



Point out the " Way "—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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RENASCENT MYSTICISM

The world needs no sectarian church, whether of Buddha, Jesus, Mahomet, Swedenborg, Calvin or any other. There being but ONE Truth, man requires but one church—the Temple of God within us, walled in by matter but penetrable by any one who can find the way ; *the pure in heart see God.*

The trinity of nature is the lock of magic, the trinity of man the key that fits it. Within the solemn precincts of the sanctuary the SUPREME had and has no name. It is unthinkable and unpronounceable ; and yet every man finds in himself his god.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY

The present recrudescence of sacerdotalism in the West would be a depressing phenomenon were it not for the simultaneous resurgence of Eastern Mysticism which is taking place. That large numbers of people are seeking for a way of life which may be called religious, in the broad sense, is evident from the article of Mr. C. E. M. Joad which we print below. Other contributions in this number, as well as the reviews, show that thoughtful people are sick and tired of sectarian creeds. What most sincere minds are looking for is some psycho-philosophy on which they can build their individual inner lives. Neither blind belief in relig-

ious dogmas nor acceptance of the shifting theories of modern science appeals to the thoughtful ; nor are they drawn to the sweetness and light of ethical ideals. What thinking people desire is some virile code of practical mental discipline which would satisfy the reason as well as the yearning of consciousness ; they are tired of empty ritualism and prayers to a far-away Deity as of the masses of knowledge of the vast universe which relieve not the anguish of brain and blood ; they want to feel devotion to something real which they sense to be deep down in their own hearts, and they want to feel this not vaguely and gropingly but with un-

derstanding and enlightenment.

The excitement with which Aldous Huxley's *Ends and Means* is acclaimed is a sign that many thoughtful Occidentals are looking for the Eastern mystical discipline of life. To us the volume is significant, not only because of its virile and very practical message of Detachment and Dispassion of the type taught by such Indian sages as Krishna and Buddha, but also because of the psychological inner conversion of Mr. Huxley. *Ends and Means* is a chronicle of this conversion. We publish elsewhere a review by Mr. D. L. Murray, whose estimate of the volume is different from ours; we put its worth very much higher. The Oriental point of view regarding the volume will be presented by us a little later. Here we

want to make the point that the time is ripe, and many in the Western world are ready, for the acceptance of Eastern mystical doctrines. Hindu philosophers and practising mystics have a duty to perform; instead of obediently following the Western savants as the former do or leaving them alone as the latter do, they should give a lead with a straightforward presentation of Eastern thought. Not philological but philosophical, not speculative but practical ideas are required; the soul-satisfying teachings of the Aryans are needed. Such is our conviction in which we are borne out by the essays and reviews which we have arranged for presentation in this number of our magazine.

RELIGION IN THE WEST

THE NEED AND THE REASON FOR IT

The present position of religion in the West is peculiar. On the one hand, the influence of the official religion of Western civilization, Christianity, continues to decline. In Great Britain, for example, the power of the churches has been for many years diminishing and there are no signs of recovery. Candidates for the ministry fall off, congregations melt away, the number of young persons attending Sunday schools for religious teaching

grows fewer every year. A visitor to a large town church will find it more than two-thirds empty, while the little church I attended last Sunday in the village where I live in the country contained a congregation of only four persons. Those who do attend include an abnormal proportion of old people and of women. (The last time I went to a city church I counted the number both of men and of women in the congregation, and

found that the latter outnumbered the former by five to one.) As to the old people, they are survivals from an earlier and more orthodox age when the Church still played an important part in the social and religious life of the community. The younger have not followed in the tradition of their elders, with the result that the army of the Church Militant suffers wastage without attracting recruits. As the flock grows smaller the shepherds grow fewer. Preaching in Westminster Abbey, Dr. Barnes, the Bishop of Birmingham, told his congregation in the autumn of last year, "No church can get an adequate supply of men of the right type to enter its ministry". "In our secondary and elementary schools", he went on, "the number of teachers of either sex able and willing to give religious instruction is diminishing". He concluded by expressing the fear that within a few years' time, if present tendencies continue, religious instruction in the schools might cease altogether through the inability of the churches to find suitable persons to give it.

One of the causes of the diminishing influence of the official religion is to be found in doctrinal controversies within the Church. Part of the structure of the traditional Christian faith related to matters which fall within the province of modern science. To anybody who reads the Christian Bible with an unprejudiced eye it is evident that its doctrines are based upon and are relevant to the scientific ideas prevailing at the various periods when it was written. It is even possible to trace an advance in the science as in

the morals of the Bible from the Old Testament to the New. Now the scientific ideas of 2,000 years ago have been superseded, with the result that the teaching of the Scriptures in these matters is now definitely untrue;—for example, the astronomical doctrine of the solid heaven and the stable earth, the geographical doctrine of a heaven above and a hell beneath, the physiological doctrine that a substance called the soul leaves the body at death, the chemical doctrine that bread and wine can be changed into substances of a different order by special processes. The result is that young men now growing to maturity are faced with a choice between what science backed by their own experience assures them to be true, and what the teaching of the traditional religion requires them to believe. Faced by this forced alternative, increasingly they choose the former. The fact that the matters in question have nothing whatever to do with the real content of religion which, belonging, as it does to the spiritual world, is independent of geography, physiology and chemistry, is not to the point. What is to the point is that part of the Church still insists upon the literal truth of the Christian Bible, refuses to abandon any part of the traditional teaching of the Christian religion, and consequently retains the obsolete science together with the spiritual truths. The modern Westerner, compelled to reject the obsolete science, throws out the baby with the bath water and forgets the spiritual truths.

I say "part of the Church" because another part, the part more particularly associated with the

modernist movement, deliberately jettisons whatever is repugnant to the modern Westerner's matter-of-fact attitude to the world. Modernism, for example, cheerfully abandons stories such as those of the Flood, Jonah and the Whale, the account of the Creation given in the first chapter of Genesis, and even the miracles of Christ. Thus Bishop Barnes in the sermon referred to above spoke of a "recent commentary on the Bible, in which Bishop Gore's influence has been paramount, which concedes evolution and seeks to retain miracles". The concession, which virtually no one disputes, undermines that authority of the Bible, on which the whole Anglican position is built". But if the authority of the Bible is to be undermined what need is there, Bishop Barnes goes on, to retain the miracles? He concludes there is no reason, commenting that "the vast majority of living Churchmen who have felt the influence of scientific method find miracles no aid to faith". Few Churchmen would go as far as Bishop Barnes. Hence arises controversy within the Church, controversy touching dogma, doctrine, ritual and policy, which further discredits in the eyes of the layman a body which can neither compose nor conceal its own differences.

Such is one side of the picture. And the other? Though the bishops quarrel and the congregations fade away, though the churches are seen to stand for little more than a system of tradition eroded by time, though men in increasing numbers refuse to subscribe to orthodox beliefs, the part which religion has played in man's life is far from being finished. There

are signs indeed that it is taking a new lease of life. The number of books on theology published last year was a record. Discussion of the fundamental questions with which religion deals is more frequent and vigorous than ever before. Five years ago our young men were talking economics and politics. To-day they are talking politics and religion. The Press, an admirable pointer to the tendencies of the times, has in recent years devoted an increasing amount of space to the discussion of religious topics. Under such titles as "Is there a Soul?"; "Where are the dead?"; "What I Believe", fundamental religious issues are eagerly canvassed, and leading novelists are invited to express their views on themes that belong to theological and philosophical discussion.

The fact is not surprising. Most men have a need to believe. They like to be told what to think and what to do. That is why the Church and the Army have been in the West their two most popular institutions. Most men lack the courage to gaze into pain, evil, death and the deserts beyond death with their own eyes. They need to look through the dim and misty glass of legend and dogma. The average mind, like a creeping plant, demands a support to which it may cling and upon which it may grow, and finding it embraces it with fierce intensity. The discomfort occasioned by the absence of such a support is none the less keen because its source is seldom realized. Most men, I repeat, have a need to believe; and in all previous ages in the West the traditional creed has satisfied the need. The modern age is peculiar in

that the support which the traditional creed affords is no longer such as to sustain the weight of the contemporary mind. Coming to us from the remote past it is simple in structure, unsure in its foundations and ill adapted to the complexities of the modern intellect. Consequently for the first time in hundreds of years a generation of men and women has grown to maturity without religious belief. Unless we are to suppose that this is a generation of biological "sports" in the sense that it is without a characteristic which all its predecessors have possessed, we must deduce that the need exists but is suppressed, and, being suppressed, will find expression through a variety of surprising outlets. Nature abhors a vacuum in the spiritual world no less than in the physical, and a host of religious substitutes springs up to take the place of religion. There is Spiritualism, there is Christian Science, there is the Oxford Group Movement. All these in their different ways may be regarded as makeshifts designed to satisfy the need to believe which the traditional religion has failed to satisfy.

More important are the *political* effects of the decline of religious belief. As the God above the clouds grows increasingly dim, the demand for a human substitute grows increasingly powerful. In the Dictatorship States the leaders are coming increasingly to be invested with quasi-divine attributes. "Hitler is lonely, so is God. Hitler is like God", is a quotation from a speech by one of the Nazi ministers. At an Art Exhibition recently held in Munich a picture of

Herr Hitler speaking at a meeting prior to the assumption of power by the Nazi Government was entitled, "In the Beginning was the Word..." Like God, the dictator is invested with infallible attributes. "Justice is Hitler's will"; "What Mussolini decrees is right"; "Stalin knows what is best for his children". Such statements are indicative at once of the need which the masses of modern Western civilization feel for worship and of their willingness in the present twilight of religion to accept substitutes in human guise for the deity they have lost. There are many causes for the modern worship of the State and the modern religion of nationalism; some are economic, some are political; but one of the most important is the decline of official religion in the Western world, coupled with the persistence of the need to believe.

I have mentioned so far only the surface manifestations of this deep-seated need, manifestations which, in the absence of religion, take the form of the acceptance of religious substitutes. Two causes are, however, at work in the West which may lead to a real religious renaissance. The first is the manifest movement of the Western world in the direction of decivilization. There is to-day a palpable decline in the traditional humanistic virtues of the West, humanity, kindness, charity, the respect for individual personality and the concession of individual freedom; there is correspondingly a definite reversion to the values and to the behaviour which Europe was thought to have left behind with the Middle Ages. War is preached as

a good ; the right of nations to expand, of individuals to impose their wills upon other individuals is everywhere proclaimed. Superior force is accepted as at once a criterion of merit and an arbiter of disputes. The destruction from the air of defenceless towns, such as Guernica scarcely stirs the blunted sensibilities of a civilization which, forty years ago, would have risen in righteous indignation to denounce the perpetrators of what it would not have hesitated to call a crime. The Howard League for Penal Reform comments in its report of 1937 upon the growing use of torture to intimidate opponents and to extract forced confessions from prisoners.

Humanism is not, then, as we had thought, sufficient to restrain the savage in man ; it would need, it would seem, to be backed by religion. When it is remembered that the code of ethics which is increasingly set at nought is precisely that preached by Christ and Buddha over two thousand years ago, a code to which the Western world is committed by the religion which it officially accepts, it is difficult for the thoughtful Westerner to avoid the conclusion that it is not because religion has failed, but because it is not being practised, that the Western world has reached its present impasse. Hence a renewed attempt to live according to the way of life which all the great religious teachers have enjoined appears to an increasing number of individuals to be the only way of salvation, not only for their own souls, but for the civilization to which they belong. The success of the Peace Pledge Union, from whose members

there is required a refusal to take part in violence of any kind, is a straw which shows the way in which the wind is blowing. This movement takes on the semblance of a crusade and attracts its adherents by the thousand.

In the second place, there is a growing recognition that science has not said the last word with regard to the constitution of the universe. This recognition is bound up with the decline of materialist science. Under the influence of nineteenth century science physicists were dominated by the notion that to be real a thing must be of the same nature as a piece of matter. Matter was something lying out there in space. It was hard, simple and obvious ; indubitably it was real, and as such calculated to form an admirable foundation upon which the horse sense of the practical man could base his irrefragable convictions. Now matter was something which one could see and touch. It followed that whatever else was real must be of the same nature as that which one could theoretically see and touch. Hence, to enquire into the nature of the things we saw and touched, to analyse them into their elements and atoms, was to deal directly with reality : to apprehend values or to enjoy religious experience was to wander in a world of shadows. Common sense, under the influence of science, took the same view ; to use the eye of the body to view the physical world, was to acquaint oneself with what was real ; to use that of the soul to see visions was to become the victim of illusion. And the views of the universe to which the visions led had, it was

urged, no objective reality.

To-day the foundation for this whole way of thinking, the hard, obvious, simple lumps of matter, has disappeared. Modern matter is something infinitely attenuated and elusive ; it is a hump in space time, a "mush" of electricity, "a wave of probability and undulating into nothingness" ; frequently it is not matter at all but a projection of the consciousness of its perceiver. So mysterious, indeed, has it become, that the modern tendency to explain things in terms of mind is little more than a preference for explanation in terms of the less unknown rather than of the more.

The imaginative conception of reality no longer being limited by likeness to the things we can see or touch, there is room for wider views. Value, for example, may be real, and so may be the objects of the ethical and the religious consciousness. Hence, there is now no need for those who accept the results of the physical sciences to write off, as they had once to write off, as subjective illusions, the experience of religion and the promptings of the moral and the æsthetic sides of their natures ; the nineteenth century gulf between science and religion is in a fair way to being bridged and the way is open to a reconsideration of the religious interpretation of the universe on its merits.

If there is more in the universe than the matter which physics seeks to analyse, if there are modes of being

other than the physical, of causation other than the mechanical, the question arises, by what methods are we to achieve contact with the "more", to realize the modes ? To this question there is one answer which, continuously urged in the East, has been neglected for centuries in the West. It is that the ultimate reality of the world is spiritual ; that with this reality we are continuous ; that of it our real selves are expressions ; and that by the cultivation of a suitable psychological technique we can achieve contact with it by realizing our true selves. The technique is briefly that which the mystics have followed. Hence arises a new interest in mysticism, and a cultivation of the self along the lines which the mystics have enjoined, in order that it may escape from the bondage of desire and the prison of the physical world to achieve communion with the reality which is at once behind the physical world and within the self. Of this new interest Aldous Huxley's book, *Ends and Means*, is one manifestation. What it indicates is a movement in the direction of a religion which accepts the spiritual reality of the universe as its basis, but which does not personalize that reality into a God, and which calls men to psychological discipline and a particular mode of life, not only in order that they may achieve salvation for themselves but in order that they may also salvage their declining civilization.

C. E. M. JOAD

EXCLUSIVE CHRISTIANITY

EMIL BRUNNER OR NICOLAS BERDYAEV

[K. S. Shelvankar is a Hindu who has made London his home ; he is a journalist by profession. In this article he describes two main schools of Christian thought represented by Brunner and by Berdyaev, which might be called theological and mystical. Both these writers refuse the aid of Eastern culture in their struggle "back to religion" meaning "back to Christianity".—Eds.]

Emil Brunner, Professor of Systematic Theology in the University of Zurich, and Nicolas Berdyaev, Head of the Institute of Religion in Paris, are among the leading influences in Western Europe striving to bring about a revival of religion. It may be of some interest, therefore, to compare the different angles from which they approach the problem and the relative validity of the philosophies they uphold.

Common to both is the conviction shared by all keen observers that the tragic and sanguinary upheavals of the present age are but symptoms of a profound maladjustment in the spiritual consciousness of the nations, and that effective remedies can be found only in the direction of a religious re-orientation. Berdyaev and Brunner, like the rest of us, have been driven back to a consideration of first principles. Brunner was a young man when the War broke out, while Berdyaev has behind him a long life of thought and activity, the earlier phases of which were shaped by the Social-Democratic movement in Russia and the struggle against Tsarism. His mind has thus acquired a richness and a flexibility, an awareness of the relevance of the historical process, such as one misses in the drier and more scholastic writings of the Swiss theologian.

Not only Berdyaev's complex experience but also his intellectual ancestry—if one may use the phrase—and his spiritual affiliations account for the differences we shall find between him and Brunner. Plato and Marx, Hegel, Baader, Boehme and Solovyov are the men to whom he would perhaps acknowledge the greatest indebtedness, while the Greek Orthodox Church, which nursed him in infancy and endured his apostasy for a period, has now received him back into her bosom.

Brunner, on the other hand, was born and brought up in a strictly Lutheran *milieu*, involuntarily absorbing the strength as well as the narrow limitations of the dogmatic heritage in the name of which the Reformers broke away from the Roman Church in the sixteenth century. St. Paul and St. Augustine, Luther and Calvin, Melanchthon and Zwingli—these are the sources at which he has drunk, the fountain heads of the purified doctrine which he considers essential for the revitalisation of human life.

It is implicit in what I have said about these two men that the fundamental basis of their outlook is Christianity. To-day more than ever the religious treasures of the East are accessible to Europeans and one might have hoped that all forward-

looking persons would collaborate in the task of building up a truly œcumenical culture. Though neither Brunner nor Berdyaev can be said to be totally unaware of the spiritual content of the great Asiatic religions,* they are at one in dismissing it in perfunctory passages and footnotes. This "regression into Christianity"—admittedly the phrase is possible only to a writer standing outside the various Christian confessions—is in itself a significant aspect of the present state of Europe, and is unfortunately co-extensive with the movement "back to religion".† It is essential to discriminate between the different forms this movement takes if we are to arrive at a just evaluation of it.

The Protestant Churches of Europe and America have been profoundly affected by the rise of the new theology, but we cannot help wondering whether its influence will in the long run make for an increase of true spirituality. For the whole aim and tendency of this theology is to combat precisely those currents in European culture which have broadened and deepened the religious consciousness. A hundred years ago—not uninfluenced by Eastern philosophy, which was being rediscovered by Europe about that time—Schleiermacher developed a view of religion which little by little attained almost universal recognition, a view which shifted the emphasis from dogma to experience, from external authority to

inward recognition of the reality of the spirit.‡ Now Schleiermacher has become "the enemy"; once more the emphasis is being transferred to authority and dogma; and the categories of Grace, Faith, Revelation and Redemption which the genius of Schleiermacher had tried to interpret in terms applicable to the common experience of all civilised races, are being reinvested with the rigidity and exclusiveness they formerly possessed, as the attributes of Christianity and Christianity alone.

The elaborate criticism of all idealist and rational philosophers which Brunner has carried out in order to clear the ground for his defence of the pristine purity of Protestant dogma cannot be traversed within the limits of this article, but we must briefly examine the critical "moments" (in the Hegelian sense) of the teaching which he and the other "dialectical theologians"§ are championing to-day.

In many respects, the category of Revelation forms the corner-stone of this teaching. Christianity is the religion of the Word of God—therein lies its supreme distinction. For, Brunner contends, neither Nature, nor time, nor race, is a vehicle of revelation. It is no doubt *in* Nature, time and space, and among the members of a particular social group that Revelation occurs, but it occurs in these circumstances only as an expression of God's abounding love for

* Berdyaev has a long chapter on Theosophy in one of his major works, *Freedom and Spirit*, which is well worth our attention.

† There is no such thing as the "common essence" of all religions, declares Brunner in his *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 109.

‡ "The true nature of religion is immediate consciousness of the Deity as He is found in ourselves and in the world." (Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, p. 101).

