THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and lost among the host — as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—The Voice of the Silence

VOL. XXXI MARCH 1960 No. 3

TRADITIONAL AND MODERN

[IN these quiet reflections **Shrimati Lila Ray** dissolves the opposition of tradition and modernism in the view that each successive "modern" period is a challenge to make a creative contribution to tradition. She makes in closing some penetrating remarks about our particular "modern" period. — ED.]

THE WORD "MODERN" is what a young Indian philosopher calls a Humpty-Dumpty word. It is all right on a wall.

Our present and recent past have been characterized, among other things, by technological progress. Contemporary life is supported by a steel framework built and maintained with a high degree of technical skill. A radio is *de rigueur* for those who wish to be *à la mode*. The cinema, some claim, has outmoded the novel. Yet much that man has to communicate, the intimate and intuitive workings of his thought processes, his emotional evolution, is not merely visual. He may make use of the visual in giving it expression, but what he says transcends and transmutes the visual just as it transcends and transmutes the aural. The written word will stay. The novel, the story, the essay, poetry, drama—all verbal forms of expression are indispensable to man's progress. There is no correlation between progress in technique and progress in civilization. Technique may improve while civilization remains stationary or suffers a setback. Psychic advance is not necessarily accompanied by any corresponding revolution in technique, though the development of technique may follow upon it.

By modernism do we then mean a rationalist tendency in religion? Religion is another Humpty-Dumpty word. The prevalent systems of faith and worship are not contemporary or recent in their origins. To recognize a superhuman controlling power is to recognize something non-rational or super-rational, assuming that rationality is characteristic of the human

species. To reject what cannot be tested by reason in religion is to reject religion altogether. It certainly is not modern either in inception or in practice.

Modernism, therefore, is thought of as contradictory to traditionalism and opposed to it. What is the oldest and most universal custom man's ancestors have handed down to their posterity? How have men accumulated experience? By making things with their hands. By using the things they make with their hands. The habit of making things, the custom of creation, has been handed down to us through the ages. What then is traditional? Creativity. A break in creativity is a break in the oldest tradition of the human race. Tradition means the continuity of creativity. Creativity is both old and new-fashioned, contemporary and ancient.

There is not and cannot be any conflict between traditionalism and modernism. Modernism designates a period, the modes of belief and expression current in the times in which a person lives. Its meaning is confined to the moment, changing from moment to moment. It is a part; tradition is the whole. In contributing creatively to man's inheritance modernism enriches tradition. If man's powers of creation develop or expand significantly in any particular period that period can be said to have made a distinct addition to our human heritage. It is modern at the moment it is made. A barren period makes no contribution. Men fall back upon their powers of imitation and upon mechanical, as distinct from creative, skills. Such a sterile period is also modern to the man who lives in it.

As creation is a joyous activity and imitation is not, men feel sad and frustrated in sterile periods. They are restless. They hide their despair from themselves and others, seeking satisfaction in substitutes. They avoid being alone and lose themselves in collectives: their contempt for the individual is self-contempt.

No one period is totally barren or wholly creative. Both ingredients are present in greater or less degree. The relative degrees delineate the period, giving it distinct and recognizable outlines.

What about our own period? The twentieth century? Up to the present it has been, like its predecessors, a century of Cain. But the extent to which men have slain their brothers in it is unprecedented in the history of mankind. Has not the Everest of cruelty been scaled? Have men seen so much evil, done so much evil, that they have lost their sensitivity to good? Can propitiation be made? Propitiation by kindness?

A moral issue is always the challenge that is fateful for the future. Whether India should remain enslaved or be free was such a moral issue.

The people of India met the requirements of the situation with a creative response, a response that has been one of the redeeming features of the age that is, for us, modern. Progress towards self-determination is the criterion of growth, for individuals as well as for societies.

Society is the field of action, but the source of action is in the individuals composing it. We have seen how tragically collective organizations fail when the individuals who compose them are not their own masters sufficiently to realize what is being done with the strength they give these organizations. Criticism must be directed inwards to the individual character and its integration as well as outward to existing social institutions and those who uphold them. During the first half of this unhappy century criticism has, by and large, been directed outward. The last fifty years have been turbulent. Out of the turbulence has emerged a new social *milieu* which has been imposed upon us. The challenge of our times is a dual challenge, technological and psychological. To what extent has man succeeded in responding to it creatively?

LILA RAY

CONTINUITY

Our thoughts
Sometimes calm, sometimes tumultuous
Flow like a river
Into the sea of eternity;
Within that river
Lurk memories joyous or sad;
And always, always, with the river
They are flowing out to sea.

HERBERT BLUEN

THE SELF

[OUR old and esteemed contributor, **Mr. Joshua C. Gregory**, is the author of a number of fine books which converge, one might say, on the philosophical aspects of scientific thought. His approach in this thoughtful essay may remind some readers of the Buddhist approach to the question of the apparent self. The Buddha showed that this self is a stream, not an entity. Mr. Gregory points out that the truth behind our sense of personal identity is not permanence but continuity.

Accepting this, however, does not preclude the reality of another Self, changeless because it is not subject to time, whose perfect Integrity and incorruptible Wholeness are manifested dynamically in the exactness and mercy of Universal Law.—ED.]

IN his "*Cogito, ergo sum*" Descartes relies on his thinking to establish his own existence. "I act, therefore I am" has been affirmed to give the same assurance. Many other analogues of the Cartesian formula suggest themselves. "I dream, therefore I exist" is one; "I am conscious, therefore I am" is another. The experient may confidently believe he exists because he feels pain, or hopes, or writes poetry, or is sentenced to be hanged. These and other analogues combine to give full assurance of existence—each expressing one aspect of the total convincing experience.

One analogue eminently expresses the sense of existence. A golfer has six balls from one batch in his bag. Each ball is identical with the other five in the sense of exact likeness. (Leibnitz need not trouble this exposition with his "Identity of Indiscernibles"—arguing that no two balls are *precisely* alike.) The golfer uses one ball for the whole round. At the finish his clubs have battered the ball out of its exact resemblance to its fellows. At the last hole, however, in another sense it is identical with the ball driven from the first tee. This *continuant* sense is involved in the realization of his own existence by the golfer.

Descartes did not intend to confine his thinking to a single moment or to spread it through a series of disconnected thinkings. His formula, however, does not expressly include the continuity inherent in his sense of his own existence. Neither does "I dream, therefore I am," nor does St. Augustine's "If I err, I am."

When the sentenced murderer realizes that *he* is to be hanged, recollected scenes of his own innocent boyhood may well suffuse the *he* with a vivid sense of his own continuous existence. "I remember, therefore I am" does express the sense of continuity that suffuses the realization of being existent. This expression is most evident in explicit recollection which in-

cludes awareness of remembering. The sedate senator who thus recollects a youthful prank remembers explicitly that, years ago, he himself was the delinquent. Memory most frequently prompts the round of recognition without any awareness of remembering. The recognition of a seen owl as an owl, though it depends on previous experiences, whether personally or by hearsay, and thus on memory, does not normally include any awareness of remembering. Such unconsciously operating memory presumably contributes to the general sense of continuing identity that pervades the realization of being an existent. Specific recollection, however, with its included awareness of remembering, most emphatically endorses the conclusion that we must exist because we remember.

Visitors to the house of a novelist were warned that if he described, with vivid detail, his shipwreck on the Norwegian coast, they must remember that he had never been to Norway: so the report runs. This suggests another analogue of the Cartesian "*Cogito, ergo sum*": "I imagine, therefore I am." The novelist only thought he was recollecting, but pseudo-memories, by contrast, help to manifest the genuine memories that certify to the rememberers their own genuine existence. Also, though most specific recollections probably contain at least a touch of imaginative reconstruction, they still confirm the recollector's being an existent. The novelist's imaginative construction, by connecting his present self with the shipwrecked man, rests as firmly on a sense of continuing identity as on a genuine recollection. Imaginative constructions, by posing as recollections, may be their effective deputies. So the most effective single analogue of the Cartesian formula is: "I remember, therefore I am."

At one time, Descartes records in the second of his *Metaphysical Meditations,* he connected walking, feeling and thinking with his soul without dwelling upon its nature. At times the soul did suggest to him "something extremely rare and subtle," like a "wind" or a "flame" or "a very volatile air insinuated and diffused throughout" his "more material parts." At another time his realization of himself as a thinking thing banished this vaporous notion of the soul. This banishment included the realization that he was not the "collection of members which is called the human body."

In his first impression of his soul, or mind, as tenuous, Descartes, however unwittingly, reproduced a very wide-spread notion of the soul, especially in earlier times. Resurrection and reincarnation beliefs have, through the ages, helped to soothe this disturbing sense of the soul's tenuity by housing it in the concrete body that Descartes dissociated from his "I." John Citizen's sense of his continuing body fortifies his realization of his persistent self. This realization, thus fortified, of his own personal

persistent being may still leave a troublesome problem unsolved, for the dualism of body and mind seems to interconnect, or try to interconnect, two incompatibles.

Memory, however, especially specifically recollecting memory, assures each human being that he, or she, is an enduring self. The body, by providing "a local habitation" for the "I," fortifies this assurance.

We human beings are enduring selves, and our bodies concretely strengthen this testimony of memory. The realization of the self does not straightway solve all the problems raised by its existence. "I remember, therefore I am," however, with all that it involves, contains an assurance of a personal enduring self.

Recollection does not involve that the enduring self experienced during later life be a replica of the enduring self experienced at an earlier age. The old man realizes that he has continued his youthful self without perpetuating it: he is a stream of changing continuity. The aging body fortifies this realization of the ripening and aging self. Memory, especially recollective memory, testifies that the self changes as surely as it endures. The successive selves of any one continuing identical self have no analogue in the six identical golf balls of one batch. They have their analogue in the alterations in the single golf ball as it is driven round the course.

The sense of the self, guaranteed by memory and fortified by the sense of the body, constantly underlies human experience. During life's conscious round, however, the normal human being is usually unaware of his continuing though changing self. The mind, preoccupied with outward events or with its own course of thought, ignores, in effect, its own existence. From time to time, notably in reflective moments, the sense of the self does surge into awareness. Descartes, by his reflections on these insights, may have helped many men and women to realize that they are selves.

The mind, or soul, has been disrespectfully called the "Ghost in the Machine." The body, the "Machine," helps recollection to realize that the self is more enduring as well as more changeful than a "Ghost."

"We may define a 'mind' as a collection of events connected with each other by memory-chains backwards and forwards." So Bertrand Russell writes in *My Philosophical Development*. We know, he adds, the "collection of events" constituting ourselves more completely than "anything else in the world."

For supplemental interpretation the "memory-chains" represent a complexly organized memory system, and the meaning of a word indicates the unconscious operation of much remembering. The verbal symbol "tiger" means a large, Asiatic, striped, feline quadruped. It also means

more than this *O.E.D.* definition: an animal hunted by sportsmen on elephants, for instance. When an eye sees the written "tiger" it may have little, or no, conscious awareness of the meaning provoked by the verbal symbol. A visual image of a tiger, vague or distinct, may haunt the mind's eye, or other notions about tigers may pop into awareness. Normally, however, the meaning is remembered with very little conscious awareness of its content—often with none. If the written or spoken statement, "John shot a tiger," stirred a medley of conscious notions about John, tigers and shooting in a mind, it would inflict on that mind a chaos instead of a steadily grasped meaning.

