

# AUMS

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,  
and lost among the host—as does the evening  
star to those who tread their path in darkness.  
—*The Voice of the Silence*

## THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. IX

NOVEMBER 1938

No. 11

### INDUSTRIALIZATION A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH

Those who are enamoured of the mechanistic civilization of the West are strongly advised to read with attention a remarkable book to which we have referred more than once in these pages. That is *Man, the Unknown* (Hamish Hamilton, London, and Harper's, New York) by Alexis Carrel. All of those who imitate the Western modes of living in food, dress, etc., but especially those who wish to see India industrialized, are committing a grave blunder in not studying this book. Its author is no ordinary man; he occupies a most prominent place among the front-rank scientists of the world.

Alexis Carrel is a Frenchman by birth who had already attained fame as a medical man and a surgeon when on the invitation of the Rockefeller Institute he went to New York. In 1912 he won the Nobel Prize for his researches in human blood-vessels; in 1931 he won the Nordhoff-Jung Cancer Prize. To this

volume, which no thoughtful man can afford to miss reading, he brings his research and his long experience in the service of humanity. He writes an intimate book, and in passage after passage he reveals the dangers of industrialization to modern civilization—dangers which are as menacing as those of war itself, if not more so.

Below we print a few extracts, in the hope that reformers everywhere, but especially in India, will make what good use they can of them in their endeavour to create an enduring civilization. For if a civilization is really to endure its foundation must be not economic and political but moral and spiritual.

What are the roots of our present troubles?

Modern civilization finds itself in a difficult position because it does not suit us. It has been erected without any knowledge of our real nature. It was born from the whims of scientific discoveries, from the appetites of men, their illusions, their theories, and their

desires.

Those who suffer most are the labourers :—

Esthetic activity remains potential in most individuals because industrial civilization has surrounded them with coarse, vulgar, and ugly sights. Because we have been transformed into machines. The worker spends his life repeating the same gesture thousands of times each day. He manufactures only single parts. He never makes the complete object. He is not allowed to use his intelligence. He is the blind horse plodding round and round the whole day long to draw water from a well. Industrialism forbids man the very mental activities which could bring him every day some joy. In sacrificing mind to matter, modern civilization has perpetrated a momentous error. An error all the more dangerous because nobody revolts against it, because it is accepted as easily as the unhealthy life of great cities and the confinement in factories. However, those who experience even a rudimentary esthetic feeling in their work are far happier than those who produce merely in order to be able to consume. In its present form, industry has deprived the worker of originality and beauty.

According to this great scientist those countries which are industrially most developed are fast returning to barbarism :—

We are unhappy. We degenerate morally and mentally. The groups and the nations in which industrial civilization has attained its highest development are precisely those which are becoming weaker. And whose return to barbarism is the most rapid. But they do not realize it. They are without protection against the hostile surroundings that science has built about them.

Those factors which are supposed to raise the standard of life are of questionable merit, not according to some mystic philosopher, but in the opinion of this eminent scientist.

Electric lighting, elevators, biological

morals, and chemical adulteration of foodstuffs have been accepted solely because those innovations were agreeable and convenient. But no account whatever has been taken of their probable effect on human beings.

Further Dr. Carrel does not believe even in improving the scientific gadgets ; he recommends turning away from the present path "in order to follow the mental and the spiritual" way of living.

What is the good of increasing the comfort, the luxury, the beauty, the size and the complications of our civilization, if our weakness prevents us from guiding it to our best advantage ? It is really not worth while to go on elaborating a way of living that is bringing about the demoralization and the disappearance of the noblest elements of the great races. It would be far better to pay more attention to ourselves than to construct faster steamers, more comfortable automobiles, cheaper radios, or telescopes for examining the structure of remote nebulae. What real progress will be accomplished when aircraft take us to Europe or to China in a few hours ? Is it necessary to increase production unceasingly so that men may consume larger and larger quantities of useless things ? There is not the shadow of a doubt that mechanical, physical, and chemical sciences are incapable of giving us intelligence, moral discipline, health, nervous equilibrium, security, and peace.

Our curiosity must turn aside from its present path, and take another direction. It must leave the physical and physiological in order to follow the mental and the spiritual.

To transform the established order of industrialism, such as it obtains in Britain or the U. S. A., is wellnigh impossible ; but in countries like India where people advocate establishment of a similar order it is imperative that the considered pronouncements of such scientific authorities as Dr. Alexis Carrel should be heeded.

# THE CASE AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

## WHY HAS IT LOST GROUND ?

[Fenner Brockway is the author (with Stephen Hobhouse) of *English Prisons To-day* (1921), and of *A New way with Crime* (1928). In addition to his book knowledge and investigation he has practical experience ; for he suffered nine prosecutions, and more than one imprisonment including two years' hard labour, under the Military Service Act during the War, for conscience sake.

It is a commentary on the barbarism which is enveloping the West to read his statement that "the cause for the abolition of capital punishment has suffered a set-back". He is looking to the emergence of a New World from which every kind of "domination" will vanish. This will not be till the West recognizes the principle of Non-Violence epitomized in the saying of the Great Buddha, "Hatred ceaseth not by hatred but by love."—EDS.]

Until the 1930's or thereabouts the case against capital punishment was making great progress. In many European countries the death penalty had been abolished ; the Soviet Union had followed its revolution in 1917 by ending executions not only in civil life but in the army ; and in Britain a Commission had recommended a limitation of the death penalty which was generally recognised as a first step towards abolition.

But to-day we must recognise that the cause for the abolition of capital punishment has suffered a setback. In the Soviet Union the death penalty has been re-introduced ; in other countries there are few signs of progress towards abolition, whilst in many the death penalty is being imposed on an extended scale. Why is this ?

I think the answer is to be found in the increased use of the death penalty in political cases. Twenty years ago it was rare for a political offender to be executed. Far more prisoners were sentenced to execution for civil crimes than for political crimes. But now the proportions

have been reversed. *During the last five years a hundred prisoners have been executed for "treason" for every prisoner executed for murder.*

The new tendency was begun in Germany, where, after the Fascist victory, a large number of Socialists and Communists were done to death ; but now capital punishment for political offences is probably employed in the Soviet Union more extensively than in any other country.

During recent months the wide use of the death penalty for political offences has extended to Palestine. Technically the offences have been crimes of violence or the possession of firearms ; but the motive and cause were political. During the civil war in Spain the death penalty has been employed not only for military offences, but for political purposes in the sectional struggles behind the lines. These are only a few instances of many which could be given.

With the political use of the death penalty growing so extensively in this manner, it was inevitable that the campaign for the abolition of capital

punishment for offences such as murder should lose considerable force. Many of those executed for political offences were undeniably men of principle and good character. If they must die, why get excited about criminals who have committed vile deeds of violence for greed or passion?

Yet, despite these circumstances, the case for the abolition of the death penalty remains, and mankind will again turn to it as civilisation progresses.

Capital punishment can only be justified on two grounds. The first is the ground of the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. This principle, applied to cases of murder, is nakedly the principle of revenge, above which all that is best in humanity has long ago risen. The second is the ground of war—the destruction of an enemy who is dangerous. This is the principle on which political executions are justified; but every one who is seeking a solution of our political problems on the basis of freedom and true democracy (that is, the political expression of social and economic equality) must regard the recent extension of capital punishment in the political field with abhorrence.

Let us look at these two cases—hanging for murder and execution for political offences—separately. Within the space of this article we must do so briefly, so I put the points concisely.

1. The death penalty is defended as a matter of justice. The offender has taken a life; he must forfeit his life. But before the justice of any punishment can be deter-

mined, all the considerations which made for the committal of the crime must be weighed, and when we begin that examination we shall find that the causes of homicide are as much social as individual. The majority of murderers, to quote the Editor of the official Judicial Statistics for Britain, "belong to the poorer classes". Overcrowding, the squalor of poverty and the bitterness which it causes, the lack of education, the denial of a healthy worth-while life—these are the factors which go to the making of crimes of violence. *When crime increases, a community should not turn revengefully against the criminals but should ask itself what is wrong with its own social basis.*

2. The death penalty is defended as a deterrent. There is no evidence to justify this argument. I have examined carefully the statistics of States which have abolished the death penalty and compared the figures of murder in the years immediately preceding and succeeding. In actual fact the number of murders has on the whole *decreased* after the abolition of the death penalty; but this may be due to other considerations. One can say emphatically, however, that a survey of all the evidence available provides no support for the argument that the death penalty is a deterrent.

3. The advocates of the death penalty never pay any regard to its effect upon those who have to carry it out. If the supporters of capital punishment had themselves to manipulate the gallows or turn on the switch of the electric chair or fire the shot—or look after the victims prior

to the sentence being carried out—there would be few executions! I shall never forget a personal experience in Liverpool prison, where a Chief Warder who was in charge of a murderer came to me the day before the execution and unburdened his agony of mind. The prisoner had treated the warder as a confidant and friend, baring his soul naked. Yet it was the duty of the warder to officiate at his hanging! None of us has the right to impose these inhuman duties upon others.

When we turn to the case of political executions we shall find that they are always the reflection of war or dictatorships. Spies who are giving away military information to an enemy country are shot. Opponents of the Hitler or Stalin regimes are shot. The British authorities in Palestine execute Arabs and Jews, whose enmity is due to conditions imposed by Imperialist dictatorship. In Spain, the Communist Party, acting according to the pattern of Stalin, apply the methods of brutal dictatorship to opposing political sections, even though they are anti-Fascists and take their full share in the struggle against Franco.

It is doubtful whether these methods will succeed, even taking a temporary view. By his methods Hitler has lost the sympathy of all that is best in all peoples in the world. Stalin has destroyed the early enthusiasm among the workers of all countries for the Russian Revolution and is creating an Opposition in his own country which threatens to overwhelm him. Every execution carried out by the British authorities in Palestine only serves to intensify the antagonism between the Arabs and Jews, and at the same time creates a hatred of British Imperialism which will await its opportunity of expression. The Communists in Spain have destroyed the unity of the anti-Fascist forces in their own country and undermined support from other countries.

We may have to pass through wars and dictatorships before the existing order of society—Capitalism, with its twin evils, Fascism and Imperialism—is destroyed and replaced by the World Co-operation of Socialism. But the ideal must be kept alive of a New World in which domination of nation over nation, class over class, and individual over individual, is ended. In that world there will be no place for capital punishment.

FENNER BROCKWAY

# AVICENNA, THE PHYSICIAN-PHILOSOPHER

[Dr. Zaki Ali is an Egyptian by birth, a medical man by profession, who laboured for the independence of his country, and has made Geneva his home since 1935. He is the author of *The History of Arabian Medicine* (Arabic) and of *Islam in the World* reviewed in the September number of THE ARYAN PATH.]

In August 1932 we published an article on "The Mystical Teaching of Avicenna" by Dr. Margaret Smith and quoted what Madame Blavatsky had to say about him.

H. P. Blavatsky points out : "Modern medicine, while it has gained largely in anatomy, physiology, and pathology, and even in therapeutics, has lost immensely by its narrowness of spirit, its rigid materialism, its sectarian dogmatism." (*Isis Unveiled*, Vol. 1, p. 20.)

Avicenna by combining philosophy, science, and practical medicine comes nearer to some of the concepts of occultism about the art of healing.—EDS.]

The Hippocratic aphorism that the physician who is also philosopher is the most nearly divine, finds its significance in the person of Avicenna; indeed he earned the title of "Prince of Physicians" and was held by his contemporaries to be second only to Aristotle as a philosopher. At once physician, philosopher, astronomer, geologist, poet and statesman, Avicenna was one of the marvels of his age, and it can be safely said that no genius more versatile could be found among his contemporaries. Only last year was the nine-hundredth anniversary of his death and he is still considered one of the most illustrious men the East has ever produced and the most famous physician-philosopher of the Middle Ages.

Avicenna, whose real name was Abu Ali Al-Husain Ibn Abdalla Ibn Sina, was born in the small village of Afshana in the province of Bokhara in 980 A.D. His childhood was remarkable for a rare precocity, as at the age of ten he knew the *Quran* by heart and studied Arabic classics, and at the age of twelve he memo-

rised the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle and disputed in law and in logic. He then gave himself up to the study of mathematics, astronomy, geometry, physics and philosophy. At the age of sixteen he developed a pronounced inclination for medicine, which he studied with deep interest, and when eighteen years old, he was already a famous practitioner. He worked during the day, and solved problems in his dreams. "When I found a difficulty", he said, "I referred to my notes and prayed to the Creator."

His medical fame soon brought him into favour with royal households. He cured the Samanid Sultan of Bokhara, Nuh Ibn Mansour, from a dangerous illness. His chief reward was an access to the Sultan's library, a very valuable one. Avicenna was officially employed at the Court of Bokhara. With the fall of the Samanid dynasty in 1004, he left Bokhara and travelled through many towns in search of a suitable patron. He spent a short time in the service of the ruler of Khwarazm and then wandered in the neighbour-

ing provinces until at length he arrived at Jorjan, where he became connected with Al-Juzjani, who afterwards became his disciple and biographer. He began lecturing on medicine, logic, astronomy and philosophy. But misfortune awaited him, for his protector, Prince Qabous, was soon dethroned and imprisoned. Avicenna, full of bitterness, set out again on his travels and continued to lead a wandering life, like many savants of his time. Ultimately he arrived at Hamadan, where he cured its Emir, Shams-ul-Dawla, and was entrusted with the post of Vizir, and general literary and scientific adviser to this Sultan. But his term of government was not a happy one, for his great superiority as a man made him many enemies. He accordingly renounced public functions and became immersed in writing many of his great works. As he had a strong desire to leave Hamadan, he applied secretly to the Emir of Isphahan. The Emir of Hamadan discovered this step and straightaway imprisoned him; but during his captivity he continued his literary work. After many adventures he succeeded in escaping, disguised as a Sufi, and at last arrived at Isphahan where he obtained favour with Sultan Ala-ud-Dawla. There he received the honour and dignities he so well deserved; and there he spent the last fourteen years of his life in tranquillity. Throughout this period Avicenna combined hard intellectual work with bouts of pleasure. His health was ultimately wrecked by the most strenuous exertion, and when he saw that physic

was of no avail, resigning himself to the inevitable, he sold his goods, distributed the money to the poor, and read the *Quran* through once every three days. He died in his fifty-seventh year, in 1037.

Avicenna was a prolific writer who wrote about a hundred works, some of which ran into twenty volumes. His writings embraced many fields of knowledge. His marvellous description of the origin of mountains (cited by Draper and Withington) entitles him, according to Garrison, to be called the "father of geology". Most of his works are written in Arabic, but he composed in Persian, his mother tongue, a vast manual of scientific philosophy entitled: *Danish-namah-i-Alai*. He also enjoyed reputation as a poet and in his most celebrated Arabic poem he describes the descent of the soul into the body, coming from the superior sphere which is its abode. This poem of true beauty has been translated into English by Edward G. Browne in his *Literary History of Persia*. Avicenna is the author of the famous medical text-book *Al Qanoon fit Tibb* which had a tremendous influence on the evolution of medicine in the Orient and in Europe. This great work of about one million words dealt with all branches of medical science, and was the most celebrated medical classic for some six hundred years. It formed an essential part of the medical curriculum of the Universities of Europe, where it had been translated into Latin, throughout the Middle Ages, and in the Universities of Louvain and Montpellier it was

eliminated from the medical courses only at the end of the seventeenth century. Various parts of it have been translated into modern European languages.

