

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly,
and lost among the host — as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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"THUS HAVE I HEARD" —

"Of me, if of anyone, it can be truly affirmed that, in me, a being without delusion has arisen in the world, for the weal and welfare of many, out of Compassion towards the world, for the good, the weal and welfare of gods and men."

These words were spoken by Gautama, the Enlightened Sage, the Wise One.

In modern times the teaching of Buddha is looked upon as abstruse, cold, highly metaphysical, soulless, stern in its conception of Karma or Justice. It is said that there is no hope, no comfort, no consolation for any one save for the man himself who must seek peace and salvation by striving to realize Nirvana. Buddhism is said to be a religion of pessimism, very prosaic, stressing self-effort to gain redemption — at best a religious philosophy in which penance and prayer are but for the purpose of obtaining salvation — a higher form of selfishness! It is said to lack tenderness, mercy, pity, love. This is not accurate.

It is true that Gautama taught that "Rigid Justice rules the World." It is a hard saying that

"A harsh word uttered in past lives is not destroyed, but ever comes again." It is also true that self-immolation — the destruction of *Tanha*, the thirst for earthly life, is recommended for attaining the Peace of the self-less Self. But what is not understood is that the acquiring of the wisdom that leads to the *summum bonum*, demands the practice of Compassion. No Compassion, no Wisdom. One may gain knowledge without Compassion; but not Wisdom, divine and eternal, which leads to the realization of Peace, Bliss and Light. Compassion is then not only the supreme end; it is also the means by which the darkness of ignorance is dispersed; the glamour of world-deception is overcome; the machinations of the egotistic self are defeated; the ugliness of evil is pierced and the beauty of the supreme Unity is perceived.

In the above quoted words of the Master, Compassion is the motive—the good of others and not only of himself. Immediately after his reaching Enlightenment under the Bodhi Tree, he was tempted by Mara not to waste his wealth of Wisdom on the *hoi polloi* but to enjoy the fruits of his efforts in Nirvana. Then it is said Brahma spoke to him, beseeching him to preach to the worlds of men and gods and share with all the fruit of his attainment. And the text says:—

Heeding Brahma's entreaties and moved by Compassion for all beings, I surveyed the world with the Eye of Enlightenment and I proclaimed—Nirvana's gates stand open wide to all.

It was not therefore knowledge but Compassion which was the starting point of his noble mission; and Compassion became his abiding purpose. It was indeed Compassion practised in previous lives (as allegorized in the Jataka Tales) which brought Gautama to seek Wisdom and on attaining Emancipation from the round of *samsara* to renounce living in the Land of Bliss and to accept the "woes of birth" for the sake of suffering, selfish and deluded mortals.

Pity, love, compassion form the very soul of Buddha's teachings—the Pancha Sila, (the Five Precepts,) and the Four Noble Truths about the crushing force of suffering, the healing of human ills rooted in

longings, the seeking and the treading of the Noble Eight-fold Path. Without the Virtue of Compassion neither these nor other philosophical truths can be fully or truly comprehended. As compassion grows and deepens insight into philosophical and psychological doctrines also deepens. Buddhistic tradition tells us that, when in his incarnation as Sumedha he had met the Buddha Dipankara, he began the search for ways and means to Buddhahood. "Come let me search the Buddha-making conditions," he said "this way and that, above, below, to the ten points, even to the primary elemental foundation (*dhamma-dhatus*) of all things."

Our modern civilization badly needs this neglected, almost unknown method of gaining true knowledge. We all recognize that knowledge assimilated leads to the acquisition of greater knowledge and that the Mind is the instrument for gaining knowledge. But our civilization has yet to learn that knowledge may grow from more to more without becoming Wisdom, while the practice of Compassion not only makes the heart compassionate but also kindles the flame of true insight. Compassion is like the air we breathe; only a few appreciate its true value, its strength and beauty. As we exhale Compassion we inhale purer compassion and it is the growth of Compassion which can raise us to the Terrace of Pure Truth, Pure Light, Pure Bliss, Pure Life. The prayer of the follower of the Tathagata is:—

"May all beings be happy and secure; may they be happy minded."

WHAT THE WEST EXPECTS FROM INDIA

[**Shri Sunder Kabadi** is an able journalist and is the London representative of the "Express" Newspapers of India. In this survey he is factual and objective and avoids utopian speculations. In his opinion, the present struggle is between two ideologies, not between two nations or two races. But does not this idea indicate that fratricidal civil war will precipitate itself in almost every country when the third world war breaks out? Will it be the *Mahabharata* war on a global scale?—ED.]

The countries which are described with brevity as "the West" hold different opinions on the major issues of our time as well as what should be the Western approach to them. There have been different opinions before, depending on class, religion, politics or individual experience, but what is important about the present ones is that they are in the process of change. The spiritual and psychological effect of two world wars within half a century has been to make people look again at the foundations on which their civilization has been built. The great question is: can a peaceful world be built on such foundations? If not, how and with what, can they be reinforced?

At the present time, what may be called the conventional thinkers, those who have no doubts about where they are going and how they are getting there, are guiding the destiny of the West. But one only has to recall the prophecies made by such men as H. G. Wells, George Orwell, Bertrand Russell and others, to realize that there is widespread uncertainty and apprehension as to the pattern of the future. And

responsible leaders like President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill confess, even as they shape the affairs of their countries, that Western civilization is on a razor's edge. One false move and civilization will bleed to death.

Because Western civilization is on this razor's edge there are many voices raised in doubt and criticism as each new step is taken. Should the Germans be rearmed? Should Christian nations build atom bombs? Are not conditions too brutal in Kenya? Is there real interest in the cause of democracy in Malaya or in the price of rubber? Should an attempt to reach a settlement with Russia be made by bringing about a meeting of the heads of the principal nations, or should it be assumed that Soviet Russia is a conspiracy to enslave the world?

It is possible for a nation, like an individual, to become so engrossed in its own ideas that it will not listen to other points of view, particularly if these call for a readjustment in its thinking. This is very likely to be the case if the nation, or group of nations, has for long

held undisputed mastery over the destiny of the world, as has Europe. Even up to the beginning of the 20th century, as Sardar Pannikar has observed, the European nations, in the enjoyment of unprecedented economic prosperity and political prestige,

remained unshakably convinced that they had inherited the earth, and that their supremacy in Asia was permanent and was something in the nature of a predetermined Divine Order.

Sardar Pannikar was writing on the theme of "Asia and Western Dominance," but Western dominance did not stop at Asia. The white man was supreme in Africa, in the Far and Middle East, and in Asiatic Russia. Even in the meanest streets of London, Berlin, Paris or Vienna, there was, up to the turn of this century, a climate of permanence, of durability, of self-assurance.

Today in Europe there is a reluctance to look too far into the future, and a nostalgia for the past. There are deep psychological reasons behind the fact that the age of the First Elizabeth is now being endowed with the highest virtues; and that the Oxford Union is taking as a subject for debate the question whether the Elizabethan age is to be preferred to the Welfare State. One of the reasons for this hankering after past glories, real or imaginary, is that few people can see their way clearly into the future—apart from those professional men, like generals and unrepentant im-

perialists, a few of whom still survive, who are obliged to reduce life to the terms of a struggle for survival in which sheer material strength is the deciding factor.

While the physical and psychological destruction caused by two world wars has contributed to the uncertainty and doubt in the West, the Russian Revolution, the revolution in China and the awakening of Asia have had a very positive effect on Western thought. Europe is no longer feeding itself intellectually and spiritually solely on a European diet, but is beginning to recognize that other peoples and other civilizations have knowledge and truths which they want to share with all who are searching for the answers to their problems.

I would not say that there is conscious realization among thoughtful people in the West that India's ancient heritage has some of the wisdom and knowledge that the West stands in need of in this uncertain period of its history. Statesmen and nations do not consciously set out to influence each other. They influence each other because they are what they are, just as the sun melts snow or lightning strikes a tree. The influence that India is exerting on Western minds is already evident in many spheres; in the manner in which political freedom was transferred to us; in the more tolerant attitude being taken toward colonial questions; in the importance that is being attached, (as the Berlin

Conference illustrated), to talking patiently but firmly with those whom you fear.

This note of toleration comes at a time when the physical power of the Western world is greater than ever. Its physical technique for domination has not deteriorated in the past half century. In fact it has been vastly strengthened.

But despite this development of physical strength, the moral and material ascendancy of Europe was finally shattered in India. Since India achieved her independence the very word "imperialism" has become a term of reproach in the Western political and moral vocabulary. This is an outward sign of an inner change. A statesman who continues to uphold the ideals of imperialism—as some of them occasionally do—strikes his contemporaries as a rather ridiculous and forlorn figure.

The Germans, by pushing the "Master Race" ideology to its logical conclusion, finally killed the idea of racial or national mastery. The consequences of this are becoming increasingly evident in the political, religious and moral thinking of the West. What all men of significance subscribe to now is international liberty, equality and fraternity. These ideals, having made some headway in the social and economic affairs of various countries, are now projected as the highest ideals and those that should govern the relations of all nations.

Because this great shift in world outlook, or what the Germans call *Weltanschauung*, has taken place, it enables countries like India to work in harmony in many fields with those believing in this new world concept.

It may be believed in all sincerity, but the world being in a state of transition, the old and the new attitudes are both at work at the same time. The ideal of "partnership" is being substituted for the old idea of colonialism. But what we must regard as the last vestiges of colonialism are working themselves out in the struggles in Malaya, Indo-China and Kenya; and in the shame felt by intelligent men and women when they see people being discriminated against on account of their colour.

In Malaya, Indo-China and Kenya, it must be remembered, the colonial powers do not believe they are fighting against inferior colonial peoples but against Communism or terrorism. Britain, declared the *Observer* recently, is in fact and theory "anti-colonial."

Alone among the colony-owning powers, Britain has given proof that she will voluntarily relinquish her control of dependent peoples when they become ready for self-government. Hence our much-vaunted multi-racial Commonwealth.

It is the multi-racial aspect of the Commonwealth that is Britain's greatest contribution to the cause of Western democracy outside its own historic shores,

Colonialism or imperialism involves the division of the world into inferior and superior peoples or nations. It means the division of the world into two blocs, the white bloc and the coloured bloc; the roots of whose antipathy and antagonism stretch much further back in history than the roots of the struggle between Communism and Capitalism. In such a division, the Russian cause would have everything to gain because it has no history of colonialism behind it and it has challenged the centuries-old ascendancy of the imperial powers.

The present struggle is a struggle for ascendancy between two sets of ideas, not two nations or two races. Ideas have already proved themselves more powerful on the material plane than the most powerful weapons devised by military science. The great task confronting Western civilization is to live down its historical association with the Asian and African peoples whose good-will, at least, it cannot do without if it is to resist the challenge of Communism peacefully and over a number of years.

All sorts of movements have been started in Britain to promote understanding and good-will between Westerners and Asians and Africans. "There obviously can be no holding down of coloured people because they are coloured," declared the political columnist of a Tory newspaper.

In the British Empire coloured people

are being given as much responsibility, in the higher positions, as they can and will take. . . . There must be a way to win the hearts of millions of coloured people in the British Empire and in the world. The most frightening fact in the world today is the criminal encouragement of blacks to hate whites just because they are white. A coloured versus white strife in the world would be worse than the present strife of Communism versus decency.

India can, because the integrity and honesty of her approach to world problems is universally recognized, help the West and Russia to preserve a sense of perspective as they try to prevent their differences precipitating into war. India could, after achieving national independence, have retired into her shell to grapple with her great domestic problems—increasing food production, industrialization, developing social services, eradicating illiteracy—and have left the rest of the world to solve its problems. No one would have blamed her, considering the great tasks that face the country. Instead, Jawaharlal Nehru has brought some of the spirit of India into the counsels of the world, and what India has been able to contribute to the discussion of the complex problems that divide the nations has been appreciated.

When Canada's Prime Minister, Mr. Louis St. Laurent, addressed a joint meeting of the Houses of the Indian Parliament in New Delhi on his recent visit he paid tribute to the rôle India has been playing in

world affairs. Canadians were glad, he said, that Mr. Nehru and other Indians

have found it possible to spare time from their pressing pre-occupations at home to help in the solution of world problems and India has assigned so many able public servants to work in the international field.

What India has helped the world to understand by achieving her national emancipation in a non-violent manner is that the era of world dominion by a single group of nations has ended. It follows that if an enduring world society is to emerge in the second half of this seething 20th century it will be longer delayed if any nation or group of nations continues to aspire to a position of world mastery. With some adjustments here and there—as in the colonies—the nations of the world have to agree to live together *as they are*, with all their good qualities mutually recognized and all their bad qualities mutually tolerated.

We are now in a period when the world is not dominated by one nation or a group of nations. Is this to be merely another interlude, or the new foundation on which world society will be fashioned? Generals and some politicians in the West are heard talking about the West's "mission" to save the world from Communism. Voices are heard discussing preventive wars. Military

strategists, like General Van Fleet, write about the need to raise Asian armies so that Asia can "save" itself.

It would be unnatural if such ideas were not heard and if such policies were not pursued in this age of transition. What India can do, and what enlightened opinion everywhere expects that she will do, is to continue in the many ways open to her to foster spiritual opinions throughout the world, by her deeds as in Korea and by her sentiments as at the United Nations. This will act as the greatest deterrent to war. Restraint must eventually come to everyone from within, not through external coercion. There is no other country in the world better able to help bring about restraint through spiritual opinion than India. There is everything in the Indian character, history and culture to enable her to collaborate with other nations who believe in these ideals, and with all people who seek an honest peace, though they often seem to be going down strange paths to find it.

No one expects India to be able to present the world with a cut and dried solution or panacea for the problems that make for war. We know that for some time the fresh young shoots of the new internationalism will be overshadowed and obscured by the decaying foliage of the old order.

SUNDER KABADI

THE TRIPLE WORLD

[The writer of this article, **Dr. Edward Conze**, is a British educationist who describes himself as a Buddhist by religion and an Oriental scholar by inclination, with the *Prajñapāramitā* literature as his special field of study. His book on Buddhism which was published in 1951 has been translated into French, German and Italian, and *Buddhist Texts Through the Ages*, an anthology edited by Dr. Conze, was published recently. He has done well to challenge the denial of consideration to (and even the occurrence of) phenomena which transcend physical-plane experience and therefore show themselves unamenable to verification by accepted methods of natural science.—ED.]