§ Karl Barth, Thurneysen and others.

mankind abruptly manifesting itself, abruptly tearing asunder the uniformity and continuity of Nature. It has not been prepared for, or merited; it is not the culmination of a process within Nature—it is the intrusion, the wholly voluntary intrusion of a Power external to Nature. Its peculiar paradox consists in the fact that although, as an event, it has its place in the sequence of days and nights, there are no antecedent temporal occurrences in any way related to it. God hath spoken to Man: He hath spoken to Man at a definite point in the stream of history; but it is God, a Being synonymous with Eternity, who spoke to Man at that specific moment. The idea that the Revelation was given at a precise date and that it was given by one who stands outside History are both cardinal to the view of Revelation advocated by Brunner.* The Bible is the physical testimony to this miraculous Event. Not itself the Word of God, it is the Witness of those who did hear the Word, the persons to whom Revelation was vouchsafed.

The philosophical and religious implications of this position are obvious. It constitutes a radical rejection of every suggestion of Immanentism. God is wholly other, *totaliter aliter*. The gulf between Him and Nature or Man is immeasurable. "I have always been impressed", says Brunner, "by Kierkegaard's insistence on *the infinitely qualitative difference*

between time and eternity". Hence, between the divine and the human, as well. Religious experience, the spiritual aspirations of man, the imperatives of Love and Truth—all these, in the last analysis, are and can be *merely* human: they signify nothing that could be described as pathways to God. There are, indeed, no pathways to God; and man, being completely alienated from divinity, is incapable by definition of taking even the first steps towards Him.† He can but abide the hour when God, in His infinite mercy, will claim him as His own. Meanwhile, he must make an act of absolute self-surrender, of Faith; and Faith, as Calvin said, consists of Confidence, Knowledge and Assent. There can never be any assurance that one has this Faith.‡

There is a certain quality about such teaching that can be described only as spiritual bleakness. When we have threaded the intricate labyrinths of argument and erudition, all that remains is this: Salvation only through the Grace of God, accorded to those who have Faith in Jesus Christ. That is why it is so refreshing to turn to a thinker of the type of Berdyaev whose appreciation of the significance of Jesus Christ is no less profound than Brunner's but who is nevertheless able to rise above narrow sectarianism.

As against the view that Revelation is a definite, concrete historical occurrence, Berdyaev holds that

*"Either the Cross actually stood on Golgotha, 'which we have seen and our hands have handled', or our faith in Christ is a beautiful phantasy". (Brunner, *God and Man*, p. 123.)

† It would take us too long to examine the doctrine of the *imago dei*, which seeks to solve the difficulties inherent in this problem.

‡ "What Faith is no one knows save he who knows himself addressed by the Word of God; there is no other knowledge about faith." (Brunner, *God and Man*, p. 112.)

Revelation takes place wherever the divine is manifested.*

The traditional distinction between revealed and natural religion is exoteric and not very profound. Every religion in which we can see a measure of divine illumination is a revealed religion.†

This is not to say, indeed, that Christianity has no distinctive character of its own: the personality of Christ is its unique contribution; but the "religious positivism" which would identify Revelation with some particular event or creed is false. Berdyaev even goes to the length of asserting that "the real depths of the spiritual life are not revealed in traditional Christianity, for spirit is opposed to race and racial customs."‡

Underlying this doctrine of Revelation, there is a view of the relation between God and Man, Spirit and Nature, which distinguishes Berdyaev's position sharply from the newer Protestantism. It involves neither transcendentalism nor immanentism, but a mystical union of the two, which can be apprehended only in the spiritual life.

Man is at once an earthly and heavenly, a natural and supernatural and spiritual being; in him two worlds meet. Spirituality and the spiritual life are inherent in human nature in so far as it is the image of the divine. Spiritual

life and spirit are immanent in man and not transcendent.§

If, then, the basic and original characteristic of the spiritual world is that it represents the meeting-place of divine and human nature, all monophysite theories which stress either of these two factors to the exclusion of the other are, in truth, heresy. And Christianity is preëminent, is in a sense the only religion, because it alone conceives of this unity in living terms, as embodied in the person of Jesus. "The mystery of the eternal life of the two natures is the mystery of Christ, the God-Man."** Looked at in this way the life of Christ is the symbol of the interpenetration of God and Man; and it is that Life, rather than the Protestant "Word", which is potent for good in the world. The "theandric humanity of Christ" is the key to true understanding, declares Berdyaev; and we who strive for spirituality must reconstruct within ourselves that mystic union, not by Faith or the intellect alone but with the whole of our being. For "salvation" means not "justification" but sanctification, the acquiring of perfection.

The application of these metaphysical and theological ideas to questions of ethics and social

* "Revelation is always a revelation of meaning and does not consist of outward events in themselves apart from a spiritual interpretation." (Berdyaev, *Freedom and Spirit*, p. 94.)

† "Where revelation is concerned there is no distinction between that which comes from without and that which comes from within, between that which emanates from the object and that which proceeds from the knowing subject. . . . Revelation cannot be regarded either as entirely transcendental or entirely immanent, for it is both, or rather neither, for the distinction between transcendent and immanent is a purely secondary one." (Berdyaev, *Freedom and Spirit*, pp. 88, 91.)

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

** Berdyaev has worked out a most interesting theory of symbolism and myth which is too often overlooked.

organisation has likewise engaged the attention of both Berdyaev and Brunner. Whereas to Brunner social institutions and the process of history are of no intrinsic importance—pertaining as they do merely to the realm of “Nature”—to Berdyaev

they represent the sphere wherein the Spirit is active and therefore call for the most earnest consideration. His own belief is that socialism, though not necessarily of the Marxian variety, is the *régime* best suited to the exigencies of religion in our time.

K. S. SHELVANKAR

THEISM PLUS HUMANISM

[While both the ways of reform suggested in the above article are sectarian, in the following a broader note is heard. But it is still a note from the church organ struck by Dean Paul E. Johnson of Morningside College of Sioux City, Iowa, U.S.A.—EDS.]

Religion is in conflict. Not a new rôle for religion in human history. “Our souls are restless”, as Augustine confessed, and this eternal restlessness of religion has made it a storm centre in virtually every age. Our own day is no exception. The place of religion may not be altogether secure in the modern world, as some of its opponents believe, but at any rate religion is a major issue among the conflicts that swirl about us to-day.

Not every one agrees on the exact location of the religious conflict. Current discussions come to controversy over clashes between fundamentalism and modernism, evolutionary science and religion. We have witnessed skirmishes drawn across pulpits, forums, magazines, and court-houses. But deeper than any of these is the conflict between humanism and theism. In the arenas of every culture the conflict rages between the divine and the human in belief, worship and conduct.

There have ever been two aims in religion which face like two-faced

Janus in opposite directions. Unmeasured treasures of thought, life and economic goods have been invested over and again in religion. To what end? Why the tireless pressing on in the religious quest? Historically religion has often appeared as a human search for divine good. This is the motive of sacrifice where every form of human good has at one time or another been relinquished to God. The tragic terror of human sacrifice shows the length to which man has been willing to go to reach divine blessing. At other times religion has appeared as a divine search for human good. The most impressive note in the early Christian theology was that “God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son”—the suffering of God in the humiliation of the cross for man’s redemption.

In modern setting the contest of God and man is evident in religious creeds. The Apostles’ Creed begins: “I believe in God”. But there are many who ask: why is it necessary to believe in God to be religious?

Theists reply that the essential meaning of religion is reverence to God, and that without God one is not justified in calling his experience religious. But humanists declare that they can be religious without God. "I believe in man" is their full religious obligation. Again we may note the place of God and man in prayer. Public worship is usually either objective or subjective. In the so-called "high churches" prayers, rituals, hymns and anthems are directed to God as the object of united attention, praise and petition. In the so-called "low churches" the entire service of music, scripture and sermon is directed to man for his instruction, entertainment or inspiration. Likewise, in private prayer there is the question: does my petition actually reach God, or is it merely meditation with my own thoughts whose quieting effect has subjective value? Similar conflict appears in religious views of salvation. Evangelical orders seek salvation from God, minimizing the goodness of natural man and depending upon the grace of God as the only power unto salvation. Other religious groups seek the good life through human character and insist that man must work out his own salvation. The same question comes into religious service. Where lies the primary duty, in serving God or serving man? He that loveth not God can hardly be expected to love man. While others ask: if you do not love your brother whom you have seen, how can you hope to love God whom you have not seen?

We may be justly suspicious of any religion that ignores human

values. A stern puritanism that casts out joy in the name of religion leaves but the dry pulp of conscientious formality. A rigid asceticism in holy India or in monastic Europe can never capture the abundant life. Frantic retreat from the cares of this world to the indulgent delights of heavenly bliss is not worthy of the victorious life. Over-anxiety about the secrets of divinity may well cheat humanity of its natural birthright. Pursuit of God in distant places remote from the here and now is bound to beguile religion into barren wildernesses. The fallacy inherent in all such other-worldly vagrancy is the error of an absentee God. To be real at all God must be present, in intimate touch with every pulse and breath of life. "Closer is he than breathing, nearer than hands or feet." "In him we live and move and have our being; for he is not far from any one of us." You will find God not at the ends of the earth nor in distant spaces strewn with starlight more than in the face of a little child within your home. God is present in the quiet hush of a mountain sunrise no more than in the noisy bustle of crowded streets. The earnest seeker for divine good may best begin at home, and not flee the abundant present for the empty spaces of remote evasion.

And yet though religion returns from weary journeys we may not conclude that all journeys are in vain. The humanist who leaves out God and declines to venture beyond human fields is not thereby the richer, but the poorer. Humanism is inadequate first because it is provincial. To confine one's interest to

these tiny human walls in a universe as vast as ours is rather serious confinement. There was a day when man thought his world the centre of the universe and saw himself the crown of creation. Adaptation to environment might then be quite a simple matter in the cosy little cottage he pictured around him. But living in a universe of such infinite proportions as are now discerned about us we need a longer view, a wider cosmic reference to find ourselves at home in so great an environment. It becomes increasingly more astonishing to find life here at all on this little sphere drawn about by forces of such moment. To find our way about in this vast order we can hardly afford to neglect our cosmic bearings. By every scientific and religious means at our disposal we had better orient ourselves in line with the larger purpose of it all. Our destiny hangs upon thus conforming to, working with rather than against the stream of cosmic purpose that our fathers called the will of God.

By leaving out God, by ignoring the cosmic resources, humanism breaks the circuit that religion has sought to establish. The theistic circuit, instead of threading its way from man to man, has ever moved out to God and returned to man from that larger source. The value of so enlarging our human circuit may be denied. But religion is content to submit the case to pragmatic considerations. "By their fruits ye shall know them." If one is interested in the power of the religious circuit he might study the history of human movements and individuals motivated by the contact with larger re-

sources of energy. If you want to test the effect of religion in human life, learn how to set up contact with God and judge for yourself the power available in this larger circuit. With the infinite resources of our universe accessible to us it would be folly to break the circuit and thus impoverish human achievement.

A third difficulty in humanism is compromise. Religion historically has claimed a heavenly vision, a divine resource that offers a standard of and a means to perfection. The call of religion as Plato viewed it is to become as much like God as man is permitted to be. The command of religion as Jesus felt it is "Be ye therefore perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect". The genius of this religious ideal is to recognize the eternal contrast between the divine and the human, at the same time urging the human to strive toward the divine. When religion gives up God and devotes its energy to the conservation of merely human values, that perfect ideal slips down to the level of mediocrity. God idea has made man discontent with himself and has planted an eternal restlessness in his heart, and stirred him ever and again to be better than himself. Without this eternal contrast between God and man religion compromises with easier attainments and more comfortable ways of living, which are neither to man's credit nor his highest value. *Religion confronts no more insidious danger in modern life than compromise.* One by one her defences have come down until the church has become an echo rather than a prophetic voice, and vices gain re-

spectability under sanction of sacred institutions.

The chief contribution of religion lies in its ability to maintain creative tension between the divine and the human. We need these unceasing counsels to perfection that we fall not into contentment with our average good. We need the stern challenge of uncompromising heroism to rescue us from the cowardly security of safe majorities. It would be a tragic loss to our civilization in this generation if either the religion of divinity or the religion of humanity should overthrow the other. The first commandment is not sufficient without the second, or *vice versa*—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart; and thy neighbour as thyself". Each emphasis has enriched and corrected the other. Each demonstrates the need of its companion obligation.

Other-worldly religion fails in its flight from the living present, even as a merely human religion fails in the provincial incompleteness of its broken circuit. True religion is co-operation of God and man. In creation of life, in formation of new patterns of energy, in evolution and progress of the race, man is not revolting against but working with the creative purpose and the power of God. In serving God, we bring our human need and resources to a larger destiny, while in serving our fellow man is manifest the religious touch of divine love. Religion in its effective expression must ever preserve these two poles, for the potential energy here involved is dependent upon that unbroken contrast of God and man—not separated one from another but united in the essential opposition of mutual completion.

PAUL E. JOHNSON

[While recommending to the humanist the acceptance of the God idea the writer of the above article argues that without God men are compromising with religious ideals. But then, how is it that the greatest compromise with spiritual ideals takes place in the church—irrespective of denomination? Because Christianity tightly holds to the "contrast between the divine and the human" it is fast failing—has already proven its failure. God is not only not away from man as our author rightly contends, but man is identical in nature and powers with God. Dethrone the Personal God idea, and prayer to God transforms itself into communion with the Divine Self in the heart of every man and every woman. The author refers to the "commanding, unapproachable ideal"—but why unapproachable? Let the reader turn to the next article.—EDS.]

RELIGION AT THE CROSSROADS

PSEUDO-MYSTICISM VERSUS MYSTICISM

[The day of bleak theology is over ; on every side the note of mysticism in religion is being heard. In this article a warning note is struck against pseudo-mysticism and a false method in the comparative study of religions by Dr. Saroj Kumar Das of the University of Calcutta, the author of *Towards a Systematic Study of the Vedanta*. He also refers to "secularism" of religion attempted in Humanism but his angle of vision is that of a Hindu Pantheist and Vendantin.

Deity is immanent and transcendent, and as man the Microcosm is the miniature but exact copy of God, the Macrocosm, there is the transcendent aspect to man also. It is possible to demonstrate the existence of God and the immortality of man's spirit like a problem of Euclid. Madame Blavatsky wrote in 1877 :—" We were taught that this omnipotence comes from the kinship of man's spirit with the Universal Soul—God ! The latter, they said, can never be demonstrated but by the former. Man-spirit proves God-spirit, as one drop of water proves a source from which it must have come. Tell one who had never seen water, that there is an ocean of water, and he must accept it on faith or reject it altogether. But let one drop fall upon his hand, and he then has the fact from which all the rest may be inferred. After that he could by degrees understand that a boundless and fathomless ocean of water existed. Blind faith would no longer be necessary ; he would have supplanted it with KNOWLEDGE."—EDS.]

In the clash of ideals and the conflict of loyalties which the modern world is experiencing, Religion is being weighed in the balance. Religion as an "experience of God, not a proof of Him" arises directly from, and is man's response to, the intuitional perception, however dim, of the uncreated and adorable—"the abiding presence and persuasion of the Soul of souls".

Religion is in its essence mystical. With Whitehead we recognise that "Religion is solitariness" and that "Religion in its decay sinks back into sociability". When, however, the mystical essence of Religion is overborne by institutional paraphernalia, the conditions of right judgment fail, and we are constrained to repeat that "religion is the last refuge of human savagery". There has ever been this alternating preponderance of the

mystical over the institutional factor in the religious life of mankind. But, as Dr. Inge once remarked, "the aberrations or exaggerations of institutionalism have been, and are, more dangerous than those of Mysticism". The best service, therefore, that Mysticism can render to Religion and to human civilization in general is to rid us of what Dr. L. P. Jacks has happily called "institutional selfishness". The supremely important thing in any religion is the revelation of Deity, which has a regenerating moral effect upon our conduct. *What we actually need, therefore, is a new orientation of Religion.*

There is no denying that in matters religious the appeal to experience (not to dogma) will ever remain the central fact. This has been the contention of the mystics through the ages, and is also one of the vital ele-

ments in the Modernist's plea for a reorientation of Religion. But though Religion is mystical in essence, it must not be overlooked that in the past it has suffered from its association with Mysticism, solely on account of the abuses and extravagances into which the latter has run. Pseudomysticism has always proved the canker of Religion.

The necessary preoccupation of Religion with experience breeds in its adherents a loyalty which not infrequently degenerates into bigotry. The native absolutism of the religious temper registers itself in an aggressively hostile attitude towards other positive religions. The comparative study of religions is a healthy check upon religious fanaticism. The absolutist's claim rests on the belief that his own specific dogmas and creeds are unique, a belief which comparative study has demonstrated to be totally erroneous. All revelation, we should not forget, is *ad modum recipientis*; and the claim of a revelation to any authority should not be confused with the claim to infallibility. Comparative study confirms this. There need not be either rivalry or hostility between one religion and another; the question of truth or falsity of religions, or of the supersession of one by another need not arise at all.

The comparative study of religions is of recent growth, and has had to encounter objections from many quarters. It is urged against it that comparisons are odious. Only invidious ones are; comparisons that breed not only tolerance but also genuine appreciation and respect for others certainly are not. But that

comparative study which commits itself *ab initio* to the elicitation of the points of agreement only is sure to end by bringing down all the historical religions to the dead level of a barren uniformity.

The enormity of the error is heightened when it is sought to explain the affinities in question as cases of conscious or unconscious borrowing. Every fresh discovery of close parallelism furnishes evidence for belief in a universality which exhibits itself as a unity in variety, and not as a colourless uniformity. Regimentation is altogether out of place in the sphere of religious experience and religious expression. The motive of counteracting religious intolerance by discovering whatever element of truth or value there is in all the historical religions, is laudable, but the inspiration seized on the wrong side does more harm than good to the cause of Religion. Too often a comparative study of religions, as one of its devoted students once remarked, leaves men only comparatively religious! The dogged search after the "least common multiple" of religions ends in the reduction of religion to its lowest terms, and a dilution of its past recognition. Eventually the dividing line between religion and irreligion is carried to the vanishing point, and the search for a man who is not religious becomes difficult.

The comparative study of religions leads, by its logic, to the point from which we started, that some basic, integral experience is the very soul of Religion, relatively independent of its diverse expressions. Comparative religion thus shades off into, and consummates itself in, the philosophy of

religion, which is concerned, not with the antiquity and origin of religious expressions but with their value. The philosophy of religion is the religious life of man brought to the focus of self-consciousness. Thus focalised, the religious life reveals itself as the integrative life, as the reaction of the whole man to the whole reality, in marked contrast to the partial reactions that come about in art, science, etc. This explains the "transcendent importance" of religion.

When this integrity of religious experience breaks asunder into the exclusive preponderance of the constitutive elements, we have what may be called "near-religions" or religious approximations. They form a class distinct from Religion; they masquerade as Religion. As things of arrested development they miss the inward "drive" of Religion; and theirs is a somewhat precarious existence. But these can never be satisfactory substitutes. In daily living they cease to inspire their votaries with the native warmth of a living faith.

Disengaged from the centripetal influence of religious experience, these religious "comets" pursue a centrifugal course, disturbing the harmony and equilibrium of the religious life of the community.

