



The Aryan Path

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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"THUS HAVE I HEARD"—

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There is no satisfying lusts even by a shower of gold-pieces. He who knows that lusts have a short taste and bring suffering in their train is wise.

So says the Master Gautama, He who followed in the footprints of His Illustrious Predecessors. This Verse 186 of the *Dhammapada* contains a principle of conduct which modern Psychology ignores. Lust carries within itself the force of greed: lust is ever avaricious. It craves fulfilment repeatedly, for its pleasures are short-lived.

The ordinary kind of lust is described in the *Gita* (XVIII. 38) as *rajasic*—mobile, seeking satisfaction of a craving and, as soon as it is satisfied, asking for more. Its pleasure arises "from the connection of the senses with their objects which in the beginning is sweet as the waters of life but at the end like poison." Furthermore, repeated indulgence tends to draw it downward to a grosser materiality. It becomes more and more dull and dark and tends "both in the beginning and the end to stupefy the soul."

The modern psychotherapist, to whatever school he belongs, not knowing what lust is, whence it arises or how it can be controlled, sometimes tends to the dangerous belief that indulgence will cure by producing satiety. Modern Psychology well knows that man is dual—human and animal. But the origins of human-ness and animality are traced to a wrong source called the mind, and that mind once again has remained *terra incognita* because its nature and its powers are not adequately understood.

Above all, the part played by the emotions is not comprehended. Their relation, on the one hand, with the senses and the organs and, on the other, with the mind—the sixth sense and therefore material—is one factor. Then, the relation between the functions of this combination and the higher mind, Man, the real Thinker, is the other. Un-

less these relations are recognized the true prescription for the control of lust, be it of sex and the body, or of anger and greed of the mind, will not be discovered.

The profound teaching is presented in these very simple words of the Mahayana tradition :—

Do not believe that lust can ever be killed out if gratified or satiated, for this is an abomination inspired by Mara. It is by feeding vice that it expands and waxes strong, like to the worm that fattens on the blossom's heart.

How, then, is man to control the force of lust, which, satisfied, develops greed and grosser types of concupiscence, and, when opposed, becomes irritated and wrathful? From passion proceed anger and avarice and thus in this world men and women are ever face to face with the three gates of hell. (*Bhagavad-Gita*, XVI. 21)

The person desirous of controlling his animal tendencies has to clear his consciousness and fix in his understanding the truth that it is not by gratification or by satiety that he will be able to rise above those tendencies. He must also gain the conviction, born of knowledge, that he need not and should not remain a prey to his animalism—whatever its name and form. Next, that the Controller is within him, nay, is himself. One or two experiments in perceiving that he himself is other than and superior to his animal tendencies will bring him real confidence. Once a man gains the faith,

rooted in knowledge, that he is the master and controller of his animalism, the rest will be easy. Of course, effort will be needed to control the enemy seen and to gain the final victory over him. But well begun is half done, and the initial perception of his own superior nature as the Controller is the preliminary step.

There is one more thing which he who is afflicted with animalism must learn, if he wants to conquer it. Western Psychology classifies mental states which are joined to emotional ones. The Psychology of the *Gita* and the ancient Sages also classifies the *moral* states, treating the mental states as effects produced by moral conditions. The old-world Psychology lays bare unsuspected bases of error; it discloses the most subtle forms of self-delusion; it marks out the true course so painstakingly that the dullest mind cannot fail to gain a clear perception of the way to gain the victory over animalism. The Will to fight and to succeed will open the ways to knowledge and with this Will as bow and arrow a person can successfully take aim and hit the mark. Otherwise? What happens to the mentally lazy and morally blind? Says the *Dhammapada* of the Master Gautama Buddha (Verse 240) :—

As rust springing from iron eats into its own source, so do their own deeds bring transgressors to an evil end.

