AUM

"The small errors of life are nothing,
but the general sum of thought is much."

—W. Q. JUDGE

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WHICH ONE AM I?

Monks, there are three persons found existing in the world. What three? The topsy-turvy-brained, the scatter-brained, and the man of comprehensive brain.

"The schoolmaster is abroad," said Lord Brougham in 1828. Now he is ubiquitous. Mind training is therefore supposed to take place. While psychologists are discussing what the mind is, whence it comes and how it functions, educationists are already kneading the child-mind as if it were dough to be made ready for the oven, and treating the adult mind as if it were a sensitive plate prepared to receive images. In the numerous theories of psychologists and educationists there is often a thread of reality by which the entire tangled pattern is held together. In this wise, then, the mind of the race is affected; and yet in spite of millions of pictures held before the mental vision, the whirling mind continues to wander, its selfishness persists in its greed, and its possessor, man himself, has to submit to disease, decay and disintegration on more than one plane. Education is supposed to free the mind, but it enslaves; to enlighten the mind, but it causes bewilderment; to give direction to life, but it begets doubt.

Gotama, the Buddha, in his wonderfully simple way once classified human mentality into three types, given in the above quotation, and he proceeded to explain them thus:—

And of what sort, monks, is the topsy-turvy-brained?

Herein a certain person frequents the meeting-place to hear Dhamma from the lips of the monks. The monks teach him

Dhamma that is lovely in the beginning, lovely in the middle, lovely in the ending, both in spirit and in letter. They make plain the holy life perfectly fulfilled in all its purity.

But as he sits there he pays no heed to that talk in its beginning, pays no heed to its middle, pays no heed to its ending. Also when he has risen from his seat he pays no heed thereto . . . Just as when a pot is turned upside down, the water poured thereon runs off and does not stay in the pot, even so in this case a certain person frequents the meeting-place . . . but pays no heed to that talk . . . also when he rises from his seat he pays no heed thereto . . . This one is called "the topsy-turvy-brained".

And of what sort, monks, is the scatter-brained?

In this case a certain person frequents the meeting-place . . . As he sits he pays heed to that talk in its beginning, its middle and its end, but when he has risen up from his seat he pays no heed thereto . . . Just as when in a man's lap divers kinds of food are piled together, such as sesamum, rice, sweetmeats and jujube fruits. When he rises from his seat he scatters all abroad through absent-mindedness,—even so, monks, in this case a certain person frequents the meeting-place . . . but when he has risen from his seat he pays no heed thereto. This one is called "the scatter-brained".

And of what sort, monks, is the man of comprehensive mind?

In this case a certain person frequents the meeting-place to hear Dhamma from the lips of the monks. They teach him Dhamma that is lovely in the beginning, lovely in the middle, lovely in the ending, both in its spirit and its letter. They make plain the holy life perfectly fulfilled in all its purity. As he sits there he pays heed to that talk in its beginning, he pays heed to that talk in its middle, he pays heed to its ending. Also when he rises from his seat he still bears it in mind. Just as when a pot is set upright the water poured therein accumulates and does not run away, even so in this case a certain person frequents the meeting-place . . . and pays heed to that talk . . . Also when he rises from his seat he bears it in mind, in its beginning, in its middle, in its ending. This one, monks, is called "the man of comprehensive mind".

Such, monks, are the three persons found existing in the world.

Is it not worth while, for reader and writer alike, to resort to self-examination and ask—Which one am I?

PSYCHIC PHENOMENA

II.—SUGGESTED EXPLANATIONS

[**C. E. M. Joad** here offers an explanation of his own supernormal experiences described in the first part of this article published in our last number.

Since the foundation of the Society for Psychical Research in 1882, volumes of data of supernormal happenings are published, but a noteworthy fact is stated by Mr. W. H. Salter of that Society in his article on Psychical Research in the latest edition—the XIVth—of the *Encyclopædia Britannica:*

> But for the most part, the "debatable phenomena" of 1882 remain almost as debatable in 1929. This would be a surprising fact in view of the number of scientists and philosophers of the highest eminence, who have interested themselves in psychical research, if the study were not one of exceptional difficulty.

One of the greatest self-created difficulties that the psychical researchers have erected is due to the neglect of the explanations given in oriental psychology for the phenomena exhibited in the séance room. These are attributable to three main causes: (1) The astral eidola, or shells, of the dead; (2) Elementals, and (3) the astral double of the medium. Compare, in this connection, Madame Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. II, p. 596.—EDS.]

In this article I shall venture to offer a tentative explanation of some of the phenomena described in my last. I have already expressed the view that no single explanation covers the whole field, and what I shall have to say is, in the present state of our knowledge, in the nature of hypothesis only.

The explanation generally put forward is that many of the phenomena are caused by the discarnate spirits of those who have "passed over" and wish to communicate with their friends on earth. This view is usually held in conjunction with the belief that the human soul survives death and is immortal; it may be, and frequently is, associated with a belief in reincarnation. That something survives the break up of the individual's body is, I think, likely. I do not, however, believe that this something is an individual mind or personality. I am not denying this hypothesis; I content myself merely with asserting that it does not seem to me to be proven. I also think that it is antecedently improbable for the following reasons.

I have already pointed out that the communications received from "spirits" are often on a lower level of intelligence, knowledge and culture than that achieved by the alleged communicator during his life time. *If ghosts have souls, they would seem to be without brains.* The view that we survive as individuals bereft of that faculty of reason which is the distinction of our species, or that the faculty, if it persists for a time, suffers a continuous decline in quality, so that

we relapse to the level of savages or half wits, is to me morally repugnant.

A stronger argument against the survival of individual personality is derived from the close connection between mind and body. The closeness of this connection is an accepted fact and need not be stressed here. But if the personality is what it is, very largely because the body is what it is, in what sense can the same personality be said to persist when deprived of a body? An invalid, for example, has a different mentality from a healthy man, a hunchback from a straight man; character is bound up with the secretions of the ductless glands; an insufficiency of thyroid produces a half wit and an excess of adrenalin a coward. Change a man's body and you change the man.

If a man's nature is largely determined by his body, it is bound up no less with his memories. My knowledge, such as it is, is largely a memory of the things I have learned; my outlook on life the effect of the things I have experienced. If I had not fallen out of the window at the age of five, I should not be afraid of heights now. As one gets older, memories become more important; very aged people live almost entirely in their memories; in fact, *they are* their memories.

Again, a man is very largely the product of his environment. I, for example, am a child of the twentieth century, with the outlook, beliefs and attainments of my generation. Body, memories and environment—these go far to make a man what he is; his personality is, for the most part, their joint outcome.

Now nobody who believes in Reincarnation holds, so far as I know, that one inhabits the *same body* in different lives. Obviously not, since we know what happens to old bodies; they become worms.*

People do not normally have any memory of their past lives, so that one's memories in each life would be different; one's environment from life to life is also different. Given a different body, different memories and different environment, the difficulty is to see in what sense a man could be said to be the *same* person in different lives, just as it is difficult to see how he could be regarded as the same person when bereft of his body. If I may commit an Irishism, if it is really *I* who continues to live on without a body, or to live through a number of different lives, then I must be a different person each time I change my body or leave it.†

I turn, then, to an explanation on rather different lines, which is

* *Ashes*, in the more hygienic and civilized method, *viz.* Cremation,—to the benefit of the populace, and, says Theosophy, to the benefit of the defunct.—EDS.

† This is the Theosophical position only partially stated; but is there not a thread on which hang personalities like beads? Hypnotic experiments show that the nature of memory changes in the same personality. Theosophy makes a distinction between personality and individuality. Personality does not survive, but Individuality never dies. See *Key to Theosophy* pp. 111-114.—EDS.

the one which I myself consider to be open to the fewest objections. This explanation follows naturally from my general view of a living organism as being essentially a dualism, manifesting the operation of a non-material, vital principle in a material medium. A living organism is for me literally a lump of matter animated by the breath of life, and, in animating, life moulds and controls the medium it animates, using the organism thus created as an instrument for the fulfilment of its own instinctive purposes. I cannot here enlarge on this view* further than to point out that it constitutes a metaphysical background not only compatible with but even favourable to the view that some at least of the abnormal phenomena described in my last article are genuine.

Materialism, it is obvious, is incompatible with the occurrence of such phenomena, for materialism requires us to suppose that so-called mental events are always the effects, never the causes of physical events. But such phenomena as ectoplasm and the movements of small objects certainly *seem* to suggest that some mind is acting directly upon and altering the form or the position of pieces of matter. On the other hand, the religious hypothesis in the crude form in which it is usually put forward by the Christian Churches in Western countries, seems equally difficult to reconcile with the phenomena of the séance room. That we should be immortal is credible; that God should permit us to know, or for reasons of His own to withhold knowledge of this fact, is also credible. But that He should allow us neither to know it nor not to know it, but to suspect it merely as a doubtful inference based upon equivocal happenings in the somewhat squalid atmosphere of the normal séance room, I find difficult to believe.

But, if the dualistic hypothesis suggested above be adopted, if a living organism is a manifestation of a vital force which uses and moulds matter for its end, then the phenomena studied by psychical research would afford only a particular and somewhat unusual case of what is a perfectly normal proceeding. If mind is always acting upon and producing movements in the body, it is not inconceivable that it should act upon and produce movements in a table or a tambourine; it might even be able to affect and to manifest itself in a body other than that with which it is usually associated. Consider the nature of the miracle involved by the normal growth of a human body. The matter of which a living body is composed, beginning as a microscopic speck of protoplasm, ends as a many-millioned colony of cells. These cells are highly organised, and specialized for the performance of different functions. Some are marshalled to carry on the work of the nervous system; others to form the engines we call muscles; others,

* For a further account see my *Matter, Life and Value*, especially Ch. IV.

again, serve the comparatively lowly purpose of bone-levers. Instruments of incredible delicacy, the eye and the ear are evolved; yet the whole complex mechanism of a living human body is developed from a particle of living matter smaller than the finest pin-head.

Now it seems impossible to explain this process of development on purely mechanical lines. We are driven, on my view, to postulate the presence of a purposive drive present in the organism from the first which, acting upon and animating it, directs its growth along the lines appropriate to its species. Driesch's experiments on embryos afford an even more striking example of the operations of the activity I wish to suggest. Driesch found that, if an embryo which has developed as far as the blastula stage, in which it is a hollow sphere of cells without any top or bottom, right or left, is then divided into two or more parts with a sharp cut, each half develops into one entire embryo. Thus, since there are an infinite number of planes along which the cut might have gone, any one part of the embryo must know what the other parts are going to do, and, moreover, must be prepared to perform almost any function. In other words, until a very late stage in development each single cell must have the potentiality of turning into any other cell, according to the necessity of the whole body. Any one cell might become a liver-cell, a blood-corpuscle, or a constituent of bone tissue according to the demands made upon it; demands, too, incapable of being foreseen, for the plane of the experimentalist's cut is a matter of chance.

Now the suggestion I want to make is that the directing activity which is responsible for the facts of normal growth both in the embryo and the organism, may also be responsible for the abnormal manifestations witnessed in a séance room. Just as it may proliferate in a cancerous mass of superfluous cells, so it may manifest itself in ectoplasm; just as the informing life normally moulds and controls the growth of the embryo, so it may on occasion, acting abnormally, control and mould the disintegrated substance of the medium's body into the forms assumed by ectoplasm.

Nor does the movement of small objects, on this hypothesis, offer any insuperable difficulty. Certainly it appears to involve the action of force from a distance, but the notion of force acting from a distance has long been discredited in physics, and there is nothing more mysterious in a directive mind operating from its base in the medium's body to cause the movements of small objects without the interposition of a visible material agency, than there is in a magnet doing the same, or in the deflection of the needle of a galvanisator in a magnetic field. I cannot pursue this suggestion here, which I have

elaborated at length elsewhere,* but, since I have now introduced the words "directive mind," I will conclude by trying to say very briefly what I mean by them.

I hold, following Dr. Broad†, that an individual mind is probably to be regarded as an emergent. It is, that is to say, a compound in the sense in which water is a compound, the essential point being that water, which is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, possesses properties which are not the properties of either constituent. All the more highly developed products of evolution are, I think, emergent in this sense. Now the constituents on whose combination a mind emerges are, I hold, the immaterial stream or activity of life, or rather an individual current of this stream which I shall call the psychic factor, and the material stuff, the body, which individualises, and, as it were, insulates it from the main flow. A mind, then, is a temporary existent emerging on the combination of the body and a psychic factor (itself not a mind) and continuing for so long as the combination persists.

At death the body disintegrates, the combination is dissolved, and the mind goes out of existence; but the psychic factor may for a time at any rate survive. Moreover it may still possess its old property of being able to combine with a body to form a mind.

Now consider the case of a medium in a trance. The medium's body, we will suppose, is temporarily vacated by the medium's mind; at any rate the mind is in abeyance. It is with this temporarily vacated body that the surviving psychic factor combines and upon the combination there emerges a new temporary mind. This mind is not the mind either of the dead person or of the medium. This theory, of course, is sheer hypothesis, but there are, so far as I know, no facts which are incompatible with it, and there is one set of facts which it explains particularly well.

"Spirit" messages frequently bear traces which suggest an origin in the surviving mind of the dead person, although they are usually too childish and simple to be quite characteristic. Also they are faintly reminiscent of the personality of the medium; so much so as to suggest to many the hypothesis that they emanate from the medium's unconscious self. If we suppose that the mind that sends them is a temporary, rather elementary mind, owning as its ingredients the vital factor of the dead person and the body of the medium, this double reference of the messages which remind us partly of one and partly of the other would be explained. It is, I suggest, this temporary mind which may also be responsible for ectoplastic and other physical phenomena. It breaks

* See my *Matter, Life and Value*, Ch. IV (Oxford University Press) and *Movements in Modern Thought* (to be published this autumn by Faber), Ch. VII.

† See *The Mind and Its Place in Nature* by C. D. BROAD.

down the stuff of the medium's body into ectoplasm and then proceeds to give it temporary shape and form; it also amuses itself by causing tambourines to rattle, tables to jump and the other trivial occurrences of the séance room. I say "amuses itself" because that quality of rather pointless mischievousness, which I have already noticed as characteristic of psychical phenomena, is precisely what one would expect of a temporary intelligence possessing the childlike and elementary disposition appropriate to its casual origin and brief *ad hoc* existence.

I should like to offer one further suggestion in regard to telepathic and other supernormal, psychological powers. These I believe to be present in every individual. By a deliberate technique such as that perfected in the East, they may be evoked and brought under volitional control; but in most of us they remain latent because life withholds from the conscious control of the individual the use of its and his full powers. If the individual could foresee the future, remember all the past, live in the minds of his fellows, he would lose that incentive to effort and struggle which is born of limitation and by means of which his character and faculties are developed. It is only through such development that he becomes an adequate instrument of life's purpose, fitted to carry life to higher levels than it has hitherto reached. When he is approaching the end of his life as an individual, and the performance of his function as an instrument of life is about to be terminated, the reason for withholding the use of these hidden powers no longer obtains, and they become for a few moments accessible to consciousness. Thus the typical instance of telepathy is the message sent by the soldier in the trenches on the point of death to mother or wife at home. The process by which the drowning man remembers in a flash and apparently lives through all the details of his past life, is an example of the same sudden enlargement of powers.

C. E. M. JOAD

Before the Soul can see, the Harmony within must be attained, and fleshly eyes be rendered blind to all illusion. Before the Soul can hear, the image (man) has to become as deaf to roarings as to whispers, to cries of bellowing elephants as to the silvery buzzing of the golden firefly.

—THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ODOURS

[**H. Stanley Redgrove, B. Sc., F. I. C.**, is a specialist in the subject on which he writes and has published an interesting volume on *Scent and All About It.* In this article he goes into the subject of the classification of smells, and in passing refers to the origin of smell itself—on which problem interested readers may consult THE ARYAN PATH for March and November 1931.—EDS.]

In his book, *The Flying Inn*, G. K. Chesterton puts into the mouth of a dog a song about the noselessness of man ; and there is no doubt that, in comparison with dogs and many other animals, the human olfactory apparatus seems to be relatively little developed. It is, indeed, often assumed that, in mankind, the sense of smell is weak and unimportant; for which reason, perhaps, the phenomena of olfaction have received so little attention in comparison with those of hearing and sight.

As yet no perfectly satisfactory system of classifying and naming smells has been devised. We can only describe a new or little known odour by saying that it is " like " a well-known one. For example, the substances rhodinol, geraniol, phenyl, ethyl, alcohol, and many others which might be named, all have odours which can only be described by saying that they are like that of roses. The odours of these substances are, however, all quite distinct, even to the relatively untrained nose. We can, perhaps, achieve a better description by comparing the odour of each with that of a particular type of rose ; but even this plan is not really satisfactory, for the odours of the flowers in question, though " like " those of the substances mentioned, are actually of a considerably more complex character.

In recent years, Crocker and Henderson have put forward the theory that all odours are made up of not more than four components, namely, fragrant or sweet, acid or sour, burnt or empyreumatic, and caprylic or œnanthic, which may be present in varying degrees of intensity from 0 to 8. On the basis of this theory, they have endeavoured to analyse a considerable number of odours, with results which, in my opinion, are quite unsatisfactory. The diversity of odours is far greater than can be accounted for in this manner.

Two older systems of classification, namely, those of Rimmel and Piesse, although marred by obvious defects, seem to be of more practical value. Rimmel's system is frankly empirical. It relates to pleasant odours only. Eighteen complex odours, namely those of bitter almonds, ambergris, aniseed, vanilla, camphor, cloves, lemons, pears, jasmine, lavender, peppermint, musk, orange-blossoms, roses, sandalwood, cinnamon, tuberoses and violets, are chosen as types, other odours being grouped along with these on the basis of " likeness ".

In Piesse's system, 46 pleasant odours are arranged in a gamut, corresponding to an extended musical scale in C major. Odours which form octaves with each other are "like". Those which are distant at intervals corresponding to harmonious chords, give pleasing results in combination.

The possibility of establishing useful analogies between sounds and odours is one of great interest. Readers desirous of pursuing the matter further are referred to two articles by myself published in *The Perfumery and Essential Oil Record* ("Perfumes and Music," February, 1929, and "In Defence of Noses," May, 1930). It may be said, however, that interesting and suggestive though these analogies are, they do not provide a completely satisfactory means for classifying and naming odours.

A game is sometimes played in which the competitors are required to name, while blindfolded, the contents of a number of bottles which they are allowed to smell. In the bottles are placed various common products having characteristic odours. It is notorious how many curious and amusing mistakes are made in their identification.

The fact, however, remains that smell is the acutest of man's senses, and this is well known to perfumers. They are quite aware that the addition of a minute trace of a suitable odorous substance to a perfume may make quite a profound change in its odour, and that the quantity required may, in certain cases, be so small as to be quite impossible of detection by any other means.

Odours probably play a much larger part in our lives than we are aware. We are constantly breathing in odorous emanations; and, even if the sensations they produce do not arise above the subconscious level, they are quite capable of affecting our general states of mind.

Odours are well known to form extremely strong mental associations. Hence they are very able to recall memories to the mind. Why this should be the case is not known; but it is a fact, and to this fact, no doubt, are to be attributed the powerful effects which certain odours are capable of exercising on the emotions.

The action of odours as emotional stimulants is a subject of great psychological interest. But before considering further this aspect of the psychology of odours, it may be useful to mention some of the other ways in which odours play an important part in human lives.

A liking for sweet odours is common. Most of us enjoy the fragrance of flowers, deriving a pleasure therefrom analogous to that derived from looking at a fine painting or hearing a fine musical performance. The perfumer endeavours to capture, or by artificial means to recreate, the fragrance of flowers for our perpetual enjoyment. He aims, too, by the compounding of various aromatic bodies, to produce new and delicious combinations of odours. His

work is entirely analogous to that of the painter and the musician, yet it seems to have failed to have gained universal recognition as constituting one of the fine arts.

The task of creating harmonious combinations of odours is not restricted to the perfumer: it extends to the chef. We sniff food to judge of its goodness; and when we eat it, the sensations we experience are largely of an olfactory character. Tastes, commonly so-called, are made up of two distinct factors: tastes proper, and flavours. Tastes proper are very limited in number: probably there are only seven in all, namely, sweet, salt, sour, bitter, metallic, alkaline, and pungent. Flavours, however, are almost infinite in their variety. And just as odours are experienced in virtue of the entry into the upper part of the nose of particles of aromatic materials breathed in, so the sensation of flavour arises from similar particles reaching the olfactory apparatus from the mouth as the breath is exhaled.

