigation. To deal fairly with our non-human neighbours we must understand their habits and their feelings a great deal better than we do, and such understanding can be won only through patient observation and clear thinking.

But it is not enough to pile up scientific data. We need at the same time to train ourselves and our children in just and wholesome attitudes. We must have high ideals and liberality of spirit and the wisdom to value things of the spirit above material wealth. Without the correct attitude, increase in scientific knowledge may increase rather than diminish our sin—as in our own times we have seen happen on a tremendous scale. Although our need for more extensive and exact scientific information in many fields is great, our present need for cultivation of the spirit is far more pressing.

The doctrine which we here expound is, like so many others, capable of being “twisted by rogues to make a trap for fools.” Let no man set forth on a career of aggrandizement, of exploitation of his neighbours or ruthless destruction of Nature, in the delusion that he is making of himself something so great and noble, or so useful to his fellow-men, that he thereby redeems himself from the sins he is committing on so vast a scale. The probability is that such a man, far from having a noble, generous and lovable spirit, is of a mean and selfish character

which, if successful in his sordid schemes, he will attempt to conceal beneath spectacular acts of charity. Living as humbly and unobtrusively

as we can, we shall find it sufficiently difficult to balance our accounts with Life.

ALEXANDER F. SKUTCH

SPORT AND NEW INDIA

Cricket fares ill at the hands of Shri J. C. Kumarappa in *Gram Udyog Patrika* for April. He calls it one of the trappings of imperialism and objects to its expense, to the claims it makes on time and effort and to the restriction of its benefits in exercise to the few. The desirability of encouraging indigenous recreations, rural sports, folk dances and periodical festivals, is as obvious as is the superiority of such wholesome types of entertainment over racing, gambling and even cinemas, in whose more or less demoralising company cricket finds itself in Shri Kumarappa's objection to the waste of scarce newsprint on pastimes.

We are in sympathy with his desire that India build up anew its requirements in amusements, but we would not out of hand reject a game because it is of foreign origin or even because some of its devotees have failed to practise moderation in it. Anything, however good, becomes objectionable if overdone. We would have the criterion in the choice of games not only that which will provide the greatest exercise to the most people, but that which will best subserve, as every human activity should subserve, the aim of the building of character and the elevation and strengthening of moral standards.

If cricket has done nothing else it has contributed a great deal to the moral tone of the race in its conception

of Fair Play. A dishonest or underhanded action "isn't Cricket." That unrelenting moral standard needs only to be applied in all directions to raise the tone of human conduct generally. Galsworthy, for example, wrote in 1923 that the greatest way in which the writer could ease the future was simply stated in the words "Fair Play."

At present, with, of course, many and distinguished exceptions, the Press in every country plays the game according to rules of its own which have too little acquaintance with those of Sport.

"We need," he wrote elsewhere, "a sort of universal sportsmanship," as the basis of a mood that, while competing keenly in things of the spirit as well as in sports, would put the material welfare of mankind first and of self second, "and we need that such a mood should be beyond and above all narrow national prejudice and partisanship."

Business men have as much as journalists to learn from organised sport, and every individual can make a nobler showing not only by following Fair Play in all his dealings but also by accepting defeat, if it comes, in a magnanimous spirit that turns it into moral victory; not whining excuses but congratulating—and meaning it—the opponent who played fair and won. Being "a good sport" means something praiseworthy in the West. It must do so in India as well.

ENDS AND MEANS

[It is an issue of the highest importance which **Shri G. R. Malkani**, Director of the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner, raises here. We agree with him in seeing an organic relation between ends and means in individual conduct. But that relation surely must subsist no less in the political and social fields. The greatest need today in world affairs, it seems to us, is to apply the highest ethical insights of individuals not only to relations between man and man but also to relations between nations and groups and between each and its constituent units. The Karma of collective action is no less a fact than what all recognise as action and reaction in individual life, and lasting harmony can rest only on justice and fair-dealing between groups as well as between individuals.—ED.]

Mahatma Gandhi had a philosophy of life which is widely accepted. One important principle of this philosophy is that if the end is good, the means also must be good. You cannot achieve a good end through means which are morally objectionable. After all, no end is good which involves for its achievement any violence to our higher moral nature. Internal freedom is more important than external freedom. If we are only particular about the means, the end will take care of itself. Good can never come out of evil, even as nectar cannot come out of poison.

This is a noble principle for the life of the individual. Virtue is its own reward. There is no end higher than virtue. But it is one thing to set up virtue as the only worthy end of life; it is another to suppose that a virtuous or good end cannot lend its character to the means employed to achieve it. It is possible to make no distinction between ends and means. Every action that we do, stands on its own ground, and

must be morally justifiable. One so acting can do no wrong, simply because *each action for him is an end in itself*. There is for him no question of any means to an end. But once we make the distinction, we cannot escape its implications.

What is an "end," and what are "means"? An end is that future state of being which we regard as intrinsically good, and which accordingly can inspire our action. The "means" are not regarded as intrinsically good, and they do not therefore inspire action. We do not act to achieve the means. We act only to achieve the end. In fact there can be different means to the same end, even as there can be different paths to the same goal. The paths may be longer or shorter, easier or more difficult; but when you have traversed them and reached the same end, the different paths make no difference to it. It is merely a matter of historical detail how you have got to the end. But the goal is the same. Even so for

the means you employ to an end.

But is the analogy quite correct? Is it not a fact that in human affairs it is the means that determine the character of the end, and that the means are not unimportant? If you proceed about your business in a non-violent manner, you achieve one kind of end, which is morally pure and noble. But if you proceed about your business in a violent manner, you achieve quite a different end, which is morally inferior and perhaps unworthy. Independence may be achieved through violence or through non-violence; but it is a morally different kind of independence that we achieve in each case.

In so far as this argument is correct, all that we have proved is that different ends are achieved through different means. If our end is A, we must employ the means X; if our end is B, we must employ the means Y,—which once again reduces itself to the problem of whether our end itself is good. It is the difference of ends that determines our means. If our end is good, the means must be likewise, for the simple reason that they are the means to *that end*. But if our end is bad, the means too must be, for the same reason. There is an organic relation between the end and the means. It is, however, the end that is all-important, not the means. It is the end that determines the means, not *vice-versa*. If our end is good, the means will take care of themselves.

But it may be argued that it is

the means that come first. The end is a later product. If, therefore, we are careful about the means, the end will take care of itself and is bound to be good. "Take care of the pence and the pound will take care of itself." We definitely differ from this view. Morally and logically speaking, *the end precedes the means*. What elicits action or inspires it is the end, not the means. The means follow the end, and are determined by it. All depends upon the kind of end we have in view. The provision of the necessities of life may be an end for all human beings. But it is not an end unconditionally. To the thief, the end is providing the necessities of life "through stealing or by any means whatsoever." To the honest man, it is providing the same necessities "through honest labour." *The end itself bears the imprint of the moral character of the person who works for it*. It is not open to the honest man to snatch or to grab. His end is already characterised by a certain moral quality.

If our argument is correct, all that we need choose carefully is our end. The means take care of themselves. They are subordinate to the end. This issue, however, does not arise in a pointed manner in the private life of a person. A person judges himself and is judged by others by the ends he sets himself to achieve, and those ends are hardly distinguishable from the means employed. There is a moral continuity in the whole process, and no moral judg-

ment takes either the one or the other exclusively into account.

It is in the political and social field that the issue becomes more pointed, and has given rise to some confusion. The ends of political life are not strictly moral ends, and a politician who would judge his actions by the standards of morality employed in his private life would be a disillusioned politician in the long run. For he does not know his business. He is a misfit. Society is a moral entity only in a transferred sense, *i. e.*, in as far as it is composed of moral individuals. The politician is not called upon to lead a moral life, in its narrow sense, in his public actions. He is simply called upon to provide certain *conditions* of moral life for the citizens of the State. The calculus which he employs is not *total good*, but *predominant good*. For this, he employs all the means which are appropriate in the circumstances. A politician must have a policy, a moral individual has no policy. A politician must be calculating, a moral individual is not calculating. A politician must know what to suppress and where to suppress. He must not blurt out everything that may be in his mind.

Political morality is in a different category altogether from private

morality. If a person like Mazzini, for example, is seeking refuge with a countryman of his, is not the latter morally correct if he speaks a falsehood to the enemies of his country, to put them off the track, and save the leader of his people? Politics is not an unmixed good. It is a question of compromise, and the acceptance of the lesser evil for the greater. There can be no politics in the Kingdom of Heaven.

The virtues of truth and non-violence are noble in the private life of an individual. But in the life of the nation what matters is the *end*, and the perception of the proper and the right means to achieve the end. Falsehoods may have to be countered by falsehoods, and violence by violence; and if a person, like Mahatma Gandhi, thinks that political life cannot be divorced from the standards of private life, the net result can only be the ruin of the nation. There is no politician but needs to calculate the amount of good against the amount of evil, and to have a policy which will achieve the greater amount of good for his country even if he has to adopt means which would appear morally undesirable if directed to private gain. *It is the end that justifies the means.*

G. R. MALKANI

ASIA AND WORLD PEACE

AN INTERVIEW WITH DR. ARTHUR UPHAM POPE

[**Dr. Arthur Upham Pope**, world-known authority on Persian Art and Chancellor of the Asia Institute at New York, an outgrowth of the American Institute for Persian Art and Archæology, visited India in behalf of his Institute and of cultural co-operation between India and America, early in 1948, lecturing in several cities. On February 29th, on the eve of flying back to America, he gave the representative of **THE ARYAN PATH** the interview which is reported here.—ED.]

Dr. Pope, tall, blue-eyed and white-haired American of distinguished scholarship and the bearing that goes naturally with it, had spoken in one of his lectures at Bombay on "World Unity and Cultural Individuality." "Would not the attempt to unite nations under a world government be foredoomed to failure unless individuals became world citizens?" he was asked.

People did have to become citizens of the world, he said, but they were inclined to that already. The difficulty came from Governments that thought that they had very different special interests to serve at the expense of somebody else. Such conflicts of interest precipitated the world into war. The one interest which the whole world had in common, Dr. Pope declared, was Peace. No smaller interest like commercial advantage or prestige should weigh for a moment against the necessity of world peace. And Asia had an important part to play in relation to it.

The Asia Institute, he said, was

interested in trying to reveal to America the richness, the beauty and the nobility—and also, where necessary, the deficiencies—of the whole of Asian cultural history. Asia was more than half the world in terms of population, and in terms of resources was destined possibly to be the most powerful part of the world. It was also the oldest. It was from Asia that the West had derived the essential elements of civilisation.

Knowing his views on the desirability of strengthening the cultural unity of Asia, Dr. Pope's caller asked whether the formation of an Asian bloc might not constitute a hindrance to world unity. He replied that the formation of a bloc would be unfortunate, perhaps, but closer union among the Asian countries was potentially more of a service to world unity. The counsel for peace which the countries of Asia would give in the United Nations would be a great contribution. United Asia was not against any one, he said, even potentially. True, Japan had been aggressive in the last war, but she

had learned aggression from the West, primarily from Germany, where their officers had gone in such numbers to study.