In the following account, I shall confine my attention to Avicenna's philosophical and psychological outlook.

Avicenna composed an encyclopædia of philosophy entitled *Al Shifa* (The Cure), which includes comprehensive treatises on Logic, Physics, Mathematics and Metaphysics. He made a *résumé* of this vast work under the title of *Al Nadjat* (The Recovery), written in very concise language, but clear and logical. He wrote another important book on "Oriental Philosophy" which unfortunately was not handed down to us.\*

Avicenna gave Logic an important place but did not exaggerate its power. He says in his *Isharat* :—

The aim of Logic is to provide mankind with a rule, the observance of which will prevent him from erring in his reasoning. Logic, then, strictly speaking, does not discover truths, but helps man to make the best use of those he already possesses, and prevents him from making a wrong use of them.

"By definition", says Avicenna, "man is enabled to represent objects ; by argument he is able to persuade." According to him, imagination always supports reason.

In the domain of physics, Avicenna recognised the principle of mechanics that what is gained in power is lost in speed. His account of physics, as a whole, bears evidence

to a very acute intellect.

Avicenna carefully systematised psychology and showed himself to be a realist. His psychological accounts form interesting reading. He remarks, for example, in connection with education of the child :—

All our study, all our care, should be directed to forming and moulding the character of the child. Care must be taken that he does not blaze out with anger, nor be overwhelmed with fear, nor cast down by sadness, nor harassed by wakefulness. So we must always notice what he wants, what he is eager for, and this should be provided for him and given to him, but what he dislikes should be taken out of his way. For hence comes a twofold advantage, one to the mind, the other to the body.

The following anecdote shows the psychological ability of Avicenna, who recognised the value of psychotherapy :—

Avicenna was called to attend on the nephew of the Sultan of Jorjan, near the Caspian Sea, who suffered from an illness which defied the skill of all the doctors of the province. After a thorough examination of the patient, Avicenna asked for a person who could recite the names of all the districts and towns of the province ; during the recital he kept his fingers on the pulse of the patient. At the mention of a certain town, Avicenna noticed a change in the pulsation. "Now", he said, "bring me some one acquainted with all the quarters, streets and houses of this town." The same experiment indicated a certain street and then the name of a girl of a certain family living in that street. Avicenna exclaimed : "We have got

\* Avicenna's other philosophical treatises include : *Kitab al Isharat wat'tanbihat* (Book of Theorems and Propositions), *Philosophy Al-Arudi*, *Guide to Wisdom*, *The Fountains of Wisdom*, *A Treatise on the Soul*, *The Human Faculties and Their Perceptions*, and several mystical treatises.

it! This young man is in love with such and such a girl, living in such and such a house, street, quarter and town, and the face of this girl is the remedy which will cure him." The marriage was then celebrated at the hour chosen by Avicenna and brought about the recovery.

Another anecdote proves that Avicenna knew the therapeutic effects of suggestion. A prince of the house of Buwayh suffered from the fixed idea that he was a cow. Nothing could dispel this delusion, and the melancholic prince refused to take food, crying each day, "Kill me, so that a good stew may be prepared from my flesh." The physicians were so helpless, and the condition of the patient grew so critical, that Avicenna was called to take charge of the case. He directed an assistant to shout that the butcher was on his way, and then, Avicenna came with a knife in his hand, asking: "Where is this cow, that I may kill it?" Satisfied at last, the sick prince began to moo. Avicenna ordered him thrown to the ground and bound with ropes; he, then, felt him all over in a manner of a butcher, and announced: "This cow is too lean, and not ready for the slaughter; it must be fattened." The patient, therefore, ate readily, and with the return of strength his mind was entirely cured.

Avicenna divided science into three categories: (1) Superior science or metaphysics, science of things not connected with matter; (2) Inferior science, or the knowledge of things pertaining to matter (physics); (3) The middle sciences, the various branches of which are related to metaphysics as well as physics (*e.g.*, the

mathematical sciences).

In metaphysics Avicenna treats of the primary cause and necessary being. He discusses in a dignified manner the metaphysical theory of causality. According to him, the primary cause being absolute unity, it can only have unity for its immediate result.

The theory of the soul was dealt with by Avicenna with particular attention. He cleverly proves the spirituality of the soul. The soul is created for eternity. The immortality of the soul follows directly from its spirituality. The dependence of the soul on the body is not essential but accidental. The aim of its union with the body is its development in a spiritual and independent microcosm where it comes to form a single essence with the good, the true and the beautiful. During our life in this world we have only an obscure presentiment of this future state. This presentiment produces according to the diversity of dispositions, a more or less intense desire, and it is precisely on this that the degree of our preparation depends. This preparation is only achieved by the development of the highest faculties of the soul. Thus prepared, the soul, having left the body it had used only as an instrument, enjoys eternal bliss as a purely spiritual being. Every soul being eternal and imperishable, will finally attain the ultimate bliss for which it was created. After death, the reasonable soul attains perfection. Only the soul which has been prepared by the practice of virtues enjoys this future happiness. Otherwise, its taste is vitiated and it accordingly suffers.

But if a man has lived a mediocre life, his actions never reaching the height of his intentions, his soul when freed from the body, becomes the centre of a struggle between his pure desires and his bad habits. Only when purified by this grievous struggle does it attain perfect bliss. In other words, the soul which deserves punishment beyond the tomb will be excluded temporarily from this state of bliss.

Avicenna's theory of optimism is similar to that of Leibniz ; evil is not a part of Divine decree *in essentia* ;

its place there is accidental. Like Leibniz, he considers that, however common it may be, evil is not the general rule ; it is only the exception to the good.

The philosophical system of Avicenna shows the influence of Aristotelianism and some fundamental views of Neoplatonism, as well as an endeavour to give a rationalistic account of Muslim theology. In his philosophy, as a whole, Avicenna remains faithful to the religious conceptions of Islam.

ZAKI ALI

## THE PATH

The path is only known to those, alone,  
Who seek the fire and reach the blazing Zone,  
Echo and harbour of the labouring Sun,  
Winter and summer of the Wandering One.

Only the aspect of another Day  
Can hold us spellbound, only through the spray  
Of luminous oceans shall we find the path  
Beyond all limits.

BARNETT D. CONLAN

# THE FUTURE OF RELIGION

## I.—THE INEVITABILITY OF A WORLD-RELIGION

[J. D. Beresford examines the present world situation, which every one recognizes as chaotic, from the point of view of religion. The creeds clash—be they formulated in scientific, political or theological terms. This clash may be pompously described as difference in ideologies; the cause of the difference and the clash is human passion and greed. The distinction between Nazism and Communism is without a difference; so also between the dogmatism of the Roman Catholic and the Spiritistic Churches there is no difference. Practice of ethics will lead to a knowledge of right philosophy, and then only can emerge a real world-religion.—EDS.]

The use of the word "religion" in my title must be understood as an indication that the subject of this article will be mainly confined to the formal creeds and practices associated with that term. All religions, as such, without any exception whatever, represent the codification of certain beliefs, which from whatever source they are derived, must represent spiritual and not material values. All religions, therefore, are concerned with the attempt to translate spiritual values into language, faith into practice. This is quite obviously an impossible task if we are speaking of absolute and not of relative values. If, as I believe, this is a spiritual universe and all the phenomena of space-time are the infinitely various expressions of the One through the many, all such translations become, in their turn, phenomenal. Truth is that absolute standard of reference, outside space-time, sought by the physicists; and all space-time truths are relative to it. All religions contain a proportion of these relative truths. No religion could conceivably contain the whole. If it could, it would cease to be a religion and become that from which

it derives.

This belief, however, does not deny the possibility of a religious evolution in the phenomenal world, although an historical retrospect of the last 2,500 years may fail to furnish any evidence of the process. The history of world-religions, more notably Taoism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islamism, could hardly be adduced either as representative of an increasing revelation, or as exerting a progressive influence on the spiritual development of mankind. Moreover, each of them displays the characteristic claim to be the only true religion, a claim that can be made good only by the conversion of the whole world. And so long as two such claims exist contemporaneously, one of them must be invalid, an opposition that leaves the various races and nationalities of the earth to adopt one or the other according to their different temperaments. (Even climate may have its influence in this connection. Roman Catholicism is predominantly the religion of Southern, some form of Protestantism of Northern, Europe.)

This opposition of opinion necessitates the elevation of dogma

into an absolute rule. He who would be saved must think thus and thus. And with every codification of the original inspiration into a fixed ordinance, religion crystallises into a form that is incapable of further growth. History exhibits this process in the two major religions of Buddhism and Christianity, both of which display a process not of evolution but of decay. They, like various natural forms, are experiments that have failed.

Some explanation is demanded of this disturbing inference that humanity as a whole is not more religiously minded to-day than it was 2,500 years ago—is, indeed, less so, in certain respects, than it has been in various earlier periods of religious history. For if we accept that conclusion without further inquiry, we may lose our faith in the validity of any spiritual inspiration whatever—an effect that has been very noticeable among thinking men and women during the past two generations. The only possible explanation, the one given by Occultism, is that 2,500 years is far too short a period upon which to base any deductions of this kind. The grounds for that assertion need not be examined here. They pervade occultist literature and are an essential feature of all its teaching. But it is worth while to note in passing that most of the absurdities of Western religion arise from the assumption of a time-scale limited to a few thousand years.

These preliminary statements leave us free to disregard the precedents of the brief historical record that reaches back with

decreasing authority and certainty through, at most, ten millennia ; and any prophecy that may be possible as to the future of religion will here be based on an examination of the present condition of thought in the contemporary world. Most of the premises for this survey will be found in the March number of THE ARYAN PATH, under the general heading of “Renascent Mysticism”, but it will be necessary to recapitulate one or two of those references, which I propose to do without further acknowledgement of the various authorities.

The first “sign of the times” is provided by Mr. Aldous Huxley’s recent book *Ends and Means*, which has a very special significance for our present purpose. Mr. Huxley represents a type of mind that is characteristic of many thinkers in the world to-day. The type, as such, is that of a man of very wide reading who has sufficient imagination and power of reason to save him from any form of specialisation, whether in philosophy or science. These gifts give such a man the ability for that detachment which is absolutely essential for those whose aim is the search for truth ; a detachment that has always been clearly evident in Mr. Huxley’s writing. Now, in *Ends and Means*, he has reached a stage at which he finds in this “non-attachment” one of the paths to wisdom. It is a path that corresponds to meditation in the East. Both lead to a realisation of the evanescence and unreality of the phenomenal world regarded objectively, and thence to the recognition of the animating principle responsible for the

objective appearance. This is a stage that will infallibly be reached by any thinker who has the courage and independence of mind to refuse the adoption of any specific formalised belief.

Another exemplar of this type is Mr. Gerald Heard who in his last book, *The Third Morality*, arrives at the same position as that of Mr. Huxley. In the first half of this book, he gives a scientific and historical, as opposed to philosophical, account of the way he has come, tracing the development of world-thought through the stages of anthropomorphism and mechanomorphism to the uneasy conditions, political and religious, of the present day. The difference of training, experience and natural tendency between these two thinkers is very marked, yet we find them arriving at that conclusion which is, I maintain, the only possible one for any thinker who strives to keep his mind as nearly as may be, free from prejudice. This conclusion is that all matter as we know it through the senses is a presentation of something other than matter, a conclusion that is the beginning of wisdom.

The next premise, derivable from the collation of the articles previously referred to, is found in the general consensus of opinion that Christianity as taught, and even occasionally practised, by the Churches is rapidly losing its hold on the respect of the people. This inference does not depend only upon a detailed examination of church attendance and similar statistics, but upon such broad examples as the tendency in Russia and Germany to substitute the wor-

ship of national ideals, personified in the figure of the Dictator, for the worship of Christ. Indeed, throughout the world at the present time we find the signs of an increasing doubt in the truth of revealed religion, with a corresponding laxity of moral fibre. Mr. Heard attributes this to the results of the materialistic doctrine arising from the scientific attempt to explain all world-phenomena in terms of mechanism. He sees this belief as rapidly declining among the better informed minds, scientific and philosophical; but there is a very considerable time lag below that level, and the mass of the people are only now passing through a phase of thought that was influencing the more able minds a generation or more ago.

The more obvious consequence of this unhappy materialism is the growing callousness with regard to the taking of human life. We see this in miniature in the increase of crimes of violence, on the grand scale in the feverish rearmament race among all the principal European powers. The minority reaction against the threat of war, with all its modern enormities and brutal indifference to the sufferings of non-combatants, represents but a small fraction of the population. Such a body as the Peace Pledge Union in England would be unable to make its voice heard and would lose many adherents, if some such cause as the "national honour" could be made the excuse for using the hideous material we are so rapidly accumulating. And even if by some happy chance a European war is averted or con-

fined within comparatively narrow limits, we shall have to face the inevitable consequences of spending enormous sums to produce entirely useless material, in a trade depression compared with which the last one will be almost negligible.

The world as a whole is in fact passing through a stage of unbelief and moral decline, which corresponds in the individual to that "dark night of the soul" spoken of by Blake. This is no loose analogy. There is a direct correspondence in spiritual as well as in physical evolution between the individual and the mass of mankind. And we must reconcile ourselves to the knowledge that the night which began to creep over the world at the beginning of this century has not yet reached its darkest hour. It is an aspect of world Karma, the Nemesis of a civilisation arising from the worship of wealth and temporal power. And if there be any truth in occult teaching and the ancient Wisdom-Religion—and I, personally, believe that these sources come as near to a revelation of the absolute as is possible in this space-time universe—the evils of our civilisation carry with

them the inherent necessity for its damnation. No gradual conversion is possible by adoption of such expedients as socialism or communism. The principle of these political creeds is admirable enough, but they cannot provide the drastic purge necessary for the world soul. We find, for instance, that the communist theory of material-minded Russia is responsible for the same wholesale crimes of murder and injustice as the Fascist theory of Germany and Italy. And the crimes of a civilisation not less than the crimes of an individual can be expiated only by suffering.

What form that suffering will take is not a question that need be debated here. The single essential is that our present civilisation is rotten at the core and will inevitably collapse. And the single means to its recovery will be found in the understanding and practice of the world-religion that will first enclose and then eliminate the foolish oppositions exhibited by the innumerable sects laying claim to the knowledge of the unknowable absolute.

It is of the coming of this enclosing world-religion that I shall write in my second article.

J. D. BERESFORD

# ALICE LEIGHTON CLEATHER

## A FRIEND OF ORIENTAL CULTURE

[Basil Crump, the former Editor of the *Law Times*, was a lifelong friend and co-worker of Mrs. Cleather's—EDS.]