The unanimous tradition of the Perennial Philosophy distinguishes three kinds of qualitatively different facts—natural, magical or psychic and spiritual. The constitution of man is accordingly composed of three parts, reality presents itself on three levels, and threefold is the attitude we can adopt toward events.

In *man* we have body-mind as the first constituent, the “soul” as the second, the “spirit” as the third. In the *objective world*, the first level is the body of facts which are disclosed by the senses and scientific observation and arranged by common sense and scientific theory. The second level comprises a great variety of facts which weighed heavily with our forefathers, but have ceased to be scientifically respectable. With some justice they are called “occult,” because they tend to hide from our gaze. There we have astrology, or the knowledge of the relation between the position of the celestial bodies and the character, destiny, affinities and potentialities of people. In addition

there is the range of the psychic senses, such as clairvoyance, clair-audience, precognition, thought transference, etc., the huge field of myths and mythical figures, the lore about ghosts and the spirits of the departed and the working of magic, which is the ability to cause effects in the physical world by means of spells and the evocation of “spirits.” As distinct from this, the spiritual world, finally, is an intangible, non-sensuous and disembodied reality, both one and multiple, both transcending the natural universe and immanent in it, at the same time nothing and everything, quite non-sensory as a datum, and rather non-sensical as a concept. Indescribable by any of the attributes taken from sensory experience, and gained only by the extinguishing of separate individuality, it is known as “Spirit” to Christians, as “emptiness” to Buddhists, as the “Absolute” to philosophers. Here our senses are blinded, our reason is baffled and our self-interest defeated.

The three worlds can be discerned easily in our *attitudes*, say, to cold

weather. The common-sense reaction to it is to light a fire, to wear warm clothing, or to take a walk. The magician relies on methods like the *gtum-mo* of the Tibetans, which are claimed to generate internal heat by means of occult procedures. They are based on a physiology which is totally different from the scientific one, and their name, *a-sad-gtum-mo* (three-veins-meditation-warmth), indicates that they depend on the manipulation of three mystic "arteries" (*nadis*), which are described as channels of psychic energy, but which ordinary observation fails to detect, since they are "devoid of any physical reality."¹ Finally the spiritual man either ignores the cold, as an unimportant, transitory and illusory phenomenon, or welcomes it, as a means of penance or of training in self-control.

Technical progress and scientific habits of thought increasingly restrict us to the natural level. Magical events and spiritual experiences have ceased to be familiar, and many people do not admit that they are facts in their own right. Scientific thought, backed up by experiments and statistics, has to them become the sole and exclusive standard of truth. The Logical Positivists have built a philosophy on this assumption and, as a result of years of their burrowings, English philosophy now presents the picture of a waste land strewn with the ruins of the past. They maintain that magical and

spiritual phenomena are not accessible to natural experience, and that therefore they are non-existent and unworthy of serious consideration.

To meet this challenge one should, I think, admit the first part of their thesis, but reject the second. By their own inner constitution the three realms differ in their accessibility to experience, the rules of evidence are by no means the same in all three of them, and each of them has a logic of its own. In the infinitude of the spiritual realm not one particular fact can be seized upon by natural means, and the facts of the magical world are marked by a certain indefiniteness, a nebulosity which springs partly from the way in which they present themselves and partly from the uncertainties of their relation to the familiar data of the bright daylight world of natural fact.

Every student of the occult knows that in this field the facts are inherently and irremediably obscure. One could easily demonstrate the lack of unambiguous clarity in the evidence by an analysis of the workings of prophecy, or by showing how for nearly 80 years "psychical research" has striven, in vain, by the quite inadequate methods of natural science, to find one incontestable instance of survival after death. There is no room here for detailed discussion, and I can only state that, while I myself have not the

¹ *With Mystics and Magicians in Tibet.* By A. DAVID-NEAL, p. 203.

slightest doubt about the reality of magical and psychic phenomena, I have never yet come across one which could be established in the way in which natural facts are established. There is a twilight about the magical world. It is neither quite light nor quite dark, one cannot see it distinctly and, when the full light is turned on, the phenomenon vanishes, like a shy beast when you point a torch at it.

In addition it is hard to co-ordinate magical concepts and phenomena with physical facts. To begin with the tribal magic which was revived in recent times in Germany and Japan: What is the relation between magical blood (as "blue blood," "good blood," "Aryan blood") and blood in the chemical sense, or how is the Goddess Amaterasu placed in relation to the disk of the sun? The same difficulty presents itself in psychical research. For generations it has been baffled by the mutually inconsistent physical attributes of ghosts. Similarly, apparitions have a reality which is different from that of physical objects, and it is not easy to define how they are related to the persons (living or dead) whom they represent.² Likewise in astrology, what is the relation of "Capricornian gloom" and "Leonine conceit" to the constellations Capricorn and Leo? There are literally-minded people who believe that

these constellations exert some influence on people by means of rays, or vibrations, or something no less tangible. They forget that in astrology we have ignored the precession of the equinoxes for the last 2,000 years, and that we are nearly one whole sign out now. On January 5th the sun is no longer actually in Capricornus, but in Sagittarius, and so on. In this way we establish the relation between the character of a person in 1950 A.D. and the position of the stars as it was in 50 A.D. Surely all this is very vague, bewildering and unsatisfactory. And yet it seems to work excellently.

Magical space and time are different from natural space and time. In the case of prophecy time does not observe the familiar sequence of past, present and future, but the future somehow obtrudes upon the present. And as to space, it is very difficult to get a satisfactory idea of space in which the spirits of the departed have their being, and that accounts for many of our difficulties in describing life after death. Further difficulties are due to the fact that the natural mind coincides with the physical body, whereas the boundaries are much less neat and defined on many of the psychic levels.

So much about magic. The situation becomes still more desperate when we come to the spiritual. Here it is quite impossible ever to

² See *Apparitions* by G. N. M. TYRRELL (1954).

establish any fact beyond the possibility of doubt. The Buddhists express this by saying that Nirvana is "sign-less" (*a-nimitta*), *i.e.*, it is of such a nature that it cannot be recognized as such. This is really a most disconcerting thought, though we cannot avoid it. Spirit is non-sensuous, and what sense-data do we have to work upon? In addition, spiritual actions are disintegrated when reflected upon. They must be performed unconsciously and automatically if they are not to lose their bloom. Further, to be spiritual, an action must be unselfish. It is in the nature of things quite impossible ever to prove with mathematical certainty that an action has been unselfish, because selfishness is so skilful in hiding itself, because insight into our motives is marred by self-deception, and, in any case, our motives are so numerous that we can never be sure that we have got hold of all of them. Kant has spoken the last word on this subject when he points out that

in fact it is absolutely impossible to make out by experience with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action, however right in itself, rested simply on moral grounds and on the conception of duty. Sometimes it happens that with the sharpest self-examination we find nothing beside the moral principle of duty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or that action and to a great

sacrifice; yet we cannot from that infer with certainty that it was not really some secret impulse of self-love, under the false appearance of that idea, that was the actual determining cause of the will. We like then to flatter ourselves by falsely taking credit for a noble motive, whereas in fact we can never, even by the strictest examination, get completely behind the secret springs of action; since, when the question is of moral worth, it is not with the actions which we see that we are concerned, but with those inward principles of them which we do not see.³

We have here one of the inescapable difficulties of the human situation. All the meaning of life is derived from contact with the magical and spiritual world. Without such contact life ceases to be worth while, fruitful and beautiful. *It seems rather stupid to discard the life-giving qualities of these realms simply because they do not conform to a standard of truth suited only for the natural world.* It is indeed only natural that they should be more inaccessible to natural experience than natural things are. *The reliance on senses and sense-based reasoning is one of the bad habits which bind us to this world; it is one of the attachments which have to be sacrificed when we set ourselves free from it.* There are other faculties in us which reveal that which the senses cannot see, faculties such as faith, mystical intuition, trance and the power of transcendental wisdom, to some extent aided by

³ *Metaphysics of Morals.* By IMMANUEL KANT, Translated by T. H. ABBOTT (1879),

the sense organs for psychic things which are probably located in the pineal gland, and supported by a mind both trusting and bold. There is something mean and timid about the caution of those who wish everything to be established beyond any reasonable doubt, and to have it inspected again and again by myopic and distrustful eyes. *Lacking in nobility of the soul, the scientific mind has lowered the tone of life everywhere,* and it is rapidly transforming the surface of the earth into one vast slum. The

methods of science, mighty and effective though they may be, are useless for the exploration of two-thirds of the universe, and the psychic and spiritual world are quite beyond them. In view of the current prestige of science it is, I think, not without point to state this "obscurantist" conclusion quite clearly, if we do not want to see all the traditional knowledge of the higher life crushed and submerged by the combined efforts of statistician, semanticist and bulldozer.

EDWARD CONZE

GITA

If ever I am to be
rid of arrogance and pride
I might as well begin
to be modest from today.

If ever I am to master
the soft and truthful answer
I may as well begin
to speak softly from today.

If ever I am to be
content in every circumstance
I might as well stop
complaining from today.

If ever I am to keep
my head in spite of sorrow
steady in face of pain
I may as well try to begin.

If ever I am to be
friendly as a tree
compassionate with sympathy
to all that lives

I may as well begin
with a scorpion and a rake
and when shall I begin
to focus my mental powers

to deepen my sense of certainty
if not today? And I must
not judge for judgement
is unjust. Why wait?

If ever I am to be
at all what I'd like to be
I may as well begin.
The end of the wedge is thin.

LILA RAY

THE PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: A STUDY

[We publish here an informative study of the Preamble to the Indian Constitution; the writer, **Shri C. J. S. Bindra**, an advocate and a Master of Arts, is the Registrar of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India. It is very necessary that Indians should have the clearest possible idea of the fundamental law on which their Government rests and keep in mind the ideals which their Constitution was designed to serve. Moreover, as Shri Bindra mentions, a Preamble is a "key to the mind of the makers of a Constitution" and this Preamble should be reassuring to all of the framers' *bona fides* and the Indian Republic's commitment to the democratic ideal.—ED.]

PREAMBLE

WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, and to secure to all its citizens:

JUSTICE, Social, economic and political;

LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;

EQUALITY of status and of opportunity;

and to promote among them all

FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation;

IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.

India is constituted a Sovereign Democratic Republic, which means that the country is no longer subject to the authority of any monarch or of any other country. Formerly the control of Indian affairs lay with the British Parliament and the King of England was the Emperor of India.

The Indian Independence Act, 1947, which was enacted by the British Parliament and assented to by King George VI, and which created the Dominions of India and Pakistan, conceded self-government to both the new Dominions, setting up a separate Constituent Assembly for each. The States, which up to then had been ruled by the Indian Princes and Chiefs, were simultaneously freed from the control of the British Crown, and with the lapse of paramountcy, as it was called, could make their own political alliances. The two Constituent Assemblies were vested with sovereign power to frame whatever Constitutions they thought suited their needs best. This included the right to secede from the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Indian Independence Act came into force on the 15th of August 1947, and the Constituent Assembly of India adopted the Constitution on the 26th of November 1949. It came into force on the 26th of January 1950. This date is observed each year in India

as Republic Day, and the 15th of August is celebrated as Independence Day.

A state is said to be sovereign if it has residing in itself supreme and absolute power, acknowledging no superior. It should be self-controlled within its own sphere, exercising the final power for taking decisions, and be independent of the will of other states. According to Schwarzenberger, it should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over that portion of the globe.

The Constitution of India confers on the Government absolute power to compel obedience to its orders and to punish for disobedience within its territory without reference to any external authority. The Indian Parliament has been vested with the supreme legislative authority, while the President wields the ultimate executive power and the decisions of the Supreme Court are final and binding on all courts in the country. No appeal lies from its decisions to the Privy Council in the United Kingdom since the enactment by the Indian Parliament of the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947, which did away with the jurisdiction of the Privy Council over courts in India. To emphasize the sovereignty of India the Objectives Resolution of the Constituent Assembly stated that India would be a Sovereign Independent Republic. But, independence being an attribute of sovereignty, flowing from it as a matter of course,

the word Independent was dropped.

India is, however, still a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, recognizing the Ruler of England as the head of the Commonwealth, but that ruler is only a symbol of the free association of independent nations, freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress, as was accepted at the Prime Ministers' Conference held in London in April 1949. The head of the Commonwealth has no functions, declared the Prime Minister of India, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, on the floor of the Constituent Assembly, and the citizens of India owe no allegiance to him. In recognition of this position the Parliament of Great Britain enacted the India (Consequential Provisions) Act, 1949, enabling Indians to continue to enjoy certain special rights in that country though they were no longer British subjects. At the time of the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II, India did not figure in the list of countries that she swore to govern according to their laws and customs, nor was India mentioned in the citation of her titles.

India is a Democratic Republic. Forms of government are classified according to their principal features, such as the distribution of power, the nature of the executive, the type of people sharing in governmental functions, and the authority in which sovereignty resides. A government may thus be unitary or

federal, parliamentary or presidential, autocratic oligarchic or democratic, and again it may be a monarchy or a republic.

In a unitary government all power is concentrated in a single central organization with legal omnipotence over the entire country; the local governments are the creations of the central government and act as its agents. In a federal government political authority is divided between the self-governing parts and the centre, each operating in its own sphere of action as defined in a fundamental law. In the parliamentary form of government the executive power is exercised by a prime minister and his cabinet, who are usually members of the parliament and continue to hold ministerial office only so long as their major policies are supported by a majority in the parliament. In the presidential form there is a distribution of power among the principal branches of the government, the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. The chief executive officer is elected and continues in office for a prescribed term irrespective of support in the legislature. Under the autocratic or dictatorial form of government political authority vests in a single individual or an organizing minority, who may capture power and the control of the government regardless of whether it is unitary or federal, parliamentary or presidential, a monarchy or a republic. In an oligarchy political authority is exercised by a few in

the interests of a class or a minority. In a democracy a considerable number of the adult population participate in the formulation of public policy, the selection of state officials, the control of the administration and the enforcement of law. In the representative form of democracy, as in India, the people choose their representatives who carry on the government, so that legal sovereignty comes to reside in them rather than in the electorate, which does not exercise any political function by direct vote.