“United Asia means the development of sympathy, of tolerance and of co-operation. It means a strengthening of the basic principles of Asian life, which are all pacific and capable of application to more than immediate causes or interests. A united Asia may mean a reaffirmation in the world of the great principles of Buddhism, Christianity and Confucianism, all wise and beneficent philosophies which an antipathetic and quarrelsome world certainly needs.

“The more one knows of Asia, particularly of its artistic and other cultural achievements, the more one has to respect it and be profoundly grateful for it. Our spiritual traditions in the West are painfully meagre. They concern a few persons and a few incidents elaborated very largely, with an over-meticulous fidelity, whereas in India, China and Iran, the great religious traditions are exemplified in magnificent poetry, far surpassing in bulk and variety our religious poetry, in a greater variety of monuments and a far greater variety of legends and of myths, and various popular envisagements of the basic truths.”

There had been, Dr. Pope admitted, plenty of wicked, cruel people in Asia, plenty of massacres, etc., but by and large the dominant thinking of Asia and the vocations of its people were in behalf of right doing

and right thinking. “Asia knows that the ethical standard is indispensable to any good life, personal or national.”

Dr. Pope said that he was trying to raise money in this country to get some Indian professors sent to America to explain Indian art, philosophy, religion, history and languages with the authority possible only to great scholars born to the tradition. Indians in the last century had been led to look down upon their culture, by the Western attitude of superiority and complacency which the Westerners had even imposed upon the people of Asia, discouraging them, depriving them of their sense of dignity and worth, and depressing their morale. That, he said, was a dreadful kind of cultural dominance; it was the kind of thing that had to be corrected.

Asked his impression of India, Dr. Pope said, “Everything is better and more hopeful than I had thought. I strongly disapprove of people who sentimentalise about India without any understanding of its problems or its difficulties and who come to India expecting a Vedic Paradise. They are not very helpful. And in their disappointment they are apt to turn resentful. I found less of misery and more of happiness here than I had expected.

“Since I have been here, too, there has been a definite diminution of the artificial, useless and cruel tension.” This he thought due not only to Gandhiji but also to the basically ethical character of Indian

civilisation. "Gandhi could have appealed to Hitler, and what good would it have done? It would not have had the least effect. He would have been laughed at and spat upon. India responds to a great ethical and noble appeal. Therein lies the superiority of India, from which the world has much to learn."

On what basis could individuals unite for permanency, Dr. Pope was asked. Was culture enough? "Culture is a beginning, because it means mutual respect and admiration. It cultivates a sense of fraternity. It shows that our finest ideals are really held in common. And it is the enrichment and happiness that come from culture that we really want. Those are much more satisfactory values than money or power, and the more genuine the culture which people have, the wiser they ought to be. It does not always follow. There are cultivated people who are rascals and profligates and there are cultivated nations that are cynical and selfish, but we have to think in terms of the large trends."

And culture, he said, could be co-operative. The great problems in science and in history were best solved by people working together. Co-operation was always a great healer of divisions, as well as a great force for fraternisation. On the *Survey of Persian Art* in several mammoth volumes which he had edited (and to which, it may also be mentioned, he was the chief contributor), no less than seventy scholars of fourteen different countries had

collaborated. Beside the co-operation among scientists in making instruments of destruction we had to set the constructive co-operation in which the scientists of one country who had perfected some special technique or skill helped solve the problems put them by the scientists of other countries.

The truths common to all the different religions, he said, offered a great basis for union. "There is no essential conflict between any of the great religions. They all teach compassion, fraternity, discipline, devotion. None are free from superstition, and none are free from the basic error of misunderstanding what the essentials are. They will quarrel over the phrasing of a dogma or a ritual act which means nothing. They quarrel to the death over trivialities, whereas if they kept their eyes on the essentials there could be no quarrels."

Dr. Pope wanted support from Indians for the important work of his Asia Institute. From nothing, nineteen years ago, it had grown so that it now had property worth nearly a million dollars. And from 20 students it had grown in nineteen years to a large enrolment of students and a teaching staff of forty. The Asia Institute now had a chance to acquire the fourth largest library on Chinese culture in the world, one of 220,000 volumes, of which 35,000 were in European languages. They might, he hoped they would, be able to do it; the Asia Institute had been, he agreed, an adventure of faith

from the beginning. But the rapid growth had multiplied its problems. An increase of 50 per cent. in the enrollment, for example, meant an increase of 150 per cent. in the deficit.

The Asia Institute gave free public lectures, he said, and its Museum of Oriental Art, which covered four floors and had nearly twenty galleries, was open to the public. The Institute was building up a Lecture Bureau to enable it to send lecturers on Asian culture all over the country. It had exhibitions of the work of contemporary Indian artists for circulation throughout the United States; and an Information Bureau for the press, for institutions and for individuals was planned. Another new project, a co-operative one in which Indians were to collaborate, was a magazine on India, with articles by both Americans and Indians.

Asked whether he felt that his visit to India had been worth while from the point of view of the time and energy it had cost, he admitted that it had been rather costly in energy. "Whether I have contributed anything to Indian thinking, Indians will have to say, but I have got a great deal from it." He said that he had even found time to make some discoveries in regard to the influence which had been exert-

ed upon Indian culture by the culture of Persia. His caller mentioned that in ancient times Persia had been called Western India. He said that he knew it. Sind, he said, had been actually occupied by Persia off and on, for a period that had totalled nearly three hundred years.

Apropos of the work of the Indian Institute of Culture at Bangalore, mentioned by his caller but of which he had heard, that work being to try to bring the best in world culture to ordinary, fairly educated minds, he said that that Institute had a very interesting programme. He was sorry that limitations of time and energy had prevented his visiting it and making what contribution to it he could. It would not be surprising if its work expanded as time went on. Cultural work had to begin on every level. "I got a great thrill," he said, "out of seeing hundreds and hundreds of illiterate peasants from the villages flocking eagerly through the Museum at Baroda, and getting a sense of splendour that illumined their lives. In the Asia Institute we are trying to prepare scholars so that they can teach the people. Our task is to supply leaders and teachers.

"Perhaps we can correct the deformities and the distractions of Western civilisation by renewing filial respect and devotion to Asia, from which we came."

THE MEETING OF THE WATERS

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF EAST AND WEST IN THE MYSTERY OF THE GRAIL

[A symbol was well defined by Madame H. P. Blavatsky as "an embodied idea, combining the conception of the Divine Invisible with the earthly visible." The search for the deeper meaning of the Grail symbol, upon which so much of Western poetic, musical and artistic genius has spent itself down the years, has intrigued many. Believing that "there is a logos in every mythos, or a groundwork of truth in every fiction," we welcome the attempt made in this article, which we are publishing in two instalments, to trace the Grail symbol to its origins, thereby establishing another link in the chain binding East and West together.

Mrs. Hannah M. M. Closs is the author of several works of distinction, including *Art and Life*, *Tristan*, and *High Are the Mountains*, reviewed by Mr. Hugh I'Anson Fausset in our pages in May 1946. A sequel *And Sombre the Valleys* is to appear soon.—ED.]

II

Step by step, the affinities between ancient Indo-European concepts and the Grail spring into sharper focus. The land of immortality where every wish finds fulfilment, where the Gandharvas (one recalls the "bird" father of Ivonek and more particularly in this case Lohengrin) are in charge of the holy vessel—the sun, but perhaps also the moon (even as two vessels often appear in the Grail legend itself).

But the lance too finds its place, for Indra, who loots both sun and Soma, is described as wielding not only the thunder-bolt and the arrow but also the spear. He is accompanied by the Maruts, a swift-footed host of youths in gleaming armour who are often interpreted as the storm winds, but also like the Gandharvas as the spirits of the

dead.

It is natural that Jessie Weston refers to them with gusto as helpers of Indra who, freeing the waters, brought fertility on the land. In their traditional dance (represented in ritual mime by the priests) she sees indeed a germ of the folklore sword-dance and even prototypes of the Knighthood of the Grail. Certainly the rain-making capacity of Indra must have been of primary importance to the dwellers of the plains and it may be justifiable to build up, step by step, a theory of the Grail romance which centres round the Waste Land, though that aspect does not seem to exhaust the problem. As she herself admitted, in some versions of the Grail legend the theme of the Waste Land has lost its point, or, as in Wolfram

von Eschenbach's *Parzival* plays practically no part at all. But in the latter case, there appears, it is true, what may be the remnant of an original substitute. First, as she herself states, the very nature of Amfortas' wound whose sexual symbolism Wolfram in no way euphemizes, suggests a fertility motif which supports her theory. At the same time another point in Wolfram's description, and one that has caused great perplexity to scholars, namely, the treatment of the wound, may perhaps cast a yet clearer light on the subject.

The agony of Amfortas' wound was rendered most unendurable through frost. Now it appears that no less an authority than Hillebrandt held that at the time when the Vedic peoples inhabited a colder region, Indra must have been a Sun-God who *melted the frost* on the approach of Spring. Hence the strange idea of laying the spear (Indra's weapon) on Amfortas' wound to alleviate the agony attains some sort of sense, as the residue of ancient beliefs mingled with medieval alchemy and folk customs, a fact borne out by the allegations of Suhtschek (to whose theories we shall be referring later) to the effect that a similar ritual is practised by the natives of Sistan today in treating the plague.

Another image that has given rise to much speculation is that of the Fisher King. Admitting the possible

influence of Babylonian, Semitic, Christian and Hellenistic legend, it seems that striking affinities may nevertheless be drawn between the Grail Fisher and Indo-Aryan and Buddhist imagery. The golden fish is for instance a symbol of the first avatar (incarnation) of Vishnu. Transferred to the Mahāyana Buddhism of Tibet, the fish, being golden, is regarded as symbolising the preciousness of Samsaric beings who are to be freed from ignorance; immersed in the ocean of Samsara they are drawn by the Fisherman to the Light of Liberation. It was, however, once again through one of the treasures of Buddhist Japan¹ that a deeper significance was revealed to me. Here, drifting on the ocean which, like some vast lake girt by rocky tree-clad continents, surrounds the central boss figuring the mountain Meru, we find the actual figure of the Fisherman himself. As in the imagery of the Grail, the Otherworld landscape and the Fisherman appear united.

We have, then, an ever recurrent group of images surrounding the central idea of the *life-giving Light*; the sun-vessel (cauldron or pot), and the weapon used in its recovery; the secret landscape with cosmic mountain and tree where the light withdraws and where is likewise the fount of immortality. Desire and yearning for a happier or higher state of existence necessitate a quest

¹ A bronze mirror from the treasure of Shosouji in the Todajdshi monastery at Nara illustrated in *Durer und der nordische Schicksalshain*. By J. STRZYGOWSKI. (Heidelberg, 1937). Plate 47.

for that secret realm easily associated with the immortal dead. The imagery lingers on in Nonnos' description of the Argonauts in which a bowl (the heavens or heavens with the sun) hovers over the illuminated tree on the cosmic mountain. Sometimes the sun-vessel is actually a boat.