In itself, an odour seems of so ethereal character, yet capable of so profoundly affecting the mind, that some have been led to think that odours must in some peculiar way belong to the spiritual realm. Now regarded from one point of view, every sensation is a spiritual phenomenon, since it exists only in mind; and, in the last analysis, the Universe itself may be reduced to minds and their experiences. The materialist hypothesis, however, is a useful tool for co-ordinating experiences. It is as foolish to neglect to use it, where it is useful, as it is to endeavour to regard it as affording an ultimate explanation of all things. The hypothesis is as useful in dealing with olfactory phenomena, as in the case of any other class of sensation. And every scientific study of the mechanism of olfaction confirms the view that olfactory sensations only arise when particles of aromatic materials gain access to the olfactory apparatus situated in the upper part of the nose.

To the trained nose, odours are extremely informative. We may witness this in the case of dogs and other animals; and as already intimated, the human olfactory apparatus is not quite as insensitive as is commonly supposed. The chemist is able to identify a very considerable number of substances by merely smelling them; and, subconsciously, we probably rely on our olfactory sensations more than we suppose.

Since actual entry of material particles into the nose must occur before a sensation of odour is experienced, it follows that all odorous materials are volatile or contain volatile constituents. The quantity necessary to produce the required stimulus is, in certain instances, very minute. Hence some materials whose volatility is quite low have very powerful odours. Natural musk provides a case in point.

There is a certain ambiguity in the expression "strength of odour". Some substances, such, for example, as ammonia, sulphuretted

hydrogen, and the fumes of burning sulphur, have very powerful, pungent and stupefying odours, whose powerfulness seems to reside in the fact that the substances are very volatile. Another and distinct class of materials have odours the strength of which manifests itself in an entirely different way. These substances, among which may be instanced some of the recent creations of aromatic chemistry, such as exaltone and ambrettolid, are only slightly volatile. The most minute quantities, however, are able to affect the olfactory nerves. Hence, while the substances in a pure state do not smell strong in the way that those of the former class do, even when most highly diluted and mixed with other odorous materials, their own odours may be smelt.

It is remarkable that, in the case of certain odorous materials, a change in the mere concentration of the stimulus, seems to alter the character of the odour entirely. In other words, the sensation produced differs from what is expected. Hawthorn, for example, contributes largely to the delicious fragrance of English country lanes in spring and early summer. Yet how disappointing is the result if we endeavour to make its closer acquaintance. The odour is changed in character and becomes repulsive. Pure civet has a most disgusting odour ; but when highly diluted the odour becomes sweet and flower-like. Methyl-heptine carbonate, a chemical substance used in perfumery, is another material showing a similar phenomenon. The faintest trace suggests the leafy note in the fragrance of violets. The pure substance has an abominable odour.

The ancient Egyptians, prizing aromatic materials above all earthly things, considered them to constitute the most fitting gift that could be offered to the gods, and they burnt incense on their altars that the fragrant smoke might ascend to heaven. The practice of burning aromatic woods, spices and resins, as a religious rite, was not restricted to the Egyptians ; and incense is used to-day by numerous religious bodies both Christian and non-Christian, in some cases, at any rate, frankly because of its effect on the minds of the worshippers. The action of incense, conducing to a religious frame of mind, is probably psychological, rather than physiological, and operates in virtue of association of ideas.

At the other extreme might be instanced the amazing and mostly evil-smelling concoctions, the burning of which formed an important part of the rites of necromancy and black magic, according to the records which remain of these practices. The effects of the fumes cannot, however, be attributed to odour alone, as these concoctions usually contained narcotics which act, even in minute traces, on the brain.

The remarkable power certain odours possess for heightening the sex-impulse seems inexplicable on a physiological basis, and calls

for a psychological explanation. The use of certain aromatic materials as aphrodisiacs has been long practised in the East, and is not unknown in the Western world. Perfumes are no doubt largely used because they heighten sex-appeal.

It is, indeed, remarkable that mankind should appreciate sweet odours at all, for unlike such odours as those of roast meat, onions and cheese (which as perfumes would be detested), they do not seem to answer to any of his biological needs. It is true that the substances to which the fragrance of flowers and the aroma of spices are due, are in nearly all cases, useful antiseptics. One might say, therefore, that a liking for these odours is healthy, and that, other things being equal, those races having a fondness for sweet odours would survive at the expense of those lacking this peculiarity.

Perhaps this factor has operated; but I think the true explanation lies deeper. Curious though it may seem, there is a connection between the fragrance of flowers and the odour of human sweat. The latter odour is usually considered offensive; nevertheless clean flesh has a very agreeable sweet smell, which can only be due to *minute* traces of perspiration. It is another case where intensification of the stimulus produces a complete alteration in the character of the odour as experienced. If we allow that the *expected* sensation from an intensification of the stimulus is a very floral odour, then it is easy to understand why sweet odours should be appreciated, and why, further, they should, in certain instances, have an aphrodisiac action.

Dr. Th. H. van de Velde, in his book *Ideal Marriage* (trans. by S. Browne, London, 1929) has considered the aphrodisiac action of odours in a most interesting way. He has attempted a classification of odours into four groups, namely those which intensify pleasant personal odours (two groups, masculine and feminine), and those which counteract unpleasant ones (another two groups, masculine and feminine).

The whole subject of the psychology of odours is both interesting and important; but, in spite of the recognition of the value of incense by religious bodies, and the common (if unconscious) use of perfumes as aphrodisiacs, the study of the subject has been very seriously neglected. It is hoped that the present article may stimulate enquiry in what promises to be a most profitable field of research.

H. Stanley Redgrove

DOES THE "GITA" SUPPORT ORTHODOXY?

[**G. V. Ketkar, B. A., LL. B.,** is one of the two founders of the *Gita* Dharma Mandala, started in Poona in 1924 for the study of the great text and the spread of its teachings. This interesting article together with its second part, to appear next month, was sent for perusal to Mr. Gandhi by the author, who received the following reply from the great Indian leader:

Yeravda Central Prison.
11th January, 1933

Dear Friend,

I have now carefully read both your articles on the Gita. I have found them to be interesting.

I observe that you have reached the same conclusion that I had by a different method. Yours is the learned way. Not so mine.

Yours sincerely,
M. K. GANDHI.

The Sarda Act, referred to in the beginning of this article, was passed in 1929. Under it the marriage of girls below the age of 15 is forbidden.—EDS.]

The passing of the Sarda Act roused the orthodox section of Hindu society to organise itself under the All India "Varnashrama Swaraja Sangha". These supporters of the old order of things have curiously enough copied the modern methods of organisation and propaganda. There is no foundation for these methods in the Dharma-Shastra texts on which the orthodox people rely. The old way of doing these things was different. *Varnacracy* presumed the rule of a Kshatriya king acting with the guidance of Brahmin pandits. He was responsible for maintaining order in accordance with the Dharma-Shastra texts. There was no need of newspaper propaganda, meetings and resolutions, petitions and protests. The Shastras are silent about these. Modern democracy was beyond their contemplation. The orthodox people who rely on the Shastras for everything have now to face the misfortune of defending the Shastras by obviously non-Shastraic methods!

The orthodox organisation which owed its birth to the Sarda Act has now entered a second phase of intense activity since the fresh impetus given to Anti-untouchability propaganda by Mahatma Gandhi's fast. Unlike many other reformers Gandhi is a faithful follower of the *Bhagwat-Gīta*. In that book he finds a complete guide for moral conduct. To him the *Gīta* is the epitome of Hinduism as he understands and interprets it. Naturally, therefore, the orthodox section would be glad if they could turn Gandhi's own favourite text against him. And they have been trying to do so. The question has thus assumed special importance, whether and how far the *Gīta* supports the Hindu orthodoxy in its present form.

The orthodox or the *Sanatani* section maintains that Hindu society must abide by the rules laid down in the *Vedas* and the *Upanishads*, in the *Smritis*, the *Puranas* and the accepted *Commentaries* on the *Smritis*. These sources of guidance are collectively called "Dharma-Shastra" or simply "Shastra". Any rule of conduct or injunction laid down in this "Shastra" is called a "Vidhi". These injunctions a Hindu must follow with almost blind faith. He can exercise his intellect to know what is the injunction. But he must not question why. Nor has he the right to say that, as times have changed, he can modify the injunction so as to suit his purpose. The verses at the end of the sixteenth chapter of the *Gīta* (*23 & 24*) seem to lend support to this orthodox view. They are therefore often quoted and relied upon in the present controversy. It is therefore desirable to examine this passage in the *Gīta* in order to ascertain how far it supports the orthodox view. A free translation of the verses mentioned above may be given here. "He who gives up the rule of the Shastra, and follows the promptings of his own sweet will does not attain perfection, nor happiness, nor the highest spiritual goal." Therefore, says the *Gīta* in the following verse, "In determining right and wrong the Shastra must be your guide or authority. In this world you should know the rule of the Shastra and act accordingly."

At first sight this passage seems to support the orthodox view unequivocally. No wonder therefore, that the *Sanatani* preacher and propagandist snatches at this portion of the *Bhagwat-Gīta* and uses it as a trump-card. The text accepted by the champion of reform is thereby neatly turned against him. But closer examination of this often quoted passage, and especially of the context in which it occurs in the *Gīta*, will make us doubt whether it can reasonably mean all that is attributed to it and whether it lends really the support which is sought from it. The sixteenth chapter of the *Gīta* is devoted to one theme, *viz.* the two kinds of human beings, godly and demoniacal—virtuous and vicious. The moral of the whole chapter is laid down in the 21st and 22nd verses. This twofold division of humanity is described in order to show that "lust, wrath and greed" lead us to Hell. When we abandon these three veritable inlets of Hell we can tread the path of salvation. That is the moral of the chapter. After this moral come the verses about Shastras. In the previous chapters the *Gīta* has more than once declared *Kāma* [lust] as the source of all evil action, and the avoidance of *Kāma* as the way to spiritual advancement. Good and evil actions are discriminated by this criterion. This same view is again stated with emphasis in the 21st and 22nd verses of the sixteenth chapter.

Then follows the passage in

question. The *Gīta* view of right and wrong obviously comes in conflict with the accepted orthodox view. According to the latter, what is ordained by the Shastras is right, what is not so ordained is wrong. How are the two views to be reconciled? The *Gīta* has here tried to reconcile them with its subtle method of reconcilement. It accepts the view with reservations and with a different meaning. In such cases of reconcilement with the accepted old view, the *Gīta* takes care to see that its difference with that view is expressed as unobtrusively as possible. The difference is pointed out by the word *Kāmakāratah* in the first line of the 23rd verse. Everybody who abandons the rules of Shastras is not sinful. Out of those who abandon the Shastras, those alone are sinful who follow the promptings of *Kāma*. The word *Kāmakāratah* indicates the *Gīta's* amendment of the old proposition.

It is this amendment that has suggested the following question of Arjuna in the opening of the seventeenth chapter. What will be our fate if we abandon the Shastraic rules, and yet with faith we perform the sacrifice? The answer of the *Gīta* to this question is clearly given at the end of the chapter. *Shraddhā* which is indifferently translated by the word "Faith" is the primary necessity. What is done without *Shraddhā* is bad even if it is done strictly in accordance with rules of the Shastras. One question here naturally suggests itself to the orthodox reader. To him *Shraddhā* itself means blind unquestioned acceptance of the rules in the Shastras. How can there be faithful action by disregarding the Shastras? Again, if the rules of the Shastras themselves enjoin what is good and what is bad, how can there be good action without following the Shastras? Arjuna's question at the beginning of the seventeenth chapter becomes meaningless if we take the accepted meanings of *Shraddhā* and *Shāstravidhi*. But the meanings of these two words in the *Gīta* must be determined by reference to the *Gīta* itself. On such reference we find that they are different from the commonly accepted meanings. The significance of the passage in question cannot be properly understood unless we determine the correct sense in which the *Gīta* uses the words *Shraddhā*, *Vidhi* and *Shāstra*. The commonly accepted sense of the word *Vidhi* is injunction or imperative order to do something. But there is also another and well-known sense in which it is sometimes used in Sanskrit. It means the accepted or traditional method of doing something. The *Gīta* uses *Vidhi* in this latter sense. This word occurs in the 23rd verse of the ninth chapter. There it is said: "Those who worship other deities with faith worship Me, though without *Vidhi*." Here the meaning of the word must be taken to be "method" or the "proper way of doing". In the seventeenth chapter the best kind of sacrifice is described in the 11th verse:

That sacrifice is regarded best which is done without desire of personal profit, with a firm belief that it is your duty and which is done according to *Vidhi*.

Here also you must take it to mean the accepted method or the traditional way of doing it. Both in xvi, 17 and in xvii, 5, wicked people are described as performing sacrifices and penances contrary to *Vidhi*. There too it means "proper method". In xvi, 24, the word *Vidhana* is used as a synonym for *Vidhi*; the same word *Vidhana* again occurs in xvii, 24. In both places the word means "method". The word *Niyama* is used as an equivalent to *Vidhi* in vii, 20. There worshippers of other gods are said to worship them with the respective *Niyama* prescribed in that behalf. *Niyama* there denotes the method or external observances of worship.

The meaning of the last two verses of the sixteenth chapter—the verses which form the subject of this discussion—is that in doing things we must follow the traditional method as laid down by experienced men in the past.

If there is still doubt in some minds about the real meaning of *Vidhi* in the *Gīta* it will be dissolved by reference to a concrete example mentioned at the end of the seventeenth chapter. The *Vidhi* or method which is discussed there is this: Every good action is to be commenced with pronouncing the word "*Aum-Tat-Sat*". This is the traditional threefold designation of the Eternal (*Brahma*). The pronunciation of this formula is a *Vidhi*. But what is the meaning of that formula? "*Aum*" means Brahma, "*Tat*" means without the desire of personal gain, and "*Sat*" means good feelings, kindness, good work and steadfastness in doing good things. By this interpretation of the formula the *Gīta* suggests that if we do really good actions without the aim of personal profit we follow the formula in sense. A bad thing done with the pronunciation "*Aum-Tat-Sat*" will not be transformed into good by that formula. It is better if we follow the *Vidhi* of pronouncing that formula. But even without the formula if the act is sincerely done and in good faith it will do. Everything done in bad faith is *Asat* and it will not be helpful to you even if you recite the "*Aum-Tat-Sat*" mantra.

G. V. KETKAR

PHILOSOPHY AND A SENSE OF HUMOUR

[**T. V. Smith** is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Chicago, and is Editor of the *International Journal of Ethics.* We wonder whether Mr. Denis Mackail will find in this article an exception to prove the rule he has enunciated in the extract from his writing printed on p. 165.—EDS.]

Philosophy never shone with brighter lustre than at the immortalized banquet which Agathon gave in celebration of his prize tragedy. Aristophanes, renowned for his comedies, was there to greet the rising tragedian. Alcibiades arrived drunken to shame all paradoxes with the master paradox of a strange love at once earthen and divine. And Socrates, paradox himself incarnate, was there still sober at daybreak to match the strange logic of stranger events with a logic of discourse which was veritably the cream of the jest. For just before Aristophanes, master of comedies, dropped off, and just before Agathon, master of tragedies, toppled over, Socrates had welcomed the dawn by extorting from both alike confirmation of his paradoxical thesis that "the genius of comedy was the same with that of tragedy, and that the true artist in tragedy was an artist in comedy also". In truth, as Socrates departed for his bath at the Lyceum and his day as usual in Athenian streets, the Grecian sun looked down that morning upon the spirit of pure philosophy dying while it lived and living through its death.

I

The philosopher as philosopher works with words. In this he differs from the common man, who works with things; from the scientist, who works with instruments; from the politician, who works with people. From the littérateur, who also works with words, the philosopher differs in seeking directly through words to tell the plain unvarnished truth. Precisely therein lies the heart of philosophy—a heart which appears, as you will, tragic, or comic, or humorous. For words, though things in their own right, are not the things intended by the philosopher; they remain even for him symbols. Now yearn as one may for reality, the symbol is not the thing symbolized; and so the philosopher is doomed always to occupy himself with something other than his true vocation. Plato is not the only philosopher who in recognition of this fact and fate has resorted to heroic measures to prevent, as he puts it, seeing himself at last altogether nothing but words. Fate followed him, however, to Syracuse—and back again. If in honest recognition of our fate we say, with George Santayana, that "knowing is not eating," it remains by that very fact that knowledge cannot fill the hungry human spirit. In seeing, however, what the philosopher is doomed to miss, one should not fail to remark what he gains

by his choice of media. Verbal symbols, while not enabling one fully to appropriate anything, not even the words themselves, do enable one in a fashion to know everything. What has not been named may be named; and whatever has a name may have its name called by the philosopher and be thus introduced by him to all things else with names. Acquiring through such potent ceremony a station, all named things acquire duties; and there arises easily out of the matrix of nescience by means of this philosophic roll-call not only a logical cosmos but a moral universe as well. It is, however, an airy universe built on air, flanked by chaos. Symbols not only are not the things symbolized, but verbal symbols at least are not even from the same realm of being as the things for which they stand. How, then, can they stand for them? They cannot, save with a dash of the tragic, or the comic, or the humorous.

II

The philosopher who takes with complete seriousness what he is doing seasons his performance with a touch of the tragic. Though it requires an outside view to see this, some succeeding generation, if not contemporaries themselves, may be depended upon to unveil the completely serious as tinted with the tragic. Remember Hegel. And, in general, mark well how immodest is the philosopher's field. "It is the function of the philosopher," says Aristotle, " to be able to investigate all things." Indeed, the philosopher thinks to display nakedly the morphology of being; he thinks to pluck out the heart of the mystery of existence. Now, beyond all doubt Reality was made one size too large to be completely captured by any net of words. To see the word-weaver weaving his 'glossamer' net to catch Being, when the net will not hold even the breeze generated by its own enunciation—is not this tragedy unless converted into humour by a smile? To paraphrase a witticism of Voltaire, philosophy is only a pack of tricks we play on reality. But since, as Carl Becker says in his *Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, "it is unlikely that these tricks do the dead any harm, and it's certain that they do us much good," better philosophy with a tincture of the tragic than no philosophy at all.

III

Philosophy without this tint of the tragic is difficult to achieve. For the way to escape from the serious is to cease to be serious; and a philosophy that does not believe itself to be the truth is comic whether it appears to be so or not. Consciously not to aim to tell the truth while manipulating language forms of truth-telling is, if human at all, perversely so. Even the contemporary proponents of Essence, while distinguishing essences from things, claim nevertheless that they represent the *essences of things*. A philosopher who, in strict behavioristic fashion, talked literally to find out

what he was going to say rather than to disclose the truth would suggest, though hardly illustrate, the attitude here in question. But such is the profundity in Socrates's ancient thesis that tragic over-seriousness usually appears to one who sees it for what it is as comic, and a philosopher who acknowledged in the telling of his truth that it was comic would himself appear not unmarked by the tragic. When, moreover, our net of words fits reality like a metaphysical Mother-Hubbard, covering everything but touching nothing, the onlooker detects comedy, however serious the performance. This is indeed, in Bergson's theory, the very essence of the comic.

IV

Only the greatest philosophers have discovered and exemplified a middle course between laughing at themselves as consciously comic and having others laugh at them as unconsciously tragic. Indeed, to discover this golden mean between the tragic and the comic is the surest mark of philosophic, not to say also of human, greatness. This discovery constitutes a sense of humour. In practice the first fruit of such a sense is golden reticence about the heart of life and things. "He who knows does not speak," said Lao Tse; "he who speaks does not know." Though Carlyle praised silence in many eloquent volumes, Plato chided his royal student who had essayed to talk about the incommunicable: "I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so in future . . . I do not think the attempt to tell mankind of these matters a good thing . . . no intelligent man will ever be so bold as to put into language those things which his reason has contemplated." The second fruit is a modesty of claim about the truth of what one does essay to tell. Plato is again our best model. In myth, in farce, in repartee, in raillery, in bluster, in eloquence he attempts to communicate the communicable; but in moments of the highest seriousness he is capable of interrupting his truth-claim with the acknowledgment of his best as "a tolerably credible and possibly true though partly erring myth".

The final characteristic indeed of a sense of humour is to discount both one's serious and unserious claims while making them, without impairing the dominant quality of either. And the final fruit of such a sense is the reward of being taken at the value one puts upon himself. Such an one can tell the truth he meant to tell in language, and communicate otherwise what mother-wit tells him is beyond the power of speech. Let it be remembered that even Plato who disavowed effort to tell the final truth in words, spent his life nevertheless in revealing to others the first things. On that margin of meaning, where gestures supplement words and the symbolized gently pushes the symbol aside, in the fecundity of what Plato calls "close companionship . . . suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, insight is gener-

ated in the soul . . . . and the mind, as it exerts all its powers to the limit of human capacity, is flooded with light".

But just here the genius of abstract philosophy fades into the form of a robust philosopher, and we are once more in the presence of Plato's Socrates fusing the genius of tragedy and comedy, which are one and the same, into a living sense of humour. Such a sense enjoins the dead to bury their dead and seasons the weight and woe of thought with the upspringing of joy.

That I grow sick and curse my being's source
If haply one day passes lacking mirth.