Even the power to amend the Constitution has been placed in the hands of the legislatures in India and not in the hands of the electorate. Thus the political structure of India may be described as federal, parliamentary, democratic and republican; that of the United States of America as federal, presidential, democratic and republican; that of the United Kingdom, unitary, parliamentary, democratic and monarchical; and that of Canada, federal, parliamentary, democratic and monarchical. In India there is also provision for switching over temporarily to the unitary and presidential form, the powers of the High Courts excepted, but essentially the Indian political structure is federal, inasmuch as there is a dual polity, that of the Union at the centre and that of the States at the periphery, each endowed with sovereign power to be exercised in a field prescribed by the Constitution; and the States are not merely administrative units of the

Union Government. Under the Indian Constitution sovereignty is deemed to vest in the people of India. The Preamble sets forth clearly that the Constitution was adopted and enacted in the name of the people of India, though there is no specific mention, as in the Constitution of the Irish Free State, that all powers are derived from the people. It is also emphasized that this Constitution is the voluntary act of the people of India and not an imposition from outside, as was the Government of India Act, 1935. The phrase "people of India" would include such Indians as had migrated to India from the Dominion of Pakistan after the partition of the subcontinent and were represented, along with other citizens of their Province, in the Constituent Assembly. The people of India cannot interfere in the day-to-day administration, except in so far as public opinion makes its weight felt in influencing policy, but in the general elections their decision as to who should be at the helm of affairs is final.

The four corner-stones of the Constitution of India as laid down in the Preamble are Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. Justice is defined by Salmond in his *Jurisprudence* as the harmonious reconciliation of individual conduct with the general welfare of society. Social justice envisages humane conditions of work and living, due safeguards against exploitation and equal opportunities for education and employ-

ment. To secure economic justice there has to be a guarantee of enjoyment of the fruits of one's labours, of fair wages, of equality of opportunity and of freedom of occupation and of work. To ensure political justice it is necessary to provide for equality before the law without discrimination on the basis of class or religion, for freedom of association, of speech, of movement and of religion, and for the right to equal representation in the Government.

Lest there be any doubt as to these, the Preamble expressly lays down that the object of the Constitution is to secure to all its citizens not only justice but also liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; as also equality of status and of opportunity. Liberty of vocation and association has been provided for specifically in Part III of the Constitution, which deals with Fundamental Rights. Equality before the law has not been mentioned in the Preamble but has been provided for in Article 14. In view of the diversity of the population of India, special stress is laid on promoting fraternity among all the inhabitants so as to assure the dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation. This is in line with the French Declaration of Rights, that men are born free and equal in their rights.

Thus the Preamble to the Constitution of India indicates the authority in whom political sovereignty

vests and what objects the Constitution seeks to establish and promote.

There is a close resemblance between the Preamble of the Burmese Constitution and that of India because of the affinity in ideology between the two countries. In the Constitution of the U.S.A. the emphasis is on a more perfect union of the States, on the establishment of justice and domestic tranquillity, and on providing for a common defence and for the general welfare. The people of Eire have stressed the dignity and freedom of the individual and the common good in accordance with the principles of prudence,

justice and charity.

A Preamble is, however, no more than a mere key to the mind of the makers of a Constitution, indicating the general purposes for which it is ordained and established. It is neither a source of any substantial power nor does it create any right or confer any power which is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself. It can be referred to only to clear an ambiguity in the Constitution, but where the provision itself is clear the Preamble cannot be used to give it an interpretation different from its obvious meaning.

C. J. S. BINDRA

FILMS AND VISUAL ARTS

UNESCO has recently published "Films on Art: Panorama 1953," an international catalogue. It lists the titles of some 800 films from different countries with the names of their producers and directors, and where possible the names of distributors. The catalogue brings up-to-date two previous catalogues issued in 1949 and 1950 of films dealing with painting, sculpture, drawing, architecture and applied arts. It should prove helpful to those interested.

The catalogue includes two articles, "Films and the Visual Arts" by Francis Bolen and "A New Dimension in Painting" by Denis Forman. Mr. Bolen discusses the chief trends of the art film in context with its historical background while Mr. Forman states that the artist can paint directly on the celluloid film. For this he will need no camera nor will a host of technical colleagues embarrass him in

his creative process. Interest in this new type of plastic art is spreading but it is still in its most primitive stages and one cannot understand the process from what is said in this short article.

Mr. Forman, however, says

New inventions have often allowed the artist to break the shackles of tradition and express himself in a fresh and more fertile way. Secondly, the dimension of movement is so large a part of our 20th Century life that I believe that the artist who can manipulate movements will find it easier to bring his art to terms with his mind. Young painters today have the choice of celluloid or canvas and I for one believe that if they choose celluloid they may very soon forge a new and important medium of artistic expression.

All this is leading to a combining of sound and visual art, which is now being experimented with by Norman McLaren with the "epciter lamp"—a new tool for the expansion of this art technique.

MADAME GONNE-MACBRIDE

THE PRISONERS' FRIEND

[The name of the beautiful Maud Gonne is associated in the public mind with Yeats and the Irish dramatic revival. The courageous part played in the Irish freedom struggle by this "daughter of the gods, divinely tall, and most divinely fair," is inspiringly told here by **Mr. R. M. Fox**, to whom we are indebted for a number of very interesting pen-portraits of his distinguished countrymen.—ED.]

Madame Gonne-MacBride, who died recently in Dublin in her 88th year, represented that phase of revolutionary agitation which flowered around the period of the first world war. During that time leaders in National and social struggles were often intensely individualistic. They were not so much spokesmen of mass movements, concerned with practical questions of what could be done, as men and women who stood out as idealists and romantics. They had the freedom that goes with lack of responsibility, for the world they lived in seemed so solid and assured that no one expected them to be able to change it. All they could hope to do was to blaze against the surrounding darkness. Maud Gonne made a lovely blaze.

In earlier years she was often associated with W. B. Yeats, the tall, young Irish poet with a straggling lock of lank, black hair across his forehead and a cloak flung about his shoulders. Maud Gonne was as tall as Yeats, elegant and breathtaking in her beauty. Passers-by would turn and stare at these two beings who looked as if they had

dropped from some strange planet. At the time of the anniversary of the 1798 Rising in Ireland, Maud Gonne joined in a series of commemoration meetings. She loved the turbulence of these gatherings though it seems true that Yeats allowed himself to be dragged into an agitation for which he was temperamentally unfitted.

Earlier still, Maud Gonne had taken part in the Land League agitation when she was a young girl and she claimed proudly that none of the evicted tenants whose cause she took up was left without a shelter. She belonged to a military and aristocratic family but the savagery of the landlords made her throw in her lot with the people. As a girl of 16 she saw some unkempt prisoners, handcuffed and bundled into a cart, being driven to gaol. A small group of women, sad and silent, looked on. Mastering her shyness, she waved her handkerchief and called for cheers. It was her first effort at heartening bewildered people who did not know where to turn. In succeeding years she frequently undertook this task.

A title that she justly earned was that of "the Prisoners' Friend." There were Irish "treason-felony" prisoners who had been in gaol so long that they were forgotten. Some had not received a visit for 10 years when this fashionably dressed young woman obtained permission to see them in Portland. She carried on a campaign for their release, speaking in England, in America and on the Continent. She also founded a journal, *L'Irlande Libre*, in Paris to serve the Irish independence movement.

Apart from her national and humanitarian activities she will be remembered for her beauty, which inspired some of the loveliest verses Yeats wrote. He described her as the most beautiful woman of her generation. She played in the title rôle of his *Cathleen ni Houlihan*, written for her, and might indeed have figured simply as a human projection of Yeats's "Celtic Twilight" period but that she had the will and determination to strike out on a line of her own.

Nevinson, writing of early days, says:—

With Yeats one naturally associated the name of Maud Gonne. . . . I, like everyone else was overwhelmed by her beauty. It was indeed amazing. I held my breath in adoration. Tall she was and exquisitely formed; the loveliest hair. . . . One thing further I noticed. At the club she sat long silent, perhaps bored by the political conversation, perhaps thinking of Paris, from which she had just arrived. But

when the others began asking me questions about the Greek War and the fighting, at once she raised herself and became eager, listening and asking questions with the rest. Then I saw the meaning of that strong and beautiful chin. I knew that her longing was for action in place of all the theorizing and talk so common in Dublin.

She was an intense believer in militancy. Once, when we were talking about the Irish physical force movement, she said: "It is the fighters who achieved freedom for Ireland. Of course the politicians will take the credit. They always do, for they make the speeches and draw up the proclamations. But the people we have really to thank are the fighting men." This was her basic thought, at the back of all the efforts she made to help Irish prisoners in the struggle. Her marriage with Major MacBride, a brave man of action, who arrived in Paris with all the glamour of his self-sacrificing service with the Boer Republic, was understandable. But they were not suited to each other and the marriage broke down, leaving the relationship between herself and Yeats, like that of Dante and Beatrice, one of the world's great stories of unsatisfied love.

In the Labour revolt of the unskilled workers, led by Jim Larkin in 1913, Maud Gonne rallied to his side. She was out of the country in 1916 when the Easter Rising came but at once stood with the resurgent forces. She told a journalist that she hoped her small son

would, one day, become President of an Irish Republic. Actually Mr. Sean MacBride did become Minister for External Affairs in the Government which officially declared the Republic of Ireland.

When the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed, enacting the Irish Free State, Maud Gonne MacBride accepted this as a breathing space in the struggle and went to Paris, representing the Provisional Government in Dublin. But, as soon as the civil war began, she threw up her diplomatic position and went back to Dublin, joining the Republicans and resuming her life's work as the prisoners' friend.

Week after week she held her meetings on the ruins in O'Connell Street, Dublin, giving news of prisoners. She headed deputations and parades. She arranged for parcels of food and other necessities to be sent to prisoners in the Bridewell or interned in the camps. She comforted relatives and provided an information service. Women pickets she led to Mountjoy Gaol at midnight were hosed by the military guards. Once I saw a policeman jump up on the front of a lorry and tear her dress in an effort to drag her down. She held up the tatters and called upon the crowd to see what was being done to an Irish woman. In fog, mist and rain, her queenly, black-robed figure would head a file of women calling attention to prison treatment.

Camped on the threshold of the

gaol, she was absolutely fearless. When girls were arrested for sticking up leaflets, she would hold a meeting, announce that she intended to paste up the offending leaflets, walk across to the ruined shell of the G.P.O., fix her leaflets to the wall and then resume her meeting. Always she struck the dramatic and forceful note. With her great height, her beauty and her single-minded determination, she drew universal attention. She could walk through a police cordon without seeing it but only because she was prepared to be batoned or arrested. When in prison she was ready to go on a hunger strike and force release, dead or alive.

Once I travelled with her to a small country town where her son, Sean, was being tried for Republican activities. What I remember about the journey was not the trial but the way that—all along the route—she was greeted by men and women who reminded her of what she had done for them when members of their family had been imprisoned or victimized. Everywhere she was invited to enter the white-washed cabins to receive hospitality. Her record of service made every journey a triumphal tour.

She left the brilliant social gatherings at which she was a notable figure, the art classes she attended in Paris, to spend her life at the prison gate and, often, to pass through. It was a generous gesture, a scattering of roses on the grey

pavement. In our world of cynical struggle over doctrinaire ideologies it is unlikely that we shall see such

a pinnacle of personal sacrifice reached again.

R. M. Fox

MEDICAL SCIENCE AND TRANSPLANTATION

During the present century medical science is supposed to have taken great strides—whether for better or for worse is another matter. News comes from America of a “key advance” that is about to be taken: medical science is on the verge of an era in which skin and other tissues and even whole organs such as glands, hearts, kidneys and lungs will be freely transplanted from one human being to another, living or deceased, and possibly also from animals.

It is reported by the *New York Times* and the *New York Herald Tribune* of 13th February, that a group of specialists from the United States and abroad who took part in a conference sponsored by the New York Academy of Science saw now but one stumbling-block to such transplantation: namely, that the living body rejects transplantations, the transplanted organ refuses to

“take” and grow and function in the host... the body protects itself against a foreign substance by the formation of immunity factors, or antibodies, that neutralize or destroy the invading foreign agent.

The conference closed with the discussions of experimental methods for modifying the body's response to transplantations.

It will not take long for any unprejudiced, spiritually inclined and thoughtful individual to see that there is something radically wrong with this practice. Apart from the fact that the natural functioning of the body should not be interfered with by the introduction of foreign agents which it naturally

rejects, and that diseases of the body may be passed on in such transplantation; what is a more serious cause for concern is that tendencies, characteristics or weaknesses of a man's character may also be transmitted. Bodily organs are made up of living atoms and cells which carry with them the impresses of the man's or animal's nature. The possible psychic or psychological effects of this practice are being utterly ignored by medical men as well as by vast numbers of lay people easily taken in by any new “feat” made possible by present-day “advanced” medical science.

“Is not a man's life valuable enough to be saved, whatever the means employed?” we will naturally be asked. If such a practice is recommended only because it may be a life-saving procedure, then the problem boils down to the question of the intrinsic value of human life. In other words, it enters the realm of philosophy. Unless a man is philosophical enough to consider, as a working hypothesis at least, the idea of many lives on earth for each soul, there is little hope that he can grasp the philosophical position in respect to this or any similar practice. If the present life is regarded as only one in a long series of such existences, there is immediately seen a higher purpose than mere physical survival, or life-at-any-cost. On the basis of soul immortality, there appears a more important integrity than that of the physical instrument—a higher purity that renders it imperative for the individual to consider the spiritual aspects of any and all medical practices.

NEED FOR A NEW IDEAL OF EDUCATION

[**Dr. M. Hafiz Syed, M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt.**, advocates a reform in education which will inculcate a spirit of comradeship and self-sacrifice in children. He firmly believes that the world can be bettered not by "economic measures" but by "a change of heart." And human nature can best be changed by the right education of children.—ED.]

The reform of education for which I plead will affect all types and grades of schools. One result of this will be that sooner or later the distinction between primary and secondary education will disappear and the distinction between preparatory and advanced (college) education will take its place. So long as the former distinction holds good, some secondary school children will be snobbish. I look forward to the day when the spirit of comradeship will dominate all our schools and to a somewhat later day when, as the result of this, the same spirit will dominate the whole community and in doing so will sweep away all distinctions, or at least whatever is invidious and anti-social in distinctions. It is perhaps being too hopeful to dream of either day, but the dream comes and unless it is realized the reconstruction of society on the only basis that is intrinsically sound and durable, *i.e.*, the basis of co-operation and mutual good-will, will not take place.

The way to self-transcendence is the way of self-sacrifice. The spirit of self-sacrifice can be awakened and helped to unfold; and all who wish

for a better and a happier world should direct their energies to this. It is the function of the teacher to evoke it in children, but it is a function which not one in a hundred is at present able to perform. For teachers themselves are the products of the very educational methods which have been the chief cause of our troubles, and yet they, and they alone, can change these methods.