Born and brought up in a literary atmosphere, Alice Leighton Cleather studied both Eastern and Western philosophy and religion from an early age, and so, when Madame H. P. Blavatsky came to England in 1887, she at once sought her advice and instruction. Finding all her questions answered and her problems solved, she became one of Madame Blavatsky's pupils until her death in 1891, and so found herself involved in the final effort then about to be made to save the Theosophical Society towards the close of the second septenary term of its existence. With that aspect of her work, which ended in 1899, however, I am not here concerned. I wish rather, as her co-worker since 1892, to deal with her literary, artistic and cultural work, as well as with her deep interest in Buddhism, both philosophically and in its practical application to the ever increasing gravity of world problems.

Mr. Huntly Carter's article in *THE ARYAN PATH* (April, 1938) on the Russian theatre of to-day and its work for peace and brotherhood, deeply interested me, for one of the earliest of our attempts to apply what we had learnt from H. P. Blavatsky's teachings took the form of expounding the symbology of Richard Wagner's music-dramas. It began with lecture-recitals to Theosophical lodges and a series of articles in Mr. Judge's

magazine, *The Path*. Wagner's *Prose Works* were then being translated by Dr. Ashton Ellis, who had helped Madame Blavatsky medically in Ostend and London when she was writing *The Secret Doctrine*, and Mrs. Cleather reviewed them in *The Queen*, one of the three papers on which I was doing editorial work. Thus we became acquainted with the Oriental philosophical sources of Wagner's symbology and were enabled to quote his own interpretations and explanations, so that no one could say that they were our own ideas or specifically Theosophical. The importance of these writings, from our point of view, lay in the fact that they revealed Wagner as a great thinker, a philosopher and a mystic, deeply versed in the sacred books of the East, all of which we saw in his library at Bayreuth.

At that time most people regarded Wagner as a great composer who had brought about drastic reforms in operatic music. The majority did not even know that he was an equally great poet who used his musical and dramatic faculties to drive home the meaning of the symbolic poem. In the wonderful combination of arts he embodied one could scarcely fail to recognize an *avatar* in the realm of creative art appearing at a definite cyclic period when a revival of the Æschylean drama in modern Western form, following the culmination

in Beethoven of "absolute" Western music, was coincident with the revolution in religious and philosophical thought effected by the marvellous writings of H. P. Blavatsky. She has told us that Æschylus was an Initiate of the Greek Mysteries who gave out as much as he was permitted in his great symbolic tragedies. It is evident to the observant student that Wagner's work had a similar inspiration and ethical basis, as will be seen in the following typical passage from his essay, "Art and Politics" (1867 : *Prose Works*, Vol. IV) :—

In the Theatre there lies the spiritual seed and kernel of all national-poetic and national-ethical culture ; no other art-branch can ever truly flourish, or ever aid in cultivating the Folk, until the Theatre's all-powerful assistance has been completely recognized and guaranteed. . . . If it be possible that for modern Life, reshaped through Art's renaissance, there shall arise a Theatre in equal answer to the inmost motive of its culture as the Grecian Theatre answered to the Greek Religion, then plastic art, and every other art, will at last have reached once more the quickening fountain whence it fed among the Greeks ; if this be not possible, then reborn art itself has had its day.

Wagner's *Ring* Tetralogy is his most definitely Æschylean work with its symbolic gods and heroes and the central theme of the "Ancestral Curse", or Karma-Nemesis, as H. P. Blavatsky calls it (see *The Secret Doctrine*, II, 409 : "The 'Curse' from a Philosophical Point of View" : here *Prometheus Bound* is fully discussed and explained according to the Esoteric Philosophy). We find the same elements in the Hindu drama. As Mr. Huntly

Carter tells us (*THE ARYAN PATH*, April 1936) it "manifests itself in initiation and unfolding" while in the Soviet plays the unfolding is associated with "revelation, initiation and conversion". He does not, however, deal with the musical aspect in either case. Russia, although more than half Oriental, shares with the Western races their musical and operatic forms, but in the Hindu drama, music (including what Wagner calls Tone-Speech) is an essential element, as it is with him. Like drama and dance, it is religious in origin, going back to the *Vedas* and probably earlier, like the Esoteric Philosophy. It is an exact science which takes some twenty years to learn, and, like Sanskrit, once mastered there is no room for error, while other systems become easy. To discuss this and Wagner's Tone-Speech and his web of musical *motifs* would need more space than this article permits ; suffice it to say that, although he based his dramatic tone-poem on the Greek model, using Western legends, he went to India for his philosophical principles. The spirit of Compassion (*Mitleid*) in Buddhism (the *Mahayana* ideal of the *Bodhisattva*) always fascinated him, so that quite early in his career he sketched a drama called *The Victors* with the Buddha as the leading figure. It took final shape as his last work, *Parsifal*, the pure simple youth who, like Prince Siddhartha, first feels compassion for the death of a swan and thereby eventually becomes spiritual head of the Grail Brotherhood. As Wagner traced this mystic fraternity to the Himalayas with Prester John as the Grand

Master, he would seem to have heard of the Brotherhood with whom H. P. Blavatsky studied for ten years in the middle of last century (see our book on *Parsifal, Lohengrin and the Legend of the Holy Grail*: Methuen, London). Our last concert-lectures on this wonderful mystery-drama, illustrated with music and coloured lantern slides, were given in Florence and Paris in 1912-13. Since then the sound-film and natural-colour photography have greatly expanded the possibilities of work on these lines, while the number of people who can be reached all over the world is immeasurably greater.

In this connection Indian readers will be interested to hear of an "Opera-Oratorio" entitled *Prince Siddartha*, performed last year in London, which made a deep impression on those who heard it. It is the work of Count Axel Wachtmeister, a pianist and composer of distinction and the son of H. P. Blavatsky's most intimate and devoted companion in her last years. Here is an instance of a Buddhist work which India is unlikely to hear, for it only ran a week in London. If it were adequately filmed it could be heard all over the East where even such a mixed Hollywood production as *Lost Horizon* drew crowded houses for weeks, although the supposed Tibetan monastery was really a Christian foundation.

When Mrs. Cleather first lived in India, 1918-25, although she, her son and I were initiated into the Gelugpa Order at Buddha Gaya by Geshé Rimpoché; the work she then did was mainly to clear up misconceptions concerning H. P. Blavatsky's

teaching due to "the pseudo-theosophy of unreliable psychics and their dupes who have corrupted the pure teachings" (THE ARYAN PATH, April, 1938, p. 163), whose doings she exposed in a pamphlet entitled *A Great Betrayal*. This was followed by *H. P. Blavatsky: Her Life and Work for Humanity* and *H. P. Blavatsky as I Knew Her* (Thacker Spink, Calcutta). In the former work she explained that the Benares Constitution of "The Theosophical Society or Universal Brotherhood" in 1879 was really the throwing open of initiation to all who were qualified, which had been insisted upon by the Buddha. There were three sections: the first being composed of "Initiates in Esoteric Science", the second of those who "have become able to regard all men as equally their brothers", while the third was the "Section of Probationers". "This purely Esoteric basis for the *whole Society*", writes Mrs. Cleather, "was interfered with by Colonel Olcott's exoteric objections and activities. When H. P. B. finally had to leave India in 1885 (again owing to this attitude of his in failing to support her in refuting the Madras Missionary attack) she revived it as the 'Esoteric Section' at London in 1888." The inner history of this final effort with the E. S. and the Inner Group, of which she was the last active member, is related in Mrs. Cleather's second book.

At the end of 1925 we went to Peking, partly to come into direct contact with the Head of our Order, the Tashi Lama, who was then a refugee there. "Teach and preach Buddhism and my blessing and pro-

tection will be with you in this and future lives", were his words on our arrival, and when we prepared an unaltered reprint of *The Voice of the Silence* (Tibetan Golden Precepts : Translated by H. P. B.) with our own notes confirming the accuracy of H. P. B.'s sources, he wrote a special *sutra* for it. A gentle and lovable nature, working always for peace through Buddhism, he suffered severely during thirteen years of exile from the political and other harmful influences which he could not avoid, and at last in November of last year laid down his earthly burden, worn out and disillusioned, at the very frontier of Tibet. The Japanese invasion of China, a terrible and unprecedented act of aggression as from one Buddhist people to another, had by then entered on a much more extended phase involving all the horrors of aerial bombing of non-combatants, as in Abyssinia and Spain. Mrs. Cleather, who did not long survive him, had begun to fear for the future of humanity in a world increasingly dominated by materialism, ruthless violence and what M. André Maurois calls "the tragic decline of the humane ideal". She often recalled H. P. Blavatsky's prophecy that if the noble ethics of the Esoteric Philosophy (to use her favourite term) were not accepted and put into practice, then the storm would burst and modern civilization would go

down in a sea of blood such as history has never yet recorded. It seemed to many that the last great war was a fulfilment of this prediction, but it was not a complete *débacle* and the awful aerial warfare (a re-birth of the old Atlantean *Viwân* mentioned in the *Ashtar Vidya* and other works).

The Chinese were so pleased with Mrs. Cleather's pamphlets, "Why I Believe in Buddhism" and "Some Thoughts on Buddhism" that they were translated and widely circulated. The same thing is happening in India since her death. On our return in March last year, she was much heartened by the spirit shown at the Parliament of Religions in Calcutta, and especially the insistence by most of the speakers on the two fundamental Buddhist teachings: the Brotherhood of Man, and his innate Divinity (See "Man and Deity in Original Buddhism", THE ARYAN PATH, July 1938). She was also encouraged by the successful application by Gandhiji of the Buddhist principle of Non-Violence (*Ahimsa*) ably dealt with by Mr. Hugh I'A. Fausset in THE ARYAN PATH, April 1936, as the only effective antidote to the Fascist doctrine of violence. As Gandhiji said recently in reply to those who characterised the Indian Congress as Fascism: "They forget that Fascism is the naked sword. . . . The Congress is the very antithesis. Its sanctions are all moral."

BASIL CRUMP

# ON THE PHILOSOPHER AND HIS WORK

[Dr. P. T. Raju, Sastri, of Andhra University is the author of *Thought and Reality : Hegelianism and Advaita*.—EDS.]

From the beginnings of philosophical speculation there has always been questioning whether the preachings of the philosopher are practicable. One may ask whether it is necessary for philosophy to be practical, whether it is to remain a mere handmaid to practice. Philosophy, it may be said, is the result of curiosity or wonder. It is love of knowledge for the sake of knowledge without consideration of its practical results. It is enquiry into truth, whatever that be, and whatever the consequences of that discovery.

But certainly there is truth in the contention that philosophical enquiry should not be made secondary to practice. Many great philosophers—James, Dewey, Schiller, Vaihinger, etc.,—have assigned primacy to practice. Even Kant emphasized the primacy of practical reason. The former treat thought as an instrument for the process of life, as only a means to its furtherance. But unless we have the conception of a perfect life, an ideal to be sought after, we cannot make proper use of thought. And the ideal life is a question for theory and speculation. We feel reluctant to treat as perfect the life of an animal that succeeds in adaptation to its environment and in controlling it and using it for its physical growth. For with the appearance of human life, new values aside from self-maintenance lay hold on it. The question of the ideal life involves such other questions as : What is true happiness ? What is real

perfection ? Thought ceases to be considered in its mere biological significance. It may be said that thought can still be treated as an instrument for the realisation of the new values. Even then, however, the so-called practical considerations are no longer merely biological.

Besides, there is real need for disinterested enquiry into philosophical problems apart from practical considerations. For the ideal life is a question for speculative philosophy, in the answer to which much divergence of opinion is possible. And though naturally we start from what is immediately given us, it cannot be over-emphasized that our attempt to understand it should be unbiassed and uninfluenced by immediate practical considerations. The final implications of our finite experience are not directly known ; and in the attempt to find them out we should be thorough.

But in speculation there lurks a danger, the presence and the recognition of which have offered support to the philosophers of practice. The tendency of thought is to be consistent. Wherever a link is missing in the chain of reasons and consequents, thought postulates its existence. The ideal existence is not in our ordinary experience ; it is for us an ideal construct, the concept of a more than what we are. Not to be fictitious, however, it has to be based on our common experience, by bringing out the implications of which, the idea of

the ideal life is obtained. The ideal existence is not merely a dream of the heart, but the true existence. Hence thought has to discover the implications or presuppositions of our finite experience. But to bring those out is to frame hypotheses. These hypotheses in philosophy cover the widest field and therefore the most general and universal. And so we often postulate more than is necessary to explain the facts, e.g., the concept of causality, which has undergone many changes in meaning from animistic and anthropomorphic interpretations to its interpretation as correlation etc., as explained by Karl Pearson and others.

Besides, in philosophy the question of fact cannot be detached from the question of norm. In Plato the truth is the World of Ideas, identical with the world of ideals. The true horse, for example, is the ideal horse. That is, we understand what a thing is in terms of what it ought to be. Hence Hegel was able to say that a blind man, for instance, was not a true man, because he did not answer to the concept of what a man ought to be. Thus with the question of true existence that of ideal existence gets inextricably mixed. In formulating this ideal which is to be the truth, we may rise so high above the fact that the hypothesis may lose all touch with it. Hence we have to guard against philosophy being top-heavy. Sometimes, to connect top-heavy speculations with actuality, fictions are introduced as connecting links. Each system of philosophy tries to be consistent, sometimes by denying certain facts, at other times by inventing those which none can

experience. In the former case, we feel the system to be inadequate; in the latter we wonder whether its preachings can help life. So far as its theoretical aspect is concerned, from the standpoint of mere consistency, it may be difficult to question the truth of any philosophy. For a philosophy may be artificially consistent. Every philosophy is consistent, provided we admit all its assumptions and its postulates. Yet there is no standpoint or assumption that cannot be called in question, and also none that cannot be defended by introducing fictions. Hence from the side of pure theory it will be difficult to treat any as invalid.

Such being the case, the only question is: How far can the teachings and the practical implications of that philosophy help in our progress and in the perfecting of our lives? Sidgwick says:—

Philosophy must deal with the principles and methods of rationally determining "what ought to be" as distinct from the principles and methods of ascertaining "what is, has been and will be".

Muirhead appreciatively quotes from Russell's *Scientific Outlook*:—

Knowledge if it is wide and intimate brings with it a perspective in which values are seen more clearly. Even more important than knowledge is the life of the emotions. A world without delight and without affections is a world destitute of value. These things the scientific manipulator must remember. All that is needed is that men should not be so intoxicated by new power as to forget the truths that are familiar to every previous generation. Not all wisdom is new, nor is all folly out of date.

Philosophy as pure theory untouched by considerations of practice is possible, it is claimed, if we confine

it to mere logical analysis. This is what Russell in some of his writings wants philosophy to be, and the modern school of Logical Positivism following Russell claims to attempt nothing else than logical analysis. This certainly helps the clarification of concepts. Yet it has its own pre-suppositions, which cannot be left unexamined in the light of broader considerations. There are spheres of experience which it cannot touch, unless it employs different methods for different spheres, and then the question of the significance of logical analysis in general will arise in a new form. Or again—and this is a general defect of all analysis—it may take for separate what are merely distinct entities. When all these considerations are taken into account, the query that develops out of logical analysis will be little different from that of speculative philosophy.