T. V. SMITH

The mysterious law of compensation which arranges that millionaires shall be dyspeptic, and that beautiful women shall be stupid, and that prima donnas shall be fat, and that bachelors shall have holes in their socks, has also ordained that the great sages and philosophers shall be entirely deprived of a sense of humour. This being the case, it is remarkable—or at any rate curious—how many great sages and philosophers have been impelled to write long books, and to deliver long lectures, in which they have the gosh-darned impudence to tell us how and why we laugh.

Absolutely undeterred by the fact that they never laugh themselves or at the best produce an occasional, dry, wheezy cackle when they find that a colleague has misplaced a Greek accent, they have the all-fired nerve and consummate gall to analyze these bubbles on the champagne of life, and to explain to us the formula which has created them. Professor Gumm has done this. So has Dr. McOstrich. So has Herr Doktor-Professor Rumpelbach, who informs us that the laughter of man owes its origin to a synchronized co-ordination of neurophysiological reflexes with the semi-automatic impulse of mass-inherited suggestivism.

"All right," we feel inclined to reply, in the never-to-be-forgotten words of the manager to the high-salaried comedian, "Now make us laugh."

But they can't do that, of course—or certainly not in the way that we mean. So we leave them to their dull and dismal work, and turn back to the enjoyment of all the fun that they are missing.

For can it really matter how the champagne is made, so long as the bouquet tickles our palate, and the bubbles go foaming up to the top of the glass? Can it really matter why we laugh, so long as there are things to laugh at? Can it—But if we're not careful, we shall be turning into philosophers and sages ourselves. Away with all this profundity, then.

—DENIS MACKAIL in *The Golden Book Magazine*

MYSTIC BROTHERHOOD THROUGH ISLAM

[**Robert Sencourt** is the author of *The Life of Empress Eugénie*, *The Life of George Meredith*, and *India in English Literature*. In perusing this article the reader should bear in mind that Occultism makes a distinction between "psychic exaltation and union" and "spiritual exaltation and union," the former is devilish, the latter divine. The pivotal idea of esoteric philosophy is that Divine Love is Compassion, which being impersonal is felt by the ascetic's heart impersonally. Says the *Voice of the Silence*—"Compassion is no attribute. It is the Law of LAWS—eternal Harmony, Alaya's SELF; a shoreless universal essence, the light of everlasting right, and fitness of all things, the law of Love eternal. The more thou dost become at one with it, thy being melted in its BEING, the more thy Soul unites with that which Is, the more thou wilt become COMPASSION ABSOLUTE. Such is the Arya Path, Path of the Buddhas of Perfection."—EDS.]

The relationship between peoples, between religions, between cultures, partakes of the natures of both brotherly comradeship, sympathy and variety in development from a common origin and also of that passionate creative impulse by which separate natures are drawn together in a magic unity to create a new life within reality, a new reality within life. Their relation has the double nature of both brother and lover. This in the Divine Wisdom is finally to bind together East and West, to enrich Western culture with the secret doctrines of the Wise of India, to give India a new creative impulse through impact with the *philosophia perennis* which Europe has developed through the sages of Athens from Heraclitus, and developed through all those schools of spiritual wisdom which were the nucleus of Western culture. But the relationship of brother and lover is perfected by the fact that between the East and the West is the spiritual mediation as there is the geographical interposition of Islam.

The Sufi mystics have devoted themselves with a peculiar ardour to the passion for Unity; final Unity is the overmastering instinct of their religion and their theology. To the students of religions Islam appears as a compromise between primitive Christianity and the warlike and uncompromising tradition of the tribes of a desert steeped in intense sunlight; so Protestantism appears as a compromise between medieval Catholicism and strong popular institutions as well as the organization of physical comfort against inclemencies of climate. But whereas Protestantism in its conflict with certain phases of religious materialism swept away all the subtleties of mystical tradition and the specialities of occult activity, Islam actually opened the door of Attic philosophy, and with it of mystic discipline to the Catholic Church.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the Moslem culture of Spain.

The very landscapes of Spain have the dryness of the African desert. They are bathed in the same intense light. The influence of the Moorish Invasions, and with them of Arabic traditions, is integral to Spanish culture: it marks the very pronunciation of the language: it inspires impressive monuments like the Giralda of Seville: it leaves its own memorials in the Mosque at Cordoba and the Alhambra: and it shares the ardour of virile passion with the Soul of Spain.

No example of Moslem culture in Spain, however, is more eminent, or more stimulating than Abenarabi (Ibn 'Arabi) the Sufi of Murcia, who was born there in 1164 and died in Damascus in 1234. His marriage brought him under the influence of religion, and he received his initiation during an illness about the year 1184. From that time on he lived as an ascetic. Soon afterwards, he met the great Aristotelian Averroes and before many years he was known to be advanced in esoteric knowledge, so that authorities came from afar to consult him. He then withdrew to a life of solitude, and was seen to converse in low and enraptured tones with disembodied companions. He sought wisdom of other ascetics. "I know of no grade of mystic life," he wrote, "neither of any sect of religion, but that I have seen some person who professed it."

This search for the secret wisdom made him a traveller, and he passed—now famous—into Africa, and made inquiries of several advanced Sufis. Two years later he went to Fez. Finally he made pilgrimages to Mecca and Mosul and settled at Damascus. There in the centre of a Madrasah and Mosque at the outskirts of the city, his beautiful tomb may still be admired. His two most important works, the *Fotuhat* and the *Fosus*, have been ranked by Moslems from his own time up to now with the *Diwan* of Abenalgarid and the books of Al Gazzali as classics of esoteric knowledge. They have been republished recently in Arabic not only in Cairo and Constantinople but also in Bombay, and they have recently been made the central study of the great Spanish scholar, Professor Asin Palacios, of the University of Madrid, who with M. Louis Massignon is since the death of Sir Thomas Arnold the greatest Arabic scholar of the Western World.* This then is the Sufi who in his mystic philosophy shows most clearly how the Moslem unites the part of both brother and lover in joining East and West.

For love, he tells us, is union: the union in the higher spiritual planes of soul with soul, as in the subtle life of the physical senses it is the union of body with body. For even physical love has its spiritual quality. A being possessed with natural life, of that double life which the spirit breathes into those minglings of energies which

* See *El Islam Cristianizado*. By MIGUEL ASIN PALACIOS. (Editorial Plutarco, Madrid. 25 pesetas.)

become palpable, and which are changed from hour to hour by the chemistry of life, is endowed with the instinctive, the essential, the creative tendency to draw together to another of his kind and to find pleasure and delight not only in the creative engagements of marriage but in the rich exchanges of converse, of the embrace, of the kiss. So, says Mohidin Abenarabi, even physical love has three phases: firstly sympathy or amorous inclination, which is content with the currents which pass to and fro in the presence of the two lovers or friends, and where in fact the brotherly sentiment predominates and suffices. But in the second phase, the life of the lover is so enhanced that the inclination towards the beloved creates a new realm of romantic passion, of abandonment which invests the object of its interest with a charm which glitters like crystal, so that the lover seeks and even finds in his beloved the entrancing qualities of an ultimate perfection; but this is not the final phase of personal relationship, there is a third and higher relation, a fixed loyalty of the heart which perseveres to the exclusion of all obstacles, " which looks on tempests and is never shaken ".

So much can Mohidin say even in his account of physical love: an example and an elucidation of the ideal relation of brotherhood and of attraction, and of self-sacrificing love between East and West. And then he points out how this movement of sympathy towards union is exalted by that faculty of the intelligence which looks through the sensible image and finds it, according to the Platonic mood, both veiling and revealing a reality which is beneath it, and which shines through it. Mohidin says:

> We divide the mystics into two groups. One of these as their fancy contemplates the image of the reality they love feel that they are united with it in imagination with a union sweeter and more delicate than that which is concrete and objective . . . this phenomenon is the subtlest known to love. He who has experience of it never fails to be content.*

Imagination in fact is the meeting ground between divine and physical things. The spiritual man who, occupied with things above the senses, loves what the senses have perceived, elevates them into the more permanent reality of the world of creative imagination; and into the world of creative imagination, the spiritual man can bring also the things of God.

But when it comes to the things of God, another faculty is required. For as the Sufi observed, it must be with the love of the Creator as with the love of the created. A lover must know whether or not his beloved has or has not a personal Will: for if what is loved has no personal will, or if that will is ignored, then love becomes merely selfish and physical. But how different when the lover knows the other's

* *Fotuhat* II, 445.

will, and seeks to fulfil that will, loving the other for that other's sake! Then, he can attain to union only by attaining to some quality or act peculiar to the being of the beloved. Must this not be still more significantly true if he is seeking union with Deity? If the beloved is indeed the Mystery of the Divine Nature, then the mystic lover must receive from the Divine a certain godlike aptitude to perform the act, or attain the quality, in which the lover and his beloved can be at one. The at-one-ment, the attainment of the Godlike aptitude, must therefore be the free gift of God, on a scale of living above the soul's human capacities and must in fact be a similitude to the Divine Nature by which he is enabled to share in a life that transcends his own. The lover of God, in other words, must be prepared to transcend human standards. *Sensible pleasure even in wholly emotional things, and imagination's building of memories of sensuous or even emotional pleasure, are not the best guides to the secrets of the Divine Nature,*—secrets which are dark by excess of light. And in this deep and dazzling darkness, seeing is a new faculty; it requires new aptitudes. At this point, Mohidin Abenarabi becomes the guide of Christian mystics of Spain. His doctrine is taken up by Raymond Lull of Majorca who wrote that "He who loves not lives not," and that "He who lives by the Life can never die". But furthermore we are faced with the striking and intriguing surprise that the classic mystics of Avila, St. Teresa, and St. John of the Cross, developed a doctrine which has very close analogies to this. Indeed almost all the distinctive features of the teaching of St. John of the Cross are anticipated by the Moslem Sufi, and we are forced to the conclusion that if St. John was not actually acquainted with the works of Abenarabi, then Abenarabi voiced and strengthened a tradition which had been developing in Spain, and was always retained there, and which had peculiar affinities with the Moorish spirit which characterises the genius and civilization of Spain.

But in the meantine we have to note the analogy equally striking between the work of Mohidin and Dante. For as Professor Asin Palacios pointed out in an earlier work which has been translated into English at the instance of a great Spanish nobleman,* the *Divine Comedy*, in every place where scholars had been inclined to think that Dante was most original, follows the model given by Abenarabi. As Señor Asin has written:

> There Dante could have found the geometrical plans of the architecture of the *Inferno* and the *Paradiso*, the general features of the scenery in which the sublime drama is laid, the vivid picture of the life of glory led by the elect, the Beatific Vision of the Divine Light, and the ecstasy of him who

* *Islam and the Divine Comedy.* By MIGUEL ASIN PALACIOS with a preface by the Duke of Alba. (John Murray, London. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

beholds it . . . . . Moreover it would be difficult to find two thinkers whose poetical and religious temperaments are so alike as those of Dante and Abenarabi.*

For what is the central poignant relationship of the *Divine Comedy*? It is the Platonic passion of Dante for Beatrice. She on whom his eyes had rested as a child, and who had inspired him with passionate longing and ideal fervour, is seen to be the guide and loadstone of his soul, so that gradually her ideal qualities become absorbed into those of the Blessed Virgin (the Mother of Jesus is venerated as a Virgin alike by Catholic and Moslem) and finally are identified with that mystical theology which bathed the soul of the poet in heavenly light. So as he last sees her in the Rose of Paradise Dante cries out:

O Lady, in whom my living hope is teeming
And who didst once endure to leave the trace
Of thy dear feet in Hell for my redeeming,
In all the worth and beauty finding place
In things thou hast enabled me to see
I recognize thy virtue and thy grace.

Thou leddest me along from slave to free
By all those ways, by all expedients
Whereby the power to do so lay in thee.
Preserve me in thy own magnificence
So that thy spirit through thy healing, may
Content thee as it slips the coil of sense.—
Far as she seemed on hearing me so pray,
She smiled and lookt: then to the Fountainhead
Eternal turned her smiling eyes away. †

It was long thought that Dante, who shared this romantic exaltation of Platonic passion with the Provençal troubadours, owed to Germany this doctrine of human love made transcendent. As Professor Asin has shown, that was not so. Romantic love in all its intense importance for not only Dante but for Shakespearean literature in England may be traced back rather to the Spanish Sufis and most of all to Abenarabi Mohidin, the Moslem Saint of Murcia and Damascus.

Here then, beginning with a common kinship to the East and West, and so making a link of brotherhood, this enlightened seer, who so subtly showed how the analysis of romantic passion in human love leads us to understand the qualities of mystic at-one-ment, joins the East to the West in the way peculiar to the geographical place and to the functions of Islam. And surely it is peculiarly promising that a Sufi so widely venerated in the East should have learnt in the first place so much from the disciples of Plato, of Aristotle, and of Jesus, and then in turn should have influenced the greatest masterpiece of Christian literature, and touched so deeply the inspiration of the universal genius of Shakespeare.

ROBERT SENCOURT

* *Islam and the Divine Comedy*, p. 276.

† Paradiso XXXI, 79-90. Anderson's translation.

MODERN SCIENCE AND THE SECRET DOCTRINE

II.—MOTION

[**Ivor B. Hart** contributes the second article of his series, the first of which appeared last month.—EDS.]

In a previous article we showed that one of the main concepts of modern science, namely, that of Space, is leading the physicists of Europe and America to broad conclusions that were in fact developed half a century ago by H. P. Blavatsky, in *The Secret Doctrine*. We now proceed to another of the dominant concepts of modern physics, that of "Motion".

We cannot, of course, divorce the concept of motion from that of space, and a moment's consideration will show that this is inevitable. The common factor between the two is "matter".

Not only for the student of physics, but also for the average person, the notion of space could have but little meaning until we put matter, or at least radiant energy (regarding this, in accordance with modern views, as a modification of matter) into it. Until recently, too, it was not possible to consider motion except in terms of matter. "Movement of what?" one naturally asked. What a puzzle there must have been for Science when Römer, with the aid of eclipse phenomena in connection with Jupiter's satellites, first provided us with the new phrase "the velocity of light," the reality of which Fizeau subsequently brought to the level of the laboratory. Something that was not matter was in incredibly swift motion! 186,000 miles per second! And what a relief when the subsequent years showed that light, as a form of radiant energy, is sufficiently related to the concept of matter to bring consistency to what had appeared inconsistency.

Yet now the latest trend in modern physics brings us back once more to the apparent inconsistency of former times. We referred in our previous article to Einstein's gift to the world of a space that is curved and not flat—a space in fact that Jeans likens to a gigantic soap-bubble. Lemaitre, the Belgian mathematician, has carried the story further. He has shown that this gigantic soap-bubble universe of space is unstable. To preserve itself as an entity it must conform to the requirements of the forces of its instability. It is incapable of standing still under the conditions of its creation, and so it expands; and indeed it must go on expanding and expanding to the end of time. Once again it is not matter, but space itself, with which we associate the idea of *motion*, and this time it is *eternal motion*.

And now let us see what Mme. Blavatsky has to tell us on this same subject. On p. 55 Vol. I of *The Secret Doctrine*, we read:

> The "Breath" of the One Existence is used in its application only to the spiritual aspect of Cosmogony by Archaic esotericism; otherwise, it is

replaced by its equivalent in the material plane—Motion. The One Eternal Element, or element-containing Vehicle, is *Space*, dimensionless in every sense; co-existent with which are—endless *duration*, primordial (hence indestructible) *matter*, and *motion*—absolute "perpetual motion" which is the "breath" of the "One" Element. This breath, as seen, can never cease, not even during the Pralayic eternities.

One has, of course, to interpret this passage with due regard to the distinction between the inevitable esotericism of the language of Eastern theosophy and the exoteric phraseology that is characteristic of Western Science. But here we have unmistakably the doctrine of eternal ceaseless motion in the universe of space. The Blavatsky of fifty years ago pronounces as definitely for the fundamental motion of the universe as do the mathematical physicists of to-day. We meet it again on p. 455 of the same volume when, referring to the particular stage of evolution according to the doctrines of theosophy (corresponding to the "Creation" of exoteric phraseology), she speaks of "the *absolutely eternal* universal motion, or vibration, that which is called in esoteric language 'the GREAT BREATH'."

Later, on p. 633 of Vol. I of *The Secret Doctrine*, we meet with a passage of special interest, because it shows that the vehicle of this eternal movement in and of space is of the form we speak of as wave motion in orthodox physics, although of course this is all placed in its appropriate theosophical setting.

The passage makes reference to Professor Tyndall's researches on sound vibrations (Tyndall being, it should be noted, a contemporary of Mme. Blavatsky) and reads thus:

> He [*i. e.* Tyndall] traced . . . . the whole course of the *atmospheric vibrations*—and this constitutes the *objective* part of the process in nature. He has traced and recorded the rapidity of their motion and transmission; the force of their impact; their setting up vibrations in the tympanum and their transmission of these to the stolithes, etc., etc., till the vibration of the auditory nerve commences—and a new phenomenon now takes place: the *subjective side* of the process, or the *sensation of Sound*. Does he perceive or see it? No; for his speciality is to discover the behaviour of matter. But why should not a psychic see it, a spiritual seer, whose inner Eye is opened, and who can see through the veil of matter? The waves and undulations of Science are all produced by atoms propelling their molecules into activity *from within*. Atoms fill the immensity of Space, and by their continuous vibration *are* that MOTION which keeps the wheels of Life perpetually going. It is that inner work that produces the natural phenomena called the correlation of Forces. Only, at the origin of every such "force," there stands the *conscious* guiding noumenon thereof—Angel or God, Spirit or Demon—ruling powers, yet the same.

It may fairly be claimed, then, of the authoress of *The Secret Doctrine*, that in the enunciation of those principles which have made for her a supreme place as the greatest of all exponents of modern Theosophy, there was blended a leaven of cosmology and physics that certainly find their broad counterpart in the accepted views and theories of Western Europe of to-day.

IVOR B. HART

THE RELIGION OF A SOCIALIST

[**Miss Jennie Lee** is well qualified to write on Socialism, for it is her birthright. She comes of a mining family, and her grandfather Michael Lee was a pioneer of the Scottish miners' trade union movement, and was associated with Keir Hardie in founding the independent working class representation in politics. Miss Lee entered Parliament at the early age of 24, and although she was defeated last election, will stand again as Socialist candidate for North Lanark. She is a graduate of Arts and Law of Edinburgh University.—EDS.]

Many socialists who talk of socialism as their religion are not socialists at all. They are splendid people with a strong sense of pity for the poor, but they are just not socialists. For them the be-all and end-all of political agitation is the provision of good houses, adequate health services, and considerate treatment for working class people. But all the social reforms in the world do not sum up into socialism nor touch the most vital element in the religion of the socialist.

So long as society is divided into classes, so long as land and industry, banking and commerce are owned and controlled by private holders, there are problems of status, of personal and class pride left unsolved, which account for as much of the dynamic force behind real socialist activity, as the more obvious struggle for improved material conditions.

To the non-socialist it is sometimes puzzling why so much emphasis should be placed on who shall own and control. Are the results, it is argued, not of greater importance than the methods taken to achieve them? If a scientifically organised Capitalism could succeed in abolishing poverty and unemployment, and in providing adequate health and educational services for all, would the demand for socialism not then lose all meaning?

There is only one possible answer to that question. It is a most emphatic "NO". Unless the sentiments and emotions as well as the economic theories that give passion and force to that "NO" are understood, the religion of the socialist must remain completely unintelligible.

That religion could never have become the power it is in the world to-day if it were merely a rational calculation of the economic structure of society most likely to provide bread and security for the poor. Men and women do not spend their entire energies and resources on a movement for material reasons alone. Indeed if growing rich or rising in the social scale is what a man most desires, then the further he remains from socialist organisations, the more chance he has of success. The lot of the worker who has chosen to toil for the creation of a socialist movement has been, for the most part, ridicule and victimisation. Yet fear of becoming social outcasts, of being made an object of

ridicule in the eyes of the orthodox, of losing even badly paid employment, has not deterred thousands of men and women from throwing themselves unreservedly into socialist activities.

What vision, what sense of present wrong, compels them to behave so? Instead of attempting to answer in abstract and general terms, I had better begin where my faith itself had its beginnings, for nowhere is the choice between accepting or fighting the established order of society put in more cruel and sombre terms than in the mining villages.

Two young miners, Peter and Paul, attend mining school until they qualify as underground firemen. For the ambitious this is the first rung on the ladder of promotion. They now cease working at the coal face and take their place among the lowest grade of mining officials. But Peter and Paul soon learn that in order to climb any further they must be prepared to do many things that honest men do not do of their own free will. Colliery company profits must now count for more than even the safety of the men whose lives are entrusted to their care. Then the supreme test comes when the colliery goes on strike. Peter sees his father and brothers and neighbours standing loyally together in an effort to protect themselves against tyranny. But he is ambitious, so no matter what the merits of the dispute may be he must crawl back to the pit and blackleg. In this way he earns the contempt of his former workmates but may reasonably hope to have gained the favour of the colliery directors. In time, no doubt, he will be pointed to as an example of the liberality and benevolence of British Capitalism in permitting the deserving children of the poor to rise to positions of wealth and importance.

