

# THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly,  
and lost among the host — as does the evening  
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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## “THUS HAVE I HEARD” —

There is much reason to fear that modern systems of administering human Society will prove a commentary on and a justification of Manu's ideals— but by contrast.

These words were spoken in 1909 by the venerable Dr. Bhagavan Das. Read today they sound like a prophecy fulfilled. The two wars were a direct result of wrong principles used in governing nations. But even the devastating wars have not awakened the States to change their system of administration built upon false foundations.

In his excellent lectures published under the title, *The Science of Social Organization*, Dr. Bhagavan Das has pointed out how modern society can and should be built on the pattern drawn by the great Lawgiver Manu, who is quoted:—

Only he who knows the Science of the true and all-embracing Knowledge, only he deserves to be the leader of armies, the wielder of the Rod of Justice, the King of men, the Suzerain and Overlord of Kings.

Even India has forgotten the Laws of Manu, and Gandhiji's interpretation of the *Varna-Ashrama*

*Dharma* has been more often ignored than followed. Perhaps it was difficult for his many followers to examine that interpretation while they were engaged in the struggle for the country's freedom. But now, in shaping the India of tomorrow, that interpretation should be studied, with a view to its application.

One major difficulty is that Gandhiji's Religion expresses itself through political, social and economic ideas and therefore appears diffusive. The task of the Indian legislator and administrator is to understand and apply those principles; the understanding of them will be simplified and their application strengthened if they will take the trouble to examine the ideas propounded by Dr. Bhagavan Das in his *Science of Social Organization*. Not only is his exposition of the important subject of education valu-

able, but also his teaching on the building of the State. In these days the democratization of the State has been given a wrong direction, not only in Russia but also in all Occidental States, and by those Oriental ones who copy them.

One common defect is related to the principle of equalization. The triad of the French Revolution is not equitably applied—Liberty and Equality outrun Fraternity, and so Liberty turns into license and Equality becomes the womb of self-assertion and ruinous pride. Manu also teaches that Self-Dependence is the mother of happiness and other-dependence the womb of unhappiness. Nature reveals the principle of equality in and through diversity in every kingdom, including the human. Nature is intelligent and counteracts the foolish attempt, say, in Russia, to destroy the capitalist and the bourgeois, or in the U.S.A. to do away with the Socialist and the Communist. Some Indians take pride in pointing to Australian or New Zealand social phenomena, and especially applauding the Russian custom, that the taxi-driver will sit down to dine with his passenger and will drink with him. It is good that humble birth is no handicap and aristocratic birth no advantage. But

this kind of equality has another side to it. Our esteemed friend Dr. Bhagavan Das would, we imagine, say:—

While it is quite right that the chauffeur should eat at the same restaurant table with the owners of the car and the minister and his wife, and be treated as an equal in this respect, yet he will scarcely be able to carry on *equally* well the minister's work, or a bank-manager's, or a general's, or a science professor's. And that the latter should have to wash their own dishes and clothes, and cook their own food would mean much loss of time from their proper work. This is where Manu's fourfold scheme comes in and is justified.

In modern India, Fraternity, Universal Brotherhood, should be stressed as of the highest value. Then "equality" of men and women, of human beings and animals, etc., will be correctly understood. Further, liberty will not turn into license, and the talk of rights will be replaced by the due recognition of the Duties of Man. Manu does not advocate untouchability any more than the levelling down of all to a uniform mediocrity when he teaches:—

One's own ploughman, an old friend of the family, one's own cow-herd, one's own servant, one's own barber, and whoever else may come for refuge and offer service—from the hands of all such Shudras may food be taken.

SHRAVAKA

## MĀRA, THE TEMPTER

[ **Shri S. K. Ramachandra Rao**, Research Assistant in the Department of Social Sciences of the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, discusses here the problem of Evil from the point of view of the struggle between the higher and lower aspects of man's nature. While Evil as an opposing or contrary force in Nature is necessary to the equilibrium of the Kosmos, balancing active Goodness, as Spirit and Matter or the centrifugal and centripetal forces are mutually dependent and necessary to the harmony of the manifested world, it is possible for man by strong effort to purge his own nature of evil, as Shri Ramachandra Rao has brought out in this article.—ED. ]

Seven years did I keep intent vigilance on the Buddha to catch him in a moment of weakness ; but lo ! he was ever watchful.

—Māra, the Tempter.

When the future Buddha was born, Asita, the sage of the Sarvadhara Hills, prophesied that the child would grow up to be a successful monarch or a great mendicant. These two alternative ambitions face everyone ; either living in the world, seeking to fulfil all one's wants and to master all one surveys ; or resisting the world's temptations, renouncing all attachments and fixing one's attention on mastering oneself. The former flows out (*pravṛtti*) ; the latter withdraws (*nivṛtti*). Both have been recognized as normal courses, but in the pursuit of the former, the wise warn us, one ought to be exceedingly cautious, lest in one's anxiety to master the world, one loses one's own self. The "mastery" achieved thus would turn out to be a deplorable servitude : yet the major portion of mankind choose this course. Withdrawal is a trying, arduous and unattractive course ; few enter it and fewer still succeed. Between

the pleasant and the good, what is pleasant always tempts.

This factor of temptation is personified in the Buddhist legends as Māra. Etymologically it is closely related to "death," a snare which binds man, and catches him not once but again and again. In the *Kāṭha-upaniṣad*, Yama, the Lord of Death, asserts :—"One who believes entirely and only in the world gets into my grip again and again." One of the prayers of the *Ṛg-veda* reads : "Let not thy worshipper be disregarded like a wild animal in a pasture or go along the road of Yama !" In the *Atharva-veda*, Vivasvat is implored : "May death pass away and deathlessness come to us ! May he preserve these men from decay : May their spirits not depart to Yama !"

The *Satapatha-brāhmaṇa* also points out that the unwise are "indeed born again after death and become again and again the food of death."

Thus death really means an unending series of births and deaths, a terrible prospect for a Hindu. In popular literature, Māra is pictured as a most handsome youth, full of lust, bewitching whomever he sees. He comes to disturb the austerities of ascetics, to turn their minds toward worldly enjoyments and thus keep them under his sway. We have the famous legend of Kāma (a synonym of Māra, meaning Desire) with his fair consort Rati (literally Enjoyment), disturbing the severe penance of Śiva (literally Good) in order to direct his attention to the damsel Umā<sup>1</sup> (literally Easy Life) and thereby preserve the world from destruction by the "demon" Tāraka (literally Saviour). This is the theme of Kālidāsa's famous epic poem, the *Kumārasambhava*. The truth behind the symbolism is that desire assisted by love of enjoyment distracts the good and leads to an easy life; this results in the continuance of the world. Kāma or Māra is thus the spirit of the world; man, who has his eyes on the prize of liberation, rest, or immortality, must combat this spirit of desire and death. Māra is wicked because he frustrates the noble urge to liberation and drags his victim into helpless servility.

In the legend of Gotama who became the Buddha, Māra is described as a constant opponent of

the Teacher's struggle to liberate himself and to liberate mankind. He is pictured as seething with jealousy, for Gotama would not only free himself from his snare but would establish his own kingdom as a rival to Māra's. The Buddha was determined to pull down the palace of Māra, conquer the wicked inmate and inaugurate the reign of *Dhamma* (Law), which is the exact antithesis of Māra.

The Buddha's whole life was a constant repelling of the force of Māra. Long before Gotama became the Buddha, when he had just gone out of his home, he met Māra for the first time. Māra attempted to dissuade the agitated young man from renouncing his attachment to worldly life: "Depart not, in seven days from today you will be an emperor!" But Gotama heeded him not.

The second time Māra met him, Gotama, worn out by excessive austerities, but not a Buddha yet, was on the banks of the river Neranjara in the forests of Uruvela. Māra appeared before him, warned him that death was at hand and urged: "Live, my man, life is precious!"

But Gotama declared that defeat in a struggle was worse than death: he would rather die struggling than live like a coward. Then Māra came in the disguise of an excited mes-

<sup>1</sup> The word is split as U-mā, and means "Don't!" It refers to the pleading of the mother, Menakā, that her daughter, young, frail and fair, shall not waste herself in severe austerities. (*Vide the Kumārasambhava*)

senger and cried: "Devadatta has conquered Kapilavasthu, imprisoned your father and abducted your wife! Why stay you here, you are badly wanted there!" But Gotama was not moved. Then Māra argued that Gotama was attempting an impossibility; enlightenment would not come and he would waste his life. Failing again, Māra employed the artifices of his three daughters, Rati (Pleasure), Tanha (Craving) and Arati (Discontent), to win him over. These beautiful damsels in all grace and youth came to Gotama with songs of spring and words of love. But the ascetic's answer as translated by Ananda K. Coomaraswamy was:—

Pleasure is brief as a flash of lightning  
Or like an Autumn shower, only for a  
moment. . . .

Why should I then covet the pleasures  
you speak of?

I see your bodies are full of impurity:  
Birth and death, sickness and age are  
yours.

I see the highest prize, hard to attain  
by men. . . .

The true and constant wisdom of the  
wise.

Māra grew furious and began to assault this extraordinary man with a terrible whirlwind, a storm of rain and a mighty flood, showers of rocks, a storm of deadly weapons, burning ashes and coals, and with "thick and fourfold darkness." But the ascetic sat unmoved; and "Māra's bow and his standard fell from his grasp, and all his cohorts, a million and thirty-six thousand in number fled, filled with dismay." Māra ran away confounded and

ashamed.

Māra approached Gotama for the third time when the latter had just come out victorious in his struggle, and was sitting under the *nigrodha* tree, working out the implications of his enlightenment. This time Māra urged him to die: "Pass away now, my man, now is the time for you to pass away!" Now that the Buddha had defied him and escaped from his sway altogether, Māra was anxious that he should not induce others to imitate him. But the Buddha had resolved to proclaim his gospel and lead the entire mankind to liberation; he therefore would not yield to Māra's plea.

The final visit of Māra to the Buddha was at the latter's death-bed on the banks of the Nerañjarā. He urged the great teacher to die, and for once the Buddha felt like complying with his wish: "Make yourself happy, O Evil One, I will die ere long; three months from now will be the time for me to pass away." The principle of death did devour the constitution that had experienced the highest liberation, but it was a death that entitled the self to eternal rest. The Buddha had conquered Māra and his domain completely while he lived, and thus on his death he transcended the principle of death.

In Śāntideva's *Sikṣāsamuccaya*, four Māras are mentioned: the Māras of the constitution, of suffering, of death and of the gods. Others add another, the Māra of the

accumulation of Karma. Further it is said in the canons, Māra has three sons: Confusion, Joy and Pride. And his three daughters are named Craving, Discontent and Passion. He wishes ill, injury and insecurity. His army consists of: Desire which is "next-in-command," Discontent, Hunger-Thirst or bodily needs, Sloth-Torpor or bodily inclinations, Fear, Doubt, Contempt, Arrogance, Gain, Fame, Honour, Self-praise and Speaking-ill-of-others.<sup>2</sup> The symbolism must be obvious.

Māra is variously designated: Friend of Fools, Wicked Sprite, Evil One, Hold-fast Dragon. It is a principle of existence that each individual must encounter. Ordinarily the individual surrenders to this great power and becomes insensible to the highest ideal and incapable of attaining to it. He neither sees the goal nor knows the way. Such an ordinary man, who is Māra's prisoner, is called a fool; he is careless. Māra is not a power that can be destroyed for ever by any individual, however great and enlightened. It is a problem for every individual to face and solve. There is no way of destroying it absolutely, for "this revolution of existence is begin-

ningless, and there is no known origin of individuals, who come and go, veiled by ignorance and chained by desire."<sup>3</sup> Māra exists or does not exist for individuals, but it is inherent in average human nature.

In the very air is bondage, where the mind runs to and fro.

With *that*, O recluse, I will bind thee.  
Thou shalt not escape me!"<sup>4</sup>

"Whenever you say 'this is mine' and call something 'me' and if you mean what you say, then, O monk, you are in my hold!"<sup>5</sup> It is therefore that the Buddha calls out: "Arise! be alert! (literally sit upright) Train yourselves aright for quiet (*santiyā*). Seeing you slack, let not Maccurājā (Māra) take you over (to himself)!"<sup>6</sup> And in the *Dhammapada* he points out that this laughter and these joys of man are improper, for the whole world is on fire—the fire of Māra: "Hid in gloom, O ye men, seek ye not light?" But to seek the light needs effort, one must struggle to overcome the thick gloom which has mankind in its hold. Each must struggle for the light.

The passions that bind man, according to the *Majjhima-nikāya*, are threefold: those of sensuous pleasure, of existence and of ignorance. In the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, a

<sup>2</sup> *Sutta-nipāta*, Padhana-sutta, 2-2-12 to 15.

<sup>3</sup> *Saṃyutta-nikāya*, Nidāna-vagga, XV, 5. Oldenberg's translation of this passage runs as follows: "The pilgrimage of beings has its beginning in eternity. No opening can be discovered from which proceeding, creatures, mazed in ignorance, fettered by a thirst for being, stray and wander."

<sup>4</sup> *Vinaya-Pitaka*, i, 21 (F. L. Woodward translation).

<sup>5</sup> *Saṃyutta-nikāya*, Sagatha-vagga, IV, 19 (free translation).

<sup>6</sup> *Sutta-nipāta*, 2-10-2.

list of 10 fetters is given: egoism, doubt, mistaken discipline, sensual desire, ill-will, love of life, longing for a future life, conceit, arrogance and ignorance. In the *Dīgha-nikāya*, five hindrances are mentioned: sensuous desire, ill-will, sloth-torpor, conceit and doubt. Nāgārjuna's *Dharmasaṅgraha* lists a number of major and minor stains: greed, hate, pride, ignorance, heresy, doubt, idleness, vanity, shamelessness, cruelty, anger, enmity, hypocrisy, contentiousness, envy, avarice, deceit, double-play, haughtiness, malice, recklessness, sloth, arrogance, breach of trust, indolence, carelessness, indifference, forgetfulness, wickedness, argumentation and idle curiosity. A probationer for renunciation is to guard against these wicked things: destruction of life, taking what is not given, unholy living, falsehood, wine and drinks, eating at improper times, entertainments like dancing and music, the use of ornaments, gold and silver.<sup>7</sup> All this renders the roots of man firm in the world; he becomes "food" for Māra. Then it becomes hard for the mind to escape his clutches, even as a fish cannot endure being taken out of its watery home and dropped on dry ground. (*Dhammapada*. v. 34)

"Māra must be fought with the weapon of wisdom."<sup>8</sup> And wisdom is paraphrased in the following verse: "As a bubble of water, as a mirage,

so must this world be viewed; it is then that Maccurājā becomes blind."<sup>9</sup> The natural instinct is to cling to the world, accept its reality and obey its behests. Attachment develops and with it dependence. The self gets lost in the overpowering atmosphere of worldly existence; the essence of being is lost sight of and we credit with confidence the insignificant. The reign of falsehood is thus inaugurated and we become devotees of unreality. This is the false outlook (*micchādiṭṭhi*) which leads one astray, into the jaws of Māra.