The meanings of words or statements seem to be both essentially mental and predominantly active in the unconscious mind. Thus meaning and the spontaneously recognized owl suggest unconsciously acting memory. Since all possible recollections do not constantly flood conscious awareness, they seem, when they do occur, to be actualizations of potentialities in an unconsciously organized memory-system. The mind, or self, thus presents itself as mainly, and essentially, an elaborate organization of experience into an unconscious.

Though it enigmatically eludes complete understanding, this unconscious seems imperatively to claim its rôle as interpreter of the psyche. It disconcerts by interpreting, for it is as plainly hypothetical as it is effectively interpretative. The self does not relish this reduction to a mainly hypothetical being. In deep sleep, without even a flicker of conscious awareness, the self, very disconcertingly, seems to be wholly hypothetical.

Recollection, however, with its conscious awareness of remembering, still convinces the rememberer that he genuinely exists. As he reminiscently surveys his past life he realizes his enduring, though changing, self. He may be perplexed by his changing identity, and puzzled by his hypothetical unconscious self. He remains convinced that he could not remember himself if he did not exist. I remember, therefore I indubitably am.

JOSHUA C. GREGORY

HE should raise the self by the Self; let him not suffer the Self to be lowered; for Self is the friend of self, and, in like manner, self is its own enemy. Self is the friend of the man who is self-conquered; so self like a foe hath enmity to him who is not self-conquered. The Self of the man who is self-subdued and free from desire and anger is intent on the Supreme Self in heat and cold, in pain and pleasure, in honour and ignominy.

— *Bhagavad-Gita,* Ch. VI

LOGICAL POSITIVISM

[**Dr. S. N. L. Shrivastava, M.A., D.LITT.**, Head of the Department of Studies in Philosophy, Jabalpur University, has already contributed three interesting essays on schools of contemporary philosophy to THE ARYAN PATH (July and September 1959 and January 1960). In this, he examines the ideas of a school which has been very influential in our time, though its influence has perhaps now begun to wane. Dr. Shrivastava states its position lucidly, and offers an outline of criticisms urged against it. — ED.]

"IF I were asked to state in one word," writes H. J. Paton, "the main impulse to all this new thinking, and particularly to the whole logical and linguistic movement of this century, I should take the question literally and say simply that it was science (including mathematics)."[1] Yes, science; Paton has put his finger exactly on what may be termed the linchpin of some of the characteristically twentieth-century movements of thought — I say "some" advisedly, for there are others like Existentialism which sound a note of protest against the idolatrous attitude to science. The modern schools, however, of Realism, Logical Positivism, Analysis and Materialism have definitely taken scientific knowledge as the very model of all knowledge which is worth while. They are in a mood to say, as it were: "Come unto us all ye who are weary of the old cloud-gazing philosophies which flouted science and common sense; we shall give you peace and rest in a philosophy which is at once scientific and commonsensical!" Despite the cold and arid-seeming programmes of these modern philosophers, one cannot fail to detect an evangelical zeal in them. As an indication of the attitude of modern philosophers towards those of the older generation, I quote here the following words from a recent review of a work on Kant. The reviewer writes:—

> Those who think of philosophy as a matter of exact and careful statement, closely reasoned, as most philosophers in this country do, will find little to admire in the book ; but readers who have sympathy with an older tradition of philosophizing, according to which the philosopher is a wise man with a distinctive way of looking at the world, may well learn something from it.[2]

I am not here concerned with the rightness or otherwise of the reviewer's opinion. My point is simply to illustrate the language in which the philosopher of today loves to accentuate the difference between himself

---

[1] *Contemporary British Philosophy* (Third Series), p. 352.

[2] Review of Richard Kröner's *Kant's Weltanschauung* in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, January 1959.

and his forebear.

The movement known as Logical Positivism originated with what is known as the Vienna Circle, a group of philosophers and mathematicians which formed itself around Professor Moritz Schlick when he came in the year 1922 to occupy a Chair of Philosophy at the Vienna University. The leading members of this Circle, on the philosophical side, were, apart from Schlick himself, Friedrich Weismann, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Herbert Feigl and Victor Kraft; on the mathematical side were Hans Hahn, Karl Menger and Kurt Godel. Wittgenstein, living near Vienna, though not an official member of the group, maintained very close personal relations with Schlick. After the death of Schlick in 1936, the Circle was disrupted by its members going over to the United States and England. Today Professor A. J. Ayer of London, the celebrated author of *Language, Truth and Logic,* is regarded as the leading British proponent of Logical Positivism.

Logical Positivism is "positivist" in so far as it refuses to acknowledge any trans-empirical reality, anything beyond the realm of actual or possible sense experience—a line of thought which is nothing but a continuation of the Humean tradition. Where the modern positivists claim originality is in their having developed a rigorous and thorough logical technique. As a necessary corollary, it appears, to their disclaimer of any trans-empirical reality, they have developed an extreme anti-metaphysical attitude which is a prominent feature of their school. All metaphysical statements are devoid of factual or literal significance. Metaphysics is nonsense. Metaphysical knowledge claims to be a knowledge about the universe as a whole—an impossible feat for the human mind! Metaphysicians talk of a transcendent reality behind and beyond phenomena, but empirical premises do not warrant the postulation of such a reality. Along such lines the positivists seek to end all metaphysical disputes for all time to come by showing the impossibility of metaphysics and by showing that all metaphysical statements are pseudo-statements, not genuine.

This brings us to the question of a criterion by which the genuineness of apparent statements is tested. That, according to the positivists, is the criterion of verifiability:—

> We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the propositions which it purports to express — that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false.[3]

[3] A. J. AYER: *Language, Truth and Logic* (London, Victor Gollancz, 1955), p. 35.

This criterion of verifiability is the bee in the bonnet of Logical Positivism. Any proposition which does not admit of the possibility of verification in empirical or sense experience is, whatever its grammatical appearance may suggest, either a mere tautology or pseudo-proposition or simply an emotionally significant sentence, but in no case a genuine proposition. Logical Positivism is committed to the absolute, final and indubitable reality of sense experience; as Ayer has put it pointedly:—

> ...anyone who condemns the sensible world as a world of mere appearance, as opposed to reality, is saying something which, according to our criterion of significance, is literally nonsensical.[4]

The critics of Logical Positivism have always urged—I think rightly—that, granted that the genuineness of a proposition can only be tested by its verification in experience, there is no reason to limit the range of experience to sense experience only. Why rule out of your purview such specific and significant human experiences as the moral, æsthetic or religious experiences?

The positivists are faced with a difficult situation in dealing with *a priori* necessary and universal truths such as those in logic and mathematics; for, to admit that there are such truths is to forsake the empiricist position and yield the ground to rationalism, and then the whole foundation for an attack upon metaphysics collapses. To escape this fate, as Ayer says, there are only two ways left open to the empiricist in dealing with the truths of logic and mathematics:—

> He must say either that they are not necessary truths, in which case he must account for the universal conviction that they are; or he must say that they have no factual content, and then he must explain how a proposition which is empty of all factual content can be true and useful and surprising.[5]

Mill, as is well known, chose the former alternative. No amount of inductive generalization from experience, he argued, can establish a *necessary* truth. The theoretical possibility always remains that what is true in experience $n-1$ times is liable to be upset the nth time, howsoever large a number n may represent. Ayer disapproves of Mill's procedure. He adopts the second alternative to escape from rationalism. He grants that the truths of logic and mathematics are *a priori*, necessary and universal; but they are, according to him, analytic and tautological, not synthetic and factual. They are *a priori* in the sense that they are not, and they do

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

not require to be, empirically validated. Though devoid of factual content, they are not senseless like metaphysical propositions.

> For, although they give us no information about any empirical situation, they do enlighten us by illustrating the way in which we use certain symbols....They call attention to linguistic usages, of which we might otherwise not be conscious...[they] do not increase our knowledge.[6]

Now, from the premise that analytic propositions do not require to be validated by empirical observation, the conclusion does not follow that they are devoid of empirical content. It is difficult to understand what precisely Ayer does mean by saying that analytic propositions are devoid of empirical content. If propositions are true at all, the only conceivable and intelligible sense in which they can be so is that they are true *of* facts. Their truth may not depend on observation of facts, but they cannot be devoid of factual reference. The reader may here be reminded of Bradley's pithy remark that there never are "floating ideas." "The proposition 'Either some ants are parasitic or none are,'" says Ayer, "is an analytic proposition. For one need not resort to observation to discover that there either are or are not ants which are parasitic."[7] Yes, you need not resort to observation to establish the truth of the proposition, but the proposition is not devoid of reference to a factual situation. The most disconcerting part of Ayer's account of *a priori* propositions is this, that he thinks that *all a priori* propositions are analytic and tautological and that there are no *a priori* synthetic propositions at all. Without going any further I should like to close the discussion of this problem with the following observation of Ewing:—

> ...the verification principle itself could not be verified by sense-experience and the principle that there can be no synthetic *a priori* propositions must itself be synthetic *a priori* if it is to be known and to be of any interest.[8]

Now, if metaphysics is nonsense, is any business left over to philosophy? The positivists answer the question in the affirmative. They say that philosophy is a special branch of knowledge, though metaphysics is not. The business of philosophy is not "to formulate speculative truths, or to look for first principles or to make *a priori* judgments about the validity of our empirical beliefs"[9] but a wholly critical business of a special kind. The positivists' conception of the nature of philosophical analysis is

---

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 79.

[8] *Contemporary British Philosophy* (Third Series), p. 145.

[9] A. J. Ayer: *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 51.

based on their conception of the nature of philosophical problems themselves. These problems, according to the positivists, are not factual at all; they are merely linguistic. A *locus classicus* of this view may be found in the following statement of Wittgenstein:—

> Most propositions and questions, that have been written about philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. (They are of the same kind as the question whether the Good is more or less identical than the Beautiful.)
>
> And so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems are really *no* problems.
>
> All philosophy is "Critique of language" (but not at all in Mauthner's sense). Russell's merit is to have shown that the apparent logical form of the proposition need not be its real form. The proposition is a picture of reality. The proposition is a model of the reality as we think it is.[10]

A "critique of language," the testing of all propositions of science and common sense by translating them into their equivalent sentences in a logically perfect language—that is what philosophy finds itself reduced to at the hands of the positivists. The business of the philosopher is not to add new propositions to his list, but to clear away from his stock all those "pseudo-propositions" which simply befog and bedevil us. In fact, philosophy is not to give us any knowledge at all.

> It is science that gives us our knowledge of the world; there is not, there cannot be, a philosophical brand of knowledge which would compete with science in this field. But where in that case does the philosopher come in? One thing he can do, of course, is to act as a sort of intellectual policeman, seeing that nobody trespasses into metaphysics.[11]

"What, only criticism and no meat? The philosopher a fog dispeller?" asks F. Weismann in despair and adds: "If that were all he was capable of I would be sorry for him and leave him to his devices."[12]

Having acquainted himself so far with the standpoint of the positivists, their approach to philosophical problems and the nature of their plan and programme, the reader can easily guess what their attitude to ethics and religion would be. In ethics, the positivists advocate what is known in current discussions as the "emotive" theory of ethical judgments, as

---

[10] *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), p. 63.