If there were ten teachers in the land who knew how to liberate the spirit of self-sacrifice in their pupils, and if each of these ten could imbue some who would become teachers of the next generation, and so on in geometrical progression from generation to generation, teachers would in due season transform the face of society. But until the number of true, inspiring teachers grows from tens to hundreds, and their followers to thousands and tens of thousands, the regenerative influence will not be widely felt. And if this does not happen the canker of selfishness, individual and collective, working as a rule slowly and insidiously, but in some cases swiftly and violently,

will thwart and nullify even the beneficent influence of a few.

If Russia under Communist rule has proved nothing else, it has at least proved that the attempt "to improve the world by economic measures" is only the way to ruin, not to reform.

Indeed, it may be doubted if better food, climate and economic conditions can much improve human nature. These can, it seems, only modify the environment and in doing so give men fresh opportunities for self-improvement—or the reverse. If the world is to be improved, human nature must be improved—for what do we mean by "the world" but the world of men and women? An expression for the improvement of human nature is "a change of heart." But if human nature is to be improved, its own latent potentialities for good must be awakened while it is still possible to do it; and this can best be done by right education of children.

A change of means in education should be accompanied by a change of heart. The change of means should, however, be gradual, for were it sudden, violent and on large scale, it would, through its tremendous and premature dislocation of the existing system, bring undesirable results.

. . . Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?

If we cannot obey this precept to

the letter we can at least try to be faithful to its spirit. Life will always take precedence over the means of living, and the means will owe such value as they possess to the fact that they are means to an end which is higher and beyond them. This is an answer to those who hold that an inner change of heart does not count and that outer economic measures alone can improve the world. "Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you." Added not by any super-natural agency but by the working of natural law. For the supreme end of action controls and disposes in due order all the hierarchy of means and ends which lead to it. And though, things being as they are, a man may seek the kingdom of heaven and yet lack food and raiment, if all the world were seeking the kingdom of heaven there would be such peace, harmony and good-fellowship and such a readiness to co-operate amongst men, that there would be an abundance and an equitable distribution of food and raiment and other means of living. All economic problems would be solved.

Divorced from intuition, reason is at best a poor counterfeit of itself. Antipathy to intuition carries with it antipathy to idealism, which is in the sphere of purpose and action what intuition is in the sphere of cognition and thought. Hence the cynicism of the typical rationalist. Nothing is easier than to flout ideal-

ism in the name of reason, and nothing is more certain than that the latent idealism of man's heart will avenge itself on those who flout it, if they happen to be zealous reformers, by compelling them to become idealists—for what is fanaticism but idealism turned upside down and gone mad?—without their knowledge and against their will.

Hence if a durable social structure is to be built, a change of heart must prepare the way for it. The spirit of comradeship, of fellowship in devotion to a high ideal, must diffuse itself throughout the world. As it diffuses itself, however slowly, there will be healing in its wings; and, one by one, our troubles, difficulties and grievances will all melt away like mists before the rising sun. In every sphere of man's social activity it will make for co-operation rather than for competition, for good-will rather than for ill-will, for peace rather than for strife. The spirit of fellowship will blunt the sharp edges of separative distinctions, and go far towards affecting them: for under its influence the aristocrat and the plutocrat will begin to learn that pride, however concealed, is littleness. It will level down the monstrous inequalities of wealth, which are so potent a cause of social unrest. Under its influence the millionaire will realize that he is a social anomaly, a cancerous outgrowth on the body politic and that the best thing he can do for himself and his country

is to commit economic suicide. In trade it will make profiteering impossible, and promote fair and honourable dealings between producers and merchants, between merchants and retailers, between retailers and consumers. In industry it will make for co-partnership between employers and employees, and for a voluntary limitation of profits on the part of the former. In politics it will make corruption impossible and heal the bitterness of party strife. In religion, which is the most fruitful cause of anger and unrest, it will make for tolerance and charity, and so prepare the way for co-operation in the service of the Most High.

But you cannot change human nature. "Men will be greedy, selfish, self-indulgent and quarrelsome to the end of time." So the cynic and the pessimist will protest; and one would imagine from the way they talk, that they know all about human nature, that they had examined all its limitations, gauged all its possibilities and fathomed all its mysteries.

What is essential in human nature cannot be changed. If this is what the pessimists mean they are right; but this is not what they mean. Human nature as such, human nature in its totality, cannot be changed. Nor should it be changed. It should be set free to evolve itself, to transcend itself, to realize its infinite potentialities and ideals.

The average adult cannot be looked upon to rebuild this ruined

world. He is the victim of long years of dogmatic direction towards false ideals enforced by compulsion and repression. But the young and impressionable child, if rightly educated, could most certainly usher in a better and happier world than the present one.

Distrust of human nature will never give us a new world. Faith, and faith alone, can build it—faith in the infinite possibilities of the new-born child; faith in the transforming, or rather in the liberating and stimulating influence of education; faith in the meaning and purpose of man's life and in the wonder and the glory of the world;

faith in the magnetic power of the ideal; faith, above all, in the orientation of man's heart towards truth, beauty and love, and in the child heart which is father to the man. It is not where statesmen deliberate or where anarchists hatch plots nor in the counting house or the market-place; not in the laboratory or the factory; on the platform or in the pulpit; it is not through the press or on the stage that the foundations of the new world are to be laid; it is where latent ideals wait to be realized—it is in the nursery, the home and the school that they should be laid.

M. HAFIZ SYED

GOD AND MAN

Materialists deny the existence of God. But God has ceased to exist for most Theologians also. Ralph Tyler Flewelling points this out in his article "Theological Panic: God is Dead!" in *The Personalist*, Winter 1954. But the exact date and circumstances of the Divine demise are most uncertain. Some believe that God passed away in the days of Abraham, others believe that he died in the time of St. Paul, or Calvin, and so forth. But the sad fact is that man needs "God" today; and so an "enervated world awaits a manifestation of Divine power." No patchwork theology can solve this problem, Mr. Flewelling says:—

To recall the truths and stratagems of yesterday and attempt the revival of the experienced assurances of other days in order to meet the crises of today will not be enough.

Not unless man has the right key to interpret these. First of all, man must be aware of the living presence of Divinity. And Mr. Flewelling is emphatic on this point. He glimpses in the strife and rubble of this world:

a reality more enigmatic even than the problems of evil...the presence of a living Spirit co-operating with all men of good will.

He sees this reality in the devotion of loving hearts, in events like Gandhi's dying prayer for his murderer and in Albert Schweitzer's dedication to a noble cause. He is convinced that:—

If He is a Living God, He must express Himself to living men through the medium of life rather than by dead phrase or formula...For any age the all-important truth is: "He speaketh, not spake." "Those who do His will shall know of the Doctrine."

MUMTAZ MOTIWALLA

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

IN THE GARDENS OF ARVÈDE BARINE

[The authors of this article discuss the genius and charm of the prolific French writer, Arvède Barine. Her deep intelligence and intuitive mind together with her wide reading of eastern and western philosophies and literature enabled her to write fascinating books on various subjects. The two wars had silenced her fame but recently she has received notice and the authors hope that "readers of *The Aryan Path* might care to take part in this revival and to roam about in her various gardens."—ED.]

During the Nazi invasion we were sheltered in the home of a friend in the hills. On a shelf was a row of books by her grandmother: Arvède Barine. Long ago, they had seemed to us "Jardins à la Française," and it had been a delight to roam about in them as in a garden; would they still attract, could we enjoy them once more?

Books published during the war and "allowed" by the *censure* were better left unread; then, one reread the classics for they did not deceive. But Arvède Barine's books, we found, had not grown old, their charm had not faded. Her clear style, tool of a deep intelligence and of a healthy mind full of womanly intuition, had lost none of its fascination. Understanding and indulgent towards human weakness, brilliant and sarcastic towards untruth, Arvède Barine had the rare gift of handling deep subjects with a light touch.

Her historical studies, *Louis XIV et la Grande Mademoiselle*, *Madame, Mère du Régent*, *Bourgeois et Gens de Peu*, etc., had attracted many readers when they appeared early in this century. Under old-fashioned garments and solemn attitudes, Arvède Barine had the ability to discover the secrets of human hearts; and her studies are as enjoyable as modern psychological novels. Her erudition was great, her modesty and discretion greater. It is not her heroes and heroines that one follows most eagerly, it is her own in-

sight, intelligence, tact and originality. When we read her chapters on the horrors of war, centuries are abolished, her political commentaries could have been written of today as the following translated paragraph shows:—

The last but not least fault of that "regime absolu" was to launch the country into the most harmful politic: one of moral uniformity. In the name of uniformity, Louis XIV suppressed "L'Edit de Nantes": a good Frenchman had to follow his King's religion. One century later, in the name of moral unity, "La Terreur" beheaded Frenchmen who were not virtuous in the same manner as Rousseau and Robespierre. The reader can . . . count the acts of oppression committed during the 19th and 20th centuries, in order to give the country, uniformity, . . . which means intellectual death. In politics, religion, art, literature, in everything in fact, diversity is life.

In *Portraits de Femmes*, Arvède Barine gives us a vivid image of Jane Carlyle, of George Eliot and others.

In *Princesses et Grandes Dames*, she paints a colourful image of Christine, Queen of Sweden, who knew Greek and Hebrew, and was as learned as an old "savant" and as despotic as a young tyrant. At dawn she would discuss philosophy with Descartes and later with the same ease talk with Bochart, the orientalist; then have one of her lovers assassinated!

In *Poètes et Névrosés*, Arvède Barine's clear, healthy mind deals with the complicated, tormented souls of Ernst Hoffmann, the German author of *Fantastic Tales*; De Quincey, the opium smoker; Edgar Allan Poe; and

the at times insane French writer, Gerard de Nerval, who in his *Voyage en Orient* describes his trips in the near East, who was attracted by religious problems, believed in reincarnation and whose novels treated of the law of Karma.

When Arvède Barine's book, *Essais et Fantaisies* appeared, interest in dance, folklore and fairy-tales was not as keen as now; she was ahead of her time. A recent article by Verrier Elwin in *Vigil*, reminds us of her chapter on "Dancing"; to translate:—

What instinct does one find in the origin of dance? The instinct of *number*; there is in us a natural attraction toward number; the result of the instinctive effort of humanity toward Beauty; number is at the origin of the different arts... Without number, no order; without order, the universe would be chaos... Old legends, ancient songs show us Poetry, Music, Dance, standing round the cradle of all races.

Lately also, Prince Ghika, in his book *Le Nombre d'Or*, attached a great importance to number in all manifestations of art. Those ancients who built pyramids and temples, and the cathedral builders, observed the law of numbers, handed down to the latter by the Free Masons.

Walking slowly through Arvède Barine's "French garden" of writings, we discovered among her *Essays* another garden; an Oriental one! We had not noticed it before since the East had not yet become our spiritual motherland. *Les Mémoires d'Une Princesse Arabe*, takes us to the court of Zanzibar! A young Princess, daughter of the Sultan and one of his hundred wives, elopes with a German merchant and spends most of her life in Hamburg, living as a *petite bourgeoise*; she writes in her *Mémoires*:—

I left my motherland an Arab from head to foot and a good Mahomedan; what have I become? A bad Christian and hardly half a German.

She ventures to come home to Zanzibar, but she is unhappy there also, and returns to Germany. After analyzing these curious *Mémoires*, Arvède

Barine, not suspecting that Mohomedan women's emancipation was not far off and that Asia would soon awaken, judges rather severely the Arab mentality.

Unhappily misunderstandings are not only due to conflicts between East and West. In Europe different countries are separated by deep moral gulfs; in small villages, near neighbours are enemies for generations; in social life, old friendships are destroyed by antagonistic ideals; in families, brothers are enemies; and how many married couples of the same race and breeding develop mutual life-long hatred, as in Strindberg's dramas.

A book, *Japanese Fairy Tales*, published in Tokyo, is studied by Arvède Barine with deep insight. She anticipates what Rabindranath and Abanindranath Tagore wrote on the same subject much later; the first in his introduction to *Thakurmat Jhuli* (Grandmother's Bag of Stories), see the *Visva-Bharati Quarterly* (April 1952); the second in his collection of *Nursery Rhymes*.

Genji, the famous novel written in the 10th century by the Court Lady, Murasaki, attracted Arvède Barine; she calls the hero a "Japanese Don Juan" and writes:—

In that novel, as far as ideas and feelings are concerned, the likeness to our European 19th century is much more striking than to our 10th century.

Interested by Chinese thought, Arvède Barine analyzes a translation of *Li-Ki, or the Rules of Ceremonial*. We translate some of her remarks:—

It is an original work, full of flavour, because through the dry heap of ceremonial one follows the thought of a strong genius; it was the inner shrine of the moral man that Confucius was aiming at, with all those regulations about how to blow one's nose and how to sneeze. He had already grasped the law of association of ideas.

In *The Soul of Ants, an Essay on Animal Psychology*, Arvède Barine inspired by the books of Sir John Lubbock, studies these insects carefully.

It is proved that, like men, they don't practise fraternity; they strangle their own species in the nest, as well as different ones.

In principle their government is monarchic, yet, it has been proved that as soon as they have tasted a republican regime, they don't want any other; this fact will bring them much sympathy, but 'also, I fear, many enemies. [This hint is very characteristic of Arvède Barine's humour.]

The ants possess the mental faculties which enter into the making of a soul; so they have a soul, a small one, proportionate to their physical means; a shortened and weakened image of our own soul. Man and animals are thus on the same ladder; is the distance that separates them immeasurable?

These lines reminded us of a meeting, in the desert round Oodeypour, with a noble Rajput (dressed as if he had stepped out of an ancient miniature). Every morning, bending over some forlorn ants, he had brought them food, a living image of India's love for animals; he believed also that they had a soul.

Biographies are among the most complete works of Arvède Barine. For the one of *Saint François d'Assise* she translated *The Legend of the Three Companions*, a rare Latin manuscript written in 1246 in a monastery where the Saint was staying. His deep love for nature, his fraternity with animals, his poverty, place St. François very near the true Indian Sannyasi. Also there was some likeness between his youth and that of Prince Siddhartha. Ere becoming an ascetic, François had been a wealthy, spoilt young man. His first meeting with misery, when a beggar entered his father's home, had influenced him for life, prompting him to abandon his family and to become a monk. One cannot help thinking of the *Lalita Vistara* describing the future Buddha leaving the palace after his first meeting with old age, illness and death.