The temptation to believe in the world and accept it as important must be resisted and it is only thus that Māra can be weakened. There is indeed something beyond, and this was shown by the Buddha. When one is aware of the important *beyond*, the interest in *this* ceases, and a positive dislike for it arises too. Note, for instance, how the Buddha looked upon his own body. The monk Nāgasena declares that the body must be regarded as a sore, one must not cling to it, but must employ it for the practice of the holy life.<sup>10</sup> It must become the tool of the highest attainment. For rendering it thus, love of pleasure must be discarded, it must be unmoored from all attachment. When in this structure of darkness light dawns, Māra becomes powerless. When he

<sup>7</sup> *Vinaya-Pitaka*, Mahāvagga, I, vi.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, v. 40.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, v. 170.

<sup>10</sup> Cited in *Milindapañho*, p. 77.

tried to assault the nun Kisāgotamī, she spurned him and announced: "Sped for me is all worldly joy, pierced is the mass of gloom. Defeating death's array, here I stand stainless."<sup>11</sup>

Wisdom is said to have the merit of an axe; it cuts off. What does it cut off and how? The answer is given by Nāgasena in the *Milinda-phaṇḥo* (p. 36): The man grasps the mind by his mentation and cuts off the evil stains by wisdom. Wisdom is thus a beneficent factor. There are other beneficent factors also, such as virtue, faith, energy, mindfulness and concentration.

Virtue is described as the gateway and groundwork of all the others; when founded in virtue, nothing will decline. "Founding his mind and wisdom on virtue, the earnest monk will clear all this tangle." *Sīla* strictly means "habit," but by usage it has acquired the sense of "virtuous habit" or "good conduct"; and in the Buddhist literature it is used to mean "that which calms the mind or prevents the fickleness of mind."<sup>12</sup> It not only helps good grow but eradicates evil as well. It has a positive aspect in so far as desirable conduct is concerned, and it restrains the individual from undesirable conduct. It weakens Māra and strengthens *Dhamma*.

Wisdom without virtue amounts to little, for, as Mrs. Rhys Davids observes: "Man had not just to

know; he had to wayfare, to become in order to attain. He had, in a word, to live his religion." It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of noble living for obtaining final release from worldly fetters; wisdom sheds the light, but the effort involves action. To become worthy of the high ideal, the whole being must be properly disciplined, the senses well under control, the mind in perfect order, and the heart quietly at rest. The senses being the prime means of contact with the world, it is of urgent necessity that they be subjugated. For the chain of interdependence originates here as admirably retold by S. Tachibana in *The Ethics of Buddhism*:—

If any one does not restrain his organs of sense, his morality will not be preserved well; if his morality is not preserved well, the right concentration of mind will not be attained; if this is not attained, knowledge and insight which see things as they really are will not be attained; if these are not attained, disgust at worldly vanity and freedom from human passion will not be attained; and if these are not attained, emancipation, knowledge and insight will not be attained.

This is a difficult process and needs strenuous effort; family, company, work or illness is capable of distracting one from the pursuit of this ideal. Unless the whole being is seized with an impelling urge, success is not certain, for

<sup>11</sup> *Saṃyutta-nikāya*, Sagāthavagga, 5, 3.

<sup>12</sup> See B. C. LAW: *The Life and Works of Buddhaghōṣa*. (1923)

countless are the ways temptation can follow. Māra's assault is an incessant threat and until the moment of complete liberation, one must stand in dread of him. Māra waits and watches for an occasion to enter and, once he enters, he conquers. Gotama was watching

Māra continually and was ever aware of his plans: never did he forget and never was he indolent. He actively guarded himself against this unwelcome but persistent visitor. Finally Māra confessed his defeat, in the words quoted from *Sutta-nipāta* with which this article opens.

S. K. RAMACHANDRA RAO

## THE GITA INSPIRES

The distinguished Yale University Indologist, Dr. Franklin Edgerton, addressed the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on March 30th on "A Westerner's Impressions of the *Bhagavad-Gita*." He praised both its greatness as a work of literature and its eminent suitability as an introduction to the very best of Indian philosophical thought.

The *Gita*, he said, combined simplicity of language and grandeur to a degree rare in great Indian poetry, even in that of Kalidasa, "one of the really great poets of the world." And its appeal as a religious and devotional work was very wide. It was not only the favourite sacred book of India; it also challenged the admiration of American graduate students but slightly acquainted with Sanskrit and showed them "what an exciting field of study Indian religious thought must be."

The motive of the *Gita's* author seemed to be, like that of Buddha, to get his message across so that all could understand it. Hence the everyday words, the graphic, homely similes, so simple, yet so effective.

Dr. Edgerton praised especially the catholicity of the *Gita*. Not only did

it recognize different effective ways of attaining salvation, which different individuals might prefer, or the same individual might prefer at different times; it even stated that worship paid to other gods with sincere devotion was paid to and accepted by the true God. This was one of the fine and inspiring things in Indian thought and certainly more characteristic of it than of Western thought. That was the real tolerance which did not mean indifference.

The Emperor Asoka in the third century had proclaimed in an Edict that one who vilified the sects of others did great damage to his own. He wanted all his subjects to listen gladly to the doctrines of sects other than their own, always looking for the good in them, and he said that the sects should try to live in peace and harmony. Dr. Edgerton thought that it would be hard to find, down to the present day, any European ruler who would think such a sentiment should be commended to the thought of others. He saw in India's "latest great Rishi, Mahatma Gandhi," a lineal descendant of the Emperor Asoka. He had shown the same kind of tolerance for the religious views of others and one of his great points had been urging the people to seek for the good in others' religions.

## THE INFLUENCE OF LITERATURE

[We live in an age when modern science and technology are very highly valued; very probably over-valued. As a result, the influence of literature is undervalued, not only by the political and business worlds but also by large numbers of the rising generation who will be the citizens of tomorrow. We are very glad, therefore, to present a thoughtful paper by **Mr. R. H. Ward**, a playwright, whose essay on "The Mind of Poetry" we published in our issue of November 1949. This is a shortened and revised version of the lecture given by Mr. Ward at the London Branch of the Indian Institute of Culture on May 1st 1953.—ED.]

All literature of any real importance and value has two meanings, an outward one and an inward one; and it is probably true to say that the inward meaning can be discovered and defined in as many different ways as the work in question has readers. For we are capable of discovering in it only what we are capable of bringing to it.

I am not in any exact way equating the two meanings of essentially valuable literature with form and content. Any piece of writing must be "about something," and to this extent it has content: any piece of writing uses words to express that "something," and to this extent it has form. But if we put the word "significant" before the words "form" and "content," we leave behind the conventional concept and lay emphasis only on form and content which are meaningful; literature of real importance has a meaning to be found in its shape or construction and a meaning to be found in the ideas underlying this. We have now abandoned as essentially unmeaningful, the great

majority of the world's writings, all ephemeral literature of whatever sort; for only meaning will preserve the life of words and the ideas they stand for.

We can continue to speak of form and content, as convenience and the limitations of language require us to do, though we have limited both. Now we must limit them further by suggesting, though in no hard-and-fast way, that the construction of meaningful forms is, *relatively* speaking, an intellectual activity, and that concern with meaningful content is, equally *relatively* speaking, an activity in which the feelings take the lead.

In the creation of a significant work of literature these two faculties of mind and heart work together integrally, neither can work effectively in separation from the other, though this will not prevent many contemporary critics from concentrating, in the over-intellectualized fashion of our times, upon form to the exclusion of content. This is another way of saying that we tend at present to be concerned with

processes of thinking rather than processes of feeling.

When there is this kind of approach to literature, the very phrase "intellectual beauty," so full of meaning for Shelley, becomes nonsense, because beauty itself implies emotion; the heart as well as the mind must appreciate it. Therefore to emphasize only the form of a work of literature, and appraise only that, is not really to criticize it at all. Supposing it to be a work of real literary value, and its form and its content fully interdependent, the one reveals the other and only both reveal the whole with which criticism should properly be concerned.

Literature of any real importance speaks from two levels, a more superficial and a deeper level. We can properly say that the outward level is more directly expressed by form, but not that it is form, and we can properly say that the inward level is more intimately related to content, but not that it is content. In order, however, to discuss the matter, we must make a kind of conventional separation of these two meanings. This is a matter of convenience and of the nature of language, which, for the sake of clarity or ease, tends to absolutes, whereas we are really dealing all the time with relatives.

"Man shall not live by bread alone." We seldom question the meaning of these familiar words. We have some notion that they

indicate man's need for religion, or that humanism is not enough, or that God must come into man's purview; and doubtless these words do imply these things. The fact remains that man can "live" by bread alone, if by "bread" is meant nourishment for his body and its brain. But the next words, "but by every word which proceedeth out of the mouth of God," indicates that the word "live," bears an inward and deeper meaning relevant to some other potentiality in man, a kind of life which requires to be thought about in an entirely different way from his bodily life. The full quotation seems to imply that this different kind of life can also die if it lacks nourishment of the sort appropriate to it.

At once we find ourselves considering man as having the outward form of a body and the inward content of a soul; and the soul requires to be thought about on a different level of understanding. Meanwhile, man as a whole—for we are making an essentially false separation between his two aspects—requires yet a third kind of thinking if he is to be understood; he requires whole thinking, thinking with mind and heart, or imaginative thinking; it might appropriately be called "visionary" thinking.

Literature which is worthy of consideration is always imaginative or "visionary." It sees things whole. The text quoted proclaims man's need of other than bodily nourish-

ment and of learning to think about himself in other than merely "rational" ways. Yet it seldom strikes us that our inward and deeper lives would perish did we receive no nourishment at that deeper level. We do not think of ourselves as possessed of souls which actually live on impressions and perceptions, as our bodies live on bread. We do not think of ourselves as dying inwardly if our souls are denied the proper food.

Still less do we think of ourselves as whole men whose wholeness will be preserved only if the two aspects of our nature are fed adequately, each with the "bread of life" appropriate to it. If we did so think of ourselves, maybe we would never have allowed to come into existence the industrial civilization which now threatens our existence, an intellectualized civilization permitting only the nourishment of the body and progressively depriving the soul of the nourishment fit for it; a civilization in which the emotional life inherent in man's relationship with unspoilt nature and with unspoilt human beings is at a discount. Meanwhile, literature of the kind which ministers to man's mind and to his heart has meaning on the third or imaginative level, and so ministers to man as a whole. Such literature is food of the kind which comes into question when it is said that man cannot live by bread alone.

Man can be poisoned in his body, and indeed killed, by bodily food

which is inappropriate or contaminated; and it is equally true that he can be poisoned in his soul, and indeed killed, by absorbing into his psyche impressions and perceptions which the soul cannot usefully assimilate. Impressions and perceptions which relate only to the animal level of existence cannot be fed to the psyche without doing it harm. Literature which has only superficial meanings, can only starve or actively poison the soul.

Almost all literature as we know it, including much that is very highly thought of, is of this kind. Not absolutely so: it is a question of degree. But the degree of psychic nourishment contained in most of what we call literature is so small, the degree of psychic poison so great, that the harm done to man by the majority of books published far outweighs the good.

Let us look at it as a matter of values. The body and its mind have their own proper values belonging to the "rational" man, sometimes called the "scientific" or even "mechanized" man. The soul's values are of quite another kind; they are the values Pascal referred to when he said that "the heart has its reasons of which the reason knows naught."

What makes most literature poisonous to the soul is our ignorance of the difference between these ways of thinking; an attempt to impose the body's values upon the soul. This is food which the soul can not

assimilate. Man's soul can no more live on food which does not "speak to its condition" than his body could live on the symphonies of Beethoven.

Literature of the kind with which we are concerned has a more superficial meaning which the mind understands by "body-thinking," and a deeper meaning which the heart understands by "soul-thinking." The New Testament is, I suppose, Western man's clearest example of literature of this kind. The quotation which we have been considering is an instance of its dual significance, which comments in turn upon the dual significance of man himself. (In recent years the New Testament has been examined from something like this point of view in the writings of P. D. Ouspensky and Dr. Maurice Nicoll.)

On one level the Gospels are the outward story of the birth, life and death of Jesus of Nazareth. They can be understood on that level only, and are so understood by most who read them, whether or not such men call themselves Christians. Of course it is realized by these readers that this story, or history, as Christians prefer to call it, "has a moral" and carries the ethical implication that you must conduct the life of the body and its mind, which can live by bread alone, in a particular way. If you suggest that the Gospels also have a meaning of great emotional and psychological importance, which only the heart,

working in harmony with the reason, can imaginatively understand, it is very probable that they will refuse to consider your suggestion seriously. At best they will attempt to argue it away by treating it on a purely rational or "body-thinking" level. But these matters can be dealt with only on their own level, where a different way of thinking operates.

What emerges from your discussion with those who read only the surface of the Gospels is that, where any consideration of the soul is in question, there are many whose understanding is incapable of functioning in the necessary mode. Such people cannot but dismiss the soul and the things which belong to it as either nonsensical or nonexistent. They lack the apparatus for thinking as the soul thinks; whatever psychological quality they may once have possessed which would have given an inward and deeper meaning to their bodily and mental existences, that quality is there no longer. The circumstances of the average contemporary human life are such that the soul, if it does not actually die, falls into the coma which results from starvation, and from this coma something more than words, even the singularly potent words of the Gospels, is required to wake it.

We can say that, to the majority of men the inward meaning of such literature is inaccessible; it must escape their understanding. They can apprehend the Gospels only as

a history which evidently "has a moral," but a moral which, when they try to apply it to their own outward lives, they find themselves powerless to implement; for it is not to the outward life that the real "moral" of the Gospels belongs.