Doubtless the fertility, the sex aspect, forms an integral part but may one not also perhaps divine from the first a latent hankering for the transcendental which is borne out by the tendency of "northern" art (from the Celtic West to the Asiatic East) towards abstraction, infinity and a symbolic conception of landscape? Already in a silver bowl from Maikop, Kurgan, South Russia¹ dating from between the third and second milleniums B.C. we have an instance of beasts moving in the ritualistic circumambulatory manner we have noted, in a symbolic landscape of mountain, tree and water. Perhaps such conceptions are really likely to be rooted in the nature of peoples who spent half their year in darkness, though not in the extreme cold that characterises the Polar regions since the second Ice Age. When climatic conditions and other factors urged them in repeated migrations to drift southward, such ideas may gradually have found expression in vegetable and animal form (though still abstract or symbolic), the process of personification becoming ever stronger as

they intermingled with races who, unlike themselves, held anthropomorphic ideals in religion and art. But behind the consequent evolution of systematized religions and the practice of varying fertility cults, the yearning for the light remains—the imagery persists—now, as in Indo-Aryan or Celtic Myth, in the rape of the sun-vessel and the quest for a paradisaical "land of youth"; now, after an assimilation of Syro-Phœnician mysteries and identification with sexual symbolism and the dying God in an ultimate gnosis that ultimately embraced Christianity. Thus expressed as a Mystery of the Holy Grail it could even invoke Christian relics through identification of Cup and Spear with the instruments of Passion.

It cannot, however, be denied that Wolfram's Grail differs from the latter imagery. His Grail is a precious stone—a radiant jewel. But is the jewel not also a solar emblem? We meet with it on the tree of Life—the illuminated Sun-tree. We find it in the three jewels of Vishnu's helmet and above all in the Buddhist *padma mani*—the jewel in the heart of the lotus which is itself of solar origin. It too leads to a gnosis and to liberation. It appears to be the Indo-Iranian concept. But it suggests perhaps, too, that the essence of the Grail is to be found in more than an original fertility aspect; that the latter, though an integral part of the mystery, is subordinate to the

¹ *Spuren indogermanischen Glaubens in der bildenden Kunst.* By J. STRZYGOWSKI. Plates II and 123.

concept of the radiance, the Light. But how was it that a German knight at the commencement of the thirteenth century should have chosen the Iranian in place of the usual Western form?

Friedrich von Suhtschek¹ challenged the whole academic tradition of Western literary history when he maintained the Arthurian cycle to be of Iranian origin and Wolfram's *Parzival* and Gawain's romance a free translation from the Persian. His view is extreme. Is it not more likely (as it has indeed been the purpose of this essay to prove) that there may well be various developments of a Grail concept deriving, part consciously, part unconsciously, from a long forgotten source? The poet responds to every vital influence from outside, apprehends an analogy, grasps without knowing it the archetypal image. In Wolfram's case, however, there may be reason to suppose a greater degree of contact with the Eastern stream. Connections with the East, through the Crusades, the Arabs and even long before them were far stronger than most of us suspect.

There may not have been, as Suhtschek would insist, an actual *Parzivalnama*. Enough perhaps that there certainly existed not only the curiously similar Manichæan tale of the "Pearl"—the story of a quest and an initiation on the part of a fatherless and poorly clad youth—but that there were sufficient tales of

Iranian chivalry to fire the imagination of a European knight. None-the-less the affinities are so remarkable that it almost seems as though Wolfram were describing the setting of such a Manichæan citadel as Kuh (Mount) i-Sal-Chwâdcha (his *Munsalvalsche* seems a perfect echo of the name) on the lake of Hamun in Sistan, whilst Gawain's adventure in Klingsor's magic castle gives the most astoundingly accurate picture of the Buddhist monasteries of Kabulistan and above all the palace in Kapisa, with its fantastic throne on wheels (the rolling bed), gigantic stupa and all. Particularly important for us is that this very corner of the globe, the borders of Persia and Afghanistan, was the melting-pot not only of various religions but also of influences in art, and that it is in Iran that we find, as already noted, the perpetuation of Mazdaian concepts of that Holy or Secret Landscape which afforded a starting-point for our enquiry. In Iran, indeed, that Paradise, through the grace of God's spirits—the radiance of the Chwarna—is made manifest on earth. Thus in the *Awesta* it is written of the Chwarna—

It appears now as bird, now as a creature swimming or diving, as a ram or in the form of some other beast or it passes over into the milk of a cow. Chwarna causes the streams to gush from the springs, plants to sprout from the earth, winds to blow the clouds, men to be born; it guides the moon

¹ Wolfram von Eschenbach's *Reimbearbeitung des Parzivalnama* (Klio No. 25); and his *Parzivalnamaubersetzung* (*Forschung und Fortschritte*, 10)

and stars on their path.¹

Nature becomes a symbol, continually reborn through the spiritual fount of all life—"for ever spending, never spent." But the crux of the whole matter in regard to Wolfram's Grail is that, like the Manichæan Jewel, it possesses the qualities of the Chwarna itself. Moreover, upon that Manichæan stone alights a dove, to set upon it the Hanma Seed, just as Wolfram's dove brings a sacramental wafer to the Grail. It is on Good Friday (significantly on the advent of Spring—the northern sun's rebirth) that the power of the Grail or the Manichæan stone is thus renewed. Wolfram's Grail likewise possesses the qualities of the Buddhist *cintamani*—the wish jewel—Wolfram's "*Wunsch von Paradis.*" There are Buddhist paintings of the divine maiden bearing the joy-spending jewel. She might well be an Asiatic sister to Wolfram's Repanse del Schoye. It is significant that the latter married, in the end, the paragon of Eastern chivalry—Feirifiz.

Above all the Manichæan jewel or Pearl is the symbol of compassion. In Wolfram's version, does not the very significance of Parzival's initial failure lie in the fact that he does not ask "King, what ails thee?" It takes him years to redeem that youthful lack of understanding, and significantly—though he is able to regain eligibility to the Grail king-

ship only through bitter experience, through inner growth and self-realisation—understanding must ultimately come through the guru—the hermit Trevrizent. How important a part is assigned to the hermit's teaching in Wolfram's version! I would here quote an analogy with a passage I discovered quite independently of any Grail research in a book on Tibetan Yoga. "This accepted conviction or truth hath not been arrived at merely by the processes of deduction and induction, but essentially because of the Guru's teachings which have made one to see the Priceless Gem lying unnoticed within one's reach."² In Mr. T. S. Eliot's words in *Little Gidding*,

And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we stand
And know the place for the first time.

What is it that the Guru teaches Parzival? The need of "*demut*," *i. e.*, humility, and self-recognition—"Datta" (Give), "*Dayadhvam*" (Sympathize), "*Damyata*" (Control)—the doctrine of Mr. T. S. Eliot's *Waste Land*.

It is precisely that quality which the great emperor in the Alexander romance lacked, and which there too was symbolised in a stone sent from Paradise—the landscape with which we are by now so familiar.

"Go and say to Alexander that it is in vain he seeks Paradise; his efforts will be perfectly fruitless for the way of

¹ *Asien's Miniaturenmalerei.* By J. STRZYGOWSKI in collaboration with HEINRICH GLUCK, STELLA KRAMRISCH and EMMY WELLERZ. (Klagenfurt, 1933).

² *Tibetan Yoga.* By W. Y. EVANS WENTZ.

Paradise is the way of humility, a way of which he knows nothing."

Influences from the East were doubtless transmitted through the Arabs and the Crusades, but the direct key to Wolfram's Grail probably lies in the riddle surrounding the much-disputed Kyot, whom Wolfram claims as his source. The very existence of this mysterious personage has been denied by many who would see in him only a mask for Wolfram's originality and, according to medieval standards, unforgivable adulteration of the source. But is not the true test of creative imagination the vitality and poetic power with which he has obviously rendered both story and symbolism so that even if its source be Eastern it has become with him a fervent expression of the ideals of Western chivalry?¹ Who was Kyot? An Armenian, as Suhtschek suggests? Or, as Wolfram himself maintains, a Provençal—a terrain that can certainly embrace Languedoc? Surely it is more than likely that there, in the land of the Albigenses, a territory imbued with Manichæan beliefs and Arab-Sufi influences from across the Pyrenees, legends would find not only access but the most fruitful soil in which to develop, not only as literature but possibly even as a cult. If Jessie Weston is right in believing that an Attis-Mithra Grail cult flourished in Roman Britain, then a Manichæan mystery, original-

ly deriving as we have seen from similar sources, may still more easily have found a home in the citadels and vast fortified grottos of the Ariège.

The Cathar citadel Montségur has been regarded by Otto Rahn² as the Castle of the Grail. However, any cult centring in the castle of Montségur must have been subsequent rather than antecedent to Kyot's story, for we know that it was only in the years immediately preceding the threatened Albigensian Crusade that the ancient ruin was refortified as a Cathar citadel. If it was conceived as a Grail Castle it was most likely as the expression of a wish-fantasy in which grim necessity and fashionable æsthetic snobbery mingled with the craving of a hyper-civilised people for spiritual rebirth. But the intermingling of ambition, of human frailty and passion does not cancel the power of the spirit's yearning. The quest remains. Still the Grail-bearer of Montségur haunts the imagination of the Pyrenean peasants—in the shape of Esclarmonde, a synthesis perhaps of the two Esclarmondes, one of whom—the great Cathar abbess—dedicated Montségur to the Cathar faith whilst the other died as a martyr at the stake.

Is it mere chance that the legendary Esclarmonde did not die but was actually transported to the mountains of Asia? She makes one

¹ A heartfelt appreciation of Wolfram as a poet is to be found in Dr. Margaret Richey's *The Story of Parzival and the Grail*. (Oxford, 1935).

² *Kreuzzug gegen den Gral*. By OTTO RAHN. (Freiburg, 1933).

think, moreover, of one of those reincarnations of Repanse del Schoye's spirit as conceived by a modern German poet Albrecht von Schaeffer in his own poem on the Grail.¹

Die is Titurels, des Alten, Tochter ;
 Tragerin des Grales, lebt in ewiger
 Jugend durch den Duft in dem Gemache
 bis die Tochter eines neuen Konigs
 ihr die Burde abnimmt und die Wurde ;
 stirbt am Ende schmerzlos ; wird geboren
 augenblicks an andrer Erdenstelle ;
 heisst Beate oder auch Renate ²
 lebt mit Menschenlos ; zu lieben, leiden,
 ohne Wissen eingedenk der Heimat
 und des Einhorns und des reinen Dienstes
 kensch wie keine ; endlich stirbt sie
 ganzlich.

There are nevertheless numerous points of analogy between Montségur Manichæism³ and Wolfram's Grail, amongst them the discovery in the Pyrenean citadel of earthenware doves. The dove as we have seen was closely connected with both Wolfram's Grail and the Manichæan pearl. It was, moreover, the badge of Wolfram's Templeisen—the name he gave to his knighthood of the Grail. This warrior caste, by the way, which stands in seeming opposition to Cathar pacificism, almost recalls the ideas on militarism expressed in the *Bhagavat-gita*. There is moreover the question of the Manisola—the secret feast of the Cathars—which still awaits further elucidation. Was it perhaps a mystic

meal such as Jessie Weston associated with her Attis-Mithra cults? In any case it would involve an enquiry into the festivals of the dim past—the Aryan feasts of the dead. So once again the circle would close, leading back to the Land of Light, the realm of youth, of departed spirits.