Consider the flutter created by the psycho-analytical study of religion. Making due allowance for its so-called discoveries, the eroto-mania which has seized the modern psycho-analysts in their attempt to account for "the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth" as cases of the Freudian complex, or even as sub-

limation of the "libido", urgently calls for a "defence of philosophic doubt". When the "Idol of the scientific method" is irresistible in its triumphant march, and claims a votary from every freshly annexed department of knowledge, it is no wonder that religious thought should fall an easy prey to the craze of the day.

One substitute for religion is Agnosticism with its Unknowable. It is, indeed, undeniable that a "learned ignorance", due to the "Divine Darkness", to which mystics in all ages have testified, is the inalienable partner of all the considerable religions of the world. To barter away this agnosticism for a cheap gnosticism is to sell the birthright of religion for a mess of pottage. As Dr. L. P. Jacks once wrote, "What discredits religion is not the unknowableness of God, but the knowableness of Mumbo-Jumbo". There must ever be "the cloud of unknowing" over the face of the Highest that we know and worship. There is force in Jacobi's warning—"a comprehended God is no God"; particularly in its pointed reference to the Kantian "Religion within the limits of mere reason". But it is equally undeniable that the worship of the Unknowable, drawing its inspiration from a faulty metaphysics of relativism, or phenomenalism, must stultify itself sooner or later with its veritable doom of a *reductio ad absurdum*.

Again, a passing reference must be made to the substitute for historical religion that has been found in Ethical Religion and the Ethical Culture Movement in Great Britain and America, and its appeal during the

last fifty years. Its worship at the altar of the eternal values of Truth, Beauty and Goodness has no doubt a sentimental appeal, but we miss what Alexander called in another reference the genuine "flavour of worship". Moreover, the mode of worship prescribed by the Ethical Church bears an unmistakable family resemblance to the worship of "Ideals" anathematised by Dr. Martineau :

Amid all the sickly talk about "ideals" which has become the commonplace of our age, it is well to remember that, so long as they are dreams of future possibility, and not faiths in present realities, so long as they are a mere self-painting of the yearning spirit, and not its personal surrender to immediate communion with an Infinite Perfection, they have no more solidity or steadiness than floating air-bubbles, gay in the sunshine, and broken by the passing wind.

Without attempting here anything like a detailed examination of Humanism, both old and new, one may justly observe that Humanism is but Religion secularised. Our charge against it is not that it discovers in the highest conditions of human life the supreme revelation of the Divine, and is thus guilty of anthropomorphism—but that it is "human—all-too-human". Its anthropomorphism

is understandable but its secularism is indefensible. If the Religion of Humanity professes to be the worship of humanity and nothing more, it becomes a mere travesty of what mankind has hitherto meant by religious worship. If this worship is a fact, "Humanity" is a misnomer ; it is only another name for "deiformity". Abolishing, as it does, all reference to a Transcendent Beyond, an aspect of "other-worldliness" which must ever abide in every religion worth the name, the Religion of Humanity borders on Naturalism of the crudest type.

This other-worldly element of religion is no mysterious noumenon, standing in an exclusive or antagonistic relation to this world and all its interests. On the contrary, as has been wisely observed, the "other world is only this world rightly understood". Mysticism reconciles Divine immanence and transcendence in the conception of the organic unit which holds the Microcosm and the Macrocosm, Man and the Universe, in a relation of reciprocal support and dependence. This Higher Pantheism is in perfect accord with the Higher Mysticism.

SAROJ KUMAR DAS

THE RELIGION OF SOCIALISM

[Socialism has become the religion of many, especially in the West, and often socialists do not belong to any church. Miller Watson, a Scotsman, who lived many years in Brazil, idealizes the religion of socialism ; he names its main features which are more absent than present : Universal Brotherhood is absent, cliques of comrades exist ; there is bond of affection but there is also hatred, and the capitalist is the devil of the religion of socialism ; again, the British labourer may shout " The poor people of India must have our support "—but has such support been given in deeds ?

The author puts his finger on the cause which makes for the failure of modern socialism as a religion of love and brotherhood when he names the Essenes. They did not much trouble about the politico-economic aspect of socialism, but stressed the moral aspect. They followed the method of self-examination and self-purification and obeyed the instruction of *Ishavasya Upanishad*—" Covet not the wealth of another." There is a higher form of Socialism founded not on economic but moral principles. Right morality adjusts economic deformities ; economic redress does not solve moral problems.—EDS.]

Any political theory or social programme which has not a spiritual basis is like a house built upon sand.

Socialism, once considered a political creed pure and simple, has provoked more argument and more antagonism than any other political theory of modern times. It has provoked as much argument and antagonism as a religion, for that is what socialism has become. It has become a religion, a creed, with an ideal. Combated and approved with equal fervour, its structure is a growing reality.

What is the spiritual rock upon which the tower of socialism is being raised ? It is Brotherhood. But how can there be brotherhood without the spirit of love ? No one, I think, could reasonably suggest that you can love your fellow men as brothers and yet not wish them all equally well. You cannot love two men and desire wealth for one and poverty for the other. The essence of brotherhood is mutual love and respect. Is it a brotherly state in which one man

sickens in surfeit while another suffers starvation ? The rich man cannot look on the beggar with complacency if he really loves him. If we love our fellow men we must wish to see them happy and contented ; nourished, not starved ; and partaking of an equal part of the world's riches. Socialism says the world is for all, not for the few. Its wealth and its comforts must be divided equally amongst the brothers. Will a man take something from the brother he loves and leave him with less than his share ? It is still perfectly true that you cannot serve God and Mammon and you cannot love your brother and rob him.

It has been said that many socialists are such because they hope to gain something for themselves. This is unfortunately true, but it does not condemn socialism. We do not condemn Christianity for the errors of its followers. It is true, too, that some men have sunk so low in the morass of a selfish society that they are no longer capable of altruism, their

starving desires being concentrated on their own misery. These poor souls stand in great need of socialism. When socialism has cured their ills they will again be able to love their brothers.

But what of the great mass of socialists? Are they selfish seekers after personal gain? No, emphatically, no! What of those who have renounced position and wealth to preach the gospel of brotherhood? Were they selfish? What of those who have gone to prison rather than relinquish their beliefs? Were they selfish? What of the hundreds of thousands of modest workers who speak of "we"? Why does each worker not speak of "I"? Amongst socialists everywhere one constantly hears the word "we", and "we" is the whole of humanity. The socialist does not plead for better condition for himself. He demands it for all mankind. He speaks of the workers and the forgotten classes; is he an egoist that speaks so little of self? No, selfishness is not there. Socialism preaches love. It says, love your neighbour, and all mankind is your neighbour. But it also says, feed your neighbour, for it knows that love is kind and generous. It knows that love does not withhold from the recipient one tittle of all that is due. The love which socialism preaches is the love of deeds. It is not the love which slavers useless sentiment to fill an empty stomach. It is the love which feeds and which binds up wounds. It is the love which divides a loaf in equal parts and the love which asks, "Are we better than they?"

To those who say, "Why do we

not hear socialists speak more of this wonderful spirit of love which you say inspires them?", I answer that great love is often not voluble. Is it not natural that in the intense activity of realising brotherhood socialists may speak seldom of the spirit which inspires them? After all it is deeds, not words, which count.

If a man devotes his time and labour to bringing about the greater happiness of mankind; if he works for their social emancipation; if he tries to bring about a state in which brotherhood is a fact as well as a theory; if he fights to help the weak and the despised; if he does all these things with no hope of personal reward—by what spirit can he be moved? By none other than the spirit of love. He is loving his neighbour as himself. No one can deny that socialism teaches all these things, and many are those who devote their lives unselfishly to the good work.

There is an important aspect of socialism which deserves more attention than it usually gets. By insisting on the equality of mankind in its right to the material things of life, it is not thereby making its aim materialistic. Socialists know that man does not live by bread alone. But they do know that it is the staff of life. They know that without bread, or with scarcity of bread, the hungry ones' thoughts never rise beyond bread. The poor must be fed before they can listen to the gospel of love. When every man knows that he is the equal of every other, and can never be more, in the material sense, his thoughts turn to something higher. He is free from the burden of

forced labour ; his thoughts can rise above bread and his spirit once more is able to breathe. While mankind struggles for bread the spirit is suffocated by the body.

Socialists say "To man the product of his labour". Jesus said, "The labourer is worthy of his hire". Not a part of his hire but the whole of his hire. When the industrialist employs a worker he pays him only a part of his hire, for the labourer is unable to buy with his pay the product of his labour. The industrialist, by reason of his money, is able to live by the sweat of other brows. The more money he has, the greater the number of people he can get to sweat for him. You do not love by saying, "Give me your all, and I will give you a little". You cannot love while saying, "You are poorer than I am and that is as it should be". You cannot even love by saying, "I am stronger and more intelligent than you and therefore it is just that I should have more money". In love the stronger helps the weaker, by giving of its strength. The strong wealthy man can only love the poor weak man by giving of his strength which is his wealth. If the strong clever man really loves his fellow men he will forego that which he produces in excess of his weaker brethren. For if he is strong it is just that he should help the weak. There is no other course for the man who loves. If he says, "I have worked harder, I am more intelligent and I am stronger than those others, therefore I have the right to keep my riches to myself"—he is thinking only of himself and love is never selfish. How much greater is the

British dock-labourer who says, "The poor people of India must have our support !" He thinks of others, even those whom he has never seen.

When the Essenes (of whom Josephus wrote, "They exceed all other men that addict themselves to virtue, and this in righteousness") decided to live a holy spiritual life, their first move was to live as socialists. They formed what was probably one of the earliest Communist societies amongst civilised peoples. They were largely agriculturalists and all wealth was equally divided between them. Josephus says of them :—

This is demonstrated by that institution of theirs, which will not suffer anything to hinder them from having all things in common ; so that a rich man enjoys no more of his own wealth than he who hath nothing at all.

The passage merits several readings. The Essenes not only had economic equality. It is not that they held all things in common. It is more than that. For the wealthy man, receiving only as much as the others of the sect, could not be wealthier in money or goods. He could only be wealthier in the sense that he could produce more. But he enjoyed no more of the wealth than the poor members of his community. In other words the strong man helped the weak. This was the work of love. And it was pure socialism.

It may have been pure coincidence that John the Baptist, who baptised Jesus, carried out many of the Essene practices. His mortification of the flesh and his belief in baptism were like the Essene beliefs, and he frequently denounced the Pharisees and Sadducees, the two other main sects of Israel, whom the Essenes

criticised for their ungodly practices. It may also have been a coincidence that Christ and his disciples lived on a common fund, by which all were equal in the goods of the world. But under the circumstances it is difficult to believe that Christ did not accept the ideal of economic equality. Jesus insisted upon the brotherhood of man, and how often did he repeat, "Love thy neighbour"? How often did Jesus explain the difficulty of the rich man attaining everlasting life! Surely it was not only because the rich man's thoughts are on material things. Jesus knew that the rich man could not love his neighbours as himself.

Who can doubt that Prince Gautama saw the injustice of human differences when he ceased to be a prince to become the Buddha? And that he believed in the essential brotherhood of man is proved by his teaching that caste presented no barrier against salvation. His whole teaching shows us the disgust in which he held human distinctions of wealth, race and class. He, too, said in effect, "Love your neighbour as yourself", and "Do to others that which you would have them do to you". Can any man do this and still wish to be wealthier than his fellow men? It is possible that in the days of Buddha and Christ it seemed difficult to imagine a state in which all men would have abun-

dance, and that a state of relative poverty for all seemed the most just thing. But it seems evident that neither Christ nor the Buddha approved of abundance for a few with poverty for the many. Christ and Buddha may have been more than socialists. But they were socialists when they proclaimed, "Love your neighbour".

The socialists of to-day still cry, "Love your neighbour as yourself". But they say it in another language, in the language of an age which science has made bountiful beyond the dreams of man. They say: All men are brothers and all have equal rights. If you love your neighbour you must not deny him any good thing which you yourself have. If your brother is chained in the bondage of want you must free his soul by setting free his body. You must feed the man so that the soul may grow strong. And in this you, yourself, profit. There is abundance for all, in this world. Let no man take more than his just share and there will be plenty for all. Let no man lay up treasure for himself, but let him love his neighbour. His neighbour is all mankind.

Socialism can throw down the Golden Calf for Love is omnipotent. In the body of socialism courses the warm blood of spiritual strength—Love, universal Love.

MILLER WATSON

A RELIGIOUS SURVEY

OPTIMISM VERSUS PESSIMISM

[Professor A. R. Wadia of Mysore University shows that Eastern Religions are really optimistic. He strikes a true note when he asserts that "there is only one way of doing the right thing", while "endless are the ways of being evil". The question naturally arises—where, in which code of religious philosophy is the one right way to be found? All seek knowledge but are given belief. Which philosophy gives the technique by which man may live from day to day doing right?—Eds.]

The contrast between optimism and pessimism is usually taken to be ultimate, but in fact neither can be taken at its face value. A pure optimist is at bottom a fool, even though he be a very lovable fool like the immortal Micawber of Dickens. A pure pessimist is perhaps a more common species, gloomy himself and casting a blight on all that come into contact with him. But even he radiates at times a certain sympathy, a certain benevolence, which would have no logical basis, if the world were fundamentally evil. The degree of a man's optimism or pessimism depends primarily on whether he is apt to look at life through roseate or jaundiced spectacles. This is governed by the number of thwacks he has received or not received at the hands of Karma. Lastly there is the influence of the beliefs and traditions of the society to which he belongs. That is why the different cultures are apt to be dubbed optimistic or pessimistic, but unfortunately often without a clear understanding of the terms used or of the cultures concerned. The European tends to look upon the Hindu culture and particularly upon Buddhism as pessimistic, while the Indian retorts that the whole Christian conception of life is rooted

in the sense of sin and thus in pessimism.

The roots of European culture go down to two different strata of thought and life : Greek and Hebrew. It is difficult to conceive of two cultures more opposed to each other than these, but in nature extremes often meet so as to produce a certain balance. Greek culture was the child of reason, of a philosophic impulse. It battled against superstitions and blind faith. Socrates is the typical embodiment of the Greek spirit : inquiring and rational, joyous and assertive. Plato stood for a synthetic vision of the whole world. Aristotle stood for patient research, gathering vast masses of facts to facilitate inductive conclusions. Phidias and Praxiteles stood for the beautiful. The Greek crowds that witnessed the Olympic Games and the beautiful forms of the gymnasts stood for that joy in life so characteristically expressed by the French phrase, *joie de vivre*. Of course the Greeks were not unaware of the sombre side of life. The figures of the Three Fates weaving the destiny of human beings, and the grim picture of Hades, the dark abode of the dead, were there in the background. And if they ever tended to forget that, there were Sophocles and

Euripides with their deep tragedies to remind the Greek masses that life was not all a play. Nevertheless it remains true as a general statement that the Greeks were pagans in the finer sense of the term: they were not obsessed by the sorrows of life. They tended rather to be gay and to love the beautiful and the good things of life. Even in the days of their political servitude they kept up their old spirit with Epicureanism, a philosophy of sweet, if shallow, reasonableness. And there was Stoicism, grim but courageous, willing to rise above the joys and sorrows of life alike, acknowledging the Law of Nature and claiming the whole world as the sphere of its citizenship. Rome was the mistress of Europe, a great civilising force battling against the barbarians in central and western Europe. In this world of pagan life appeared the figure of Christ and introduced a new current of ideation, bringing with him centuries of old Hebrew traditions and modes of thought.

Hebrew culture knew no pure philosophy. It was based on revelation. It had an abiding sense of one true God, with whom contact was sought to be maintained by a long line of prophets, who spoke in thundering tones against the iniquities of God's chosen people and melted into pure limpid poetry in their unabashed humiliation before the might of God. The God of Hosts and the God of Vengeance with the lapse of centuries came to be exalted into the God of Mercy and the God of Love and it was this tradition that Christ came to fulfil. His was not the heroic figure armed

with sword and shield. Nor was his the voice that argued in logical terms. He was gentleness personified. He did not hanker after the rich, but sought to reach the poor and the lowly. He spoke in parables that the most illiterate can follow and grasp. Verily there was in him a thorough transvaluation of values as understood by the Greeks. The Greeks looked upon man as a potential hero: beautiful in body, great in intellect, brave and daring, revelling in a life of political activity or carving out an empire with his sword and ruling over it with a rod. On the other hand there was the Christian ideal of a God suffering and dying for man, for his was not the kingdom of this earth. Man had fallen and had continued sinful. He was in sore need of being saved from himself and from the anger of God. He needed a redeemer and behold! there was the Christ to fill the rôle. Europe was converted. The Venus de Milo on which the æsthete had glutted his eyes was dethroned from her pedestal and lay buried and unknown for centuries. Jove the Thunderer was shoved from his pedestal by the ordinary labourer whose ancestors for centuries had grovelled before him in terror. And instead there arose altars with the image of the bleeding God, an emblem of suffering humanity and yet an emblem of universal resurrection.

Does European history for the last 1500 years since Constantine accepted Christ show any harmonisation of Greek and Judaic values of life? Are we in a position to say that the Greek was optimistic and the Chris-

tian with his sense of sin a pessimist? Open any book of the old Christian Fathers, Augustine or Tertullian, or later thinkers like Thomas à Kempis or Luther and we read of sin. Enter a Christian Church and the hymns and the sermons alike in plaintive tones bear witness to the sinfulness of man. Kempis wrote what a good Christian might write to-day: "When thou art ill at ease and troubled, then is the time when thou art nearest unto blessing....So long as we carry about with us this frail body, we cannot be without sin, we cannot live without weariness and trouble".

Palpably the Greek and the Christian ideals of life are the poles apart. No wonder if Europe has failed to synthesise the two, for how can they be synthesised? One reveling in the life of pleasure, the other turning its back upon it; one intent on the power and the pomp of life, the other on the will to suffer and to serve; one having its vision bounded by the earthly horizon, the other diving deep into the invisible. Was the one necessarily optimistic with its fear of death and the other with its conquest of death necessarily pessimistic? The Greek had his short span of joyous existence and ended in a cold Hades. The Christian, conscious of the limitations of this life with its diseases and pains, its treacheries and struggles, looked forward with absolute certainty to vast vistas of eternity in which he could rest in Christ and attain that peace which the pleasures of this life could not offer. Against the short-lived hectic paganism of the Greeks, the Christian would claim his faith

to be optimistic in the best sense of the term.

If this is correct, is the Christian justified in speaking of Buddhism and Hinduism as pessimistic? Both resemble Christianity in emphasising the limitations and the pains of our earthly life. To this extent all appear to be pessimistic, but if Christianity is justified in repudiating pessimism, Buddhism and Hinduism alike can do so too. There is much in common in the life of Buddha and Christ. Both set their faces against the ephemeral joys of earthly existence. Both set their hearts on showing a way out of this morass of life. Both sought to introduce into this world peace and harmony based on the great law of love. They differed in their ultimate goal. Christ sought to establish the Kingdom of God. Buddha sought to rise above the cycle of births and deaths and pointed to Nirvana as the goal of mankind. It was fashionable not so long ago to picture Nirvana as a state of extinction. If this was the end of life, truly was Buddha pessimistic. But modern scholars have come to realise that Nirvana was not mere negation; it was rather a positive state of existence, corresponding to the *anandam* of the Upanishadic Brahman. Buddha thus rose above pessimism, for the end of life is bliss and it can be attained. Here again we find optimism in its deeper sense as against the exaltation of the series of short spans of earthly existence.