Paul, on the other hand, cannot stand against other workers when he knows their grievance is justified. He refuses to blackleg. He is repelled by the senseless greed and bullying with which business is conducted. He has learned that knowledge and industrious habits are not in themselves sufficient to lead to success. In addition he is expected to surrender all integrity of mind and purpose and to do whatever his master bids, however mean or unscrupulous that bidding may be. Paul cannot bring himself to earn promotion at such a price. He has a vision of something quite different. His first loyalties are given to his workmates. He is more eager to vindicate the character and capacity of the stock he belongs to, than to build up a private banking account at their expense. Nothing can reconcile him to a society divided into classes in which an inferior and servile status is imposed on himself and his people. In the resources of the world around him he sees the means of giving sufficiency and security to all, and he is determined to insist that it shall be so. In short, he has become a socialist.

Paul probably fights shy of the word religion. His socialism is the very breath of life to him. He is prepared to work for it and will not shirk suffering for it, but it is not easy for him to explain the why and wherefor of his feelings. It springs partly from a sense of fair play and contempt of false privilege; partly from a belief that humanity if given a better material and cultural environment would respond generously to new opportunities; it also springs from a strong sense of pride. Paul has too much dignity to climb the social ladder on hands and knees. But he has also too much energy and imagination to lie quietly at the foot of the ladder. He has found something better than either of those things. He has found the religion of socialism.

There is no country and few forms of employment where similar experiences to those of the workers in the mining villages do not recur. The setting, the language, the degree of harshness and servility demanded by those who control Capitalist society may vary, but the essence of the conflict remains the same. The ambitious must either conform or lose their place in the struggle for personal promotion. In time most men and women, however disinterested the ideals with which they start out on life, are broken in to the acceptance of economic cannibalism. But some remain who can know no peace unless struggling for status and justice as well as for bread. It is those who form the iron core of the socialist working class movement in every part of the world. In their religion there are no barriers of race, colour or creed. They are seeking to build a solid international front against Capitalist methods and Capitalist values. They are in revolt against venal competition between man and man and nation and nation in a world clamouring for co-operation instead of conflict, unless war and squalor are never to cease. They believe that with sane economic planning and just distribution of material resources, the adventure of living could rise to an immeasurably more exciting and satisfying level. They are seeking bread but also something still more precious than bread; they want to vindicate the dignity and worth of the ordinary people in every land and to justify the faith of the ploughman and genius who prophesied that

> For a' that, and a' that,
> It's coming yet for a' that,
> That man to man the world o'er,
> Shall brothers be for a' that.

JENNIE LEE

THE FIRST ARTICLE OF BELIEF

[**J. D. Beresford's** article is most appropriate for the Great Festival of Nature on the 21st of March, the Navroz, the New Day celebrated by Asiatic peoples—Persians and others—and in Christendom as Easter.—EDS.]

I have a friend, a mystic and follower of that universal religion which has no name, who has a perfect confidence that a new spirit of goodness is beginning to work in the world consciousness. We shall find no evidence of it in the political history of the moment; and little enough perhaps in the various religious revivals that are affecting the thought of many young men in England at the present time. But my friend foresees, with a simple, exalted faith, that the world having passed the lowest point of the curve will in the comparatively near future, in one, two or three generations it may be, reach the spiritual stage of what he calls "The Great Awakening".

For him the faith begotten by his mystical consciousness is sufficient guide. For us, who however we may long for the coming of the new spirit, still lack the inner certainty of any secret wisdom, it may be well to examine briefly what it is that the world and ourselves are doing to aid the coming of the new order.

I will take the world first, since it affords the less debatable material for a conspectus, and begin by asking what the dominant religions are doing to raise the spiritual tone of their congregations. The most influential religion in this connection is undoubtedly Christianity in its various forms. There are, according to statistics, only 682 million Christians against 1,165 million "non-Christians" to be considered, but the numerical minority is almost completely in command of the essential resources of civilisation,—including the munitions of war. The majority on the other hand is represented almost entirely by the population of one continent, Asia, and of these peoples an overwhelming number are either completely unaware of the modern movement in history or untouched by its developments.

For our present purpose, therefore, we may confine our enquiry to asking what effect the Christian religion is having on the temper of civilisation generally, and how far it offers itself as a vehicle for the coming of the New Spirit. The answer in both cases is, unhappily, that its influence is so small as to be negligible. Of all Christianity's many sects only one, and that the smallest, the Society of Friends, boldly set its face against the awful evil of War in 1914. In international politics, religion plays no part as a unifying, idealistic element; its single function in this relation being rather to provide new causes for dispute. And the reason for these failures may explain our belief that it will

not be by any revival of the Churches that we shall come to the Great Awakening.

Let us consider in the first place the influence of the modern Christian Church,—Roman, Orthodox, Anglican or Nonconformist,—on conduct. It is certainly true that its ethic is unimpeachable in so far as the example held up is that of the *Imitatio Christi.* Yet how many of those 682 millions of nominal Christians even attempt to live up to that ideal ? How many just persons could be found in any of our contemporary Cities of the Plain, to show good cause for the Saving of the Community ? Must we not find some good reason, therefore, for the fact that, after nearly two thousand years, the beliefs of the Christian religion have had so little influence in raising the standard of personal ethics ?

My own explanation starts from the assertion that the principle of vicarious sacrifice, taken over from older and still more primitive religions, has been the great debilitating factor in Christianity. It has no part in Christ's own gospel. His " Because I live, ye shall live also " does not mean, as the following verses clearly show, that the profession of faith is sufficient, that by Christ's death in the character of the transcendent Scapegoat, the sins of the whole world should be remitted. Nevertheless that principle in some form or another became and still is the most powerful doctrine in all forms of the Christian religion.

The inevitable consequence of this has been to relieve the individual of responsibility in this matter of conduct that we are considering. If men are taught to believe that any weakness, any crime, even the whole of the evil resulting from a debauched and selfish life, can be forgiven and its consequences blotted out by the act of repentance and subsequent submission to the Church, what stimulus remains for self-development ? It is not by such beliefs as these that we shall reform the world, nor fit ourselves to become instruments of the informing spirit that comes to the inauguration of a new age.

And something of what I have said of Christianity applies, though it may be for different reasons, to such other prevailing religions in the East as are practised by the majority of Buddhists, Confucians, Hindus, Taoists, Mahommadans or Zoroastrians. Any of them, with the possible exception of the Mahommadans, may develop a great spirit, perhaps a new teacher, but they have become formalised, degenerating into a body of dogmatic beliefs that offer no susceptible vehicle as an instrument for a great world regeneration.

What then do I demand as the principal articles of creed that shall be susceptible to the new influence, to this coming of the spirit that shall turn the minds of men from materialism, selfishness and brutality into which they have fallen ?

In the first place and predominantly, I demand the principle of good-will towards men, *without any distinction or exception*. As a principle nothing could be simpler or more inclusive. If it could be put into universal practice, nothing more would be necessary. Within a generation the world would renew itself, and we should be living in a golden age. Unfortunately neither reason nor appeal to the emotions, however convincing or eloquent, can effect that transformation. And the explanation of this is to be found in the second article of our creed.

Briefly this may be stated as saying that the law of cause and effect rules in the spiritual world, with even greater certainty than in the world of matter, in other words that every wish, thought and act of humanity is followed by its ineluctable consequence. Wherefore humanity to-day is suffering and must continue to suffer for the sins and failings of the past until such time as it shall earn its release by the will towards universal compassion.

I do not, indeed, require any further articles than these for a religion that should release the new world-spirit. Between them they form a complete guide to conduct. They may be elaborated and explained for those who are unable to grasp them in their simple entirety, but in effect these two primary articles of Theosophy contain all the essentials of a world-religion.

Let us, for example, consider for a moment the tremendous import of the second article which we speak of as the law of Karma. In doing this, however, it is essential to avoid as far as possible the sense of nemesis or retribution, which has unfortunate associations with the Christian hell,—a false image, since it conveys an idea of eternal punishment, which is on the face of it unjust and ridiculous. Nor is there any need, in this connection, to consider the person of any God or supernal ruler deliberately meting out rewards and punishments according to his personal inclination and judgment. The laws of Karma must be regarded as inherent in the nature of the Universe, and they cannot be evaded by any appeal to the Court of Heaven,—a lesson that Christ pointed very clearly in the parable of Dives and Lazarus.

The doctrine of Karma, then, is of prime importance because it teaches that each individual must shoulder his or her own responsibility in the conduct of life. No excuse will avoid the consequences of wrong thinking and ill-living or palliate a lapse into sin. Circumscribed as we may be by influences that affect our earthly destiny,—many of them influences that we ourselves have helped to shape in the forgotten past,—we still have a vital element of choice and self-determination. And for every wrong choice, for every violation of the article of universal brotherhood, we must pay a penalty here or hereafter. Repentance if followed by a renewal of effort may mitigate that penalty,

since all goodness is vindicated as infallibly as evil is requited. But throughout life we are casting our own account. And every debt must be paid in some form, sooner or later, in this life or the next; for every man or woman has the power and the onus of self-determination, a power that cannot be delegated to any other authority.

In these things it is evident that I do not speak out of my own authority, nor do these indications of the essentials of belief and conduct even represent an intellectual eclecticism. They are, in fact, to be found as the simple bases of the teaching of all the great mystics and adepts. They have been grossly misrepresented by subsequent generations, perverted and disguised to serve the worldly needs of the Churches. But the command to love one's neighbour as oneself, and the warning that every man is responsible for his own destiny, stand out as naked, eternal truths in the body of all inspired teaching.

It must not be imagined, however, that this simple plan of the great world-religion which alone can prepare the way for the coming of the new spirit is in itself sufficient for those who have already reached a higher stage of development and consciousness. From them more will be demanded according to their powers. "To live to benefit mankind is the first step. To practise the six glorious virtues is the second."* And the world-religion is for those who are taking this first step; it is a means of spiritual renewal for the great body of humanity, the essential influence in aiding our slow upward movement on the gradient of that vast cycle which, according to my friend, has already passed its lowest point.

And as I see it, the great duty of all Theosophists throughout the world is to hasten the "Great Awakening" by the stricter observance of the first article. We have to find the golden keys to the seven portals, and the first of them is "The Key of Charity". We have to "bear love to men as though they were our brother-pupils, disciples of one Teacher, the sons of one sweet mother."† And until we have passed that first gate, we shall stultify our own efforts if we seek to press further. That way lies the snare of spiritual pride, and if we fall into it we shall presently have to retrace our footsteps in shame and sorrow. But "armed with the key of Charity, of love and tender mercy, we are secure before the gate of Dana, the gate that standeth at the entrance of the PATH,"‡ and shall so become the early messengers of peace and happiness to this dark and suffering world of men.

J. D. BERESFORD

* *The Voice of the Silence*, p. 36 (Indian Edition).
† *Ibid.* p. 54.
‡ *Ibid.* p. 57.

THE ETHICAL VALUE OF THE DOCTRINE OF REINCARNATION

[**Saroj Kumar Das** is the author of *Towards a Systematic Study of Vedanta*, and among his addresses and articles the one on "The Spirit of Indian Philosophy" contains many good things. It was his Presidential Address to the Indian Philosophy Section of the Philosophical Congress held at Patna in 1931. In this article he answers some major objections to the teaching of Reincarnation, and points out that linked with the doctrine of Karma it enables us to understand and explain the present as the unfolding past. We must not, however, overlook that the practical application of the twin-doctrine of Reincarnation-Karma as a reformative and educative force to create the future in and through the present, is even of greater value.—EDS.]

It is undoubtedly a commonplace of critical scholarship that in evaluating the true import of a doctrine of pre-historic antiquity, one has to cultivate that mental alertness which refuses to be persuaded by its traditional sense or popular appeal without examining *de novo* its credentials. It is all the more urgently needed in those cases where clusters of associations, incidental or accidental, precipitated by long standing prejudices, spring up, overshadowing the main theme, and the result is that one cannot see the wood for the trees. But, then, on closer inspection it is sure to appear that the fault originally lay with our defective vision.

The doctrine of reincarnation calls for just this circumspection and level-headedness that alone can ensure the best interests of a critical study as contemplated here. Now, much of the odium incurred by the doctrine of reincarnation is traceable to its association with the doctrine of transmigration with which it would be invariably hyphenated in primitive thought. As a matter of fact transmigration of human beings into animal forms was part and parcel of the Orphic and the Pythagorean tradition in ancient Greece. Such was the popularity enjoyed by these twin doctrines that a catechism bearing on this theme is, with no loss of dramatic propriety, put into the mouth of ordinary unsophisticated people by Shakespeare in his "Twelfth Night". To the clown's query, "What is the opinion of Pythagoras concerning wild fowl?"—is given a ready retort by Malvolio. "That the soul of our grandam might haply inhabit a bird." The reply in question is symptomatic of the reaction the doctrine makes upon the popular mind. Whatever may be the reasons for or against the reception thus accorded to the doctrine, this much is unquestionably true, that in primitive thought no ethical significance is attached to transmigration, or for the matter of that, to reincarnation. In Pythagoreanism, however, the idea of retribution comes to be superadded while in the Eastern, or the far Eastern version, it acquires a moral

colouring and figures as the principle of retributive justice. Thus construed, it is hardly distinguishable from the far-famed doctrine of *Karma* in Indian thought, to which it naturally affiliates itself and by which it is constantly reinforced.

Thus it is that the doctrine of Reincarnation in the keeping of the doctrine of Karma acquires for the first time a philosophical status, in so far as the doctrine of Karma as a vindication of cosmic justice figures as one of the recognised postulates common to the six systems of Indian philosophy. Although a full-fledged doctrine of Karma is not to be found in the Hymns of the *Ṛgveda*, we have nevertheless in the concept of *Ṛta* its immediate philosophic ancestor. Without initiating a scholarly discussion on the diverse shades of meaning connoted by this word, one may safely take it to mean an impersonal order or law, pervading the physical or natural realm. Now, beginning with this concept of *Ṛta* as the natural order of things, we notice a steady and continuous advance through the interpretation of it as social law or customary conduct, till it reaches its culminating point in a cosmic justice or equity, a moral order of the world. *Ṛta* thus stands as much for a physical as for a moral order—the former standing in an instrumental or subordinate relation to the latter. It provides, strictly speaking, an ethic in accordance with the highest human ideal, which was destined later to realise all its ethical implications in the doctrine of Karma. Of this there is no room for misgivings.

Now, Karma is no other than the moral counterpart of the scientific Law of *Causation*. Or, to put it simply, it gives us the Law of Ethical Causation. As you sow, so will you reap—that is how it is usually understood in popular parlance. Academically speaking, the doctrine of Karma illustrates the inviolability of the cause-and-effect relation in the moral life of man. On closer inspection it will be found that it serves as a double-edged weapon—implying, on its positive side, what is known as the rejection of *kṛta-praṇāśa* or annihilation of what has been realised or done, and on the negative, the rejection of *akṛtābhyupagama* or appropriation of what has not been realised or done. In and through these twin correlated aspects, the law of Karma vindicates itself as the law of moral causation and retributive justice. To borrow the technique of modern thought, it stands for the conservation of the moral values. Whatever is sown must be reaped: no moral effort or aspiration, nothing of spiritual energy is ever lost in this "vale of soul-making". Contrariwise, what has not been sown cannot be reaped: there can be no spontaneous or unconditioned origin of moral deserts. It is as much prospective as it is retrospective in significance. But attempting, as it does, more often to account

for what is happening in one's present life rather than what would happen in the life to come, its appeal usually is to the past rather than the future. Anyway, on the argumentative side, there is perfect parity.

Now, rebirth or reincarnation follows as a logical sequel to the *modus operandi* of the law of Karma. The *raison d'être* of every form of earthly existence is fruition of Karmic potentialities, these being mainly two varieties of Karma, initiated (*prārabdha*) and accumulated (*sañchita*). With regard to both, the rule of procedure is the attainment of release from the grip of Karma. This is generally posited as the moral ideal for every individual, and realisation of this ideal state is not in any way contingent upon the cessation of bodily existence. As a matter of fact salvation (*Mukti* or *Moksha*), in the sense of release from the domination of Karma, may be achieved *here* and *now*, and the released soul is made a partaker of the Life Eternal. This favoured state of existence—of which the inviolable pledge is held out by Indian thought and culture—is known as redemption even in an embodied state of existence (*Jīvanmukti*). For such a soul embodiment is no ensnarement in the meshes of the flesh. When, however, the unspent potentiality of the fund of Karma, already initiated, (for whose maturescence this earthly existence has started on its career) is fully exhausted, the *Jīvanmukta* shuffles off this mortal coil and attains unto that fullest stature of spiritual development which is called, in the technical language of Indian philosophy, redemption with disembodiment (*Videhakaivalyam*). To such a soul alone applies the prophetic assurance of the Upanishadic seers—"Verily he does not retrace the cycle of existence" (*Na sa punarāvarttate*). For, he relapses into that perfected state of beatific bliss which is impervious to all sense of imperfection or pain or want, and, as such, has no need to be reborn.

But to return to our main theme, and concentrate on the restricted nature of our enquiry. Our chief concern in broaching this subject of reincarnation consists in vindicating, if we can, an ethical foundation for it. The best way to achieve that end would be to meet the stock criticisms urged against the doctrine. In the first place, what seems to be a formidable difficulty in the way of its acceptance is the absence of a felt continuity between the successive incarnations, a continuity which is made possible only by memory of previous births. And without memory the point of retributive justice is nullified, and therewith the penal purpose of incarnation is rendered abortive. It is further contended that in the absence of memory, notwithstanding the identity of a soul-substance, the different incarnations would be nothing short of different persons, and the juridical motive of incarnation would stand abrogated thereby. For, there is no point in punish-

ment unless the victim is made to realise the head and front of his offence and that the punishment is deserved by him. And it would be extravagant to assume that this individualisation of punishment is best secured by the individualising force which is a mere word, signifying no reality. Now, what one would like to suggest, in the first instance, in meeting this charge, is that the juridical point of view has been pressed rather too far, and too high a premium has been imposed upon the penal purpose of incarnation. But, then, it would not do to forget that reincarnation is primarily and essentially an ethical postulate, and in such an ethical rendering of the theory of reincarnation, the juridical demand for a conscious continuity and reciprocity between wrong-doing and suffering which is only made possible by memory of past lives —must necessarily be of subsidiary and secondary importance. Accordingly the time and energy that have been so far devoted to an empirical verification of the theory, in and through memory of a soul's past lives, seem to be rather misdirected. Even if it were possible to collect such evidences, they would have no evidentiary value, or probative force. An ethical postulate or its validity is in no way staked upon or conditioned by empirical evidences. If the whole creation subserves, as the Hindu thinkers are accustomed to believe, a moral end, if this earthly abode is, in literalness of fact, "the vale of soul-making," then what this accumulation and fruition of Karma in and through a series of incarnations does, and what it signifies, is the formation of character. Indeed, one might remark in the words of Browning, adapted to the needs of this theory, that a series of reincarnations is the

> Machinery just meant
> To give thy soul its bent,
> Try thee and turn thee forth, sufficiently impressed.

In such a context, memory is not an indispensable necessity, in the sense that without it belief in reincarnation would be an utter absurdity. If it is to be admitted in any capacity, it is only as an extra belief (*aberglaube*). What is of supreme importance in the interest of soul-making is the creation and conservation of the moral values, in and through a succession of lives, so that men "may rise on stepping-stones of their dead selves to higher things".

It has been further contended that the doctrine of Karma, and therefore the pendant doctrine of reincarnation, is not based on the real facts of moral causation. For punishment of moral evil by natural evil can neither claim a moral justification nor a rational vindication, payment in kind being the law of spiritual harvest. Assuming, however, that the doctrine in question rests upon the ethical postulate of absolute justice, the real nerve of such justice is no other than the primitive *lex talionis*, or what is the same thing, the spirit of crude vindictiveness or revengefulness. But, "re-

venge," as even Lord Bacon reminds us, "is a kind of wild justice which the more a man's nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out." And if it has no legal justification, far less can it claim a moral sanction. Indeed, no moral justification can be extended to a theory that regards punishment as an end in itself and earthly existence as a penal measure. But it is no use labouring the point that the universe, though subserving a moral end, is neither a moral reformatory nor a glorified police-court.