In this oriental garden of Arvède Barine are there some Indian flowers? Yes, in her biography of *Bernardin de*

Saint-Pierre. Many have read his tropical novel, *Paul et Virginie*, translated in many languages and over which many generations have shed tears; but few people, nowadays, have read his *Chaumière Indienne* written in 1791. In it a group of English savants undertakes to write an encyclopædia; each one of them starts for a different country in search of Truth and carrying a list of 3,500 questions! The most learned one goes to India, collecting on the way 90 huge bundles of rare books. He discusses with Jewish rabbis, Protestant ministers, with Catholic doctors and members of 24 French and Italian Academies. He meets Greek *papas*, Turkish *mollahs*, Arab *sheiks*, Parsis; he comes across Armenians, Persians—and at last, Indian *pandits*! In raptures, to be loaded with so many Truths, the Englishman intends to go home, when all of a sudden he discovers that his knowledge and books provide no answers whatever to the 3,500 questions! Desperate, he consults a famous *brahmin* who tells him that, though *brahmins* know everything, they do not say anything. Happily a severe storm obliges the Englishman to seek shelter in a *pariah* cottage. In one short hour the poor *pariah* teaches him more of Truth than all the *pandits* had done during several years. This *pariah*, of course, could neither read nor write; his wisdom came from studying Nature with his heart, not with his mind!

Ending our wanderings, we will meditate under the *pariah's* guidance. Between the two wars, the ashes of silence covered Arvède Barine's fame. Most of her books were out of print. Lately some ashes have blown away: an article has appeared about her books; the radio had a lecture on them. Readers of THE ARYAN PATH might care to take part in this revival and to roam about in her various gardens. . . .

A. KARPELES AND C. A. HOGMAN

GREEK AND ROMAN VIEWS*

This is a book for which it would be difficult to find the right place in a library. It deals with so many subjects that the puzzled owner would not know whether to put it amongst the works on psychology, on comparative religion, on philosophy or on Græco-Roman history. The author has been entirely honest with his reader from the very start and warns him in the title what to expect: *The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate*. If the reader is still in any doubt about what he is in for, the first lines of the preface will remove that doubt:—

What is the nature of the mind? What are its processes? What is the soul? What is the nature of life? What happens at death and after? What is the significance of the body and of its various parts in men, in animals, in plants? What is the form of the world and how did it originate? By what forces and what means are human destinies determined? What are universals? What is time? This book began in an attempt to discover the earliest answers of the Greeks and of the Romans to these fundamental questions.

The reviewer confesses that at this point he became alarmed at the thought of what he had somewhat light-heartedly undertaken—to give an opinion about a book which he now found provided the Greek and Roman answers to all the questions man has been asking, ever since he was first capable of wondering at the miracle of his own existence. Not to a single reviewer should such a work as this have been entrusted but to at least six, a team that would have to include a theologian, an anthropologist, a psychologist, a classical scholar, a philosopher and a medical man. And alas, the reviewer who had undertaken this task possessed the qualification only of the last and the least important of this suggested

team of critical talent. How was it possible for him to carry through such a formidable task?

An hour's further reading, however, removed some of his feeling of inadequacy but by no means all of it. Professor Onians is a scholar and a brilliant one at that. He is Hildred Carlile Professor of Latin in the University of London and his book is a work of immense erudition. But clearly it was written for men of that scholarly type and not for semi-lettered seekers after truth such as the reviewer is. Despite the publisher's blurb on the dust jacket this is *not* a book intended for "the plain man who would penetrate into prehistoric times and the beginnings of our civilization." The reviewer happens to be that plain man and he can assure the publishers that this book is far too learned a one for such as he is. It is a book addressed by a scholar to scholars.

And that explains why its field is so wide that it embraces the whole range of human thought. The scholar resembles the swallow in that he is swift of flight and beautiful to watch. He swoops down with superb skill on a subject, touches it lightly, then disappears again to do it somewhere else. The scholar differs from the seer in that he deals only with the surface of things and never penetrates into their depths. For that an entirely different type of man is required, with gifts so different from those of the scholar that they are almost of an antithetical nature, and nowhere is this essential difference between the *pundit* and the thinker brought out more clearly than in the *Bhagavad-Gita*.

Is this an unfair review? Perhaps it is, for the author has nowhere put forward a claim to answer the funda-

* *The Origins of European Thought about the body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate*. (New interpretations of Greek, Roman and kindred evidence also of some basic Jewish and Christian beliefs.) By RICHARD BROXTON ONIANS. (Cambridge University Press. xviii+538 pp. 2nd edition, 1954. 50s.)

mental questions with which he starts his preface. All that he has really promised to do is to tell us how the ancient Greeks and Romans dealt with them and this promise he has fulfilled admirably.

This book represents thirty years' work and it includes researches on Fate

for which the author received the Hare Prize. The fact that a second edition has been called for is sufficient to show that the importance of this book has been widely recognized by those who are far more competent than is the reviewer to assess its merits.

KENNETH WALKER

The Future Poetry. By SRI AUROBINDO. (Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry. 406 pp. Paper: Rs. 10/- and Cloth: Rs. 11/8)

This is in substance a reprint of a series of articles which appeared in the *Arya* nearly 40 years ago. The occasion was Dr. Cousins's *New Ways in English Literature*: but what was begun as a review spanned ultimately into a leisurely sequence of 32 chapters.

After his return to India in 1893, Sri Aurobindo had lost to some extent his contact with the living current of English poetry. Dr. Cousins's book was a welcome eye-opener, and provoked Sri Aurobindo to follow the new trends in English poetry and to evaluate some of the new powers in the world of poetry—A.E., Carpenter and Yeats, for example. But behind these poets lay the weight of a tradition dating back to the Anglo-Saxons, and even to the poets of ancient Greece and Rome. Besides, there was the invisible pull of the future. All our yesterdays have led up to the present: and the present, in its turn, must press on to the far horizons of the future. To assess any living thing aright, it is necessary to take account of its origins as also of the possibilities of its future development. This is why, although the starting-point is Dr. Cousins's book Sri Aurobindo's "review" becomes in effect a survey of the origins and general course of English poetry and a forecast of the "future poetry," an evocation of the noon-day Sun already

heralded by the first clear streaks of the present dawn.

Being both a poet and a Yogi, Sri Aurobindo has seen the story of English poetry and the development of the arts of poetry itself as a continuing process, striving increasingly to achieve the ideal of soul communicating with soul, leaping as it were over the meddling instruments of word, sound, imagery and rhythm, or rather transforming them into a quick and infallible engine of transmission. *Mantra* is the key-word here: for at its purest and most inspiring poetry approximates to the *mantra*; and Sri Aurobindo feels that *mantric* poetry will be the natural, even inevitable, consummation of the now obscure urges in present-day poetic experiments. Sri Aurobindo deduces from the increasing global sweep and intrinsic strength of the English language that such *mantric* poetry may very well be achieved first in the English medium.

Such is the central thesis: and it is presented with the luminous argumentation and overwhelming elaboration characteristic of the writer. *The Future Poetry* is literary history and comparative criticism rolled into one, and it fuses the elements of scholarship, dialectic, vision and prophecy into a deeply stimulating and satisfying work of prose art. It may be added that, since the thesis was outlined 40 years ago, we have seen the first harvest of the "future poetry" in works like Mr. Eliot's "Four Quartets" and much of Sri Aurobindo's own later poetry.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

At the End of a Road. By CLAUDE HOUGHTON. (Hutchinson and Company (Publishers), Ltd., London. 239 pp. 1953. 10s. 6d.)

Perhaps the ultimate wisdom of the human kind is crystallized in the maxim: *Become what thou art.* But Mr. Houghton's Basil Ashe tries to become what he is *not* and suffers accordingly. Like all Mr. Houghton's novels, *At the End of a Road* is in effect a parable.

Set in a minor key, the theme might be pregnant with the possibility of illuminating the dark places of our lives. But there is a melodramatic element in Mr. Houghton which causes him to make of Basil Ashe a "special case" rather than a reflection of the universal predicament. Ashe is alleged to have been an "intelligent, vital, tautly-strung man, with voluble hands and features responsive to every thought and emotion;" but by the time the novel opens he has willed himself into becoming a master-crook who believes that decency and culture are synonymous with decadence. One recalls Rimbaud's adventures; but the story of Rimbaud is credible and significant, whereas Basil's is neither. As a maniacal crook he may convince; but as an intelligent man who has willed himself to become a crook, no. Sara, his wife, is more sympathetic; but even she suffers from

Mr. Houghton's habit of overpainting his subjects. Although "hers was the kind of beauty which is fully appreciated only by artists," several of her husband's fellow-crooks seem sensitive to her tangible charms as well as to her entity as a person. And vaguely sympathetic though she is, one doubts if even filial piety would have induced her to marry Basil's money in the first place, let alone remain faithful to it for so long after she had surmised its source.

In spite of all this there is a great residue of worth in the book. Mr. Houghton has gusto, wit and narrative power. He should be forcibly ejected from the West End of London—wherein he so manifestly loves what he so brilliantly castigates—and compelled to eke out his days in rural monasticism. He would then write the novels of which he is capable. He might even learn to become what he is.

J. P. HOGAN

[Our esteemed friend, Mr. Claude Houghton, was shown this review in case he wished to comment upon it. He writes: "Why does Mr. Hogan assume that one lives where one would choose to live? 'Rural monasticism'—with Mr. Hogan—would be Paradise Regained."]

God and the Universe. By HOLGER CHRISTIAN LANGMACK. (The Philosophical Library, Inc., New York. 173 pp. 1953. \$4.75)

This book is indeed a tragic proof of how desperately the West needs the "soul satisfying philosophy of the Aryans." It shows that however earnest and well-intentioned one may be, if his basis for thought is the narrow materialism of western science and theology, he can never understand life—

and in trying to explain it he can only produce a monster of the mind.

On page 14 Mr. Langmack questions:

Who created God? We have just seen how God created "the Heaven" (justification of duration) and "the Earth" (chance for change) but who knows if there really is a God. If so, who created Him? These are important questions . . .

But Mr. Langmack does not answer them.

E. P. T.

A Challenging Decade: Bengali Literature in the Forties. By LILA RAY (D. M. Library, Calcutta. 128 pp 1953. Rs. 3/-)

The author is a connoisseur of literary values. Her present book, is in the nature of a number of footnotes to the history of Bengali literature in the forties. With remarkable sensitivity to the challenge of "the most critical period in the history of Bengal within living memory" (to quote from the Preface, contributed by Shri Prabodh Chandra Sen, Rabindranath Professor of Bengali literature in the Visva-Bharati University) and to the response of the writers, old and young, men and women, thereof, she has given a dispassionate, critical estimate of their works. The overall survey shows, however, that "Bengali literature has gained in depth, seriousness, passion and intensity." The short story has

undergone a remarkable development; numerous forms both in poetry and prose have been experimented with; regional, sociological and epic novels have been successfully attempted; the personal essay is now "a tense, subtle and elastic medium for thought," and a new category of light satirical verse has been created. This much on the credit side; on the debit side she places the absence of a group of iconoclastic young men of the stature and vitality of the *Sabuj Patra*, the *Kallol* or the *Parichaya* groups of the twenties and thirties. "This does not augur well for the future and is causing much concern," concludes Shrimati Lila Ray. Her almost poetic style has endowed the brochure, which is largely made out of her monthly notes in *The Indian P.E.N.*, with the readability and enjoyment of a romance, indeed.

M. G.

Hieronymus Bosch: With an Introduction and Notes. By R. H. WILENSKI. (The Faber Gallery. Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 24 pp. 1953. 9s. 6d.) Received through the courtesy of the British Council.

This beautifully printed book presenting excellent coloured reproductions of some of the paintings of the little known Belgian artist, Bosch (c. 1450-1516) is one of a praiseworthy series. In his excellent Introduction, R. H. Wilenski writes that Bosch

has been hailed as precursor of the 1912 Surrealists [and] of the Neo-Surrealists of the 1920s and 30s who exploited Freudian . . . fears and sadisms . . .

That Bosch was a remarkable painter there is no doubt—but what he tried to convey through his extraordinary symbolism is rather obscure. Wilenski's biographical data and comments make study of the pictures more interesting. In themselves, they incline one to the impression that Bosch's mind was strongly affected by both the ecclesiastical and the secular degradation of his day; that he painted warnings, using partly Biblical images and partly his own imagination, and, possibly, impressions received from the astral light, the Sidereal Light of Paracelsus. His work is refined and intellectual, not at all gross or sensuous, in spite of his subjects.

E. P. T.

The Golden Book of Bible Stories from the Old Testament. Selected and Arranged by ELSA JANE WERNER. Illustrated by FEODOR ROJANKOVSKY. (Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, and Purnell and Sons, Ltd., London.

124 pp. 1953. 10s. 6d.) Received through the courtesy of the British Council.

Beautifully brought out with profuse and imaginative illustrations and a very

readable type, the book on first sight makes one rather hopeful. But as one turns to the first page and sees "God," a bearded, old man in the midst of his six-day creation, one is disappointed. Proceeding, one reads that the "Lord God"—"sitting on a throne lifted up on high" said this and commanded that, favoured this one and punished that one. And then one wonders if it is wise to give such an anthropomorphic conception of God with this too literal rendition of the Old Testament stories to young minds. But this is the fault common to most, if not all, children's books on religious themes.

Elsa Werner has selected the stories with discrimination and omitted such

parts as are not at all suitable for children. Among the psalms, she has included the beautiful ones attributed to David and these are touchingly illustrated. She has rendered the stories in a simplified but interesting manner. The story element is kept well in view but one feels that greater emphasis could have been laid on pronouncements such as the following:—

For the Lord does not see as man sees ;
man looks on the outward appearance, but
the Lord looks at the heart.

Be strong and of good courage. . . . Do not
be afraid and do not be dismayed ; for the
Lord your God is with you wherever you go.

MUMTAZ MOTIWALLA

A Speculation in Reality. By IRVING F. LAUCKS. (The Philosophical Library, Inc., New York. 154 pp. 1953. \$3.75)

Psychical phenomena are as old as man but their scientific study is of comparatively recent origin. Once one has become convinced of their reality it is hardly possible to consider them less than a challenge to modern scientific thought. But there are what one may call superstitions even in science and men of science cling tenaciously to them. Thanks to the discoveries of the last few decades science has lost much of its dogmatism and is now adopting a more conciliatory attitude toward the claims of the psychic. Materialistic explanations, however refined they may be, do not fit in. These phenomena demand a reinterpretation of existence and Mr. Irving F. Laucks offers his own.