If thus the consideration of the effect of theory upon practical life cannot be avoided, the question will have to be asked : what should be the nature of the philosopher whose preachings we have to accept? It is not enough that he be highly intelligent. There are intellectual giants whose mental development on important lines is unusually dwarfed. One may be great in mathematics, another in physics, and a third in chemistry. But their pronouncements upon the nature of reality and the relation of man to the cosmos may be of little value. It may be beyond their powers to appreciate the real value of a number of human experiences. The philosophical theory they formulate, because it has to go beyond what they

can experience and appreciate, will be inadequate to help and to guide the activity of life in its different fields. Hence one important requisite, besides intelligence, is that the philosopher's mind should be fully developed. His views should be those of a complete personality. The ideal philosopher should be one who not merely shows some sparks of intelligence and flashes of insight here and there, but who, by means of his fully developed personality can fathom the depths of reality and bring the truth to light. It has been said that the philosopher is the spectator of all time and all existence. This fact is generally interpreted as due to the philosopher's acquaintance with universals or Platonic Ideas which are above time and space and, so are applicable to all time and to every place. If the doctrine of the eternal reality of the universals is accepted, we should interpret the statement as meaning that the philosopher could not know, much less appreciate the significance of, the universals present in the various realms of experience, if his own experience were not rich enough. Even when that doctrine is not accepted the statement remains true of the philosopher whose preach-personality is fully developed, can he appreciate all possible forms of experience.

Even then the question will be raised, whether the philosopher's practice is consistent with his own theory. If his daily life is divorced from what he teaches, we are justified in doubting whether the philosopher is himself convinced of the truth of his theory. We often hear the advice to do what a great man says and not

to follow what he does. But to the question why theory has not influenced practice in the life of the philosopher himself, we cannot find a satisfactory answer. The charge that that philosopher is a hypocrite can hardly be met. Especially in India, no philosopher's life is left without being pried into. This may be due to envy and malice, but it can also be due to the desire to know whether his theory is true to life.

It seems that in India the problem of the relation between life and philosophy has assumed peculiar importance. The reverence for ancient philosophy, in spite of some utterances against metaphysics in general, still obtains. But the conditions of life in which alone that philosophy could have a direct bearing on life are no longer found. The philosopher is expected to advocate and to preach ancient philosophy. But he does not find the conditions of life favourable to putting into practice the theory as handed down. If he interprets the ancient philosophy so as to bring it into relation with life by caring more for the spirit than for the letter, he is said to misinterpret. On the other hand, if he advocates the ancient philosophy as handed down, he cannot avoid a split between practice and theory.

The philosopher who is to guide the thought of our country therefore should be one who leaves the mind open to all the currents and cross-currents in the various fields of life, is moved by them, and yet rises above them in order to co-ordinate

and to pass judgment on them. The scholar of ancient texts who is nothing more than a mere recluse unmoved by the burning topics of the day will not be of so much use as he was in the olden days. Herbert Spencer could produce his Synthetic Philosophy by living a retired life, but there is no evidence that he was unmoved by the important events and thought of his time or that he was a mere scholar of ancient texts. Apart from the Vedantic tradition in which we have been brought up and according to which the problems of thought and of life are interwoven, the peaceful and settled conditions in which we could devote our time to long trains of thought about abstractions are not now found. *The ideal of our national life has not even been clearly formulated.* Even when it has been it is still a question whether that ideal will not change; so that with the process of life in both the individual and the nation there will be a constant demand for theory to systematise and to guide life. In spite of all criticism, we have to admit that the greatness of the idealistic tradition in European philosophy lies especially in its concern for life and its values. We can ill afford now, in the unsettled state of national and individual life, to theorise over abstractions. If his philosophy is not to be barren and useless, the philosopher should bring it into as close contact as possible with the rich variety of life's experience, for which not only his intellectual powers but also his personality should be fully developed,

P. T. RAJU

# PHARMACY AND FIRE THERAPY

## IN INDIA AND ASSYRIA 4000 YEARS AGO

[Dr. H. G. Cimino is a linguist familiar with sixteen languages of the Eastern Hemisphere including Arabic, Assyrian and Sanskrit. By profession he is a doctor and has worked as a medical officer in East Africa, Uganda and the Congo. —EDS.]

In these days when the different therapeutic methods of the ancients are once more practised, albeit under new names, it may be not uninteresting to look into the origin of two agents: alcohol and fire.

### ALCOHOL

The origin of the old Arabic form of this word is too well-known for the author to waste time or space in repetition, nor is it the aim here to discuss the OH group, from the horrible  $\text{CH}_3\text{OH}$  to  $\text{C}_{60}\text{H}_{119}\text{OH}$ , the hypothetical alcohol of Hexaconthane at the other end of the aliphatic row. More interesting is the "alcohol" of the Hindus and Assyrians of 4000 years ago.

Let us begin with the former; it was simply *mead*, the well-known mead of our Saxon forbears; originally in the jungles of India it was fermented liquor of honey, in Sanskrit: *madhu* and *madu*. The bee was simply the bearer of honey, the *madhulith*, the "mead-bearer", also the producer of the nectar, the "madhukāra"; lay the stress at the very end of this word, and you have the true nature of the liquor, for "madhukarā" means "a stream of intoxicants".

And the root? the adjective? It was *Mada*, our "mad" pure and simple: true, in the Near East the

word denotes more: exaltation, religious fanaticism such as the epithet "*Madh Mullah*". . . . the word *madh* being fondly classified as Arabic by our pundits of Oxford, and of course, by our employes in Somaliland.

In India the particular type of frenzy was more erotic: thus *Madana* meant "sex-appeal", *Madhura* sweet, *Madhyapa* was the sippler, and *Madhumada* was the intoxication with wine.

In Assyria the word was: *Sikhari* or *Zigari* (compare our "sugar"); and if the full truth must be told, those gentlemen were aye prone to the remedy.

The Assyrian tablets of materia medica introduce every prescription with the delightfully vague expression: "*inn libbi maris*" ("if you are ill"), reminiscent of: "if your liver is out of order"—and after the usual recommendation to invoke this or that deity, paying heed to the position of the moon and stars, there is always the consoling postscriptum: "drink *sikhari*". Let us examine word for word these Assyrian prescriptions. The introduction: "*inn libbi maris*" is not difficult to analyse; for *inn* (if) is the Scot "*ghin*" ("*ghin* a body") (or: "come on, *ghin ye da'ur!*"); it is the Arabic *in*, the German *wenn*, the

English *when*. *Lip* or *libbi* is our "liver" and "to live", *via* the old Saxon, *libh*. So say our etymologists when quoting this root, for they are quite content with a sound seven hundred years old, when the older form of 4000 years ago is "unknown" to them. *Maris* is the old *mori* (to die) of Rome, in Sanskrit *mṛ*: compare also German *morsch* (rotten, putrid). *Sikar* (our "sugar"?) spelt with the Southern G in Babylon, with K in Nineveh, is translated by our Oriental scholars in various ways, mostly as "liquor", possibly from the sugar-cane.

And now, leaving those gentlemen-in-waiting of Sardanapal to "sleep it off"...stretched in sleep (*gedriht swefan*) as it says in Beowulf, let us return to India.

There intoxication was not such a national curse as in North Assyria, largely owing to climatic conditions. The mountains of Armenia forming a mighty semi-circle to the north of Nineveh were covered with snow in winter, and the icy blast brought the temperature down to freezing point, then as nowadays, in the plains on many a night; hence the need of a stimulant.

In India the Brahmins had inculcated temperance; their prescription was:—

*Sarveshu peyeshu jalam pradhānam*  
Of all drinks water is the best.

Let us examine these curious old Aryan sounds, and see how far our English slang is from the original Sanskrit.

*Sarveshu* is the ablative (or locative) plural of *sarva* our "several"; the R and the V have changed places.

*Peyeshu* from *pey*, the drink, just as the older form *bey* (the Turkish "horde") is *beg*....just as the other form of *yard* is *garden*, so is the older form of this Sanskrit "*pey*" simply *peg* (G for Y).

Quoth the sahib in his club after the polo match to his opponent:—"Have a peg?" He little dreams that probably on that very spot where he stands there was four thousand years ago a Rajah's Palace...or a jungle and in both cases the word *peg* or *pey* was heard every day—absolutely as in our London.

#### FIRE THERAPY

"Fire is the antidote against fire":  
*Vahyureva vahyurbheshajam*;  
literally: Yea even so! Fire is the remedy against fire.

In the above quotation: "Fire is the remedy against fire" we find the earliest therapy for burns. The method was adopted long before there was a hint at olive oil or other sedatives and the Brahmins of forty centuries ago tried the system so thoroughly that at least they seemed insensible to heat, as they repeatedly proved to their admiring neophytes at their fire tests.

Seated between two piles of blazing wood, facing each other two rival priests would solemnly, silently remain squatting on the ground, with the lambent flames scorching their knees and elbows, apparently insensible to the agony. Slowly the skins burned red, until the burn of the first degree passed into the blots of the next stage, sometimes even to the third degree: incineration.

Generally, however, before this

was reached, one of the two rivals would collapse ; this was due not so much to the surface burns, as to the inhalation of smoke : asphyxiation.

In the course of centuries this resistance to fire-heat was brought to a fine art, and the festivals where the devotee passed barefoot over the glowing embers ceased to be a display of the miraculous.

The secret of this insensibility ?

It was a very thorough control of, or mastery over the sympathetic nervous system, a very complete self-hypnosis, an auto-suggestion induced by the reiteration that there is no pain, that there shall be no feeling of heat, that "Fire is the antidote 'gainst heat" with the whole mind concentrated on this appeal.

"*Vahyureva vahyurbheshajam*"

Oblivious of the surroundings, of the crowd of onlookers, of the heavens above, and the glowing earth underfoot : the appeal became a spell, and the spell worked.

Let us study this formula :—

*Vahyu*, even without the final R— which is merely an enclitic letter connecting two words—is the *Vire* of Somerset not unlike the sound *Vahye* of our Sanskrit text.

*Eva* is our *even so* !

*Bheshajam* is derived from the Sanskrit *bhash* and the old Arabic *Bashara* meaning, in both languages : to announce, to talk ; *in both*

*languages*, for in the dawn of history, there was little difference between the dialects of India and those of Arabia : or to quote the Sumerian book of Genesis : "and the whole earth was of one language and of one speech."

In Sanskrit the third development of *bhash* was *bhishaja*, *i.e.*, the magician, the spell-binder, the medicine-man. Four thousand years have passed since then ; the medicine men are no more ; we have now medical men, who treat their patients not with magic spells, but with very concrete pills.

Yet this *bheshaja* in its primitive form *bhash* (to talk) is quoted every day by the man in the street ; it is our epithet : *bosh* (precisely as in India : "all *Talk* !"), typical of our disbelief in formulas...the "bosh !" of our slang, our richest fund of archaisms.

In Germany the *bheshaja* has retained some of its pristine value ; it is *beschützen* (to protect) and the *Schutzmittel* is the preventive measure.

Then, are we completely materialistic in all our systems of therapeutics ?

Not so ! in the last fifty years psychotherapy has won more and more adherents, even outside the charmed circles of fashionable professional men in their treatment of neurotic cases.

H. G. CIMINO

## A DIALOGUE ON PHYSICALISM

[Joshua C. Gregory was connected with the University of Leeds till his retirement in 1936. He is the author of *The Nature of Laughter, A Short History of Atomism from Democritus to Bohr*, and *Combustion from Heracleitos to Lavoisier*.—ED.]

*Edith.* Mums! Is Daddy a Physicalist?

*Mrs. Peters.* No, my dear, he is an Odd Fellow.

*E.* Physicalism has nothing to do with money.

*P.* Then your father certainly does not belong to it. My dear, remember that there are some very queer religions nowadays!

*E.* It has nothing to do with religion either.

*P.* Well, most ideas to-day are queer—so be careful! What is this Physicalism? It is not a Friendly Society; it isn't a religion; your father will be displeased if it is a kind of Communism or of Fascism.

*E.* It is not political; it emanates from the Viennese School.

*P.* A school!

*E.* It's not a boarding-school; it's a group of thinking people.

*P.* I see! A set of men and women have agreed to disagree about something. Your Ted is at Cambridge—when he is working, or supposed to be working.

*E.* Ted works very hard indeed! He is very interested in philosophy.

*P.* So Physicalism is the latest *philosophy*! You must talk to your Uncle George. He used to tell me about the Absolute, but I was always vague about it.

*E.* Physicalism will cure vagueness.

Ted has explained to me how the Physicalists move with the times.

*P.* You must be very careful to-day about moving with the times. George often says that when the times move queerly, the people who move with them become queer too, and he is a very intelligent man. So is your father, though he is an Odd Fellow.

*E.* Poor Uncle George is too busy with the Absolute; Ted says that absolutist philosophers are misty and musty.

*P.* My dear! Are Physicalists not respectful to their uncles!

*E.* Now Mums! Wouldn't it do Uncle good to be stirred up by Physicalists?

*P.* It might do George good to have a real mental upset. My dear, I distinctly feel inclined to try Physicalism on him. Can you prime me?

*E.* I do not understand the exact relation between Physicalism and Logical Positivism or Logical Empiricism, but I do know that for all three wisdom begins with the Principle of Verifiability.

*P.* If that is enough to upset George, it is enough for the moment. Now, Edith, expound!

*E.* If I say to you, "There is a tiger in the garden", what do I mean?

- P. There is a catch somewhere, I suppose.
- E. This is a serious philosophical discussion, though knowing how to catch the tiger would be part of the understanding.
- P. I can understand "There is a tiger in the garden", without trying to catch such a dangerous animal.
- E. Yes! But what is *meant*? You would know, would you not, that if there were a tiger in the garden it could be caught?
- P. If a tiger did stray into our garden I would not try to catch it.
- E. According to the Principle of Verifiability you understand "There is a tiger in the garden" because you know how to verify the statement. If you caught the tiger, that would be verification. If you went into the garden and saw it, that would be verification also.
- P. I would prefer a view from the window; but, Edith, surely I can understand "there is a tiger in the garden" without looking through the window or trying to catch the tiger!
- E. You understand the statement if you know how to verify it. The sentence *means* that you could catch the tiger, or be eaten by it, or see it. If the meaning is known the statement is understood.
- P. Surely, Edith, since there is no tiger in the garden I cannot see it, therefore I cannot verify your statement and cannot understand it—according to P. V.
- E. To verify means to decide whether the tiger is, or is not, in the garden. You understand "There is a tiger in the garden" because you know how your eyes could verify it.
- P. I am to tell George that if he knows the method of verification he understands the statement. Will that upset him very much?
- E. It will when he understands that an unverifiable statement has no meaning.
- P. George may dislike P. V. but do you expect his whole philosophy to totter?
- E. P. V. bombs it to bits. If there were no method of verifying "There is a tiger in the garden" the statement would have no meaning: it would be nonsense.
- P. Poor old George!
- E. You understand.
- P. You cannot see the Absolute through the window. You cannot put it in a cage. It cannot be seen or heard or tasted or smelled or handled.
- E. Exactly! "The Absolute exists" cannot be verified: the statement is nonsense.
- P. Poor George is in a mess! I don't want to ruin his life. Why, Edith, your poor uncle has spent years in talking and thinking nonsense! This is terrible! Things are so much simpler for us culinary women. I hear a crash and say "Cook has smashed a pot": my statement has meaning because it is so easily verified.
- E. The broken bits would verify it, and it would have meaning.
- P. If I did look for the bits, I fancy they would be like your tiger.