In countering the force of this last argument, all that is necessary for us to recognise is that the punishment of moral evil by natural evil does neither lack an *a priori* justification nor an *a posteriori* confirmation. To take the latter first, one need not go a-hunting for empirical evidences of this accredited theory. It is a matter of every day experience that persistent wrong-doing or sinfulness brings inevitably in its train some physical ailment or disability, *i.e.*, natural evil in some shape or other. The *a priori* justification proceeds from the simple but categorical demand of our moral reason that the natural and the moral, the physical and the spiritual, must on no account be represented as two non-communicating spheres, administered by exclusive laws of their own, and antagonised to each other by the whole diameter of being. The law of Karma affords the necessary guarantee of a constant co-ordination and interdependence of the natural and the moral order both being grounded in the nature of a Being that is the uniting principle of both. By being so grounded in the nature of a Being that is essentially moral, the ethical order remains no longer parochial in its nature but acquires a cosmic or ontological significance. The "immense expansion" which the moral realm thus acquires can with no loss of meaning be described in Martineau's well-known words:

> The rule of right, the symmetries of character, the requirements of perfection, are no provincialisms of this planet: they are known among the stars: they reign beyond Orion and the Southern Cross: they are wherever the Universal Spirit is.

SAROJ KUMAR DAS

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

A CHALLENGE TO MODERN RELIGION*

[**Hadland Davis** is the author of *The Land of Yellow Spring, Myths and Legends of Japan, The Persian Mystics : Rumi and Jami.*—EDS.]

Sir S. Radhakrishnan has written several important books dealing with Indian philosophy, and his latest, *An Idealist View of Life*, contains the Hibbert Lectures for 1929 delivered in London and Manchester. In addition he has used material in the Principal Miller Lectures of Madras University and the Third Krishnarajendra Silver Jubilee Lecture of Mysore University. The First Lecture deals with the modern challenge to religion, scientific and social. The Second is entitled "Substitutes for Religion". The Third is concerned with religious consciousness, and the Fourth attempts to show "that scientific certainty is not the only kind of certainty available to us". The Fifth outlines the spirit in man, and the Sixth and Seventh Lectures are devoted to a scientific or empirical view of the universe. In the concluding Lecture the author sets forth his case in regard to ultimate reality, an attempt "to restate a point of view which is nothing new but constitutes the very essence of the great philosophic tradition of idealism". It is a learned, courageous and helpful book, an honest attempt to reveal, clearly and forcibly, a spiritual philosophy which is opposed to the dogmas of religion and scientific naturalism.

The post-war years have not contributed to an idealist view of life. On the contrary, they have added to the clouds of pessimism. Crime, poverty, misery, unrest and uncertainty, seem to be on the increase. The Dope Press continues to shout all is well when the more thoughtful among us realise that the world is sick because it has lost touch with the things that matter. Established religion has failed, and those who have discovered its failure run after some new cult, some new substitute for their old gods. A considerable number of people have thrown up the religious sponge, having found it dry and unprofitable, and have sought the conquest of happiness by living as near the earth as possible. "The qualities which make for happiness," said Bertrand Russell, "vary inversely in proportion to the amount of a man's religious belief." Religion, according to that philosopher, is a disease born of fear, "a source of untold misery to the human race". Give up the idea of God and a spirit world, indulge your sexual passions when and where

* *An Idealist View of Life.* By Sir S. RADHAKRISHNAN. (Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 12*s.* 6*d.*)

you will, and joy will be your reward.

In the author's modern challenge to religion he brings to bear the big guns of criticism. He stresses the tyranny of religion, the fanatics who insist on a one way to God, and heartily damn those who differ from them: the priestcraft, idolatry and heresy-hunting, the so-called holy wars that have been perpetrated in the name of religion. In one of Strindberg's plays a captain who is an atheist says to a nurse who is a Christian: "It is a strange thing that you no sooner speak of God and love than your voice becomes hard and your eyes fill with hate." Religion so often engenders anger against other religions, so often creates lack of moral sanity that many free spirits believe that "the world would be a much more religious place if all the religions were removed from it". Their strident cry is for freedom to face the truth, however unpleasant it may be, rather than turn to God who, in their opinion, is no more than a figment of the imagination. The universe, they say, is already running down. A time will come when it will be utterly destroyed. That, they claim, is sufficient proof that there is no Supreme Deity directing and controlling life: no divine purpose, no divine love. Two points of existence for these people, the cradle and the grave, and between the two they think it well to live as fully and freely as they may.

It is not religion that is at fault, whether expounded by Christ or Buddha or any other great initiate, but our misinterpretation of it. That there are fallacies in the Sacred Books is of no importance compared with the germ of truth common to them all. There is an unmistakable unity in divine revelation, and modern science is by no means opposed to some directing power which is beyond human understanding. Determinism has gone for ever and the universe is not so much matter hung in space and human beings meaningless flotsam and jetsam. Life is not chaos but unity. When we renounce religion and fly to humanism, it is to discover a cold stone that yields no sustenance.

> When the foundations of life are shaken, when the ultimate issues face us demanding an answer, humanism does not suffice. Life is a great gift, and we have to bring to it a great mood; only humanism does not induce it. (p. 69)

"Men think," said Amiel, "they can do without religion; they do not know that religion is indestructible, and that the question simply is, which will you have?" In *Back to Methuselah* Shaw definitely states that "Civilisation needs a religion as a matter of life and death".

Keyserling and Spengler tell us what is wrong with us, but their criticism is destructive rather than constructive. Sir S. Radhakrishnan goes much further when he asserts that

> Notwithstanding the transformation of life, the shifting of moral values and the preoccupations of the time, the primal craving for the eternal and the abid-

ing remains inextinguishable. Unbelief is impossible. (p. 82)

He thinks " we are waiting for a vital religion, a live philosophy, which will reconstruct the bases of conviction and devise a scheme of life which men can follow with self-respect and creative joy ". What is that rallying centre ? Is it to be Plato's synoptic vision, a *samanvaya*, as Hindu thinkers describe it ? Our author seems to suggest a philosophy, universal in its application, " which will free the spirit of religion from the disintegrations of doubt and make the warfare of creeds and sects a thing of the past ". Although Sir S. Radhakrishnan does not stress the importance of any one religion, he finds in the Vedas " seers who were able to discern the eternal truths by raising their life-spirit to the plane of the universal spirit ". We awake to spiritual truth when we realise that the privacy of the self has been broken down, " invaded by a universal self which the individual feels as his own ". William James writes in *Varieties of Religious Experience :*

> In mystic states we become one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness. This is the everlasting and triumphant mystic tradition, hardly altered by differences of clime and creed. In Hinduism,in Neoplatonism, in Sufism, in Christian mysticism, in Whitmanism, we have the same recurring note, so that there is about mystical utterances an eternal unanimity which ought to make a critic stop and think, and which brings it about that the mystic classics have, as has been said, neither birthday nor native land. Perpetually telling of the unity of man and God, their speech antedates language, nor do they grow old.

Was George Fox deluding himself when he asked us to " learn to see all things in the universal spirit " ? He was not, but he attained that knowledge through intuition and not through reason. Reason will not explain religious experience. We get some flash of wisdom that transcends the human intellect. It is not an illusion but an awareness of the unity of life, the world a lamp for the inpouring of the Light of God. "Intuition," observes the author of this book, "is the extension of perception to regions beyond sense." All the deeper things in life are known in this way. Theophrastus said: " They who seek reason for all things do utterly overthrow reason. " Virgil was Dante's guide in the realm of reason. It was from Beatrice he learnt " that which lies beyond". In the spirit world it was " faith not reason's task".

When we study the lives of those who have been spiritually reborn we are not aware that they have less joy in life than those who are frankly and freely concerned with the ways of the flesh and nothing else. On the contrary, we discover they rejoice in a state of harmony which is proof against life's misfortunes. They speak with the voice of the spirit which can only be comprehended by those who are similarly enlightened. They are neither fools nor hypocrites. This rising from animal desire to something

better, this tireless search for God, is innate in man. But the quest is not only on his side. Because of the unity of life, which in some way beyond our comprehension is bound up with love itself, the Being we seek is also in search of us. "Hindu Mythology looks upon God as an eternal beggar waiting for the opening of the door that he may enter into the darkness and illumine the whole horizon of our being as with a lightning flash." A similar conception is expressed in Tagore's *Gitanjali* and Francis Thompson's *The Hound of Heaven.*

In the opinion of Sir S. Radhakrishnan our world to-day is overrun with Moseses and Messiahs. He does not profess to be a prophet and propound some new message that shall heal a troubled world. He simply restates profound truths and interprets what he believes to be ultimate reality. The book is rich in wisdom and spiritual insight. It contains many passages which the discerning reader will know how to appreciate. He has no axe to grind, no fads to display. He discusses the intricate problem of space and time. He sets the stage for a combat between spiritual and worldly wisdom. Without forcing the issue, without weighting the dice of argument, he succeeds in making good his claim to an idealist view of life. He writes :—

> Each must tread the weary path up the steep mountain from the top of which alone the vision can be seen in all its splendour. The teacher may put us on the way, speak to us of the hazards and hardships, but grasping the final mystery is an individual achievement. (p. 121)

HADLAND DAVIS

TWO ANTHOLOGIES *

[**Professor D. S. Sarma** is the author of a *A Primer of Hinduism*, *The Kathopanishad and the Gita*, etc., and is well known to our readers as a contributor of numerous instructive essays to this journal. Next month we will publish his considered opinion on "The Origin and Growth of Indian Castes."—EDS.]

Lyra Mystica, which is an anthology of mystical verse, inevitably invites comparison with the *Oxford Book of English Mystical Verse.* The latter confines itself to the mystical poetry written in the English language except for a few Gaelic poems written in the British Isles and subsequently translated into English. The Oxford editors, even while thus restricting themselves, say modestly, "We cannot, therefore, pretend to have made an exhaustive collection of the mystical poetry of the English language or of any poet." Whereas the publishers of *Lyra Mystica* raise great expectations not only by the fact that they have been able to get the Dean of St. Paul's to write the Introduction to their anthology but also by the following announcement on the cover :—

* *Lyra Mystica*. Edited by C. C. ALBERTSON. (Macmillan & Co., London, 7*s*. 6*d*.)
The Testament of Light. Edited by GERALD BULLETT. (J. M. Dent & Co., 5*s*.)

This anthology is intended to contain all the finest mystical poems to be found in the literature of the world, those written in other languages being given in an English translation.

Lured by this astounding "puff," if any Indian reader should hope to find in this book translations of passages from the *Upanishads* or the *Bhagavad-Gita*, which undoubtedly belong to the front rank of the world's mystical poetry, he would be sadly disappointed. Curiously enough, the first poem from Indian sources to be admitted here is the anonymous so-called Hymn of the Sivaite Puritans—an iconoclastic piece of the tenth century. The poem that immediately precedes it belongs to the fifth century, and the poem that follows it belongs to the eleventh century. Thus the Hymn of the Sivaite Puritans is the sole representative of "all the finest mystical poems to be found in the literature of the world" during a period of six centuries. Indeed the lack of sense of proportion displayed in this collection is remarkable. The anthology which begins with an Egyptian piece dated 3000 B. C. and comes down to living American poets, consists of about 460 pages. Of these less than a hundred pages are devoted to the "finest mystical poems" that the world produced in about 47 centuries, and more than 350 pages, or more than three-fourths of the book, to what it produced in the last century and a quarter. And reading some of the modern poems we are at a loss to understand why they are admitted at all into an anthology of mystical verse. Mystical verse does not mean merely religious verse, much less theological verse. In mysticism, as Professor Pringle-Pattison says in a passage quoted by Dean Inge in his introduction, "God ceases to be an object and becomes an experience." So any poem based on a church dogma or on sentimental piety can hardly be called mystical. The genuine accents of mysticism are heard not in

> It is the sorrow of the Son of Man who has voluntarily tasted and redressed our sins. (p. 303)
>
> Father of all! In every age,
> In every clime adored. (p. 95)

but in

> No tapers of sense may shine
> On those heights of Eternity. (p. 30)
>
> The massy earth and sphered skies are riven!
> I am borne, darkly, fearfully, afar—(p. 104)
>
> That Voice is round me like a bursting sea (p. 258)

But the objection to a great majority of the contemporary poems included in the latter part of the book is not simply that they are not sufficiently mystical, but that they are not sufficiently poetical. The underlying experience is rather vague and thin, and the expression is correspondingly frail and trivial. We do not mean to say that there are no first class mystical poems in the book. There are a good many of them which are a thrill and a joy to the reader. But on the whole we regret to say that the collection is unequal—and that from more than one point of view.

Mr. Bullett's anthology is one

of spiritual knowledge rather than of spiritual experience. So he has chosen sparingly from the literature of mysticism. Nor is literary excellence his chief criterion. The editor has a certain philosophy of life to convey and he conveys it through these short extracts, three-fourths of which are in prose and one-fourth in verse, taken from about thirty authors ancient and modern. In one of the notes in the Index he says :—

> In this very personal anthology, I have been glad to borrow other men's voices with which to express convictions of my own. But where I have failed to find some particular part of my thought stated by another, I have resorted to the unusual expedient of writing, as best I could, the passage I was in search of.

Mr. Bullett's aim is to testify to the divinity in man, the inwardness of authority and the redemptive power of love. He is against all asceticism, institutionalism and the tyranny of rules. The three passages which are written by himself in this anthology give us the clue to his philosophy. He says :—

> There is a positive danger, as well as falsehood, in attempting to conform to an ideal of virtue that is alien to the deepest impulses of one's own spirit.
>
> Without spontaneity man's life is mechanical and unmeaning and his morality a dead letter.
>
> Self-sacrifice has neither spiritual beauty nor any other human value if it is not, at the same time, genuine self-expression.

This is the spirit of romanticism in religion craving for freedom and self-expression and chafing at bonds which are not of its own making. It is also the essence of *Svadharma* which the *Bhagavad-Gita* teaches us—a rule of life which makes our actions shine ultimately like the flowers on a tree. *Svadharma*, in which a man acts according to his own nature (*Svabhāva*), connotes not only freedom, ease and spontaneity, but also perfect beauty; whereas *Paradharma* in which a man acts according to another's nature connotes repression, discomfort, pose and insincerity.

But this is a gospel for the spiritual adult and not the spiritual child. And in the kingdom of the spirit at the present stage of the evolution of our species the number of children far outweighs the number of adults. So it would not do for us to belittle or despise, as Mr. Bullett seems to do, the rigid rules of discipline of the school from which we have emerged on coming of age. Artificial conscience may be a false god, but free love may prove a falser god. That is why the highest spiritual wisdom embodied in the great historical religions has always insisted on a graded discipline to be used as a ladder by every soul that aspires to freedom. It is obedience to mechanical rules laid down by the wisdom of others that leads one ultimately to the discovery of the law of one's own being. *Svadharma* is in the first place the law of the group, and then the law of spontaneous action. Mr. Bullett's philosophy seems therefore to be rather one-sided and not well-balanced.

D. S. SARMA

BERNARD SHAW—BISHOP!

[**J. S. Collis** is the author of *Forward to Nature* and *Modern Prophets*. His *Bernard Shaw* was hailed by critics as provocative, clever, stimulating bold and illuminating—EDS.]

In his Preface (written at the end this time) to his latest volume,* Bernard Shaw drops the remark that he is now considered "the unofficial Bishop of Everywhere". If this is so we are entitled to enquire what the Bishop has to say concerning Religion. At no time has he been reticent on the subject. *Blanco Posnet*, *Man and Superman*, *Back to Methuselah*, *Saint Joan*, are all primarily religious plays. We should therefore be able to answer the question—What is the religion of Mr. Shaw?

But that is not really what we wish to ask. For there is only one Religion. Either you possess it or you do not possess it—you cannot choose between two, three, or four kinds. We may enquire as to which formulation of religious experience he prefers—Roman Catholicism, Mahomedanism, Buddhism or some other. But that is hardly an interesting question, since it is the experience itself that is important. Our question should not be, What is Mr. Shaw's religion? but, How deep has been his religious experience?

In answering this question we get little help from our Bishop. There are may religious minded people who do not understand the meaning and essence of Religion just as there are many artistic people who do not understand the meaning and essence of Art. Bernard Shaw is one of these. He is under the impression that when there has been a discussion concerning the Bible, the purpose of existence, the geographical position of God, and the good life, Religion has been discussed. He thinks that in order to know God it is enough to determine where He is. But God cannot be known by any method of intellectual search. Religion consists of intimations, presages, divinations, intuitions, promptings which, when they come, convince us that though God may not be in his heaven, all is right with the world. From this feeling has sprung all the religions of man; building upon this foundation the various Churches have been erected to appease our intellectual needs; banking upon this certainty man has ordered his experience into various "beliefs"; and going still further he has joined rules of conduct to the body of the doctrines. But there has come a time in the life of every religion when the intellectual beliefs are treasured more than the experience that begot them, and men clinging desperately to these beliefs without possessing the experience, have been at the mercy of those who denied them. This has happened so often that

* *The Adventure of the Black Girl in Her Search for God* (Constable, 2*s*. 6*d*.)

at last it is beginning to be understood that the business of the priest is to emphasise the experience before the creed and to acknowledge that ethics arise spontaneously from Religion but that Religion owes nothing to ethics.

In *Blanco Posnet* written in 1909 it had seemed as if Bernard Shaw was prepared to conduct his enquiry into the true centre of the problem. Blanco experiences God as a still, small voice within him, and surrenders to it. That is Religion pure and simple. But very soon he begins to hold forth on the problem of evil. *Already we get the suspicion that the author is more concerned with setting up a new creed than in experiencing God.*

Our suspicion is confirmed when we come to *Man and Superman*. In that play God is again experienced and again surrendered to under the sign of the Life Force. But the whole discussion revolves round the new creed, the new absurd intellectual concept of God as an unfulfilled purpose working on a basis of trial and error. It is another lengthy attempt to answer the problem of evil—a problem, which all who really experience Purpose, dismiss.

In *Back to Methuselah* there is more talk concerning religion but no Religion itself. In reading this play we come to understand why the religious Shaw can never possess Religion, however passionately he may desire to. For he does not love anything. He hates the world. So do many men of Religion. But they also love it. And that love does not spring from idealism, from any hope of what life may one day be, but from the contemplation of what it is. The man of Religion does not seek to solve the riddle of the universe by thought; he is content to look at it, at any given object, until he is filled with awe, perhaps with joy, and finally with love. "There is no answer to the riddle of the world save to be able to see the world," wrote Middleton Murry in one of his inspired moments.

This is outside the Shavian ideology. What does Shaw mean by contemplation—a word most freely used in *Back to Methuselah?* Here we come to his great weakness. He is in love with nothing—save Thought. Yet there are only two kinds of contemplation and both mean victory over thought. There is the contemplation which comes under the heading of Yoga—abstraction from thought in order to surrender to the deepest Self : and there is the contemplation of immediate reality as described above—which again is release from Thought. To Bernard Shaw there is only one kind of contemplation—" the contemplation of pure thought"! The entire system of Yoga is meaningless to him—there is no trace in all his work that he has ever examined or even heard of it. And the other kind of contemplation is equally foreign to him. His terrible Elders are engaged in the contemplation of nothing because

nothing in all this world is worth contemplating. All Shaw's life he has looked down upon Art. Never has he shown any idea of its meaning and essence and message. He has always spoken of artists and poets in a patronising tone hard to bear. To him they are pleasant people writing pretty word-patterns or shaping dolls to which we may turn for entertainment and consolation from the harsh realities of life; they are only to be taken seriously when harnessed in the service of propaganda. It has never occurred to him that Art is outside propaganda because it is the handmaid of Religion, and that when it is truly practised for its own sake it saves the world. For when Art is truly itself it teaches men *to see*. When Art is truly itself it teaches men *to love*. If love is lacking then the mightiest thinking, the purest thought, the greatest effort of contemplation are vain.

In *Saint Joan* Shaw chose to dramatize a mystic, and a saint. Here he was put to a severe test. Was he going to reveal how her sole guidance was the inner voice? We may grant, I think, that he does show this and that it is a great play. But did he *feel* it, did he *understand* it? Evidently not; for in the preface he shows a complete misunderstanding of the mystic position and even goes so far as to complain against Shakespeare's phrase "To thine own self be true, and it must follow as the night the day, thou canst not then be false to any man," on the ground that it neglects the individual's duty to the State!

Now in 1932 he gives us this story of the Black Girl's Adventure in her Search for God. It is a fable on the evolution of religion. Here we shall learn then whether Shaw has advanced any nearer to Religion, to Revelation. We find that he is exactly where he was when he came to London at the age of twenty-one. The girl searches for God. She samples a lot of the Gods man has agreed to believe in from time to time, including the No-God of the Nineteenth Century scientist. She turns them all down. Eventually she comes to rest—where? She comes to an old man digging in his garden (Voltaire). He assures her that the best thing for her to do is just to cultivate the garden with him and leave God alone. She accepts this. Soon an Irishman (Shaw himself) comes into the garden, and she finally marries him. The Irishman has the last word concerning religion—"Nothing would ever persuade him that God was anything more solid and satisfactory than an eternal but as yet unfulfilled purpose, or that it could ever be fulfilled if the fulfilment were not made reasonably easy and hopeful by Socialism." That is all. Thus ends her search for God. She does not find Him. But (how strange!) she rests content with a new theorem concerning Him. A new creed to which men shall cling parasitically in terror against the time when some one will disprove it. No ecstasy, no joy, no intuition of

faith—just this barren concept—thus ends her search!