To be properly understood and used, the Gospels must be studied, not only as the history of the birth, life and death of the historic Jesus, but also as the psychological history of the birth, life and death of the soul itself. The outward history of Jesus is a symbol for something of quite another kind. All literature of a certain order is essentially religious, however secular it may superficially appear. If, for example, we examine in the light of imagination a work such as the *Rubàiyât* of Omar Khayyam, generally considered to be the exaltation of materialistic hedonism, we shall see that it is a document of very profound and extraordinary psychological and religious significance.

The outward meaning is never the same as the inward. We can only say that the outward meaning "stands for" the inward. The inward meaning is an enigma; the outward meaning is the clue to it. The enigma always requires to be interpreted, and the interpretative faculty is neither the reason *per se* nor the emotions *per se*, but the imagination which is their synthesis. The soul has no words; it and its life are ultimately ineffable. But the way in which writers, who are

in the proper sense creative, use words, making exoteric symbols for that which is esoteric, brings them near, at their best, to "speaking for" the soul. Only he who has eyes to see and ears to hear can read such words as they should be read. The soul of a book can speak to a reader's soul only if his soul is awake to hear. But literature is literature in the sense in which we have been considering it only if great art on the part of the writer bridges the gap between the two different kinds of thinking, marrying the outward form and the inward content as closely as the body and soul of a human creature, and demonstrating clearly their interdependence, so that one reveals the other in the light of the third way of thinking, the imaginative way.

Imagination, the quality which gives literature value, like God whose servant it is, is undefinable, except in negative ways. It is not "fancy" or "fantasy" or "surrealism" or any mode of thinking noticeable merely because it is bizarre. Indeed, imagination is often not noticeable at all, though a man who was himself imaginative would notice if it were absent from a work of literature. God, after all, is known only to the man whose consciousness is such that it can recognize God's existence; for a man lacking this consciousness, God does not exist; except perhaps as an intellectual supposition. But such a man does not himself exist; he lives, but by bread alone. Really

to live is to live, not only in the body and the mind, but also in the soul, which, when it is properly nourished, co-operates with the intellect to bring forth the imaginative vision.

The influence of all literature which has the necessary dual meaning is an influence for life of this kind, for "more abundant" life. A book matters vitally in so far as its form carries a content which is a soul. In such a book the reader whose own soul is awake can see that soul mirrored as he reads; from such a book he can learn something which will enhance his own self-knowledge, waken him further, lead

him toward the development of imaginative vision in himself. All literature which does not have this mysterious inward effect upon men is negative, and probably harmful.

It is an ironic reflection that, while positive and creative literature contains within it that which might save the contemporary world from the soullessness and lack of imagination which threaten it with destruction, probably nothing has done more to bring about that soulless and unimaginative condition than literature of the negative kind. Books can be lethal. But they can also be the bread of eternal life.

R. H. WARD

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## WORLD GOVERNMENT AND U.N.O.

A distinguished deputation led by the Rt. Hon Arthur Henderson, Chairman of the British Parliamentary Group for World Government, presented to the British Minister of State on March 18th their Group's proposals for United Nations Charter revision in 1955.

Accepting as the goal the creation of a World Federal Government with adequate but properly defined powers as alone capable of preserving world peace, it made several recommendations for ultimate radical transformation of the UN to achieve this. Two preparatory changes urged as immediately practicable called for (1) Opening UN membership to every Sovereign State fulfilling the conditions of payment of dues, etc.; leaving to the International Court the decision in disputed cases as to whether applicants met the definition of a Sovereign State to be

written into the Charter; and (2) Forming a small uniformed UN Police Force of persons responsible to the Secretary General and available for guard duties at critical points and perhaps for taking charge of the stock pile of atomic material proposed by President Eisenhower.

A third practicable change, less directly related to peace and disarmament was recommended—the creation of a World Economic Development Authority to which each nation should contribute a percentage of the value of its total production. The Directors of the World Economic Development Authority would be responsible to a Committee of the whole UN, the number of votes cast by each member state being related to its annual financial contribution to the WEDA fund.

The problem is one of pressing and general concern.

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## MY REASONING AND MY REALIZATIONS

[**Shri J. M. Ganguli** is on solid ground in pointing out the limitations of reason. However important for the consideration of material things, it is certainly incapable of helping its possessor to a knowledge of spirit. Reason is the lower power of the human mind and as it grows in strength it is but too likely to shut out man's spiritual perceptions, as Shri Ganguli has observed in his own case. Fortunately, man is not without the higher power of intuition. To this power of direct spiritual perception Indian philosophical thought acknowledges its great indebtedness. One phase of its expression is "the vision splendid" of youth to which Wordsworth has paid eloquent tribute in his "Ode, Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood" and which too often man, alas, perceives "die away, and fade into the light of common day." The scientist will no doubt cling to his clumsy weapon of reason, but the aspiring soul will be well advised to weigh and ponder Shri Ganguli's warning against risking the wider vision for the sake of a logic precluded by its limitations from finality.—ED.]

Between my reasoning and my realizations there is no silver bridge, no harmony, no reconciliation.

Before I had not learnt to reason, I was more intent on looking for light and inspiration than later when I sat brooding, sifting, analyzing and threading some fanciful thinking and reasoning through events, occurrences and my own experiences. Neither the past nor the present had then made me halt and look backward and forward, and so my intuitions throbbed spontaneously and my nature functioned in smooth harmony with my actions and with the effects which my environment brought to me. The ripples and waves of the present gave me inspiration and brought realizations which kept me absorbed and instead of scattering my thoughts in search of a cause, sent me deep within myself in quest of

the answers which I sought for my satisfaction.

Then there came a change; and, as I drifted along with the ebb and flow of events, I made tendrils out of my passing reactions and wove them round what I saw and felt. In so doing how much I have lost! How many eventful moments have passed; how many colours have shone and disappeared; how many thrilling inspirations must have come and gone unreceived and ignored!

Nature's mysteries now reveal themselves and again withdraw from sight in their own majestic way without a break to give us time to fling our thoughts back, to catch our thread of reasoning and to tie with it what we now see, feel and marvel at. Where are the skill and wisdom in us to arrange and connect the different traces of events, flashes

of our sentimental reactions and subtle, provocative inspirations, which lead away our thoughts and overwhelm us? What folly for me, a grown man, to go back to playing with blocks, building a structure of what we call cause and effect out of my environmental reactions! Where is the line of cause and effect in the chaotic contents of my realizations? Yet my vanity is pricked by my having to admit that I cannot reason out and map out mentally the minutest and the vastest doings of the Omniscient; that I cannot bring within the compass of my comprehension all my impressions and observations, ordered in the manner I have chosen for my satisfaction. Am I to spin out reasoning and extend the limits of my comprehension without attempting to judge the soundness of either?

I came into the world a crying baby, shy and nervous in a strange environment; I was rocked into quietness in the nursery cradle, which was then all that interested me and which I understood as much or as little of why it moved as I understood why I moved my limbs. When out of the nursery, I ran and fell and jumped and played through boyhood till youth arrived, then impulsive forces swung my senses to and fro as the cradle had once swung my little body. They shattered my tranquillity of mind. I reflected not; I noticed not the tremendous significances that Nature and the Subtleness within it were unfolding before me. I was absorbed only in

magnifying and glorifying a misguided Self within, which accepted or rejected things as it pleased and ever pointed the way to mere impulsive and crude pleasure which intoxicated it. Thus my sight was dimmed, and my thoughts ever kept revolving round my personality, within the limits of which only was my consciousness receptive and within the framework of which I arranged and connected my experiences and recollections.

Thus I forged my chain of reasoning with links of the assorted presumptions which my vanity and egotism made me make out of mere sense reactions. Thus weakly, uncertainly and even arbitrarily my reasoning started working and getting me and my thoughts into its grip. Then, before I would take a step forward I would weigh doing so on the scales of reason. Something within me, however, makes me rebel against thus stopping at every turn to tie whatever I see and feel with what I have known before, so that a logical sequence may be maintained. I want to spread my gaze over a wider landscape, where the trace of cause and effect is imperceptible, even irrevocably lost. I gaze upon that vaster landscape and receive inspirations which thrill me. They bring realizations which ever remain beyond all reasoning. What reasoning can encompass my feelings, which make me reverently put my hands together and stand still, forgetful of myself and unworried by the weight

of my past or the ceaseless demands of the present when a glow, rising from unknown depths, dispels the chilly gloom? What is it that makes me close my eyes and restrain my outer senses and listen inwardly to a mysterious call when tumultuous waves of dark mystery beat upon my vanity and overthrow my logic and my calculations? What argument can keep my tears flowing when, in the midst of overwhelming grief I suddenly experience, like a soothing balm, a tender touch within, which turns me toward a new light, a new and stupendous realization?

Then I awake and my eyes open, and I see the great folly of my having sought to bind my thoughts and my emotions with the cord of what I had fancifully presumed to be good logic and reason, cause and its inevitable effect. "What cause brought me here," I now ask myself. "What had made me argue and assert, relying on the ridiculous imperfections of my physical senses and on the scantiness of my sense-collected materials?" Into the depths of the past I gaze as far as I can look back, but I fail to find any cause that I can grasp and understand, that I can co-ordinate with another in the gigantic whirl and sweep which make the world. Two or three steps I take on the line of cause and effect but, those taken, I fall into the chaos of the Indeterminate and the Unknown.

The more I reflect, the more I feel and observe, inwardly or outwardly,

the more deeply I lose myself in thoughts in which any impulse to correlate things and impressions so as to bring them within the operation of my reasoning, is totally absent. I gaze on them and marvel and toss upon the crest of feelings and sentiments, whose origin, whose sequence, I do not understand and whose heights and depths my poor reasoning can never scale or plumb. My feelings and emotions remain divorced from reason because they come and go, how often, unrestrained and unlimited by what has happened before, whereas reasoning is only a laboured effort to heap the rolling present over the débris of the past, so as to get a whole perspective that might satisfy me.

"This cannot be disjointed from what I have known; this must follow that in a sequence which I can understand." So I say to myself; but when I compare my understanding with that of others I find that each has traced the same thing or event back to a different cause of his own supposition. Each asserts the correctness of his own logic, but each, having reacted differently from others, has constructed a different line of cause and effect.

Our reasoning, our linking of cause and effect, are thus based, not on any truth or reality, but on how things impressed us and how we reacted to them. Reasoning is the projection of our egoistic conceptions on to our environment and our experiences and, as our

conceptions change and develop, our logic and our line of reasoning lose their meaning and significance. The sense and inspiration of the Real and the Absolute can come only through mental doors flung open wide, not through the lattice of prejudiced reasoning. The depths of the Infinite can be reached only when, unmooring ourselves from finiteness, we plunge into them without stopping to reason, without a look or a thought behind. Is it not when we forget ourselves that we see and feel and realize as we had not done before? Is it not when overwhelming grief has made our interest in the present fade and the environment disappear from before our unseeing eyes, that we get a realization that dries our tears and brings a new realm into view?

It is self-intoxication, the vain-glory of the "I" which thinks that it rules but which is really the creature of the physical senses, which dictates the line of my thinking, interprets my impressions. The Great Reason, the Great Cause, which supports and holds together all things, is beyond this "I" and will enter into my realization only when that "I" is curbed and my true Self awakens. For that true Self is an integral part of the Great Cause that unfolds itself in the Manifestation surrounding and absorbing me. That Self has to be liberated from the dominion of the cruder senses; it has to be washed clean of the blinding dust that has settled on it in my headlong pursuit

of the tempting and illusive impulses of the body and the mind. It is only as that liberation and that cleansing are effected that the Self can see the Light and catch a glimpse in true perspective of That of which it forms a part. It is then that the Great Cause which underlies All is sensed, and then, that the Reason that threads through the Whole is comprehended. The Cause and the Reason thus seen then merge into a supreme Realization, the Realization of the Self. From time to time, in dreams and in wakeful hours at times of self-forgetfulness, at moments when wild grief or mad ecstasy have shaken me out of my intoxication with the physical, there have arisen realizations which were fragmentary but which have led to and form parts of that supreme Realization.

Even these fragmentary realizations are not containable within the small orbit of my childish, presumptuous reasoning. The proud attempt to submit them to the reasoning process dwarfs my outlook and makes me miserable. It can give no peace, no harmony. I must step out of reasoning's orbit to inhale the thrilling inspirations and be receptive to the subtle, unthought-of and inexplicable impulses and realizations, which come to me so often in moments of unawareness, and in strange circumstances, when I am free from the drawing power of memories and of calculations for the future. Then alone can I undertake in the right way the Quest for

the Supreme Cause, and then alone will there be peace, solace and harmony in my thoughts and be-

tween my reasoning and my realizations.

J. M. GANGULI

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## ON IMPROVEMENT

Self-improvement and improvement of others are the two objectives of liberal education writes Marten ten Hoor in his article "Education for Privacy" appearing in *The American Scholar* (Winter 1953-54). But he thinks that enough stress has been laid on attempts to improve our neighbour, called "social-mindedness in education," the need now is to improve ourselves. There have been enough leaders and reformers lacking in wisdom, capacity and good example.

Mr. ten Hoor presents four elements—and these are closely related—that he thinks are essential for "education for privacy." The first is "to learn how to think . . . intellectual and spiritual orientation." Each individual must think for himself and think synthetically. Man must see truth and see it whole. Philosophy and the works of great thinkers should help but it is only through "the alchemy of private reflection" that philosophical ideas become personal resources.

The second essential is—"the establishment and maintenance of moral harmony"—which cannot be overstressed. Mankind has always been faced with the problem of "guilt" and it is, with good cause, assuming dan-

gerous dimensions at present. But how shall the individual acquire "moral resources?"

. . . a vision of the good life, the spirit must have; for devoid of it, the imagination is without moral perspective, conduct without guiding principles, and action without trustworthy habits.

The third essential is "the development of emotional stability." Emotional disorder is "unquestionably" the most serious and the most common cause of unhappiness. Moreover, emotions have been ignorantly considered effects rather than causes. But what is education of the emotions? It is "education in self-control, in equanimity and serenity."

To these basic three: a philosophical point of view, a steady vision of the good life and serenity of spirit, Mr. ten Hoor adds a fourth essential:—"appreciation and practice of the fine arts." In education, the presentation of opportunities for enjoyment and training in appreciation are not enough, there should also be instruction and encouragement in the creation of works of art. So, he concludes:—

Education for privacy and education for public service constitute education of the whole personality.