Coming to speak of the Hindus, we find in the Vedas a note of primitive joy, an exultation in nature and its different forces, a confidence of overcoming foes and of achieving

victory. They breathe a distinctly higher note of morality than the pantheon of love-sick Greek gods and goddesses. With the Upanishads we come to an age of deeper reflection on life. Instead of the old gods and their worship we come across a new note of the ultimate unity of the universe conceived as Brahman, which as Atman embraces everything in the universe. This leads to a sense of power strong enough to overcome every ill. The triumphant cry is heard in numerous places: "I am Brahma". The Upanishadic seers were also, like Buddha after them, anxious to overcome the round of births and deaths. This may be pessimism to begin with, but it ceases to be such when man begins to realise that he is Brahman and this knowledge is regarded as moksha or redemption. Surely this is not pessimism. For the ultimate realisation of the identity of *Brahman* and *Atman* spells *anandam*: bliss, rising above the turmoil of the world.

In Zoroaster, we come across an acute consciousness of the evil in life. Even his heroic spirit suffers and he becomes despondent. But the realisation that there is Ahura Mazda, the God of Purity, makes him defy the spirit of evil and he tussles and succeeds and has passed on to us the great thought that the good man is sure of ultimate victory, that the doors of Paradise are open to him and that the evil one will lie vanquished and abashed.

Centuries later Islam shows the same confidence. Life was not a bed of roses for the Prophet. But as the inspired of God, he defied the foes of his new faith and achieved suc-

cess and promised that the righteous man, whatever his tribulations on this earth, would enter triumphant into Paradise.

Thus it is that in all the great religions optimism is the key-note. In its recognition of evil each of them shows itself removed from the easy and cheap variety of optimism that has raised its head, off and on, in human history. There is a belief that there is no such thing as evil: what appears to be evil is only due to our ignorance, to our incapacity to understand the scheme of things. Thus argued Spinoza. Leibnitz spoke of this best of all possible worlds and was satirised to tatters by that master of sarcasm, Voltaire, in his *Candide*. There is also the mystic attitude, the attitude of the recluse who runs away from contact with life in all its phases, good and evil. It finds expression in the poet's thought:

God's in his heaven—
All's right with the world!

This type of optimism, whether philosophic or mystic, may be soothing, but it is cheap and ostrichy. Life is strong and cannot be reduced to illusions, however pleasant. The world is amoral, *i.e.*, morally neutral. It is the privilege of man to be moral or immoral in this amoral world. He can easily be the latter, for endless are the ways of being evil. But if he means to be good—not good in the sense of innocent children—he will have to look life squarely in the face. *In the complex arena of life and its myriad motives, at any one time and under any particular circumstances there is only one way of doing the right*

thing and that is the best ; that is moral. The essence of genuine optimism is not the denial of evil—for it cannot be denied—but the recognition of it and the will to conquer it.

A genuine pessimist believes that the world is evil and that it cannot be made better and that there is no way out of it. The only philosophy consistent with pessimism is materialism, with its denial of God and of the immortality of the soul and life hereafter. The only logical outcome of such a life is suicide, both individual and racial. But pure materialism is rare. It appears and reappears in the history of man, but always to be discarded, for it does not harmonise with the manifold experiences of man. It is not possible to undertake a critique of materialism in this place. Suffice it to say that when man begins to think he does not find rest in the idea that he can do all the evil he can and then commit suicide when life loses its zest and ennui sets in. If man has risen above the beast it is only because of the Power of Spirit with-

in him.

The essence of spirit is to recognise its power to mould the raw material of life into beauty, truth and goodness. These are the ultimate values and the man who believes in them and has faith enough to realise them in the face of nature's crude force and man's treachery to man,—he is the genuine optimist : he knows no defeat, for he always rises triumphant above the ills of life. The Roman faith in *Justitia floreat, ruat coelum* ; the Christian urge to emulate the love of God ; the Buddhist faith in Dhamma ; the Zoroastrian's and the Muslim's faith that the good shall conquer ; the Vedantin's faith that in the last resort it is only *jnana* that counts and that makes for *shanti*—all these are but the different facets of the one great truth of religion and philosophy alike : that life is not good but that it can be made good ; that goodness cannot be bought, that it has to be achieved. It is this faith, this optimism, which constitutes the divinity of man.

A. R. WADIA

THE DEVIL

[Not understanding the problem of pessimism which is intimately related with that of evil, Christian theology has conjured up the existence of the personal devil. Ahriman of Zoroastrianism or Mara of Buddhism are known to be personifications, but the Christian Devil is not only recognized as a personification but as a being, the adversary of God. This theological crudity is fast being dethroned because of the rise of Mysticism in Christianity, and yet the belief in the Personal Devil is deep-seated and its ramifications are numerous as will be seen from the following article. A. R. Williams is the author of *The Cornfield*, a volume of country and nature studies, *Tales for Teachers*, a volume of educational studies, and other books.—EDS.]

Next to God the devil appears the most important person in religion, often getting more attention than the Deity. Some would say this is properly so, as the devil seems to play the largest part in human affairs.

Our ancestors must have become deeply impressed by the potency and frequent interposition of the evil spirit. To go through tradition, legend and literature extracting all references to the devil would be a Herculean task; beside the notice given him by preachers and moralists.

Some day an anthologist will compile a collection of quotations with the devil as central figure. Milton takes a volume to himself.

Shorter references and poems will make a large book, especially if Shakespeare's numerous mentions of the devil are included.

Comic poets cannot be excluded. Robert Burns will have a prominent place, his "Address to the Deil" forming an admirable introduction to the tome.

I have no wish to trespass on the field of the ethicists any more than on that of theologians—or diabolists—but it seems a pity the human race was ever allowed to attribute its

shortcomings to an exterior influence. It looks like cowardice or hypocrisy: it was certainly an evasion of responsibility to shuffle on to a malignant fiend the blame for man's cruelties and bestialities, weaknesses and wrongdoings.

We are not to-day so apt to charge to a perverse demon the errors and failings of which we are conscious.

Nevertheless, belief in the interference of Satan has left its mark on popular phraseology. If we have ceased to believe in the apostate archangel—as most of us have—his titles remain embedded in that mountain of fossils: our language.

Anything extraordinary, weird or vivid was liable to have the devil's name affixed to it.

Consequently we find place names such as Devil Postpile, a mass of basaltic columns in California; Devil's Lake, a saline stretch of water in North Dakota; Devil's Thumb, a promontory off Greenland; and Devil's Tower in Wyoming.

Nearer home we have in Ireland Devil's Bit, a mountain of Tipperary. Devon has Devil's Cheese Wring. A flat-topped rock fronting a hollow in Ivy Scar on Malvern

Hills is Devil's Pulpit. Scotland owns the Devil's Beef Tub.

None of these is ugly or harmful, some being in beautiful surroundings. Surely most ungracious is Devil's Punch Bowl at Hindhead! Devil's Chapel for a glade in the Forest of Dean is nearly as inappropriate. The Devil's Chimney at Leckhampton, Cheltenham, overlooks a lovely champaign.

Attribution of the unique or the incomprehensible to the devil has permanently coloured speech, particularly that used in moments of tension or in rhetoric.

Writing three centuries ago Samuel Butler says in *Hudibras* :—

Bumbastus kept a devil's bird
Shut in the pummel of his sword.

He was quoting a typical medieval superstition of imputing Satanic aid to a man who possessed ability or knowledge beyond the understanding of his fellows. It forms the basis of the Faustus legend, as of many another myth. In human relations it worked incalculable injury.

In their fondness for the fable of a human being selling his soul to the devil one is astonished or amused at the high estimate our forebears set upon themselves and their chances of eternity.

Was Mephistopheles really so stupid or so generous or so ready for a bad bargain as that?

Coming to the present century : during the European War the Germans nicknamed the American Marine "Teufelhund"—Devil Dog.

This may have been inherited custom from ancient times, or terror, or humour or admiration. Which, com-

plimentary or otherwise, we will leave the Americans and the Germans to decide.

Though we lack the fears of our predecessors men are still quick to exclaim "The Devil!" at anything striking, to show they are staggered mentally.

The same name is used for a variety of mild oaths and comparisons, sometimes jocularly, as when a saucy child is a "little devil"; scornfully, as in "devil dodger" for a pious or a religiously elusive person; pityingly, as "poor devil", or enviously, "lucky devil".

Proverbially we talk about "the devil to pay" when mischief is afoot.

Kipling uses it with nautical correctness in "The devil to pay and no pitch hot", the "devil" being a ship's seam on the water line and so difficult to caulk, and "to pay" being the operation, from the meaning "to cover".

Old wisdom has it that "He who sups with the devil needs a long spoon".

Thousands must have said at least a part of

The Devil was sick, the Devil a monk
would be;

The Devil was well, the Devil a monk
was he,

without knowing it comes from Urquhart's translation of *Rabelais*.

A man of reckless character with a love of boisterous pleasure is "a devil of a fellow" or a "devil-may-care".

The kitchen sends us devilled bones and devilled kidneys.

In the same gravely comic vein we speak of a printer's devil, and of hacks devilling for lawyers and authors.

A "devil-on-the-neck" was an old instrument of torture.

Modernly a devil may be a workman's open-air fire, or a machine of rough type, vigorous and destructive in action.

From the tropical ocean comes the devil-fish, the largest ray. Less often the term is applied to the octopus, the angler-fish and the grey whale.

The dasyure of Tasmania has won the name "Tasmanian devil" from its habits.

A number of other creatures have the same disparaging cognomen, among them insects, as the "Devil's coach-horse", a large black beetle.

The flowers of the field have not escaped this diabolical appellation. There are some dozens of them, usually of a coarse nature, the adjective being roughly synonymous with "dog" as in dog-daisy or "horse" in horseradish. Such are wild chervil, devil's parsley; couch grass, devil's grass; scabious, devil's bit, and a long list more.

Two fungi, the stinkhorn and the puffball, are the devil's candlestick and the devil's snuffbox.

So "Devil" has permanently coloured our language with quaint and significant phrases. Searching of dictionaries reveals columns of them, with cognates from other titles of the adverse spirit and his habitation.

A few must suffice. "Divil" is the favourite expletive of the stage and literary Irishman.

The First Battalion Connaught Rangers were "The Devil's Own".

In his "Ballad of Reading Gaol" Oscar Wilde says of himself and his fellow prisoners,

"We were the Devil's own brigade".

Playing-cards are "devil's picture books", as dice are "devil's bones".

A person who drums with his fingers and toes is beating a "devil's tattoo".

A. R. WILLIAMS

Archaic philosophy, recognizing neither Good nor Evil as a fundamental or independent power, but starting from the Absolute ALL (Universal Perfection eternally), traced both through the course of natural evolution to pure Light condensing gradually into form, hence becoming Matter or Evil. It was left with the early and ignorant Christian fathers to degrade the philosophical and highly scientific idea of this emblem (the Dragon) into the absurd superstition called the "Devil". They took it from the later Zoroastrians, who saw devils or the Evil in the Hindu Devas and the word Evil thus became by a double transmutation D'Evil in every tongue (Diabolos, Diable, Diavolo, Teufel). But the Pagans have always shown a philosophical discrimination in their symbols. The primitive symbol of the serpent symbolised divine Wisdom and Perfection, and had always stood for psychical Regeneration and Immortality.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY

A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

II. MAN : HIS NATURE, ORIGIN AND DESTINY

[Below we print the second of the articles of Alban G. Widgery, Professor of Philosophy at the Duke University.—Eds.]

A philosophy of religion is concerned with man as he reveals his nature in religion. In it he manifests needs which have no specific relation to the physical world or to human society. That is a central fact for a philosophy of religion. Needs are not the same as desires : needs are generic, basic in human nature ; desires are more or less spasmodic. Particular desires can be suppressed without any necessary evil, in some instances even with advantage ; but *the extent to which an individual fails to satisfy his needs is an extent to which he remains deficient*. Religion not only reveals specific needs but also that which is found to satisfy them.

In religion man is aware of a capacity to apprehend himself—not merely the externals of his physical body—but his thoughts and feelings, and to pass judgment on himself. In short, he differentiates his nature from the physical, calling himself spirit, and spirit as such is an ultimate or a complex of ultimates being incapable of explanation, definition in terms of, or derivation from something that is not itself spirit. In religion man has stressed the fact of his own inner power : that he need not be a mere slave either to the physical or to his fellow men. As spirit, he possesses freedom. But in religion his consciousness of freedom is associated with

an awareness of his own deficiency ; and that which makes him conscious of that deficiency challenges him to action. His freedom is a capacity to act in one way or another in face of that challenge. Preaching in all religions has been, in the last issue, an appeal to the individual to exercise his freedom in this way or that. It has sometimes wrongly been supposed that some religions deny freedom. But the careful student of the *Quran*, for example, will see that the fact of freedom is admitted in it, though along with other expressions which superficially may seem to contradict it. The Oriental doctrine of a Law of Karma, too often represented as a negation of freedom, really implicates it in the context in which it is actually taught. What it involves is that the individual will enjoy or suffer the fruits of his action, not that the acts are determined. All Oriental religions admit the possibility of spiritual advance, implicating some freedom of present acts whatever the consequences of past acts.

This characteristic of the freedom of man as spirit can only be accepted as an ultimate feature of his nature. Freedom cannot be regarded as derived from something other than itself ; nor can it be refuted by reference to anything other than itself. It may be noted in action, but its character as such in no way defined. A philosophy of religion must simply

acknowledge it as a fact, and challenge critically all attempts to deny it. This it may do by indicating that all theories that deny it either imply an absolutely static existence or themselves involve essentially the same implication as the doctrine of freedom, in that the fact of change must be acknowledged, and this in every instance includes something different in the later stages called effects from the earlier called causes. The so-called naturalistic philosophy of emergent evolution is an admission of this mystery of change, limiting itself to mere description of the facts of emergence. A philosophy of religion has as much justification for maintaining the truth of the proposition that man as a spirit is free, as naturalism has in acknowledging the actuality of emergents.

This freedom of the spirit is a fundamental characteristic of man as he finds himself in religion. For it involves his capacity at any time and in any place to start off in a direction different from that in which he has previously been pursuing satisfaction. Expressed in the language of the religions, he can experience "regeneration", spiritual "resurrection". Whatever his past may have been, it can never hold him completely in its paths: with his freedom he may strike out in new directions or return to old ones from which in the previous exercise of his freedom he may have wandered away. The whole history of religion is replete with such turnings and such renewals. Those in themselves are sufficient evidence for a philosophy of religion to admit the truth of the freedom of man as spirit.

It is in itself an interesting question and one significant for a philosophy of religion to ask: Has man, as spirit, an origin? The expressions in the different religions have been diverse on this subject. Jainism and Advaitist forms of Hinduism suggest that man, as spirit, has no origin. Judaism and Christianity describe him as having an origin. The question for a philosophy of religion is whether, in spite of such different expressions, there is any similar implication. It should be recognised that the doctrine of pre-existence may be held with either view. For a human spirit may have originated and may pass through a number of lives; or it may always have existed and may experience innumerable lives.

Jainism and Advaitist Hinduism do not discuss the question of origin because the idea seems ruled out by other forms of expression. For the former the spirit as real, is eternal; for the latter the spirit as real is identical with the eternal Brahman. The difficulty with both of these is virtually the same. Advaitist Hinduism does not really face the problem as to the manner in which or the occasion for the eternal Brahman to assume the forms of finite spirits, or to manifest itself as such. A thoroughgoing Advaitist may reply that there are no forms of finite spirits, no such manifestations. Individuals as individuals are so many illusions. But then the question rises again with reference to the illusions; and with the answer that there are no illusions, the problem is evaded. Jainism asserts that each is actually pure spirit in his ultimate nature.

But the problem which is not seriously considered is how the pure spirit ever began to become associated with what gives human beings their apparent finitude. However, in both these views there is one fundamental implication with reference to that with regard to which the question of origin is significant for a philosophy of religion. This is, that whatever the description of man as apparently finite, both regard him as such as not self-explanatory. The Advaitist account implies that all apparent finite spirits are grounded in one supreme Reality. In referring back from apparent finite selves to the Brahman, it implicates a basis for significant relationship between finite selves and between these and the apparent physical world. And Jainism, whether it describe the ultimate as one or many, involves harmony because of the nature of pure spirit beyond the apparent finite beings.

The conception of the human spirit as originating in creation does not include any understanding of the "how" of creation as a process. It has a similar implication to the doctrines discussed in the last paragraph : that the finite beings are not self-explanatory, that they have some dependence on something other than themselves as finite. And thus, that their appearance is not chaotically spasmodic but co-ordinated. The expression as "creation" is meant to imply this dependence as related with the reason, activity and feeling of the Supreme as itself spirit. *A philosophy of religion is thus interested in the question of the "origin" of man, not because there is anything valuable in having an*

origin, but rather as concerned with a spiritual basis for the relations of finite spirits to one another and to the physical world. And forms of expression so different as those discussed, Advaitist Hinduism, Jainism, and the Christian doctrine of creation, involve such a spiritual basis as their chief significance. Thus, religion regards man, as spirit, as not simply a product of the physical.

The question of human destiny has received consideration in all the great religions. All have represented the significance of the human spirit as extending beyond the limits and the temporality of its sojourn in association with a particular physical body. This has been done with different forms of expression. A philosophy of religion is not concerned so much with the differences of expression but with the general implication. Doctrines of transmigration and of immortality alike imply a continuity beyond an individual life on earth, but it is clear on examination that in no religion is the emphasis on mere continuity. Destiny is thought of mainly as a form of realisation in which the discontent of the spirit, apprehending itself as finite, or as in bondage, or as imperfect, is transcended. The significance of continuity is with reference to its providing opportunity for the satisfaction of needs of the spirit. And here, in opposition to the criticism, often made by adherents to the view of personal immortality, that other views, such as that of Advaitist Hinduism, imply a "loss", it must be pointed out that not a "loss" but an expansion is involved. The question here finally

concerns the ideal of religion and varying forms of its expression—the subject for the final article.

But in considering human destiny it may definitely be asked : Can and will the ideal be realised ? The religions have, at least for some spirits, given an affirmative answer to that question, and most religions have implied the possibility for all. First to be remembered in this connection is that the ideal envisaged is an ideal of the spirit. Now man finds the range of his freedom limited with reference to the physical world. But it is not evident that there are limits to his spiritual advance, to his development of his own spiritual nature, and it is especially with regard to the use of his freedom in affairs of the spirit that the religions are interested. His relation with the physical and the social is secondary, and it may be in the forms we know it only temporary. From the standpoint of the freedom of the spirit, there is at least the possibility of ultimate realisation of the spiritual ideal. And as it cannot be shown that the human spirit is a temporary product of a temporary physical body, there is the possibility of the continuity of the spirit enabling it through many lives or some kind of personal immortality to achieve the ideal.

Nevertheless some forms of expression associated with some religions seem open to question in this connection. Advaitist Hinduism virtually states that that about the possibility of which we ask, already is : that the Brahman is eternally the realisation of the destiny of the human spirit, and that as the human spirit is in

essence one with the Brahman its destiny is eternally guaranteed. But this raises the objection that if the existence of the discontent now is compatible with the Brahman as eternally realised ideal, there seems no reason why it may not always be compatible. Jainism is apparently in a similar position in its form of expression. For if the essence of the human spirit is already “pure spirit”, that is, realised destiny, this also seems to be compatible with the present bondage in which the human spirit misapprehending itself as finite now finds itself. If the “pure spirit” actually now is, and is compatible with such bondage, it may always be. Claims have been made that individual Hindus have attained apprehension of their identity with the Brahman and lost all trace of discontent and evil ; and that some Jains have attained complete spiritual freedom ; but there is no way of deciding on the validity of such claims.