Thus we see that our Bishop in his search for God has advanced no further than the Problem of Evil. It is strange; for within himself Shaw has always experienced such a deep feeling of Divine Significance (never missing an opportunity to gird at the scientists who were supposed to be undermining that intuition) that it is hard to see why he should have considered it necessary to formulate Creative Evolution in order to justify it. Such formulations only frustrate Faith. But Shaw, adoring Thought, preferred to let Experience look after itself while he explored subsidiary problems. The problem of evil is a subsidiary problem. However enormous, however painful, it cannot be overcome by Thought. There is only one way by which it can be overcome—by religious experience. He who, one way or another, through quiet inklings and intuitions or through ecstasy, experiences the feeling of a Divine Purpose is thereby enabled not to solve, not to shelve, not to evade, but to *dismiss* the problem of evil.

But Bernard Shaw so loved Intellect that he has always emphasised the rationalisings of Experience instead of leading men to Experience itself. It would seem that he has been muddled as regards this distinction, and at all times has felt some strange necessity to solve the problem of evil, till at last in *Back to Methuselah* he devised a Utopia, the most depressing in all literature, the inhabitants of which have overcome that problem. And how have they overcome it? By ceasing to be human! And the Black Girl cannot find God because all the time at the back of her mind is the idea that she must first solve that problem. It is most tantalising; for at moments Shaw has lucid intervals. "Make a little garden for yourself," says Voltaire to the Black Girl, "dig and plant and weed and prune; and be content if God jogs your elbow if you are gardening unskilfully, and blesses you when you are gardening well." We are delighted; here is a new, peaceful expression, unusual coming from the pen of Shaw; he is content to abandon Thought so that God may enter in. But our hopes are dashed on the entrance of that Irishman, who has the last word, and does not hesitate to drag the red herrings of socialism and creative evolution across the theme.

In this delightfully illustrated book there is a picture on page 56 of the Irishman (with Shaw's features of course) attempting to jump the garden gate when the idea of marriage was proposed. Did John Farleigh the artist realise what a perfect symbol the picture makes of Shaw's attitude, how it accounts for his failure as a bishop and an artist? For it does indeed and most happily symbolize his endeavour to escape from reality into the ivory tower of Thought. To get away, that has always been his object,

away from marriage of his own, away from children of his own, away from the cares and burden of everyday life, away from personal contact with all problems, away from everything save the luxury of *thinking about them.*

In thus suggesting that Shaw so far from being the Bishop of Everywhere is not a Bishop of Anywhere, I am not conscious of being unjust in any single sentence. But I am conscious that in showing how he does not possess the equipment to set up as a priest, I have not disposed of him. It is the last thing I wish to do. He cannot be disposed of because of the greatness of his real contribution. The latest volume of the Standard Edition of his Works sent out by Constable, *Doctors' Delusions Crude Criminology and Sham Education,** reminds us of how definite that contribution is. It has nothing to do with Religion; it remains within the province of militant sociology. There he is the supreme master with no rival past or present. There he is a constructive no less than a destructive thinker. The moment he stops thinking in terms of religion and takes up the cudgels on behalf of children or against doctors or prison authorities or schoolmasters then we are glad that his clear, hard, narrow mind was never rounded off by the mystic vision. We are glad; for truly this age would have been the poorer without the compassionate brilliance he sheds upon the problems of the day.

J. S. COLLIS

Visions of the Daughters of Albion. By WILLIAM BLAKE. Full Colour Facsimile—with an Essay by J. MIDDLETON MURRY. (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London. 15*s.*)

Most, if not all, inspired writings of a mystical or symbolic nature suffer at the hands of anxious commentators whose speculations tend rather to replace than illuminate the original texts. Witness, for instance, the innumerable "essays," "notes," "commentaries," etc. on the *Bhagavad-Gita.* Not that many are not helpful, but on the whole they create confusion, rising like a mist between the student and the message. The teaching is lost under volumes of exegeses. The inner meaning of the great scriptures of the world springs up from within the gradually awakening intuition of the individual student in the course of time if study is diligently and patiently pursued.

The writings of William Blake may be taken as an exception to this general rule, in part at least, because comparatively few have grasped his message with sufficient insight to essay an interpretation. Strangely, too, most of the lovers of Blake have become such after perusal and study of other students who have been able to reveal the essential beauty and charm as well as meaning hidden in what often appears impenetrable allegory, rather than as a result of personal contact with Blake's writings.

Mr. Murry has given us an essay-exegesis which will prove of intense interest and joy to lovers of Blake, while it cannot fail to win the interest of new enquirers, energizing them to make the effort necessary to win the pearl of great price.

C. T.

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* *Doctors' Delusions Crude Criminology and Sham Education* (Constable, 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Light. A Philosophy of Consciousness. By ARCHIBALD WEIR. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

This is a remarkable book. That it is also exceedingly stiff reading is of course no criticism of its argument, but I must confess that its originality at times baffles the understanding. The basic position upon which the author builds is the rejection of every conventional category of thought—space, time, life, cause, personality, matter, etc.—as excluding the very fact upon which they are all dependent, the fact of Consciousness. Hence a viable philosophy, he maintains, must be a philosophy of Consciousness, a philosophy, that is, which concerns itself with the analysis, of the nature and manifestations of Consciousness.

Reason is but the "by-product of the nature of things". Consciousness "employs it as an indispensable servant, as a specialist, indeed, but never has either the place or the service been other than subordinate". And Consciousness is inseparable from the Unconscious. The nodal point at which there goes on a perpetual adjustment between the intimations of the Unconscious and the actualities of the Conscious is the Self. Self is therefore a necessary part of the All, and contains within its transient material framework—a framework, be it noted, in space and time, which is itself the creation of Consciousness—all other selves. Our knowledge of the Self is to be trusted so long as we do not confound it with developments from space-time existence. Right is a universal rule mediated by the Self between the Unconscious and the Conscious. Its authority is the authority of the universal. "And the general outcome of this obedience to authority through self universal is a humanitarian ethos in absolute opposition to animal methods of survival."

As Mr. Weir recognizes, this is, in technical language, an "organic" philosophy, and is not without resemblance at some points to the idealism of the Vedantists. The exposition is extremely suggestive, and though the unfamiliar terminology is forbidding, and the author's occasional references to his former work *Dark* indicate that an acquaintance with his earlier writings is indispensable to a full comprehension of his thought, the reader who takes up this book in an earnest and sympathetic spirit will be well repaid for his pains.

K. S. SHELVANKAR

An Indian Monk: His Life and Adventures. By SHRI PUROHIT SWAMI. (Macmillan & Co., London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Twenty years ago W. B. Yeats, the Irish poet, introduced the *Gitanjali* of Tagore to an enthusiastic English public. He now presents Shri Purohit Swami in a long preface, hoping that his autobiography "may prove of comparable importance". We beg leave to doubt that, but certainly the book will attract as much *interest*—interest of an ephemeral kind, but none the less interest. For the Indian attitude to religion is just now a matter of supreme concern to the West, whose own religious institutions are near to bankruptcy. It hopes, by finding adaptable props in the East, to save the Western world for Religion after all. That, at least, is the idea of a body of keen thinkers, and they are followed from afar by a growing public in the libraries. What, however, will they make of this monkish autobiography which will, we suspect, be readily devoured by both curious and hungry alike? The style is good; competent friends have combined with the author to make a good literary venture. But the taste resembles that of the brilliant Dead-Sea apple—it is, to say the least of it, a little sour. No doubt there are fine passages and noble sentiments, but India has done better than this. Her religion and her philosophy are necessary to us; their enemies will be quick to draw attention to a flavour of sensational magic and wild asceticism in Shri Purohit's book, which can only harm the cause. It is especially impor-

tant, at this time, to present Indian religious life to the West with the utmost care; and after, say, the books of Dhan Gopal Mukerji, such tales as those of Shri Purohit about his personal ecstasies, aberrations, and illnesses smack of egoism and will seem regrettably far from that balance in spiritual life which constitutes the finest asset of the great seers; while his attitude towards marriage will appear almost hysterical to the Western mind in modern times. East and West have been strewn, both of them, with the wrecks and eccentricities of religious genius; such things have their interest for the psychologist; but this is emphatically not the moment to draw public attention to them in a popular book. Emotional and physical excesses have led Shri Purohit, despite his splendid efforts, his great affections, his magnificent flights of thought, to a health, at fifty, completely broken down, and to less than his fair share of inner peace. That comes of "exteriorising" the Lord. He is body *and* spirit, and near to us without the need of frenzied efforts to attain. The simple faith of Abu Sa'id rings truer here, truer especially for one who is not a genius on the Path:—

> They told the saint how one holy man could walk on the water, how another could fly in the air, and how a third could in the twinkling of an eye transport himself from one city to another. "The frog can swim and the swallow skim the water," he replied: "the crow and the fly can traverse the air, and the Devil can pass in a moment from East to West. These things are of no great account: he is a man who dwells amongst mankind, buys and sells, marries, and associates with his fellow-creatures, yet is never for a single moment forgetful of God."

R. A. L. ARMSTRONG

The Mystery of the Mahabharata. By N. V. THADANI, M. A., Late Principal, Hindu College, and Rector, University of Delhi. Vol. I. Illustrated. (Bharat Publishing House, Karachi. Rs. 12.)

When at the present moment leading scientists of the world are coquetting with the electron, the proton, the photon and the crinoline concepts, and when philosophers of diverse denominations such as Idealists, Realists, Behaviorists etc. are standing wonder-dazed at the rapid march of science and scientific discoveries, Mr. N. V. Thadani's attempt to interpret the incidents of the Mahabharata, and the work as a whole in such a manner as to make out that it is a "picture of pure philosophy" has a romantic interest about it. The romantic character is enhanced when it is seen that the author resorts to the method of letter-analysis to establish his conclusions. The cell indicates the origin of the evolution of life. Sanskrit is a wonderful language, points out Mr. Thadani, which in "its vowels and consonants, general structure, Sandhi rules and grammatical forms," reflects some of the modern scientific concepts like "nucleus, cytoplasm, centrosomes, and chromosomes of the cell" (p. iii) (1) "The whole universe is created out of Purusha and Prakriti, the male and female energies of life . . ." (2) "The most elementary form of life is the cell . . ." (3) "The universe is partly manifest and partly unmanifest . . ." (p. v) The Vedas and the Mahabharata contain unmistakably the three fundamental ideas. Excluding the Introduction, there are nine chapters in this volume devoted respectively to "The Meaning of Mahabharata," "A New Language," "Systems of Hindu Thought," "The Golden Egg and the Universe," "Theories and their Application," "The Origin and Character of Sanskrit," "The Method of Interpretation," "The Hymns of the Vedas" and "The Gods of the Vedas".

Mr. Thadani seeks to maintain that the Vedas present a picture of the "Science of Life" (Chap. viii) and that "Vedic Gods represent different ways in which Life becomes manifest" (Chap. ix). The first volume under notice is devoted to a survey of the Ṛg-Veda from the standpoint indicated above. The second volume will deal with an elucidation of the "Mystery of the Mahabharata". That

the Mahabharata is not a mere epic but a comprehensive critique of systems of philosophy would appear to be the main thesis of the author, complete working out of which will be awaited with interest by students of ancient Indian literature and thought. There is a familiar line which proclaims that other works merely repeat what is contained in the Mahabharata, and that what is *not* contained in the Mahabharata is found nowhere else. "*Yadihāsti-tadanyatra-yannehāsti-na-tat-kvachit.*" Mr. Thadani may after all be right in his new interpretation of the Vedas and the Mahabharata. I am aware of a South Indian venture directed to demonstrate that the Ṛg-Veda knew all about Marsh Gas. But then, authors like Mr. Thadani should be prepared to be greeted with some opposition to their ultra-original interpretations of texts which unless strained in particular ways do not bear them.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

The Evidence of Immortality. By DON P. HALSEY. (Macmillan & Co., New York).

This book is evidently meant for laymen and is written in simple style. It is free from technicalities. The arguments offered for immortality cover a wide field. The problem has been studied from the religious, scientific, philosophic, psychic and spiritualistic standpoints.

Emphasis has been laid upon the existence of God as supporting the doctrine of immortality. It is assumed as a reasonable and logical premise "without which reason itself cannot exist," that God lives and in Him we live and move and have our being". (page 14). The author conceives God to be infinite Justice and infinite Love. He infers that with such God the wrongs of this life will be remedied in the day of reckoning. But is it not better to hold that retributive justice is at work everywhere in nature? Karma determines our evolution, here and hereafter, that is, in ultimate analysis, we ourselves determine.

The author then reproduces the views of Plato, Aristotle and Kant amongst others. He also quotes from later European thinkers including Bergson. He does not agree with Prof. Haldane in the theory of Absorption. He emphasises James's vision of the unseen world encompassing the little world of experience. So far as scientific viewpoints are concerned, the author thinks that "if there is not a clear demonstration of immortality there is no clear proof that there is no life beyond the grave". He then considers the existence of disembodied spirits and direct communication with them. According to him, conviction eventually comes from faith. Nothing is said about the final destiny of the soul.

Two kinds of immortality should be distinguished: (1) Personal Immortality, and (2) Supra-personal Identity.

So long as personality clings to the soul it is bound by the forces of Karma, and Karma determines the evolution of the individual, and of the race. But there is a supra-personal immortality: Personality may grow fine or gross according to Karma and so long as the chain of Karma continues the soul has its evolution through the cycles of manifestation. The soul can have its disembodied existence and in higher psychic states can feel its separation from the body. But even then it is not free from the inherent tendencies. True immortality lies in the complete freedom from Karma and evolution, from birth, growth, decay, death. It is eternally real. Such a freedom necessarily introduces us to the *supra-personal* conception of self.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

The Lure and Romance of Alchemy. By C. J. S. THOMPSON. (Harrap and Co., London. 5*s.*)

Alchemy has been variously regarded as (1) the alleged art of making gold and silver by transmuting the base metals, (2) the chemistry of the Middle Ages, (3) a philosophical system, dealing with the universal mysteries. It may be said at once that the reader of Mr. Thompson's book will obtain an idea of alchemy in each of these aspects.

Corresponding to these three aspects of alchemy, three main types of its practitioners, the alchemists, are to be discerned in the work under notice: (1) the gold-seeker, or "puffer," held in derision by so many of the alchemical writers and painters, (2) the philosophical alchemist, the true forerunner of the modern chemist, and (3) the religious mystic, who regarded alchemical processes as allegories. The first type, which included many charlatans and cheats, followed alchemy merely in the pursuit of material gain; the second kind of alchemist was primarily interested in the wonderful changes which matter was found to undergo; and the third kind was mainly concerned in proving, by experiments conducted on the material plane, the truth of an all-embracing philosophical system.

The most fundamental conception of alchemy was probably the imagined unity of all things: "what is below is like that which is above, and what is above is like that which is below, to accomplish the miracles of One Thing," runs the first precept of the mysterious Emerald Table of Hermes Trismegistus, the supposed father of alchemy, the Hermetic Art. In keeping with this conception, all forms of matter were regarded as derived from a *prima materia*, and as possessing a common soul. This soul alone was permanent, the body or outward form of the metals and other kinds of matter being merely a transitory mode of manifestation of the eternal soul. The same fundamental conception led to the belief that the Philosopher's Stone, the medicine of the metals which could perfect them into gold, was closely related to the Elixir of Life, the medicine of man which could perfect his body and his mental and moral nature.

A study of this alluring subject makes it clear that alchemy was a crystal of many facets: a potpourri of chemistry, astrology, magic, mysticism, philosophy, theosophy, and other enticing ingredients. Each of these aspects is sympathetically handled in Mr. Thompson's interesting pages, and the author is to be congratulated upon his skilful selection from the enormous and bewildering mass of literature which confronts the writer on alchemy; the unusual wealth and variety of the illustrations also call for appreciative mention.

In a work covering so wide a field there are naturally many details which might be submitted to criticism. The text appears to contain few serious mistakes: possibly the most obvious is the statement (p. 160) that the several treatises bearing the name of Basil Valentine "were not printed until the second half of the seventeenth century, and the one by which he is best remembered, *The Triumphal Chariot of Antimony*, was not known until 1685". The *Triumph Wagen Antimonii* was published, in German, at Leipzig, in 1624: and this edition was reprinted in 1676; A version "faithfully Englished and published for the Common Good" by I. H. Oxon, (possibly John Heydon, the astrologer and rosicrucian), was printed in London, in 1660; and Richard Russell's English translation appeared in 1678. Valentine's *Chymische Schriften*, published at Hamburg in 1677, also contained the *Triumph Wagen*. Apparently the author refers to the Latin version published at Amsterdam in 1685, and translated into English by A. E. Waite in 1893. Other tracts ascribed to Basil Valentine appeared in print as early as 1602.

Too great an emphasis is perhaps laid upon the scientific value of the work of John Mayow (p. 229), particularly in view of the recent interesting researches of Prof. T. S. Patterson; and it is unjustifiable to claim that Mayow

was the first to collect gases in vessels inverted over water.

Symbolism is of prime importance in alchemy, and the author rightly devotes a good deal of attention to alchemical symbols, symbolical representations, and secret alphabets; many of his readers, however, will wish that he had included a glossary of alchemical symbolic usages (such as the toad, the dragon, the old man), and also interpretations of the symbolic illustrations reproduced on p. 127 and elsewhere—these so often leave the uninitiated reader guessing. The value of the book would be much enhanced also by the inclusion of a comprehensive alphabetical list of alchemical terms, including names of substances, apparatus, etc. We are sure that so attractive an exposition of a fascinating and romantic subject will be widely read, and we hope that the author may deal with these suggestions in a future edition.

JOHN READ

Hypnotism, Suggestion, and Faith-Healing. By ALEXANDER CANNON, M. D. (William Heinemann [Medical Books] Ltd., London. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

Mesmer published his work *Ueber die Magnetkur* in 1775, and the hundred and ten years that followed saw the researches and publications of Braid, Reichenbach, Gregory, Liébault, and Charcot. But despite all that was done by these eminent men and their colleagues to demonstrate the indubitable value of hypnotism both as an anæsthetic and a curative agent in nervous diseases and certain forms of insanity, the medical profession as a whole has remained indifferent or hostile; and the treatment of disease by suggestion (to say nothing of the older and much abused methods of animal-magnetism) has been for the most part left to untrained outsiders, who usually do not know how to diagnose the conditions they set out to cure.

Dr. Cannon's excellent little handbook defines very briefly the scope of hypnotism in medicine, describes the methods employed by Liébault and others, and gives unanswerable reasons why the subject should receive the serious attention of medical men. Himself a psychiatrist of wide experience, the author is a profound believer in the value of hypnotism, which he uses daily, and with success, in his mental hospital work and medical practice generally.

All enthusiasts are apt to claim too much for their speciality; and Dr. Cannon is no exception; for, when he says that

> Crystal-gazing, Spiritualism, "Christian-Science," faith-healing, clairvoyance, and the like, can be fully explained by the study of the various phenomena which can be produced, at will, in the hypnotic states,

he is going very much farther than the facts warrant.

With what Dr. Cannon has to say about the ethical side of the question of hypnotism, all who have made any theoretical or practical study of hypnotism and the allied subjects, will be in cordial agreement. He writes:

> . . . In some cases, patience, as well as kindliness of heart at all times, . . . is required. (p. vii)
>
> It [hypnotism] is a power for good or evil; let no one therefore even hint at anything bad, either by word or action to an insane person! (p. 21)
>
> Under the hypnotic state the patient is extremely sensitive to your suggestions, and you must select your words; for remember that words are greater than the sword, and that *then—every* word has magic power. (p. 37)

R. A. V. M.

[Readers who wish to know what is the Occult view of Hypnotism would do well to study the article by H. P. Blavatsky on that subject, first published in 1890 in *Lucifer*, and now included in *Raja-Yoga or Occultism*. Mme. Blavatsky wrote in answer to several specific questions concerning hypnotism. And she stated that "Our replies must be made from the standpoint of Occultism alone, no consideration being given to such hypotheses of modern (another name for "materialistic") Science, as may clash with esoteric teachings." —Eds.]

Carlyle. By EMERY NEFF. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 10s.)

There is much in Carlyle that is merely eccentric and impermanent, but one may find in his writings the elements of an outlook on life which imperatively call for recognition in our own age. The dominant theories of Western civilisation to-day are not substantially different from those of the early nineteenth century: philosophically—materialism, and socially—*laissez faire.* It was against these that Carlyle waged impassioned war.