SHRAVAKA

UNITY AND HARMONY IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE

[We publish here the summary, prepared by the lecturer, of the very interesting address on this subject delivered at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on August 26th, under the chairmanship of Principal K. Sampathagiri Rao of the National College, Bangalore. The lecturer, **Shri K. Balasubramania Aiyar**, Member of the Legislative Council, is a Secretary of the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Madras, and a well-known Sanskrit scholar. The message of unity and harmony which Sanskrit literature conveys, as is well brought out here, is one of which our modern world stands in most urgent need.—ED.]

In this lecture on "Unity and Harmony in Sanskrit Literature," my only attempt will be to share a few rambling thoughts with you. In one scene, Shakespeare shows us Hamlet, the Prince of Denmark, walking, reading a book. Polonius meets him and asks, "What do you read, my lord?"

And Hamlet answers: "Words, words, words."

Evidently not satisfied with this answer, Polonius further asks, "What is the matter...that you read?"

Now it may be true that some books we read are "words, words, words." But no great literature is merely words.

The English word "literature" is derived from the Latin *litera* (letter). But the word for literature in Sanskrit is much more expressive and significant. It is *Sāhitya* or the state of union.

Bhamaha, the great Indian rhetorician, expands this as the union

of *Śabda* and *Artha*, namely, word and sense united together, where the harmony consists in enhancing the beauty of the *rasa* or æsthetic sentiment of the composition. It is a complete harmony and commensurateness between the expression and that which is expressed, between form and content.

Another great Indian *Alaṅkārika*, Kunthaka, has described it thus: "*Sāhitya* is the harmony between one word and another in the expression and between one idea and another in the expressed."

The great Vaishnavite saint, Pārāśarabhatta, similarly speaks of the *Soubhrātra* (brotherliness) between the words and the brotherliness between the ideas and prays to Lakshmī to vouchsafe to him this boon of literature. Hence the finest poetry consists in the perfect union or complete understanding that subsists between the word and the sense. Metaphorically, this has been sometimes described as the marriage of word and sense. Wilfred Meynell,

in his biographical note to Francis Thompson's poems, writes: "'Sister's Songs' is a poem to be read aloud, for sound and sense herein celebrate their divine nuptials."

Kālidāsa likens the union of Shiva and Pārvatī in the *Ardhanārīśvara* form to this union of *Vāk* and *Artha*, word and sense. In *Raghuvamśa* (I.1) it is said, "For the correct understanding of words and their meaning; I bow to Pārvatī and Parameśwara, who are the parents of the universe and are associated together like words and their sense." It is not the ordinary union of sound and sense, which consists in a word having a meaning and denoting it. It is a union *par excellence*, in which, apart from the ordinary meaning of the words and sentences of a literary piece, there is a suggestion of a noble emotion or idea which enhances the beauty of the composition and creates a profound æsthetic joy in the heart of the hearer or the reader. This has been called *Dhvani* in Sanskrit Rhetoric. The genius of great poets like Vālmīki, Vyāsa and Kālidāsa consists in this *Dhvani*, namely, the peculiar unity and harmony of sound and sense. The Sanskrit language is so constructed that the Sanskrit words have three *Śaktis*, namely, *Abhidhā* or the well-accepted meaning of the word; the secondary significance, called *Lakṣhaṇā*; and the third, the most important, the *Dhvani* or suggested meaning. I can illustrate the *Dhvani Śakti* by a beautiful *śloka* found in the *Kumārasambhava* of Kālidāsa, in which

he goes into ecstasies over the beauty of the voice of Pārvatī.

The *Dhvani* of the words *Anyapushṭā* and *Abhijāta* suggests to the reader the fine idea involved in the verse. The poet suggests that the beauty of the voice is not merely the sweetness of the sound but is also the outward expression of the beauty of the soul. Thus: "When she of sweet voice spake, radiating nectar, as it were, even the notes of the cuckoo appeared harsh to the listener, like the sound of a harp untuned." Many more examples can be given from Sanskrit literature but I shall resist that temptation for want of time.