There is a slight advantage in theistic forms of expression which do not represent the spirit as in any way inherently in its essence as perfect nor as identical ultimately with God. The difficulty may still be urged that if God permits evil to exist now, may He not always do so ? The only answer to that, at this stage, is that man does seem to be able with a proper exercise of his freedom to eradicate and avoid evil, and that the spiritual attainment by man is actually found to be through struggle. There is the possibility of a complete triumph of the good.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

REVERENCE FOR LIFE

[Beatrice Lane Suzuki is a Buddhist and her article brings out some of the highest phases of religious life.—EDS.]

I think I could turn and live with animals,
they are so placid and self-contain'd,
I stand and look at them long and long...
Picking out here one that I love, and now
go with him on brotherly terms.

WALT WHITMAN

I regard Albert Schweitzer as a Christian Bodhisattva. Over thirty years of age, he renounced his profession as theologian and university professor to study medicine and fit himself as a medical missionary to the Negroes of Central Africa. He says, "By devoting myself to that which needs me, I make spiritual inward devotion to being a reality and thereby give my own poor existence meaning and richness".

According to Schweitzer, a man should give himself in devotion not only to men, but to animals, insects and plants, when these enter the circle of his life needing his help. When building his third hospital in Africa he used always to inspect the bottom of a pit before a heavy beam was slipped into it, lest a toad had jumped and might be crushed; he insisted that certain trees should be transplanted at great trouble, not merely cut down, because unless necessity justified life should be held in reverence. For him duty is a "limitless responsibility toward all that lives" and it is not only his thought but his life activities which put him in the company of Bodhisattvas, who feel themselves one with all life and work to help it. Schweitzer remarks:—

European thinkers walk carefully that no animals run about in the field of their

ethics. Either they leave out altogether all sympathy for animals or they take care that it shrinks to a mere afterthought which means nothing. If they admit anything more than that, they think themselves obliged to produce elaborate justifications or even excuses for so doing. It seems as if Descartes with his dictum that animals are mere machines had bewitched the whole of European philosophy.

He shows that Wundt and Kant asserted that the only object for sympathy is man and that ethics has to do only with the duties of man towards men. In Indian and Chinese thought ethics consists in a kindly relation to all creatures. In *Kan Yin Pien* we read, "Be humane towards animals, and do no harm to insects, plants, and trees". The following acts are condemned: "shooting with bow and arrow at birds; hunting quadrupeds; driving insects out of their holes; frightening birds which are asleep in the trees; blocking up the holes of insects, and destroying birds' nests." Delight in hunting is described as a serious moral perversion.

Except in recent times the East had been more compassionate to animals than the West. The Old Testament teaching that animals were created for the good of man has become so ingrained in the minds of Westerners that the average person considers the practice of *ahimsa* absurd. Nowadays a small but growing earnest minority has organised humane and animal welfare work, advocates a vegetarian

diet and condemns vivisection.

The problems of vivisection and killing for sport, meat-eating, wearing furs, etc., would adjust themselves if men would practise true compassion and revere life because all are one. *The question is not whether man shall be the master of the earth but what kind of a master, cruel and selfish or compassionate and responsible?* Man is feared by animals and in his cruelty to them he becomes a barbarian. John Galsworthy has written truly :—

You creatures wild, of field and air,
Keep far from men where'er they go!
God set no speculation there—
Alack—we know not what we do!

The Buddha is the supreme example of one who taught and practised reverence for animal life. He stopped animal sacrifice whenever he came in contact with it, rescued doomed and wounded animals whenever opportunity offered and in his teaching emphasized compassionate treatment for them.

The Emperor Asoka was animated by compassion towards men and animals. One of his edicts reads in parts :—

Everywhere has His Sacred and Gracious Majesty made curative arrangements for men and beasts. Medicinal herbs also, wholesome for men and for beasts, roots too, and fruits wherever they were lacking, have been both imported and planted. On the roads both wells have been caused to be dug and trees planted for the enjoyment of man and beast.

A meritorious thing is abstention from the slaughter of living creatures.

In times past Their Sacred Majesties used to go on so-called "pleasure tours", during which hunting and other similar amusements were practised. His Sacred and Gracious Majesty the King, how-

ever, after he had been consecrated ten years, went forth on the road to wisdom.

In Japanese history we find many instances of Reverence for Life. In the period of the Civil Wars (*Sengoku-jidai*) the Buddhist temples kept records of the deaths not only of friends but of enemies and also of animals. To set free creatures destined to be killed is a Buddhist custom in China and Japan, and it has played its part in turning people's mind to compassion. In the ancient Shinto rules recorded in the *Engishiki*, we find admonitions against the killing of animals. Shotoku Taishi, the Japanese Prince, Buddhist scholar and lawmaker, respected animals and inculcated kindness to them. Ruokwan, surnamed "Iwö Bosatsu", a holy priest of Kamakura, helped not only sick people but also animals, maintaining shelters for horses, oxen and dogs. Zen Buddhism teaches reverence not only for teachers, animals and plants, but even for fire and water, for all are forms of life.

St. Francis of Assisi also spoke of Wind and Fire as his Brothers and Water and Earth as his Sisters. He called the fish his brothers, the doves his sisters. Lecky tells us that the wild beasts attended St. Theon when he walked abroad, and the saint rewarded them by giving them drink out of his well. An Egyptian hermit had made a beautiful garden in the desert, and used to sit beneath the palm-trees while a lion ate fruit from his hand. When St. Poemen was shivering one winter night a lion crouched beside him and became his covering. Lecky tells us also of ancient legislative protection for animals.

"The ox, as a principal agent in agriculture, and therefore a kind of symbol of civilization, was in many different countries regarded with a peculiar reverence." The sanctity attached to it in Egypt is well known. The beautiful passage in which the psalmist describes how the sparrow could find shelter in the temple was as applicable to Greece as to Jerusalem. The sentiment of Xenocrates who, when a bird pursued by a hawk took refuge in his breast, caressed and finally released it, saying to his disciples that a good man should never give up a suppliant, was believed to be shared by the gods, and it was regarded as an act of impiety to disturb the birds which had built their nests beneath the porticoes of the temple.

Among the early Romans it was for long actually a capital offence to slaughter an ox, that animal being in a special sense the fellow-labourer of man. A similar law is said to have existed in Greece in early times. Despite the Roman games with their cruelty to men and animals, Roman literature, and that of nations subject to Rome, abound in delicate touches displaying a high degree of sensitiveness to the feelings of the animal world. Lucretius drew a beautiful picture of the sorrows of the bereaved cow whose calf had been sacrificed upon the altar. This tender interest in animal life is a distinctive feature of Virgil's poetry. Plutarch urged kindness to animals with a zeal unparalleled in Christian writings for seventeen hundred years. He wrote :—

We certainly ought not to treat living creatures like shoes or household goods

which, when worn out with use, we throw away, and were it only to learn benevolence to humankind, we should be merciful to other creatures. For my own part, I would not sell even an old ox that had laboured for me. . . . I cannot without grief see so much as an innocent beast pursued and killed that has no defence, and from which we have received no hurt at all.

We do not treat animals with love and respect because we lack understanding and consideration for them ; and the universal sympathy which the Buddha, the Bodhisattvas and many saints have possessed.

How dare man think himself civilized when he considers the unthinkable atrocities perpetrated upon the hapless and defenceless animals ? Schweitzer says that when we think of this there should spring " a compulsion to do to every animal all the good we possibly can ".

By helping an insect when it is in difficulties I am hereby attempting to cancel part of man's ever new debt to the animal world. Whenever an animal is in any way forced into the service of man, every one of us must be concerned with the suffering which it has thereby to undergo. None of us must allow to take place any suffering for which he himself is not responsible, if he can hinder it in any way, at the same time quieting his conscience with the reflexion that he would be mixing himself up in something which does not concern him. No one must shut his eyes and regard as non-existent the sufferings of which he spares himself the sight. Let no one regard as light the burden of his responsibility. While so much ill-treatment of animals goes on, while the moans of thirsty animals in railway trucks sound unheard, while so much brutality prevails in our slaughterhouses, while animals have to suffer in our kitchens painful death from unskilled hands, while animals have to endure intolerable treatment from heartless men, or are

left to the cruel play of children, we all share the same guilt.

Some call this feeling for animals sentimentality. But there are many others who feel that "Reverence for Life is the highest court of appeal". John Galsworthy writes :—

Our modern sentiment towards animals is not parvenu. Nor is it excessive. The love for animals aids and abets a general benevolence.

Reverence for Life in connection with animals is an extension of Reverence for Life in our fellow-men. If I have laid more stress upon Reverence for Life in animals than in men it is because it is less practised and is a lesson much needed to-day. True, cruelty and lack of consideration for children, for aged persons, for the poor, is among us. Schweitzer felt it so strongly that it compelled him to go to the rescue of the sick Negro in Africa, who may be taken as a symbol for all sick, unhappy, lonely souls who need our help, consideration and reverence. *Man's lack of respect for man is something to which we cannot close our eyes.* But how seldom we find respect for animal life ! In my opinion this rev-

erence for life is what we need most to cultivate, for faithfully practised it would put an end to war and to the exploitation of both men and animals.

I have quoted much from Albert Schweitzer because his views on this subject coincide with my own and are expressed more valuably. He is a Christian but much of his thought is closely akin to Eastern thought which through many teachers upholds Reverence for Life. Santi-Deva, a Mahayana teacher, urges us to bear the sorrow of others, to take and practise the Bodhisattva's vow :—

May I ever accompany and protect all sentient beings, remove from them things that are not beneficial and give innumerable blessings, and also, through the sacrifice of my body, life and possessions, may I embrace all creatures and thereby practise the Right Doctrine.

The ideal of the Bodhisattva as found in Mahayana Buddhism is, I think, the superlative expression of the principle of Reverence for Life. Let us all aspire to the understanding and love of the compassionate Bodhisattva.

BEATRICE LANE SUZUKI

"I will not hurt any living thing needlessly. Nor destroy any beautiful thing, but will strive to save comfort all gentle life and protect all natural beauty."

—RUSKIN

DHARMA RAJYA

DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES

[Last month we printed the first study in this series by H. Krishna Rao of Mysore on the good character of the rulers, which is regarded as a basic principle for right Democracy, as the following article shows.—Eds.]

The scope of the present article is the examination of Indian political thought in the light of Democracy. The term democracy is used as a form of Society or State. The Democratic State is consistent with any form of Government so long as all laws and institutions are framed with a view to public welfare. In estimating public welfare every one is to be counted as one, and in allocating public offices every one is considered to be as good as another. Democracy, thus understood, means the progress of all under the leadership of the best with the consent of all.* Full consent and Government are incompatible. Government by consent ordinarily means that Government rests on the *moral* acquiescence of the ruled.† Democracy is not a sum in addition. It is a genuine union of true individuals, for Democracy depends upon the creative power of every man.‡

Public welfare (*Lokahita*) is the very purpose for the realisation of which the state stands in India. Government in Indian thought is in the nature of a conditional contract.§ The power of the ruler is limited

from within and without. Righteousness binds the king in all his actions. He who is unrighteous ceases to be a king. “A king of unrighteous character...though an Emperor, falls a prey either to the fury of his own subjects or to that of his enemies”.** The right of the people to depose a bad ruler is inherent in Indian thought. If the king be an enemy of virtue, the people should resist him as the ruiner of the state and such bad rulers may be deposed by the priests and ministers and their successors may be appointed.†† Royal prosperity, which is so difficult to attain and more so to retain, entirely depends upon the good will of the multitude and rests steadily *only* on the moral purity of the ruler. A king possessed of loyal subjects and royal qualities is greatly to be desired.‡‡ Subjects are loyal when their ruler washes them clean like a washer-man, washing away their dust without taking away their dye.§§ If the ruler is infatuated with the concept of power and filled with greed and pride, he is bound to lose what has been acquired.*†

Ministers are neither mere crea-

* Hernshaw, *Democracy at the Crossways*, (Chap. I).

† Lindsay, *Essentials of Democracy*, (Lecture I).

‡ Miss Forlet, *The New State*, (Introduction).

§ Cf. Locke : “Why does political power exist? It can only be for public good.” (Quoted by Professor Laski).

** Kautilya.

†† *Sukra Nitisara*.

‡‡ *Kamandaka Nitisara*.

§§ *Mahabharata*.

*† Brihaspathi.

tures of rulers nor party men. They are men of character and ability. It is their duty to know what is unknown, or partly known, to decide what is already known, and to dissipate doubts.* Their aim is to combine order with progress. If there is no improvement in the State's extent, population, efficiency, revenue, if the administration is jeopardised by the ministerial counsel, what is the good of having such men?† The ministers are to be loyal to their masters and selfless in their work. They should not do anything that is good for the king but harmful to the people.‡ Even a son at variance with policy is an enemy. Dharma is the main factor, not personal objects. One bad man ruins many. Fate depends upon manhood.§ The king should appoint men to office after examining their fitness for it and he should know that there is no person who is utterly unfit. He should appoint them by rotation and should have three men for each department, the wisest of them for three to ten years. He should never give office for ever to anybody. One should judge the ministers by their record of work. Nothing should be done by any officer without a written order. The written document with the King's seal is the real king ; the king is not a king.**

The acts of ministers should be in conformity with Dharma. Councillors must speak of measures regard-

less of their master's preference. The fruit of policy is the attainment of Righteousness (*Dharma*), Productive works (*Artha*) and Enjoyment (*Kama*) and the last two are to be tested by Righteousness (*Dharma*). The Council is meant to effect unity of opinion.†† Acts regarding which the minds of Councillors agree and which are not contrary to the spirit of the time should be passed.‡‡ All administrative measures are to be deliberated in a well-formed Council. Utmost secrecy is to be maintained in all Council proceedings. The ruler should consult ministers individually and collectively and ascertain their ability by judging the reasons they assign for their opinion.§§ He should seriously weigh any opinion they give before taking action on it.*† In case of difference of opinion among them he shall not generally abandon the many for the sake of one but if that one transcends the many in consequence of possession of many accomplishments, then he shall for that one abandon the many.*‡

Judicial administration is popular and righteous. Representatives of different communities are to be consulted by the King in administering justice. Persons so chosen should be men of dignity, free from envy, conversant with *Sruti* and *Smriti*, impartial and competent to decide readily between disputants.*§ There should be no delay in justice and no secret trial. Provision should be made for :—

* Kautilya.

† *Sukra Nitisara*.

‡ *Sukra Nitisara*.

§ Brihaspathi.

** *Sukra Nitisara*.

†† Brihaspathi.

‡‡ *Sukra Nitisara*.

§§ Kautilya.

*† *Sukra Nitisara*.

*‡ *Mahabharata*.

*§ *Mahabharata*.

- (a) Trial by one's equals in case of artisans, agriculturists, corporations, etc.,
- (b) Local men to judge matters in dispute,
- (c) Panels of judges, three, five or seven in number,
- (d) Courts of various grades of intelligence to help people in getting justice at the hands of the State.

The king would be considered a sinner if he were to decide cases arbitrarily without reference to *Dharma Sastra*. Judicial investigations are vitiated through the greed of the king

and his ministers. The Councillors should not be indifferent to a King's immoral methods of procedure in judicial administration.* Righteousness consists in inflicting chastisement on all offenders, rich and poor, according to the measure of their offence.† Punishment accorded with due consideration makes people devoted to righteousness, productive works and enjoyment. Punishment ill-awarded on account of greed, anger and ignorance excites fury even among hermits, not to speak of householders.‡

H. KRISHNA RAO

* *Sukra Nitisara*.

† *Mahabharata*.

‡ *Kautilya*.

OCCULT AND MODERN SCIENCE

[This extract from *The Secret Doctrine*, I. 477-8 should be read to better appreciate the article which follows.—Eds.]

So far as Science remains what in the words of Prof. Huxley it is, viz., "organized common sense"; so far as its inferences are drawn from accurate premises—its generalizations resting on a purely inductive basis—every Theosophist and Occultist welcomes respectfully and with due admiration its contributions to the domain of cosmological law. There can be no possible conflict between the teachings of occult and so-called exact Science, where the conclusions of the latter are grounded on a substratum of unassailable fact. It is only when its more ardent exponents, over-stepping the limits of observed phenomena in order to penetrate into the arcana of Being, attempt to wrench the formation of Kosmos and its *living* Forces from Spirit, and attribute all to blind matter, that the Occultists claim the right to dispute and call in question their theories. Science cannot, owing to the very nature of things, unveil the mystery of the universe around us. Science can, it is true, collect, classify, and generalize upon phenomena; but the occultist, arguing from admitted metaphysical data, declares that the daring explorer, who would probe the inmost secrets of Nature, must transcend the narrow limitations of sense, and transfer his consciousness into the region of noumena and the sphere of primal causes. To effect this, he must develop faculties which are absolutely dormant—save in a few rare and exceptional cases—in the constitution of the off-shoots of our present Fifth Root-race in Europe and America. He can in no other conceivable manner collect the facts on which to base his speculations. Is this not apparent on the principles of Inductive Logic and Metaphysics alike?

—H. P. BLAVATSKY

SCIENCE AND OCCULTISM

THE LAW OF CYCLES

[J. S. Collis lectured for seven years at Toynbee Hall in the Adult Education Movement ; he is the author of *G. B. Shaw, Forward to Nature, Farewell to Argument* and *Irishman's England*. This thought-provoking article is referred to on page 160. We also draw our readers' attention to page 138 where the position of the Occultist in reference to modern science is given in the words of H. P. Blavatsky. —Eds.]

I find extremely difficult to see why people want to divide knowledge up into distinct types. I have recently been reading the works of Madame Blavatsky who is regarded—is she not?—as an occultist, *par excellence*. But the reader of *Isis Unveiled* and *The Secret Doctrine* is overwhelmed, even knocked down and floored, by the enormous extent of her intellectual knowledge. She states facts. Not high-flown ones but the very kind open to direct scrutiny and corroboration or contradiction by others. When in *Isis Unveiled** she says, “No subsequent people has been so proficient in geometry as the builders of the Pyramids and other Titanic monuments, antediluvian and postdiluvian. On the other hand, none has ever equalled them in the practical interrogation of nature”; when she categorically states what were the facts recognised by Plato and Aristotle ; when she tells us that in 2000 B.C. the Hindu sages and scholars were acquainted with the rotundity of our globe and the Helio-centric System ; when she speaks to us of the contents of the *Ebers Papyrus*, of the medical teachings of the Kabala, of the marvellous knowledge of natural science upon which Chal-

dean Magic was based, of the so-called magical effects brought about by natural active causes—we do not feel that we are dealing with an unscientific author, but rather with one who in the truest scientific way wishes to use all the facts and all the senses in her pursuit of absolute truth.

When we are dealing with facts or what we believe to be facts, how can we be scientists *or* occultists ? What is the difference between a scientific fact and an occult fact ? For instance, Madame Blavatsky † divides human and cosmic history into great cycles of about forty thousand years when the polar and equatorial climates gradually change places and when, according to popular tradition, the world in turn is burnt and deluged. Such a statement is either true or false : it cannot be either scientific or occult—unless it be supposed that occultism is a sort of inspired guess occurring in some mysterious way in the head of a mysterious person.