We should also have to enquire into the report that the skeletons of the Cathars have been found arranged in a radiating circle, which suggests analogies not only with the circumambulatory and radiating formal arrangements in art referred to so often above, but also with the Tantric designs in which Jung has discovered the magic power of the archetype. Indeed it is perhaps ultimately only through the study of the ever-recurring Grail images that we shall understand the extraordinary creative power of a symbolism that has continued to have a hold over us for thousands of years, and which if rightly comprehended might lead us to a recognition of the hidden unity between East and West.

For the way of the Grail is the way of self-recognition, of acceptance of the Shadow. In the dualism of the world of appearances, the darkness apprehended perhaps by primitive northern man in the

¹ *Parzival*. By ALBRECHT SCHAEFFER. (Leipzig, 1922).

² The heroine of A. Schaeffer's novel *Helianth* (Insel Verlag, Leipzig, 1922), who incidentally is brought into relationship with Akhnaton, the heretic sun-king of Egypt.

³ Samuel Singer has pointed to Manichæan heretical influence in regard to Wolfram's "neutral angels" in *Wolfram und der Gral: Neue Parzival Studien*. (Herbert Lang, Berlin, 1939) whilst Rolf Schroder in *Die Parzivalfrage* (Munich, 1928), considers the Manichæan problem at length.

nightly, or half-yearly, disappearance of the sun, cannot be denied, but it can be transcended. The path, whether it lead through the death-simulating gloom of a Celtic-Hellenistic mystery ritual;¹ through occult alchemical searchings for the divine essence sleeping in the heart of matter (an aspect presented by Flegetanis in Wolfram's poem) or along the purifying paths of a Manichæan gnosis, has ultimately the same goal—the liberation from darkness into a realm of light, of higher consciousness, where the radiance of the spirit is no longer obscured but burns more eternally even than the never-dying sun of the cosmic heavens or the mystic jewel

crowning the mountain of the world; where man, breaking the bounds of all otherness enters at last into the holy landscape to recognize his true self in the likeness of God.

A deeper elucidation of the story of the Grail might indeed help in bringing about an understanding of that unity between East and West which Wolfram von Eschenbach and many of his contemporaries apprehended and which he embodied so fervently in a figure from India's Westereiche—Parzival's half-brother, Fierifiz. Had their spirit not been obscured in the centuries that followed, the world might never have been led to its present pass.

HANNAH M. M. CLOSS

BEAUTY IN THE HOME

We have every sympathy with the efforts which "Silpi Publications" (Madras) are making to bridge the gap between ancient Indian creative spontaneity and modern Indian imitativeness. *Furniture and Other Designs* by Shri V. R. Chitra, a beautifully got-up illustrated brochure, is the fourth in their series designed to "bring out the present day talent and also give a fleeting picture of our heritage in the development of the various crafts, for which we are rightly famous." The charming and practical designs of Shri

Chitra, so admirably suited to the Indian setting, should carry on the revolution in modern Indian taste which the Tagores began. We share the hope expressed by Shri O. C. Gangoly in his Foreword that the designer's talent for beautiful designs for furniture will be taken advantage of "by cultured Indians who believe in giving an Indian atmosphere to an Indian home instead of disfiguring and denationalising their native domesticity by importing fifth-rate Chippendales or sixth-rate Louis Sixteenths."

¹ Celtic concepts related to an ideal Byzantium are reflected in the recent poems of Charles Williams, *Taliessin through Logres*. (Oxford University Press, 1938) and *The Region of the Summer Stars*. (Editions Poetry, London, 1944)

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

ANCIENT EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY *

[This review by Prof. N. A. Nikam, M.A., of the Maharani's College, Bangalore, was presented at the Discussion Group of the Indian Institute of Culture in that city on February 12th, 1948.—ED.]

It would have been better had the title of this book been: "An Introduction to Ancient *European* Philosophy," because there is a philosophy which is really ancient, which is not European, and which is far earlier than 624 B.C., with which date this book begins. It deals with the history of European thought from that year to 529 A.D., and includes some forty philosophers before the birth of Christ and twenty-eight after his death. Part of the survey includes what are called philosophies of Asia Minor, which are really minor philosophies of Asia. I propose to deal with the subject in my own way, and the survey may be divided into three periods: Before Socrates; from Socrates to Aristotle; and the Post-Aristotelian period, ending with Plotinus.

The early Greek philosophers were called "cosmologers" because their primary interest was in cosmological questions and their "philosophy" was really "physics." The two questions in which they were interested were: What is the constitution of Matter; or, what is that of which all things are made? Secondly: What is the cause or origin of Motion? For, said the Greeks, everything is in constant change. Various answers were given to the first question; some said it was Water;

others, Air; some, Fire; and others, *all* the elements—earth, water, air and fire, but in proportions. Some, like Heraclitus, said: "*All is change*"; others, like the Eleatics said: "*Nothing changes,*" and denied the reality of change by very subtle arguments, such as the one of Zeno: The flying arrow is always at rest.

Greek thought took a different line with the Pythagoreans; their speculation introduced the germ of the two fundamental concepts which dominated all Greek thought afterwards, *viz.*, Form and Matter, which concepts had their origin in the Pythagorean conception of the Limit and the Unlimited.

It is the Principle of "Limit" that "creates" all things; I believe it is the ancient Pythagorean conception of "Limit" that survives in Whitehead's notion of God as the Principle of Limitation, in Chapter XII of his *Science and the Modern World*.

These speculations were good as far as they went, but they did not go far. For the question of questions is: What is man who thinks about these? What is *his* nature? What is his *End*? These questions needed an answer. The new orientation to philosophy was given by Socrates, who brought philosophy from the heavens to the market-place, after all. And he came to the question

* *An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy*. By A. H. ARMSTRONG. (Methuen and Co., Ltd., London. 15s.)

which is a link between Ancient and Modern Philosophy—the nature of *Universals*, which is the universal problem of all philosophies. Expressed in an “ancient” language it is: *Kasmin vijñāte sarvamidam vijñātam bhavati* (*Mūndaka Upanishad*): “By knowing what, does all this become known?” To know whether this or that act is just or not, one must know “Justice”; likewise Courage and Temperance and Wisdom. “Virtue is knowledge”; it is knowledge of the Good.

“That, by knowing which” all particulars become known, is called in Socratic-Platonic language, a “Form.” And the Soul has knowledge of these “Forms” because it has lived in their company. In its embodied state the Soul makes an effort to “recollect” them, but unsuccessfully, for, to have true knowledge of Forms, we must get rid of this body. Universals or Forms, the doctrine of Immortality and Transcendental Recollection, these were the contributions of Socrates to the development of Ancient Thought.

The philosophy of Socrates made the distinction between a universal and a sense-particular, between *knowing* the universal and “sensing” the sense-particular. This distinction is the foundation of Plato’s metaphysics: The Doctrine of Ideas. An “idea” is known only; the many (particulars) are *seen*. And what is seen is a plurality. It comes into being, suffers growth and change and goes out of existence. Thus it is in space and time, and is an effect, a phenomenon. But the “idea” is known only; it is a unity; it does not come into being or pass away; it is not in Space or Time; it is the cause of things. Thus we have two worlds: of Being and of Becoming; the former *is*;

the latter is *in* Space and *in* Time. The world of Becoming is neither pure Being nor pure non-Being but is intermediate. The world of Being is an organic unity, and Plato probably thought that it was hierarchical, *i. e.*, that one universal or idea was inclusive of the other, as, for example, Justice is a more inclusive virtue than Temperance; and the Idea of the Good, as the most inclusive of all Ideas, is therefore, at the top of the hierarchy of Ideas.

So far, so good; but what is the relation between the two worlds? Is the world of Becoming “like” the world of Being? If so, in what sense of “like”? This was the crux of the whole problem. Plato said that the world of Becoming was a “copy” of the world of Being. Supposing it is a copy, we have to ask: Where is the original? It seems as if Plato’s theory puts the world of Ideas far away and beyond the phenomenal world, so far away and beyond, so safe and secure in itself, that it is “outside,” and so cannot possibly have a relation to the world of Particulars. It is not a world within another world, but a world beside another world; not a solution but the heritage of a problem. A Dualism indeed.

Aristotle, Plato’s greatest pupil, but very unlike him in temperament, was dissatisfied with Plato’s doctrine of Ideas. He said that the Platonic theory was not a scientific explanation. A scientific explanation according to Aristotle meant, if I may say so, a four-dimensional notion of “Cause,” and all answers to the question as to the “why” of things. The causes were material, efficient, formal and Final. I do not suppose that Final Causes now are a part of what is called “scientific

explanation." Therefore it is, I suppose, that modern scientific explanation has nothing "Final" in it, but is content to proceed from one probability to another; this being the "kindly light" that leads science on and on, whither one does not know yet.

But all the four causes could be reduced to two: Form and Matter. There is nothing which is not a "mixture" of the two; mere Matter is a mere potentiality, if not non-being, yet being-to-be; whereas Pure Form, *i.e.*, a realisation of all that is yet to be, is nowhere except in God. So God to Aristotle is Pure Form. And the phenomenal world is an *evolution* of Form-in-matter; and the evolution is a "struggle," but a "struggle" of a different sort than the "struggle for existence" of Darwin. The struggle of Form and Matter in Aristotle's philosophy is more like the struggle of *Purusha* and *Prakriti* in the *Sāṃkhya* philosophy: Form wanting always to escape from its imprisonment in Matter, and Matter always resisting the influence of Form. According to Aristotle, Form is *in* Matter, even as the tree is in the seed. So, in one sense, Form is the End of Matter, as the liberation of *Purusha* is the end of *Prakriti's* evolution in the *Sāṃkhya*; while, in another sense, Form is quite unlike matter. Form is *in* matter, true, but Form thinks that it is a "grievous mistake" that it is in! So, is it Evolution or Dissolution that is the End of the whole Process?

The philosophies of Plato and of Aristotle, comprehensive and imposing though they were and having about them the characteristic of eternity, were philosophies that grew in and were nourished by the civilization of

Greece and therefore were inseparable from the Greek national life. When Greek national life declined, when the Ancient world expanded into the world round the Mediterranean and foreign influences began to be felt, the old Academies of Plato and of Aristotle lost for a time their hold on the individual. The individual became a "citizen of the world," with no attachments as before to national custom and tradition, and what he gained in breadth of outlook he lost in inner certainty. And so the philosopher became a "quack"; he acquired the vanity and pride of the quack, and like quacks the philosophers of this period, called the Hellenic Period, were many; they were read and forgotten. I shall, therefore, omit the Cynics, the Cyrenaics, the Stoics, the Epicureans, and deal only with Plotinus.

Plato had a vision; this seems to me to explain the unity of his philosophy. Aristotle never confused categories which were distinct; this explains his lucidity of thought and style and his scientific genius. But neither of them, I suppose, had a mystical experience such as Plotinus seems to have had; nor did they come into contact with the mystical philosophies of the East as Plotinus did. In Plotinus the best intellectual tradition of the West and the mystical experience of the East meet, for Plotinus had travelled into Persia and was learned in Sufi Mysticism. In the philosophy of Plotinus the mystic rationalises and "explains" the relation of the phenomenal to the Absolute.

The mystic-philosopher's starting-point is the Absolute; his problem is to explain its "descent," not the "why" of it but the stages of the descent.