MUMTAZ MOTIWALLA

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## ENDS AND MEANS

[The ancient teaching reaffirmed in our day by Gandhiji, that ends and means are inseparably related, is implicit in this article in which the English novelist and serious writer, **Mrs. Esme Wynne-Tyson**, challenges the means adopted by Communism to gain its professed humanitarian ends. As comes out in her treatment of the problem, however, Communism holds a threat to human values not merely because of the questionable means which it adopts but also and primarily because of its belittling basic concept of man, his nature and his potentialities. — ED.]

The advocates of the free way of life and those who object to totalitarianism are failing in the ideological war for lack of an honest assessment of the situation and a clear sense of direction. Their propaganda is all too often ineffectual, because they blame Communism for the wrong things and fail to give it credit for its undoubted achievements. This not only suggests a blindness, wilful or otherwise, in themselves, but also discredits their propaganda in the eyes of those who can be persuaded to resist Communism only when they see a genuine reason for doing so.

Such a basic and incontrovertible reason does actually exist and it should be given plainly to the whole of mankind instead of the sometimes superficial and often unfair criticisms that are made of an efficient if mistaken way of life which is attracting more and more underprivileged members of mankind to its ranks.

In order to give this reason Christendom must first be prepared to cry "*Peccavi!*" (I have sinned) It must admit its own failure or

submit to the materialists' argument that Christianity has failed.

Far from failing, Christianity produced the Christian conscience, which originally had its practical political expression in Socialism and Fabianism, only to be betrayed by the self-righteous humanitarian who forgot whence his compassion and idealism had sprung. Convinced that his good-will belonged naturally to his human make-up, he scoffed at religion and at the impractical and often extremely materialistic religionists of his times, and adopted the new scientific and materialistic outlook.

The materialism of the Communists is not, unfortunately, an answer to our own spirituality, in which case it would be powerless in presenting a negative, but is a darker shadow of our lesser materialism.

Christian values are certainly being challenged by the materialists, but we must not delude ourselves into thinking that what calls itself Christendom is based on, or has consistently upheld, these values. It has paid lip-service to them, but on many counts it is every bit as

materialistic as the Communists. It was the "Christian" nations who dropped the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; it is the "Christian" nations who have invented and are using napalm bombs. It was a Christian Pope who issued the call to the "Holy War" of the First Crusade. It is, in fact, the betrayal of Christian values by Christendom that has directly led to the rise and success of Communism.

The individual members of Christendom — the flock of which the Church was supposed to be the shepherd — cannot wholly be blamed for this betrayal. For attempting by Total Thought Control, which we see in all its ugliness in political totalitarianism, the Church brow-beat its sheep into believing that they must not think for themselves, but "bring into captivity every thought to the obedience of" the Church! Had that been synonymous with "the Christ" of the earlier direction, we should long ago have achieved such a perfect world that the problem of Communism would never have arisen. The injustices which it combats would never have existed. But unfortunately this was far from being the case, and Church totalitarianism either kept people blinded to the unremedied evils of their times or drove the more intelligent first from the Church and then very often from religion altogether.

An outstanding case in point was that of Mrs. Besant who described

her own experience when she took her doubts and earnest desire to arrive at the truth to the famous Doctor Pusey. To her intelligent questionings he replied:—

It is not your duty to ascertain the truth. It is your duty to accept and believe the truth as laid down by the Church. At your peril you reject it. The responsibility is not yours so long as you dutifully accept that which the Church has laid down for your acceptance.

As she commented afterwards:—

Out of such men were made the Inquisitors of the Middle Ages, perfectly conscientious, perfectly rigid, perfectly merciless to the heretics. To them heretics are the centres of infectious disease, and charity to the heretic is the worst cruelty to the souls of men.

And equally out of such men, or of such a mental attitude, have been made the totalitarian commissars of today, with their ruthless treatment of deviators. Such Churchmen, who now complain so bitterly of political totalitarianism, have themselves set the pattern for it.

Moreover by its rigid inflexibility, its support of the privileged at the expense of the under-privileged, its worldly subservience to vested interests and above all its refusal to evolve by growing more spiritual and Christlike, the Church has earned the condemnation that the Founder of its Faith bestowed on the expounders of the Mosaic Law of his own days:—

Ye have taken away the key of

knowledge: ye entered not in yourselves, and them that were entering in ye hindered. (Luke XI. 52)

The Kingdom of Heaven was always the reign of love and compassion advocated first by Gautama and then by Jesus of Nazareth, and had that been truly taught by the Church and lived by its members, poverty and injustice would long ago have been banished from the earth. But since it was neither taught nor practised, but instead, men were taught to think of their high or low estate as being ordained by God, the task has been taken on by the advocates of class hatred.

We must face this fact quite clearly if we are ever to solve the problem of our age: Communism is doing by the evil means of Total Thought Control and materialistic totalitarianism what should have been done by the good means of applied Christianity, *i.e.*, by ensuring that mankind as a whole should get a fair economic deal and a fair share of the world's riches.

Had Christianity been lived instead of being merely preached and believed; had Christian nations really been nations of people of peace and good-will who could not endure the spectacle of poverty, massacre and suffering, the conditions which are now being corrected by wrong means would already have been corrected by right ones.

We must be honest enough to admit that what the Communists

are attempting—the promotion of the welfare of the greater part of mankind—is right. How they are doing it and the philosophy on which they base their acts are profoundly wrong.

For Dialectical Materialism is the complete negation of the eternally true statement that the Kingdom of Heaven is within us. It teaches instead that once a man's outer conditions are put right, his inner condition will become right, a fallacy proved beyond question to be such by the extremely poor inward condition of many whose outward conditions have always been satisfactory. In fact the class-war propaganda of the Communists mainly consists of pointing out the baseness of the nature of all members of the human race who cannot genuinely be classed as proletarians, and whose conditions have always been such as those which the Communists are aiming to make universal, *i.e.*, satisfactory and comfortable. According to this reasoning, the Communist heaven will be peopled with such base characters as their present enemy class!

Certainly the materialists have no hope through their philosophy of ever attaining to any higher nature. And this is where the religionists, for all their failure in application, have been right and the materialists so tragically wrong. For the religionists at least have preserved some gleams of the light left to them by the Founders of their faith, which

pre-eminently revealed the need of a better *human species*, a less animal and more truly compassionate species, man made in the image and likeness of Love and Goodness, such as Gautama and Jesus and many others who showed the way undoubtedly exemplified.

This regeneration, or evolution, of the units that make up the world would quite obviously ensure the world's salvation from the evils projected by unregenerate men. And equally obviously by no other means can true salvation come about.

Men may change their government, improve their economic systems, ensure fair distribution of the world's goods and remedy obvious external wrongs, but unless the inward nature of humanity is improved, unless violence, greed, rivalry, injustice, lust, self-will and love of power, to mention only a few of the faults which exist just as surely in the Communists as in the Capitalists are eliminated from the individual, there will never be any real happiness or security for the human race.

So that if Communism is generally accepted on account of the outward improvements which it makes, the evil of its means will not only eventually defeat its ends—presumably the well-being of mankind—but it will also put an end to the hope of evolution for humanity. And man, arrested in his present all-too-imperfect state of development, will be yet another failure of evolution.

For the means employed by Dialectical Materialism in order to enthrone its gospel of utilitarianism in the hearts of men is to reject *in toto* the God-idea—the idea of any higher mind or existence beyond what is at present known and visible, to deny the necessity of seeking to achieve the stature of manhood exemplified by such evolved men as Gautama and Jesus, who were love and compassion incarnate.

The protective love of the Buddha, which was extended to the lesser creatures as well as to men, the compassionate love for the individual that Jesus manifested, seem to the materialist expressions of mere bourgeois sentimentality. The gospel of utilitarianism regards animals as part of the world's goods that must be used for the needs of the proletariat: for food, for medical experimentation and for clothing. It is true that the materialism of Christendom views them in much the same light but the fact that vegetarians, anti-vivisectionists and pacifists are allowed to live and present their point of view within the non-Communist nations does prove that progressive and evolutionary thought is allowed by their governments to exist. Gleams of light at least are allowed to penetrate the darkness instead of being banished as reactionary, as they are by the deeper materialism of Communism. This regards men not as individuals but as units in the totalitarian hive—to be looked

after efficiently and coldly by the State, which has need of their labours; but individuality, like morality, must be "entirely subordinate to the interests of the class war" and to the community. The individual can never hope to become a better type of human being, because he is merely a cell in the body of a community which has been built up on the materialistic hypothesis that man is essentially matter, beginning with birth and ending with death, whose only hope and aim is to get as much material good out of life for himself and his fellow men as he can in the few years allotted to him.

By the acceptance of such an hypothesis man is placed in exactly the same category and position as the ant in the termitary. There is a vast unexplored universe outside the termitary but the ant will never know it. He has accepted the termitary as his world and his life, and if he wanders outside the total magnetic control of his Queen, he perishes.

If mankind in general could be persuaded to accept the evil means to the sometimes excellent ends of Communism, it would actually retrograde to the status of the

termite. For it, spiritual values as we at present conceive them would cease to exist; all the glorious visions of the world teachers, together with their examples, all the experiences of the mystics, would fade from human memory and experience. Mankind would, in theological terms, have gained the whole material world at the price of its belief in a soul—or its own innate spirituality. In actual fact, it would have renounced the whole aim and meaning of life—the evolution of man to the nature and stature of Buddha, Jesus, Krishna and all other visible exponents of Atman.

This is what the acceptance of the materialistic hypothesis means. This is the true reason that should be given for man's rejection of a means that often promises the achievement of such alluring ends. For unless people are thus instructed and made to see the pit into which specious and often convincing materialistic arguments would have them fall, there can be no adequate mental resistance of the human race, such as that which Gandhi advocated and demonstrated, to an idea which, for all its material benefits, can only lead mankind to spiritual death.

ESME WYNNE-TYSON

## PERSONALITY—HUMAN AND OTHER

[ The title of **Shri Samir Kanta Gupta's** short article is thought-provoking. Many readers, like ourselves, will not accept the implied ascription of personality to the One Source. They will, moreover, have to remind themselves that "personality" comes from *persona* (a mask) to justify applying it to any manifestation below the human kingdom. Shri Gupta has well brought out the omnipresence of Life and Consciousness, one of the fundamental concepts of the Esoteric Philosophy towards which modern science may be more open-minded than it was before the discoveries of the last sixty years. Granting to matter a common origin, it is but logical to concede that it should have common attributes at different levels of development. The vital and divine spark which animates the material body of man must therefore lurk in every member of a lower species. Between the latent mentality of the lower kingdoms and the self-consciousness of man, however, there is a great gulf which is not bridged by according to the sub-human beings the possession of a "personality" of sorts.—ED.]

What constitutes the personality of man? Is it his nature, his functional organism, his body, his mind or his life? Is it a secret demand and a dynamism that receive from and respond to an unseen and mighty force of flux or reflux, themselves taking shelter in a perishable habitat? Or is it something subtle in man's existential make-up? Perhaps all these — and something more.

Ordinarily the epithet "man of personality" is applied to a heroic character, a fighter, one who is not tempted or cowed down, one who advances without a faltering step, and speaks and moves with inner conviction: he is a man of personality. But whence comes this force of personality? From a strong vitality no doubt. And to this must be added a sound physique and a keen, vigilant and energetic mind.

History abounds in such men of personality.

Yet that is not the whole secret of this matter of personality. For do not the occultists say that even a supposedly inanimate object like a plant possesses a personality all its own, influences earth and the life on earth? Are there not Vedic hymns which sing the praises of the moon and the sun as if they were living gods with personality? Indeed, the ancient seers presented profound truths in the garb of those highly poetic images. In this universe each unit is distinct; no two pebbles are exactly alike; no two trees are wholly similar. Each individual unit enshrines a particular consciousness which may, however, extend and embrace the universal. And the atom has a throbbing centre at its core which is one with the Origin and the Vast. This pure

and original vibration is no other than the light of consciousness: according to its vehicle it may be consciousness seeing more or less, but it perceives unerringly that which it sees. And, as it reflects itself in the surface formation of an object, it takes on tone and colour, a personality, so to say, whether vividly self-assertive or modestly escaping the inattentive.

If we picture a human being as a luminous sphere, then consciousness appears to be its centre and its radiating energy forms its essential personality. This radiant personality should not, however, be con-

fused with the external environmental consciousness which forms a protective ring or circle around the person.

Personality and consciousness are not the monopoly of man. If it is true that "the One becomes the many," then the many may reasonably be supposed to have a fraction of its personality and consciousness also. The only difference is that in man personality and consciousness grow and assume the likeness of the parent Source, whereas in other things they remain constant luminous points.

SAMIR KANTA GUPTA

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## WORLD BROTHERHOOD

Dr. Everett R. Clinchy and Dr. William A. Shimer, respectively the Administrative President and the Director of the Pacific-Asia Division of the World Brotherhood organization founded in the U.S.A. in 1928, described its aims and work at the Indian Institute of Culture, Bangalore, on March 26th. Their subject was "Inter-Group Relations in Today's World."

Dr. Clinchy brought out the finding of the cultural anthropologists that man got the greatest satisfaction out of team-work. War was not natural to him. Prejudice was not inborn; children were indoctrinated with it; they ought to be indoctrinated instead with the fact of brotherhood. National patriotism did not rule out the sense of world relationship and an International State was no more irreconcilable with Nation States than a neighbourhood was with family units.

Dr. Shimer said that their organiza-

tion did not interfere with politics or theology or proclaim the superiority of a particular religion. It was working in many countries for active mutual understanding and the freedom of individuals and groups in a world society. It believed in cultural pluralism, on which Indian culture was based, and that brotherhood was taught in all the world religions, all Asian in their origins.

Materialism, Dr. Shimer said, believing only in physical force, offered no basis for brotherhood, but materialism had been shattered by the discovery that the ultimate reality was some kind of vital energy. Some of the greatest scientists recognized the limitations of science, *e.g.*, its inability to explain consciousness. Science, religion and philosophy were coming together in viewing the universe as a moral and spiritual reality.

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## A LETTER FROM LONDON

[ **Shri Sunder Kabadi** is an experienced journalist serving India in London. We hope to publish every quarter a communication from him and take pleasure in publishing here the first of his letters.—ED.]

Seldom does a day go by without the London newspapers, especially the evening ones, “splashing” on their front pages a story of murder or of robbery with violence. The newspapers have plenty of choice as to the story to which they shall give prominence, because since the war crimes of all descriptions have steadily increased in Britain.

In 1938 only 127 people were sent to prison for violent crimes, whereas in 1951 the figure had risen to 3,929 and in 1952 to 4,127. In 1938 there were 56,092 cases of larceny or robbery, but in 1951 the figure had risen to 87,201, with a slight drop in 1952 to 84,235.