In *Isis Unveiled* Madame Blavatsky states that the ancient philosophers divided the interminable periods of human existence on this planet into cycles, during each of which human races gradually reached

* Vol. I., p. 22.

† *Isis Unveiled* Vol. I, pp. 30-31.

the culminating point of spiritual evolution and then gradually relapsed into abject barbarism. To what eminence the race in its progress had *several times* arrived "may be feebly surmised by the wonderful monuments of old, still visible, and the descriptions given by Herodotus of other marvels of which no traces now remain". And only from hearsay was he able to give a report of some marvellous subterranean chambers of the Labyrinth where lay the sacred remains of the King-Initiates.*

In 1888, as every one knows, Madame Blavatsky produced *The Secret Doctrine*, one of the most difficult and amazing books ever published. It is a mass of statements dealing with the birth and history of our planet. For some time it was assumed that as she was an "occultist" her facts must be wrong. But it so happens that her statements are now found to tally with those of modern scientists. In which case we must acknowledge that science and occultism cannot be fundamentally antagonistic. That occultism is not fundamentally opposed to science but is rather the complement and the missing soul of the latter is indicated by these statements in *The Secret Doctrine* :

No Occultist would deny that man—no less than the elephant and the microbe, the crocodile and the lizard, the blade of grass or the crystal—is, in his physical formation, the simple product of the evolutionary forces of nature through a numberless series of transfor-

mations ; but he puts the case differently.†

That man originates like other animals in a cell and develops "through stages undistinguishable from those of fish, reptile, and mammal until the cell attains the highly specialized development of the quadrumanous and *at last the human type*," is an Occult axiom thousands of years old. The Kabalistic axiom : "A stone becomes a plant ; a plant a beast ; a beast a man ; a man God", holds good throughout the ages.‡

The Occultists trace cycle merging into cycle, containing and contained in an endless series. The embryo evolving in its pre-natal sphere, the individual in his family, the family in the state, the state in mankind, the Earth in our system, that system in its central universe, the universe in the Kosmos, and the Kosmos in the ONE CAUSE...thus runs *their* philosophy of evolution.§

Madame Blavatsky said in *The Secret Doctrine* that the earth is the fourth of a chain of seven globes. Evolution takes place by means of seven successive journeys, during which a main stream of life passes round and round this chain. Each complete Cycle is called a Round, while the seven Rounds complete the evolution of the Chain. We are now in the Fourth Round, and the time since evolution in this cyclic form began on our planet is roughly two thousand million years.** (See especially *The Secret Doctrine*. "Stanzas from the book of Dzyan".)

Recently scientists, adopting the methods of astronomical calculations in regard to the orbit of Mercury, considering the deposition of the sedi-

* *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. I, p. 5.

† *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 636.

‡ *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. II, p. 258.

§ *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. II, p. 189.

** *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. II, p. 68.

mentary rocks and so on, have come to the same figure as that advanced by Madame Blavatsky. Sir James Jeans* says :

While these various figures do not admit of any very exact estimate of the earth's age, they all indicate that this must be measured in thousands of millions of years. [Which was not the "scientific" view when *The Secret Doctrine* was written.] But if we wish to fix our thoughts on a round number, then probably two thousand million years is the best to select.

Unless this is a mere coincidence it is absurd to say that science is any more scientific than occultism.

But the idea of coincidence will not do ; for coming to the next step, we recognize that if Madame Blavatsky was right in saying that a current of life goes seven times round, then life must necessarily appear and disappear on the earth after definite periods of time, periods of activity followed by periods of inaction and lifelessness. *The Secret Doctrine* states that the earth has already passed through three such major periods of activity and is at present in the fourth.

Does Geology support this ? Does it find traces of such periods and intervals on the materials of the earth ? We find that this is so, that the geologist is compelled to divide past time on earth into Eras quite separate from one another and with distinct characteristics. The successive breaks in the geological record have forced scientists to the conclusion that the earth has passed

through a series of cycles or rhythmic changes. Summarising these findings, H. G. Wells and Julian Huxley in *The Science of Life* say :

The great earth revolutions seem to come at regular intervals. What causes this rhythm of occurrence is not our concern ; what does concern us is the fact that these revolutions have the profoundest effect upon life's development.

In short, the occultist speaks in terms of Rounds and the scientist in terms of Eras, and instead of First, Second, Third, and Fourth Rounds the latter says the Archeozoic Era, the Protozoic Era, the Paleozoic Era and the Mesozoic Era.

And if we further examine the occult descriptions of the earth during the First Round as advanced by Madame Blavatsky together with the scientific evidence we again get a remarkable agreement. The first says that the earth was fiery, cool and radiant as its ethereal men and animals were during the First Round.† Such terrestrial conditions as prevailed had no touch with the astral or ethereal evolution then proceeding.‡ All forms being ethereal no fossil traces would remain. The scientists speak of the earth beginning in a nebulous condition at a high temperature, life beginning as tiny floating drops of jelly-like protoplasm—this not being at all impossible since "living organisms are still found to exist at a temperature of 150°-180° Fahrenheit in the hot springs of the Yellowstone Park."§ Green scum (*algæ*) appeared in the hot mud—"Life may be said to dawn, but

* *The Universe Around Us*.

† *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 252, foot-note.

‡ *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. II, p. 157.

§ Professor Schuckert, *The Earth and Its Rhythms*.

being soft-bodied would have no fossil traces". The agreement is more or less complete.

According to *The Secret Doctrine*, each Round repeats the same evolution on a more solid material basis, the astral prototypes of vegetation, animals and men in earlier Rounds contributing to the formation of the types in this one,* though only in the Fourth or the present Round did the Earth reach its present stage of density,† or even physical vegetation its present form.‡ The break or interlude before the rhythm of life returns for the Fourth Round is acknowledged by Wells to represent millions of years. When the veil lifts, science declares, the Age of Reptiles is at an end, the stupendous monsters have absolutely disappeared—and the Age of Man begins.

We see, then, that the rhythmic and cyclic flow of life is the finding of both occultists and scientists. If this is so then I cannot understand how occultism can be regarded as something upon which it is less safe

to rely than science. The occultist does not receive his facts haphazard out of the blue. He adds two and two together from his knowledge of the ancient scientists.

To my mind it is not safe to read the scientists without the occultists. For if we do we are, or up till recently have been, in danger of thinking of evolution not in terms of cycles but in terms of a steady progression. Madame Blavatsky continually reminds us of the *immense* antiquity of man, and of how the oldest esoteric traditions teach that many races of human beings have lived and died out in turn and that some of those races may have been far more perfect than anything we know of—a real spiritual race, a race of gods. There is no proof that the closer we come to the origin of man, the more savage and brute-like he must be. "Plato describes admirably in *Phædrus*", Madame Blavatsky reminds us, "the state in which man once was, and what he will become again : before, and after the 'loss of his wings.' "§

J. S. COLLIS

It is not physical Science that we can ever ask to read man for us, as the riddle of the Past, or that of the Future ; since no philosopher is able to tell us even what man is, as he is known both to physiology and psychology. In doubt whether man was "a god or beast," he is now connected with the latter and derived from an animal. No doubt that the care of analyzing and classifying the human being as a *terrestrial animal* may be left to Science, which occultists—of all men—regard with veneration and respect. They recognize its ground and the wonderful work done by it, the progress achieved in physiology, and even—to a degree—in biology. But man's *inner*, spiritual, psychic, or even moral, nature cannot be left to the tender mercies of an ingrained materialism ; for not even the higher psychological philosophy of the West is able, in its present incompleteness and tendency towards a decided agnosticism, to do justice to the inner.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY.—*The Secret Doctrine*, I. 636

* *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. II, pp. 256-7.

† *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 252, footnote.

‡ *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. II, p. 186.

§ *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. I, p. 2.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE RELIGIOUS QUEST

[This month our reviewers have supplied us with viands which enable us to make up a very interesting menu—progressively entertaining ; not that the latter reviews are more tasty than the earlier ones, but the sequence is progressive in developing the theme of Religion—from sectarianism to mystical idealism.—EDS.]

LITERATURE AND SPIRITUALITY

[The first review examines the influence of the Victorians on the twentieth century ; their "lack of spiritual certainty" has left its mark on us, but this "lack" is examined from the point of view of literature and misses the spring from which "a new creative tide must flow"—is already flowing.—EDS.]

Towards the Twentieth Century. Essays in the Spiritual History of the Nineteenth. By H. V. ROUTH. (Cambridge University Press. 21s.)

"The more one examines oneself and talks to other people", writes Dr. Routh at the beginning of this long and very able book, "the more it becomes evident that what the twentieth century lacks is spiritual certainty". And since, as he is able to show, all our most daring and destructive ideas were freely mooted among our fathers and grandfathers and we are still living on the thoughts which they originated, he believes that we may win to a glimpse of the future by looking towards the past and discovering to what extent and why the eminent Victorians, despite their show of confidence, failed to achieve as writers and teachers the integrity which is the mark of all great literature. His book therefore is well described as "an inquiry into ourselves as tested by our predecessors". The Victorians were the heirs of the Romantic Movement and if they could have developed what was true in that movement, its enlarged spiritual vision, and outgrown the false egoism or futile titanism in it, things would have been very different. Goethe, in Dr. Routh's view, succeeded in doing this, Emerson failed. In thus making Goethe and Emerson illustrate the strength and weakness of the epoch which they close he

overestimates, I think, the integrity with which the one bridged the rift which had sprung across the culture of Europe and undervalues the spiritual insight of the other. But certainly in investigating the expedients by which Victorians tried to bridge the gulf he is able to adduce homesickness for the past as one of the maladies which most disabled them. This is particularly true of Newman, Tennyson, Browning, Carlyle, Clough and Arnold ; less so of Froude and Ruskin. And to each of these he devotes full and searching chapters. Each of them, he concludes, laboured in different degrees under a secret sense of weakness, and was unable to reconcile insight with experience. Each of them embodied a conflict between culture, which restores a man to the consciousness of his intimate self, and civilisation, represented in the social activities of his epoch. And so amid the perplexingly rapid and ramified developments of the nineteenth century they found an increasing difficulty in rallying their true selves. In Arnold the quest of spiritual self-possession amid the welter of intellectual distractions became more conscious but his attempt to live on the spirit of Homer, Sophocles, Shakespeare or Goethe, because his own spirit was unfulfilled, inevitably failed. The essence of a great writer's genius, as Dr. Routh remarks, depends on his belief in himself, not as an infallible

authority, but as an adventurer on the threshold of a more spiritually perfect existence, which could be shared by others. And lacking this belief, each of these representative Victorians was driven to take refuge in a traditional culture against the evils of their own age, which they misjudged because they were not at home in it. Nor were the rationalists or those in whom "rationalism impinged on reason" in much better case. Dr. Routh concentrates on three of them, Mill, Spencer and George Eliot and finds each of them disappointing. They explain too much, they mistake the problem of society for the problem of life, and while a controversial one-sidedness was inevitable to Mill and Spencer, George Eliot, despite or because she aimed at humanising science, failed in the one thing demanded of an imaginative writer, real creativeness. A chapter on Darwin, Huxley and Haeckel traces the further advance of rationalism and materialism in the century and how it influenced imaginative writers to become neo-realists, with no other standard by which to measure life than their own inhibitions and disappointments. Gissing, Meredith and Hardy are taken as examples of such neo-realism. Finally a chapter is given to three philosophical humanists, Butler, Nietzsche and Bergson, who have encouraged the twentieth century to turn its back on the past and start on the exploration of its subconscious self. Such a summary of Dr. Routh's penetrating survey may suggest unfairly that he finds no virtue in and allows no greatness to these eminent Victorians. But that is far from the truth. His essays are as full of fine literary appreciation as they are persistently critical of a spiritual inadequacy. Yet he is driven at the end to describe Victorian literature as a magnificent failure,

not for lack of genius or idealism,

but because the spirit always rears its fabric on intellectual foundations; and these in the nineteenth century crumbled. The foundations had crumbled because man is bound to seek an enlargement of power and in this case had found it in science—both a new direction of himself and a new control of his circumstances—but had not found an adequate recognition and expression of this victory in religion and culture. The consciousness of power had stopped short at the intellect. So the first problem of the twentieth century would necessarily be the creation of ideas and ideals to serve a spiritual revival: to restore our zest in life, our confidence in our species and consequently in our intimate selves, without sacrificing intellectual truth.

This is well put. But Dr. Routh has little to offer the "modern man of culture" who is now "looking for a new spirituality which must be authorised by science and yet contain a religious value". And this is inevitable for one who considers the problem only from the standpoint of literature. Doubtless a new spirituality would in time create for itself a literature which would give it "the clear outline of a living form". But Dr. Routh has shown clearly enough in his Victorians how far fine writing and the atmosphere of books can be from reality and how it can enervate the spirit which it consoles. Yet he fails in the end to realise how free from all "literary" associations the birth and growth of a new spirituality may be. And so in conceiving the culture of the future, "the world of humanistic insight and scientific imagination, which poets, moralists, and novel writers also must capture," he is bound by a too "literary" view of life and overlooks the deepest channels through which a new creative tide must flow. But as a survey of the way in which the human spirit betrayed an inner conflict through the literature of a century his book is a fine piece of imaginative research.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

SECTARIANISM

[The tendency to monopolize the Spirit still prevails in the Occident ; of this mystical sectarianism the two following reviews make mention. Dr. Betty Heimann, an exile from Germany now employed by the London School of Oriental Studies, not only is biassed in favour of Christianity but also thinks that even in philosophy East and West will not meet. "Religious tradition" is "equated with Christian tradition" and professor Goodenough seems to miss the point that unless Christianity regains the universal basis which Jesus gave to it and which the Church has destroyed, it is of little value even to Christendom. He does not write about Religious Tradition and Myth, but about Christian Tradition and Myth.—Eds.]

Indian and Western Philosophy. A Study in Contrasts. By BETTY HEIMANN. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 5s.)

In reply to my pointed query whether Indian philosophical doctrines, now claimed to have been popularised in the West, as the result of research and publications by some Indian and European scholars, have in any vital degree influenced the life and conduct of the civilized Western nations, Dr. F. W. Thomas, Boden Professor of Sanskrit at Oxford University and President of the Oriental Conference which has just concluded its session in Trivandrum, has written to me admitting that Indian philosophy and philosophical doctrines *have not materially altered or affected the outlook of the West on life*. Dr. Betty Heimann's booklet under notice sets forth and demonstrates this thesis with added emphasis. Her conclusions are these :—

(1) The contrast between Indian and Western philosophy is grounded on factors climatic and geographical. (2) The *force majeure* of tropical nature is responsible for the characteristic Religion, Theology, Ethics, Logic, Æsthetics, Sciences, in fact, pure and applied, of India. The conditions of the temperate zone are responsible for the characteristic Western culture and civilization. (3) The contrast between the two types of culture and civilization is vital and real and their *rapprochement* apparent and unreal.

I do not know whether existence in the temperate zone made Dr. Heimann make the grammatical blunder of NYAYAM (p. 42)—this must be deemed inexcusable in a philologist-Indologist—and remark that the "Indian God appears to be divested of every personal attribute of divine Omnipotence"

(p. 45) but one thing is certain. Unless Dr. Heimann abandons the absolutely sterile and barren philological method of research, there is no hope of her understanding the significance of the truths of Indian philosophy in the right perspective.

I regret to note that Dr. Heimann's assessment of the value of Indian philosophy stands vitiated by *two* dominant psychological currents. There is the feeling that Christianity offers a better God than the Vedanta or the other Indian systems, and side by side with it, the equally strong feeling that the climatic conditions of the temperate zone have made man not merely the measure of all things, but the unquestioned master of his destiny—secular and spiritual.

The significant question, however, is this :— Granted that the Kipling touch in philosophy paints the true picture of life and culture in East and West, is the maximum spiritual advantage secured by the pattern of conduct available in the temperate zone or that in the tropical? Sooner or later, the question has to be boldly faced and answered. Sri Sankara is said to have expressed horror at the apparently endless prospect of transmigratory thralldom. ("*Punarapi-jananam - punarapi - maranam-punarapi-jananee-jathare-sayanam...*"). Is escape from this possible?

The Kipling touch in philosophy is not at all a matter for regret and artificial unity-mongering is the bane of all philosophy and of conduct based on it, but Dr. Heimann's "Epilogue" is most disappointing. Indian philosophy is cosmic. Western philosophy is anthropological. Granted. Does Dr. Heimann envisage a higher synthesis *à la* the Hege-

lian, which is intended to swallow up both? Or is a third and radically different pattern visible anywhere on the horizon? To none of these and allied questions are there any answers in Dr. Heimann's book. I am sure the reviewer's disappointment will be shared by others. I desire to submit in conclusion that Dr. Heimann's Sanskrit

requires brushing up. UPADHI (pp. 80-156) in Nyaya-Vaisesika is irreconcilably different from UPADHI in Advaita-Vedanta. None of these comments would touch the general excellence, however, with which Dr. Heimann has worked out the contrasts between Indian and Western Philosophy.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Religious Tradition and Myth. By ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH. (Yale University Press. \$ 1.50)

The intellectuals of the modern world are in an unstable and untenable position. Most of them were brought up in a world of certainties and have made of it in every direction a world of uncertainty.

The spread of scientific knowledge, now flooding softly after the stormy breaking of the dykes in the last century, the study of comparative religion, the political and economic chaos, the shadow of the vulture wings of war, all these have left the modern man in a stage of complete uncertainty about everything, have left him a weary agnostic without even the fierce delight that inspired agnostics of a previous generation to give battle to the hallowed certainties of tradition. We are in a sceptic's paradise in which everything may be doubted, in which everything is doubted. The God of sceptics has rewarded his worshippers—our mouths are filled with dust and ashes. Our faith is nil and as the *Gita* says, "what a man's faith is, that is he himself".

This book is, however, no mere lament for the lost certainties of the past; still less is it an attempt to set those certainties upon their feet once more, a thing which the author sees cannot and should not be.

Yet, the more I live with my unbelieving associates, the more I am apt to discover that we, in surprising proportion, have, as our most carefully guarded secret, a vital if lonely sense of mystical association with that same perfection of which our ancestors spoke so freely.

The author feels profoundly that "the loneliness and inarticulateness of the

modern intellectual's religious life is robbing our civilization of one of its deepest needs" and his aim is to try and render the modern man's inchoate mystical feelings more articulate and so more vivid by an analysis of the fundamental elements which flowed in the mixed stream of Christianity and for so long made it the living thing it was for Western men.

The first stream, the ethical idealism of the Jewish prophets (and summed up by Jesus) with its insistence on "mercy and not sacrifice" is still a necessity for us but it must be divorced from its association with an anthropomorphic, or at least anthropo-pathic God and conceived as an ethic immanent in the human heart.

The second stream gives us the metaphysical God of Greek philosophy, the abstract centre of the sphere of being, the unseen sun behind the blaze of light, the unthought mind behind the changing thoughts. Our metaphysics may have developed in new directions but there is still the need for such an absolute being, the unconceived and inconceivable term of all our thoughts.

The third stream is that of Greek nature worship. This has passed into Christianity in the form of the worship of local saints and of "Our Lady", of this, that and the other place, a worship really of local goddesses loosely syncretised. This worship is an expression of that sense of communion with nature which has inspired so much poetry and is perhaps a vital necessity for a healthy psyche but the author omits to note that it has roots which go down into the bog of primæval superstition and that in times of crisis its tree bears sinister fruits.