- E.* I don't understand.
- P.* Cook is nippy—the bits would soon be in the bin. Also if cook accused the cat, her meaning would be as good as mine.
- E.* Her truthfulness would not be, but *P. V.* refers to *meaning*.
- P.* It seems strange that a pot in pieces should be the meaning of either "Cook smashed the pot" or "The cat broke the pot". Besides, a tiger *might* have upset it.
- E.* The complete meaning of "cook has smashed a pot" would be that if you had been in the kitchen at the time you would have seen the pot dropped.
- P.* If I say "Queen Anne is dead", does that *mean* that I would have seen her die if I had been watching? I suspect that George is not in such a mess as I thought.
- E.* No sisterly sympathies can save Uncle George's philosophy from the bomb. He can mount to the highest heaven or drop into the deepest hell.
- P.* My dear Edith!
- E.* Whatever happened he could not verify the Absolute. Metaphysical statements can be verified neither by sense-perception nor by introspection: they are all as nonsensical as chatter about the Absolute.
- P.* Do these metaphysicians know that they have been bombed by *P. V.*? George has been specially lively of late. Such devastation ought to spread consternation. Even the editor of *The Daily Mail* seems to have heard nothing of it. Philosophy is not news, but its downfall surely would be! Your father once murmured, "George is a topping dialectician." Your father is sometimes slangy. If I try to upset George, he may upset me. Will he really crumple up under *P. V.*?
- E.* Some philosophers are still very troublesome about *P. V.* Ted and I are a bit puzzled to understand how *P. V.* can itself be verified. *P. V.* *must* have a meaning.
- P.* It will be awkward for you and Ted if it hasn't. It will also be awkward for me: George is quite capable of discovering that *P. V.* cannot be verified if it cannot.
- E.* Old-fashioned philosophers are always troublesome about new truths. Some philosophers, I admit, are sympathetic. One of them said that nonsense in the *P. V.* sense, unverifiable statements, that is, is nonsense in a technical sense only.
- P.* Do you mean that real nonsense need not be *P. V.* nonsense, and *vice versa*?
- E.* I suppose it would be absurd to say, "Tigers wear Uncle George's old silk hats at lectures on Physicalism." It would not, I presume, be *P. V.* nonsense: the statement could be shown to be untrue.
- P.* If, contrariwise, *P. V.* nonsense need not be real nonsense, it seems to be a let-off for the metaphysicians. I doubt whether we can bomb George's Absolute with *P. V.* I need not be sorry for him; I may

be sorry for myself if I get into the mess.

*E.* Ted does not see how Uncle George can possibly defend the Absolute against P. V.

*P.* Uncle George may see what he does not. Your father said, "The members of the Friendly Society are Odd Fellows, but the metaphysicians are cute fellows." This P. V. attack on Uncle George will need skilled handling. You cannot verify everything as easily as the tiger in the garden. The verifying, of course, must be by sight or hearing or handling or smell or taste.

*E.* I do not understand the Physicalists completely, but all verification must be in physical terms.

*P.* If I say, "I see a rose" or "I feel sure that George will not believe in P. V." or "I feel happy", do you know what I mean?

*E.* One writer says that a proposition may only be verifiable in a weak sense. It is verifiable in the strong sense if experience can conclusively decide whether it is true or false, but only then.

*P.* I am in the jaws of a tiger; I call out, "A tiger eats me." My "proposition", as your literary friend calls it, is conclusively verified on the spot, if you are watching. Does your literary friend say that a strongly verified proposition has a strong meaning? If so, has the weakly verified statement a weak meaning?

*E.* I am not sure about strong and weak meanings, but the veri-

fication is weak if the proposition is only probable. The statement has no meaning unless some observations are relevant to its truth or falsehood.

*P.* I suppose that my behaviour is "relevant" to my assertion that "I see a rose".

*E.* When you say "I feel happy" I cannot observe your feeling, but I can observe your complacent expression. I cannot see your seeing of the rose, but I can observe that you stare at it, or I can, at least, understand that if you were in the garden you would see it.

*P.* If George cannot get his Absolute into some relevant connection with observations, your father will cancel the "topping dialectician". I fancy, my dear, that the Principle of Verifiability is less dangerous to metaphysics than you imagine. It may be in danger itself from the troublesome philosophers.

*E.* P. V. will finish off metaphysics!

*P.* It may be so! I suppose your proposition has a meaning. I understand it, and observations are, or will be, relevant to its verification. If so, it has technical as well as real sense. I advise you, however, to understand Physicalism thoroughly before you try to bomb Uncle George. When you do understand it, make sure it does not bomb you. Every generation has its enlightened Teds; sometimes they really are enlightened, but they are usually less enlightened than they imagine,

E. I am glad that Uncle George is not to be upset. He is a misty and musty absolutist, but he is a bit of a boy.

P. My dear Edith!

E. Well, Mums! Uncle George has taken me out often!

P. I must have a word with George

—you don't mean that he did—!

E. No! He did not! But he is a bit of a boy.

P. Well! Well! We shall let him smoke and meditate on the Absolute in peace.

JOSHUA C. GREGORY

## THE "EVIL EYE"

Reverting to Shri R. B. Pinglay's letter in your August number let me say that like many another popular belief which the *savants* dismiss as baseless, the widespread belief in the "evil eye"—a belief as prevalent in Southern Europe as in India—is not without foundation.

It rests upon a fact familiar to ancient Eastern psychology but still undreamt of by the Western science which goes by that name. That fact is magnetism. Every living creature gives off its own magnetic effluvium. Man is no exception. With his superior powers of will and thought he can even direct that emanation consciously. Most men are unconscious of the influence which, by their mere proximity, they exert upon all others for their weal or woe. Nevertheless, every man is constantly emitting a magnetic influence, beneficent or maleficent, according to the mental, moral and physical purity or impurity of the individual. That emanation is chiefly through the hands and from the eyes.

If a man is conscious of possessing the power of the "evil eye" he is practising sorcery when he directs his glance at another with malice and hatred. He is wielding a weapon none the less powerful for being invisible. The malignance of his desire may bring evil forces to a focus and a bolt thus projected in a moment of fierce anger or as the climax of long-festering hate may actually deal death to its victim.

In most cases, however, the baleful power of the "evil eye" is possessed and exercised quite unconsciously. It is worth noting that it is not only malevolent thoughts which endow one with the disagreeable gift. A man may be quite innocent of any wish to injure others and yet his glance may bring disaster on them.

A morbid interest in accidents and crimes, for instance, joined to a great plastic power of thought may impregnate one's glance with the potentiality of every kind of mishap and catastrophe. Such a man, it is said, need not even be thinking of executions or of accidents or crimes at the time when his gaze rests upon one whose own past conduct has been such as to offer a suitable focus for the energies generated by the former's morbid thinking. The two may but pass each other in a crowded street, yet the "evil eye" will have done its work and set the stage for subsequent disaster to its unwitting victim.

The best protection against the "evil eye", as against every possible malign influence, is still, as it has ever been, a clear conscience and a steadfast will to benefit mankind. It is taught, moreover, that any man has it in his power, by the right type of thinking and feeling, to cultivate the antithesis of the "evil eye", that is to say, to make his own glance as potent for blessing those on whom it falls as the glance from an "evil eye" is for injury,

PH. D.

# NEW BOOKS AND OLD

## ON THE GITA\*

[Below we print two reviews of this important publication—one from a Hindu whose own writings on the Song Celestial are widely appreciated and the other from an Englishman who is a lover of the Eastern Wisdom.—EDS.]

### I

The readers of THE ARYAN PATH are well acquainted with Sri Krishna Prem. They know that it is the name taken by a young English gentleman, a distinguished graduate of Cambridge, when he renounced his all and came to live in the Himalayas as a Sanyasin. They know that he wrote a series of articles on the *Gita* which appeared in THE ARYAN PATH under the title—*The Song of the Higher Life*. These articles have now been revised and published in book form with the title—*The Yoga of the Bhagavat Gita*. The introduction strikes three important notes which indicate the author's method of approach to the *Gita*.

First, he says :—

To anyone who has eyes to see, the *Gita* is based on direct knowledge of Reality, and it is of little moment who wrote it or to what school he was outwardly affiliated. Those who know Reality belong to a Race apart, the Race that never dies, and neither they nor those who seek to be reborn in that Race concern themselves with the flummeries of sects and schools.

So the author is not concerned with the questions whether the *Gita* was originally a Sankhya text-book or a Bhagavata manual, whether it teaches Dwaita, Advaita or Visishtadwaita.

Secondly, he says :—

The point of view from which this book has been written is that the *Gita* is a text-book of Yoga, a guide to the treading of the Path. By Yoga is here meant not any special system called by that name, not Jnana Yoga, nor Karma Yoga, nor Bhakti Yoga, nor the eightfold Yoga of Patanjali, but just the path by which man unites his finite self with infinite Being. It is the inner path of which all these separate Yogas are

so many one-sided aspects. It is not so much a synthesis of these separate teachings as that prior and undivided whole of which they represent partial formulations.

So he is not interested in proving that the *Gita* is ultimately a Jnana Sastra or a Bhakti Sastra or a Karma Sastra or that the first six chapters teach Karma Yoga, the second six, Bhakti Yoga and the third six, Jnana Yoga. Nor does he waste his ingenuity in trying to make out that the three sections of the *Gita* correspond to the three words in the Upanishadic Mahavakya —*Tat-tvam-asi*.

Thirdly, he says :—

The Path is not the special property of Hinduism, nor indeed of any religion. It is something which is to be found, more or less deeply buried in all religions, and which can exist apart from any formal religion at all. That is why the *Gita*, though a definitely Hindu book, the very crest-jewel of Hindu teachings, is capable of being a guide to seekers all over the world.

Thus it is purely as a mystic, as one who has his feet on the Path and who seeks guidance from all the masters of wisdom that Sri Krishna Prem approaches the *Bhagavad Gita*. Throughout his commentary he seems to be thinking aloud on the import of each sacred verse and on the practical value of it to one who is trying to live the Higher Life. The disadvantage of his method is that it often loses sight of the wood for the trees, and consequently the reader of his book is left at the end with no unity of impression on his mind. But where there is so much to illumine and stimulate by way of comparison with the writings of other mystics as well as of personal experience one should not complain of

\* *The Yoga of the Bhagavat Gita*. By SRI KRISHNA PREM. (J. M. Watkins, London. 8s. 6d. Sole Agents for India, Burma and Ceylon : The International Book House, Ash Lane, Bombay. Rs. 6/6.)

the absence of the lower virtues of composition. Nor should one mind very much the rather fanciful interpretation of some of the terms used in the *Gita*, e.g., Sastra, Parjanya, etc.

The book is provided with eight appendices and a useful glossary.

## II

The Yoga of the *Bhagavad Gita* is not only made up of all phases of spiritual life—Karma, Bhakti, Jnana, Dhyana, Sannyasa, etc.,—but is also vitally connected with Deity, Nature and Society. In the new spiritual life that we are taught to lead we have, first, to learn to give up the fruit of all actions ; secondly, to give up the personal agency of those actions ; thirdly, to look upon God's activity in the universe as the pattern of all action ; fourthly, to become independent of all external rules and scriptural laws and, fifthly, to take refuge in Deity and live in Him so constantly that our activity becomes a part of His and our ends are the same as His, as far as we can envisage them.

But if God is our father, Nature is our mother, and so the spiritual life we have to lead should be faithful to both. It is the glory of the *Bhagavad Gita* that it recognizes this vital fact and incessantly dwells upon the importance of training, directing and sublimating the natural endowments of all individuals. Accordingly we are taught, first, never to repress our natural endowments, secondly, to adjust all our religious prac-

tices to our capacities, thirdly, to see that all our actions grow spontaneously out of our natures as leaves on a tree ; fourthly, never to quit our ground and be guilty of false imitation or unnatural pose and, fifthly, to make our *Swadharma* the path of our salvation.

If God is our father and Nature is our mother, society consists of our brothers and sisters. Accordingly the spiritual life that the *Gita* asks us to lead has to be led not in solitude, not in caves or forests, but amidst the din and bustle of the everyday world. We are taught here therefore, first, that the welfare of society is the primary concern of the spiritual man ; secondly, that even amidst the mystic raptures of Dhyana-Yoga one should not forget the well-being of the world ; thirdly, that the ideal society is that in which the various classes of men work in harmony and love according to their individual capacities ; fourthly, that the religious man who looks upon others' pain as his own is the most beloved of God and, fifthly, that God himself comes down to help men when the forces of social disruption threaten to get the better of them.

Surely in this wonderful Yoga of the *Bhagavad Gita* there is nothing sectarian or one-sided or incomplete. It is a universal message which, if accepted and acted upon, would make man the son of God.

D. S. SARMA

Readers of THE ARYAN PATH will have already had an opportunity of studying the series of articles in which this book originated. And if they were as much impressed by them as the present writer, they will, I think, be even more impressed and enlightened by re-reading them here, not merely because of revision and some addition of new matter, but because to appreciate fully the exceptional precision of Sri Krishna Prem's understanding requires more than one reading and an unbroken concentration on his theme as it unfolds which periodical publication rendered

difficult. For the *Gita*, as he insists, is a whole from which we cannot arbitrarily abstract parts without distortion. It is a progressive guide to the treading of the Path and each chapter has to be lived through in its proper sequence. A failure to do this inevitably leads to one-sided emphasis of which the old controversy between those who claimed it as a text-book of *jñāna* or of *karma yoga* is perhaps the most notorious example. The profound value of course of the *Gita* lies in the fact that it reconciles the various aspects which special systems of Yoga reflect in that essential

Yoga which underlies them all and so teaches man how he may come to unite all the faculties of his finite self with Infinite Being.

Sri Krishna Prem is exceptionally qualified to interpret the Gita as such a whole. For being born and educated in the West he is unbiassed by any particular school of Eastern thought. At the same time by going to the East and submitting himself to its spiritual discipline he has learnt not merely in terms of the intellect but as an experiencing soul what it is to live through each chapter of the Gita in its proper sequence. The Oriental who has made a close study of Western thought is a familiar figure in our midst. Far rarer is the Westerner who has drunk, without being intoxicated, of the spiritual wisdom of the East and is able to expound it in terms acceptable to the Western mind, while at the same time opening up levels of reality against which that mind has hitherto been generally closed. Sri Krishna Prem has this capacity to an unusual degree. All that he writes has the stamp of that intellectual precision in which the West likes to think it is preëminent. But the clear focus of his mind is an expression of spiritual integrity and an instrument of spiritual understanding. He himself emphasises more than once the sterility of exclusive intellectuality. And conscious as he is that "the knowledge that can be expressed in words is not the true knowledge" and that any description of spiritual states is useless if interpreted by the intellect alone he is equally alive to the danger of any withdrawal into a realm of abstraction which involves separation from the world of action and feeling.