Official figures are not yet available for 1953, but there can be no doubt that this post-war crime wave has not yet begun to recede. Sexual crimes, crimes of perversion and sadism have all increased, and only the other day a Member of the House of Lords was sent to prison for a year for conspiring to incite two members of the R.A.F. to commit serious sexual offences.

After the moral and social upheaval of a great war, there is usually an increase in the incidence of crime. But it is interesting to note that the great social reforms undertaken by the Labour Govern-

ment immediately after the war and continued by Sir Winston Churchill's Government since 1951 have done little or nothing to sublimate the great upsurge of anti-social conduct carried forward from the war years when the demands of totalitarian war broke down so much of the moral and social cement that binds a nation together.

The motto of Britain's post-war social revolution was “Fair Shares for ALL.” You would think that as the citadels of economic and social privilege were stormed and the banner of economic democracy was unfurled, there would have been a corresponding flowering of the innate good qualities of the British people.

But, surveying the crowded prisons and the hedonistic tone of society, religious leaders and public men in Britain have been continually stressing the need for a “spiritual revival.” Mr. Billy Graham, America's most highly-publicized evangelist, is now in Britain on a “Greater London Crusade,” attracting thousands of people every night to the Haringay Arena, the home of greyhound racing and ice-skating, where he calls upon them to renew their faith and to practise the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount.

It would seem that in putting the emphasis on building a Utopia on earth, Britain has—like other countries—moved away from spiritual values. Science postulates that man can master the objective world and mould his circumstances to suit his needs. But this is true only to a certain extent.

Only a fool or a saint would deny that it is a moral advance for a nation so to regulate its economic activities that none shall be penalized for inherent shortcomings of brain or body. Britain has made this moral advance to the point where there is a strong social conscience working for the welfare of the poor, the needy, the sick and the aged. There are very few beggars in Britain today, and there is no reason why anyone should beg. The State, if not the Mother Bountiful, is at least playing the rôle of the Mother who looks after those of her children who have the greatest difficulty in fending for themselves.

Instead of the response being one of gratitude, however, it is more often than not ingratitude or apathy, particularly among the more fortunate. There is a restless searching and clutching at all that is meretricious and transient in society.

Britain has been put on the road to economic welfare, but not shown the road to spiritual welfare. As in Russia, most of the people who enter a church appear to do so not so much to pray or to renew their faith as out of curiosity, or to

admire the architecture and the stained-glass windows.

The majority of the British people are in the mood to find a quick and effective solution to an inner disharmony which can only be resolved by a growing spiritual awareness. The spirit of the times, however, is not conducive to the awakening of such a mood. The distractions multiply. People clutch at every new distraction in the vain belief or hope that it will fill the spiritual vacuum within them.

They are encouraged in this attitude, unfortunately, by the most powerful influence in any modern society—the newspapers. Criticizing certain sections of the popular Press in Britain the other day, Sir William Haley, editor of *The London Times* described some papers as “a disgrace,” and declared: “Often they are humbugs enough to pander to evil by making a show of attacking it.”

Those popular papers which indulged in humbug, said Sir William, could not be said to have a direct political influence, but “indirectly, cumulatively, they are building up an attitude of mind in the new generation which can be disastrous unless it is counteracted.”

If the Press is to be blamed for helping along this depreciation in general moral standards, the failure of international statesmanship to steer the world away from destruction is also, I think, another root cause. A nation, like an individual,

must have a belief in its future if it is to restrain and control its baser emotions and feelings.

The individual looking at the newspaper headlines today, with their reports of hydrogen-bomb explosions, mounting fear and suspicion among the nations and, overhanging all these, the threat of a war that would plunge the world into a new Dark Age, is made acutely aware of his individual insignificance. If the lights of civilization are shortly to be extinguished, he may reason within himself, that the best course is to get out of this life all the pleasure one can.

The standards of pleasure are expressed in rising above the general material level which a nation impoverished by two world wars has managed to establish. The more antisocial sections of the community easily turn to crime. Others resort to sharp practices in business, or try to assert themselves in their social relationships.

This is the crisis in which Britain, and other advanced countries, now find themselves. *They have built several floors of the Welfare State, but the secret of content and real happiness*

*has eluded them.*

Poverty, as Bernard Shaw said, is a crime; but spiritual poverty is a worse crime. A thoughtful European, coming to our country, may be appalled at the wide-spread poverty of the Indian people, yet he will return to Europe with a feeling that we, in India, have something that has escaped the technologically and industrially advanced countries of the West.

“India lacks many things, but has great possessions,” said Dr. W. A. Robson, Professor of Public Administration in the University of London after returning from a three-month tour of India. In a lecture at the Indian Institute of Culture [London Branch] in London, he said that what had struck him most of all was “the spirit of contentment I felt in India,” which “contrasts strongly with anything I have seen in any Western country.” He came to the significant conclusion that “the more material standards are raised, the more discontented people seem to be.” As was said centuries ago, “Man shall not live by bread alone.” This is the injunction which seems to have been forgotten.

SUNDER KABADI  
March 25, 1954

## NEW BOOKS AND OLD

### THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN INDIA\*

Co-operation has sometimes been described as the economics of human happiness. In the ultimate analysis its value to mankind has to be judged by its success or failure to promote human happiness. Does the Co-operative Movement as it has developed in India during the last half a century subserve this social purpose, is the question that Dr. Eleanor M. Hough poses, though not directly, in this third edition of her admirable contribution to co-operative literature.

This is one of the few publications in India on the Co-operative Movement which has gone into a third edition. The second edition was published in 1950 and no striking developments, except the formulation and acceptance of the Five-Year Plan, have taken place which would call for a revised edition within so short an interval. But this very fact indicates, first, the awakened interest among the intelligentsia in the subject of Co-operation, and secondly, the success which Dr. Hough has achieved in stimulating that interest by the range and manner of her presentation. The present volume is not only larger in bulk than the second edition, but contains a special section on recent developments compiled with the aid, as Dr. Hough explains, of Shree K. Madhava Das, a young officer in the Agricultural Department of the Reserve Bank of India. The additional matter in this section helps much in making the factual survey up-to-date and comprehensive. There is hardly any noteworthy event which occurred during the past few years that Dr. Hough and her collaborator have missed.

Though a confirmed believer in the

efficacy of the co-operative method, Dr. Hough, as an outsider, is able to take a dispassionate view of the progress of the Movement and can separate the wood from the trees. A feature of the revised edition is her critical analysis of certain recent trends. In the past several years, there has been an extension of the principle of State Aid, particularly for new forms of co-operative activity. There is a tendency evident among co-operators to resort to Government for financial assistance and for guarantees. Anxious as they are to promote schemes of economic development for the common man on the basis of organized effort, State Governments often respond to such demands as a matter of policy. Will not the extension of State Aid be detrimental to the growth of self-help and self-reliance which form the bedrock of co-operation? The question that Dr. Hough asks is one to which it may be difficult to give a categorical answer. It is, however, an aspect of policy over which co-operators and those in authority should ponder deeply both before the initial step is taken and when the practice is allowed to continue.

Another similar question which occasions serious misgivings to Dr. Hough is the enforcement of compulsion for certain forms of economic activity. What she has in mind particularly is the introduction of co-operative farming by the coercion of an unwilling minority. At one place in the Report of the Planning Commission, the suggestion has been thrown out that in any village where a majority of holders, representing at least half of the total area under cultivation, desire to establish a co-operative farm, legislative

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\* *The Co-operative Movement in India: Before Partition and in Independent India.* By ELEANOR M. HOUGH, M.A., PH.D. Third enlarged edition, with a chapter on "Recent Developments in India" by K. MADHAVA DAS, M.A. (The Oxford University Press, Indian Branch, Bombay. 435 pp. 1953. Rs. 15/-)

means should be at their disposal to proceed with the formation of a co-operative farming society for the whole village. This suggestion has not, however, been put into actual practice. In Bombay, for instance, the only provision is that when two-thirds of the holders of land, holding not less than three-fourths of the area affected, agree, the rest have to participate in the scheme. Even then provision does not seem to have been made to compel a minority to join a co-operative farming society. The utmost that has been done with schemes of co-operative farming, or other advanced forms of co-operative effort, is for the State to hold out inducements for agriculturists or other persons of small means to join an organization with a view to achieve their own economic betterment.

This takes the discussion on to whether the Co-operative Movement should figure in a programme of planned national development. It is possible to argue that a movement spreads better naturally and of its own accord

than under direction. As Sir Horace Plunkett pointed out in his Introduction to the first edition, what we have in India is not a Co-operative Movement but a Co-operative policy. Co-operators in India have, however, demanded, and the Planning Commission has agreed, that co-operation should now be deemed as an essential instrument of social policy. The acceptance of this position involves obligations. But these should not necessarily lead, as Dr. Hough fears they may, to the abandonment of the principles of voluntary association, self-help, mutual aid and democracy that differentiate the co-operative from other forms of economic organization. The call will only be for harder and better organized effort, for clearer and more well-ordered planning, for more attention to and greater emphasis on training and education, than has been the case so far. To such a call an ardent adherent of the cause, such as Dr. Hough, cannot but respond whole-heartedly.

VAIKUNTH L. MEHTA

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*Response to Beauty: A British and An Indian Point of View.* By REGINALD LE MAY and M. A. VENKATA RAO. (The Indian Institute of Culture, Bangalore. 24 pp. 1953. Re. 1/8)

This Transaction of the Indian Institute of Culture at Bangalore, contains two essays by two well-known writers. Dr. Reginald le May is an English authority on Asiatic art and Prof. Venkata Rao was a professor of philosophy. They deal here with a subject which has great practical importance in the matter-of-fact world of today.

Life without beauty is like a body without a soul, and Dr. le May very rightly emphasizes the need for education in beauty. The hunger for the beautiful is an instinct as well as a habit. The habit keeps the instinct alive. It is of paramount importance, as he points out, that an idealistic approach to the whole problem of the need for beauty should supplant the materialistic approach now prevalent in

England. He very clearly and forcefully brings home to the reader that without beauty the development of the whole man is not possible.

The writer is not discussing here the philosophic aspect of the "beautiful," he is putting emphasis on the practical point of view, which needs to be stressed again and again, not only in England but in India as well.

If Dr. le May has laid stress on the need for education in beauty, Prof. Venkata Rao has dealt with the Indian concept of art and beauty and of the manner in which Indians have achieved beauty in their works of art. He has dealt at some length with the theory of *rasa* and *dhvani* in Indian poetics. In a small space he has tried to do justice to the highly developed and thoroughly argued points of these theories and the reader is sure to gather a good idea of India's sense of the beautiful and her method of achieving it from his essay.

Readers should be thankful to both authors and to the Indian Institute of Culture for this much-needed reminder.

GULABDAS BROKER

*Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.* (Vol. I)  
By NARAHARI D. PAREKH. (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad. 405 pp. 1953. Rs. 6/-)

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was so much a part of Mahatma Gandhi that to write his exclusive biography would be like attempting to write the biography of Lakshmana apart from that of Rama! It was during the *Satyagraha* "struggle" in Kheda District that Mahatma Gandhi discovered the Sardar. Gandhiji had stipulated that if he was to start the movement he must have at least one worker of the Gujarat Sabha to accompany him and give all his time to it until its completion. The Sardar alone offered his services. Thus started a life-long fellowship between the two in the service of India. The Sardar has been described sometimes as a "blind follower of Gandhiji." It might be truer to say that he was a close follower of the Mahatma's principles. As long as the Mahatma's leadership was available, the Sardar acted as his disciplined soldier. But when it was removed, he took over leadership. He deplored the tendencies of even seasoned workers to look to the Mahatma for guidance in small matters and pleaded that they should learn to take responsibility and help themselves without taking all their troubles and worries to Gandhiji.

The Sardar's public work began with his election as Secretary of the Gujarat Political Conference in 1917, Mahatma Gandhi was its President. But even earlier, in January 1909, he displayed an unusual sense of duty when he continued to conduct a murder case after receiving a telegram in court telling him that his wife had died. For the rest of his life the Sardar had no personal or domestic life, though he was fond of his children. His life was dedicated to public service, without seeking

any personal advantage. Though Mahatma Gandhi had already established the Sabarmati Ashram, the Sardar contemplated starting a Gujarat Sevak Samaj on the lines of Gopal Krishna Gokhale's Servants of India Society.

Until the Bardoli *Satyagraha* the Sardar's activities were largely confined to Gujarat. When at the end of the Borsad *Satyagraha* campaign, the Sardar met Gandhiji in Poona the latter welcomed him as "the king of Borsad." The Sardar's brother, Vitthalbhai Patel, used to call him the "Suba" or Governor of Gujarat. So great was his influence in Gujarat that a British Police Superintendent, who had witnessed the part he played in re-establishing peace during the Rowlatt Act agitation, told the Government ten years later that "without Vallabhbhai it will be impossible for you to maintain law and order."

It is interesting to note that the two brothers, Vitthalbhai and Vallabhbhai, differed widely in their politics but remained good friends. Vitthalbhai joined the Swaraj Party with Pandit Motilal Nehru and C. R. Das with the professed object of non-co-operating with the Montagu Constitution from within the legislature; while Vallabhbhai, with Mahatma Gandhi, C. Rajagopalachari and Rajendra Prasad, preferred non-co-operation and a constructive programme. During the Flag *Satyagraha* in Nagpur, the Governor met both the brothers at a conference, and they presented their cases from opposite points of view. The premature claim of a people's victory and the release of political prisoners made by Vitthalbhai Patel in a speech in Bombay drove Vallabhbhai to repudiate his brother's action.

The Sardar was forthright in his speeches and never minced words. During the course of a Karnatak tour he said to a meeting of peasants:—

Your representatives go to the legislature and fight among themselves; and when they come out, they encourage you to fight among yourselves. How long do you propose to let them fool you thus?

How true this is of political parties

even today!

The volume under review tells the story of the Sardar's campaigns for municipal reform, for the rights of the humbler cultivators in Gujarat, for national self-respect and for the political independence of India, up till 1929. This was a period of preparation for his great work of the consolidation of India after independence.