[11] A. J. AYER *et al.*: *The Revolution in Philosophy* (Macmillan, 1956), pp. 78-79.

[12] *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 461.

distinguished from the "cognitive" theory. Let me quote A. J. Ayer on the point:—

> The fundamental ethical concepts are unanalysable, inasmuch as there is no criterion by which one can test the validity of the judgments in which they occur. . . . They are mere pseudo-concepts. The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, "You stole that money." In adding that his action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, "You stole that money," in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker.[13]

What about God? Well, "to say that 'God exists' is to make a metaphysical utterance which cannot be either true or false"[14] and if the mystic asserts that he has an immediate experience of God, well, he is "merely asserting that he is experiencing a peculiar kind of sense-content."[15]

S. N. L. SHRIVASTAVA

> AFTER the sacred volumes of God and the Scriptures, study in the second place, that great volume of the works and creatures of God, strenuously, and before all books, which ought to be only regarded as commentaries.
>
> —FRANCIS BACON

[13] *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 107.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 115.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 119.

JAMES ELROY FLECKER

POET OF THE SUN

[**Mr. Herbert Bluen** is known to our readers by his many brief, reflective poems. His account of James Elroy Flecker is sympathetic and full of interest.—ED.]

THE POET'S VOICE was never more needed than in this twentieth century when rampant materialism threatens to stifle all that is best in life. Yet little poetry is read today despite the fact that many thinking people are not content to live by bread alone and are hungry for spiritual sustenance. Poetry is the quintessence of literature. It expresses man's loftiest thoughts. It can satisfy spiritual hunger; but if a poet wishes to gain a wide audience he must be intelligible. Unfortunately much modern poetry is arid. Its authors have little ear for the music of words. Their symbolism is private and beyond the comprehension of ordinary readers. They make no attempt to please, uplift or solace, but are cynically aloof. It would appear that so long as the poet can purge his mind of the bitterness that corrodes it by expressing his thoughts on paper he has fulfilled his mission. It is difficult to see what purpose there is in such poetry which is usually tainted with a complete lack of humility. Fine poetry, on the other hand, is never just an exercise in morbid introspection. It has universality. Great poets have been essentially humble men with a love of humanity, an understanding of its joys and sorrows, a belief in a Supreme Being.

It may be true that the general public is so obsessed with material matters that it has little time to spare for poetry. Yet the popularity of such poets as John Masefield, W. H. Davies and Walter de la Mare suggests that the general public does enjoy poetry when it is reasonably intelligible. The poetry of James Elroy Flecker is not so widely known as that of the three poets just mentioned. He is nevertheless a fine poet. His poetry is musical and exotic. It is quite different from the work of any other English poet. Occasionally, however, it is reminiscent of Charles Baudelaire, also a lover of exotic Oriental imagery. Flecker is a passionate poet. His inspiration has all the warmth and brilliance of the summer sun at noonday,

> When the whole sky is vestured silken blue
> With not one fleece to view.

To those weary of the drabness and regimentation of modern life Flecker's poetry is a fountain of refreshment. Only occasionally is it introspective. He regards the miracles of nature with eyes of wonder and gratitude.

Occasionally he is witty. He has no message, no political axe to grind. He is not a great but a fine minor poet. To appreciate him it is not necessary to have received a higher education although some knowledge of ancient mythology will help. Most of his poems are short. His short life gave him no opportunity for a massive contribution to literature. Lack of quantity is, however, amply recompensed by quality and originality. Each of his poems has been "meticulously jarred," to quote the Chief Grocer in *Hassan* when praising his jams. It represents the triumph of genius over ill health.

James Elroy Flecker was the son of the Reverend W. H. Flecker. He was born on November 5th, 1884, and educated at Uppingham and Oxford. He entered the Consular Service and served in his official capacity at Constantinople and Beirut. In 1910 he married Helle Skiadaressi, a Greek lady. He had already produced two books of poems, *The Bridge of Fire* and *Thirty-Six Poems*. He died of consumption at Davos on January 3rd, 1915, aged thirty.

In spite of his religious upbringing Flecker became an agnostic but was reconverted to Christianity on his death-bed. His friends considered him an optimist, yet some of his poetry is tinged with sadness. He is assured of a permanent place among the English poets.

Apart from his gifts as a lyric poet, Flecker proved in his play *Hassan* that he possessed considerable dramatic power. He wrote one other play, *Don Juan*, which is of less importance. *Hassan* was successfully produced at His Majesty's Theatre in 1923. It is not the purpose of this article to deal with this play as a whole, but to consider Flecker from the aspect of his lyric poetry. Nevertheless, it must be said that in addition to its dramatic power *Hassan* sparkles with poetry even though most of it is written in prose. It tells the story of the rather ludicrous love of Hassan, a fat middle-aged confectioner of Bagdad, for Yasmin, a beautiful young widow, and the tragic love of Rafi, King of the Beggars, for Pervaneh, a slave girl in the palace of the Caliph, Haroun Al Raschid.

Part of the fascination of Flecker's work is in its curious un-Englishness. He writes to a great extent like an Oriental poet who has chosen English for his poetic medium. *Hassan* is an example of this characteristic. It gives the impression of having been written with ease and delight. Unlike so many modern plays and novels it has a good, strong plot. Despite its fantasy it is convincing. It maintains the interest throughout and works up to a violent and tragic climax possibly distasteful to some phlegmatic temperaments. Although the play ends on a note of cruelty and tragedy, we are uplifted by the beauty of a completed work of art.

Flecker's knowledge of the East was profound, and in *Hassan* he uses his

knowledge to good effect. He delights in portraying Oriental luxury:—

> Have we not Indian carpets dark as wine,
> Turbans and sashes, gowns and bows and veils,
> And broideries of intricate design,
> And printed hangings in enormous bales?

The romantic side of Flecker's poetry is apparent from the following strangely haunting lines from the play:—

> Sweet to ride forth at evening from the wells,
> When shadows pass gigantic in the sand,
> And softly in the silence beat the bells,
> Along the Golden Road to Samarkand.

Most poets have written of love. Flecker is no exception. His love poems have an enchanting quality because although his mind dwells much in the past he is also quick to seize the beauty of some fleeting rapture and transmute its gold into poetry:—

> And Life stood still a moment, mists came swinging
> Blindly before us; suddenly we passed
> The boundaries of joy: our hearts were ringing
> True to the trembling world: we stood at last
> Beyond the golden gate,
> Masters of Time and Fate,
> And knew the tune that Sun and Stars were singing.

The joy of two lovers in each other's presence, the sense of a fusion of soul with soul, could hardly be more eloquently described.

Despite ill health Flecker had a great capacity for happiness, especially that serene happiness induced by contemplation of the beauties of nature:—

> Ah, misty woodland, down whose deep
> And twilight paths I love to stroll
> To meadows quieter than sleep
> And pools more secret than the soul!

Even Flecker's saddest poems uplift us because of the consummate artistry with which they are written. This is the test of good poetry, which should have the power to transcend pain and suffering.

Flecker could create a vivid picture with a few brief strokes of the pen:—

> A ship, an isle, a sickle moon—
> With few but with how splendid stars
> The mirrors of the sea are strewn
> Between their silver bars;

Although Flecker is essentially a poet of the sun the beauty and mys-

tery of the night could also inspire him as these lines illustrate.

Flecker was fascinated by the splendours of the past and the sea is often in his thoughts:—

> I have seen old ships sail like swans asleep
> Beyond the village which men still call Tyre,
> With leaden age o'ercargoed, dipping deep
> For Famagusta and the hidden sun
> That rings black Cyprus with a lake of fire.

Genius often flowers out of suffering. This is true of Flecker. In hospital, stricken with illness and shut away from the workaday world, he triumphantly proves that "stone walls do not a prison make." His body may lie upon a hospital bed but the spirit has the power to escape like a bird uncaged and become one with "The shimmering lake in which the planets swim."

"The Ballad of Camden Town" is not perhaps an example of Flecker at his best. Indeed it can hardly be described as typical Flecker. It has echoes of John Masefield and W. H. Davies. It has no gorgeous Oriental imagery. It is, however, written with an attractive gusto:—

> I walked with Maisie long years back
> The streets of Camden Town,
> I splendid in my suit of black,
> And she divine in brown.

This is the charming and very English picture with which we are presented in the first verse of the Ballad, which tells the story of two lovers whose love was ill-fated. "A bed, a chest, a faded mat" and a few broken-down chairs was all the furniture they possessed, but Maisie's lover was happy when they walked to Hampstead Heath, and he could "crown her head with daisies." Then, one day, he fell ill, and "She left the latchkey on its nail" and he never saw her again. Her lover wonders whether some dreadful fate has overtaken her, yet dreams wistfully that "she dwells in London still"—

> Once more together we will live,
> For I will find her yet:
> I have so little to forgive;
> So much, I can't forget.

"Brumana" is one of Flecker's finest poems. Homesickness is its theme, a longing to see once more the "Meadows of England shining in the rain," with her "daisied lawns" and "ramparts green." As in so many of his poems the sea is in his thoughts. Dreaming of his return to England, he asks the English streams to store for him their love and kingcups, and his

oid fragrant friends, the pines, to sing for him as they once sang long ago

> When, lonely boy, beneath the chosen tree
> I listened, with my eyes upon the sea.

He remembers how

> ...from the sea's blue fields and syren dales
> Shadows and light noon-spectres of the foam
> Riding the summer gales
> On aery viols plucked an idle sound.

In those distant days the poet fancied that the pines were singing to him of

> "...older seas,
> That beat on vaster sands,
> Where the wise snailfish move their pearly towers
> To carven rocks and sculptured promont'ries,"
> Hearing you whisper, "Lands
> Where blaze the unimaginable flowers."

Perhaps Flecker anticipated that his poetry would survive him; for, in "To a Poet a Thousand Years Hence," he writes:—

> Since I can never see your face,
> And never take you by the hand,
> I send my soul through time and space
> To greet you. You will understand.

Every age has its competent poets, but mere competence does not suffice if a poet is to survive the changing winds of fashion. Only the poet who is gifted with some unique quality will be remembered by posterity.

James Elroy Flecker is such a poet.

HERBERT BLUEN

A FORGOTTEN SANSKRIT POET

[**Shri S. K. Ramachandra Rao** is well known to our readers. He writes sympathetically of a rather neglected Sanskrit poet and introduces us to his one known work — a pleasant poem rather in the manner of Kalidasa's *Meghaduta*.— ED.]

IT is the misfortune of some poets to be ridiculed by their contemporaries and ignored by posterity, notwithstanding their eminence. Sanskrit literature abounds with examples. Ghaṭakarpara, for instance, was an outstanding poet of his age, rivalling even Kālidāsa. But some ill star haunted him both during and after his life. His work remained neglected and his name obscure until very recent times. His works have now all been lost save for a poetic fragment, known after his name. Another short collection of verses, however, has been ascribed to him: *Nītisāra*, in the form of a dialogue between a hog and a lion.