The true Path, as he interprets it through the Gita, certainly involves an

inner detachment from the passing show of things, but only by a progressive union with the higher powers of being. The spiritual life must be as organic in its unfolding as the blooming of a flower, and all methods which transgress such a process whether by attempted short cuts or by forced and unnatural straining of the will are creatively false and doomed to failure. It is only in such an experience of the whole that the relative dualism of manifested life can be reconciled with its absolute unity. And there can be no surer test of true spiritual vision than the capacity to achieve at every stage of the Path this reconciliation. In the Gita, as Sri Krishna Prem shows, no support is given to those who rejecting forms as *māyā* would strive to save their souls in a sublime indifference to the needs of the world. This, as he writes, is not spirituality but *tamas*. The sense life is not to be negated or outwardly discontinued but surrendered to the control and inspiration of that higher Self, which is itself an expression of the One from which all living forms issue. How well Sri Krishna Prem maintains the vision of unity in duality is perhaps most notably exemplified in the chapter entitled "The Yoga of the Division between the Bright and Dark Powers", in which he shows how all ethical dualisms of good and evil can only be truly evaluated in relation to the two great tides of the Cosmos, the outgoing breath which creates form and its inflowing counterpart by which all things return towards the One. But his intellectual analysis is always thus rooted in a realisation of the glory and mystery of the creative process. And it is for this reason that his interpretation of the Gita quickens as well as clarifies.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

## IN A DEAD WORLD\*

In the radiant three or four years just-before-the-War, years that glowed with a sunset then taken for a sunrise, there burst upon London an "explosive-mouthed gang of scarce-breeched filibusters" (to quote Ford Maddox Ford who was then controlling the *English Review*) who declared that impressionism was dead, that Conrad, Henry James, etc., were exploded, *vieux jeu*; who began calling themselves Cubists, then Vorticists; who contributed to an anthology called *Des Imagistes*. Among the gang were Wyndham Lewis, Richard Aldington, T. S. Eliot, Robert Frost, "H. D.", Carlos Williams, Gaudier Brzeska, and—Ezra Pound. "The London Trans-Atlantic crowd" Mr. Ford called them, clamouring, vociferous "infants", who evolved a whirlpool. Then night came. The glowing years were quenched. The "infants" were silenced—some for ever—some for a time. Those who survived were scattered.

Ezra Pound, after throwing at his public at intervals, from different parts of the world, such varied works of poetry and prose as *Cathay*, *Lustra*, *The Spirit of Romance*, *The A.B.C. of Economics*, *Gaudier Brzeska*, now hurls at us from Italy where he has been settled for some years, this *Guide to Kulchur*. It is a handful of astringent pellets of learning; a mental bomb of doctrine; "a digest", as the publishers say, "of all the wisdom he has acquired about art and life during the course of fifty years". Mr. Pound's intention, he tells us in the preface, is to COMMIT himself on as many points as possible. He certainly does this, and we are left—iff buffeted and gasping—grateful.

Surely no pedagogue was ever so un-pedagogic as Mr. Pound—so young and so apt to appeal to the young, so ready to heave bricks at shams! His colossal scholarship is a *living* scholarship; he moves among the old great ones—among Plato, Aristotle, Kung, Tai Troung,

Frobenius, Shakespeare—taking nothing for granted; moves among them admirably *and* critically; above all, revealingly. He says somewhere:—

Properly we should read for power. Man reading should be man intensely alive. The book should be a ball of light in one's hand.

That is profound. How many people—even the most cultivated—really read?

Among his comments on poets, politicians, composers, periods of history, governments, the writer has many trenchant comments on the Money-Power. A man as individual as he is, as un-machine-made, as brilliant, craggy and contemptuous; a man as indifferent to being in the correct camp (literary or political) at the correct moment, with the correct bunch; a man whose mental broom sweeps as vigorously and hilariously as his does, from attic to cellar of our modern mansion; a man so proof against *hypnotism* in all its forms, such a man is bound to point out, to assess, to discredit the Money-Power. Bound, in fact, to *see* it, a feat which appears to be beyond the capacity of all but about two of the English literati. The Money-Power (or International Finance), monstrous in size and in vile-ness, squats on our myriad-headed civilization, sinking it to Hell. Yet is not *seen*! Is ignored as completely as a passing rain-cloud. Mr. Pound, walking with head up and eyes alert, naturally does see it—and its significance. "Get rid of *that*", he tells us, in effect, "then, if you still want to, quarrel about politics—but you'll find there's no need. The 'Right' and 'Left' issue, along with much other garbage, will have vanished. You can then begin to live, even to love."

He is right—piercingly and crashingly right—when he affirms that it is of the first necessity that novelists should *take count* of monetary pressure when weaving their fictions; that

any real portrayal of modern life must deal with situations which are 80% monetary ;

that

no sane and clear code can be formulated until and unless all tangled relations between men and women have been analysed and set in two categories : those due to money, and those that are independent of it ;

that when

you have isolated the situations wherein it does not enter from those where it does, you...can talk with augmented clarity of t'other or which, instead of confounding them together.

A thousand times right ! And I sigh to think that a recent novel of my own had not the fortunate chance of being reviewed by Mr. Pound. A novel in which I set out to do *exactly that* : explore the extent to which money tangles up the relations between man and woman—to say nothing of those between man and man, and between nation and nation. I venture to believe that Mr. Pound would have “got” what I was at, and approved. Approved the matter, whether or no the manner.

But Mr. Pound, on the subject of Finance, is seldom so restrained, so indirect, as in the passages relating to fiction, quoted above. Mostly he lashes out at the system straight—and with venom. “No man free of mental lice”, he declares, “would tolerate the bank racket or the taxing system”. And, “the first step towards a new Paideuma is the clearance of every prelate or minister who blocks, by diseased will or sodden inertia a cleaning of the monetary system”.

He insists that economic light in our times has not come from the HIRED (that is, from ordinary orthodox reformers, whether of the Right or Left) but from free men—from an engineer, Douglas ; a man of commerce, Gesell ; a professor

of physics, Soddy. His grouse against Communism is that it is not fundamentally revolutionary ; “Marx never questioned money. He just accepted it as he found it.”

Among the briefest, simplest, most poetic aphorisms in the *Guide*, is this one : “The earth belongs to the living.” Too obvious to need stating, some will say? The need, on the contrary, is tremendous. The earth *should* belong to the living, the author means. Actually, it belongs to the dead—the physically dead, the mentally dead. The young of to-day wait paralysed on the brink of the gigantic grave where the young of yesterday rot. *Will* the earth ever belong...? Only if that system, that abomination of desolation, Orthodox Finance, is overthrown.

Mr. Pound is of the living—in all senses. That is something to be thankful for. And if I have stressed a certain element in his book at the expense of the others that is not only because it delights me personally (though such a reason might be held sufficient), but because it will almost certainly be understressed, if not passed over by the bulk of his reviewers. I have tried to redress—to a certain extent—a balance.

But the book has everything in it—essence of economics, essence of everything else of value. Never mind the shouting capital letters, never mind the violence, the zigzag leaps from subject to subject. *Read it!* That, in the end, is all a reviewer can say—if he keenly and honestly appreciates a book. His few hundred words boil down to just that. To use an admirable dictum of Mr. Pound's own :—

Let the critic...disabuse himself of the idea that he has made or is making anything. He is, if decent, fighting for certain ideas, or attempting demarkations.

IRENE RATHBONE

## MIND AND NATURE\*

These essays originally written at different times and in different connections do not give a continuous argument on any specific problem. The general standpoint is that of the plain man. Professor Hicks never gets down to the root of things. His answers to some of the great questions of philosophy are superficial and unsatisfactory.

The author thinks that epistemology or a theory of knowledge is the ground on which alone a true metaphysical system can be built up. He argues, that we cannot treat metaphysics as an independent or a self-sufficient science. Since our approach to reality is through knowledge, a criticism of knowledge is essential to a sound theory of the whole of reality. This, however, appears to us to be only a half-truth. A theory of knowledge implies a metaphysics. In any analysis of knowledge, we have to make certain assumptions about the nature of things as a whole. In fact, it is our metaphysics that determines in a way what our theory of knowledge is going to be. We do not reach up to a metaphysics through a theory of knowledge. A theory of knowledge is at best part of the metaphysical problem itself.

According to Professor Hick's theory of knowledge, the distinction between the knower and the known is ultimate. He rejects subjective idealism. The mind does not create its object in knowing it. It merely apprehends it. But what is the nature of the known? He rejects the view sponsored by certain realists that what is known are sense-data or the sensible manifold of Kant. What is known is the physical object in physical space. It is this to which the knowing act is directed. This is no doubt the common sense view. But to state it is not to solve any metaphysical problem. The question has to be faced, what is matter apart from its sensible appearances? How do we ever get over the subjec-

tivity of our knowledge? This subjectivity has been recognised by every philosopher of eminence. He however dogmatically asserts :—

The subjectivity which is of necessity implied in all knowledge has not in itself a vitiating influence upon the knowledge itself.....

He admits that there is no piece of knowledge which may not be erroneous. But if that is so, and all error is necessarily due to subjective factors, it is for him to show the possibility of a knowledge which is entirely free from subjectivity and therefore true *par excellence*. The suggestion that we must rely on empirical tests and eliminate error progressively is most unphilosophical, for all empirical tests being ridden by the same subjective element are no real tests at all.

It is in our opinion essential to any true theory of knowledge to make a distinction between appearance and reality. What we know as something *other* than ourselves is appearance only. As long as there is this fundamental duality in our knowledge, the duality of the knower and the known, it is best to admit that reality as it is *in itself* can never be revealed to us. What we know are phenomena only or appearances only. A true revelation of reality must cut at the duality of the subject and the object. It must make reality self-revealing or self-known. The object must coalesce with the subject. It must become the subject itself. We have this type of knowledge in self-awareness. But such a view would be wholly unacceptable to Professor Hicks.

... To demand of knowledge that it shall be one with the object known is tantamount to demanding that knowledge shall both be and not be knowledge.

Our answer is that if the meaning of knowledge is thus restricted, it will never come up to its own ideal. It will never be knowledge in the true sense of that term.

Another important point : according to him, there is no such thing as pure awareness. All awareness is qualified by its content. This content is not the object which is known. "The content of the act of cognising blue is not blue, but the awareness of blue." As a consequence of this view he holds that "the awareness of a water-drop differs, *as an awareness*, from the awareness of a primrose". The two awarenesses have nothing in common except the abstract quality of knowing, which in itself and as such is not an existent fact. This appears to us to be the very reverse of the truth. That pure awareness is not an empirical fact which can be introspected into is beyond doubt. The only facts of this kind which we can introspectively know are particular awarenesses, the awareness of A, or of B, or of C, etc. We cannot know awareness as such. It is no kind of object. But it is admitted even by Professor Hicks that awareness of blue is not itself blue. How can he then contend that "cognition is not a bare activity that remains entirely untouched by the attributes of the things which it discriminates"? Awareness is nothing if it does not remain unaffected by the objects which it knows. It is not awareness of A *as awareness* that is distinct from the awareness of B. Awareness in itself is one unbroken self-identical reality. We break it up by relating it to the objects which it reveals. If this were not so, if there were no pure awareness, it would be impossible to say that awareness precedes its objects or that it is a self-existent reality independent of physical objects. The awareness of a flower would come into being simultaneously with the contact or the interaction of the flower and the physical organism. What more would be needed to turn this interpretation of the fact of knowledge into a wholly materialistic doctrine of reality?

So much about the theory of knowledge. What does Professor Hicks think about the entities called matter and mind? His whole view about

mind appears to us to be somewhat confused. He dissents from Professor Broad who argues that the actual mind is a compound of two elements, one physical and the other psychical. According to Broad, it is "this psychical factor" which in all probability survives the disintegration of the compound, and carries in itself those traces which account for the abnormal phenomena connected with the so-called survival of personality after death. There may be different views about the exact nature of this mind-stuff. But unless something of the sort survives the body, mind becomes no more than an epiphenomenon of the latter. Professor Hicks is not a materialist. He must therefore find some intelligible meaning for what is called mind as distinct from matter. To say that the mind is its states or that it is the actual series of mental events is to say what is trivial. Certain questions will have to be answered: What constitutes the states into a unity? What is "I" or "me" running through these mental states? Is the series of these states ended for good with the disintegration of the living organism? If it is not, what is the form of that which survives? Professor Hicks does not attempt to find answers to these questions. He is satisfied by merely comparing the unity of mental states to a highly developed organic unity.

As he does not go deeply into the question of the reality of the mind or of the ego, so he does not raise or answer any metaphysical question about the reality of matter. Indeed he rejects, and rightly so, the scientific view of the wholly quantitative nature of matter. He criticises Eddington's view of nature as an "extract of pointer-readings" and his contention that what alone can give concreteness to nature is the "background" of these pointer-readings which, on the analogy of our brain-events, we must judge to be some form of consciousness or mind-stuff. He rightly contends that a quantitative view of nature is an abstraction useful for certain scientific purposes, but that

it cannot be adequate to nature as known to us. The scientist has to admit in one way or another the qualitative aspect. Matter really has some of those secondary qualities which are apprehended by our different senses, e.g., colour, temperature, hardness, etc. But Professor Hicks does not push this argument further. He does not consider the metaphysical issue of the ultimate status of matter viewed in this way. If matter is nothing in itself apart from these qualities, can it be independent of the forms of our perceptual knowledge? If it is, how do we get to know what matter is in itself? How do we

ultimately draw a line between veridical perception and erroneous perception, if we are confined merely to our perceptions and can never get out of them to view matter as it is in itself?

It appears to us that our author has altogether failed to do justice to the problems which he has himself raised. We seek in vain for any illuminating idea. The papers stand more or less by themselves without inherent connection. The book is useful only as an indication of certain views associated chiefly with Professor Hicks and in part with those who are appreciatively quoted by him.

G. R. MALKANI

---

*A Cloud That's Dragonish.* By VERRIER ELWIN. (John Murray, London. 7s. 6d.)

Verrier Elwin has already shown, both in direct description and under the thin veil of fiction, his intimate knowledge of primitive life in a Gond village. By his stern refusal to judge or generalize, and by the sunlit clarity of his presentation, he has succeeded in being frank without lapsing into vulgarity, and has told the world the most damaging truths about the hidden life of a part of India without giving offence to anybody. His latest novel, however, is not a mere continuation of his expert and sympathetic account of the joys and sorrows and superstitions of an aboriginal people; it develops in the latter half into a thrilling story of crime and detection, where the suspected witch is a well-beloved romantic heroine and the successful—by now world-famous—detective is Panda Bāḥa, who is melo-

dramatically, and rather unnecessarily, revealed at the end as the father of the heroine. All the characters stand out in their zoistic simplicity, but there is a hint of a civilization that is sanative in the unsophisticated, love-inspired rationalism of Ratnu and Bukwa. The villain of the piece, a man of many murders, is the village Kotwar, who has seen a law court and who has to pay a monthly visit to the nearest police station forty miles away. The author refrains from connecting as cause and effect the Kotwar's official contacts and his deep-laid crimes and we should respect this reticence. The people (including the monkey and the snake) are convincing; the story—with its round of drinking, dancing, feasting, "unregulated polygamous entanglements" and mysterious deaths—is exciting. There is no need, and no one has the right, to draw a moral,

K. SWAMINATHAN

*To Thine Own Self.* By MARY TABOR. (C. W. Daniel Co., Ltd., London. 5s.)