The fourth stream is that of the Hellenistic "mystery" tradition especially as exemplified in Philo Judæus. The myths of the various traditions (including the Jewish) were seen to be glyphs of the return of the Soul from its immersion in matter to the realms of pure spirit. It gave Christianity its sacramental mysticism and the higher forms of prayer. Its symbolic treatment of the Divine mediators may teach us to tread the mystic path to the inconceivable Godhead without entangling ourselves in hard and fast dogmas about the nature of the mediating Logos, the forth-streaming "utterance" of Light.

The author's contention is that each of these four streams represents something vital and enduring in the human psyche, something that cannot be destroyed and can only be suppressed at our peril. They are present within us whether

we will or no and it is time for us to come to terms with them by giving them an expression in harmony with the best thought of our times.

The author's arguments are straight and scholarly with none of the apologetic special pleading that mars so many books on the subject. "Religious tradition" for him seems to be equated with Christian tradition and this is certainly a limitation in the book, the title of which suggests a wider field. Perhaps he considers that Christianity is the only living option for the average Western man. Those of us who think otherwise must at least remember that non-Christian religions are often romantic exotics in the West and that *other things being equal* a scheme of symbolism that has its roots in the cultural past of a nation is more likely to bear healthy fruits for the average man.

SRI KRISHNA PREM

IDEALS WESTERN, EASTERN, UNIVERSAL

[Leaving the past and tradition behind we come upon an attempt to recover ideals of social philosophy and of the philosophy of religion; according to our learned reviewer the book falls short because the Indian points of view on different problems are not considered.—EDS.]

The Recovery of Ideals. By GEORGIA HARKNESS. (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.)

It used to be said of the Irishman that he does not know what he wants but that he won't be happy till he gets it. The gibe may be urged as a literal truth in the case of the present generation. There is feverish activity everywhere but a total absence of anything that gives it meaning. There is supreme listlessness combined with movement, blank despair marked by surface gaiety, a tragedy of souls functioning without ideals. Even in countries like our own, where the war did not make itself felt as intensely and directly as in Europe, the contact with alien cultures has been responsible for the numerous disinte-

grating influences noted by Professor Harkness. The old ideals are gone; fresh moorings have not been secured; in the meantime there is no faith in the possibility of any moorings. People cling to life not because life is worth while but because death seems even less so.

Redemption from such a situation cannot come with merely waiting for time or nature to effect their own cure. If ideals were really dead beyond hope of revival, creative idealism would be a delusion. But man is finite-infinite, sinner and saint; his very restlessness and despair testify to the persistence of ideals. Instead of ignoring them and being miserable, it is for him not merely to use them, but to live up to them,

letting them suffuse and inform his whole being. Many of our ideals are susceptible of explanation on psychological or socio-biological grounds; but this does not deprive them of compelling force. Origin does not detract from validity. Incarnating ideals in life, active saintliness, living greatly—such facile expressions hide practical problems, in solving which we seem to have no certain criterion. To look for such certainty, says our author, is futile; we can attain a great measure of practical certainty by a sufficiently comprehensive view; this is all that is attainable or essential.

So far Professor Harkness is clear, persuasive, inspiring and sound. Students of Indian culture will find much that is reminiscent of the Sankhya and the Vedanta. When she proceeds further, however, to develop her metaphysics, to elaborate her doctrine of God, the problem of evil and so on, both soundness and persuasiveness seem to be lacking, though the clarity remains.

The trouble with our author is that she is a half-way idealist. As a religious soul she will have it that God "triumphs already—and always—in the fullest sense", but she would avoid the metaphysical idealism which holds perfection to be always and eternally achieved. She says that God is both the source and the goal of ideals; but at the same time she would invest God with such personality as consists in "the power to envisage high goals and work toward their achievement". What precisely can be meant by this anomaly?

Again, it is not clear to our author how the moral could emerge from the non-moral. What does the moral progress towards? If it is true that God has triumphed already and always, does this not indicate a condition where there is no strife between good and evil, a non-moral condition? Such a ques-

tion is not envisaged, much less answered by our author. She would consider God limited by "inertia in things and chance in events", though these things and events are caused by Himself. Evil though *caused* by Him is not *willed* by Him; hence it constitutes a limitation in a sense to His power but not to His goodness; a useful analogy is that of a speech made by any of us; its consequences are caused by us but it often has many consequences, good and bad, not willed by us; it may be misreported, misinterpreted, misused. But surely what applies to a human agent who has to take the world as *given* to him cannot apply to God, and in spite of our author's cleverness in exhibiting a process as also a thing, the reader is left dissatisfied. It may be more satisfying to believe that God is limited than that God willed the Bihar or the Quetta earthquakes. But the limitation formulated must be such as does not disrupt our very conception of God.

In this, as indeed in her central quest, Professor Harkness would have derived much inspiration from Hindu thought if she had been familiar with it. The law of Karma (which is not even mentioned in the various answers to the problem of evil) would have supplied a more intelligible account of God's limitation. And for creative idealism and triumphant religion one would have found a firmer foundation in the doctrine that whatever object is dear is so, not for the sake of that object, but for the sake of the Self, a doctrine which starts from the ineradicable and inalienable basis of the Self and with its self-luminous radiance illumines all the vexed problems of personal and non-personal, creation and limitation, absolute and relative, God and man. *The Recovery of Ideals* would then have achieved a far greater measure of certainty.

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

[Here is the biography of a struggling soul who has passed through the Christian Science Church and then the Roman Church; war experience brought him to Socialism and to Yoga. The author is against the ecclesiastic, the soldier and the capitalist, but for Swami Vivekananda.—Eds.]

Victims Victorious. By W. O'SULLIVAN MOLONY. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

This is a fine, far-ranging and absorbingly interesting book. But it is hard to classify it, so varied are its contents and so informal, though bright and vivid, is the writing. Beginning as an autobiography, it passes into a treatise on the spiritual experiences of mystics—Christian, Sufi, Hindu and Buddhist—and ends up as a fierce polemical attack on Rightist forces and a vigorous plea for Communism. The "Victims" of the title are the People, and by some mysterious process (whether organisational or spiritual, we are not sure), the People are at last to be "Victorious". The book's chief defect is looseness of construction; but this is a weakness both amiable and thank-worthy, for to it we owe the presence between two covers of three excellent books, revealing, allusive and warmly generous by turns.

Mr. Molony is an Irishman who passed through Oxford (where he was a friend of Anthony Eden), Christian Science, Roman Catholicism, the Great War, Socialism and a serious illness. Before the book opens, he has had an inner experience of some moment in Switzerland, and now, aged forty, at a French hill-town overlooking the Mediterranean, he receives confirmation of the validity of that experience by study and practice of Vivekananda's *Raja-Yoga*. Calling himself a sensualist and a failure as an official, as a humourist and as an artist, he describes very prettily the dialectic movement in the process of his New Birth. While students of mysticism may well protest against his communistic diatribes, Communists may be impatient with his yogic exercises and his wanderings in hagiology, and indeed none may find this a wholly satisfying book, it must be to all its readers the next best thing, a disturbing book.

It is from Romain Rolland, "builder of bridges" not only between peoples, Eastern and Western, but also between religious mysticism and political communism, that Mr. Molony derives the quality and the fabric of his thesis, summed up in the simple statement of Ramakrishna: "If you wish to find God, serve Man." Vivekananda repeats the same message. It was his writings which revealed to Mr. Molony the oneness of the hidden Freedom of Man's spirit with the liberty of political and economic organisation, and thus saved him from developing "into a Jesuitical mystic, or into a Tantric mind-pirate with a taste for fanatical dictatorship over a sinful mankind". Mr. Molony agrees with the Mahayanist philosophers that Nirvana and Samsara are the same: "That which appears as Samsara to the ignorant is Nirvana to the enlightened. There is no question of crossing any river." The mystic who has experienced the highest bliss must come down again to use it in everyday life.

The heights are attainable by all. In religion as in the arts, all men have immeasurable latent powers, but in the people this inner mechanism lies inert, unused. The practical technique for experiencing "the eternal present" has been either unknown to the Churches or kept away from the people. Dominated by the spirit of politics and the lust of dogmatic rule, the well-established and well-housed religions have, according to Mr. Molony, become the enemies of man. But Communism, being a "total reaction upon life", is itself a real religion, a losing of the smaller in a larger collective self, a "re-binding" of broken parts. And it offers the motive, while Yoga supplies the means, for arousing the subconscious consciously.

One of the best chapters is devoted to voluntarily accepted poverty. The moral equivalent to war and revolution, which alone can destroy the triple alliance of

ecclesiastic, soldier and capitalist, is to be found in the new man liberated from material attachments, indifferent to personal poverty and therefore unbribable. Without equanimity and disinterested-

ness, there can be no heroism in practice. This is the teaching of the *Gita*, as of the Buddha, and without this there is no hope for the political reordering of the world.

K. SWAMINATHAN

[The Unitarians form a broadly liberal sect of Christianity. They recognize that religious tradition did not begin in Judea and that ideals inspired the ancient East also. The brochure examined, has an inspiring message for East and West alike.—EDS.]

World Vision. By LESLIE J. BELTON. (The Lindsey Press, London. 1s.)

The chapter titles of this little book : "Towards World Loyalty", "Towards a United World" and "Towards a Religion of Fellowship" represent the great needs of humanity, split up by conflicting and partisan loyalties into mutually antagonistic groups. "Nationhood and national sentiment are justified only as they contribute their distinctive genius to the well-being of mankind." (p. 13) Potentially they constitute "a terrible menace to the peace of the world". (p. 13) This danger cannot be combated through mere Pacifism, in itself a negative creed.

"Technical achievement has unified the world, materially" (p. 23) but mere physical unity, without consciousness of the spiritual oneness of the whole of humanity, must prove fatal to civilisation. Increasing recognition that "technical progress has outstripped sociological and psychological progress" (p. 24) is leading thinking minds to seek those universal ethics which will enable the power obtained through material knowledge to be used for constructive purposes. Orthodox religions claim to supply this need, but the various cults with their conflicting claims and revel-

ations, can only leave the seeker agnostic. To their discredit "stands the sorry story of persecutions, mass-conversions, and crusades". (p. 17) The great religious teachers are not "founders of new religions, but spiritual reformers, light-bringers, supreme exemplars of the art of life". (p. 46)

The last chapter refutes the exclusive claims made for Christianity.

Is Dr. Rabindranath Tagore the less noble a citizen of the world because he is not a Christian? Was Ramakrishna the less a saint because, for all his sympathy with other faiths, he remained a Hindu? The very questions are absurd on any sane and spiritual view... Charity, justice and truth are universal virtues, universal values belonging to the Religion of Man... (pp. 28-9) Only a Religion of Fellowship can save the world". (p. 17)

World Vision is a substantial contribution towards the fundamental object of the Theosophical Movement, "Universal Brotherhood". It should contribute to the "cultivation of a deeper understanding of the essential oneness of spiritual aspiration, and the futility of creedal strife", resulting in an ever-increasing number of men and women, "consecrated to the task of achieving world-order, world-fellowship and world-peace". (p. 31)

N. F. K.

[In this last review of this series we come upon the labours of an open-minded enquirer ; we shall draw attention to our reviewer's preference.—EDS.]

I Went to Church in New York. By W. M. BOMAR, Ph. D. (The Graymont Publishers, New York.)

This book represents quite a novel idea. Holding that "Man does not live by bread alone" and yet that he should be discriminating in his choice of spiritual sustenance, or at least stimulant (for such sustenance is only from within), the author went the rounds of the "Churches" in New York, and now presents the result, as heard from the pew so as to help the reader to make a choice. She offers no personal opinions, but simply reports a meeting of each of the organisations she visited. She gives us the hymns which were sung (excellent pointers to the temper of the "Church") as well as the sermons and lectures presented from pulpit or rostrum. Thus leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions, the author has produced a very useful and interesting book of 300 large pages.

The book deals with 31 organizations, ranging from the dogmatic and orthodox—Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Dutch Reformed, Congregational, Methodist Episcopal, Pentecostal, etc., through various liberal movements to the Humanists, Ethical Culture, Vedanta, Theosophy and even the Freethinkers. Divine grace is the predominant doctrine at one end of the series ; self-reliance at the other ; or to put this in other words, the divine is more able to touch us from without than within (as the within of us is so sinful), or *vice versa* (as the without is only Karma, and not particularly good Karma, at that).

It is quite important that the author went to Church in New York, for there he would find no hypocrisy, humbug, or church maintenance and attendance for mere social reasons, since nine out of ten of the population do not care whether any one whom they know or deal with goes to a church or not. Again, one finds the sermons of even the most orthodox

singularly liberal, for the spirit of the town permeates the churches.

It is not possible to give even a sketch, picture of any of the cults in a brief review, but in general one receives the impression of a riper, richer, more cultivated and artistic atmosphere in the older foundations than in most of the newer, some of which are quite crude and altogether too explanatory—too much concerned with the bones and muscles of the spiritual life, rather like an artist who might paint pictures of the digestive tract rather than the more pleasing and graceful exterior of the human form. All the same, every one of the movements has a charm of its own (even to the personal devil introduced to us with such earnest impressment by the speaker of the National Bible Institute—which by the way does a prodigious amount of public work ; in one branch alone, for example, 62,000 lodgings to homeless men and 140,000 free meals in the year). Not even one of them seems cursed by nationalism or such insincerities as the blessing of arms. There is very little religious "dope" in any of them.

If your reviewer may be permitted to use the book as the author intended, he will say that without hesitation he prefers the United Lodge of Theosophists meeting, at which there is shown all the humanism of the liberal churches, all the self-reliance of the more exotic cults, but in addition an appreciation of the idea of reincarnation as a means to whatever reasonable goal an aspirant may desire. This is much softer and more encouraging than the rather hectic affirmations with which some of the more exotic cults work their members up. It is noteworthy, incidentally, that the United Lodge of Theosophists in New York has not diverted its energies to ceremonials, dancing and theatricals, as some theosophical bodies in India appear to have done.

ERNEST WOOD

FELLOWSHIP OF FAITHS

ATTACK AND APPRECIATION

The World's Need of Religion. With a Preface by SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND. (Nicholson and Watson, 5s.)

This volume of some two hundred pages brings us the proceedings of the World Congress of Faiths held at Oxford in July of last year. It contains the addresses delivered at the Congress and brings us a message of hope, inasmuch as there are men and women of different creeds whose religious persuasions do not prevent them from studying faiths of other people. Such a movement as the Congress of Faiths, however, will succeed in its real object provided it enables the sectarian to see that his own religion is not superior to other religions, that what

is valuable in it is also to be found in them; even while he uses his own special form of religion he may be educated into the perception of that truth. This will naturally lead him to another significant conclusion, *viz.*, that his prophet, his holy book, his rites, his formulæ are but temporary material symbols trying to convey eternal spiritual verities, and that other symbols equally good and equally potent are used by men of faiths other than his own. By these two steps man can cross the barren deserts of formal exoteric creeds and reach the Heavenly City of Esoteric Wisdom-Religion.

S. A.

[How true are the remarks of S. A. in the above will be seen from the following four reviews which deal with.—EDS.]

BUDDHISM, CHRISTIANITY, TAOISM AND ISLAM

Gautama Buddha. By IQBAL SINGH. (Boriswood, London. 15s.)

A new approach, if sound, should enrich the literature of any subject. Unfortunately this cannot be said of Mr. Iqbal Singh's book. Instead of attempting to understand the Teacher from his Teachings, the author blunders in approaching the Buddha from the legends about him. (pp. 130-1) He fails miserably in explaining away the shell of mythology, not only because it hides from him the kernel of truth, but because he conjures up a new personal fiction, a web of unclean fancy.

Disclaiming any definitive clue to Gautama's personality (p. 5), the writer nevertheless pretends to familiarity with the thoughts, feelings, motives and reactions of the Buddha. He is certainly free from "pious reverence towards the subject". (p. 6) After describing most questionable social practices of the day (p. 107 ff.), he suggests the likelihood that Gautama may have enjoyed such

life. (p. 117) The aim of breaking down Gautama's exalted pedestal is no justification for attributing to that Enlightened Mind inclinations revolting to any decent man. The book is not devoid of appreciative remarks (pp. 170-1; 272), but these are far outweighed by the many disparaging and presumptuous statements.

Mr. Singh attributes the Ajanta paintings to the Buddhist Bhikkus' attraction to and craving for the pleasures of the world, a notion which he tries to elaborate. (p. 299 ff.) "Practically the whole of Buddhist Literature manifests a tortured pre-occupation with things of the flesh." (p. 123) To the decent-minded reader the author's morbid preoccupation with sexual interpretations of every natural emblem and symbol provides but proof of an unclean imagination, which many a turn of phrase substantiates.

We fail to see what purpose this book serves. Volumes on Gautama's life and

philosophy exist by the dozen, but few more unreliable than this. It is misleading. It is an impertinence and a prof-

anation ; a mind like Mr. Iqbal Singh's is unfit to "assess" the superior, lofty and noble morals of the Buddha.

DAENA

The Gospel of Peace of Jesus Christ by the Disciple John. The Aramaic and Ancient Slav Texts compared and edited by EDMOND SZÉKELY. Translated by EDMOND SZÉKELY and PURCELL WEAVER (C. W. Daniel Co. Ltd., 3s. 6d.)

Mr. Székely tells us in his Foreword that "an edition containing the complete text with all the necessary references and explanatory notes (archæological, historical and exegetic) is at present in preparation". It is a pity that he did not await its completion before printing this unannotated fragment, for the antecedents of the latter are vague.

Many of the sayings attributed to Jesus go directly against not only the letter but also the spirit of those in the Gospels. Here is quoted with apparent approval a reference to God as a "jealous" God (pp. 65-6) ; Jesus here declares that "everything which kills your

bodies kills your souls also" (p. 70) ; he commands fasting on the Sabbath (p. 80)—(Cf. *Mark* 2 : 23 ff.) ; he takes part in common prayer (p. 86)—(Cf. *Matt.* 6 : 6). He condemns not only a diet of flesh but even the eating of cooked food. (Cf. his feeding of the multitude with loaves and fishes, described in all the Gospels). It is almost inconceivable that if Jesus had given such detailed directions as this book makes out, as to diet, internal cleansing and other physical practices, no trace of such concrete, easily grasped and easily retained teaching should have survived until the Gospels were recorded. Until the promised substantiating data are available, this addition to the teachings of Jesus must be accepted, if at all, with grave reservations.

E. M. HOUGH

Tao Te Ching. A New Translation. By CH'U TA-KAO. (The Buddhist Lodge, London. 3s. 6d.)

The *Tao Te Ching* is perhaps the greatest of all the mystical books of China, not only because of its metaphysical profundity, but also because what we know of Taoism really begins with the *Tao Te Ching*. "No other book in the world", says Dr. Lionel Giles in his foreword, "perhaps, with the exception of the Bible, has been translated so often as the *Tao Te Ching*".

There is something about this great work which is really esoteric. The secret of its inordinate fascination has not been explained quite satisfactorily and will, perhaps, never be known. It is a collection of a number of aphorisms—often quite crude ; it lacks continuity and is essentially incoherent in construction, quite obviously attempting no logical arrangement—and yet it has a peculiar fascination ! Perhaps the secret lies in the baffling obscurity of many of its passages which have defied gen-

erations of translators and have remained still as enigmatic as ever.