A celebrated verse from *Jyotirvidābharaṇa* makes Ghaṭakarpara one of the "nine gems" (with Kālidāsa) in the court of Vikrama. Persistent tradition also makes him a contemporary of the great poet, who, according to Hoernle, lived about 490 A.D. Legends refer to the rivalry and enmity that assumed interesting forms between Ghaṭakarpara and Kālidāsa. There is even an attempt to ascribe *Ghaṭakarparakāvya* to the authorship of Kālidāsa in the colophon of the *Ṭippaṇa* by some Śaṁkara. Hemacandra, however, argues in his *Kāvyānuśāsana* for the identity of Ghaṭakarpara with Bhāsa: he refers to Bhāsa's early life as a water-carrier (*ghaṭakarpareṇa udakavahanaṁ*) and the contempt in which he was held on this account by his fellow poets. Rājaśekhara, who identified Bhāsa with Dhāvaka, also mentions the stigma attached to the poet's lowly origin. Here was clearly a poet who was a victim to ridicule and jealousy, and whose eminence and low caste struggled against each other.

The work which has immortalized his name is a short *kāvya* of twenty (in some editions twenty-two) verses, known as *Ghaṭakarparakāvya*. Ghaṭakarpara means a broken pot, and the expression occurs in the last verse of this poem: "If another poet should excel me in the *yamaka* style of composition, I shall [be his servant and] carry for him water in a broken pot."

Jīyeya yena kavinā yamakaiḥ pareṇa
Tasmai vaheyam udakaṁ ghaṭakarpareṇa

The real name of the poem has been lost, and the poet himself perhaps got his name from this cognomen. There are about nine manuscripts of

this work preserved in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute at Poona, two in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library at Madras and two in the Asiatic Society in Calcutta. Dursch published it with a commentary from Germany as early as 1828; Dinanatha Nyayaratna published it in 1869 and Jivanand Vidyasagar in 1888. But a critical edition with a commentary in Sanskrit was beautifully got up by J. B. Chaudhuri of the Prācyavāṇī Mandir only in 1953.

This poem belongs to the species of *Sandeśakāvyas*, poems intended as messages transmitted by human beings, animals or even elements. This type of composition had its origin in the *Ṛgveda* (x.108) where a dog, Saramā, is made to convey a message to the Pāṇis. In the *Rāmāyaṇa*, a monkey (Hanumān) carries Rāma's message to Sītā in Laṅkā. The *Mahābhārata* has an episode where a swan carries a message from Nala to Damayantī. It was Hanumān's message-carrying that stirred Kālidāsa to his famous *Meghasandeśa*, where the banished *yakṣa* from Rāmagiri sends to his beloved in Alakā a message by the Cloud. A cloud again assumes the rôle of messenger in Ghaṭakarpara's poem, but here it is the lady that sends the message to her lover who is in some distant land.

The poem, although neglected, has had the good fortune of numerous commentaries, including one by the famous Abhinavagupta (ninth century), who, however, inclines to consider this work Kālidāsa's. Another good commentary by Govindajyotirvid (sixteenth century) confesses that the author is one whose name is not definitely known (*anirdiṣṭanāmā*). Divākara, another commentator, describes the poem as a *kalāpakāvya*. There are glosses and annotations by Kamalākara, Caturbhuja, Kucalakavi, Bharatamallika, Tārācandra and Vindhyeśvarīprasāda. The poem has been successfully imitated by the poet Madana of the sixteenth century in his *Kṛṣṇalilākāvya*.

The theme of the poem is love: the pangs of separation are conveyed by the love-stricken lady during the month of Aṣaḍha to the morning clouds to transmit to her husband who has been away since the Vaiśākha month. The lovely sports of nature in the best of seasons pierce the heart of the tender woman: Oh, this excellent occasion for love! And it has come now, of all the times, when my dear one is far away! How shall I bear this? Won't this season kill me?

Sarvakālam atilaṅghya toyadā
Āgatāh stha dayito gato yadā;
Nirghṛṇena paradeśavāsinā
Mārayiṣyatha na tena mām vinā? (Verse 7)

The man is away on business in a distant land; and the lady wonders

what business at this moment could be dearer to him than her company. What pleasure can he find away from her in this enchanting season? She almost imagines that he has deserted her, and in anger calls him "heartless." The rainy season delights and enlivens even the hapless and the unlucky; but it burns the heart of the lady, for it has come when her dear one is not with her. The lady is wild with agony and thinks of suicide, but the memory of her husband's virtues saves her. "But why, why does he not think of my white cheeks kissed by the tips of the curling hair and come back?"

> *Kiṁ kṛpāpi tava nāsti kāntayā*
> *Pāṇḍugaṇḍapatitālakāntayā?*
> *Śokasāgarajale'dya pātitāṁ*
> *Tvadguṇasmaraṇam eva pāti māṁ* (Verse 12)

The poet assures us that after receiving this insistent call from the good woman, the husband returned to her in a few days. The noble sentiment of attachment between two devoted souls is the poet's main concern in this poem.

The woman's conception of love finds here an exquisite expression. The impatience, tenderness, concern and fears are welded in her sorrow that springs from intense attachment: without her dear one, entire nature in its most gorgeous setting is but painful. She is upset by the apparent neglect, but is understanding enough: she does not suspect his faith or intention. Her regard for him is as strong as her love for him. She only curses the pleasant season for having arrived at a wrong time. For even the flock of swans have moved to the Mānasa Lake, and the Cātaka birds are thirsty for the delicious water of the rains; will not then a love-lorn wife feel sad?

> *Haṁsapaṅktir api nātha saṁprati*
> *Prasthitā viyati mānasaṁ prati!*
> *Cātako'pi tṛṣito'mbu yācate!*
> *Duhkhitā pathika sā priyā ca te!* (Verse 8)

The poet's eye for the beautiful in nature is alert and mature: the fragrant *ketakā* trees dance in the air to the accompaniment of the rumbling clouds (Verse 15); the blossoming *kadaṁba* flowers smile sweetly at the dear lady (Verse 17); the amorous bee kisses the jasmine creeper that is decked with bright flowers and little drops of rain:—

> *Kusumair upaśobhitām sitair —*
> *ghanamuktāṁbu-lavaprahasitaiḥ,*
> *Madhunas samavekṣya kālatāṁ*
> *Bhramaraś cuṁbati yūthikalatām* (Verse 19)

Or listen to the soft music of this fine verse: The twittering swans are scared away by the loud rattling of the clouds; evenings now are like the *kunda* flowers, although devoid of a moon; and the proud peacocks cry aloud for water when clouds draw near:—

Haṁsā nadan meghabhayād dravanti !
Niśāmukhānyadya na candravanti !
Navāṁbumattāh śikhino nadanti !
Meghāgame kundasamāna-danti (Verse 2)

The poet is proud of his talent for the *yamaka* composition, which is the poetic reverberation by some "chime," involving the regular repetition of words with different meanings. With inferior poets, it means effort and artificiality; but with Ghaṭakarpara the lines flow with ease and the *yamaka* is accomplished with consummate skill. In the short scope of this piece the poet has successfully employed seven different metres: Rathoddhatā, Vasantatilakā, Sundarī, Upajāti, Mālabhāriṇī, Puṣpitāgra and Aupacchandasaka. He is clever at, and seems fond of, the Rathoddhatā metre: as many as seven verses, including some of the best in the poem, have been composed in this engaging metre.

But the poet does not compare favourably with Kālidāsa in his handling of the same theme in *Meghasandeśa*. Ghaṭakarpara's canvas is brief and limited; and he works with formal strokes of a single brush. Kālidāsa's canvas is vast and his dabbings of rich paints are wonderful and variegated. Ghaṭakarpara fails to give us the thrilling delight Kālidāsa does, but he evokes our admiration all the same. The rainy season with a love-lorn lady in the background has come up for an exquisite treatment; the task that the poet has set before himself is a very modest one, but he has accomplished that task well.

S. K. RAMACHANDRA RAO

THE AIMS OF EDUCATION

[**Shri V. T. Srinivasan,** Principal of the Vijaya College, Bangalore, writes no argumentative thesis, but proffers the sincere confession of faith of an experienced educator. We cannot but agree that the demands of political and economic expediency upon education must be subordinated to its duty of preparing human beings to live lives that are spiritually worth while; and also that some acceptable philosophy of life as a whole is essential to this. Not that we think any one set of doctrines can be rigidly defined for this purpose; there are archetypal ideas that run through all great philosophies and religions, and are affirmed inwardly by each soul as it comes to that point in its experience. But right education can produce the necessary capacity for discrimination and inculcate the habit of humility.—ED.]

FOR what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?—*Matthew*, XVI. 26

AT THIS FATEFUL PERIOD in its history mankind cannot afford to continue to drift, like a dry leaf thrown on a river, along the current of time. The menace of a possible nuclear war has cast a shadow across the world, and a cold war holds the nations in its grip. It has rightly been said that "wars begin in the minds of men, and it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed." The time has now come for education to cease to be the handmaid of politics and to take its rightful place and save mankind from the inglorious end which threatens it. One of the most urgent and important needs of the present time is, therefore, the statement, or rather the re-statement, of the aims of education, and the direction of our energies towards the realization, at least in part, of those aims.

In some respects there is a parallel between the present plight of mankind and that of certain prehistoric, mighty species which became extinct. These creatures developed highly complex and heavy defensive organs, and, when a revolutionary change in their environment took place, they could not adapt themselves to the new environment. So they were crushed under the weight of their own armour and thus perished.

Now, the advances of science and technology have placed in man's hands weapons which can practically wipe out his species from the face of the earth. Time and distance have been conquered, and the world has shrunk, for many purposes, to the size of a room. Man has thus effected a revolutionary change in his environment, but there has been no corresponding change in his character which would enable him to adjust himself to

the changed environment so as to live in it in peace with his fellow men. It has been rightly said that men have learnt to fly in the air like birds and to swim under water like fish, but not yet learnt to live on land like men. It is this disproportion between the development of the intellect and that of the character of mankind that is at the root of the present crisis. It is at this point that the crisis must be tackled, if mankind is to be saved. If education can succeed in transforming the character of man, in effecting a radical "change of heart" as Gandhiji put it, in sublimating his lower nature, it will have fulfilled its true mission.

It is against the background sketched above that we have to address ourselves to the task of stating the aims of education, which may now be set forth as follows: (1) The transmission of the intellectual, cultural, ethical and spiritual heritage of mankind; (2) the extension of the boundaries of this heritage; (3) the full and harmonious development of personality, and the acquisition of wisdom; and (4) the formulation of a convincing philosophy of life which will illuminate the mind, transform character and provide a safe guide to conduct.

The first aim, which is inseparable from the second, covers two aspects: one is external, and concerned with the immediate requirements of society; the other is intrinsic, and pertains to "its own treasures heavy with the thought and sacrifices of the centuries." The former trains the student for an occupation, while the latter educates him for life. This heritage is much more than books, manuscripts, records, monuments, etc. Its transmission essentially consists in the way in which it energizes national life, manifests itself in the thought, conduct and deeds of the citizens, and shines through their virtues, aspirations and the values cherished by them.

The never-ending quest after Truth is the master passion of education, and "the wisdom of the ages" must manifest itself in the living personalities associated with it, if the transmission of our heritage is to provide nourishment to society. Mankind grows with time, and so its heritage grows continuously, and in the task of extending its boundaries teachers have to play a leading part. It follows, therefore, that if this aim is realized, teachers will no longer be mere mercenaries or camp-followers, but that each teacher will become a living focus of mankind's growth and the students will emulate his example.