Brought up in the strict tenets of the Presbyterian creed, he went to Edinburgh at the age of fourteen to prepare himself for a clerical career. But the city no less than the university was saturated with the corrosive scepticism of the *philosophes,* and before long he found his faith crumbling. He found that Christian orthodoxy could not be sustained in the face of the rationalistic attack; that he must abandon it if he had any regard for intellectual integrity; and that there was no alternative but the then scientific view of the world as a meaningless conglomeration of natural forces. He thereupon relinquished his plans for entering the ministry, but against the materialism which appeared to be the only philosophy open to him his spirit rebelled instinctively.

Though he could not refute it on logical grounds, vaguely, insistently, he felt that it was false. One day, in 1822, something "like a stream of fire" rushed over him, leaving him more firmly convinced than ever that the universe was not a soulless mechanism. His comprehension, meanwhile, of German philosophy and literature was deepening, and he discovered in them, particularly the *Critique of Practical Reason,* a theoretical defence of that to which he had been clinging so passionately. Reason, Kant showed, had grave limitations: other faculties might legitimately be used for the elucidation of life's problems: the vision of the poet and the saint was no less true than that of the scientist. And Goethe was teaching that Nature was a garment for some invisible spirit which gave value to human actions. Such ideas in time dispelled the darkness in which Carlyle had been groping and, in *Sartor Resartus,* he wrote triumphantly, "The Universe is not dead and demoniacal, a charnel house with spectres, but God-like and my Father's!"

He was however no metaphysician: his interest was in practical affairs, he was a reformer. And he fiercely denounced the idea that men had no responsibility towards each other; that the world was a stage for unrestrained self-seeking; and that the only duty of the State was to preserve order. The industrial revolution, he saw, had greatly altered the economic structure. The distance between the rich and the poor had been greatly widened, and while wealth was heaping up at one end, at the other squalor and disease, physical and moral, accumulated with hideous results. But Society remained indifferent. Its philosophy was one of "non-interference": Every man for himself and devil take the hindmost.

Carlyle's whole career may be described as an angry and violent protest against such conditions. In practically every book of his, from *Signs of the Times,* through *Sartor Resartus* and *The French Revolution,* to *Chartism,* he dwelt on the misery and wretchedness of the common people, and announced prophetically that unless the wealthy, powerful and cultured classes emerged from their absorption in petty and selfish pursuits, and consecrated themselves to the service of the lowly, the same fate would overtake them as had engulfed the nobility of the *ancien régime* in 1789.

His dream of a high-minded and energetic aristocracy, or the Hero, the God-given Leader, establishing truth and righteousness in a sinful and chaotic world, is not altogether discredited. It is the inspiration of the many dictatorships which range over Europe today. But it is also the sign of the contradiction which vitiates Carlyle's attitude. All his life he crusaded for the Right, the Right in Action, the drama-

tic, masterful, effective Action. He did not realise—at any rate, not until the end, uneasily—that he was glorifying Might in action. He insisted, no doubt, that Right and Might were distinct, but he neither kept the distinction constantly in view nor understood that each of those principles has totally different methods of operation.

This failure—upon which Mr. Neff lays but light stress in an otherwise admirable volume—was, indeed, but one aspect of Carlyle's inherent incapacity to think things out, to weigh the evidence, to reserve his judgment. He did most valuable service in attacking the excessive individualism of his generation. He paved the way for that truer view of society which was to be developed by the Idealists of the later nineteenth century. But himself, he was no philosopher. His mind was too impulsive, too vehement, too heavily steeped in the Protestant tradition, to be capable of taking dispassionate views. He sneered at Lyell and Darwin; he wrote a malicious and ignorant attack on Cagliostro; he gradually lost sympathy with his friend Emerson who was working out a version of Eastern mysticism; and in all these respects, represented that antipathy to the unfamiliar, that insensibility to new currents of thought that is often, though mistakenly, described as being peculiarly Victorian.

K. S. SHELVANKAR

Aspasia, The Future of Amorality. By R. E. MONEY-KYRLE. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, London. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

"The question is," said Disraeli on a celebrated occasion, "Is man an ape or an angel?"—and replied, that man is an angel. But psycho-analysts believe that man is not only a highly developed ape but should also return to the ape stage of evolution from which he has been trying all these years to emerge. Judged from this view-point psycho-analysis has been like an ill wind that blows no one any good.

Dr. Money-Kyrle, an eminent psycho-analyst, says that the world's unrest, depression and material discomfort, as well as national and social animosities, are all due to the Œdipus complex with all its ramifications. This complex which is another name for the frustration of our sexual impulses is, according to him, responsible for all that legacy of hate which is poisoning our domestic, social, national and international relationships. The cure for this, urges the doctor, is more of sexual freedom. But this runs counter to all that ancient philosophers and sages not only of India but of other countries have taught. Sex licence has always been a sign of decadence and has led to the downfall of nations. We should not, therefore, advocate it in any form. What the world needs at present is not a slackening of the standards in matters of sex but a stiffening of them, for only in this way can the highest moral purity whether of the individual or of the race, be attained. It has been wisely said in *The Voice of the Silence:*

> "Do not believe that lust can ever be killed out if gratified or satiated, for this is an abomination inspired by Mara. It is by feeding vice that it expands and waxes strong, like to the worm that fattens on the blossom's heart."

The book under review shows the admirable clarity, vigour, and persuasive power of the author, but I wonder if anybody in India familiar with ancient psychology will take its conclusions seriously.

DIWAN CHAND SHARMA

Wild Talents. By Charles Fort. (Claud Kendall, New York. $ 3·00)

Was it not Claude Bernard who said: "Science is built of facts: but a collection of facts is not science, any more than a heap of bricks is a house"? The heap of facts regarding physical happenings inexplicable by science, which the late Charles Fort so industriously amassed and presented in *Wild Talents*, bears a general similarity to those recorded in his *Book of the Damned* and *Lo !*, but in this last book there is a preponderance of happenings which seem to be related more directly to man. But no more than in those earlier works did the author achieve a synthesis, suggest a rationale, or point out the laws under which these phenomena occurred. The reader of *Wild Talents* is left to make what he can of the bewildering array of evidence for the existence in man of superphysical or psychic powers. Beyond the reiterated suggestion of the power of mind to affect matter, including our own bodies and those of others, little in the way of explanation has been attempted.

Phenomena frequently more wonderful and generally better attested were described half a century ago in *Isis Unveiled*, with the tremendous advantage of an accompanying rational explanation and statement of the laws governing their production. The present volume strongly suggests Mr. Fort's more than casual acquaintance with Madame Blavatsky's writings, although it contains but one casual reference to their author.

Mr. Fort was refreshingly unorthodox. He was opposed to vivisection and, disrespectfully classed vaccines and serums with powdered toads as remedies for human ills; he rejected the ape-ancestor hypothesis, which he suggested might better be reversed; he had a theory "that, in early and plastic times, a human being from somewhere else appeared on this earth, and that many kinds of animals took him for a model, and rudely and grotesquely imitated his appearance"; he accepted the possibility of prenatal markings and stigmatic wounds as expressions of the power of mind over matter. He flouted impartially the pretensions of science, the monopoly of "miracles" by religion, and the claim of the Spiritualists that disembodied spirits are the agents at work in the phenomena recorded.

Wild Talents is a disconnected series of accounts of the marvellous, drawn chiefly from the press of the last few years and ranging from poltergeist phenomena to unexplained disappearances, from ghouls and vampires to hailstones bearing pictures of the Virgin, from dowsing or water-divining and fire walking to curiously localized fires of mysterious origin and inexplicable deaths. Even the unjustly discredited Keely motor of some forty years ago is cited in substantiation of the author's claim that "engines have run, fueled with zeals."

The cases presented are impressive by sheer force of numbers. Science can and usually does ignore the challenge of a single circumstance inexplicable along materialistic lines, but when such a mass of phenomenal occurrences is brought together it should become more difficult to brush their cumulative testimony aside. As Mr. Fort put it: ". . .some of our opponents, if out in a storm long enough, might have it dawn on them that it was raining."

Mr. Fort's interest seems to have been largely in the phenomena for their own sake; as witness his no doubt half-facetious confession that the great ambition of his life had been to be able to give to chairs and tables the order: "Fall in! Forward march!" and have them obey him.

He does not even imply any moral responsibility attaching to the unconscious exercise of psychic powers against the objects of antipathy, but the evidence adduced for the power of injuring, consciously or unconsciously, the object of hatred or malice, without lifting one's hand, is overwhelming and disquieting. To give but one of the many instances cited of what Mr. Fort called "unconscious wizardry"—within the space of a year and a half, each of the four judges who successively committed and re-com-

mitted to prison a well-known British labour leader for refusal to pay arrears due to his wife under a maintenance order, shortly thereafter "died suddenly".

That any change involves disadvantages as well as gains the author granted, but he foresaw tremendous possibilities, constructive as well as destructive, in the development and control of these "wild talents," possibilities which may transform, if they do not wreck our civilization.

Wild Talents is not a reassuring book. It makes very real the terrible dangers, mental and bodily, which threaten the race in the coming "Era of Witchcraft," as Mr. Fort ominously named it, unless man's moral development proceeds apace with or outstrips the unfoldment of his psychic powers and faculties.

PH. D.

Plotinus on the Beautiful and on Intelligible Beauty. (The Shrine of Wisdom, 6 Hermon Hill, London.)

These are two essays reprinted from the Enneads of Plotinus and reveal a striking similarity of orientation to that of Indian Æsthetics. Both the Vedanta and the Sankhya have moulded Indian thought on the nature of the Beautiful. That the inmost nature of the Self and the Universe is *sachchidananda* or Bliss, is the central insight of the Vedanta. In everyday life we are moved by *kama* and *karma* born of *avidya*. Ignorant of our true nature as Infinite Joy, we maintain a round of superficial desires and activities, born of a mistaken identification of ourselves with the impulses of the body. Now, Beauty in nature or art breaks for us this spell of familiarity, and engages the soul in a mood of disinterested contemplation. That quality in art which produces this mood is *Rasa*. Kama and Karma are suspended for the time being and we see into the life of things. Thus beauty becomes the "pathway to Reality".* Thus æsthetic contemplation is akin to philosophic, and brings about, all unknown to the subject thereof, "a migration of the self"* from the empirical to the universal planes of being. But this vision is not complete *Jnana*, because it is evanescent, not being based on perfect apprehension or the ultimate implications of experience. This view makes Rasa or inward experience more fundamental in the apprehension of the beautiful; the outer sensuous appearance is only a stimulus which makes us forget ourselves and remember our diviner nature. Hence it is that sometimes even the plainest things evoke in us the "Vision Splendid". Hence it is that feeling as such is not the core of the æsthetic experience. Feeling carries us to the realm of the beautiful only when it comes trailing clouds of glory from the Supreme within and without. There is an illuminating approximation in this matter between Plotinus and Indian æsthetics; for him also Beauty is the veil of Reality. In both these essays Plotinus brings out the identity of Truth and Beauty and sketches the voyage of the pilgrim soul from the outward beauty of forms to the inner beauty of Ideas, and from the World of Ideas to the Good, the One beyond.

From the ethical point of view, also, there is a close similarity between the two. Indian thought utilises the Sankhyan theory of Satwa, Rajas and Tamas as a spiritual criterion of art. The highest art is that which stimulates Satwa guna, or purity of nature in us. If Beauty is an experience in which there is a revelation of the Supreme Spirit to the human soul, it is obvious that the experience must have a "cathartic influence" on the emotional and sensitive nature of the experiencer. This is not to say that art must be didactic in aim. This is only to say that the spiritual 'after-effect' must count in the evaluation of any particular piece of art or experience. The demand of Plotinus for moral purification as

*"Pathway to Reality" and "migration of the self" are expressions found in Professor Hiriyanna's Presidential Address to the Indian Oriental Conference (Proceedings, vol. ii) the best account in English of Indian Æsthetics known to the reviewer.—M. A. V. R.

preparatory for the vision of beauty is an echo of this Indian criterion of *Sattwo-dreka* or evocation of the spiritual.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

Konnersreuth: A Medical and Psychological Study of the Case of Teresa Neumann. By R. W. HYNEK, M.D. Translated and adapted by LANCELOT W. SHEPPARD. (Burns Oates and Washbourne, London. 4s.)

Teresa Neumann,* the daughter of a Bavarian peasant, was born in 1898. At the age of fourteen she became a servant at the village inn, where she waited on the customers and also worked on the landlord's farm. At the age of twenty she sustained a severe spinal injury which resulted in her becoming a bedridden invalid. She was an extremely pious Roman Catholic; and in 1925, when about to be operated on for an inflammation of the appendix, she was cured phenomenally, we are told, as the result of a relic of a saint being placed on the affected part. Following this cure, which enabled her to get up and lead a more or less normal life, she began to see exceedingly vivid and realistic visions of scenes from the life of Jesus as recorded in the Gospels; and eventually she developed what are known as the "stigmata," that is to say, marks on her hands, feet, side and brow, corresponding to the wounds that Jesus is said to have received during the tortures that preceded his death. Teresa Neumann's stigmata have persisted right up to the present; and on Friday each week, she is said to witness in vision all the scenes of the passion and crucifixion as described in the Gospel narratives. While so doing, the stigmata develop into open wounds and bleed.

For all this the evidence seems to be perfectly satisfactory; but there are other details in Dr. Hynek's account—as for example that Teresa does not eat or drink anything at all except the consecrated wafer at communion—which in the nature of things would be very difficult to prove, or to accept without proof.

The phenomenon of the stigmata is not uncommon in the Roman Catholic Church, and we are informed that no less than 321 cases have been enumerated. Dr. Hynek, who regards them as due to miraculous intervention by the deity, notes with pride that they are unknown outside his Church, a fact that seems to him to confirm its unique status. It does not occur to him that an explanation may be found on other and non-supernatural grounds. The Roman Church is the only Christian body that makes a cult of the wounds of Jesus and encourages its members to visualise, sympathetically feel, and meditate upon them. Is it not more than likely, in view of all we know about the effect of the imagination on the physical body—*e. g.*, the well-known occasional effect of the imagination of the mother on her unborn child—that in the case of persons of peculiar psychological make up and unusually strong power of visualising, as Teresa's visions prove her to be, the object of constant emotional meditation should stamp its image on the flesh?

It is a curious illustration of the perversion of the doctrine of a great teacher by his followers, that so many of the popular devotions and cults, which the Roman Catholic Church fosters among its members, should centre round, not the precepts, but the physical body of Jesus, *e. g.*, the mother who gave it birth, his heart, his wounds. To what heights might not Western religion have reached if all this wealth of devotion through the centuries had been focused on the assimilation of the sublime ethical and mystical *teachings* of Jesus!

R. A. V. M.

* Since writing this review I see that the Pope has taken steps to suppress a number of mysto-hysterical cults that have been springing up in various places. Among other things he has caused Teresa Neumann to be sent to a hospital where she will receive treatment and be under observation.—R. A. V. M.

The Film in National Life. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London. 1*s*.)

It is a familiar compliment paid to Englishmen that they do not think ahead and are almost always late in coming on to the ground, but when they do come, they set to work silently and with courage, and proceed with marvellous initiative to repair the errors of omission. The Report of the Commission on Educational and Cultural Films, appointed by some hundred educational and scientific organisations, proves and justifies this compliment. While Japan, Italy, Germany, France and the United States of America had recognised the need for a permanent organisation to improve the Film and make it serve national ends, Britain had remained unalive to that need and had left the task to private enterprise. The Commission came on the ground somewhat late, later even than the Indian Committee, but it has made a comprehensive investigation, co-ordinating and incorporating the results of many a previous inquiry and report, and has put forth a vigorous plea for the constitution of a Film Institute.

The Film Institute is intended to take up the development of all that is most valuable from the point of view of science, education, commerce, recreation, and artistic enjoyment. It must be able to give information and advice, to educate public taste, to conduct research ; to preserve film records of public events and compile descriptive and critical catalogues; to advise Government by certifying films as educational, cultural or scientific, and to undertake such duties as may be required in relation to Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates, such as certifying suitability for backward races, etc. These being its comprehensive duties, the Institute should have, according to the Commission, a governing board of seven members appointed by the Government and holding office for five years. There should be a staff including technical experts, a well-equipped experimental theatre, library and "cutting" room. They should also have an advisory body consisting of representatives of educational and scientific institutions, of representatives of film industry, of persons nominated and co-opted, and of representatives of self-governing Colonies and of India appointed by the Governments concerned, for advising and assisting with suggestions.

Every nation is seeking efficiency, and education as a means to it. The eye and the ear are the main approaches to the mind. The art of writing and printing had largely increased the matter that could reach the minds of the literate through the eye—and now with the mechanical devices that have given us the Movie, the Talkie and the Broadcast, comes the almost limitless expansion of experience through sight and sound.

Some apprehensions are beyond remedy. The belief has been, and in some measure persists, that the cinema is demoralising, that it relaxes the moral fibre, increases the habit of pleasure-seeking and saps the determination to do steady honest work ; that it develops expensive and unthrifty habits among the poor and that it increases crime. And there are those who take a pride in asserting that they have never, or very rarely, gone to the cinema. The evils attributed to the cinema are denied by experts and in any case seem exaggerated. Good or evil, it has come to stay, and the only question is how shall we use it so as to secure the greatest amount of good from it.

These apprehensions at least justify the desire for control and choice and the exclusion of undesirable films. Moralists are concerned with the health and the morality of the young and the immature. Nationalists are concerned not only with the obvious interests of national trade and industry but also with the no less important, if less palpable, interests of their distinctive culture to serve and preserve.

Purely educational and scientific films and films recording public events or embodying the best forms of national art will have little difficulty in securing international circulation, especially if an International Institute such as has been

set up by the League of Nations at Rome certifies to their fitness.

In regard to films other than educational in the wide sense, the lurking fear born of the nationalisms of the past does not seem to have disappeared. The Report speaks of Japan trying "vigilantly to protect her youth against the influence of Western films and compile a national film library showing the history, the traditions and social life of her people," of France taking steps "to protect all the national interests involved and in particular conserve her customs and traditions," of Italy seeking "to illustrate the greatness and destiny of Italy"—"each nation thus moulding this new force to the service of national ends".

These efforts at self-protection of even the advanced nations as against each other's films as a possible source of disturbance and danger to their cultural interest furnish food for reflection. Pure unmixed culture is a myth, even more so than pure unmixed race. Efforts to maintain both against the intrusion of foreign elements will nevertheless continue. There has been so much free commerce in thought that it would be difficult to settle definitely the ancestry or origin of all component elements of any culture. Nor is the distinctiveness of a culture or the value of a contribution to world-thought affected by the foreign origin of any component element so long as it has been assimilated and become integral to the culture that has taken it up. Exclusion may perhaps be justified as merely a protection of the immature and the unthinking from temporary phases of injurious imitation of foreign fashions. In a world which has become shrunk and small, with all fences destroyed, is it necessary to erect this wall of exclusion?

T. R. VENKATARAMA SASTRI

An English Treasury of Religious Prose. Selected and arranged by J. LEWIS MAY. (John Lane, The Bodley Head, Ltd. London. 5*s*.)

This *Treasury* falls only just within the definition of an Anthology. It partakes more, as the Compiler truly suggests, of the nature of a common-place book, and as such shows a wide acquaintance with the religious literature of England, the earliest excerpt being dated 627 A.D. Mr. May rightly feels that he should indicate to the reader what he means by the word "religious".

> Those, then, who like Blake look not *with* the eye but *through* it, whose gaze is not riveted to the world of sense, nor confined to the things of time . . . . those, I say, I should call religious.

We must further add that the writers of all the extracts were followers of the Christian religion, but there is no sectarianism shown in the selection, men of such widely different views as Cardinal Newman and C. H. Spurgeon both finding a place. No passage from a living author is included.

We wonder how many ordinary people in these days have read the sermons of Liddon, say, or even those of Cardinal Newman. *Grace Abounding*, by John Bunyan, must be a sealed book to the majority. Perchance if such take up this volume, they may be led to go to the original authors and read the extracts in their context. A vital difference between the compilation under review, and an anthology such as *The Oxford Book of English Verse*, lies in the fact that here an extract loses by being torn from its context, while a poem is, or ought to be, complete in itself.

The reader into whose hands this *Treasury* falls must decide for himself as to the value of the passages chosen. He cannot fail to be charmed by the literary beauty of many of them, but if the book is to fulfil what we take to be its mission, that is not enough. Personally we cannot feel in regard to *all* the selections, as Mr. May seems to feel, that they

> . . . will, to the thoughtful mind, furnish matter for meditation for at least one day, serving, perhaps, to shed a glow upon it; redeeming it from the petty and the commonplace.

T. L. C.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

[**A. E. Waite** is well-known for his many valuable books—veritable flames of old knowledge which are worth an exchange with more than one modern bulb. Every quarter he will give to our readers, the benefit of his researches and reading of the many periodicals containing matter of interest.—EDS.]