P. KODANDA RAO

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*Towards New Education.* By M. K. GANDHI. Edited by BHARATAN KUMAR-APPA. (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad. First edition. 90 pp. 1953. Re. 1/4)

Gandhiji's ideas and practical suggestions regarding education in India, which are published in various articles, are here gathered in a handy volume. Eight sections have been arranged by the editor in what he deems to be the developing order of Mahatmaji's thought. Many educationists had attacked the system of education established by the British Government in India. Here Mahatmaji offers his constructive suggestions and plans to remodel the whole system. Even the most adverse critic will have to admit that most of these ideas deserve a place in any scheme of education. Gandhiji's views on compulsory education, on training in crafts in primary and secondary education, on the vernacular as the medium of instruction, are most thought-provoking. The present educational system has become exceedingly costly and far removed from the practical life of the people. The system of examination is most faulty, as it leaves ample scope for cramming and corruption. It does not give any chance for independent thinking, or for guidance and evaluation of the day-to-day efforts of the students. Manual labour has no place in the present system. The medium of instruction cannot be a foreign language, even after the attainment of complete independence. Dead uniformity is of no use. Education must differ according to the differ-

ent aptitudes of the individuals and according to the nature and needs of the physical and social environment. This book is indispensable to serious educationists and leaders of the country.

K. V. GAJENDRAGADKAR

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*Round About India.* By JOHN SEYMOUR. (Eyre & Spottiswoode, London. 255 pp. 1953. 18s.)

Though books on India by foreign tourists are legion, seldom does one find a book written with such abundant sympathy, generosity and understanding as this one. Mr. Seymour comes to India with an open and enquiring mind, hobnobs with all types of people, freely partakes of their hospitality, and leaves India

completely won over by the charm and kindness of the people, by their depth of character, their sense of values, their culture and their way of life.

He is ecstatic in his praise of the *dhoti* which is "cheap, clean, cool, comfortable and graceful" and of the humble Indian rice-and-curry dish which is so good "that you tend to eat far too much of it." "Where will you get women like the South Indian women?" he asks admiringly. He wonders also whether it would be possible for all the sculptors of the world, devoting the rest of their lives, to produce one Minakshi Temple.

Interesting observations on the varieties and vagaries of beggars; on the lot of the handcart-pullers and rickshaw *wallahs*; on corruption; on the "discomfiture" of the Brahmins; on living on a rubber estate; on the pleasures of the Indian grandfathers in fondling their grandchildren; on fat priests and lean teachers; all these arrest the reader's attention every now and then. The book may not be flawless but the flawless elegance of apt expression which clothes the author's feelings and ideas affords an irresistible invitation.

R. BANGARUSWAMI

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*Religions of Ancient India.* By LOUIS RENOÛ. (Athlone Press, University of London; Orient Longmans, Ltd., Bombay. 1953. 15s.)

This is a painstaking and scholarly work by one of the leading Indologists in France today. The field covered is vast, and the material so complex and varied that one naturally does not expect complete thoroughness in the presentation. But Professor Renou is most conscientious and in his eagerness to avoid advancing any special theories, in explanation of the wealth of detail, he has left the various threads somewhat scattered and loose. This does not seem due to inadvertence but to a deliberate policy of limiting himself to the facts in his possession. Such a treatment, however, leaves a disquieting feeling in the mind of the reader. One misses the wood because of the trees.

The first two chapters deal with the religious wealth of the Vedas. Professor Renou has well realized that the hymns of the *R̥gveda* do not deal with

intellectual conceptions but experiences which have been lived through at the culmination of a state of mystic exaltation, conceived as revelation.

He has brought out the richness of the mythology and shows an assured handling of the mythical themes characteristic of the Vedas. He points out the way in which the Vedas epitomize the whole course of the evolution of Indian thought, and would put aside all untenable theses, all direction by tradition and leave the hymns to reveal what they can, naked and alone. He admits nevertheless that

whatever survived of Vedism has become so integral a part of Indian thought that it is no longer distinguishable as a separate element;

while the rest died out. The academic interest of the Vedas is by no means exhausted.

The next three chapters give us an account of Hinduism—the classical period, the Puranas, the *bhakti* cult, Krishna and Rama worship, the

schools of Saivism and *tantrik* worship. Full of well-authenticated information and covering the major aspects of Hinduism these three chapters make interesting reading. Professor Renou incisively remarks: Other religions select and dominate, Hinduism incorporates; many contradictory features are reconciled; it has contributed more than it has received from others.

In the last chapter the Professor works out a parallel between Jainism and Buddhism; and indicates that Jainism has better survival value, it being more on the borders of Hinduism.

This book is a marvel of compression and in the course of six lectures Professor Renou provides much essential information on the ancient religions of India.

D. GURUMURTI

*Indological Studies. (Part III).* By BIMALA CHURN LAW. (The Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, Allahabad. viii+255 pp. 1954.)

Recognized internationally as an authority on such diverse subjects as Buddhism and Pali, ancient Indian tribes, ancient Indian geography and archæology, Jainism, etc., Dr. Bimala Churn Law has to his credit more than 45 books besides several articles dealing with different aspects of Indology. Dr. Law has in him the unusual combination of *Śrī* or *Lakṣmī* (wealth) and *Sarasvatī* (learning). All his writings are characterized by thoroughness.

*Indological Studies, Part III*, which lives up to our expectations, contains 16 published and unpublished articles on aspects of ancient Indian geography, excepting the last two, which are on "Contemporary Indian and Ceylonese Kings" and "Two Great Jain Teachers," R̥ṣabhanātha or Ādinātha and Pārśvanātha. Besides Buddhist and Jain texts, the author's vast source material includes epics, *Purāṇas*, accounts of Chinese travellers, catalogues

of coins, archæological survey Reports, inscriptions, and works by Pargiter, Smith, Raychaudhuri, Petech and others.

There are descriptive articles on "Kapilavastu," "Ayodhyā," "Mathurā," "Anga and Campā," "Prāgjyotisapura," "Mithilā," "Vidiśā," "Avanti," "Vaiśālī," "Pāṭaliputra and Persepolis." The general plan of the author is to begin with the location, identification, origin and importance of the site, followed by its description as found in Indian literary sources and the accounts of Chinese travellers. Then is given the political and religious history as also particulars about coins, architectural and sculptural remains, inscriptions, etc., wherever available. "Some Ancient Sites of Bengal" deals with about 30 sites. There are two articles: "The Himalaya Mountain" and "Some Himalayan Rivers" from which we get interesting and illuminating particulars. There is also "A Geographical Study of the Pali Chronicles of Ceylon."

The printing and get up are good, and the book will be helpful to students of Indology.

A. D. PUSALKER

*Rgvedic Legends Through the Ages.*  
By H. L. HARIYAPPA. (Deccan College Dissertation Series, 9, Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, Poona. xxi+202 pp. 1953. Rs. 15/-)

This reprint from the *Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute* forms No. 9 of the Institute's Dissertation Series in which already many important studies have been published. The present is the PH.D. thesis of Shri H. L. Hariyappa and his attempt is to study the "historical evolution" of three Vedic Legends "with a view

to unravelling the complexities" incidental to them. They are—Saramā, Śunaśśepa and Vasiṣṭha-Viśvāmitra. As a result of this study the author has a number of "revelations" to make. It is however impossible, in a brief review like this, to examine all of these or the numerous arguments adduced in their support. But some of them may be pointed out.

The author, aware that Yama's *two hounds* are called *Sārameyau* (Saramā's offspring), points out that Saramā, "the progenitor perhaps of the canine species," "is *not* the dog of heaven" but a goddess, ally of Indra. Then Shri Hariyappa writes *Śunaśśepa* instead of *Sunaśśepa*, which has been the form sanctioned by the *Samhita* and the *Padapāṭha* and generally adopted, in a most unconvincing attempt to make the word yield the meaning: "Source of joy or Pillar of happiness." (pp. xv, 230 ff.)

The *Taittirīya Samhitā* (III. 1. 7) speaks clearly of the rivalry between Vasiṣṭha and Viśvāmitra and the idea seems implicit in some *Rgvedic* verses, yet Shri Hariyappa holds that the "Vasiṣṭha-Viśvāmitra feud is a myth and that it has no Vedic authority:" "possibly the two sages were friends," he writes, in his Preface.

As early as the 7th century A.D. Kumārila (Tantravārtika, I. 3. 7) pointed out that our condemnation of mythical heroes, gods and seers proceeds from a failure to understand the anthropomorphic nature of the stories about them. If Shri Hariyappa had heeded this and did not attempt to interpret the legends literally, "revelations" like the above would be unnecessary. The thesis is an indication of how fascinating, yet difficult, a subject Vedic legends can be.

H. G. NARAHARI

*Nītiprakāśikā* by Vaiśampāyana with *Tattvavivṛti* of Sītārāma. Edited by T. CHANDRASEKHARAN. (Government Oriental MSS. Library, Madras, III + xii pp. 1953. Rs. 4/2)

The *Nītiprakāśikā* of Vaiśampāyana is not a work on *nīti* or polity but on *Dhanurveda* an Upa-Veda of the *Yajurveda* and mainly deals with different varieties of weapons and arms. It is written in 546 *anuṣṭubh* verses, divided into eight chapters, the first five dealing with classification and definitions of various weapons (about 136); the next two deal with military strategy, recruitment of soldiers, appointment of officers and their salaries; and the last, with the duties of kings. This work is ascribed to Vaiśampāyana who was the last of several editors of the original which was in 100,000 chapters and attributed to the divine Brahmā (*vide* ch. 1, vv. 21–28). The penultimate reduction ascribed to Vyāsa consisted of 300 chapters.

The present edition is based on a single MS. in the Government Oriental MSS. Library, Madras, and is accompanied by a lucid and concise commentary by Sītārāma of Kaunḍinya *gotra*, also based on a single MS. from the same library. At the end of this edition, there is an index of verses. The lists of subjects prepared chapter-wise should have come at the beginning of the work rather than at the end. In view of the fact that no attempt has been made by the editor to determine the probable date of the work, apart from quoting the text about its traditional origin and successive reductions, or of its commentary, he would have done well to add an index of authors, works and unidentified quotations in the commentary, to enable other scholars to tackle this problem. Notwithstanding this the work is a valuable addition to books on ancient military science in India.

N. A. GORE

duction. By A. CHAKRAVARTI. (Author, The Diocesan Press, Madras. 648 pp. 1953. Rs. 15/-)

*Tirukkural* is an ancient Tamil classic, consisting of maxims in verse, and dealing with ethics, politics, and social and psychological affairs. The brevity, beauty, and universality of the verses has given them a fairly wide appeal. Many Tamil scholars have written learned commentaries on *Tirukkural* and some Indian and European scholars have translated it into other languages. More than a dozen translations have been made into English.

Professor Chakravarti has given us in this book a new and competent English translation for each verse and a commentary in English for most of the verses. His work is based mainly on the commentaries and notes of the ancient Jaina scholars. A transliteration of each verse into Roman script has been made by Mrs. E. W. Wilder. Some minor errors may be found both in the Tamil text and in the transliteration, which it is needless to detail here.

In his Introduction the learned professor deals with a few relevant topics; some of his views will be acceptable to many, some are debatable.

Professor Chakravarti states that from internal and external evidence and according to Jaina tradition the author of *Tirukkural* was the Jaina saint, Elacharya or Sri Kundakunda, who lived in the first century B.C. (p. lxviii). And according to Jaina tradition also Tiruvalluvar must have been a Jaina, "a lay disciple" of the great Elacharya. There is still some controversy on the date of *Tirukkural*. Some scholars affirm that it existed some centuries before the Christian era, while some others notably Professor Vaiyapuri Pillai place it a few centuries later.

A conclusion of Heras cited by Professor Chakravarti is that the Dravidians were the people of the Indus Valley and were weaponless followers of the Rishabha cult based upon the principle of *ahimsa*. Contrary to this

*Tirukkural*. With English Translation and Commentary and an Intro-

conclusion, however, Mohenjo Daro and Harappa did have fortresses, citadels and defence-walls,<sup>1</sup> and weapons,<sup>2</sup> and ate fish.<sup>3</sup> Further, in the ancient Tamil classic *Purananooru*, we find that meat and drink are praised, as they are in some of the ancient Sanskrit classics.

His claim that the Indus Valley folk were Jainas (p. xii) he also bases on the view of Father Heras, who says that the script of their "seals" is Dravidian; and on that of Dr. Premnath, who says that they contain the words *Rishabhaya Namaha* and *Jainayanamaha*, which shows that they are Sanskrit.

The translation is clear, and the commentary apt and useful. The book is nicely printed on good paper in big type. It is a welcome addition to the existing literature on *Tirukkural*.

P. N. APPUSWAMI

*Hymns to the Mystic Fire.* By SRI AUROBINDO. (2nd edition. Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry. 607 pp. 1952. Rs. 15/-)

This is perhaps the most valuable contribution of Sri Aurobindo towards the correct interpretation of the Vedas. In this second edition (the first appeared in 1946) many more hymns to Agni have been added which hitherto had remained in the manuscripts left by Sri Aurobindo. And except for a few hymns from the first Mandala of the *Rig-Veda*, this volume contains a complete collection of the Hymns to the Fire.

As explained clearly in the "Foreword," the sage of Pondicherry has

sought to bring out the inner (esoteric and mystic) sense of the hymns. Sayana in his commentary has mainly tried to give a ritualistic interpretation. Western Sanskritists have found only "materialistic" ideas in the hymns. Agni to them is merely the physical element, fire. But the Rishis who chanted these hymns were thinking essentially of the inner, Spiritual Fire, vitalizing all human beings. Unless this fact is clearly remembered, there will seem to have been an almost unbridgeable chasm between the Vedic *mantras* and the mystic teachings of the Upanishads. Sri Aurobindo has clearly shown that there was no such gap discoverable in the ancient Indian tradition.

To the reviewer this book is a true eye-opener. Zoroastrians have been generally called "Fire-worshippers." In reality the physical fire is a mere symbol representing the true Inner Fire, blazing clear in the heart of each one of us: "Fire the *Son* of Ahura-Mazda." This is not an exaggerated expression of fancy made by ignorant nomads, but it is a Truth, seen far more clearly by the ancient Singers than by their modern interpreters.

The time has indeed arrived when our ancient Aryan Scriptures should be re-interpreted in a truly "mystic" fashion. Then only their true spiritual worth will be appreciated. Mere philological and lexical interpretations give us the *body* of these chants; we need to reveal the *soul*, and that can be done only through "the mystic" interpretation.

IRACH J. S. TARAPOREWALA

<sup>1</sup> Vide PIGGOT: *Prehistoric India*, pp. 79, 152, 160, etc.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 200.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 135.