The Universe is to Plotinus an organic unity and a hierarchy as it was to Plato. The Idea of the Good was to Plato the highest reality and the source of everything else. The Highest Reality is to Plotinus *The All*, the Unity-Absolute; it gives itself out of itself by an act of "emanation"; there are two sets of series of emanations. The All, the Unity-Absolute, gives "itself out of itself," I said, but it gives a Part of itself only, remaining in other respects transcendent. So a Part of it "descends" or is an "emanation"; this Part is Absolute Mind. Plotinus describes the Absolute's giving from out of itself of a Part of itself in language of its ethical significance. He describes it as "undiminished giving"; like that of the Sun, for example. In the act of giving, it creates its own receptacle, and thus we have in one act three movements: The Unity-Absolute (rather a Part of it) becoming the Absolute Mind, and a Part (so I should think) of the Absolute Mind becoming or emanating as *The World-Soul*. This is the receptacle for

the Absolute Mind." If this movement is repeated, we get another set of categories in Plotinus: The Logos, The World of Forms and the World of Nature. But the activity of Descent is simultaneous with the activity of Ascent, for, everything is wanting to reach that from which it has descended. The effort at Ascent takes two forms: Contemplation and Production; the former is higher than the latter but even this can take us only up to the stage of the Absolute Mind. Thus all our efforts at self-realisation and *Sādhana* are, in a sense, failures. Complete success in *Sādhana* comes, if Plotinus and the Mystics are right, from above; by Grace. (This is not denied but is promised; man has only to make the right effort at "ascent.") And so the *Gita* says: "Surely I will deliver thee from all sins; grieve not": *aham tvām sarva pāpēbhyo mokṣyēsyāmi mā śucha*).

I have no space here to deal with the philosophy of St. Augustine, with which this book concludes.

N. A. NIKAM

AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL MONOGRAPH*

At a time when intolerance and communal hatred have poisoned the atmosphere in large parts of India, Verrier Elwin's great work on the Muria and their youth-dormitories comes as a refreshing and most appropriate appeal for a broad-minded and liberal attitude towards customs and a way of life different from our own. His vivid picture, rich in details and glowing colours, of an aboriginal society in the forest-clad hills of Bastar should

convince the most sceptical reader that every civilization, whether primitive or advanced, must be judged on its own merits and that the test of a social system lies in the happiness and freedom of self-expression which the individual man and woman can find within its limits.

The Muria are a branch of the Gond race and inhabit the northern part of Bastar State. They number roughly 100,000, and they have retained a

* *The Muria and Their Ghotul*. By VERRIER ELWIN. Illustrated. (Oxford University Press, Bombay. Rs. 25/-)

distinct culture which sets them apart not only from neighbouring Hindu populations but also from the other aboriginals of Bastar. The most characteristic feature of this culture is the *ghotul*, the club-house of the unmarried, where boys and girls spend their evenings and nights. In one or another form such "clubs" for the unmarried are found among many peoples, both inside and outside India, and in one chapter Verrier Elwin traces the world-wide distribution of this ancient institution. But there are few places where the youth-dormitory is so much the focal point of the cultural life as among the Muria.

The general reader will be most interested in the character of the *ghotul* as a school for life, where boys and girls learn discipline, co-operation, loyalty and hard work for the public good as well as the appreciation and practice of music, dancing and games. The *ghotul* forms, indeed, a little republic, with the older boys and girls as office-bearers and a strictly maintained code of rights and duties. The classless society of the aboriginals is no doubt the oldest stronghold of democracy in India, and it is difficult to imagine a better training for a truly democratic outlook than that provided by the *ghotul*.

But the *ghotul* is in yet another sense a school for life. Boys and girls start at an early age to form attach-

ments and are free to have sexual relations within the rules of *ghotul* discipline. The results of this pre-marital freedom are remarkable. Not only are Muria youngsters happy, cheerful, disciplined and free from self-consciousness and furtive vices, but the adult Muria evinces a stronger sense of domestic morality and conjugal fidelity than most other populations. Statistical figures based on a detailed investigation of 2,000 marriages make this very clear. The incidence of divorce in Bastar is under three per cent. and adultery is extremely rare and severely condemned by public opinion.

It thus seems that the *ghotul* cannot be judged by pre-conceived ideas on sexual morality. The message of the *ghotul* is, in the author's words, "that youth must be served, that freedom and happiness are more to be treasured than any material gain; that friendliness and sympathy, hospitality and unity are of first importance, and above all that human love,—and its physical expression—is beautiful, clean and precious."

But this book is more than an appraisal of the Murias' youth-dormitories. It is one of the best anthropological monographs ever written in this country, and its scientific value is matched by its excellent production and wealth of attractive illustrations.

C. VON FURER-HAIMENDORF

HINDU PSYCHO-PHILOSOPHY*

Swami Pavitrananda has discussed religion and religious attitudes. In the certain fundamental questions touching opening chapter, Swamiji asks "Has

* *Modern Man in Search of Religion*. By SWAMI PAVITRANANDA. (Advaita Ashrama, Mayavathi. Re. 1/8); *Ancient Indian History and Culture*. By S. R. SHARMA. (Hind Kitabs, Ltd., Bombay. Rs. 3/-); *Hindu Philosophy*. By THEOS BERNARD, PH.D. (Philosophical Library, New York. \$3.75)

the world grown irreligious?" His answer is that there is no need to take a pessimistic view about the dynamic influence of religion. Laboratory science and politics seem antagonistic to religion, but after a critical examination in Chapters II and III of the relation between religion on the one hand and politics and science on the other, Swamiji concludes that "real science will never obstruct the progress of religion" and that "religion will supply the right type of persons to politics." The approach to religion made by psychology and psycho-analysis is examined in the fourth chapter. In the fifth, Swamiji answers the question "What is religion?" by defining religion as the outer "manifestation of the great hunger for the Infinite." In the concluding chapter Swamiji has endeavoured to envisage as far as possible speculatively what the future of religion is likely to be.

From this necessarily brief epitome of Swamiji's main thesis, it will be apparent that he has done a splendid service to religion's rational vindication within a small compass. But, while commending Swami Pavitrananda's work to the earnest attention of the public, I desire to point out that in the familiar attempt to detect a "common formula" in religion and politics, there lurks an obvious logical fallacy. To put the argument in syllogistic form, Religion aims at the service of the people: Politics, likewise, aims at service of the people: Therefore, politics is religion. Quite apart from the formal fallacy known as the *undistributed middle term*, the benefits of politics in all civilized countries are confined to security of person and property in return for taxes paid,

though some modern governments have interfered with religious institutions. The benefits of religions, on the other hand, relate to freeing the individual from the fetters of finite existence. Politics binds, while religion frees. You cannot have a common formula between the two. I congratulate Swami Pavitrananda on his fine portraiture of modern man's search for a religion that would confer genuine freedom from the ills of existence.

Mr. S. R. Sharma's volume is not directly concerned with religion and philosophy, as his main aim has been to narrate the history of India from the dim dawn of 3,000 B. C. to the radiant noon represented by 1,000 A. D. In a journal like THE ARYAN PATH, a mere historical narration, however interesting, of events, of the rise and fall of dynasties *et hoc genus omne*, need not receive elaborate notice. Nevertheless, I should like to draw special attention to the fourth chapter in which the "cultural history" of the period is told with reference to the multilateral ramifications of classical Sanskrit literature.

There are certain minor inaccuracies to which attention may be drawn. On page 127, *Kadambari* is mentioned as a "category of literature." It is the name of a well-known tale by the celebrated Bana. The category of literature is known as *Gadya*. Again, the author observes that "nearly 200 Upanishads have come down to us." I am afraid that this is rather an exaggerated estimate. On page 136, the English rendering of a familiar stanza is cited in which the opening of the second half is wrongly given. Reference should be to *Dandin*, and not to *Naishadha*. ("...*Dandinah-pada-*

lalityam.” But on the whole, Mr. Sharma’s work will be found useful to university students.

Theos Bernard (as explained in his *Hatha-Yoga*) has had ample opportunities of studying the original Sanskrit texts relating to the different systems of Indian philosophy and in his *Hindu Philosophy* he has attempted to expound the essential elements of the Six Systems of Philosophy (*Shad-Darsanas*) and in addition has pushed into prominence the Kashmir school of Saivism. He is carrying coals to Newcastle as far as Indian students acquainted with the original works are concerned, but others eager to learn the truths of the Indian systems will find this book useful.* Dr. Bernard, however, has chosen his bibliography arbitrarily. He has failed to mention original contributions and has included trivial works. His two outstanding guides were Dr. Radhakrishnan’s *Indian Philosophy* and Dr. Das Gupta’s *History of Indian Philosophy*, which were critically examined by the present reviewer in a series in THE ARYAN PATH, January to April 1934, the introductory article bearing the title “Indian Misrepresentations of Indian Philosophy.” Taking the most lenient and charitable view of the work, it strikingly illustrates the truth that, even with the best of good-will, foreigners still find it difficult to grasp Indian philosophical truths and traditions.

Thus, Dr. Bernard describes Sankara as “the great logician” and Ramanuja as “the great intuitionist.” The fact is, both were logicians and intuitionists. He has utterly failed to understand Madhva rightly. Madhva

does *not* deny Causality of the Ultimate Principle, as alleged. But the amazing phenomenon is the distinction he claims for Kashmir Saivism. Dr. Bernard observes that, while “Vedanta is tainted with the suggestion of dualism,” “Kashmir Saivism meets the problem by constructing a pure monism.” Here he falls into the common error of identifying Vedanta with Advaita. Dualism never philosophically taints. Kashmir Saivism is just a theological variant of Advaita. Its metaphysical merger with Advaita is inevitable.

Further, in the “Glossary,” *Jijnasa* is wrongly identified with *pratijna*. *Nigrahasthana* is given as “disagreement in principle,” whereas it is simply a ground or a logical ground for refutation of a given thesis. *Visishtadvaita* is wrongly described as “Qualified monism.” It is not monism at all. Ramanuja admits three distinct *real* entities—the animate (*Chit*), the inanimate (*A-chit*) and the Supreme (*Iswara*). I must in conclusion note a serious error. “Kapila,” writes Dr. Bernard, “learned the rudiments of philosophy from his mother.” On the contrary, Kapila taught the secrets of philosophy to his mother, who secured ultimate freedom from the ills of existence. The discussion between the Divine Son and Mother is enchantingly given in *Bhagavatha*, Canto 3, Chaps. 25 to 33.

These comments do not affect the undoubted value of Dr. Bernard’s work as a student’s manual intended for the benefit of foreigners not able to manage the original Sanskrit texts. I have not listed typographical errors, but “monastic” on p. 130 is glaring.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Drama in Sanskrit Literature By R. V. JAGIRDAR. (Popular Book Depot, Bombay 7. Rs. 8/4)

This book of outstanding value is by one who is both an artist and a critic. But Professor Jagirdar goes too far when he rejects the well-attested traditional view about the origin of Indian drama. Dr. A. B. Keith is a great scholar and he says: "The Vedic religion contained within itself the germs of drama." The traditional view is that the *Gandharva Veda* is an *Upaveda*. The great epics also gave an impetus to the emergence of the drama. For Greek drama and English drama also we find a religious origin.