Mr. Laucks informs us that his extensive technological practice had first led him to thorough materialistic convictions. But as his knowledge of psychical phenomena grew the untenability of his views became clear to him. Convinced as he is that only a new interpretation of Reality, in its chem-

ical, biological and mental aspects, can find an answer to the riddles of psychic manifestations, he sets out upon this difficult task with much acumen and understanding. No doubt great metaphysical questions: the nature of matter and mind, the reality of the unseen world, the communication of the living with the dead and a host of others that have baffled human intellect and imagination from times immemorial, are here involved, and it will not be possible always to agree with what the author says on these tricky issues. But it is refreshing to find in the West—with all its development of medicines and destructive warfare, with all its immense advance in technology and physical science—a growing awareness of "the many indications that this world is only a 'shadow-world' composed of shadows of events and reactions in the real world or universe." The author also seems to realize that once the conviction of the reality of the spiritual world gains ground in human consciousness, the victory is then surely ours against the forces of Atheism and Communism.

Mr. Irving F. Lauck's book is a stimulating work on a topic of perennial interest.

S. VAHIDUDDIN

Bālakānda. (An abridged *samashloke* version of Valmiki's *Rāmāyana-Bālakānda*.) By HANSA MEHTA. (M. N. Tripathi, Ltd., Bombay. 86 pp. 1953. Rs. 3/-)

Never has the cultural life of a people been better epitomized than in Valmiki's *Rāmāyana*. The story of Rama, holds a magic sway over the people, not only of India but of all countries that have been in cultural contact with her. The present volume is a valuable addition to the vast literature on the subject.

There have been numerous translated versions of the *Rāmāyana* in Gujarati and even of *Bālakānda*; one by the late Manharram Mehta also deserves notice. But this little book is important in several respects. It is not a mere translation, it is an intelligent abridgement of the original, the dropping of the less relevant side-stories having added to the continuity and flow of the main theme.

The author has accepted the limitations imposed by using the same metre, *anushtupa*, and of parallel verses as in the original and has succeeded remarkably well in creating a poem of literary charm and merit. By her choice of simple and graceful words and the thoughtful use of modern punctuation

marks, Hansa Mehta has secured clarity and brevity without taking undue liberties with the spellings or meanings of words. The volume adds to the laurels won by her in rendering *Hamlet* and *The Merchant of Venice* in the same metre; and to her reputation as the author of several other books in Gujarati.

The Introduction by Professor Sandesana is a valuable addition to the volume, describing as it does the influence of Buddhistic and Jaina literature on the story of Rāma. The various versions of the *Rāmāyana* in Gujarati are referred to and it is noteworthy that the Gujarati version by the poet Uddhava in c. 1458 A.D. is older than the famous *Rāmācharitā Mānasa* by Tulsi Das in Hindi in c. 1574 A.D.

Perhaps one of the most interesting parts of the book is Hansa Mehta's very brief "Dedication" which is symbolic of the high ideals of Indian womanhood.

Gujarati readers owe a debt of gratitude to Mrs. Mehta for so brilliantly enriching their literature with this book. They may eagerly look forward to the publication of the remaining portions of the *Rāmāyana* with which the author is already busy.

P. G. SHAH

Ramayana. Translated by SHUDHA MAZUMDAR. (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. 2 vols. 500 pp. 1953. Re. 1/12 each)

This latest translation of the *Ramayana*, in two volumes, by Shudha Mazumdar, presents in simple and lucid prose the message of that great Indian classic. It is free of ambiguity, as the author has taken pains to clarify certain passages that would otherwise have been obscure to the Western mind. The epic flows smoothly, holding the reader's interest throughout. It is to be specially commended for its simplicity of style, which, while lessening none of its appeal for adults, makes

it eminently suitable for the young. In this country, where education must perforce be secular, books of this type are of great value, for they can be easily assimilated and appreciated by the juvenile mind.

Published under the auspices of the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan of Bombay, the books have been priced low enough to bring them within the reach of most readers. The two volumes are well printed, and neatly bound in paper, and though they run into nearly 500 pages they are easy to handle.

The author has deleted much that she felt had no particular bearing on the philosophy or life of Rama, but

this is skilfully done and in no way impairs the continuity of the narrative.

The preface by Shri K. M. Munshi is brief but comprehensive, and explains the objectives of the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. The principle aim of this admirable Institution is to produce

a common pool of literature which it is thought would help to achieve the integration of ancient Indian philosophy with the creeds of our day, and enable man "to see Him in all, and all in Him."

ROSHAN KOTHAWALA

At the Feet of Bapu. By BRIJ-KRISHNA CHANDIWALA. (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad. 345 pp. 1954. Rs. 4/-)

The author had the happy privilege of being a member of Gandhiji's personal *entourage* for a number of years. During this period he kept a day-to-day record of whatever he saw or heard, while serving Bapu (Gandhiji). The present publication is a translation of his Hindi book *Bapuke Charanonmen*. Many of his recollections have been covered, no doubt, in other books of reminiscences which have appeared since the passing away of Gandhiji. Consequently, so far as incidents and events are concerned between 1929 and 1948 there

is nothing new here. It is the *feeling* narration which is this book's special feature, particularly the moving account of the memorable 30th of January, 1948—the day when Gandhiji passed out of his body.

The latter part of the book is of an interpretative nature, analyzing and assessing the significance of Gandhiji's ideas and activities, his Constructive Programme and his conception of Truth and God.

The book was originally written in Hindi from which it was first translated into Gujarati. Dr. Rajendra Prasad has written a brief foreword to the English edition.

G. M.

Meditation and Piety in the Far East, A Religious-Psychological Study. By KARL LUDVIG REICHELT. Translated from the Norwegian by SVERRE HOLTH. (Lutterworth Library, Vol. XLII. Missionary Research Series No. 19. Lutterworth Press, London. 171 pp. 1954. 17s. 6d.)

It takes a religious man to understand a religion, whether his own or another. The late Dr. Reichelt, speaking from nearly fifty years' missionary experience in the Far East, affirms that it is just those who have advanced furthest in their own faiths who are best prepared to receive the Christian gospel. With the Apostle of the Gentiles he believes in a "general revelation" reflected in all the great creeds and not annulled but consummated in the "special revelation" of Christ.

Clearly the earnestness of his own Christianity likewise prepared him to

understand both the religions and the religions of the East, especially of China. His chapters on "Meditation in Original Taoism," "Later Taoism and Confucianism" bear witness not only to an erudition, but equally to a sympathy, insight and respect, rare among Europeans; and all the more valuable now when access to these ancient communions has been made so much harder—alas—even for the Chinese themselves.

Although his conviction, that the fullest revelation of God's nature is to be derived only from the New Testament, remained unshaken to the last, one may be tempted to wonder why. By what standard can Christ be pronounced superior to Sakyamuni? Not, obviously, by the standard of Christ himself. Could even Dr. Reichelt have fallen into the common error of assuming what he set out to prove? The

conclusion would be superficial; but the fact that his book prompts the question is itself a tribute to its quality.

F. A. LEA

An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method. By M. YAMUNACHARYA. (H. Venkataramiah and Sons, Mysore. 307 pp. 1953. Rs. 4/-)

The importance of logic as a discipline of thought has never been seriously questioned. Only the academic and scholastic treatment of the subject without any relation to life deprives it of much of its value. True, science cannot be judged simply by its practical bearing and utility, and the basic questions of logic are really the questions of metaphysics and epistemology. But we are not here concerned with the questions dealt with by Hegel and his school, Husserl and his school, or those that the symbolic school of modern logicians have dealt with in their own way. We are here concerned only with logic for the student and logic in this context must have a use and a practical value. Many writers of note in the United States and England have written, with striking success, text books on logic as a guide to clear and precise thinking.

Mr. M. Yamunacharya follows in the footsteps of his American and English teachers and freely acknowledges the debt that he owes to them.

We have here at last a book by an Indian teacher who knows fully and well the difficulties of Indian students in their study of logic. A brief chapter on "Limitations of Science" is added at the end to throw some light on the relation of logic to our outlook on life. We only think that examples from our ancient books on logic and more illustrations from Indian literature and life would have enhanced the general interest of the book.

S. VAHIDUDDIN

The Spirit of St. François de Sales. By JEAN PIERRE CAMUS. Edited and translated with an Introduction by

C. F. KELLEY. (Longmans, Green and Co., London. 299 pp. 1953. 16s. 6d.)

During the 17th century in France, religion was rigorously regimented. The result was that the spirit was suffocated under the dead weight of the oppressive authority of the Church. C. F. Kelley, editor-translator of this classical work of Camus (1583-1652) writes that:—

It was into this stuffy atmosphere that François brought fresh air. The windows were once again opened and, without forgetting the maledictions hanging over worldliness, he made it possible for the world itself to be annexed to the kingdom of heaven.

For, St. François taught the cardinal doctrine of pure love of God which seeks not the paradise of God, but the God of paradise, to quote from one of his own works, *Treatise on the Love of God*; the other being: *Introduction to the Devout Life*. Camus was almost the other self of François, and this is, therefore, the Saint in action and words, along with Camus' comments. Out of its pages the joyous Saint often walks forth with a halo, commanding the readers' reverence for his chastity and love for his charity.

This edition, based on several previous ones, but condensed and translated afresh, correlates the Saint's observations on various subjects and has been divided into 23 chapters. Some of these deal with: "The Love of God," "The Love of Neighbour," "The True Virtues," "Scruples," "Temptations," "The Sin of Complaining," and "Inter-course with the World." The last chapter is on some "Particulars Concerning the Saint." François de Sales' reflections are full of wisdom born of practical experience, on the one hand, and of deep insight into the hearts and minds of men and women, on the other. It is not easy to choose any for the purposes of quotation, because every page of the book is worthwhile for those who desire to lead a good and devout life. The editor-translator has done an excellent job.

G. M.

CORRESPONDENCE

A BAN ON DOWRY

[Below we print a communication received from SHRI S. BALASUBRAMANIA IYER on a subject which urgently calls for a social reform. A proper discussion on this topic is invited and we hope that those among our readers who have had the pleasant or unpleasant experience of receiving or giving dowry, will share it with a view to throwing light on this much discussed topic.—ED.]

Marriages are made in heaven, as poets love to imagine, but negotiations for them in the Hindu community have a sordid, earthly basis. The more handsome, the better educated a prospective bridegroom, the greater the dowry demanded of the bride's family. Thousands of middle-class families have been ruined by the evil of the dowry system which six years of political freedom have done nothing to mitigate.

Recently, at an important session of the All-India Marwari Conference held at Calcutta, girls of that community set a courageous example to their sisters of other communities by taking a solemn vow not to marry if dowry was demanded. It must, however, be admitted that not all girls can take such an initiative or tackle the problem independently. Parents and elders are cautious and conservative and, though they may be on the verge of bankruptcy and wallow in misery, they are prepared to follow traditional practices. Often an eligible bridegroom must be found within the narrow confines of a sub-sect and his parents take undue advantage of this fact. The rates vary with qualifications, as was revealed during a recent debate in the U.P. Legislative Council. For I.A.S. officers anything from Rs. 30,000 to Rs. 40,000 is demanded, for grooms in the provincial service Rs. 20,000 to Rs. 25,000; for graduates in engineering and medicine Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 14,000; and for non-descript lecturers in colleges and universities Rs. 4,000 to Rs. 5,000.

It will thus be seen that education among men-folk has in no way helped

to improve women's lot. The Constitution has, of course, guaranteed freedom and equality of opportunity to both the sexes but pernicious social practices like the dowry system have made a travesty of it all. The All-India Women's Conference must demand Central Legislation to outlaw the evil of dowry. This should, indeed, form the first plank in its platform.

There are "doubting Thomases" who argue that mere legislation cannot abolish this evil and that it will only give rise to a regular black market in bridegrooms. One writer asserts:—

No amount of legislation can prevent this evil, and the fixing of ceiling prices for brides and bridegrooms and strictly enforcing such control prices on the parties can create only a black market, since both bride and groom are now saleable commodities in the matrimonial market just as any other commodity. Since bridegrooms of some status are in great demand at present, a black market is certain to be created the moment legislation is passed fixing up a control price for them.

Oddly enough the writer who airs these views in a weekly is a lady, but her apprehensions would seem to be groundless. If legislation is to be passed, its aim must not be to curb the evil merely but to abolish it in toto. It may tend at first to create a black market for bridegrooms but such a phenomenon is bound to be temporary. Black markets will disappear when the parents of girls are firm and realize that the law will save them from economic distress and possible ruin if they are co-operative and do not go against it. Once the Bill

is placed on the Statute Books, those in Government service will hesitate to infringe its provisions or show open disrespect for it. Such an example is sure to be followed by more people in other walks of life later on.

At the same time, Government must raise the age of marriage for girls from 14 to 18 years and amend the law to that effect. Such a reform will largely reduce, if not eliminate, parental influence in the matter of dictating terms or stipulating conditions for their son's marriage. Experience has shown that the younger a boy is, the greater is the tyranny of parental authority. It may be assumed that a groom must be 21 or 24 years old if the bride is 18 or above. An increased age tends to diminish the monetary motive which

the dowry represents.

Any violations of the law that show up, can easily be rectified if our women leaders are watchful and Government is responsive. If discrimination on the ground of sex is to go, and freedom and equality of opportunity for all are to have any real meaning, the idea that women are just chattels must be rooted out by both legislation and propaganda. It is a pity that some State Governments have not so far heeded women's demand for legislation to ban the dowry, but the All-India Women's Conference can well bring pressure to bear upon Parliament for enacting a comprehensive law to put an end to an out-dated practice that besmirches the fair name of India.

S. BALASUBRAMANIA IYER

LAW IS NOT MOCKED

Max Eastman writes that he has always wanted to compose a sermon "to advocate good conduct." In the Winter 1953-54 issue of *The American Scholar* he preaches one entitled, "The Cardinal Virtues: An Un-Sabbath-Day Sermon." He mentions there that:—

The theme would be that the most difficult virtues are essential to the rich experience of mortal life. They require no supernatural sanctions; they derive their authority from common sense and the method and results of science.

He cannot understand why prophets base their codes upon what he calls "some supernatural belief." Even the Buddha's teaching of Karma and re-incarnation he sees as "remote from matters of fact."