*Philosophical Essays.* By P. R. DAMLE. (Asia Publishing House, Bombay. 204 pp. 1954. Rs. 9/12)

The 24 essays in this collection are papers and addresses delivered by Professor Damle at different times, mostly at philosophical congresses, colleges and on the radio. Hence they deal with topics ranging from the metaphysical and technical to others of a general, practical nature. The outstanding characteristics of his thought are a spirit of reflective inquiry, a broad tolerance which sometimes leads to over-simplifications and a preoccupation with the distinction he sees between "subjective and objective aspects of experience."

In quite a few of these essays Professor Damle is concerned with the standpoint, limits and method of philosophy. Philosophy, he says, is the pursuit of wisdom, it is science organized and self-conscious. It is not mere intellectual curiosity but a contemplation of knowledge, a reflective interpretation of experience. It is man's nature to reflect, his greatness and weakness both lie in this quality of his mind and philosophy is valuable for the training it gives to intellect and mind. Professor Damle further asserts:—

I am quite clear in my mind that there is no fundamental difference in the method of science and that of philosophy although there certainly is in the use or application of the method in the two fields and in the emphasis.

The method in both should be that of "deliberate reflection on experience." But surely the method of philosophy is not basically or merely inductive!

The controversial issue as to whether Indian philosophy is philosophy or religion is also discussed. The goal of Indian philosophy is said to be "salvation" and that of Western philosophy "the highest intellectual satisfaction." But Professor Damle is of the opinion that it is not this but the emphasis on subjective experience in Indian philosophy that causes the difference.

With regard to Indian systems of

philosophy he points out the danger of treating them as museum specimens, as mere matters for historical research, for

unless we restore the ancient thought of India to its natural home—a thinking mind—even the specimens will soon disappear.

Another point he examines and emphasizes, specially in "Heresies of Indian Philosophy," is that:—

The so-called Heretical theories of Indian Materialism and Indian Sensationalism are . . . serious philosophical positions and deserve earnest study. Far from being absurd and undesirable heresies they have valuable contribution to make by way of correction of the excesses of Absolute Idealism and in their statement and exposition show a subtlety and logical rigour which is invaluable for disciplining the intellect.

Some of the other controversial subjects treated in this book are "Souls: One or Many," "Are Sensa Physical, Mental or Neutral?" "Reality and Appearance" and "Error." Among subjects of a practical value are "On Means and Ends," "On Happiness," "On Greatness," "On Friendship" and "On Spirituality." In the last-named Professor Damle says:—

Let us realize our lack of spirituality as we recognize our backwardness in other matters. . . . Just as every one of us must have hands, feet and eyes, so must we have God and spirituality.

The quality of this publication as Indian publications go is decidedly good, the minor grammatical and other errors could have been easily avoided by better proof reading.

MUMTAZ MOTIWALLA

*Vedantic Epistemology.* By GHANSHAMDAS RATTANMAL MALKANI. (The Indian Institute, Amalner. 146 pp. 1953. Rs. 3/-)

G. R. Malkani is a very earnest philosopher. He has published a number of books. His most interesting booklet is on the philosophy of Nothing. The present book is the result of his serious thought and experience of many years. It is full of terse reasoning,

cogent arguments and trenchant criticism of the various theories of knowledge as maintained by the eminent Western contemporary philosophers.

Malkani analyses here the knowledge of the objective world and shows how there are levels of knowledge; the negation of one level leading to a higher one, till we arrive at the only true knowledge. This, he explains, is super-sensuous, in fact is our real Self, identical with the ultimate Reality. He shows how epistemology seeks the ultimate truth in common knowledge, through criticism and reflection. Knowledge gained by perception is full of errors; it is merely names and forms! He analyzes our knowledge of the relation between body and mind, substance and process and our knowledge of the local forms and shows them all to be but forms of erroneous knowledge. The keen philosophical acumen that he brings to bear on the analysis of the levels of knowledge, and the dialectical method he follows in developing his arguments speak for his learning and analytical powers.

Professor Malkani is a master of a technical and yet lucid style and discusses the most difficult topics clearly and precisely. The conclusion of all his arguments is that the ultimate object of knowledge is Reality or Self, which can be intuitively or supra-sensuously perceived in spiritual experience. He has done a great service to Vedantic thought by expressing the fundamentals in European philosophical terminology, so that Western scholars may easily appraise the great merits of Vedantic epistemology.

K. V. GAJENDRAGADKAR

*Time and the Timeless: Principal Miller Lectures, 1953.* By T. M. P. MAHADEVAN. (Upanishad Vihar, Madras. 88 pp. 1953. Rs. 2/-)

Dr. Mahadevan is one of the few Indian thinkers who have tried to synthesize the fundamental philosophical ideas of Western and Eastern

thinkers. The present book is an example of such an effort.

The author maintains that time is not in itself ultimately real. It is a process that has a purpose which increases with its movement. He sees time as the gateway through which humanity may see the ultimate Reality or Brahman. Discussing the different views he says that the linear theory of evolution does not give a correct account of time, and the creative and emergent theories have exposed thoroughly the defects of the Darwinian theory. History offers an explanation of time which is also unsatisfactory. According to Collingwood thought is everything and the time process nothing. The views of the Upanishadic Rishis, of eminent Vedantists, and also of great contemporary scientists are mentioned to prove how time points out the timeless Reality, namely the Absolute or Brahman.

The author expresses his scientific and philosophical ideas in simple un-technical and lucid language that can be easily understood even by laymen. He deserves all praise for his success in clearly exposing the latest views on the time problem within the short space of 84 pages. We heartily recommend the book to all students of philosophy. The printing and the get-up of the book leave nothing to be desired, and the price is reasonable.

K. V. GAJENDRAGADKAR

*Ethics.* By A. C. EWING. (*Teach Yourself Books: English Universities Press, Ltd., London. 183 pp. 1953. 6s.*)

Dr. Ewing distinguishes between *commonsense ethics* and *systematic Ethics*. Ethics, systematic, or a logical theory of ethics, he claims, is based on commonsense ethics. We start with commonsense notions; we all have some idea as to what good and bad, right and wrong, mean. If we did not have this knowledge we could not make a start in understanding ethics at all, so, we appear to have completed the

study even before we start on it! This is not however the case. The ideas we all have are about particular situations, but Ethics (*i.e.*, Dr. Ewing's "systematic Ethics") seeks to generalize and to make these generalizations an intelligible coherent system. We have in our own minds the means of testing these generalizations and this is the attraction of Ethics as a subject.

There are two terms "good" and "ought" (or duty) important in Ethics. There is the distinction between good as a means and good as an end. Unless something were good-in-itself, nothing would be of any use at all.

"The term 'ought' differs from good in referring primarily to actions" and involves usually the notion of good as a means. The question: "How ought we to act?" involves two difficulties: (a) it involves knowing the consequences of our action; which knowledge is empirical, not ethical; (b) it involves knowing what things are bad or good in themselves. This knowledge "is not capable of complete proof by reasoning but requires an intuitive grasp" (Dr. Ewing emphatically combines reason and intuition) "and valuation of the situation at which the student of Ethics need not be more competent than another person. The result is that Ethics cannot serve practice in more than an *advisory* capacity." (This is, perhaps, a series of "don'ts" *e.g.*, "covet not another's wealth"; "Do not do injury"; etc., which aspect is, maybe, more prominent in Indian than in Western ethics). Dr. Ewing writes:—

If Ethics could really decide by itself what we ought to do, it not only would be a practical science, but the only practical science, and it certainly is not that. It is a great service if it can even only *help* us substantially in deciding what we ought to do.

There is the view that the business of Ethics is to define fundamental terms and deduce all manner of conclusions following from this. Dr. Ewing thinks that: (a) this would make Ethics a mere branch of another subject, psychology, sociology or theology, according as to how the ethical terms would

be reduced to other terms; (b) a distinction should be made between "defining" an ethical term and "knowing" its meaning. We know by direct experience what good means without being able to analyze it. This knowledge is capable of improvement.

The rest of the book discusses "Selfishness and Unselfishness"; "The Pursuit of the General Happiness"; "Duty for Duty's Sake"; "The Pursuit of the Good"; "Attempts to Define 'Good' and 'Ought'"; "The Nature of Ethical 'Judgment'" and "Deserts and Responsibility"; in these chapters Dr. Ewing discusses also the question of freedom and determinism. As a result of Dr. Ewing's thought, the reader may gain a well-balanced view of ethical theories and a clear grasp of the nature and scope of Ethics.

N. A. NIKAM

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*A Foundation of Ontology: A Critical Analysis of Nicolai Hartmann.* By OTTO SAMUEL. Translated from the German by FRANK GAYNOR. (The Philosophical Library, Inc., New York. 150 pp. 1953. \$3.75)

The publication of Hartmann's *Ethics* in English translation by Dr. Stanton Coit in 1932 and sponsored by Dr. J. H. Muirhead in his famous Library of Philosophy was an event in the philosophical world. Nicolai Hartmann (1888–1950) was recognized as a thinker of the first order and his *Ethics* was regarded by discerning students as approaching the works of Immanuel Kant in depth and far-reaching significance.

But apart from a few discussions in journals, the ideas of Hartmann do not seem to have had their deserved influence on the moral reflections of our times. Yet he represents a saner reaction to the crisis of modern civilization than do the philosophies of Existentialism and Logical Positivism, which are so much in vogue today. He recalls to Indian students, and those sympathetic to Indian thought as are

students of Theosophy, the answer given in the *Bhagavad Gita* to a similar crisis in the far-off past.

One reason for his lack of influence is, perhaps, that his earlier works on metaphysics and the theory of knowledge, preparing the ground logically for his ethics of value, have as yet remained untranslated into English. The present work is the first effort to introduce Hartmann's metaphysical ideas to English readers. It consists of a summary of his small work entitled *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, with a running criticism in accompanying chapters by the author. We do not have the full text, but only a summary of it.

Hartmann seems to occupy a midway position between Kant and Hegel. His thought resembles that of Plato, his values recalling the Platonic Ideas. Hartmann stops short of finding a place for values and being in an infinite spirit as Hegel does. His thought is strictly realistic and religiously or spiritually neutral. It is an interesting variety of humanism refusing to merge values either into nature or into spirit.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

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*The Wisdom of Insecurity.* By ALAN W. WATTS. (Rider and Company, London. 136 pp. 1954. 10s.6d.)

Mr. Watts needs no introduction as a student of and a significant writer upon Zen, Mahayana, Taoism and Vedanta. Here we have a book which is an outcome of the synthesis he has personally effected between these kin-

dred "systems" of philosophy, metaphysics and the Wisdom Religion. This time, he claims however, it is a work which is not addressed to students, but to the man-in-the-street. For, not only are there few—three in all, I think—specific references to any of these systems (and those few of a light touch-and-go character only), but the language of the book is as simple and non-technical as only one who has made his subject the stuff of his life could make it. The influence of Zen and Mahayana Buddhism, predominate—which makes the work heavier going for Mr. Everyman than had Vedanta, for instance, been the main source of inspiration. For at the present time that very "I" for which alone there *exists* an Age of Anxiety is—necessarily, in the absence of an explicit statement of Buddhistic thought—just *bludgeoned* out of existence.

There is simply experience. There is not someone or something experiencing experience. . . . No one ever found an "I" apart from present experience. . . . To understand this is to realize that life is entirely momentary, that there is neither permanence nor security, and that there is no "I" which can be protected.

Many such passages; and what will the unprepared general reader make of them? Surely it seems that when he puts the book down he is likely to feel more confused and "lost" than when he opened it. Is this method of attempting to pass on the Wisdom a wise one?

CHARLES J. SEYMOUR

The man of meditation as thus described is superior to the man of penance and to the man of learning and also to the man of action; wherefore, O Arjuna, resolve thou to become a man of meditation.

(*Bhagavad-Gita*, VI, 46)

*Young People's Hebrew History.* By LOUIS WALLIS. (Philosophical Library, New York. ix + 117 pp. 1953. \$2.50)

The great majority of educational systems today presuppose a wide-spread and modern revolution in man's outlook on the universe. The application of this recognition, however, in terms of syllabus tends to be almost entirely on the materialistic plane. Little is being done to give to the rising generation adequate guidance and instruction concerning the moral and spiritual aspects of life. From this emerges a problem of some gravity. Whereas in most subjects, teaching is up-to-date, relevant, contemporaneous, the pupil is confronted in the spiritual field with outworn orthodoxies. To one aspect of this general problem of a technological age, Dr. Wallis addresses himself.

He reminds us that Western civilization rests on a three-fold cultural foundation, *i.e.*, Roman law, Greek philosophy, and the ethical monotheism of Israel. These have never been organized into a spiritual unity. In the past, if not so obviously at the present, attention has been given to the first two elements, but the last has been clouded by an atmosphere of prejudice, myth and miracle. Hence what amounts to an academic ban has prevented the communication of what modern scholarship has to say concerning one of the great historic traditions behind the ideas of God and goodness in the Western world.

The wide-spread ignorance of the contribution of Hebrew history to the cultural heritage is due in part to dogmatic differences among the Jews themselves. There has been a reluctance to adopt the historic method of interpreting the sacred writings. Too much reliance has been placed on the argument from miracle. Many refuse to recognize that the Jewish religion is the outcome of a long evolutionary process moving from very humble beginnings to the heights of ethical monotheism. From this and other causes

comes the result that the student, familiar with the modern approach and methods in natural science, economics and history in general, has no parallel understanding of the circumstances and events out of which grew the fine flowering of Hebrew religion and morality.

In the attempt to meet this situation, Dr. Wallis has written a succinct and impressive account of the Hebrews from the arrival of the Israelites in Canaan to the rise of the great prophets in the classical age. He is clearly an expert in the subject. He traces with a sure hand the various social, economic, and spiritual conflicts out of which Judaism arose. As Kennett did in Cambridge a generation ago, the author takes as the dominant theme the long drawn struggle between Yahwism and Baalism. Unlike Kennett, however, he does not sugar the pill for the student by recommending John Buchan's *Witchwood* as a suitable commentary on the phenomenon of the survival of an older darker faith beneath the surface of the new and true. At the same time, the book takes full account of the related struggle for social justice, making points of clear relevance to the modern problem. This is the most valuable part of the argument. On the other hand, the objectivity of the scientific approach is secured not without cost. We miss that over-all sense of the living God, active in history, revealing Himself in the things He does for the people of His choosing, which is so prominent in the Hebrew Scriptures themselves.