Dedicated to Edward Bach, one-time Harley Street Specialist, by one of his team of workers, this volume of short stories seeks to demonstrate the truth embodied in the well-known words of Polonius quoted above the "Dedication":—

This above all : to thine own self be true,  
And it must follow, as the night the day,  
Thou canst not then be false to any man.

This world is full of the "living dead". Instead of being vibrant with interest and generosity, most people are "dissatisfied, unfulfilled, bored, dragging along like unhappy ghosts". To *be alive*, is to be free from personal domination and conventional notions; to accomplish this we are offered one sovereign remedy—"Follow your own desire." No objection can be raised against this principle were the writer to emphasise (as she has done in more than one place) that the desire to be followed is that of the heart, the organ of the soul and that the Higher Self expresses itself in service of fellow men energised by Universal Impersonal Love. But control of the senses is belittled; for example, the indulging in a desire for alcoholic drinks, as part of the business of knowing one's own soul, is contrary to reason, to man's innate moral perception, as well as to all systems of true ethics. Jesus is regarded by the author as the Ideal Man, but to approve of public-houses on the ground that Christ was "a wine-bibber" is a perversion of the truth. The age-old ethical principle is:—

Do not believe that lust can ever be killed out if gratified or satiated, for this is an abomination inspired by Mara. It is by feeding vice that it expands and waxes strong like to the worm that fattens on the blossom's heart.

Jesus came, not to condone sin, but to call sinners to repentance. Between the pure altruism of the Higher Self and

the impure egotism of the animal man, there is an unbridgeable gulf. Also, it is a form of conceit to say that we should drink alcohol "just to smash other people's disapproval", and the ideal of mental independence is meanly exploited when alcohol is recommended so as not to be "under the orders of others as to how much one should eat and drink". But apart from such false notes which ring hollow and are degrading, the general tone of the book is refreshing, and these simple little tales contain numerous thought-provoking ideas. There is a good statement on Reincarnation, the lost chord of Christianity:—

"Well, you've had quantities of new suits in your life since you were a brat in arms, haven't you? And they've all gone somewhere; into the dustbin or rag-bag or something. You don't know and you don't care. Well, its just the same with our bodies. We've had any number since the first time we visited mother earth, and we've deposited them somewhere and gone off leaving them like old clothes... We don't accompany them any more than we go and sit in the rag-bag or the dustbin; That's all it is, changing a suit of clothes, or a cloak, or a dress."

Rebirth is the process whereby the God within becomes manifest.

Each one of you is a Priest in a wondrous Sanctuary. He enshrines a God Who is perfect in Love, in Service, in Tenderness, in Compassion, in Wisdom. In each is the perfect KNOWING, the perfect calm, the perfect assurance, the perfect understanding. Let us not concern ourselves with any other but our Self, our God, our Father with us, our Heaven God-filled.

What enables a man to pierce through his material sensuous self to the Self of Spirit, bringing the latent divinity into expression as a living power? Sense-control, mind-discipline and soul-knowledge. Man's conventions are often wrong but the Superman's traditions are rooted in knowledge and are therefore infallible. An intelligent recognition of those traditions is an essential prerequisite to soul-progress.

N. K. K.

*The Finding of the "Third Eye"*. By VERA STANLEY ALDER. (Rider and Co., London. 7s. 6d.)

The title is a misnomer. The book contains a little about the "Third Eye", the inner eye of unveiled Spiritual Perception, but more about vibrations, sounds, colours, numbers, astrology, diet and exercise, breathing and what not, in the way of "occult" titbits. The writer seems sincere but she wields an impressionistic brush, and modern psychic claptrap shares honours with misleadingly presented ancient verities.

The publishers share the onus for the spellings, sometimes ludicrously bizarre, as in "Quesoquette" for "Quetzalcoatl". Another linguistic slip is the Pope's having forbidden the teaching of Reincarnation and Karma "in A.D. 551 by his Cancel [sic] of Constantinople". It would be ungenerous to single out such slips if they were not symptomatic of the inaccuracy through-

out, which the author would doubtless excuse on the ground that "the neophyte brain must be coaxed along step by step, the pill of truth coated with the sugar of inaccuracy, until it becomes palatable in its pure form".

Troubadours and Knights of the Round Table are gravely included among students of the occult sciences; the *Avesta* is described as the book of Sufi philosophy; the Golden Age of the past is ascribed to Atlantis and another is hinted as being about to dawn; Mesmer is placed at the end of the nineteenth century; "A Yogin is one who has studied Yoga, usually at the Buddhist University of Nalanda", etc., etc.

Miss Alder has dredged industriously, in many waters. It is to be hoped that she will do some sifting before bringing out the sequel which she announces is in preparation.

E. M. H.

*Indian Temples*—136 Photographs, chosen and annotated by Odette Bruhl, with a Preface by Sylvain Lévi. (Oxford University Press. 1s. 6d.)

When under our political conditions, Religious Endowments have been brought into the clutches of secular administration, and when further, it is learnt, according to a pronouncement of a Cabinet Member of Madras that in temples "there is everything else but God", it should gratefully be acknowledged that two foreigners have done a distinct service to the religion and culture of India by publishing photographs of our temples ranging from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin. Sylvain Lévi in an interesting "Preface" points out that there are three well formed main styles of Indian architecture, *i.e.*, "the rectangular Nagara in the north; the rounded Vesara... on the east coast; and the octagonal Dravidian in the south."

Ancient Indian leaders of thought had found temples necessary, the images of deities reminding people of the existence of the Supreme Power of the Universe. The author of the *Vedānta-Sūtras* how-

ever, clearly saw that image-worship was not everything and in the striking aphorism — *Na-Prateekena-hi-sah* — explained that God cannot be erroneously identified with any symbol. Higher minds will find delight in pure contemplation (*Dhyana* or *Nididhyasana*) but temples find their *raison d'être* in the need for the satisfaction of the religious urge of the common folk.

These photographs stand as a shining example of the architectural achievements of ancient India. Lévi observes that there is "no didactic purpose" in placing this album before the public. Maybe, or may not. Nor would it be necessary or possible to agree with him in the view that Indian culture, religion and philosophy are what they are on account of "monsoon", "thunder and lightning" and other phenomena which proclaim the supremacy of Nature over Man. Indian Temples have many a tale to tell, and the excellent and attractive album under notice powerfully revives them in memory. I consider a careful perusal of the album as a visual pilgrimage to all the sacred shrines of India.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

*The Green Leaf : A Memorial to Grey Owl.* Edited and arranged by LOVAT DICKSON. (Lovat Dickson, London. 2s. 6d.)

This farewell to one of the greatest naturalists of his time is so moving in its deep sincerity that it is above criticism. It must be read ; no brief description could possibly do justice to it.

A record of the last months of Grey Owl's life and his St. Francis-like devotion to the care of "our little brothers and sisters", stirs one to sorrow anew that this wise and practical humanitarian has gone from the world so soon. A trapper himself, once, to whom came the wider vision, he dedicated himself to the preservation of the beaver he had hunted. That love and care grew, till it took in all animals, his adopted people, the Indians, and became big enough to embrace humanity. In Grey Owl's mind there was no room for a mean or unworthy thought.

"A poor, frightened savage", he called himself ! Yet he came and taught us a higher conception of our duty, not only

*The Voice of the Occident : Swan Song of a Romany's Life in Many Lands.* By Mrs. WALTER TIBBITS. (Arthur H. Stockwell, Ltd., London, 7s. 6d.)

This is essentially a self-portrait, for all the beauty of the descriptions of nature and of the works of man—the Alhambra is unforgettably painted. Even the people who walk through Mrs. Tibbits's pages are part of her setting, from the American tourists, "the most odious specimens of mankind", staring at her, curtsying to the aged Monsignor Mori in the Duomo at Florence to the "gross Sicilian" guide of "the ethereal English woman" (herself).

The book affords a depressing illustration of the confusion that the vagaries of pseudo-theosophy can produce. Mrs. Tibbits hints at mystic experiences in India, of which she may not speak ; claims to remember her past lives and says she was a Brahmini in Benares in the time of Elizabeth ; calls herself a Hindu and claims to have received the second birth ; eats meat and rides to

to animals, but to the glorious world of Nature as a whole—four-footed, rooted, winged, and human. In a world stripped well-nigh barren of what his Indian people call "love of neighbour", and with the desire for beauty and peace either dead or stifled, this man came to "build battlements of beauty" as a fortification against evil, born of a "love that offers not passive resistance but passive aggression"—the love that casts out fear. We shall not look upon his like again. But at least we can see to it that his work shall go on.

In *Pilgrims of the Wild* he speaks of a Christian minister who, while rapt in the contemplation of a mountain lake, said :—

An Indian, an animal, and a mountain move as to some rhythm of music. All the works of the Creator are cast from the one mould, but on some the imprint of His finger is more manifest.

It can be said with perfect truth of Grey Owl that the imprint of That Finger was clearly visible.

M. STUART-FERGUSON

hounds ; haunts Catholic churches and even takes communion with no apparent reservations ; seeks (in vain) a Papal title once refused by her ancestor ("I thought, as Countess Lisaniskea, I could do more for the world") ; is intrigued by numerology ; consults a medium ; converses regularly with her dead husband, whom she worships night and morning ; discusses a Mass for him ; has borne in on her consciousness "the Divine Plan for a mission to me to make my home in London, a centre for the great truth of Spirit Return" ; at Assisi, "sensed at once the magnetism—the same as at Kashi" ; and repeats pseudo-theosophical vapourings the detailing of which here would be profitless.

The descriptions, as said, are fine, but the ideational background is a muddle and when the author assures us that she has penetrated the mystery of India and that "the hermetically sealed oyster shell opened to me, disclosing the Pearl of Great Price", we must be pardoned our scepticism.

E. M. H.

*Lost Atlantis.* By JAMES BRAMWELL. (Harper and Brothers, New York. \$2.75.)

Mr. Bramwell's main reason for adding another book to the existing literature on the subject of Atlantis is that most former writers have been either blind believers or disbelievers—and equally dogmatic. The present volume has creditably fulfilled its purpose, for it is an impartial examination of its subject.

Plato's *Timæus* and *Critias* are dealt with at considerable length but the author finds Plato's account contradictory and illogical; he gives it however, an interesting symbolic interpretation. Madame Blavatsky enlightens us in her *Secret Doctrine* (II. 395) on the apparent inconsistency between Plato's chronology and that of the Occultists. And she reminds us that "the famous island of Plato of that name was but a fragment of this great Continent".

When the "various statements of science are examined in relation to one another there is no consensus of opinion as to the date or geographical position of such a continent". As the author remarks:—

Atlantis as an island in the Atlantic Ocean has received less attention than the others and it is only in recent years that it has been seriously reconsidered.

And he adds, "Either Atlantis is an island in the Atlantic Ocean or it is not 'Atlantis' at all".

In 1888 people rejected *a priori* the evidence of *The Secret Doctrine*, but it is satisfying to note that twentieth century Science is beginning to take more notice of that ancient continent, the ancient tradition. Lewis Spence's *The Problem of Atlantis* according to Mr. Bramwell is a book which placed "the study of the whole problem on a more accurate basis". Mr. Bramwell thinks several of Spence's more developed theories debatable but many of the latter's main principles as outlined by Mr. Bramwell (pp. 141-142) are those

of *The Secret Doctrine*. The teachings of the Eastern Esoteric Philosophy also find an echo in Ignatius Donnelly's *Atlantis, the Antediluvian World* which first excited interest in, and popularised the theory of Atlantis. A footnote in *The Secret Doctrine* (II. 266) says:—

Speaking of the Aryan colonies from Atlantis, and of the arts and sciences—the legacy of our Fourth Race—[Donnelly] bravely announces that "the roots of the institutions of to-day reach back to the Miocene age". This is an enormous allowance for a modern scholar to make; but civilization dates still further back than the Miocene Atlanteans.

"The sinking of the Atlantis (the group of continents and islands) began during the Eocene period...and it culminated in the Miocene, first in the final disappearance of the largest, an event coincident with the elevation of the Alps, and second in the sinking of the last of the fair islands mentioned by Plato." (*The Secret Doctrine*, II, p. 778).

Occultism has generally been thrown out of court without a hearing and we therefore welcome Mr. Bramwell's presentation of a much-derided subject. Unfortunately, however, he confuses true Theosophy with pseudo-occultism.

The Theosophical position is not the result of "wish-fulfilment", neither is it based on "the strength of their belief in the golden age" nor is it "partly due to a subconscious desire to restore the equilibrium which has somehow been upset by their inability to adapt themselves to the conditions of modern life". With the true Occultists the existence of Atlantis is knowledge based on accurate data. Mr. Bramwell gives two quotations from Madame Blavatsky, but it would have been more profitable had the author examined at greater length her teachings.

This book is actuated by an honest motive and is the offspring of much research and thought. Rising from its perusal, however, the confused reader may well ask himself, "Did Atlantis really exist?" Mr. Bramwell has apparently left that to our decision.

DAENA

*The Ideals of Humanity and How to Work and Modern Man and Religion.* By T. G. MASARYK. (George Allen and Unwin, London. 6s. and 7s. 6d., respectively.)

It is important to realise that these two books were written by T. G. Masaryk forty years ago.

*The Ideals of Humanity* consists of lectures delivered by Masaryk in 1898 when he was Professor of Philosophy, Ethics, and Sociology at the University of Prague. *Modern Man and Religion* is a collection of articles, written about the same time, and published subsequently in volume form.

Reading these lectures—on Socialism, Individualism, Positivism, How to Work, etc.,—one cannot suppress a growing astonishment that the man who delivered them, forty years ago, was destined to become one of the greatest political figures of his age. Had one of Masaryk's students prophesied this destiny, he would have been a mighty psychologist, for one feels that these lectures might have been given by any professor with the requisite knowledge and with deep human sympathies. Reading them to-day it is difficult to believe that the man who delivered them is the Masaryk who, during the war, when he was in Russia, brought a Czechoslovak army into being, to fight side by side with the Allies—the man who created a State, and became its first President.

One's surprise is less in reading the articles for, with the exception of those in Part II, which contains, irreverently speaking, the "potted philosophies" of Hume, Kant, Comte, Spencer, etc., there is a deep awareness of the psychic trends of the age—and a remarkable analysis of modern "Wearied Souls".