There are three aspects of unity and harmony in Sanskrit literature, which I want to stress: (1) Unity and harmony of word and sense, (2) unity and harmony between man and Nature, (3) unity and harmony between Nature and God. Indian poets have often pictured to us, by their beautiful descriptions, the unity and harmony of feeling, emotion and sensation that exists between man and objects of Nature such as flowers, creepers, plants, trees, animals, and even inanimate things like clouds, rivers, mountains, etc. The poet Wordsworth says:—

Thanks to the human heart by which we live,
Thanks to its tenderness, its joys, and fears,
To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.

The finest description and realization of this unity of human beings with Nature will be found in Kālidāsa's *Śākuntala*. The heroine Śa-

kuntalā is a child of Nature, reared from her infancy, as her very name implies, by the beautiful birds of the forest. She, the abandoned child of an *apsarā* of heaven, is picked up by the great sage Kaṇva and brought up by him in the atmosphere of his *tapovana*. She lives and moves and has her being amongst the creepers, plants and trees of the forest and grows as a companion of the gentle deer and of the lamb. She loves the creepers and delights in tending the plants and watering them and revels in the enjoyment of the forest scenery. When she goes to join her husband, Dushyanta, everything in the hermitage is moved with the grief of separation from her. The sage Kaṇva calls on the trees of the hermitage to bid farewell to Śakuntalā who is going away to join her husband in the city, and he utters a beautiful verse describing the affection and friendship that subsist between Śakuntalā and the creepers, plants and trees of the forest. It seems that Śakuntalā would not drink water before she had watered the plants. Even though fond of ornaments, on account of her affection for the creepers she would not pluck the flowers from them and she celebrated her own festival when the trees showed their first sprouts in the spring. Such is her attunement of heart with Nature, that Kālidāsa speaks of the trees having given her presents on the occasion of her going to her husband, in the shape of beautiful flowers and red gums for lac-dye for her feet.

Kaṇva likes to call the trees the nearest and dearest relatives of Śakuntalā and to fancy that the trees replied to him in the beautiful sound of the cuckoo. Before parting from the hermitage, Kālidāsa says, she takes leave of the *vana-jyotsnā* creeper, which has just twined itself on the branch of the mango tree. Kaṇva is moved with the same feeling of satisfaction at Śakuntalā's joining her husband as at the creeper approaching the mango tree. This poetic fancy of the oneness of man with Nature is sustained by the conviction of the Sanskrit poets of the truth of the one Spirit which pervades all creation, and exists as much in the objects of Nature as in the human mind.

John Ruskin, in his *Modern Painters*, Vol. III, refers to this as the "Pathetic fallacy." He says

this fallacy is of two principal kinds. ...it is the fallacy of wilful fancy, which involves no real expectation that it will be believed ; or else it is a fallacy caused by an excited state of the feelings, making us, for the time, more or less irrational.

By way of illustration, he quotes these lines from Alton Locke :—

They rowed her in across the rolling foam—
The cruel, crawling foam.

The foam is not cruel, neither does it crawl. The state of mind which attributes to it these characters of a living creature is one in which the reason is unhinged by grief. All violent feelings have the same effect. They produce in us a falseness in all our impressions of external things,

which I would generally characterize as the "Pathetic fallacy."

Indian poets have taken a different view. They see no fallacy nor anything pathetic in the attribution of human feelings to objects of Nature and in the realization of the unity and harmony of the sentient and the non-sentient. They feel as Wordsworth felt when he wrote of

...that serene and blessed mood
In which the affections gently lead us on,—
Until, the breath of this corporeal frame
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul;
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things.

And again, when he says:—

...And I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things....

In the *Meghasandēśa*, Kālidāsa poses this very question and answers that the love-laden soul will see no difference between sentient and non-sentient beings and he therefore takes as the text of his poem the sending of a message with a cloud by the Yaksha during the period of his separation from his beloved from his temporary residence on Mount Rāmagiri, in Central India, to the distant city of Alakā in the Himālayas, where his beloved resides. The poem is a priceless one of exquisite poetic fancy, in which the

utter self-abnegation of the lover is finely depicted. The pleasure-loving Yaksha, in the profound grief of separation, indulges in one long drawn out "Pathetic fallacy," according to Ruskin, and describes the delights which the cloud will enjoy among the rivers and the mountains, the trees and the creepers.