It is always surprising, we may observe, how men of good will and of "common sense" can acknowledge the law of cause and effect on the physical plane and deny it on the moral one! As to the "method and results of science," their very questionable degree of reliability can be judged from the changing and uncertain pattern of scientific theories.

In the West, Max Eastman points

out, seven virtues are traditional—the four Greek ones: courage, prudence or mindfulness, temperance and justice; and the three Christian ones: faith, hope and sympathy or love. He thinks that tradition goes astray with the latter. He claims that in the "Christian sense" neither faith nor hope is a virtue. Faith should be replaced by the discipline of doubt; hope by work and growth; in fact, growth would be the scientific candidate's "inevitable crown of the virtues." Men and women should know that it is their "duty to grow," because many are today "surrendering their selfhood to a state or a party" through ignorance and a loss of faith in the old traditional directives as usually understood.

Yet, we may point out, there have been men, down the ages, who have successfully and practically used and exemplified what Mr. Eastman calls difficult "supernatural beliefs," which are not supernatural but merely super-physical, ideas and principles. And as regards "growth," perhaps Lord Buddha has something to teach on this also, after all.

MUMTAZ MOTIWALLA

THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF CULTURE

[The lecture which we publish here was delivered at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on January 17th, 1952, under the chairmanship of Samskrita-visharada Shri S. Ramachandra Rao. The lecturer, Dr. Kurt F. Leidecker, Professor of Philosophy at the Mary Washington College, at Fredericksburg, of the University of Virginia, then in India as a Fulbright Scholar, gave two lectures at the Institute. The second one, on "The Real Integration of Eastern and Western Thought" appeared in our pages in June 1952. *Dhvani*, or the theory of suggestion, has been developed in Indian poetics to a very high degree, and Dr. Leidecker does well to recognize the important part which suggestive references play in ancient Indian literature, in conveying shades of philosophical meaning which the reader would otherwise miss as well as in giving added beauty to poetic expression.—ED.]

THE PHILOSOPHIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SIMILES IN ANCIENT INDIAN THOUGHT

Metaphors and similes are liked the world over. They constitute the very life of the poet, no matter where he lives. I may not be too far from the truth when I say, however, that the Orient, and in particular India, is the classic home of the simile.

What do we mean by a simile? It is one of the ways to make language more ornate, to enhance its beauties, to bring out the hidden treasures of thought and imagination, to increase its effectiveness in reaching our heart and mind. Under the term "figure of speech" we include a great many varieties. The Sanskrit term for a figure of speech is *alankara*, and in the *Kavya-darsa* of Dandin an *alankara* is defined as that which beautifies literature. Mr. K. Chellappan Pillai, in his *Similes of Kalidasa*, quotes from the *Citra Mimamsa* of Appayya Diksita the definition of a simile or an *upama* as the one actress, who "dances on the stage of literature in different rôles and entertains those who have the power of appreciation."

A whole science has grown up around literary embellishments and the Hindus are not behind Western scholars in exploring all the niceties that are involved in the figures of speech. When a good simile is presented, almost everyone responds directly with a keen appreciation of it and he

is sure to remember it and quote it thereafter.

Kalidasa was a past master in evolving similes. Among plants, the lotus figures most often in his similes. Its petals are like the almond eyes of the beloved; when it blooms it is like a coming to life, an awakening. The lotus is the beloved of the sun to whom the lotus unveils her face while toward the moon she is more reticent as if in *purdah*. Everyone knows Kalidasa's similes of the deer, the bee and the elephant and is delighted with them. The delight is due to the fact that the comparison has made us realize something that we had not known before. We have become discoverers not of a characteristic of a thing as such, but of a relationship between things and persons which had not been obvious to us ordinary mortals but which the genius of the poet has found out.

In other words, two objects are compared which are genetically and in many other respects dissimilar, yet which have one or another characteristic in common, be it form, colour, behaviour or the like. And here we have come upon one of the essential features of the simile. If it indicated merely a likeness that could be perceived directly, such as that between one leaf of a tree and another, it would be stating the obvious and we should experience no delight. The statement

that the colour of a *sari* is like the colour of this or that flower, is not interesting. It is made, or can be made, by everyone. Not so the comparison of a creeper to a woman, or of the thin digit of the moon in the vast heavens to a lonely, anxious wife. This takes a poet of the first magnitude. It is the element of surprise, the complete absence of expectation that imparts a peculiar value to the similes of a poet.

It must, however, never be lost sight of that it is the abstract element in the simile which makes it so valuable. You cannot perceive any relationship whatever between a woman and the moon. The eyes are mute; it is the mind that establishes the bond. The poet does not even have to have recourse to such particles as "like" or "similar." In fact, the simile is more effective if he leaves them out. At least, we in the West have the feeling that an elliptical simile is more valuable and effective than one that has all its parts clearly expressed in words. It is different with the *upamana* and the *upameya*, the two terms to be compared. They must be present in a simile if it is to be understood by everyone. That the characteristics which both have in common should also be clearly stated is, perhaps, more an academic requirement of grammarians or rhetorical scholars than a requirement that the appreciator of poetry feels must be present. Any simile will be ineffective to him who is not schooled in the ways of thought and imagination. To him all poets are "liars by profession," as David Hume once wrote.

Anyone studying Indian philosophy will be familiar with certain similes which are meant to illustrate various truths. For instance, the picture of a charioteer and the horses which he drives expresses vividly the relationship between the controlling faculties of the mind and the unruly senses, wanton and undisciplined, that roam about this world of sight and sound and smell. There is the picture of the rope which is mistaken for a snake.

Buddhist literature likewise is full of similes which strikingly give the pictorially minded the idea which the philosopher wants to convey.

There is nothing mysterious, of course, in such similes, and one could tabulate them as good similes or bad, depending on how well they convey the idea which the author had in mind. They can also be used in various other ways. For instance, H. D. Griswold, in the *Journal of the Punjab Historical Society*, Vol. I, (1911), used the similes in the *Agni* hymns of the *Rig Veda* to present a clear picture of social life in Vedic times. They can be used to make out a case for Indians' acute perception of nature. They can be used to establish the fact that art was realistic and impressionistic, as when the King, in *Shakuntala*, paints the bee on his beloved's face so realistically that the Jester wants to wave it away.

Similes can be made the subject of linguistic and other investigations. But it seems to me that the main point remains generally unnoticed, and that is the idea which is conveyed in every comparison. It is the essentially intellectual element which is of chief importance in the simile, not the terms of comparison. The literary man, of course, centres his attention on the common characteristics which the poet or the author perceives in objects widely different. That is a great step toward the comprehension of the simile. In fact, in the correct analysis of these properties lies the value and beauty of the simile. It is often extremely difficult to perceive the common elements, and it is sometimes even more difficult to speak about them intelligibly. How will you, for instance, elaborate on Kalidasa's comparison of a beautiful girl of slender figure to a flash of lightning? Those less poetically inclined will lay this to the poet's eccentricity. And yet most of us feel that the comparison is justified and striking, even though we cannot rationalize it.

When dealing, however, with the philosophical similes, we must not be carried away by sentiment or be left with a vague feeling of a similarity or a correspondence. It is the business of the philosopher to be explicit and logical. The mention of the word "logical" will immediately bring forth the question, What has a simile to do with the logical? It remains vague at best, even if the common characters are perceived clearly. Then, what are we to do with the philosophical simile which has as its object enlightenment rather than obfuscation? Can its place in philosophic literature be defended?

Those who are versed in the philosophic literature of the West will recall Immanuel Kant's famous simile of virtue, which shines by its own light as does a pure crystal. The simile is most appealing and causes an immediate response in us, but unfortunately it is based on a fallacy, for no crystal shines by its own light.

May not many of the similes in Indian philosophic literature be of a like nature? Perhaps so, but what difference does that make? For, whatever we say or whatever facts are put forth, the assertions are all made on the basis of the knowledge or science of the day. That knowledge may change in years to come, just as our conception of the earth as a stationary body has changed. Hence we must accept the part of the simile which points out the common characteristics as based on certain presumptions or assumptions which we must consider for the moment as true. As in the case of the crystal shining by its own light, the whole value of the simile does not lie in the complete accuracy of the elements composing it. It has an aura of meaning which is not made inferior by the error it contains. We assume for the moment the correctness of the comparison, and the meaning of virtue is made clearer by it and its self-existent, sovereign character is solidly established in our minds.

Now it has been said that all similes obscure. Perhaps they do, to the analytic mind. To the synthetic mind they elucidate. By this I mean that if we get pleasure or insight out of reading or hearing a simile merely because a detailed investigation of the two terms of comparison, the *upamana* and the *upameya*, reveals indeed comparable features, then we have not comprehended the meaning of a simile. There is not complete likeness between any two things, even machine-made things, least of all those produced by nature, and there is no likeness at all between an object of sense and one of imagination or thought. Hence analysis is a wrong method to apply.

Perhaps imagination is best as a faculty when investigating the metaphorical and that is what has, of course, been recommended throughout the ages of literary criticism. Still it might be termed the synthetic faculty, in that the comparison creates something new in our own minds in the manner in which nature produces new forms, not merely by a summation of characters which we happen to have already analyzed. Two gases, hydrogen and oxygen, combine to form a liquid, water. Perhaps liquidity was already contained in either gas, yet whatever we say about the combination, it presents new features which we can postulate *a posteriori* in the elements themselves, but which we could not have predicted with any accuracy.

What the theory of emergent evolution tries to show in the natural sphere is illustrated in the literary sphere by the simile. The value of both terms is enhanced by their appearing in combination, and the attention is directed toward a new product. We have fixed attention too long on what the simile does to the object which is to be described, that it makes it more intelligible or more appealing. The largest measure of justification for metaphorical writing and speaking lies in the new thought which links two things that are in the last analysis very dissimilar. It is the

tertium comparationis, as it has been called, the third element in a comparison which is the worth-while result of simile and metaphor. That is why a philosophical analysis of the simile is so important for yielding new values, not merely for the literary interpretation of the metaphorical, but also for the thought itself in its various forms and stages. It is with this in view that I undertook a special study of the similes in the Upanishads, which abound in them.

I think that the whole problem of the simile in this type of ancient literature has a tremendous significance philosophically, in that it illuminates the very nature of thought itself. It is expressing a truism to say that those away from nature or unfamiliar with the social and other conditions of country, climate and human behaviour cannot properly appreciate the full force of the simile. That can be corrected by study. But to evaluate correctly the new product of synthetic combination requires some philosophic insight and training. To say that metaphorical thinking is merely an expression of the indistinct, mystical thinking of men in a stage of pre-reflective existence does not help much. In fact it regards the problem of the metaphorical as insoluble and inaccessible to scientific analysis. In this connection I should like to refer to Oldenberg who dwells much on the "pre-logical constitution of mind" in the Brahmanas and the Upanishads. Others after him have made much of this as justifying a certain indifference to the thought expressed in these documents, which is dismissed as mystical. The whole of the philosophy embodied in the Upanishads then becomes vaporous and indistinct, accessible only to a hazy apprehension in feeling and sentiment. Whereas logic is the very soul of philosophy, it becomes, in Oldenberg's treatment and interpretation, remote from all the categories of thought with which we operate today. That in itself makes ancient thought incomprehensible.

Now the very things which Oldenberg and others like him condemn, the similes illustrating metaphysical and other concepts, far from being indistinct and directing the mind toward a mystical apprehension of reality, do just the opposite. It simply is not so that the beauty indwelling in the appearance of individual objects and resting self-contained with vigour and definiteness in their forms, only rarely rose to consciousness in the soul of the Hindus or that the eyes were kept shut in the face of multifarious aspects of individual existences, as he maintains in his *Lehre der Upanischaden* (Teaching of the Upanishads). The similes themselves attest the keen sense of appreciation of the minutest details of the observation of nature. A wealth of information regarding the fauna and flora of India may be gathered from the metaphorical literature not only of classical poets, such as Kalidasa, but from the philosophic literature as well, and the Upanishads in particular. Among animals, we find mentioned there the cow, the bull and the calf, the goat, the horse, the dog, the deer, the frog, the fish, the eagle, the hawk, the snake, the spider, the bee, the mosquito; among plants, various trees, grains, seed plants, the mango, the lotus and the products as well as parts of these. The philosopher in that period did not shut his eyes to either the beauties or peculiarities of things around him.

To maintain this would be a gross error due to preconceived notions as to what the philosopher wanted to illustrate. He did not want to illustrate the nothingness or emptiness of philosophic concepts. Far from it. The life of the mind was, to him, overflowing with delight, not because it was different from the world of manifold objects, but because of values peculiar to itself. Likewise, the terms of the comparison, the *upamana* and the *upameya*, are not the all-important things in the similes, let us say, of the salt dissolved in water or of the Nyagrodha tree. The important thing is neither

the salt nor the fig, nor the unperceived being, *Sat*, nor the unperceived finest essence, it is the *tertium comparationis*, which, in the one case, is immanence and omnipresence, and in the other, intangibility and transcendence.

The object of these similes is quite contrary to that of showing the complete sameness and absence of diversity of the main terms of the comparison—although these concepts might be justifiable in the metaphysical system with which we are dealing. Their object is to establish the quality of the metaphysical being in contradistinction to reality as perceived by the senses. If comparison always assumes a comparable quality, we must, indeed, come to quite different conclusions as to the main tenets of Indian philosophy. Recently a prominent American thinker has fallen into such a pitfall of interpretation.

I do not wish to imply that Indians themselves have not laid their traditional thought open to such misinterpretation or have not themselves misinterpreted it. But the mistake is easily made and is comparable to that indicated above when the slim maiden is compared to a flash of lightning. The simile contains that "more" which any synthetic product in nature also contains. We cannot approach it with the category of correspondence. If we do, then all similes must be regarded as lame and left-handed, whereas in truth they are illuminating to an unparalleled degree. If we follow the attitude and interpretation of an Oldenberg, then we are, indeed, preventing ourselves altogether from understanding Indian philosophy. Oldenberg felt that there was great danger in interpreting similes, "of not keeping within the faint line which separates that which it was intended they should convey and that which lies in them beyond this, accidentally and unintentionally." Yet he who would avoid this danger altogether must simply forbear to lift the veil which lies over the Indian world of thought, shrouded

in types and symbols. That which really lies beyond the similes is not and cannot be the object of our search. We are concerned simply with a correct interpretation of the similes and that has to do as much with a correct appraisal of Indian philosophy as with language, which has to make use of the metaphorical in order to convey a thought.