I shall now briefly discuss the extent to which these aims are being realized in India. After the attainment of independence there has been a quantitative expansion in the educational sphere, but standards have deteriorated to an alarming extent. A study of the causes of this deterio-

ration is outside the scope of this article, but some of them will now be enumerated, so that the reader may see the steadily widening gulf between aspiration and achievement in education in our country.

The status and salary given to teachers are so low that the best men avoid the profession. Overcrowding and insufficient equipment have given rise to further evils. Respect for authority, which was undermined during our struggle for freedom, has not yet been restored. The fall in the level of morality and discipline, which is a prominent feature of the present social, political and economic situation, has infected the educational field. Parents have adopted a commercial attitude towards education, and their children's passing of examinations has become their chief aim. The domination of examinations over the entire system of education is anything but salutary, as they promote cramming, and instruction is subordinated to them, so much so that all initiative in the teacher and the student is strangled.

The third and the fourth aims of education are closely interrelated, and they constitute the very soul of education. In this regard education has failed mankind, and failed tragically, because it has remained, till now, a mere hireling of politics. Sir Richard Livingstone rightly says that, in the last war, science "served both sides with complete impartiality and provided alike penicillin and radar, the V2 and the atomic bomb," and "asked no questions." Our sad predicament is due, not to any poverty of knowledge or material resources, but to the lack of the character and the wisdom to use them properly. The strongest criticism of the present education is that it has placed enormous power in the hands of men but failed to provide a guide to conduct. In parts, our educational system is good, but, taken as a whole, it is unsatisfactory, because there is no unity of purpose, no community of values, no formulation of, or loyalty to, ideals, nothing to awaken an urge to practise virtue and walk in the path of *Dharma*.

Our educational system looks like a conglomeration of a number of unconnected masses of information, and the students are indiscriminately shoved into the pigeon-holes of various subjects, in which they are supposed to specialize, with the result that intellectual fragmentation and anarchy reign supreme. While specialization is inevitable on account of the enormous growth of knowledge, it is necessary to present the outlines of knowledge as a whole in order to impart a sense of perspective. The revelation of the Lord's *Vishwa-Rupa* to Arjuna during the teaching of the *Gita* has a deep significance for us. A comprehensive view of knowledge is essential for that enlargement of the mind which, according to Newman, is the essence of true education.

Excessive specialization has led to the emergence of what José Ortega y Gasset calls "the new barbarian," who is "more learned than ever before, but at the same time more uncultured," and consequently,

> his political ideas and actions will be inept ; his affairs of the heart, beginning with the woman he will prefer, will be crude and ridiculous ; he will bring to his family life an atmosphere of unreality and cramped narrowness which will warp the upbringing of his children.[1]

Teachers and students should be constantly and keenly aware of the distinctions between information and knowledge, and between knowledge and wisdom. In the poignant words of T. S. Eliot,

> Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge ?
> Where is the knowledge we have lost in information ?
> The cycles of heaven in twenty centuries
> Bring us farther from God and nearer to dust.

One of the chief aims of education should, therefore, be the acquisition of knowledge through information, and of wisdom through knowledge. The word "wise" is derived from "*videre,*" (the Sanskrit root is "*veda*") which means "to see," that is, to have a vision of Reality. The wise man is he who knows and *sees*. He is, in the words of Plato, "a spectator of all time and all existence," and therefore, he is able to see the problems of his generation against the background of eternity. His mind is freed from every kind of narrowness, and he can view the issues of his period with a true sense of perspective.

In this atomic age when man has soared into outer space and reached the moon with his rocket, is it not a tragedy that he is still ruled by primitive tribal instincts and separatist forces, and carried away by slogans appealing to his narrow prejudices? The acquisition of wisdom, in the true sense of the word, by the peoples of the world has now become a matter of life and death for the entire human species.

The last aim of education is the most important of all. Man is a psychophysical being, and the saying that man does not live by bread alone is profoundly true. The training of souls is at least as important as the training of minds. Life has a meaning and a purpose. The noblest task of education is to fathom this meaning and purpose, and place them at the centre of all teaching; this would give a direction to the efforts of teachers and students. In other words, a convincing philosophy of life acceptable to modern men of all faiths must be outlined. The importance and urgency of this sublime task have not yet been adequately realized. If education

[1] "Mission of the University."

fails in this regard, it will lead to further frustration and demoralization, and unregenerate mankind will rush to its doom.

Ours is a gadget civilization, a technological civilization, a civilization of iron and steel, of the clatter of wheels and the roar of engines, in which "the still sad music of humanity" has been drowned. The traditional beliefs, which imparted stability and poise to the life of our ancestors, are going to pieces, and nothing else has taken their place. We have lost our bearings, and we are caught in the storms of doubts and uncertainties. As Dr. S. Radhakrishnan says, "this is a generation which knows how to doubt, but not how to admire, much less to believe," and "this aimlessness, this indifference to basic issues, is, to no small extent, responsible for the decline of standards, for the fading of ideals, for the defeat of human endeavour."[2] A crying need of our times is, therefore, a philosophy of life for guidance, spiritual sustenance, and inspiration in moments of uncertainty, frustration, gloom, despair.

The tasks set forth above are gigantic indeed, but the problems confronting us are of similar magnitude. Mankind calls, and Fate beckons Education to fulfil its great mission. Will it rise to the occasion? I cannot answer, but hope springs eternal in our breasts.

V. T. Srinivasan

Trust not yourself; but your defects to know,
Make use of every friend — and every foe.
A little learning is a dangerous thing,
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring:
There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
And drinking largely sobers us again.

— Alexander Pope

[2] *Report of the University Education Commission.*

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

"OF OCCULT MASONRY AND HERMETIC INITIATION"*

M. ANDRE VOLGUINE, Editor of the excellent review *Cahiers Astrologiques* and author of several worthy works, continues his excellent work by publishing a series entitled "Masters of Occultism." He has brought out a collection of fundamental texts and original papers in various branches of occult sciences. Whatever may be the value of the modern studies published in this collection, on the esotericism of "Templiers," for example, or the symbolism of Tarot, it is beyond doubt that it is by publishing the complete texts of works which now have become rare, indeed, most rare, that M. Volguine acquires the strongest title to our gratitude. Thanks to him, important writings of Claude de Saint-Martin, of Gérard de Crémone, of Phillipe d'Acquin, of Paracelsus, of Confucius, to name but a few, are again available to the public.

The works selected by M. Volguine for publication are always important and it was a happy idea to have published a new edition of the crowning book of J. M. Ragon: *Of Occult Masonry and Hermetic Initiation*.

For many reasons, this work deserves to be placed before the curious and those who have a passion for occultism, and for many reasons it will hold their attention.

In the first place, the amateur of occult knowledge and the occultist will always be interested in the chequered history of the secret societies and especially of Freemasonry; they will not fail to inquire into the great periods of this institution, into the thought of its principal adepts and, finally, into the significance of its rites and dogmas. Among books treating of Freemasonry, indeed, we do not hesitate to affirm that the book *Occult Masonry* occupies a distinguished place.

The historian and theoretician of the sect, Jean-Marie Ragon (born at Bray-sur-Seine in 1781; died in Paris in 1862) was an official for a long time at the Ministry of the Interior and strikes us as one whoose testimony on this difficult subject ought to be listened to as authoritative. He exercised a profound influence on Freemasons and on all who sought the knowledge of Freemasonry. In an effort to demonstrate the occult vocation, or, if one should prefer it, the occultism, of Freemasonry, Ragon establishes the link between the pre-Revolutionary and Revolutionary Illuminism on the one hand and the modern occultism of Eliphas Levi and Papus on the other. Whereas some Freemasons and philosophers formed the link between the Lodge of Nine Sisters (Neuf-Soeurs) and the Garibaldi and Comiste movements, both having a political bias, another Masonic movement had an unbroken existence since the eighteenth century: it is precisely the "occult" current or occultism which brings us to the disciples of Martinez de Paschalis, of Cagliostro, of Swedenborg, of Dom Pernéty, and continues till the establishment of the

* *De Maconnerie Occulte et de l'Initiation Hérmetique* (Of Occult Masonry and Hermetic Initiation). By J. M RAGON; Introduction by A. VOLGUINE. (Les Maîtres de l'Occultisme, X. Editions des Cahiers Astrologiques, Nice, France. 183 pp. 1947. Frs. 540)

Masonic order of Memphis-Misraïm, the neo-Rosicrucian foundation and the disciples of Aleister Crowley.

Let it be understood that here we are trying to discern only the general tendencies and that we do not mean to place on the same level Papus and Swedenborg or the "Great Beast" and the good Saint-Martin! It is in so doing that we meet Ragon, who partook of the concerns of a temple affiliation dear to the German Order of Strict Observance before 1789. As a matter of fact, Ragon was initiated into the Neo-Temple Order of Fabré Palaprat — that astonishing creation of the first Empire, endowed by Napoleon Bonaparte with on official status.

But to consider the book itself — it is an expression by J. M. Ragon of this occult tendency, constant in Masonry, which he represents in 1853, the date of the first edition of his chief work. *De la Maçonnerie Occulte et de l'Initiation Hérmetique*. One guesses immediately that the study undertaken by Ragon unfolds itself on three levels, or more exactly, that it unfolds at the conjunction of two converging lines, along both of which he conducts us to begin with. On the one hand Ragon outlines a history of Freemasonry and on the other he portrays the fundamental features of what he considers traditional occultism. Finally, he underlines the mystagogic rôle of Freemasonry, which is heir, he believes, to the ancient Mysteries and those of Hermetism.

It is necessary to state clearly that the numerous historical pages of Ragon appear today very weak. Neither in *Maçonnerie Occulte* nor in his other works on history does Ragon constitute for modern historians an authority from which one could draw freely without doubt. Similarly, Ragon persists in an unhappy confusion between the higher forms of occultism or esotericism and other more or less degraded forms such as Mesmer's Animal Magnetism or somnambulism. While alchemy deserves the predominant place he gives it in that sphere, its "occult" psychology, that bizarre amalgam of traditional data with modern scientific conceptions (that is, those of 1853), which includes even Gall's phrenology, has become obsolete. One regrets to find it associated with doctrines which are much purer and much richer and to which alone the name "occultism" should be given. And the condemnation of astrology in our author flows from the same "scientific" prejudice.

We must admit this: if Ragon can still offer much precious information on the history of Masonry, if his chapter on numbers or the one on Hermetism still contains useful teachings, one must beware of some legends which he presents as certain facts. (As, for example, in the case of the Rosicrucians, the legendary character given whom, however, in no way reduces the importance of their symbolism.) One must also beware of a certain "scientism" prevailing at that period, which tended, so to speak, to materialize occultism.

But the great lesson of Ragon is the identification of Freemasonry and occultism with the Hermetic initiation. This is a lesson, and, above all, an invitation to reflect upon the nature of Masonry and its initiation. And this problem raised by Ragon, given opposite solutions during the eighteenth century, is still today of living interest.

Is there a Masonic esotericism? Freemasons themselves do not agree upon the answer to that question.

Some consider Freemasonry as a sort of club or merely as a welfare society, the rites of which they judge to contain some picturesqueness and charm but not to have any effective value, to be regarded more in the light of folklore than as magical or sacramental. The ritual would thus be rather

a gesture than a rite in the full sense of the term. Initiation would not be more than a fanciful manner of introducing an applicant into an association similar to an equivalent introduction to secular societies.