As already pointed out, Indian poets have never doubted this truth of unity and harmony; and Vyāsa in the *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* refers to a clear outward expression of this unity. Describing the cosmic nature of the heart of that self-realized Soul, Śuka, the son of Vyāsa, it is said that, when in his grief at separation from Śuka, who was of the tender age of five, Vyāsa followed the running boy calling aloud, "My son! My son!" the whole forest resounded as if in response: "Son! Son! Son!" Vyāsa explains it as due to the *Sarvabhūta-hṛdaya* of Śuka.

Truly has Shakespeare said:—

The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from
earth to heaven,
And, as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy
nothing
A local habitation and a name.

Similarly, Sanskrit literature speaks of the unity and harmony of Nature with the Godhead. The Sanskrit writers see the power of God in the awful silence of the mountain peaks, in the wonderful glow of the dawn and in the glorious colours of the sunset. Indian civilization has reared lofty temples which reach the skies as houses of God, and erected them on the tops of hills and in the dales.

The Ṛshi of a Vedic hymn in praise of the Dawn pictures the

Dawn in this manner (*Indian Wisdom* by M. Williams) :—

Hail, ruddy Ushas, golden goddess, borne
Upon thy shining car, thou comest like
A lovely maiden by her mother decked,
Disclosing coyly all thy hidden graces
To our admiring eyes ; or like a wife
Unveiling to her lord, with conscious pride,
Beauties which as he gazes lovingly
Seem fresher, fairer each succeeding morn.
Through years on years thou hast lived on
and yet
Thou art ever young.

Kālidāsa refers to the Himālayas as *Devātma*. In fact, the form of Shiva has been conjured up from the scene of the great mountain bearing the dark clouds resembling Shiva's matted locks on its peaks, white with snow resembling the ash-smeared body of Shiva, with the Gangā rolling down its slopes, its peaks reaching up to the skies, with the sun and the moon shining on them.

In the 13th *sarga* of *Raghuvamśa*, Rāma sees the blue ocean as resembling the blue form of Vishnu. The great Swami Vivekananda once, when asked by an American lady why Vishnu was painted blue, an-

swered, "Blue is the colour of infinity; look at the blue sky and the blue ocean."

Again, Kālidāsa likens the mingling of the white waters of the Gangā with the dark blue waters of the Yamunā to the broad breast of Shiva on which the dark-coloured snakes co-exist with the white ashes smeared on his body.

In the *Kumārasambhava* we find the same phenomenon in the fine description of Pārvatī doing penance on the slopes of the Himālayas, when the drops of rain fall upon her forehead and eyelashes. The description of the trickling down of the water from her eyelashes to her breasts, and further down to her thighs and feet, conjures up before our mind's eye the scene of water falling from the peaks to the slopes of the Himālayas and finally running down the vales. Pārvatī is the daughter of the Mountain and her unity and harmony with the Mountain are beautifully expressed in this verse of Kālidāsa.

K. BALASUBRAMANIA AIYAR

ONE WORLD GOVERNMENT

Rousseau's theory of the social contract lost its early vogue, but not before the patriarch of modern Constitutions, that of the U.S.A., opened with the words: "We the people of the United States...do ordain and establish this Constitution." "We, the peoples of the United Nations," introducing the Preamble to its Charter, represented a step towards regaining the fundamental concept of sovereignty as vested ultimately in the individual.

Mr. Morikatsu Inagaki (Central P. O. Box 324, Tokyo, Japan) concludes, with a clear statement of that proposition, his admirable chart dealing with the question "Is *One World Government Possible?*"—a chart prepared for the Second London Parliamentary

Conference on World Government, September 1952. He writes:—

Sovereignty cannot be transferred from national governments to a federal government because there is no such thing as "national sovereignty." It is always the execution of the will of the individuals, through their instruments of execution called governments. No expression can be so widely misleading as the term "national sovereignty."