The author's attempt to connect the *Suta* and the *Vrittis* with the drama is laboured and unconvincing. Bharata's *Natya Sastra* begins with a charming account of the origin of the drama as the god-given means of charming our minds and hearts, lightening the burdens of life and fascinating us into righteousness and holiness. The author calls Bharata "the Prometheus of the drama world." Kalidasa's *Vikramorvasiya* refers to him as a *Muni* (a sage). But the author tries to make Bharata the name of a clan or a family or to connect Bharata with Nahusha and to make Nahusha a non-Aryan adventurer! All this is fanciful to a degree. The Indian drama was

neither secular nor non-Aryan in origin.

The most valuable chapters are those in which are traced the evolution of Sanskrit drama, dealing first with Bhasa's plays. But neither the treatment of that dramatist nor the discussion of the authenticity of the plays ascribed to him is full or convincing. Kalidasa in *Malavikagnimitra* refers to Bhasa as a great older playwright. That play refers to Agnimitra as a contemporary King. Kalidasa thus belonged to the first century B. C. and was Court Poet of King Vikramaditya.

The author's treatment of Kalidasa also is neither full nor adequate. His translation of the great *Bharata Vahya* verse in *Sakuntala* does not do justice to its sonorous style or to its sublime thought. His treatment of Sudraka's *Mrichchakatika* is interesting but we cannot say the same of his treatment of Sri Harsha's plays. He says: "The real trouble with Harsha was that he was least qualified to be a dramatist." The poet Harsha's *Nagananda* is one of the high peaks of dramatic achievement. The author deals well with Visakhadatta and Bhavabhuti. His treatment of the later dramatists is, however, scrappy and inadequate.

The author promises a fuller work hereafter. It is to be hoped that in it he will re-examine the theories adumbrated in this volume.

K. S. RAMASWAMI SASTRI

Doctor Mesmer : An Historical Study. By NORA WYDENBRUCK. (John Westhouse (Publishers), Ltd., London, W. C. 2. 8s. 6d.)

This is a charmingly written and sympathetic, if superficial, account of the great Viennese physician, Friedrich (or Franz) Anton Mesmer, who, with

his demonstration and exposition of some of the hidden forces in nature and the powers latent in man, and his *Société de l'Harmonie*, played a rôle in the eighteenth century comparable to that of Madame H. P. Blavatsky and the Theosophical Movement of the present era. The author errs by under-

statement of Mesmer's antecedents and by overstatement in fathering upon him the dangerous subsequent developments of hypnotism and suggestion, psycho-analysis, etc., but one must be grateful for her apparent faithfulness to the results of her historical research in the outer course of his life. She not only has resisted the temptation to dramatise her hero; she has also emphatically cleared him of the charge of showmanship or of having played upon the people's love of the marvellous, a slander against Mesmer which had survived by many years the long-exploded calumny of charlatanry.

Mesmer's natural bent and inner affiliations can be traced from hints given here. He was acquainted with the writings of his great predecessor Paracelsus, who also had believed in magnetism, natural and human, and in correspondences. Mesmer's graduating thesis at the University of Vienna was on "The Influence of the Planets on the Human Body," through what he called the "Universal Fluid." He recognised, the author makes him say, but one disease—the lack of harmony—and but one cure—its re-establishment. Many moral causes—pride, envy, avarice, ambition—he tells a patient here, may throw the system out of harmony, a lesson which psychosomatic medicine is now proclaiming.

Mesmer, "aware that the magical effect of the healing touch was derived from a source of power of such magnitude that it was dangerous to toy with it," refused to impart his secrets except

to qualified individuals. And he said little of the supernormal powers sometimes manifested by mesmerised subjects.

"Nobody could say with certainty," Miss Wydenbruck writes, whether Mesmer "was actually a member of one of the secret societies" in his Vienna days, but of his *Société de l'Harmonie*, founded at Paris in 1783, its members bound to secrecy by most solemn oaths, she writes that "its rules were laid down, modelled on those followed by the branch of Freemasonry known as the Order of the Strict Observance." She seems not to suspect that many occult sciences besides that of the "animal magnetism" transmitted in mesmeric healing were taught in that Society, though she tells us of the Mason, George Washington's ardent support of Mesmer's principles.

How far ahead of the science of his day but how consonant with immemorial truth are these from Mesmer's fundamental tenets:—

There is one uncreated fundamental principle—God.

In the universe there are two fundamental principles: matter and movement.

All matter is one.

Movement causes the development of all possibilities in nature.

Truly, as Miss Wydenbruck concludes:

...seen from the vantage-point of history, when the tangled threads of human destiny appear co-ordinated in the pattern of the whole great web, Mesmer's life seems like a strand of shining gold.

E. M. HOUGH

Creation's Heir. By HAROLD DEARDEN. (Andrew Melrose, Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

Most of us are clumsy thinkers and

this, more often than not, is due to lack of adequate observation which, in its turn, is usually caused by our looking for something already subcon-

sciously impressed upon our mind or memory or imagined by us, instead of dispassionately looking at the person or the problem confronting us. But the author recognises that man is

a mysterious entity whose fate it is to make manifest a psycho-physical Inner State made up of and continuously modified by countless subtle and widely differing ingredients, among which the accumulated experience of past life is not the least important and effective.

Hence, human thinking is as liable to "the weather in the soul," as the physical frame is to the vagaries of the weather.

The author's prescription for the malady of muddled thinking is, first, the cultivation of the capacity for calm and comprehensive observation; and,

secondly, the cultivation of spiritual sensitiveness. The modern man being self-centred, his awareness of the soul is anæmic, if not atrophied. True religion, however, will help the moderns to overcome this insensibility. For such religion both satisfies their "spiritual hunger and is in harmony with their adult knowledge and intelligence." With the aid of examples and analogies and a style which at once makes the reader feel *en rapport* with him, the author has brought home once again the imperative necessity of clear, critical and cogent thinking in our daily life, honeycombed as it is with hustle-bustle and half-baked, half-digested knowledge.

G. M.

Shuttle: An Autobiographical Sequence. By HERMON OULD. (Andrew Dakers, Ltd., London. 15s)

All the more attractive for its reticences the shuttle of memory weaves the irregular pattern of an unusual career—professional singer at the age of ten, poet, playwright, International Secretary of the P. E. N. since 1926—against a vivid background ranging from London in the nineties to an apprehensive Europe in 1938.

It is an eager, warmly sympathetic personality that emerges, idealistic but unorthodox, patriotic but accepting "blood-brotherhood with all mankind," loving music and unattracted by politics but eluded by the one and pursued by the other because never able "to sit back when disaster came" and to persuade himself that it was no concern of his.

Few can have had more friends among justly famous men; none could boast of them less. G. Lowes Dickinson and Carel Kapek share honours with the blind foreign peasant in the Milan Station with his long unheeded, plaintive cry of his destination, so movingly presented as a symbol of mankind.

Mr. Ould's implication that from a modest P. E. N. post he drifted into prominence contradicts his conviction that "there is no such thing as chance." Just as his then 100 per cent. pacifism brought his two-year sentence in 1917, so his persisting "dream of a world really co-operative and at peace" doubtless brought him his unusual opportunities for human service during the recent war, scarcely hinted here.

One welcomes eagerly the closing admission that the shuttle has resumed activity.

E. M. H.

The Transmission of the Faith. By GODFREY E. PHILLIPS. (Lutterworth Press, London. 10s. 6d.)

This is a disappointing book for the general reader. Christian missionaries and those who share their belief that the one task of any value in the world is the Christianising of mankind will doubtless find in it much that is interesting and encouraging. But those who do not share that belief will find little to interest and a good deal to irritate. The tacit assumption, for instance, that God has only once revealed Himself to man and that the study of Christian doctrine is therefore the only part that matters in anybody's education, strikes a jarring note, as also does the author's bland acceptance of schools and the opportunity they afford for indoctrinating the minds of the young, as one of the Church's most powerful weapons for transmitting the faith. He even goes so far in one place as to appear to approve of the fact that there are very few books for African children to read, since that means that they read the Bible with much greater assiduity than do English children.

As a historical study of the means by which the early Christian Church transmitted its faith both to new converts and to second and subsequent generations of Christians, the book is not without interest and value, though it is doubtful how far such methods either can or should be reverted to in the modern world. It is significant also that the author's idea of what is meant by Christian teaching and a specifically Christian way of life, is based much more on the Old Testament and the writings of Paul and the early Fathers than on anything in the teaching of Christ.

A further point of interest is the indications which the book gives of a new spirit of unity abroad on the Mission Field, combating the narrow sectarianism of the past. This cannot but rejoice the heart of everyone who cares about the things of the Spirit and wants to see the spiritual life of every religious community deepened and strengthened. But for the most part it is a specialists' book and one which will have little to say to anyone except the missionaries for whom it was written.

MARGARET BARR

The Co-operative Movement at Home and Abroad. By HEBE SPAULL and D. H. KAY. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London. 4s.)

This is a survey, attractively illustrated with photographs, of the co-operative movement from its humble beginnings in Rochdale in 1841 down to the present day. It is world-wide in its scope and apparently designed for young people but the mature reader who does not scorn its simple presentation as unworthy of his intellectual

steel will find in it a wealth of information.

There is much of the picturesque in the account: the transformation which co-operation wrought in the lives of the "liveyeres," settlers of Grenfell's bleak Labrador, the co-operative settlements of Palestine, the cocoa co-operatives of the Ashantis in West Africa and the spectacular success of China's "work-togethers."

The treatment is popular and necessarily superficial; the full achieve-

ments of co-operation in so many countries could hardly be set down in 191 pages! But the soundness of the Rochdale weavers' principles comes out clearly, as does the affinity between co-operation and democracy which makes understandable the banning of co-operatives in Nazi Germany. Such, however, is the interlinking of the movement that even in the Nazi period the banking systems of two Germans, Raffeisen and Schulze-Delitzsch, were continuing to serve co-operators in other countries.

This interlinking of ideas and interests, wisely demonstrated in the

co-operation of co-operatives, in the same country and internationally, and the fact that the co-operator sets "public advantage before private gain" are two of the co-operative movement's chief claims to a position among the forces working for world unity. The example of such men as J. T. W. Mitchell, who devoted his rare business talents to the English Co-operative Wholesale Society with its ten million pounds' worth of annual trade, as its Chairman for twenty-one years, lived simply and died worth only £350, renews one's hope for the race.

E. M. HOUGH

Jivanandanam of ANANDARAYA MAKHIN. Edited by PANDIT M. D. AIYENGAR with his own commentary *Nandini*. (Adyar Library Series No. 59, Adyar, Madras. Rs. 20/-.)

This is an allegorical Sanskrit play in which the author tries to expound the course of *Jiva* or Soul through the triple agency of Medical Science, Dramatic Literature, and the methods of the Advaita Philosophy. The author is a great devotee of Śiva. He therefore upholds *Śiva-bhakti*. In his other work *Vidyaparīnāyama* also he tries to establish the supremacy of Śiva.

Anandaraya has delved deep in *Ayurvedic* literature. In the present play he brings out the principles of this science in the new form of a drama and thus does an immense service to *Ayurveda* by propagating its principles to one and all. This is, therefore, a medico-literary drama in which *Jivatman*, the hero of the play, tries to protect his bodily health and thus further his activities towards the realization of peace and happiness in

material and spiritual existence.