To show, as some have alleged, that the philosophy of the Upanishads is the same as Kant's or Hegel's or Schopenhauer's is not the object at all of a study of the Upanishadic similes, even if carried out in a spirit differing from Oldenberg's. If the study were made in the spirit of Oldenberg, we should be baulked at every turn and sever ourselves from the main stream of life and thought to which we all, including the sages of the Upanishads, surely belong. We must not allow the analytic attitude to get the better of us, for it will ultimately lead us to solitude and solipsism. We must believe in the intelligibility of all that exists, most of all in the intelligibility of what man throughout the ages has been trying to say and to convey. Social existence depends on this premise, while science also depends on it, for otherwise its researches into the nature of the world would be entirely futile.

To return to the similes in the Upanishads, they are of the utmost importance to our forming a correct estimate of Upanishadic thought. Beyond that, they might point the way toward understanding the thought patterns of a past which is still dimmer, that of the Vedas themselves.

We commit an error if we treat each simile apart from the philosophy of the language. Language and thought are too intimately connected to be considered apart. Is not that one of the main ideas met with in Vedic philosophy, that the Word has a significance and a power far beyond that of being a mode of communication between man

and man? The Word has world-creating ability; it is the very essence of the Divine, in Hindu thinking as well as among the Stoics. It is considered thus also in the story of Genesis and in the Gospel according to St. John. This is, however, somewhat afield from the problem we are faced with in the similes. For one of the main points in them is the picture and not the word alone.

Before going more into details of the triad of language, picture and thought as it presents itself in the metaphor, may I be permitted to recall an experience which I had somewhere in Northern Michigan while conversing over the fence with a farmer? We were speaking about homely topics, crops, cattle and farming in general. My interlocutor was slow in answering questions; it was his way to meditate a little before he came out with his opinion. He could not talk on philosophy, that was certain. But at one point in the conversation the reply to a question of mine required an expression which I should have couched in abstract terms. And there the amazing thing happened. He answered with a metaphor or a simile. I have long since forgotten the conversation, but the fact that he did not give me a direct answer such as I should have anticipated has stayed with me all these years. What had actually happened—and I have verified it many times since in conversation with people who do not have the faculty of speaking in abstract terms—is that, instead of the abstract term expressive of a relation, a picture had come to his mind which exemplified the relation he was thinking of. The farmer was thus an incipient poet.

For that is exactly what is going on in the mind of the poet who is evolving a metaphor or a simile. He has a swift glimpse of the connection or relation between two pictures, let us say a lotus pond and the eyes of the beloved, because at the moment of contemplation of the eyes of his dreamy

lady he is impressed with their calmness and depth and perhaps with other characteristics which are not immediately expressible in words. Being of a contemplative nature he may have had a similar experience while gazing into a lotus pond, and hence the picture of the pond is immediately recalled.

Only the uninspired person will search in his experience for similarities and identities between situations and come up with a trope which more often than not will leave the reader or hearer emotionally unaffected because it is arrived at academically and laboriously or perhaps smacks of a certain triteness. The productions of persons of lesser genius are, indeed, flowery and full of comparisons, bearing out our contention that similarities between things and persons or things and things have been searched for, whereas the mechanics of true metaphorical production is entirely different. The *tertium comparationis*, the abstract element is the crucial element in the simile which a reflective person, not a poet, would have expressed by an abstract term.

What significance does this discussion have with respect to the similes in the Upanishads? This, that if we but read the similes and metaphors aright, they will convey to us the proper meaning of the entire discourse or story and eventually reveal to us a body of abstract thought which we should otherwise have missed. If we use this technique, we shall be able to comprehend the thought of the Upanishads perhaps as well as those persons who have an intuitive insight into the tenets of these ancient productions. Of course, the way of the intuitive thinker or of the mystic is more direct than that of the logician. Yet it is possible to use either approach and penetrate to the core. The results of the application of our method will be found to be quite different from the results arrived at by those who maintain that in the Upanishads we are dealing with very primitive conceptions, with a state of mind

before man became reflective and used logic as we are using it today. We see a continuity of thought and hence are firmly convinced of the possibility of understanding the ancients.

Our own language is built up of words which had their roots in concrete reference. In the sentence just written I made use of several abstract terms that are derived from very concrete ones, such as "root" and "concrete." We never associate the basic and original meanings with these abstract terms. We have grown away from the primary meaning of words, so much so that we cannot even appreciate any longer the full significance of every word. A house is a house to us; but to the one whose needs are few, whose environment is simple, house has a much wider meaning. It is not merely a thing apart from tree, dog and cloud. It is the thing that protects, that shelters, that is a refuge. Nay, it is not the *thing* that does the protecting and sheltering: it is protection.

But protection is an abstract noun, an abstract idea. Here, however, it is equivalent to the concrete noun, "house." It is more than an equivalent; the two terms protection and house are actually identical. Protection we cannot picture, but a house or a hut we may. When we draw a picture of a house, we draw the picture of an object with certain perceptual qualities. When I draw the picture of my house, I have already infused into the drawing a great deal more than the perceptual qualities. But this more may never be appreciated by anyone else. Yet that drawing of mine has an aura of feeling and emotion about it which I might express verbally as those of coziness, love, security and the like.

The acid test of our understanding of what our self-righteous scholars have termed "the primitive mind" is this, whether we are able to associate with the picture or the concrete word the intensity of feeling, thought and emotion which abstract terms normally

evoke within us. Every abstraction has its exemplification in the concrete world. In the symbol we have but an imperfect and sometimes left-handed approach to an original unity of thought in which abstractness and concreteness were merged. Hence others' symbols are often misunderstood, misread. They have not grown up with us or we with them.

In the light of what has been said, the significance of the similes in the Upanishads will now become apparent. The decisive element is not the concrete reference but the relation or the abstract state of things which is expressed in the simile. When the great word "*neti, neti*" (not this, not that), was spoken, it certainly was not the intention of the Upanishadic sage to point out that the ultimate reality is not this particular thing or that particular thing, but that it was something else. What he did want to point out was that the great underlying Reality was not to be identified with the phenomenal world, which is an aggregate of this and that, multiplied *ad infinitum*, but had a nature different from it, that it was either of the noumenal or of the texture of thought and consciousness, which also is not a "this" or a "that."

When it is said in the *Prasna Upanishad*, 3. 3, that the mind, *Manas*, adheres to *prana* like the shadow to a person, we might, of course, have a very concrete situation in view: "Mind is the shadow of life." But that is not at all the meaning of the passage in the thinking of the person who is trained in the metaphorical use of language. Instead of a simile we should use an abstract term when rendering this phrase into English. Perhaps we should say that mind and the forces of life are inextricately bound together in a unity. We can dispense with the simile altogether without doing violence to the original thought. Not that I should wish to substitute abstractions for all similes; I merely want to indicate that the same effect is achieved

for the person given to logical and formal language as is achieved by the simile for the person who has a negative sense of the metaphorical. It is the literal-minded person who, with the advocates of a pre-logical mental make-up, may and often does arrive at fantastic translations, twisting the original thought completely out of shape till he has brought about, between our thinking and so-called primitive thinking a hiatus which is unbridgable. Perhaps when the particle *iva* is present he might not be so presumptuous as to conjure up ghosts by crediting his "primitives" with concrete minds.

The Upanishads, of course, abound in similes of a purely literary kind, some of which are not inferior to those of Classical Sanskrit literature. The Upanishads have a number of these. The body perishes as do gnats; the body is a cart without reason. The *Purusha* is the driver of a cart; the *buddhindriyas* (perceptive organs) are like reins, the *karmendriyas* (active organs) like horses; Mind is the chariot-eeer; *Atman* stands in the midst like a spectator; one who is involved in the fruits of good and evil deeds is like a lame man; *asvatantrya* is like being a prisoner; and so forth. The *tertium comparationis*, or the core of the comparison, in its abstract formulation of dependence, independence, absoluteness and the like, is too obvious to require comment. It requires a somewhat more sympathetic interpretation, however, when *Brahman* is called the only enlightener or *Atman*, a guide; or the year, the nest of *Brahman*.

In these cases taken at random, we must look somewhat deeper and call upon the knowledge gained from a

study of texts of either a philosophic or a ritualistic nature. But the ritualistic expression in itself may be a metaphor. In fact, the background of the Upanishads is to a large extent ritualistic and can be understood only through the literature of the *Aranyakas* and the *Brahmanas*.

And behind these tower the Vedas in Himalayan purity. In these, thought and word and picture are fused. Their meaning has not yet been unravelled because the whole import of the metaphorical has been missed and the original unity of the perceptual and the abstract has not been acknowledged. We have first to establish the metaphysics that undergirds such an interpretation, a metaphysics based upon the supremacy of consciousness and the intelligibility of the world of man and of nature, and not merely the intelligibility of man to man alone.

So long as it is taken for granted that intelligence has evolved in the course of human evolution, so long will the meaning of the signs and symbols of nature remain a mystery, those signs and symbols which the phenomenal or perceptual world supplies in such abundance and which are deposited in the metaphors, comparisons, synecdoches, metonymies and other figures of speech of which the ancients made such lavish use. The significance of the similes in the Upanishads rests upon the fact that in this literature the philosophic spirit and language of abstraction with which we associate philosophic speculation become evident through a haze of pictorial thought, the clue to which is discoverable only through and by way of the philosophic simile.

KURT F. LEIDECKER

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“—————ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS

The important rôle of man in the evolutionary scheme, as indicated by the scientific findings of recent centuries, was emphasized by Dr. Julian Huxley in his lecture at Bangalore on March 23rd on “Evolution and Human Destiny.” Speaking under the chairmanship of Prof. M. S. Thacker, Director of the Indian Institute of Science, and under the joint auspices of the British Council, the Indian Institute of Culture and several local scientific bodies, he called man “the business manager of evolution on earth.” Whether man knew it or not, or liked it or not, he was the instrument or agent for any further major evolutionary advance on this planet. Purely physical evolution of other species, as well as of man’s body and brain, had long been virtually stabilized. Man, however, had reason and imagination, conceptual thought and words symbolizing both objects and ideas, which permitted the handing down of a cultural tradition. In his case the cultural evolution dominated the physical.

Human resources, spiritual, æsthetic and intellectual as well as physical, were part of the world’s resources. For the first time serious consideration was being given to the possibilities of the world as a whole, but the various efforts needed to be synthesized. A materialistic view of the universe and of science had been outgrown, but he urged the correction of the present great imbalance between the natural and the social sciences, with more attention to the psycho-social phase of evolution. The higher possibilities of psychology, for example, awaited exploration. Practically nothing was known of the techniques of the experiences of the great Western mystics and of Yoga.

The production of more fully de-

veloped personalities—a qualitative, not a quantitative increase—was the theoretical aim of man’s future development. Most human beings today had not realized more than a fraction of their possibilities. Even of the well-nourished and literate minority, how many realized their æsthetic and intellectual potentialities? The development of the science of human possibilities was suggested by Dr. Huxley as the next advance in the development of science.

Prof. Paul Weiss of the Philosophy Department at Yale University, lecturing at the Indian Institute of Culture, Bangalore, on March 25th on “Ethics and Religion,” brought out man’s inescapable obligation, as a part of nature and possessing a freedom of action lacking in lower kingdoms, to pursue the good, to do all that he could to promote harmony between all beings. The whole Cosmos was a proper object of man’s concern, but finite man could not do all he wished to do. It was not a satisfactory solution to proclaim man guilty of not doing that which he could not do, of doing that which he could not avoid doing, and merely to remove the consequences by promising God’s forgiveness on certain terms.

The demands of different religions differed and their followers were in some cases asked to do things ethically wrong. The lecturer gave several examples from Judaism, Christianity, and Buddhism, taken from sacred texts and legends, to emphasize this and to show how unethical a dead-letter interpretation showed certain actions or injunctions in practice to be.

The ethical man who was religious claimed that God would find good what

men found good. Granting a God, this was conceivable but not certain; no one knew what Its nature was or what Its work. If an Infinite Being was looked to for answers these would be in Its own terms. To shift the burden of our responsibility on to a God forgiving or condemning without any ethical basis resulted in ritualism.

It was necessary to maintain the essential distinctness of ethics from religion. Their blurring, as by the Humanists, introduced confusion. The assurance that ethics was finally satisfactory was not forthcoming; the best men could do was all the good to the world that lay in their power. Western ethics tended to stress the doing of good works; Eastern ethics, the avoidance of doing harm.

Shri K. Guru Dutt, who presided, mentioned Buddhism as an ethical system that was looked upon as a religion, and pointed to the Hindu concept of *dharma*, in which ethics and religion seemed to challenge separation.

In a world threatened by war and more and more abominable weapons of warfare, it is a hopeful sign that leading men are recognizing that "peace must be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind," and not merely upon the political and economic arrangements of governments. It is therefore recommended that we must concentrate upon education as the surest foundation of peace.

In an important article, "Education and Peace," which appears in the January-March issue of *India Quarterly*, Dr. H. Lionel Elvin, Director, Education Department, Unesco, puts forward certain considerations on what kind of education we have in mind when we speak of education for peace, and what its relation is to what is now taught in our schools and colleges.

Important as it is to provide educational facilities for all children, it is not enough; *what* is taught is also of crucial importance. Real education means much more than the mastery of certain information, or indoctrination, or the formation of good intellectual habits; it aims at developing free individuals, "capable of happy and effective co-operation with their fellows." Co-operativeness, in the present world, has to be carried beyond the single nation to the community of nations. This cannot be done unless the habits of neighbourly living are first learned in the small group—the family, the school, the local community.

"The formation of attitudes predisposing young people to tolerance and the recognition of the rights of others" is most important in education for peace. To achieve this, Dr. Elvin suggests that boys and girls from different groups should be shown at school that they must treat each other as "spiritual equals," and that any other behaviour is just unthinkable.

The school curriculum needs to be modified to meet the requirements of the present age. It is necessary that children should have knowledge of the history and geography, the constitution and the ways of life, not only of their own country, but of other lands as well. Thus in almost every subject that is taught in a school there is opportunity for broadening the horizon of the child.

All this cannot be done overnight. Education for peace is bound to be a slow process. We are further told that such education "in an appropriate way should be taking place at every stage of the educational process from the earliest years right on into adult education." Dr. Elvin concludes that in the work of education for peace an international office can do much through the provision of useful comparative information and experience.