It is significant that, as a young man, Masaryk wrote a book on Suicide. Significant, because it was not the work of a detached observer. Masaryk tells us that he wrote it, "while passing through these struggles", and that therefore it was "written on the battlefield". The papers on suicide, in the volume under review, and those on Modern Titan-

ism—notably on "The Disease of the Century"—plainly reveal that Masaryk had inside knowledge of the distortions and dilemmas of "subjective" modern man. And this is important, for it shows that his own "objectivity" and his belief in Progress were not easily acquired. They were bought at a price. Progress, to Masaryk, was the overcoming of evil—not speed cars, or airplanes, or the "Queen Mary".

Perhaps one's dominant wish while reading these books is that Masaryk had lived to revise or rewrite them. Many people, forty years ago, studying his articles on suicide, would probably have felt that his insistence that "suicide is modern" was somewhat over-stressed. They would have said he had been unduly impressed by the fact that so many eminent nineteenth century writers had dealt with suicide in their work. ("What does this mean? All the latest poet-thinkers, and those just the greatest, deal in their most significant works with suicide...") But, nowadays, no such objections could be raised. Suicide, in many forms, is so common that it has almost ceased to be news.

If Masaryk were revising these books to-day, there are certain passages which would seem as archaic, on the background of contemporary fact, as a peasant's hut in the Strand. For instance, in *The Ideals of Humanity*, Masaryk says: "We shall not reach universality through foreign aid, but must acquire it through our own work; we must make our own affairs the affairs of the world. The Czech nation, the Czech question, must become world-wide."

Well, the Czech question has become world-wide—in a sense very different from the one contemplated by Masaryk. It has become so world-wide that any discussion on the possibility of big-scale European war has preliminary—and indispensable—references to Czechoslovakia.

Broadly speaking, however, the general impression left by a reading of these books—an impression strangely independent of their actual content—is

a realisation of the native greatness, the moral stature, of this man who, in achieving world eminence, retained his integrity—his purpose, his vision. Masaryk was one of that tiny band who are uncorrupted by power.

It is to the everlasting credit of the Czechs that, having produced a Masaryk, they left the shaping of their destiny in his hands.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

*Shadows of Life and Thought.* By ARTHUR EDWARD WAITE. (Selwyn and Blount, London. 15s.)

The book's chief value—and we do not except the inspiring vistas of mystic realization that open out in the closing chapters—lies in its testimony to the necessity of an open mind in one who takes the road to knowledge. Dr. Waite acknowledges his debt to the "Mistress of the Seven Hills" but—outwardly apostate to Rome these several decades—he fails to realize to what extent that Church's ideology has handicapped his quest. It was not chance that led him into the by-way of Christian Mysticism, of ritualism and of symbology, which he still takes for the highroad to final truth.

It was Dr. Waite's unconscious predilection for Rome (he records that at nineteen years "there was nothing so dead for me as the life of the Latin Church") that prejudiced him at the outset against Madame Blavatsky and Theosophy. His first contact with them was through *Isis Unveiled*, "of which I picked up an odd volume in Church Street, Kensington, and hated its anti-Christian bias. Pages by the hundred in royal were filled in the margins with my acrid pencil notes." Prejudice lent a ready ear to the whisperings of a professed friend of H. P. B.; he met the latter and fancied her capable of trickery "like many another medium"—though she never was either medium or deceiver. Honesty makes him admit the flimsy character of the S. P. R. charges and question the sincerity of her chief traducer. He even implies that if

H. P. B. had still been in India when he was offered the Librarianship at Adyar he might not have declined from doubt of "Adyar and its atmosphere for a Western Mystic. She and I would most likely have fulminated one against another and remained friends at least". He went so far as to join the Theosophical Society in the early days. One sympathizes with Dr. Waite's vigorous reaction against pseudo-occultism, but one must deplore the prejudice which precluded open-minded study of genuine Theosophy and instilled baseless distrust of its antecedents.

The book records the investigations of the claims of many bodies, Masonic and other. Dr. Waite's quest has sometimes led him on strange paths. One recognizes the truth of his confession in the last chapter, while appreciating its genuine humility :—

I have dwelt too long in the by-ways, too long in the side chapels, too often at inns of refreshment and in side issues, or amidst the glitter of false ways. If I have always "loved the highest" when I saw it, I have sat and dreamed too often with misdirected eyes.

Many of Dr. Waite's conclusions are Theosophical, though his complete misapprehension of true Occultism leads to a quite arbitrary distinction between Occultism and its *alter ego*, Mysticism. It is good to find this leading modern exponent of the Western mystic tradition affirming his conviction that "on ultimate Realities—to adapt Louis Claude de Saint-Martin—the East and the West speak the same language because they draw from the one Centre".

E. M. H.

*Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics.* By C. E. M. JOAD. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 6s.)

This volume of eight hundred pages traces the development of ethical and political thought from its early expressions in the great Greeks to the modern conceptions of Fascism and Communism.

The topics are well arranged. The first part of the book is devoted to the Ethics and Politics of the Greeks. Here the two subjects have been treated together. In Greek thought they are not split up. "The good life for the individual can be realised in a state and the best life in the best state." This is the usual view of the good life, but the emphasis on the noëtic virtues and on the contemplative life is evident in Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. The regulation of the state should be so directed as to afford leisure to the guardians of the state for such contemplative and intellectual activity. Dr. Joad favours however, the scheme which distributes these higher goods not to the exceptional few, but to all.

The chapter on "The Split", especially the political views of Dante, will be read with interest. Then follow five chapters on the history of Morals. The chapter on "A Theory of Good and Value" is interesting; especially is Dr. Joad's treatment of evil thought-provoking. He gives no solution to this baffling problem, except suggesting that evil is a real force in the Universe. Parts 3 and 4 of the book introduce politics—the political theories from Hobbes to Marx but Part 4 will be read with the greater interest, for it deals with theories that are now the new models for social and political reconstruction. The eighteenth century politics of Hobbes, Mill and Spencer are overshadowed by the new faiths created by the two naturally opposite theories of Fascism and Communism. Dr. Joad has also developed the Idealistic theory of the state which is the natural consequence of the Totalitarian state. The interesting point is

that from Rousseau downwards, emphasis has been laid upon the Totalitarian state though the basic emphases have been diverse and sympathies have differed. The idealist theories of state enunciated by Hegel and developed by Green and Bosanquet, according to Dr. Joad, make the state supra-moral and attribute to it a quasi-divine character. One may agree or not agree with him. To Dr. Joad, Fascism is the natural sequence of such an extreme concentration of right and power. Communism, in theory a counter-movement, practically obliterates all individualism and accepts the supremacy of the state.

Dr. Joad has explained and criticised these new theories and eventually finds the true solvent of the difficulties of modern politics in democracy. His leaning is towards socialism, not of a revolutionary but of an evolutionary type. He yields to the pressure of the overwhelming facts in favour of the socialistic claims, but with the true instinct of an Englishman, he advises caution in the period of transition. Today true democracy does not exist anywhere. One can understand the frank declaration of National Socialism and Fascism or even Communism, but one cannot follow the so-called Democracy under the cloak of Imperialism. True democracy is yet to come and that requires a faith and vision far wider and deeper than what is offered in the contemporary theories—a spiritual ideal of collective humanity. The modern outlook is clouded, because of the absence of that detachment which allows correct perspective, otherwise the spiritual reality of collective humanity by this time must have struck the greater leaders of action. The sense of collective humanity must be very real to help the spiritual federation of the human race. This was uppermost in the minds of great statesmen immediately after the War and one misses greatly Joad's observation regarding this new impulse and reference to the League of Nations.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

*Power Through Repose.* By ANNIE PAYSON CALL. (Selwyn and Blount, London. 3s. 6d.)

This is a welcome reprint. Though it emphasizes the material aspect of regaining the equipoise of natural living, the spiritual is more or less implicit in the recognition that it is the will from which the mental and physical receive their orders—true or otherwise as the will itself obeys natural and spiritual laws in giving them. The book defines true relations with others in terms of the unity of life, for unselfish well-balanced character leads to well-balanced nerves. Its method is based on the law of rhythm, while its homely ethical common sense is in everyday language.

It takes up the symptoms and causes of nerve tension with its wastage of

energy and efficiency and shows how weakening are "sham" exaggerated emotions, misplaced sympathies and egoistic worry. It analyses the evil thus, that most people live so strongly in the subjective that the nerves cease to be open channels for the power within them, the personal attention being reversed back uselessly on itself, so that the whole system becomes constricted.

It points out the wisdom of effortless effort, or "letting go", but warns that a teacher's help is advisable with the relaxation exercises to keep a steady balance in the training. Readers will find the book helpful on condition that they do not just pick out exercises, but apply the advice as a whole.

W. E. W.

*The Freedom of the Streets.* By JACK COMMON. (Martin Secker and Warburg, London. 6s.)

Having just written one I believe perfectly respectable review of Mr. Common's book I was suddenly impelled to set it aside and write another, for while I had set forth what seem to me his essential themes, I had somehow contrived to omit him, as a person, altogether. And the sense of him, speaking in his own terms and in his own voice, is, one might almost say, half the book, giving it, for better or worse, a large part of its essential validity. Who touches this book, touches a man, and a man whose distinction it is that, while he can juggle the terms of intellectualist discourse as ably as most, he remains, in outlook and sympathy, one with the "common people".

The volume, whether regarded as a single exposition or as the series of separate essays it more truly seems to be, has many faults of exposition. Even the basic themes appear to be sensed rather than clearly grasped, and while many aspects give the impression of not having been worked out in particular detail perhaps even more are omitted altogether. It is quite typical that writing of the decay and death of one culture, and his hope of the break-

ing through of another, Mr. Common can scarcely glance at those broad religious problems and considerations which to many minds must seem the inevitable foundation.

Broadly, his topic is the process he sees everywhere at work of the individual's absorption into the mass, the steady conversion of ever wider social strata into the single body of the economically and politically dispossessed proletariat. (Fascism he defines as frightened reaction from this—the flight of those seeking to save themselves at the expense of others.) He indicates the helplessness, and even the apathy, of this proletariat, but believes that all power finally rests with it, and that the present negative phase will pass, and the world's salvation be found in the great working-class virtue of brotherhood, of "good-neighbourliness".

Much beyond that he cannot go, but when he writes of the workers he writes of what he knows as do few authors of such books. For his publisher to call this "an exploration of every avenue" is absurd, but those avenues it does explore it illuminates with flashes of real common sense and the impact of "an intense living experience".

GEOFFREY WEST

## ENDS AND SAYINGS

The last issue of THE ARYAN PATH which contained articles on Gandhiji's political philosophy embodied in *Hind Swaraj* brought a criticism from more than one writer about the place and power of machinery in human life and in our civilization. In *Harijan* for 10th September Shri Mahadev Desai examines at length this objection, quoting Gandhiji's views in full. For the benefit of our readers and the critics we print these views below :—

Even now the question often arises : 'What is a non-violent means?' It will take long practice to standardize the meaning and content of this term. But the means thereof is self-purification and more self-purification. What Western thinkers often lose sight of is that the fundamental condition of non-violence is love, and pure unselfish love is impossible without unsullied purity of mind and body.

What is a common feature of all the other appreciative reviews of the book is in the reviewer's opinion Gandhiji's unwarranted condemnation of machinery. "He forgets, in the urgency of his vision", says Middleton Murry, "that the very spinning wheel he loves is also a machine, and also unnatural. On his principles it should be abolished." "This", says Prof. Delisle Burns, "is a fundamental philosophical error. It implies that we are to regard as morally evil any instrument which may be misused. But even the spinning wheel is a machine ; and spectacles on the nose are mere mechanisms for 'bodily' eyesight. . . . Any mechanism may be misused ; but if it is, the moral evil is in the man who misuses it, not in the mechanism." I must confess that in "the urgency of his vision" Gandhiji has used rather

crude language about machinery, which if he were revising the book he would himself alter. For I am sure Gandhiji would accept all the statements I have quoted here, and he has never attributed to mechanisms moral qualities which belong to the men who use them. Thus in 1924 he used language which is reminiscent of the two writers I have just quoted. I shall reproduce a dialogue that took place in Delhi. Replying to a question whether he was against ALL machinery, Gandhiji said :—

"How can I be when I know that even this body is a most delicate piece of machinery? The spinning wheel is a machine ; a little toothpick is a machine. What I object to is the craze for machinery as such. The craze is for what they call labour-saving machinery. Men go on 'saving labour' till thousands are without work and thrown on the open streets to die of starvation. I want to save time and labour, not for a fraction of mankind but *for all*. I want the concentration of wealth, not in the hands of a few, but in the hands of all. To-day machinery merely helps a few to ride on the backs of millions. The impetus behind it all is not the philanthropy to save labour, but greed. It is against this constitution of things that I am fighting with all my might. . . . The supreme consideration is man. The machine should not tend to atrophy the limbs of man. For instance, I would make intelligent exceptions. Take the case of the Singer's Sewing Machine. It is one of the few useful things ever invented, and there is a romance about the device itself."

"But", asked the questioner, "there would have to be a factory for making these sewing machines, and it would have to contain power-driven machinery of ordinary type."

"Yes", said Gandhiji, in reply, "but I am socialist enough to say that these

factories should be nationalised, State-controlled. . . The saving of the labour of the individual should be the object, and not human greed the motive. Thus, for instance, I would welcome any day a machine to straighten crooked spindles. Not that blacksmiths will cease to make spindles ; they will continue to provide spindles, but when the spindle goes wrong every spinner will have a machine to get it straight. Therefore replace greed by love and everything will be all right."

"But", said the questioner, "if you make an exception of Singer's Sewing Machine and your spindle, where would these exceptions end?"

"Just where they cease to help the individual and encroach upon his individuality. The machine should not be allowed to cripple the limbs of man."

"But, ideally, would you not rule out ALL machinery? When you except the sewing machine, you will have to make exceptions of the bicycle, the motor car, etc."

"No, I don't", he said, "because they do not satisfy any of the primary wants of man ; for it is not the primary need of man to traverse distances with the rapidity of a motor car. The needle on the contrary happens to be an essential thing in life, a primary need."

But he added : "Ideally, I would rule

out all machinery, even as I would reject this very body, which is not helpful to salvation, and seek the absolute liberation of the soul. From that point of view I would reject all machinery, but machines will remain because, like the body, they are inevitable. The body itself, as I told you, is the purest piece of mechanism ; but if it is a hindrance to the highest flights of the soul, it has to be rejected."

I do not think any of the critics would be in fundamental disagreement with this position. The machine is, like the body, useful if and only to the extent that it subserves the growth of the soul.

Similarly about Western civilisation. Mr. G. D. H. Cole counters the proposition that "Western civilization is of sharp necessity at enmity with the human soul" : "I say that the horrors of Spain and Abyssinia, the perpetual fear that hangs over us, the destitution in the midst of potential plenty, are defects, grave defects, of our Western civilization, but are not of its very essence. . . I do not say that we shall mend this civilization of ours ; but I do not believe it to be past mending, I do not believe that it rests upon a sheer denial of what is necessary to the human soul." Quite so, and the defects Gandhiji pointed out were not inherent defects, but the defects of its tendencies, and Gandhiji's object in the book was to contrast the tendencies of the Indian civilization with those of the Western.