Anandaraya was not only a poet but also a great politician and a soldier. He was Minister and General to the Tanjore Kings Sarfoji I (A. D. 1711-1720) and Tukaji I (1729-1735). He composed the present play during the reign of King Shahaji (1684-1710). All these kings were themselves poets, besides being great patrons of learning.

We congratulate the Adyar authorities in choosing Pandit Aiyengar for editing the text, which requires on the part of the editor a thorough knowledge of *Ayurveda* and other branches of Sanskrit learning. The learned editor has completely identified himself with Anandaraya Makhin, the author of this delightful play, a fact vouched for by the English and Sanskrit critical Introductions, the Appendices and the very learned and exhaustive Commentary *Nandini*. We are sure that the present play will find numerous readers in a free India, in which the suppressed *Ayurveda* (science of life) will rise up with new life and new vigour and thus contribute its quota to the national health and happiness.

P. K. GODE

Science versus Idealism. By MAURICE CORNFORTH. (Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

This book, most of which seems to have been written just before the announcement of the atomic bomb, constitutes a scholarly review of some materialist and idealist trends of modern philosophy. The author's own stand-point is that of Dialectical Materialism, which according to him contains a very definite criterion by which one may attempt to judge the value of any philosophy.

Every reader of this book must be impressed by its dominant note that philosophy cannot be divorced from science, and that the basis, methodology and interpretation of science should have a direct bearing on life and its practical problems.

Some of the chapters are of outstanding value. Under "Logical Analysis," the author says that logic has a purely speculative character. He warns those who feel drawn to Wittgenstein's Principle of Verification, because it seems to uphold science, to "remember that it also demolishes materialism—and thereby leaves theology and idealism exactly where they were, by demolishing their only real opponent." It leads us straight back to the subjective idealism of Berkeley and others, nay,

to solipsism, which eventually brought about its downfall.

By a process of elimination of the various theories propounded by the Berkeley-Jeans school of thought the author emerges to discuss the "Interpretation of Science" in the light of philosophical materialism. This chapter should make enjoyable reading for philosopher-scientists and narrow specialists alike. The nature of scientific theory and the process of scientific progress are described and, theoretically, one can see no limit to the latter. The method of scientific progress is to put questions to nature, and to remain ingeniously on terms of personal friendship with nature.

The principal mark of scientific genius is the ability to advance a bold and fruitful working hypothesis combined with the technical ability to carry out the investigations and experiments indicated by that hypothesis.

How hypothesis grows into knowledge is illustrated by taking examples from the physical and also the biological sciences. If the interpretary rôle of science is understood—and this is a very important point—then we can understand the whole front of advancing knowledge in its right relation to the common welfare and progress of mankind.

G. T. KALE

The Active Life: What It Is and What It Is Not: An Essay. By MARCO PALLIS. (John M. Watkins, London, W. C. 2. 4s. 6d.)

These forty-four pages are packed with the mellow wisdom of a doctrine on the nature and use of action which, the author writes, "has been common to all traditional civilizations, wheth-

er ancient or modern, Eastern or Western." The growing tendency to restrict the concept of reality to the natural world has meant the obscuration of the Contemplative Life's pre-eminence over the Active Life. So long as the resulting mental habit of attending more to applications than to principles prevails, Mr. Pallis warns,

"we shall be condemned to remain the dreamers that we are, instead of the men of awareness that we might be."

The denial of the supremacy of Knowledge over Action, he explains, empties the Active Life of the superior principle which should order it from within. The residue is the "Life of Pleasure" which, for all its convulsive movement, is essentially passive. In the fully integrated Active Life, Mr. Pallis writes, all acts are ritual in character and the distinction between sacred and secular disappears.

The key to Knowledge is given as the finding of the reality of which each act or fact is an appearance, Knowledge in the full sense being "not about

things but of That on which our very being depends."

...the act in its symbolical capacity is able to serve a purpose far exceeding the possibilities of the same act considered in itself.

The competently conceived and executed act must be necessary, skilfully ordered for its purpose, excluding all irrelevancy and

it must throughout the whole cycle of its manifestation be referred to its principle, through a full use of its symbolical or ritual possibilities.

An Islamic formula, Mr. Pallis writes, contains the most complete and concise theory of Action conceivable: "It must be all that it should be and nothing else besides."

E. M. H.

India in Kalidasa. By B. S. UPADHYAYA. (Kitabistan, Allahabad. Rs. 25/-)

This is a very ambitious work by a young scholar. Here the works of Kalidasa, the greatest Indian poet and one among the greatest of the poets of the world, have been exhaustively studied for the light they throw upon geography, polity, art, sociology, etc. There are innumerable volumes dealing with Shakespeare's dramas while we do not have even a decent critical edition of any of the works of Kalidasa. One can realise, therefore, the value of this undertaking. We do not have an index of words in Kalidasa; we do not have even an index of the lines in his political works.

In reading this work one must bear in mind that we find in Kalidasa not India at any particular age, but India as it was known to Kalidasa by tradition kept up in Puranas and other literature available to him. The material collected here is therefore of little help

for determining the age of Kalidasa. There is no proof that it was the Gupta Period, as the author seems to assume.

As a survey, the work is commendable. But as an exhaustive collection and presentation of facts it leaves much to be desired. Just as Kalidasa depended on tradition for his facts, the author has depended upon previous researches for many of the opinions he presents. "Cocoanut wine" (*Narikelasava*), for instance, is called a wine by the commentator and so accepted here; but there is reason to believe that it is only the water in tender cocoanuts. In the section dealing with "Purdah," Shri Upadhyaya does not refer to the most important term, *Avarodha*, but is satisfied with a general statement that there are many terms suggesting the institution of "Purdah." But among whom? Is it in the whole of India or only among certain communities? There is no reply. Among the musical instruments *Vamsakritya* is named. The word really means "the function

of a flute," namely, to keep the tune. The instrument itself is *Vamsa*, the flute. It is not a misprint or an inadvertence, since the author adds in brackets, "incidentally referring to the flute." What is *Murcchana*? What is *Tana*? What were the *Srutis* known to Kalidasa? There is no information in the book on these points. The citations in the foot-notes contain many mistakes.

While I commend the author's patient labour, I wish he had been a

little more thorough and careful in scientific analysis. The book is too full of details for a general survey meant for the ordinary cultured reader; and it is deficient as a reference book for the research scholar. Nevertheless, as a new approach, it certainly gives the right lead to the study of our classics. What has been attempted is admirable, though in what has been achieved there is much scope for improvement.

C. KUNHAN RAJA

Selections from the First Book of Kural. Translation and Notes by C. RAJAGOPALACHARI. (Rochouse and Sons, Ltd., Madras. Re. 1/4)

Readers of these gems of ethical philosophy will not question the verdict published in the *Journal Asiatique* in 1848 that this "masterpiece of Tamil literature" is "one of the highest and purest expressions of human thought." Shri C. Rajagopalachari has rendered a great service by this effective prose translation. The universally valid precepts here rendered so beautifully into English are both practical and inspiring, free from any hint of sectarian bias and most admirably suited for moral instruction anywhere in the world.

But a few suggestions must be offered for future editions. Surely such a book deserves an introduction! Indian publishers must begin to bear in mind the foreign public's needs. The author is known to every Tamil as "Tiruvalluvar," which, while not his name, describes his traditional status as a devotee or a teacher of pariah caste.

But even this does not appear upon the title-page. And no attempt is made to place the work in time or in space. It has elsewhere been tentatively ascribed to nine and a half centuries or more ago and Tiruvalluvar is known to have lived near the sea in "the town of peacocks," now a suburb of Madras; tradition makes him a weaver. So much of background, surely, ought to be vouchsafed the non-Tamil reader! A minor suggestion is that the notes should be set off from the translation by being in a different type or in parantheses.

Space permits offering only a few of these verses, as an appetiser for the feast that awaits the reader:—

Is not the arrow smooth and straight but cruel, and the harp curved but makes sweet music? So must our judgment depend not on appearance but on conduct.

If your thoughts show signs of turning from the path of rectitude, know that misfortune awaits you.

Various are the teachings of the religions of the world, but in all you find that compassion is that which gives men spiritual deliverance. Hold on to it.

E. M. H.

China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory. By CHIANG KAI-SHEK; with Notes and Commentary by PHILIP JAFFE. (Dennis Dobson, Ltd., London. 15s.)

The present volume contains the Generalissimo's two books, *China's Destiny* and *Chinese Economic Theory*, here made available for the first time in English. In them he reveals his hopes and aspirations for China, based on his reading of Chinese history and culture. What makes *China's Destiny* vitally important for India, Asia and the world is not only that it represents the views of China's First Leader, but that all the resources of the Government and the Kuomintang Party are behind it and are being used to imbue the youth of the land, as well as the Civil Service and the military with its teachings.

In *China's Destiny* the author writes bitterly of the havoc played with China's economic, social and cultural life by the unequal treaties imposed on her by foreign Powers. He is inclined to throw practically all the blame for China's poverty and cultural degradation on these Powers. It is perhaps for this reason that the book was not previously published in the United States. Chiang Kai-shek believes that China's salvation does not lie in imitating Western nations, but in building on the secure basis of her own cultural past.

In *Chinese Economic Theory* he outlines the self-sufficient village economic organisation of the past and the principles which underlay it. He tells us that farmers were trained as soldiers

and were organised in groups for defence. He believes that even today the same economic pattern should be kept in mind. So far as industrialisation goes, he holds that money should not be allowed to have unhampered sway over economic enterprise but that it should be controlled by the State in the interests of promoting the people's livelihood.

Philip Jaffe, an American student of Far Eastern affairs, writes an Introduction on "The Secret of 'China's Destiny,'" and notes and comments on this work. He is inclined to be hostile to the outlook of the author. He thinks that the Generalissimo's reading of Chinese history is highly coloured and romanticised, and that his attitude to the West and its institutions is mistaken. He believes that Chiang Kai-shek, in the interests of his own political party, is wanting through this book to stem the modern forces of democracy, most vocal today in the form of Communism. It is useful to have his critical observations, questions and doubts, for they keep the reader on his guard and give him pause. Nevertheless, it must be stated that, rightly or wrongly, the Generalissimo's views are apt to find sympathetic response in India and the rest of Asia which also, like China, have suffered under the heel of Western imperialism, and which in disillusionment are turning to their own cultural past for guidance in reconstructing their national life. Indians reading this book will find that the problems of China and India are similar, and so will feel drawn closer to China.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“ _____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS

The death in his eightieth year of Shri Kamakshi Natarajan at Bandra, Bombay, on April 29th, terminates an exceptionally useful life. He began his professional career as a head master; and an educationist he continued throughout his long journalistic career. The influence of his *Indian Social Reformer*, which he started and edited for several decades, until his formal retirement in 1940 in favour of his son, has far outrun its circulation, because his views were so well worth quoting by other journals. And even since his retirement “Recluse’s” “Bandra Diary” columns have kept open the channel for the expression of his instructive thinking and balanced judgment. Reformers as a group are commonly undervalued by those who cling to the well-worn grooves of custom, but without them we should stagnate and continue in our follies. One definition of the wise man in the *Dhammapada* is “one who reveals the shortcomings in others and administers reproof.” But, critical as Shri Natarajan always was of the defects in Indian society, he was never a fanatic, as his replying to Katherine Mayo’s libel proves.