Current Spiritistic and Psychical Research is awaiting expectantly the views of the American S. P. R., on an alleged discovery that certain finger-prints, held to have been produced super-normally among other phenomena of the famous Margery mediumship, are not, as by him pretended, those of "Walter" himself, the control and deceased brother of Margery. They are now said to be impressions of a living person who was one of the sitters on a certain occasion when the prints of all present were taken as a supposed precaution, because finger-prints were promised at forthcoming séances. It does not appear that Mr. E. E. Dudley, who claims the discovery, is preferring a charge of fraud, except against "Walter" himself, and then it is by implication only. Margery—who is Mrs. L. R. G. Crandon, as all the world knows—is not accused of palming-off the impressions of a living hand as those of her brother, nor is any one else who belongs to the Boston circle. The palming-off, if any, is therefore the work of the control, and it has been pointed out acutely that in this manner "the charge only substitutes one miracle for another". Mr. Dudley's allegations were offered to the American Society for publication in its *Journal*,* but, having been declined thereby, they appeared in a special *Bulletin* of the Boston S. P. R. with corroborative reflections by Mr. Hereward Carrington and Mr. Arthur Goadby, both of them, like Mr. Dudley himself, being "well-known personalities" in American psychic activities. Most recently of all, a reputable Manchester weekly† devoted to Spiritism has been enabled to print in summary form a statement which it is proposed to publish in an early issue of the American S. P. R. *Journal*: it is to some extent an *avant-courier* of the promised Report on its investigations. It does not do more at the moment than (1) rebut a suggestion that the Society had a plan to suppress the question, (2) deny that it has any intention of delivering a verdict on the charge *per se*, or (3) do anything but "assemble, analyse and present . .

* *The Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*, together with its *Transactions*, enjoyed and deserved a similar repute to those of the English Society, throughout the period when they were in the care of Prof. Hyslop. He passed away some years since.

† *The Two Worlds*, Vol. XLV, p. 821. See also pp. 729, 807.

all the material evidence" bearing on the whole subject. Here is the case as it stands in mere outline, omitting suggestions of animus, easily exaggerated, on the part of the *Bulletin* towards the *Journal*, on the part of the *Journal* towards Mr. A. Goadby, and on the part of Dr. Crandon himself towards the Boston S.P.R. and its organ. All this is to be expected, and so are the animadversions and railleries of the general press about "a great setback" to Modern Spiritistic Research. It is to be observed that the best and oldest journal dedicated to the subject in Great Britain finds reason to hope that the promised Report "will provide conclusive new evidence" as to the connection of "Walter" with the finger-prints and will "add yet another chapter to the wonderful story of the Margery mediumship".* That will be excellent for those who are concerned, but it evades unintentionally the main points, which are not the authenticity of Mrs. Crandon's phenomena or the question whether her control produces super-normal finger-prints, but whether—on at least one occasion—he foisted on her circle as his own the impression of a living thumb.

We are reminded by Mr. J. Arthur Hill, who is of repute in psychical circles, that the Society for Psychical Research "was founded in 1882 by Prof. Henry Sidgwick, of Cambridge, and a group of scholarly and scientific friends". Its jubilee therefore was celebrated last year, but after what formal manner, if any, does not appear in his record.† We are told, however, in a few lucid pages, about the objects for which it stood at the beginning, the policy by which it had been characterised and something—under a few heads—of what has been achieved; as, for example, in collecting "evidence for telepathy between the living"; in the study and tabulation of 17,000 cases of psychical experience, obtained from people selected at random by means of a questionnaire; in the study of cross-correspondences, and so forth. As regards objects, they were and are the investigation of phenomena unrecognised by orthodox science; "but for which a certain amount of evidence seems to exist," including "suggestive therapeutics, dreams, multiple personality, and many other psychological things". The policy adopted is that of a Society which, as such, has no doctrines, is not propagandist, exists for investigation only and to ascertain the truth, if possible. For the rest, "its standard of evidence is high and it criticises severely," for which reason we are told, and know at full length otherwise, that it has been "anathematised by some spiritualists as a Society for Suppressing Knowledge". This, it should be explained, belongs rather to the old days, when some of us may re-

* *Light*, Vol. LII, p. 601. See also pp. 553, 564, 582.
† *The Nineteenth Century and After*, Vol. CXII, pp. 712-721.

member the occasional joyous utterances of *The Medium* and *Daybreak*, among other periodicals of the nineties. A glance at the latest issue of the Society's *Journal* would dissuade anyone from supposing now a disposition towards silence in respect of spiritistic phenomena. While assured on the one hand that "it is not concerned with proving anything," on the other it pronounces, however rarely, a considered verdict—for example, that "between deaths and apparitions of the dying person there exists a connexion which is not due to chance alone."* Mr. Hill, on his own part, would appear to hold (1) not alone that telepathy between the living calls for no further evidence but that "it points to communication from mind to mind rather than from brain to brain"; (2) that in this case it is not a physical process; (3) that the existence of the spiritual world is therefore established, with minds existing therein; and (4) that such minds "may continue to exist when they cease to manifest through brains in the present material order".† On the question of human survival he is guarded and looks round for alternate explanations; but (1) in a quoted case of scholarship, "going beyond the knowledge of the sensitive," it is admitted that the script produced "was certainly characteristic of the two (disembodied) minds which were claimed to be the senders";‡ and (2) as to life on the other side he is disposed to believe that conditions "are more like our own than has sometimes been supposed," as also that this "is what will eventually be established"§—namely, the proclaimed belief of Spiritism. Finally, Mr. Hill visualises an intriguing prospect for experiment to come, affirming that "at any moment there may be invented some psychical spectroscope which may reveal as much of the super-physical world as the material spectroscope revealed of the stellar bodies in the depths of space".¶ Some of us, who are old students of psychic and spiritistic subjects, will be wishing that they may see that day.

According to Prof. Eddington, "Science has had to make room for a spiritual conception of the universe and man's place on it"; and Mr. Hill, dwelling on the present trend of Psychical Research, affirms that this also is moving in the same direction, being a recognition of the universe as other than merely physical. It "extends beyond what is perceptible or measurable by physical processes". He goes on to assert the continued *post mortem* existence and progression of human minds towards "some high attainment unthinkably above our present station," adding that the "central point" of the Christian faith, which regards us as "children of the Great Spirit

* *The Nineteenth Century and After*, Vol. CXII, p. 714.
† *Ibid.* p. 713. ‡ *Ibid.* p. 719.
§ *Ibid.* p. 720. ¶ *Ibid.* p. 721.

who is our loving Father," is supported thereby. Some readers of these lines will remember that the British Medical Association met in August 1930, at Winnipeg; and it is on record that the Winnipeg Medical Society, connected with or arising out of the Manitoba Medical College, was active in making the arrangements for that important Congress. The President for the year in question was Dr. R. Rennie Swan, and in this capacity he delivered an address so far back as May 23rd of that year. It has become available in England only within recent days,* and is notable as a memorial of things that were thought and said on the threshold of the Association's Meeting. A generation since, or less, it would have been impossible for Dr. Swan or any other physician, however eminent, to have spoken at a Medical College on the subject of Immortality, unless indeed as a witness on the side of negation.

Dr. Swan, however, could offer to his audience a *Confessio Fidei* leading up to an affirmative testimony through considerations of the subject in its historical, scientific and psychical aspects, and taking as his keynote that "life may be tolerable if it is to end in sleep, but not if it is known to end in hopeless frustration and nothingness". It is not possible in a brief space to do more than select a few salient points, and they shall follow here in order.

(1) "The belief that human personality survives the dissolution of the body is neither confirmed nor discredited by science."† (2) "It is impossible to explain man in terms of flesh alone."‡ (3) "The real 'I' is something within, invisible, intangible imponderable, which directs, controls and governs this physical frame." (4) "Behind the thinking is the thinker." (5) "Man is a duplex being. Science must come, is coming to acknowledge it. He is a Spirit or Soul inhabiting a body."§ (6) "The most profound change in human thought . . . will, in all probability, follow the general recognition by Science of the immanence of a spiritual world."¶ (7) Regarding Psychical Research, it is added that when the slowly accumulating facts are recognised, "it will prove the continuity of life beyond the grave," and this is denominated "a noble mountain peak" of attainment.

On that altitude the *Confessio* ends by affirming that the fear of death will be replaced "by a wondering desire for the undiscovered country". These things are not cited because they lie all and utterly beyond challenge, but rather because, taken with their context, with the time and circumstance of their delivery, the place and the gathering, they furnish a not unremarkable testimony to the changing conception of the age on the relations between science and religion.

It is illustrated otherwise and vividly in records of fact and discovery, as in commentary thereupon. "The Turn of the Tide in Modern Science" is sketched graphically by Mr. J. E. Turner,**

* *Psychic Science*, Vol. XI, pp. 182-193. † *Ibid.* p. 186.
‡ *Ibid.* p. 187. § *Ibid.* p. 189. ¶ *Ibid.* p. 190.
** *The Contemporary Review*, No. 805, pp.72-79.

when he contrasts a forecast hazarded by Bertrand Russell in 1903, and now disproved radically by recent developments. Man was envisaged less than thirty years since as "the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving," and it was laid down unconditionally that the temple of his achievement was destined to be "buried beneath a universe in ruins". Now, on the contrary, it is possible to affirm that human personality is not merely "the climax of evolution, with limitless potentialities" but in kinship with "the Creative Intelligence". Mind is no longer an "accidental by-product of mechanical processes," while "the mechanisms of Nature" are not so foreign to intelligence as they appear at first sight to be. It will be observed, however, that the second point of the Russell contention remains untouched hereby, instead of "disproved radically". But it happens that Sir Francis Younghusband, discussing cosmic destiny,* offers an alternate hypothesis, namely, that, "co-extensive and coincident with the running down proclivity of this universe is a winding-up process, and that there is no final term to either". Here is another contribution at its value to the unending clash of speculation; and a few of us who, with Matthew Arnold, watch the strife, rather than share therein, may well afford to wait with open mind, content that the debate goes on. Even the "running down" theorists calculate many millions of years during which this one planet may continue to remain an abode for life. It follows that there is time and to spare for the bells of thought to ring all their changes. It may happen also that, in another form of symbolism, we may open another door, with a different kind of key, into the secrets of the universe, the secrets of the soul of man, their "glory of going on and still to be".

A. E. WAITE

THOUGHTS ON THE INDIAN SCIENCE CONGRESS

The Indian Science Congress held its twentieth session at Patna in the first week of January. Dr. L. L. Fermor of the Geological Survey of India was the President. There were nine Sections, the Congress had begun its career with only six. From the history of the Movement in India given in the Presidential Address we find that the Congress has from very modest beginnings grown into fairly large dimensions not only in respect of its numerical strength but also in respect of the magnitude of the output of work done. We are told, for instance, that while the published proceedings of the first session twenty years ago covered only 8 pages of print, those of the nineteenth session cover 467. During the present session the number of papers read seems to be even greater in some of the Sections. In the Chemistry Section, for example, Dr. P. Neogi told us that the number of papers read reached the record figure of 250. India has already her own niche in the temple of scientific fame.

* *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XXXI, pp. 161-175.

Practically all the Addresses delivered in the Congress stressed the economic and national side of the Movement in India. Some also drew attention to the cultural values and international bearings of such studies. This practical and applied aspect of the Indian Science Movement is as important as its purely theoretical and academic side. On the theoretical side, learned Societies and Journals and competent judges all over the world have approved the solid achievements of modern Indian investigators. The Raman Effect and Ghose's Law are but two notable examples out of many. The younger generation of Indian scientists have also made their mark, and the Proceedings of the Science Congress are an additional evidence that their mark bids fair to be a lasting one. It is not possible for me to make a critical survey of the wide field covered by these proceedings, save to remark that value and validity lie not so much in the results achieved as in the processes of achieving them. These latter are valuable even when no results have, apparently, been achieved.

Even a passing acquaintance with Indian Science cannot fail to make a deep impression on people with a serious turn of mind. The atmosphere of the laboratories and fields of scientific work in the India of to-day seems to be pulsating with a new stimulus and urge for original investigation. In the Upanishads we read of the Vessel of Mystery, the mouth of which is covered by a Lid of Gold, in which the Soul of Truth is hidden. The ancient seers prayed to the Effulgent One to remove the Lid and disclose to them the Truth. During the ages of comparative intellectual and spiritual torpor through which India has passed since the days of that Ancient Illumination, the Vase with the Golden Lid has been lost to the sight of many. The comparative stagnant placidity of India's intellectual life seems now to be stirred anew. The spirit of enquiry is abroad. The waves of awakened life are washing away the dust of centuries and rediscovering the Golden Lid. Increasing numbers are feeling the urge of the quest of truth. But the seekers must beware. The Vessel is one, but its reflections on the curved mirrors of Māyā are many. Instead of catching hold of the true Vase we may be running after alluring shadows. From the time of Bacon Europe has turned away from the true Vase of Gold. The result has been a phenomenal success in matter-knowledge and matter-control. But it is being borne on the West that its knowledge is after all the knowledge of illusion, and its control the control of a phantom that ensnares and enslaves. The Indian mind, with its profound background of wisdom, should not fail to exercise discriminating judgment when as now it joins in the quest of the Golden Vase. Even in the pursuit of objective science it must not forget and despise the legacy of its ancient philosophy and mysticism. That philosophy and mysticism may be helpful to-day in a variety of ways. They will show in a proper perspective the relative and intrinsic values of the objective and other studies and disciplines and their achievements. For, this question of value is even more fundamental than that of validity. In a sense, value constitutes validity. And value, as ancient Indian wisdom teaches, has an hierarchy ranging from ordinary material good to the supreme good of *Moksha*.

Science, as many of the Presidential addresses at Patna observed, cannot but be inspired by utilitarian aims. But do, or should, such aims include nothing but the production of material benefits? Must not Science look up to higher things and probe deeper? In the old Indian works on Medicine, Astrology or even Philology we find a preamble stating not only the immediate but also the ultimate purpose for which science has to be cultivated; and the ultimate object in every case is the attainment of Perfection. A certain kind of moral and spiritual discipline is accordingly enjoined for the benefit of the would-be votary of that science: not only for his benefit but for that of the community in

general. This is true and really serviceable utilitarianism. Science in the West has deliberately divorced itself from this moral, spiritual, cosmopolitan utilitarianism. It has not consciously set before itself the purpose of all-round beneficence. The result has been abysmal disharmony and distress. The ethical and spiritual neutrality of modern science has spelled disaster. India should not copy the West here. The old Indian plan was never to lose touch with the Centre; never to bar ethical and spiritual issues as irrelevant or inconsequential.

The Proceedings of this Congress also strike one as being encouraging in the sense that Indian investigators in their researches and experiments are trying to keep in touch with the latest advances. The Raman Effect and Raman Spectra are for instance some of the latest achievements. And we are told how the Raman Spectra are being utilised here for unravelling the mysteries of molecular structures. The debt of Chemistry to Optics has been great and it is now perceived that following this line Chemistry will probably find the clue leading to matter-constitution.

The President of the Physics Section summarized the position on the relationship of Matter and Radiation, and we find that the modern conception of matter-structure is being steadily and solidly reared upon the basis of the fundamental sciences of Mathematics and Physics. Dr. Stewart of the Healing Art Section raises some grave issues for the consideration of those who are glamoured by the modern craze for birth control.

I have taken a few of the topics discussed at random.

As regards India, one cannot help putting certain questions to oneself. First, is not any helpful and inspiring light to be gleaned from her Ancient Illumination for the many problems on the cosmic situation which Science is trying to understand and appreciate? We do not mean the problems commonly relegated to the realm of Philosophy. Have not the so-called myths and parables of the ancients any sense, any meaning for us scientifically? While the laboratory and field method of scientific enquiry is good and must be pursued, is it not time we recognised and re-understood another and profounder method which was called Yoga Method in India? Is ancient Indian culture so dead that we can have from the science point of view nought but a *post mortem* interest in it?

Lastly, in assessing the economic, national and cultural values of the scientific activities, we should never forget the central fact that, in the absence of adequate moral and spiritual balances and safeguards, such activities have been productive of both good and evil, actual and potential. It is likely that the evil will tend to overweigh the good unless the requisite balances and safeguards are now provided. India's appalling poverty demands of course a scientific development and utilisation of her material resources. But the process must be part of a complete process of Indian Self-realisation perfecting both its material and spiritual "moments".

PRAMATHANATH MUKHOPADHYAYA

A CORRECTION

I read with interest the review you published of "Youth looks at Religion," [ARYAN PATH, Jany. 1933, p. 59] a book to which I contributed an essay. But there was one mistake your reviewer made. He said that two of the writers are Roman Catholics; and it is clear from his critique that he thought I was one of them. He is wrong. Miss Lowndes is the only Roman Catholic. I, myself, am an Anglican and it is therefore confusing if my essay is considered to be the result of the schooling that one expects in the case of Roman Catholics. Your reviewer said of the "two Roman Catholics," "they have no doubts". I have always thought that doubt as well as faith is the very stuff of religion.

London PETER WINCKWORTH

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"————————*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

Every time one thinks judicially, examining all sides, the way of the vivisectionist reveals itself to be bad and ugly. It finds no recommendation either from the pure moralist or the true philosopher; and the social servant, who has zealous eye for the public health, finds it increasingly difficult to praise the system when he is face to face with its results, as he encounters them in his labour of love day by day. Even on the basis of a crass materialistic philosophy of morals, the painful treatment—if we may not call it ghastly cruelty—meted out to animals cannot but be pronounced wrong. Granting that among the ranks of the vivisectionists are some researchers who experiment on animals with as much kindness for the speechless as they can muster, and do that with the good motive of alleviating human bodily pain, the cumulative result of their work does not justify the methods. But the evils of the vivisection system cannot really be fought, nor can the system itself be overthrown, as long as the wilderness of confused thinking, of which it is a part, is left untouched. Vivisection in itself is but a department of a larger system which Bernard Shaw characterizes as Doctors' Delusions. Among their numerous objectionable features vivisection is but one delusion, revolting to the sense and sensibility of truly refined people. The most progressive anti-vivisectionists, like Miss Lind-af-Hageby, recognize this, as is once more clear from the latest issue of her quarterly, *Progress To-day*. Not only does it attack the crimes of vivisection and the cruelty to animals but it also constructively tries to bring some help and light concerning the body and its health. In one of the short articles Dr. J. Stenson Hooker, M.D., sums up:

> We need a newer practice of Medicine, a newer order of doctors altogether, a fresh conception of disease and its management, a clean, harmless, purifying way of coping with all ill-health, the roping together of all the splendid things therapeutical still unknown to so many doctors, even newer ways of administrating State and Official Medicine—surely all this would play a part in the making for a goal that is good and an end which is almost divine.

Last October writing in this journal on "The Danger of Scientific Dogmatism" Henry Pratt Fairchild, Professor of Sociology at New York University, who is associated with many movements for social betterment, said:

> There has been a tremendous advance in the last few decades in the science of bio-chemistry, bacteriology, anatomy,

etc. Young physicians trained in the best medical schools are admirably equipped with this type of knowledge. But they are woefully deficient in the comprehension of the human personality. They are inclined to disregard the fact that human beings are not, and cannot be, standardized. The typical modern hospital is likely to handle its patients as if they were uniform lumps of matter that must respond in a given way to a given routine treatment. If they fail to display the expected response, it is too bad, but it is really their fault, and there is nothing to be done about it. Scientific medical knowledge is an invaluable equipment for the practitioner, but it is ineffectual and even dangerous if it is not complemented by a sympathy, comprehension, and intuition that rise above science.

But this is nothing new. Many years ago Bernard Shaw tried to save the doctors from their dilemma—in vain. Only the other day in Bombay he objected to his book being called a satire.

It is not a satire. It is a description of the actual situation regarding the medical profession. And the situation has become much worse since I wrote the book. I still hold the same views without any modification.

The three chief determinants of the health of the body are nourishment, exercise and sleep. The views of the old Esoteric Philosopy about them are radically different from those obtaining to-day, though both ancient and modern schools agree that prevention of disease is better than cure. These three indeed are master-preventives and their proper use would save our humanity from numerous ills; but that proper use itself depends upon the philosophy by which each individual lives his life. The modern doctor's preventives are injections which make of the body a veritable hospital, wherein more than one organ is under treatment. The materialist-psychologist advocates "no repression" *i. e.* indulgence, and soon the body becomes a menagerie where more than one beast growls for blood.

Another kind of danger lurks in the numerous systems of healing in which thought and prayer are used. Theosophy warns against these also, explaining that they do not effect true and permanent cures but in reality only transplant the seeds of diseases for future harvest. The most promising line of advance is what is generally called Nature Cure, in which the elements of earth, water, air, fire and light (*prithivi*, *apas*, *vayu*, *agni*, and *akasha* in Hindu nomenclature) are utilized. But even this method will not fully succeed unless the implications in this connection of St. Paul's statement are recognized: "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God and that the spirit of God dwelleth in you?" Nourishment, exercise and sleep must be studied as body-builders, and that body be recognised as the dwelling place of its Maker, the Soul.