For others, on the other hand, there is esotericism in Freemasonry, the rituals of which are potent in themselves and also because of the intention of those who practise them. Freemasonry would then be lofty, a sacred society, an "initiatory" society, using the term in the magical or metaphysical sense.

It is evidently this last view that Ragon represents. But it is not enough to affirm the veritable initiatory and esoteric character of Freemasonry; it is not enough to recognize the existence of a hidden meaning behind its words, its gestures and its varied and numerous symbols. It is necessary to explain that hidden meaning and to ascertain its origin. Here, even among those who hold to the "esoteric" thesis, opinions vary.

Some doubt that any actual masonry ever existed (such as the breakers of stones) or that there was any real initiation in the mediæval masonry. According to them that Masonry was not different from ordinary corporations and it was only subsequently that Hermetic elements were introduced into "speculative" Masonry.

Others, on the other hand, trace the initiation in Masonry and the traditional chain of Masonry, so to speak, to more remote times; but, as it is difficult to justify the affirmation of initiation in the organization of *comacines* or of the breakers of stone, they are inclined to link Masonry with mediæval chivalry. The Masonic initiation would then be derived from the initiation of chivalry. But such linking up is not easy to prove.

There is a third thesis, which was recently defended by Pierre Barrucand, which insists that there are magical elements in the Masonic ritual and concludes that "the method of Masonic realization — if realization were ever included — could only be a form of the ceremonial magic or theurgy."

J. M. Ragon confuses in the Masonic tradition the Hermetic elements and the magical ones. He also confuses that which is logically accordant with that which has filtered in. He does not distinguish, as do, for instance, the disciples of René Guenon, between occultism itself and the occult sciences and esotericism, that is, "the traditional metaphysical doctrine." But he affirms the living presence and the efficacy of occult dogmas and rites *lato sensu* in Freemasonry.

Here it would be necessary to make a further distinction: what the pseudo-occultists among Freemasons decide about Masonry and what history teaches us. Should history dictate what contemporary Freemasonry should be? Everything depends upon the importance that one gives to the traditional and historical chain of initiation — or else to the power of an organization to impregnate at a particular moment the rites and symbols with the power and the meaning that the society desires to give them.

The problem obviously is not a simple one and one doubts that a unanimous Masonic opinion will emerge to bring its solution. And yet if the problem obviously invites the interest of Freemasons themselves, since it includes deciding what is meant by being a Freemason, it should not leave indifferent those who do not belong to Freemasonry and especially those who are historians of occultism and of religions.

Of the works of Ragon none is more able than *Maçonnerie Occulte* to compel us to examine a question which is grave and can have serious consequences in so many spheres; few works can provoke us as strongly to

meditate; few could offer us as many elements of information and for discussion.

ROBERT AMADOU

[This review-article is translated from M. Robert Amadou's French original.—ED.]

Man and People. By JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET. Authorized Translation from the Spanish by WILLARD R. TRASK. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 272 pp. 1959. 25*s*.)

In this posthumously published study, Ortega stresses the fact that sociologists have not defined what society is. Such terms as the State, the nation, public opinion and public power cause groups of people to argue, or even to fight, while the meanings of the words involved are never precisely formulated. In unquiet times like these, men and women cannot easily exercise their essential attribute of meditation; and yet without a withdrawal into the self it is not possible to comprehend the meaning of the social, of society.

Ortega himself remained silent for ten years; and in these reprinted lectures he offers wise counsel to all who desire to clarify their ideas. He believed that it was man's destiny and privilege to be radically solitary, although he is always aware of the other person and of that abstract entity, "everybody else."

In their daily lives people find that, when they wish to be themselves, they come up against a social will, or an architecture of usages. This social power, of which public opinion is an example, "functions in the coercion that is 'usage.'" Usage, although exercised by individuals, cannot be suppressed by the individual will. Usage is a public entity created by the person; but once it is an observed usage — as the salutation is — it becomes an institution. The primary task of today is to make sense of social concepts, to be linguistically precise and psychologically alert.

The essence of this important message which Ortega passes on to those who will listen is that man is endangered by collectivity. Collective opinions are always commonplace and their positive qualities remain inactive: "What acts is simply their mechanical pressure on all individuals, their soulless coercion. It is not without interest that in the most ordinary speech they are called 'prevailing opinions'."

One may disagree with many of Ortega's notions, as I do myself, yet this does not get in the way of an appreciation of a work which embodies some of the Spanish philosopher's most carefully formulated and valuable thoughts.

E. W. MARTIN

Humanism and Moral Theory: A Psychological and Social Inquiry. By R. OSBORN. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 115 pp. 1959. 18*s*.)

It is refreshing to read a book which deals with psychology and philosophy and find that the author takes pains to make his meaning plain and comprehensible to any normal, educated and thoughtful reader, instead of wrapping it all up in grandiose technical terms. Mr. Osborn believes that "language is an imprecise way of conveying meanings . . ." but also: "Generally, people understand what we are trying to say from the context. . . ."

Very briefly what Mr. Osborn seems to convey to us is his idea that it is possible to have an objective basis for moral theory in terms of an ideal of

rational human development. Thus we have a philosophical and moral backing for the "brotherhood of man" and equally a rational condemnation for race-hatred, torture and other absolute wrongs.

He argues that

> if we begin with man as a social being, as reaching his humanity only in society, we can give content to the abstract notions of right, good, and ought. *Society is the good for man* [italics reviewer's] because it is through society that he achieves his humanity.

(Incidentally he gives some fascinating and horrifying details of children kept isolated from society and their lack of human development.)

The scope of this study is indicated by some of the chapter headings: "The Background of Moral Consciousness"; "The Social Basis of Ethics"; "Psychoanalysis and Ethics"; "The Good and Society." He also gives some interesting details of the growth of morality in the child, including the child's ideas on lying:—

> Many children answered Piaget's questions concerning lies to the effect that if lies were not punished they would not be naughty. Hence the lie which is believed and does not lead to punishment is not considered naughty.

(I fancy many of us have met adults with the same viewpoint about an assortment of misconduct!)

This book is of interest to the general reader, and of especial help to all concerned with the education and the care of children. It would make an admirable basis for study groups, being of sufficient depth and width to provoke further research and yet being expressed in a sufficiently plain and human manner to encourage the slower student. A further merit is the wise arrangement of chapters and the provision of a good index.

ELIZABETH CROSS

The History and Origin of Language. By A. S. DIAMOND. (Methuen and Co., London. 280 pp. 1959. 30*s*.)

This is a factual enquiry into the history and origin of language. At the outset the author stresses the need for appreciating three primary aspects of language: first, that language has no physical entity with an independent existence of its own, but consists merely of types of sounds, uttered and heard by men, which take their meaning from circumstances outside itself; secondly, that language is for ever changing; and lastly, that it is communally organic in character. It is to this third aspect that the author devotes his main attention, hoping to extract the laws according to which language changes.

He holds that the history of sounds and meanings cannot be traced independently of the ideas represented by them or, in other words, that advances in human language are closely linked with the successive advances of the human mind. The author's thesis is that language emerged out of requests for assistance addressed by one person to another in the small local semi-nomadic groups from which human society is assumed to have developed, and that if we trace words back to their origin they lead to meanings of vaguer, but more emotive, content, signifying maximum human effort.

In a series of comparatively short chapters the author starts with an examination of the nature of the sentence, the vocabulary and parts of speech in English and other languages, the origin of nouns, adjectives and adverbs in English and in the classical as well as primitive languages. The nature of grammar is then investigated, followed by three chapters dealing with the functions of verbs. Two chapters are devoted to the history of meaning. The behaviour of animals, the earliest

words of the race and of children and the physiological factors attendant on the production of speech all come in for consideration. The vocabulary and grammar of the Semitic and Bantu languages are then scrutinized so as to throw light on the origin of language. The last chapter summarizes well-known recent theories regarding the origin of languages, *e.g.*, those advanced by Max Müller, by Sayce, Jespersen and others. The author's attitude towards these is liberal; he believes that each contains a share of the truth.

The material in the book is technical in character, and beyond the range of the average reader. The author's studies bear on primitive levels of thought and movement of the human being, which he views against the background of animal behaviour. Whether the origin of language can be evaluted altogether on the basis of the evolutionary hypothesis is, however, open to question. Those who look for any philosophic content or speculation will do so in vain. We may doubt whether language, which is the most finished product of civilized man, can be fully assessed in all its potentialities by studying material solely derived from primitive levels. A study of the earliest literature of mankind, *e.g.*, the *Rigveda*, displays a wealth of vocabulary and shades of meanings, and grammatical distinctions which have not survived in the later classical Sanskrit. That does not appear to fit into the orthodox evolutionary scheme. But apart from such considerations, it is a good book, so far as it goes, free from strong bias and liberal in judging alternatives, readable though not inspiring.

K. Guru Dutt

Gandhi et les Femmes de l'Inde (Gandhi and the Women of India). By Camille Drevet; Preface by Louis Massignon. French. (Pensée Gandhienne. Editions Denoël, Paris. 250 pp. 1959. 750 Fr.)

Lanza del Vasto, the well-known admirer of Mahatma Gandhi, is the Director of the series on the "Gandhian Thought," of which the book under review is the latest. Madame Drevet has already had the distinction of being one of those who introduced the life and thought of this great sage of India to the French reading world through her two books, and a bibliography (in collaboration with M. Jean Herbert) on Gandhi. She now presents the impressions of her visit to India in 1957 when she made the acquaintance of the ladies associated with the Mahatma. For these ladies are the living examples of his teachings and "have preserved them like live sparks to comfort them in their daily life."

The author has successfully emphasized the high respect in which women were held by Gandhiji. To him, they were the symbol of love, unstinted loyalty, unqualified sacrifice and above all of non-violence. He found these qualities in abundance in his mother and later in his wife Kasturba, who was so much instrumental in his ascension towards the glories of a spiritual life. We see how deeply human he was and how his gentle firmness lent strength to the movement for the emancipation of the women of India, for with him, they fought equally bravely for India's independence. The accounts of such personalities as Gangabehn Maymudar, who helped him in reviving the handicrafts; Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, at present the President of the Indian Red Cross; the courageous Muslim lady Amtus Salam; Dr. Sushila Nayar and others will help the European reader to appreciate the greatness and virtue which Gandhiji inspired in Indian women. His letters to Esther Ferring and Miss Slade, who became his dis-

ciple under the name of Mirabehn, bear testimony to his universal and open mind. Indeed, his religion "surpassed all frontiers and inspired his triple ideal of truth, love and service."

Barring a few onomastical errors, the book is written in a simple style. It is preceded by a chronological table of the more important events of the Mahatma's life, and contains notes to acquaint the foreign reader with certain important events and items of Indian life. It ends with a small Bibliography—classified under Publications in India, U.K., France and the U.S.A., which should be helpful to the Indian research worker on Gandhian thought.

NICOLE BALBIR

India's North-East Frontier in the Nineteenth Century. Edited with an Introduction by VERRIER ELWIN. (Oxford University Press, Bombay. 473 pp. 1959. Rs. 28.00)

In the volume under review, Dr. Elwin has collected extracts from forgotten accounts of "explorers, administrators, tea planters and missionaries who wrote vivid accounts of what they saw" and has edited them with an Introduction, valuable notes and a full Bibliography.