His outlook was not provincial. He travelled as far afield as America, where he went in 1937 to deliver the Haskell Lectures at the Chicago University. But he insisted that India should evolve on the lines of her own spiritual ideals, a lesson which we need to

remember in these days of wholesale turning to the fading West for Light. The late distinguished editor’s combination of quiet detachment and courage deserves wide emulation by his countrymen.

Mankind has been trying for centuries to progress towards a co-operative society, declared Bombay’s Prime Minister, Shri B. G. Kher, in inaugurating the Nineteenth Bombay Provincial Co-operative Conference on April 11th. There has truly, as he said, never been greater need than today for spreading the co-operative doctrine, not only in India but also in the world. Without it, India could not fulfill the dream conceived by Gandhiji and by those others who gave their lives to bring the free nation into existence. There is no place in the co-operative movement for distinctions of caste, creed or politics. The co-operative platform ought, here as elsewhere, to be a meeting-place for every section of society.

Shri Kher, as well as Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, Health Minister to the Government of India, who inaugurated the Women’s Section of the Conference on April 12th, stressed the great and increasing need of workers imbued with the spirit of co-operation, the principles of which, she urged, should form an integral part of the adult-education programme.

That is very necessary for the arousing of the zeal of the people for the

improvement of their condition, the awakening of what Sir V. T. Krishnamachari, Dewan of Jaipur, referred to in his Presidential Address on April 11th as "a passionate desire to 'live better': a consuming urge to improve their standards of life."

We would not see material values overweighted in this land of traditional aspiration towards the spiritual, or have the pendulum swing too far in the direction of the Western restless ambition which too often exalts standards of living, in the technical sense, above standards of life. But the physical condition of the Indian masses is so deplorable, so indefensible, that every friend of the race must welcome any constructive effort to bring about the dynamic psychological change for which Sir Krishnamachari called. He said:—

A revolution like this can come only if the whole population is set to work on its own betterment: if it makes its plans and implements them under the democratic processes of the co-operative movement. Only in this way can we have long-term permanent results.

He said emphatically that collectivisation, as in the U. S. S. R., was totally unsuited to India, where conditions were entirely dissimilar. India could not stand a shock of this character to her economic system.

Co-operation is the natural basis for development of all sides of rural life and the movement should be the recognised agency for the execution of all projects for raising the standard of living of the people of India.

The need for the greater participation of women in the Co-operative Movement was brought out by Rajkumari Amrit Kaur in inaugurating the Women's Section of the Conference on April 12th. Co-operation began in the family but if India was to rise to her

full stature it must also extend to the larger family unit which was the country as a whole, she said. She felt that women could play a particularly useful and important rôle in the fields of education and health, in helping women in the rural areas as well as in the cities to become economically independent by training in handicrafts and societies for sale and purchase, in promoting community kitchens, mid-day meals for workers and school-children of the poorer classes, etc.

Co-operation, she said, bred trust. It could help the people to rise above fissiparous tendencies. Women, the custodians of tradition and custom, had been to a great extent excluded, by their own ignorance or by neglect, from many movements.

It is absolutely essential that women, who form half the population of the country, should be harnessed within an activity which is fraught with immense possibilities for the general good as also for the benefit of their own sex.

The needs were legion and the educated women of the country were a handful, but she had great faith in her own sex and also full conviction that the necessary funds would be available for the movement when its possibilities were realised. Trained workers were the great and pressing need.

An impressive "Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution" has emerged from the protracted labours of a distinguished American Committee headed by Robert M. Hutchins. It is dedicated to Gandhiji who it is confidently asserted would have been the first World President if an election had been held before the 30th of January last.

The scope of his conquest exceeded whatever had been achieved in any other's lifetime...right emerged in him as might, meekness as inheritor of the earth....Whoever will deserve to be World President will be an heir to Gandhi, a Mahatma, which means the magnanimous, august. It is fit that a preliminary draft of a world constitution be dedicated to the Precursor.

The Preamble, appropriately in the form of poetry, reads thus, in a prose set-up to save space:—

The people of the earth having agreed that the advancement of man in spiritual excellence and physical welfare is the common goal of mankind; that universal peace is the prerequisite for the pursuit of that goal; that justice in turn is the prerequisite of peace, and peace and justice stand or fall together; that iniquity and war inseparably spring from the competitive anarchy of the national states, that therefore the age of nations must end, and the era of humanity begin;

The governments of the nations have decided to order their separate sovereignties in one government of justice, to which they surrender their arms; and to establish, as they do establish, this Constitution as the covenant and fundamental law of the Federal Republic of the World.

Space limitations preclude analysis of the many excellent provisions of the Draft Constitution, which is available from *Common Cause*, 975 East 60th Street, Chicago 37. The framers' recognition of the limitations of any constitution, even an accepted one, is pertinent for India today. They emphasise that no constitution is "salvation and safety by itself."

A constitution is a descriptive summary of possible good works, which cannot possibly operate outside the frame of a saving will.... If mankind has made up its mind for self-destruction, any written Law, and were it descended from heaven, will leave it lawless.

How much of this thoughtful draft will find its way into the final formulation of a world constitution is unpredictable. The difficulties in the

way of the acceptance of and effective functioning under any world constitution are great, but the Committee are hopeful. Coming developments, they suggest, need not be measured on the tempo of the previous process. "Emergencies become emergences; century plants flower overnight."

Several articles of general permanent value are among the many interesting articles contributed to the mammoth *Commemoration Volume* (The United Press, Ltd., Patna. Rs. 10/-) in honour of the versatile Indian publicist, educationist, writer and humanitarian, Dr. Sachchidananda Sinha, on whose seventy-fifth birthday it was presented. One of the most striking of these is the article by the Hon. Dr. Kailash Nath Katju on "Gautama Buddha and Bihar."

The connection of India's greatest son with that part of the country has hallowed its soil. But Gautama the Buddha's message was above geographical considerations. It was a tragic mistake that Buddhism was banished from the land of its inception, to spread its beneficence chiefly under foreign skies. Its peaceful penetration, eastward to Japan, south to Ceylon, west to Palestine, is only part of the story of its influence. To be sure, the Buddha's teachings have been largely misunderstood in the West, thanks to the unenlightened labours of the Orientalists, but wherever the story of his life and teachings, as retold by Sir Edwin Arnold, has gone, hearts have been quickened. Gandhiji testified how deeply *The Light of Asia*, read in his student years in London, had appealed to him, whose later preaching of *ahimsa* echoed the teaching of his great Pre-

decessor. And that the missionary impulse of Buddhism is not spent is proved by the arrival in Hamburg this April of Great Abbot Uthu Nanda, yellow-robed representative of the Buddhist Grand Council of Burma, seeking permission to stay three years in Germany for the purpose of propagating Buddhism there.

Dr. Katju repudiates the notion that the Buddhist doctrines make men timid. The Buddha was a stranger to fear and, though he taught men to return hatred with love, he ever emphasised the need of fearlessness. We echo Dr. Katju's sentiment when he writes:—

In the interest of humanity at large, I wish that the teaching of Buddha...should become a living and effective force in the guidance of our life, individual as well as national and collective. Let us, in India, make an effort to bring back the Buddha to his native land.

Wars are not due to simple human instincts, declares Prof. T. H. Pear, Professor of Psychology in the University of Manchester, in his article "Peace, War and Culture-Patterns" in the January *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester*. Nothing, he suggests, could be much less instinctive than the behaviour of the atomic scientists. War, he says, is the expression of a culture pattern, but the latter can be changed. Professor Pear quotes effectively from Emery Reves's *Anatomy of Peace*, which gives a clue to a major modern difficulty:—

Nothing can distort the true picture of conditions and events in this world more than to regard one's own country as the centre of the universe, and to view all things solely in their relationship to this fixed point...our inherited method of observation in political and social matters is childishly primitive, hopelessly inadequate and thoroughly wrong.

Each nation from its own point of view seems indisputably right, but a pieced together mosaic, Mr. Reves maintains, has no relation to reality.

It is an unfortunate reflection on the prevailing culture pattern that "war is rapidly ceasing to have rules." Professor Pear remarks:—

It is relevant to mention that the chief argument put forward for its use [that of the atomic bomb] was that it would shorten the war against Japan, not that it was allowable by the rules of warfare. Matters had already got past even that stage of mental tidiness.

But new culture patterns can be built up out of the old ones, he maintains, and happily, "the films and radio have made the phrase 'the inevitability of gradualness' almost obsolete."

Enquiry, a new monthly magazine of psychical research and paranormal psychology, numbers well-known names among the contributors to its April issue. The Foreword is by Prof. C. D. Broad of Cambridge. G. N. M. Tyrrell in "A New Task for Science" remonstrates with science for its disinclination even to consider the evidence for phenomena painstakingly gathered by psychic researchers—an amusing attitude in view of the dismissal by modern psychic research of the work already done and the explanations given by Oriental psychologists and students of Occultism in the same field. J. W. Dunne presents a picture of the various observer-selves in the individual, each with its own range of perception and time. Dr. William Brown and the Dean of St. Paul's deal with the impact of the paranormal upon their own fields of activity.

Olaf Stapledon begins a series on "Data for a World View." He, too, considers psychic researchers pioneer

explorers of the dark continent of "Paranormal Psychology." This attitude tends to make the searcher blind to any knowledge already available. One might gain more from the methods of Occultism which take the traditions and the teachings of the past, and check, test and verify them, so that the results stand as independent evidence—a procedure possible in proportion as the verifier perfects and integrates his own nature. This, because his physical, mental, psychic and spiritual organisation affords the very instruments by which he must work, observe, interpret and apply. Ignoring to a large extent existing "traditions" and Eastern psychological science, because the terms of reference are unfamiliar, gives even the most learned of modern investigations the effect of a mountain travelling to give birth to a mouse.

The Indian Parliament, published from Bombay and now in its third volume, is filling a very useful rôle in educating Indian political thought on broad and constructive lines. Its articles by qualified writers cover a wide range of interests; its editorials are frank, trenchant, thought-provoking. Especially noteworthy was its combined February and March Special Issue in memory of "The Glory of His Age." This contained many valuable articles, by J. C. Kumarappa, R. R. Diwakar, K. G. Mashruwala, Arthur Moore, Horace Alexander and others

and accounts of Gandhiji's part in the freedom struggle and in the restoration of peace to Noakhali.

Shri K. Srinivasan wrote in his editorial in that issue of the three great rôles Gandhiji had played and in each of which he had set new standards. They were the rôles of "the sensitiser of the human conscience, the purifier of politics and the emancipator of the fettered and the oppressed." He had given a new direction to political power by translating authority into a call to service. The translation of his transcendental idealism into twentieth-century realities had not been easy. His dressing of politics in religious garb had opened a fresh pasture to the insincere, but a vigilant electorate could meet the danger.

He wanted a courageous, self-reliant Voter and a self-restrained dutiful Minister. Between them will be born the Parliament of Service.

In the trenchant editorial, "No Freedom to Kill Order," in the issue which appeared at the end of April, the appeal to civil liberties put forward on behalf of those who had been seeking to promote civil disorder—something quite distinct from peaceful civil disobedience—is thrown out of court. Civil liberty is well defined by Shri K. Srinivasan as "the acceptance of Democratic Sovereignty and the Rule of Law."

When the bunds of order give way, the waters of freedom disappear into the wasteful flood.