As an argument of the case for the scientific study of religion, illustrated by one particular faith, the book is sound. The application of the principles of æsthetical and literary criticism to the documents is well done. Although limited to the circumstances of his own country and to the religious heritage of the Western world, the writer does good service to a wide public in setting out, clearly and concisely, something of the great contri-

bution made by the Hebrews to the religious and ethical teaching of the world. Yet we cannot think that, as it stands, this is suitable as a textbook for the young. It is rather a prolegomenon to the subject for the specialist in religious education.

MARCUS WARD

*An Introduction to Trade Unionism.*  
By G. D. H. COLE. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 324 pp. 1953. 18s.)

Professor Cole has laid us all under a great obligation in the production of this excellent book. It faces frankly the difficulties and dangers of the Trade Union organization of industry, as we have it now, pointing out the decay in democratic feeling and conviction, which makes it often extremely difficult to get more than a few interested extremists to Union meetings. Consequently the direction of the Unions, and of industry as a whole, is by the said extremists for ulterior motives. He also shows the risks of a growing Trade Union bureaucracy and of the resultant bureaucratic tyranny; the fact of growing centralization and the shrinking in importance of the local Trade Union branch and the increasing depersonalization of the whole machine. We are also shown the great blessings which the Trade Union movement has brought in the past to the mass of our fellow-countrymen; and the reasons why the Unions often seem to maintain a fighting organization and spirit which is occasionally incongruous and even perilous in the semi-Socialist present. Professor Cole's book thus deals with matters which it is urgently important for every modern citizen to understand and to be able to appraise intelligently. We should all read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest it.

J. S. HOYLAND

*The Fundamentals of World Peace.*  
By A. HAMER HALL. (Philosophical Library, New York. 112 pp. 1953. \$3.)

This is, in a sense, a perfervid plea for an honest, whole-hearted and all-embracing application of the universal code of ethics embodied in the Sermon on the Mount and relating to the problems of man both individually and collectively. As far as the problem of world peace is concerned this means, according to the author, an acceptance of "eight essentials indispensable to successful government"—namely: (1) unity, not isolation; (2) conciliation; (3) law and government; (4) a police force to maintain order; (5) civil and religious freedom; (6) self-government, self-determination, freedom of choice; (7) subservience to none, possession by none; and (8) economic freedom based upon supply and demand (pp. 14-15). But:—

International morality cannot exist without the backing of individual morality. International morality in fact is merely an extension of individual morality, just as foreign policy, in a democracy, is an extension of individual policy. (pp. 15-16)

Therefore:—

The individual must not ignore his collective obligations neither must collectivism swallow up individual rights. (p. 44)

The author substantiates his thesis with examples from history both ancient and modern, which go to prove that "men have shown a desire to be at peace and on good understanding among themselves"; e.g., in 559 B.C.:—

In the Chou era in China an attempt was made to form a League out of fourteen states, which adopted the useful formula that great states should make no raids on smaller ones. (p. 58)

The spirit of the United Nations Charter is not modern!

G. M.

*Myth and Ritual in Christianity.* By ALAN W. WATTS. Myth and Man Series. 8 gravure plates, 17 line drawings and woodcuts. Glossary. (Thames and Hudson, London and New York. ix + 262 pp. 1954. 25s.)

The aim of this book is to "present Christianity as the ritual reliving of the Christ-story through the seasonal cycle of the ecclesiastical year." Advent, Christmas, Epiphany, Lent, Passiontide, Easter and Pentecost are considered in detail, and linked with the symbolism of Eastern and other religions.

Thus Professor Watts gives, not a treatment of the Biblical story as a historical record, but a universal interpretation of Christian tradition (primarily that of the late 13th century, its golden age), along the lines of the *philosophia perennis*. He deals with the subjects of Deity "in the Beginning," the Word and the angelic hierarchies; with the Virgin, associated with Sophia, Divine Wisdom, virgin matter or space; with the identity of God and Satan—Lucifer being only the necessary negative side, the forgetting of divinity, which is recollected fully in Christ. For Adam, Lucifer, Christ are all in every man. The fall of Adam and of Lucifer both present the problem of mentality confused by increasing self-consciousness. This confusion comes from the failure to see it as only a stream of illusions held together by memory, not true self-consciousness. As long as the mind, imprisoned by memory, feels itself to be "I" as the sum total of past images, it cannot save itself. Only in crucifixion, when there is nothing left to which the "I" can cling, is there salvation. The Cross of Wood (symbol of matter) brings death to the self we "remember," but is the Tree of Life itself for the true Self. The end of Being is neither in an "everlasting Heaven" nor an "everlasting Hell" on the circle of time, but is at the very Centre of Existence, out of time and space.

By presenting the Christian myth

thus, "outside-in," the author lights the way to a new renaissance in Christianity. But one danger needs to be indicated. Shadow always follows light. Imagery and ritual serve man's purpose at one point, but, if not outgrown, betray him, for "party" religions can also strengthen their power over men from the very same source which enables men to break free from their illusions. Professor Watts speaks of the *philosophia perennis* as being communicated in two ways—in a mythic and ritual fashion, and in a more-or-less direct way. The reader should not let the fact of the significance in the ritual lead him back to dependence on it. This, as Buddha indicated, is a fetter to be broken. Man cannot "come of age" in his understanding, while tied to the form. This illuminating book will help to free those who wish to be free.

W. E. WHITEMAN

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*Spiritualism on Trial.* By ARTHUR WILKINSON. (The Regency Press (London and New York) Ltd. 224 pp. 1953. 10s. 6d.)

Spiritualism is at its worst a racket and at its best a cult. It must be an eye-opener to many credulous spiritualists to find a man like Mr. Wilkinson, who has been in the movement for nearly half a century, regretting its worst features. The immense amount of fraud that meets the investigator at almost every step is frankly admitted. The telescopic tube that collapses into the dummy pencil case; the inflated rubber "spirit" hand attached to the fine black lazy scissors; the "medium" in black painted over with phosphorus—very ingenious, but not spiritualism, argues Mr. Wilkinson. We remember Hannen Swaffer's telling us that an honest man should admit the case for spiritualism just as he admits the case for Mars or the South Pole, without seeing either of them himself. Unfortunately, Swaffer's arguments, like Mr. Wilkinson's, try to prove too much.

The term "spiritualism" seems to carry different shades of meaning: it may mean a scientific or quasi-scientific theory about certain perplexing and ill-understood phenomena; it may mean the practice of "communicating with the dead"; it may mean a body of religious teachings. There is not much to be said for spiritualism as a scientific theory. "Ectoplasm," Mr. Wilkinson's proposed "link" between spirit and matter, seems to have the one virtue we do not expect of a real entity—that of obediently doing all that it is told by the theorist.

Mr. Wilkinson's attempts to assess the worth of the recent experiments in "Extra-Sensory Perception" (ESP) and "Psycho-Kinesis" (PK) are none too happy. We cannot suppose that men like Dr. J. B. Rhine, Dr. R. H. Thouless, by resorting to statistics, are wasting their time in a perpetual kindergarten; nor can we accept the suggestion that some "discarnate" joker interfered with the dice-throwing experiment. It is true that spiritualism (as distinguished from mere "spiritism") has evolved a remarkable body of teachings. Few spiritualists, however, realize that the doctrines have had a long history in Pythagorean, Gnostic and mystical literatures. On these and other cognate issues, Madame Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled* is one of the most authoritative books. The average "spiritist" would do well to read what she has to say about the "grades of communication." Mr. Wilkinson writes with obvious sincerity. He will persuade a large class of readers that spiritualism is a subject about which it is easy to form strong opinions only if one knows far too much or far too little.

C. T. K. CHARI

*The Dawn of the Post-Modern Era.*  
By E. J. TRUEBLOOD. (Philosophical Library, New York. 198 pp. 1954. \$3.75)

The future may well justify the

author's dating a new era from 1945—the year of the atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The era of science and power, dating from the Renaissance, seems to have formed a well-defined period which presents a vast and fateful drama in which Western man seems to have chosen, for the most part, the kingdoms of the world and their glory at the peril of his soul.

Civilization today is in ruins or is very near ruin. The author sketches the shattering effects of an expanding time, an expanding space and an expanding energy on the meagre spiritual resources of the peoples of the West. The challenge of the atomic age is for a radical reconstruction of the bases of civilization and the development of man in his full integrity or "his highest potentialities" as the author puts it.

The story of failure of the family and of the neighbourhood, in industry, agriculture, transportation and communications, in education, economy, politics and culture, is unfolded in terms of some of the most fruitful ideas current in America. P. A. Sorokin, R. T. Flewelling, H. A. Overstreet, Reinhold Niebuhr and many others are drawn upon in the analysis.

The conclusion is that:—

People of all ages, all nations, all races, and all faiths—all persons should have opportunities to grow up to their own greatest potential stature. The seers of all generations and all climes have caught faint glimpses of a world of fully developed persons. This is the supremely high goal, but sometimes it moves within mortal view and challenges mankind to follow its gleam. . . . This, then, is the master challenge and the ultimate goal: *a human society in which every person can and will attain his highest potentialities.*

But like most efforts along this line, the exact way in which ultimate spiritual ideals are to be realized needs more development than is given in this book.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

## ENDS AND SAYINGS

“—————ends of verse  
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS

Dr. William A. Robson, Lecturer in Public Administration at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the University of London, who recently visited India, including in his lecture tour the Indian Institute of Culture, Bangalore, has a thoughtful article, “India as a Welfare State” in *The Political Quarterly* for April.

He praises the statement in the Indian Constitution of the fundamental aims and aspirations of the welfare state as probably the most complete and explicit to be found in any state document anywhere, however difficult their implementation may be. Eliminating poverty in Britain, he says, meant largely redistributing wealth, but in India the poverty is so great that redistribution alone could do little to ameliorate rural and urban poverty.

Population trends aside—and elsewhere the reproduction rate has fallen as living standards have advanced—the problems of health, of education, of the position of women in some respects, and many more, persist. The need for increasing productivity, per capita as well as in the aggregate, is recognized by the Planning Commission. Major development projects like those providing both irrigation and power are under way, as are numerous minor irrigation projects, and a network of community projects is being spread. Inadequate capital investment seems to be blocking rapid industrial development but, while Dr. Robson finds no country more deserving of financial aid and technical assistance, or more in need of them than India, he utters a pertinent warning against

the nihilistic effects which massive industrialization and urbanization at too fast a tempo might have on a people with so old and highly developed a culture.

That India is in practice far from enforcing minimum standards of food, shelter, etc., he finds but too evident in the beggars’ plight. He suggests that it is not only lack of resources which prevents making a start with dealing with poverty in some of its aspects. “It is also a problem of awakening the social conscience and developing a sense of compassion.” The “curious apathy, if not indifference . . . towards some of the appalling conditions of housing and insanitation” may, we think, be ascribed partly to the weakening of the sense of individual responsibility and initiative, but it has to be overcome if India is to deserve the name of a welfare state.

He praises India for the common sense and judgment displayed by the large illiterate majority in the 1952 elections, for the adequate supply of graduates, “potential leaders in every walk of life,” and for the people’s ascetic tendency and their æsthetic sense and skill in craftsmanship. Indians favouring the rapid Westernization of their country should note his finding that

compared with any Western country known to the writer, the Indian people appear to possess an extraordinary degree of contentment.

Let us not barter *that away* for lesser goods!

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The International Congress for Peace and Christian Culture which met in Florence, September 1953, discussed the subject “Prayer and Poetry.” The lecture delivered by Jean Danielou at this congress is reprinted as “The Mainstay of Civilization” in the *Quarterly, East and West* (January 1954). M. Danielou said at the outset:—

man cannot expect from science what it cannot give us. Science can alter the economic foundations of human existence, but Prayer and Poetry are the two pointers to ... spiritual values.

Poetry upholds man's sense of dignity, his respect for others, his "respectful wonder at the abyss of a single human soul," his gropings after the mystery of things, of love. Poetry at its highest is prayer though not all prayer is poetry.

Poets are there to teach us that man is higher than technique, worth more than science; that he counts more than the State. These latter are just means to help him express and fulfil himself.

Another difference between poetry and science is that science is "impersonal and common to the whole of mankind" while poetry bears the distinctive features of each nation, it expresses the innermost character and aspirations of each people. Yet, poetry also expresses universal values, thoughts and feelings. Mankind would be the poorer without Shakespeare, Racine, Dante, Shelley, Pushkin and Sa'adi. But higher than poetry is prophecy, adds M. Danielou. Poetry cannot fathom "the mystery of time" or answer the question—whither mankind? But great poets like Dante give us a "real standard of civilization."

One does not, however, understand what M. Danielou means by "if civilization's aim is not to establish a new paradise on earth, it is to prepare the kingdom of heaven above." All change must take place from and within the heart of man. Man's spiritual orientation alone can bring the kingdom of heaven on earth—not "above" in some upper region!

Dr. Zakir Husain, eminent Indian educationist, in an article, "Future of Education in India" (*The Indo-Asian Culture*, April 1954) remarks—"The future of Indian education is the future of the Indian people." The present, however, is far from bright:—

With perhaps less than 40 out of a hundred children of the age group 6-11 and with less than 10 per cent of the boys and

girls between the ages of 11 and 17 at school, with less than 1 per cent of the age-range 17-23 at the colleges and universities, and with only 17 per cent of the population literate, an enormous expansion of the provision of education is called for.

Even the Five-Year Plan has made a meagre provision while the progress of educational schemes is behind schedule. Dr. Husain points out that to provide basic education for all children between 6-14 and secondary education for 20 per cent of those qualifying from this group should easily take another 25 years, with steady effort and finance.

But what about the quality of the future education? Dr. Husain makes a significant contribution here. The "material and immaterial goods" of culture set the educational process in motion. Further, an individual mind is best cultivated by cultural goods "whose mental structure wholly or at least partially, corresponds to its own mental relief." In his basic education programme for children, Gandhiji intuitively grasped this principle. He knew that "the dominant psychical characteristic of this early age period is practical activity." For the next stage a diversified system of theoretical secondary schools is necessary. These should serve the needs of the chief mental types of the students. None of these schools can hope to be entirely adapted to the specific needs of all individual pupils in an equal measure, but there can be innumerable variations and opportunities to study such aspects of culture as not adequately represented in particular programmes.

The principle means of education from the Basic School to the university will thus be "educationally productive." This productive mental work, accompanied by manual activity or not, gives an end and a purpose to the individual. When it is linked to social needs then the individual gains a social value and significance. Thus "places of individual self-seeking" may change into "those of co-operative social endeavour."