The actual authorship of the *Tao Te Ching* is a much disputed subject, although it is usually ascribed to Lao Tzu, contemporary of Confucius. Many authorities, however, even dispute the historicity of Lao Tzu, although, according to Ssu-ma Ch'ien, there is evidence to show that Confucius did actually meet Lao Tzu. Confucius is reported, after the interview, to have likened Lao Tzu to a dragon "which mounts on the wind through the clouds and rises to heaven".

The word *Tao* means "way" ; although there is no word in the English language which expresses precisely and accurately what Lao Tzu meant by *Tao* ; nor does Lao Tzu attempt to explain quite clearly the exact interpretation he himself puts on that word.

The present translation by a Chinese will be especially welcome. On the dust cover we are told that "Never before has this masterpiece of Chinese wisdom

been translated into English by a Chinese."

However, this translation, coming as it does from a man of the same race as the original author, does represent a really commendable effort. The translator has the advantage of a really profound knowledge of Chinese philosophy and, what is still more remarkable, an equally profound grasp of Western literature, to say nothing of his command over the English language. Technically, the book is a perfect translation—that

is, as far as it is possible to have a perfect translation. There are no signs of the laborious style which unhappily characterises the writings of many Orientals when writing in an alien language—especially in English.

The prose is simple, clear and flawless. There are no redundancies and the translator has made a praiseworthy attempt to preserve the terseness and the laconic wit of the original—which are really half its charm.

ENVER KUREISHI

The Book of Truthfulness : Kitābat Al Šidq. By ABU SAID AL KHARRAZ. Edited and translated by ARTHUR JOHN ARBERRY. (Humphery Milford. 6s. Rs. 4.)

This is the sixth and latest publication of the Islamic Research Association. The earlier issues were Persian and Urdu, and the Association is to be congratulated on the excellent beginning they have made in regard to the publication of an Arabic text and translation. The attractive get-up of the slim volume and the clearness and beauty of the English type as well as of the Arabic text, arrest the attention of the reader, as much as the grace with which the learned translator expresses his gratitude to the Association for offering to publish his translation. The Association must feel gratified that so scholarly a translator should express himself as so desirous of placing his labours at its disposal. The Association is as yet in its adolescence. But all lovers of scholarship and research will watch its progress with increasing interest and hope.

The short preface points out that "the importance of the treatise lies in the fact that apart from the writings of Muhasibi it is the earliest systematic presentation of the theory of Sufi experience written by a practising Sufi". This shows the true scope of the treatise. The nucleus of the title, Šidq (as explained in Lane's Lexicon) has not only the primary meaning of truthfulness but the secondary meanings of "hardness",

"soundness", "firmness of heart": "a noun signifying anything to which goodness is attributed is prefixed to Šidq governing it." So that the title may have been translated by the words "the Book leading to The Aryan Path". It ought therefore, to appeal to readers of this journal. Those interested in THE ARYAN PATH who will dive into this treatise will not be disappointed. The preliminary part is devoted to classification and analysis which might seem somewhat cumbrous, were it not illuminated by passages which reflect its central purpose, such as this :

A man should desire God in all his acts and deeds and his actions together, both outward and inward, not desiring thereby anything other than God, with his mind and knowledge standing guard over his spirit and heart, being watchful of his purpose and seeking God in his whole affair ; and that he should not love the praise or applause of others, nor rejoice in his acts performed before his fellows.

This sentiment recalls the words of the great lady Saint of Islam, Rābi'a al Adamijal who died about a century before Kharraj, and who said that her heart was so full of the love of God that it had no room for hating Satan, and who in a dream told the Prophet that her love of God had so possessed her that she had no place for loving any save Him !

Those "not unwise" who "delight in judging and interposing such thoughts and meditations" will be grateful to the translator and the Association.

FAIZ B. TYABJI

Notes on the Way. By VISCOUNTESS RHONDDA. (Macmillan, London, 6s.)

It is to be hoped that those, unfamiliar with *Time and Tide*, will not be deceived by the title of this volume. "Notes on the Way" is somewhat colourless, but there is no lack of colour in this immensely alive book.

Viscountess Rhondda possesses the major gift of the essayist :—she makes her subject-matter seem secondary. The reader feels that she would be informative, unexpected, amusing, or illuminating on any subject. Even when you do not agree with her you half-suspect you are wrong.

There is plenty of hard hitting in this book, plenty to disturb armchair complacency and postprandial optimism. "No, the Hitler and the Stalin gods are not for us. But neither, surely, is the still barbarous country in which we live—a living lie of a country really....." But although there is hard hitting, there is no anger. Tolerance is usually no more than indifference yawning on its way to bed, but the tolerance animating these essays is born of passionate detachment.

The best approach to the book is to read a few essays at random. Start with "Jerusalem", then go in spirit to

"Gibraltar" (you will not want to go in the flesh after reading the essay) then jump to "Middle-Aged Women"—"Prominent Women"—and "The Fascist Way with Women". Every word of the last three should be broadcast—but the author has a word or two about the B. B. C. If after reading a selection of these essays, you are not impelled to read all of them, then you are luckier in the books you discover than is one reader of this volume.

Space does not permit an adequate review of these essays, but, possibly, the following quotation will convey something of their candour, detachment, and penetration :—

I am not a particularly modest person. I believe that I have energy and some capacity. If I had been born a man and had had parents sufficiently well off to give me a first-class education and a reasonably good start in life, I think I might very possibly have done the rest for myself, even if they had been able to do no more than that. But I have no illusions. I know perfectly well that, being a woman, if I had not happened to have a famous—and rich—father, devoid of the usual inhibitions about using female material if it happened to come handy, I should never have been heard of outside my own locality at all.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

India in 1934-35 (Published by the Manager of Publications, Government of India, Delhi. Rs. 1-2-0.)

Students of Indian affairs have long been familiar with the annual surveys (formerly known as the "Report on the Moral and Material Progress of India") issued by the Bureau of Public Information, Government of India. As a work of reference this series of annual reports is invaluable. It is comprehensive, compact and factual. But its limitations are obvious : it represents the official point of view, and in its treatment of such

topics as "Politics and Administration", it reflects the necessarily biassed and one-sided outlook of the authorities. Efforts have been made in recent years to entrust the production of these volumes to "independent" officials, but it is difficult to say that any improvement has yet been effected, except perhaps in point of style, which is lighter and more "readable" than it used to be. The only observation that needs to be made concerning the present volume is that it is three years late.

K. S. S.

Ends and Means. An Enquiry Into the Nature of Ideals and Into the Methods Employed for their Realisation. By ALDOUS HUXLEY. (Chatto and Windus, London. 8s. 6d.)

Mr. Aldous Huxley's new book may come as a surprise to those who have looked upon him principally as a master of ironical fiction bordering on cynicism. He has no more any doubt about the "ideal goal of human effort" though the road to it may be long and the obstacles complicated. He is prepared to define the "ideal man", who is simply the "non-attached man".

Non-attached to his bodily sensations and lusts. Non-attached to his craving for power and possessions. . . . Non-attached to his anger and hatred; non-attached to his exclusive loves. Non-attached to wealth, fame, social position. Non-attached even to science, art, speculation, philanthropy.

Mr. Huxley claims no originality for this faith; and indeed it is the world-denying creed of Buddhists, Stoics, Christian pessimists like Huysmans, and metaphysical pessimists like Schopenhauer. To the outside world it seems a creed of negation, but to its initiates it means the forsaking of a realm of illusions for a supreme Spiritual Reality which can only be described by—more negations. Mr. Huxley's palinode must be one of the most complete in literary history.

True mystics in the world's history have been few, and the probability of the mass of mankind ever being included in their band seems negligible. Mr. Huxley, however, offers to prescribe not for the members of a select community but for the ills of mankind at large. The question which he poses is whether the doctrine of non-attachment, expressing itself in practical affairs in terms of absolute pacifism, the renunciation of violence, the surrender of ambition, a strictly ascetic attitude

to the satisfactions of sense will suffice to guide the world of ordinary men and women out of their troubles and perplexity. One may humbly venture to doubt it—and that without being the champion of war, violence, tyranny or libertinage. Indeed, though Mr. Huxley's professed belief is brotherhood and universal love, he seems to have very little sympathy or even common justice to spare for the large section of humanity that is still struggling in what he deems the paths of darkness. Nietzsche and Hegel are dismissed as ethical and political "eccentrics"; Shakespeare's personages embody "the extravagant day-dreams of paranoiacs"; he seems unwilling to admit even relative services rendered in human history by dictators, warriors or empire-builders, and subscribes to Lord Acton's grotesque dictum that, "All great men are bad". When we learn that for an example of a "non-attached" civilization we can go to—the Zuñi Indians, we cannot help smiling, and we seem to catch Mr. Huxley reluctantly smiling too. Indeed he concedes that "as a matter of historical fact, scientific progressiveness has never been divorced from aggressiveness". That is a raw maxim; let us say progress has involved struggle to realise desired ends. If "creative energy" rather than "non-attachment" were taken as the human ideal the question of the ineluctable element of conflict involved would sink to a secondary place. And must the Divine be reached by abstraction from ordinary human desires and ambitions, by the *via negationis*, or can it not be found also *within* the life of the senses, of science and art, of effort to realise the individual personality and subdue a recalcitrant environment? Monasteries have sometimes been the salt of the earth, but must the whole earth be made a monastery?

D. L. MURRAY

CORRESPONDENCE

PRACTICAL VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY

There is a common belief that philosophy is a dry, impractical subject, fit only for the academician who has nothing better than to theorise. Philosophy is somehow believed to have little bearing upon practical problems with which man is faced at every step in his life. Philosophers are reputed to "deal with nothing but abstractions, serving merely to puzzle and befog the brain of the practical man who has to deal with a hard materialistic world". The philosopher is not unoften compared to a man soaring in a balloon, who has thus lost his moorings on solid earth. The Proceedings of the Thirteenth Indian Philosophical Congress, held at Nagpur last December, however, belie such a conception of the philosopher and of his pursuit.

Sir Hyde Clarendon Gowan, Chancellor of the Nagpur University, emphasized in his opening speech the valuable lessons which philosophy offers to a practical man, and the rôle which philosophers have to play in the modern world. Sir Hyde admitted that at one time, during "his two years of somewhat puzzled wandering in realms of pure thought" as an undergraduate at Oxford, he was inclined to think that his struggle with Plato and Aristotle and Kant was a losing battle and a huge waste of time. But now, after thirty-six years of a busy lifetime spent entirely in worldly affairs, when the varied experiences of an administrative and political career had induced in him some measure of wisdom, he happily reversed his judgment of callow youth, and declared that "one who has been through that struggle, has in reality been thrice blessed in his preparation for the future which lies before him". He said :

For myself I can say that the more I look upon what I have called my losing battle with the philosophers, the more I realize how invaluable that battle really was. For one thing it taught to all of us the beauty

of clear and logical language, stripped of all metricious adornment, and directed solely towards the furtherance of the argument.

For another it taught us to exercise the faculty of observation and analysis. It taught us, again, to dislike sloppiness of thought, the mental attitude which refuses to face the facts of a situation ; to realize that truth can never be suppressed, and that no subterfuge, no verbal smoke-screen can prevent it coming into light at last ; to realize that one's moral judgments proceed, not from expediency, but from one's innate consciousness.

Man could not ask for a finer guide to conduct in life, concluded the speaker.

The more a *practical* man like Sir Hyde tried to visualize the effect his philosophic studies had upon his life, the more he liked to say that "although those studies might have brought him to no definite conclusions and might have even seemed to leave him in a maze of uncertainty, nevertheless in course of them he had insensibly shaped his own character, had acquired a definite outlook and habit of mind which, unconsciously, perhaps, determined the whole of his subsequent outlook upon the world.

No previous period of the world's history, remarked Sir Hyde, has stood in greater need of the philosopher than the present does. Modern civilization in its craze for speed leaves no scope for reflection and judgment. The world to-day is madly "devoting an increasingly large part of its resources and of its creative genius, not to the betterment of humanity, but to devising engines for its own destruction". Under such circumstances, "the only hope of a return to sanity lies in the spread of the philosopher's spirit, the spirit of truth, of wisdom, and of tolerance, and above all, of the ultimate brotherhood of man".

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Professor R. D. Ranade, General President of the Session, pleaded for realism in philosophy from another standpoint. Although he believed that a

consideration of certain physical, biological, physiological and psychological facts and theories led him to a spiritual interpretation of Ultimate Reality, yet he was careful to point out that that was no ground for indifference towards the affairs of the world. Man, he argued, had a duty towards his fellow beings, towards society and towards the country. He would, therefore, be indeed failing in his duty, and be false to his being, if he did not perform his part in the social and national activities.

Indian philosophy particularly has been accused of breeding a spirit of other-worldliness detrimental to material welfare and national development. Our metaphysical-mindedness has been held responsible for our economic miseries, political backwardness and bondage, and social evils. The spiritual conception of Reality, the identification of the individual soul with Brahman, have conspired to engender a philosophical outlook which places more value upon the things of the Spirit than upon the demands of the normal psycho-social *milieu* in which an individual moves and has his being. Bodily existence with its quota of pain and suffering has to be tolerated so long as deliverance from the cycle of births is not achieved. Life is at best a means and an opportunity of ensuring salvation or *moksha*. Self-realization, the logical end of all our activities, thus becomes a selfish affair which does not take into account the wider problems and issues of the state and the nation.

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Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, President of the Indian Philosophy Section, strongly discountenanced such a conception of the teachings of Indian philosophy. Indian philosophy recognizes two distinct ways of life, the way of renunciation (*nivritti*), and the way of participation (*pravritti*). At times, no doubt, in the history of Indian civilization, the way of renunciation became more popular than the way of activity; but those periods express only a passing mood of the national mind. In fact, the way of renunciation as such cannot be the basis of any social

philosophy, for it strikes at the very root of social existence and modes of behaviour. The heights to which Indian civilization reached, the material prosperity which India enjoyed at one time, the commercial, maritime, colonizing and missionizing activities of ancient India imply a zest in life which can certainly not be the result of an anti-social or even an a-social philosophy of life.

It is a gross misreading of the history of Indian thought, Dr. Kunhan Raja urged, to regard it as inculcating a flight from the realities of life for the purposes of contemplation, meditation and self-realization. The *Mimamsaka*, he pointed out, is specially emphatic on this point. In this connection, he also brought out the full significance of the doctrine of *adhikarin*, and traced many of the misconceptions about philosophy to an abandonment of that doctrine in view of a movement for the democratization and popularization of knowledge.

To-day, more than ever, Dr. Raja contended, there is an imperative necessity for removing misconceptions about the true teachings of the Indian philosophical schools. The social motif of Indian philosophy must be emphasized, so that Philosophy may no longer continue to act as an opiate, but may, on the contrary, act as a stimulant to unceasing effort which, in its turn, may raise India from its present condition of starvation and servitude to heights yet unattained.

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Prof. U. C. Bhattacharya, in his presidential address to the section of Ethics and Social Philosophy, similarly pleaded for the harmony of theory and practice in the realm of morality. He drew attention to the terrible problem of war which is threatening to disintegrate and undermine the very bases of moral life. He also stressed the necessity of adopting a realistic attitude towards the innumerable problems, social, economic and political, which confront Indian society to-day.

Lucknow

RAJ NARAIN

ENDS AND SAYINGS

It is one of the tasks of this magazine to point to an ever-growing interest in the teachings and doctrines put forward over sixty years ago by H. P. Blavatsky. We have been observing a dual phenomenon in reference to them ; first, among the most modern ideas in almost every department of knowledge, there are facts and theories which approximate to the teachings recorded by that "lover of the ancients" ; secondly, an increasing number of thinking people are taking to the study of her books and are finding her writings not only interesting and valuable but also profound and practical. In our pages attention is drawn month by month to the effects of this dual phenomenon.

At the same time, there have been open and covert attacks on the personality of H. P. Blavatsky. In more than one "biography" and "critique" an *exposé* of her personal character, methods and manners has been attempted, which has glamourised the gullible, and prejudiced a little more the orthodox in religion, the sectarian in science, and the drones and butterflies of sundry academies. Curious is the fact, often overlooked, that while her personality has been ruthlessly attacked, her philosophy has not ; the latter has not even been seriously analysed or examined by those who have attacked her. But it goes without saying that those who indulge in personal attacks without any serious consideration of her

teachings have done so to safeguard vested interests ; for there are vested interests in the world of mind and morals as in the world of trade and finance. There is mind exploitation by the priest and the propagandist, as there is body exploitation by the employer of labour. H. P. Blavatsky herself in the preface to the first volume of her first book—*Isis Unveiled* (1877)—named her future enemies : theologians, pseudo- or half-hearted scientists, free-thinkers who would go so far and no farther in their quest of truth, authorities whose eminence the advance of knowledge and pressing enquiry threatened, and the mercenaries of the press who sell their pen to any tempting purchaser. It is easy to abuse, difficult to argue. And so H. P. Blavatsky has continued to be one of the most hated persons of modern times ; and withal one of the most loved and revered—by those who take even the slightest trouble to give her an impartial and a judicial hearing.

But the tide has been turning. This journal has consistently and regularly pointed to the teachings and doctrines of H. P. Blavatsky—to their logic and reasonableness ; to their profundity and their capacity for illuminating obscure corners of philosophy and for pointing out the missing links in science ; to their breadth which encompasses every field of human interest, offering principles for application and for practice. While doing this we have more or less

ignored the rabid attacks on her personality—not because they are unanswerable but because every single one of them without exception is a re-hash of what has been dished up to the public during many decades. Further, the important consideration which has weighed with us is that only those who approach first the philosophy she taught can possibly understand the personality of H. P. Blavatsky. Shall we abuse Darwin as mad after we consider *The Origin of Species* and *The Descent of Man*? But he was abused by those who had never studied either of these volumes. The great Huxley was called names by those who never understood what he meant by Agnosticism. And so with H. P. Blavatsky, the champion of Gnosticism.

Several good defences of H. P. Blavatsky have been published recently ; and we welcome, naturally, the formation of a new association—the Friends of H. P. Blavatsky. These Friends have undertaken the noble as well as useful task of gathering data to confront the verbiage of the personal attackers and to labour for bringing “pressure on the Society for Psychical Research to withdraw their Report” which is unjust. The association is sponsored by Mrs.

Beatrice Hastings. We wish it success. Its labours will supplement our own effort, which is to press on the attention of the thinking public the teachings of Theosophy as recorded by H. P. Blavatsky in her writings. For, we repeat, that unless the philosophy she taught is understood to some extent, re-hash of attacks which are uncalled for as well as representations of defence which are unnecessary must continue. A reviewer in *Time and Tide* of 4th December makes the following remark :

Controversy and hearsay still gather round the figure of the founder of the Theosophical Society ; attack and defence are still being freely published, and the time for an unprejudiced study of a woman who was at the least a very odd personality and at the most a very queer channel for inspiration is not here yet.

The beauty of that “odd personality” and the grandeur of that “queer channel for inspiration” bursts upon our vision only when an unprejudiced and calm examination of the Teachings she presented takes place.

That these teachings are worthy of serious consideration is evident from such an article as the one we publish in this issue from the pen of Mr. J. S. Collis on “Science and Occultism : The Law of Cycles”.