To the scholar, all these 124 articles (or extracts) from John Butler, T. T. Cooper, E. T. Dalton, J. E. Gray, W. Griffith, Father Krick, J. F. Needham, W. Robinson, R. Wilcox and others are a most valuable contribution to the ethnology, history, geography, flora and fauna and even military strategy of the colourful and valiant people of our frontiers.

At the time these articles were written, Anthropology as a science was still struggling to be born: many of these early explorers, in their first impressions, considered the NEFA tribes merely as barbarians and heathens, or just as dream-children like Shakespeare's Caliban. The sympathy of man studying fellow men of the primitive strata is rarely seen except in the sketches of Colonel Dalton and the Rev. C. H. Hesselmeyer.

Written in days of Christian missionary zeal, many passages in the volume read (even Colonel Dalton was not free from the obsession of proselytizing the heathen) like the attitude of Columbus's men towards the natives of the New World.

But when everything has been said, Dr. Elwin has earned the gratitude of the students of the science of Man, by editing these extracts in a neat volume. The Introduction is valuable, the maps illustrative of the teeming tribes and the Bibliography useful, but the price seems likely to be prohibitive to many.

CHARULAL MUKHERJEA

KALIDASA'S *Kumārasaṁbhavam*. Cantos I-VII. Edited by S. R. SEHGAL, with GRIFFITH'S English translation. (Navayug Publications, Jullundur. 140 pp. 1959. Rs. 16.50).

Kālidāsa's *Kumārasaṁbhava* is available in a number of editions, but the chief merit of Dr. Sehgal's present edition is that it includes the free English rendering in verse by Ralph T. H. Griffith, out of print since 1879. It may be pointed out that the complete work, as it is known today, consists of seventeen cantos, but, according to the majority of scholars and critics, the first seven are definitely by Kālidāsa himself, the eighth probably so, and the remaining nine certainly by a different, much later and inferior hand. Many commentators have therefore commented upon only the first seven or eight cantos. The pres-

ent edition incorporates the first seven.

The title of the poem indicates that it relates the story of the birth of Kumāra, otherwise known as Skanda or Kārttikeya, the six-faced god, son of Śiva and Pārvati, at whose hands the demon Tāraka was destined to meet his end. The story told in the first seven cantos is from the birth of Umā (Pārvati) to her marriage with Śiva. Whether Kālidāsa stopped short at this point or whether he completed it and the rest of the genuine text is not available now is a matter of speculation. Scholars are not prepared to accept as genuine the last nine or ten cantos, in which the story is carried to the destruction of Tāraka by Kumāra.

Dr. Sehgal has tried to make his edition as attractive and useful as possible by prefixing a learned Introduction and suffixing Indices. One of the two illustrations from Indian archæology, which no doubt add to the charm, is upside down.

B. CH. CHHABRA

The Quest of the Infinite. By A. P. ROY. (The Author. Sole Distributors: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta. 1958. 924 pp. Rs. 12.00)

The author, who, as a competent Kaviraj (a distinction in Ayurvedic medicine), has been helpful in curing physical ailments, has, by this book, offered to help people in removing their mental ailments and in attaining spiritual health. Encouraged by the favourable reception accorded to his Bengali work by scholars, press and public, the author has brought out this enlarged edition in English. As the author explains in his Apologia, the present work is an attempt to attract "the minds of materialistically inclined men and women afflicted by the world to the path of religion and the spiritual treasures of the land."

Restrictions of space preclude a detailed discussion of this important book, and the reviewer has to content himself with a bare mention of some important topics discussed in the book. Of the two parts of the book, the first deals elaborately with the theoretical aspects of the problem of the Infinite. It expounds the essence of the Vedānta philosophy in a simple and lucid style, though with full documentation from the main authority of the Upanishads. Though advocating the monistic standpoint, the author also stresses the importance of the path of dualism, and his exposition of devotion, service and sacrifice provides interesting reading. The important topics considered in this part include such vital problems as creation, God, religion and *karma*. The author is well versed both in Indian and Western religious and philosophical literature, and holds balanced views. His catholicity of outlook and rationalism are remarkable.

The second part of the book is the outcome of the author's personal experience in the realm of Yoga, and as such will be of inestimable value as a guide to all interested in spiritual pursuits. Readers should bear in mind that the author advises the devotee to read carefully and master the first part, so that it may help in calming down "the urges of his passions and in creating a deep thirst for the world beyond and unknown" with the result that "the practice of Yoga will be found to be easy, pleasing and encouraging."

The printing and get-up are fair, but the reviewer seriously feels the absence of an Index, which would have considerably enhanced the value of the book.

A. D. PUSALKER

Ordeal of Faith: The Crisis of Church-Going America, 1865-1900. By FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER. (Philosophical Library, New York. 380 pp. 1959. $6.00)

This is an interesting book and a mine of information for anyone requiring the particular information which it contains, but it is not likely to find many readers among readers of THE ARYAN PATH. In the first place it deals exclusively with the U.S.A. and, in the U.S.A., only with the impact of modern knowledge on the life and thought of the major Christian denominations. It is true that one chapter is concerned with "New Approaches through Mysticism and Idealism" and devotes exactly one page to Theosophy. But the bulk of the book is concerned with the challenge of new ideas in science, sociology and Biblical criticism to the centuries-old orthodox teaching of the Christian churches, both Catholic and Protestant.

Moreover, even for a reader like the present reviewer, born and reared in the old tradition of orthodox Christian teaching and keenly interested in the subject of Christian history, the book is disappointing in that it is more of a catalogue or compendium for reference than a human document, the number of names referred to being so large and the references so scrappy that none of them really comes to life as a human being struggling to adjust his faith to a rapidly changing situation.

For American, and to some extent European, readers, however, the book will have considerable value. It has an exhaustive Index and notes and is excellently documented, so that anyone concerned with tracing the religious history of the last thirty-five years of the nineteenth century in any of the major denominations of Christendom will find it invaluable. It is written quite impersonally and objectively and leaves the reader with no clue as to where the author's personal sympathies lie and to which, if any, of the churches whose history he has so conscientiously studied he belongs. Moreover, it is by no means a purely critical study of the more negative and destructive type, but leaves the reader with the feeling that, underlying the battle of the creeds, the conflict between orthodoxy and heterodoxy and the even more fundamental clash between authoritarianism and freedom of thought, there remains within essential Christianity a Rock of Ages which is unshakable and immovable.

MARGARET BARR

Popular Talks on Psychological Topics. By PREM NATH. (Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute, Hoshiarpur. 141 pp. 1959. Rs. 2.50)

As the title signifies, most of the talks contained in this book — which were originally given on the air — deal with such psychological topics as "The Underworld of the Unconscious," "Mental Tensions," "The Psychology of Complexes," "The Psychology of Attitudes," "The Psychology of Rumour," "The Psychology of Fear," etc. The author has dealt with these in a non-technical style. The book will be found quite helpful by lay people who wish to understand their own life and also the life around them a little more effectively. The last two talks, "The Psychology of Resolution" and "The Psychology of Religion," are particularly enlightening.

G. M.

The Seeker's Path. By SOHAN SINGH. (Orient Longmans, Bombay. 109 pp. 1959. Rs. 6.00)

This is an excellent interpretation of Guru Nanak's *Japji,* considered to be the core and crux of Sikhism. The *Japji* is a short composition of thirty-eight principal stanzas in Panjabi verse, divided into four parts. And its argument consists of these stages: (*a*) there is an eternal Reality within and beyond the world, and so the seeker is to attune himself to it; (*b*) this attunement is achieved through hearing and reading, reflection and the reorientation of the mind to the Vision of the Reality; (*c*) after acquiring many-sided knowledge in this way, the seeker aspires to an ever-felt impact of the Spirit; and (*d*) this is possible only through Divine Grace. The Seeker's path is delineated in outline in the last stanza thus: —

> In his workshop of Self-restraint, Poise, the goldsmith, beats into shape the gold of life, using the True Doctrine as the anvil and Knowledge as the hammer. The gold itself is first purified with the help of the bellow-pipes of Discipline, fanning the fires of the Energy-accumulating austerities. Finally, in the vessel of Love and Devotion this purified gold is cast in the mould of Immortality. Such is the way in which the conduct of the True Mint is fashioned. However, only those who receive the favour of His Grace may conduct themselves in this way — only by the favour of the Gracious Lord does one attain to supreme happiness.

The original text has been given in Roman transliteration. It is followed by a fluent English translation and a commentary, which is scientific, rather than sentimental as is often the case with interpretations of scriptural verse, especially of a devotional kind. There is also an Index. The author is to be congratulated on his accomplishment, worth emulating.

G. M.

LEAVES FROM A PARIS DIARY

[**Shri Baldoon Dhingra's** reflections on the right mood for New Year's Day should find sympathy from many readers. He draws also an attractive sketch of the Egyptian writer Tewfik el Hakim.—ED.]

MOST COUNTRIES in Europe welcome the New Year in ways peculiar to their own cultural patterns. Many hold that a boisterous buoyant welcome presages good fortune. In Paris a large number of people revel into the night regaling themselves with roast turkey and choice wine; others, when midnight strikes, crowd into motor cars and honk their horns — normally forbidden — as an impish expression of exuberance. No stranger greets a stranger, there are no joyous shakes of the hand; only shrill, cacaphonous sounds deafen the ear, reminding us only too sharply that we live in an age in which more and more noise will be our daily lot. Perhaps I am old-fashioned, but I believe that if we must rejoice on New Year's Day let us do so by hailing strangers with beaming faces or hands outstretched in infectious friendly feeling. Thus we might fill our lungs with air, dispel the shades that darken looks and become conscious, even for a moment, of the presence of a host of other souls with whom we link ourselves.

As I was thinking these thoughts I began to watch objects around me almost as if I were seeing many of them for the first time. It was like looking, not through a glass darkly, but with eyes that could see again after being bandaged for many weeks. I came home and jotted down these lines as they came to me and decided not to embellish or rewrite them, for they express but a mood which comes to me again

and again as I look at things or when almost for no reason at all I am under a cloud:—

> To see whate'er we do or can around,
> With eyes as fresh as dew upon the green,
> Is to have peered, not dimly through a screen
> But felt and breathed and touched the ground.
> No vision for a passing second, this,
> No orange dawns or lemon skies provoke
> A mystic trance; it's no flashing stroke
> Of recognition; it's a way; it's bliss.
> Can we be with the sightless and the healed?
> Or with the pigeons as they peck their crumbs
> Like bobbing needles? With children doing sums?
> And peasants sowing seedlings in the field?
> If we can live each moment that is true
> Unto itself, each day, each hour, is new.

If a sense of humour is the peacemaker of the world then the great Egyptian writer, Tewfik el Hakim, has it in abundance. He is a kindly gentleman, just turned sixty, slim, graceful, distinguished. He is a wit, a man with a tremendous sense for words; a master of the brilliant phrase, the arresting sentence. I had only read one or two of his plays. The other day he asked me to have a talk with him and then, with great courtesy, he presented me with three of his books, one of which was a volume of plays. As Tewfik el Hakim has been highly considered in this country, his books have been most ably rendered into French with, of course, the author's own corrections, for Tewfik el Hakim, probably Egypt's greatest living writer, is also a master of French prose.

I read the *Maze of Justice*, and the series of one-act plays which the author knows how to make sparkle. There is one play which I should love to see acted and this is called *Madame Politique*. Speaking of translation, I am reminded of Voltaire's epigram on the subject:—

> Do you know why the prophet Jeremiah spent all his days in dismal lamentation? Because he knew that all his words of fire would be reduced to ashes—by translation.

Fortunately, Tewfik el Hakim has found good translators and his plays are eminently actable. He has fantasy and the power to create the atmosphere essential for his need to make the unreal real and the impossible probable.

Tewfik el Hakim is a man of great refinement, courtesy and charm. Even his criticisms of contemporary French culture are without bitterness or scorn: his words are spoken more in sorrow than in anger. He is saddened, for instance, that Françoise Sagan should be given such lavish praise and placed on Parnassus when in her own youthful realm she has a picture to paint and her own rightful place. According to Tewfik el Hakim, English, American and Italian literatures are now replacing French. I would have preferred to have had French retain her own niche of polished grandeur, for when it comes to prose, the French language, say what you will, is rich, melodious and precise.

BALDOON DHINGRA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"——————ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

A significant letter from the famous psychologist, Dr. Jung, appeared in *The Listener* (January 21st, 1960) replying to the large correspondence received after his October 1959 television broadcast, in which he spoke of "knowing" God.

I did not say in the broadcast "There is a God." I said: "I do not need to believe in God; I *know*." Which does not mean: I do know a certain God (Zeus, Jahwe, Allah, the Trinitarian God, etc.) but rather: I do know that I am obviously confronted with a factor unknown in itself, which I call "God" in *consensu omnibus* (*"quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditur."*) in the opinion of all — what always is, what is everywhere, what is believed in by all.

He thinks of this as something stronger than himself, which can subdue his conscious will, upset his "subjective views, plans and intentions" and change the course of his life.

In accordance with tradition I call the power of fate in this positive as well as negative aspect, and inasmuch as its origin is beyond my control, "god," a "personal god" since my fate means very much myself, particularly when it approaches me in the form of conscience as a *vox Dei*, with which I can even converse and argue. (We do, and, at the same time, we know that we do. One is subject as well as object.)

It would be immoral, he writes, to believe in a "universal, metaphysical Being" as portrayed in religious "philosophies," and impertinent to make "an arrogant qualification such as: 'God can only be good.'"

Only my experience can be good or evil, but I know that the superior will is based upon a foundation which transcends human imagination. Since I *know* of my collision with a superior will in my own psychical system, I *know of God . . . a God beyond good or evil*, just as much dwelling in myself as everywhere else: *Deus est circulus cuius centrum est ubique, cuius circumferentia vero nusquam.*

[God is a circle whose centre is everywhere, and whose circumference is truly nowhere.]

Here we have restated as a conviction a most ancient truth by one of the more profound thinkers of our time, and though the blank materialists, the dogmatic church followers, and the opposing schools of psychological thought may all misjudge his ideas and deny his influence, these are making an impact on the intelligent public mind.

"Religion," said Professor S. K. Ramachandra Rao, "is practical in its orientation. It is only when it is institutionalized that it becomes corrupt." He was speaking on "Practical Buddhism" at the Indian Institute of World Culture, Bangalore, on January 7th. He felt that the Buddha's teachings were not mere theory but a sort of discipline. This is borne out by the *Dhammavinaya*, which treats the teachings of Buddha as a doctrine pertaining to this life. The Buddha was not a philosopher wandering about preaching his philosophy; he was one who lived in forests and remote places seeking a practical value for his knowledge. His deep interest in human life showed him that man has a distorted view of the world because of the ego within him. Just as people seem to see things in the dark in accordance with their characters, so also man, owing to his ego, suffers from delusion. The main task of the Buddha was to show how to destroy the ego. For this he advocates the attainment of rectitude of life — free from confusion within and

without. Man should develop a penetrative wisdom. Driven by internal forces man is unmindful of some of the most common and everyday acts of life.

Among the forty exercises prescribed by the Buddha the speaker took only one and described how the very act of breathing could be converted from the material to the intellectual, giving us an understanding of the dissolution of life into death. Above all, the Buddha always stressed the fact that He could only show the way, but it was we who should adapt it to our needs and follow that Path.

Dr. D. Gurumurti, who presided, said that religion had been kept alive during the ages because of the impact with which the teachings of great sages like the Buddha had given new life to it. He felt that all religions are basically alike but differ only in the circumstances in which these basic concepts have been explained.

At the London Branch of the Indian Institute of World Culture on January 22nd, 1960, William Taylor spoke of the work of Danilo Dolci, "the Gandhi of Sicily." Actually Dolci had applied the techniques of *Satyagraha,* fasting and non-resistance before knowing anything of Gandhiji, except as a name in politics. The people of Sicily to whom Dolci dedicated himself, and for whom he renounced his professional status, were not only poverty-stricken (even starving), uneducated, backward and wasteful in agriculture, without any industry or capital, but also riddled by banditry and vendettas and neglected by the mainland authorities except for the immense police force kept on the island. Dolci began in Trappeto near Palermo, while working as a fisherman, to beg and borrow money for a home for the destitute. When further projects started by him — road repair and the building of an irrigation dam — brought civic opposition, Dolci broke it down by fasting, and gradually other social projects, hospitals, sewers, roads, materialized. The work spread to Partinico, where a mass fast by 700 men in connection with another road-repair scheme brought about the arrest of the non-resistance leaders. Dolci's week-long trial in March 1956 resulted in to slacken their persecution and stimulated many offers of financial and other for his personal integrity and courage that extended to other countries. The activity of influential people there, especially writers, forced the authorities to slacken their persecution and stimulated offers of financial and other help. Working against a series of obstacles (confiscation of his passport, etc.) Dolci has widened his work with four new Centres, each adopted by a Committee in a different country. The British Committee has sent an agriculturist and social workers to help in the education work, and has founded a school and community centre. Dolci's own lecture-tours and writings publicize his efforts, though only one of his works has been translated into English, by P. D. Cummins. Dolci sees only one solution for this disorganized, violent and forlorn society — a complete social regeneration from within. As the leaflet issued by his British Committee puts it:—

> ...the first requirement is disinterested service, the establishment of trust and confidence, a clear demonstration that someone cares.

Government aid *is* needed, but personal help is equally necessary to show how that aid may best be used.

> The first essential is people with the right attitude, people who understand that only in better human relations is peace to be built, people with the patience to learn as well as to teach, to wait until they find the right time and the right way to help.

An ideal can never remain abstract and endure. We are most stirred to action when the ideal becomes actual by the power of the living personal example.

Dr. R. A. Schemerhorn, Associate Professor of Sociology, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A., delivered an excellent lecture on "What Lies behind America's Immigration Policy?" under the chairmanship of Shri B. Vasudevamurthy, at the Indian Institute of World Culture, Bangalore, on January 2nd. The speaker declared that except for the Red Indians all Americans are immigrants. These immigrants could be subdivided into two groups: those who immigrated to America up to the time of the foundation of the Republic in 1808, comprising primarily North and Western Europeans, from England, Germany, the Teutonic and Scandinavian countries, Italy and, to a lesser extent, France; and those who came in from 1808 to the present times, mostly from Germany.

The American immigration policy allows any one whose country does not prohibit the entry of an American to immigrate to America. From 1703 to 1830 anyone could come into the country. After that several associations, beginning with the WASPS (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants), who wanted to enforce a twenty-one-year residence for citizenship and also to keep out criminals, tried to restrict immigration. In reality this movement was intended to keep out the Catholics and the Irish. The Civil War, however, put an end to such movements.

After the Civil War the Southern States tried to attract immigrants to counterbalance the loss of slave labour. Legislation was passed preventing this. Other important landmarks in the history of America's immigration policy are the anti-Chinese movement which started in California, after the Chinese workers who were brought to build the Trans-Continental Railway asked for citizenship, and later the legislation of 1882, which prohibited the entry of the diseased and handicapped. Of even greater importance is the wave of feeling against foreigners which the First World War precipitated. The present policy provides a quota, out of the ceiling of 150,000 immigrants a year, for each nation, in proportion to the numbers of that nationality resident in America. This bill, which was passed in 1924, includes the Chinese. Security checks are also made on those who come from countries which are "absolute" in their views.

In concluding, the speaker thought that open immigration would be better than providing a fixed quota. Justice Vasudevamurthy agreed with the speaker in this.

It is a welcome trend in recent times that judicial decisions are generally reflecting the changing pattern of social values. A recent decision of the Allahabad High Court, however, serves as a fresh reminder of the extent to which Courts can be an instrument of social change or rather a means to give legal validity to social changes. According to a P.T.I. report, the Allahabad High Court has held that the very act of a Muslim marrying again during the subsistence of his first marriage raises a presumption of cruelty towards his first wife. His Lordship declared, according to the report:—

> In the absence of cogent explanation, the Court will hold under the present social conditions that the action of the husband in taking a second wife involved cruelty to the first and that it would be inequitable for the court to compel her against her wishes to live with such a husband.

His Lordship dismissed the Muslim husband's appeal against the decision of a District Judge, holding the husband's desire to have the consortium of both the wives simultaneously to be "conjugal greed." The judgment emphasizes the present-day trend which looks with revulsion on bigamy.

It is rightly pointed out by the Judge that Muslim jurisprudence has always

taken into account changes in social conditions in administering Mohammedan law. Muslim society has not, as is usually supposed, remained static, and to argue otherwise is to deny the record of the achievements of Muslim civilization and the rich and varied development of Muslim jurisprudence in different countries. The views of the Judge regarding the provision in the *Koran* are relevant, for according to the report:—

Holding that Muslim Law, as enforced in India, had considered polygamy as an institution to be tolerated but not encouraged, His Lordship said provision in the *Koran* sanctioning polygamy was a restrictive injunction which reduced the number of wives to four at a time and thus imposed a ceiling on conjugal greed which prevailed among the males on an extensive scale. It had not conferred upon the husband any fundamental right to compel the first to share his consortium with another woman in all circumstances. His Lordship added: A Muslim husband had the legal right to take a second wife even while his first marriage subsisted but if he did so, and then sought the assistance of the civil court to compel the first wife to live with him against her wishes and on pain of inprisonment, she was entitled to raise the question whether the court, as a court of equity, ought to compel her to submit to cohabitation with such a husband. In that case, the circumstances in which his second marriage took place were relevant and material in deciding whether his conduct in taking a second wife was in itself an act of cruelty to the first which disentitled him to any assistance from the courts of law which also functioned as courts of equity.

One of the convincing evidences of the impact of social changes on Muslim law is the passing of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, which enabled the Muslim wife to sue for the dissolution of her marriage on a number of grounds previously not available. In this connection, His Lordship added:—

Today Muslim women move in society and it is impossible for any Indian husband with several wives to carry all of them around. He must select one among them to share his social life, thus making impartial treatment to ploygamy virtually impossible under modern conditions. Formerly, a Muslim husband could bring a second wife into the household without necessarily meaning any insult or cruelty to the wife. Occasionally a second marriage took place with the consent or even at the suggestion of the first wife. But social conditions and habits among Indian Muslims have changed considerably and with it the conscience of the Muslim community. Today the importing of a second wife into the household ordinarily means a stinging insult to the first.

WE greatly regret that exceptional difficulties beyond our control have much delayed this issue of THE ARYAN PATH, and may to some extent affect the April issue, though attempts will be made to come up to schedule.