Proposals for concerted action on matters of world concern have been repeatedly blocked by particular nations' jealousy of their "sovereignty," so Mr. Inagaki's warning is pertinent that, as long as the term is used, it will "stand as an obstacle to the understanding of federation on an international scale."

THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION AND THE MESSAGE OF JESUS

[Dr. Hermann Goetz, the Curator of the Baroda Art Museum and an essayist and art critic of discernment, contrasts here the message of Jesus, or pure Christianity, with the "Churchianity" which so often passes for it. "Churchianity" puts forward dogmas and exclusive claims which are foreign to the message of the Christ. It is separative in its tendency, whereas that message, which surely better deserves the name "Christianity," is a universal one, in harmony with the teachings of all the great prophets and reformers, as distinguished from those of the priests who profess to be their followers while denying the spirit of their message.—ED.]

Nothing has been open to so many and so contradictory interpretations as the message of Jesus the Christ. Soon after his death the small band of his followers threatened to be lost in the multitude of sects shooting up in the intellectual turmoil of Imperial Rome. For in a supernational empire the old nature cults had lost their authority and in the rationalism of a city society they had lost their meaning. St. Paul saved Christianity but did so by impressing on it his own very personal and even arbitrary interpretation. Soon there evolved differing traditions concerning the very words of the founder, part of which tried only to be faithful, whereas others span Jesus's sayings out according to the interpretation of this or that sect.

Thereafter Christianity developed into the most successful new ideology reshaping and co-ordinating the many currents of the dying antique world; but in order that it might fulfil this rôle its ethics were subordinated to a mass organization and

its ritualistic needs, its imagery was transformed into a substitute for the heathen myths and its theology was cramped into the terminology of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic philosophy. The final product of this transformation again was squeezed into the primitive, magic-obsessed minds of the Teutonic barbarians and of the Syrian, Egyptian and North African fellahin taking over the cultural heritage of the collapsing empire. Thus from the scientific point of view Mediæval Christianity represented a child-like and narrow, magic-animistic world, though saturated with profound symbolic meaning and general human wisdom. Beginning with the Renaissance this world picture broke up, also that human wisdom and at last even the very message of Christ embedded therein was discredited. Since then, the quest for Christ's message has never ended; interpretation has followed upon interpretation, without end and likewise without conclusive result.

For through all these vicissitudes the Gospels have never ceased to cast their spell over whosoever has made their acquaintance. Men might bitterly disagree on the philosophy of the Gospels. But they could never ignore the appeal of the ethical message conveyed therein. Even less could they free themselves from the spell of the magnetic personality of Jesus, of the tragedy that had been the life of him who called himself the Messiah, the Christ, the Saviour, the Son of his Father. Confused as the tradition is, the uniqueness of this personality, of its message, of its tragedy, shines through every line of the Gospels. However much subsequent generations may have tampered with this tradition, they could neither have invented nor utterly distorted the picture of a person and a message that stand fundamentally isolated in their time, and that also the modern critic cannot help accepting as one of the loftiest, if not the loftiest within the reach of mankind.

But as soon as we try to define that general impression, we fail. Jesus's life, acts and sayings appear full of contradictions. It is evident that already the Evangelists had felt helpless, though they had obviously tried to offer a truthful account, some more pragmatically, like St. Mark and St. Matthew, others relying on an already digested interpretation, like St. Luke and St. John. All were confronted with the task of co-ordinating the mate-

rial, of bringing sense and logic into it. We feel the various trends of reaction. The miracle worker or the social revolutionary who taught that "many that are first shall be last; and the last shall be first," that "the meek...shall inherit the earth" and "they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake...the kingdom of Heaven," and that publicans and harlots might enter the kingdom of God before the rich and righteous ones. Or the Messiah of the line of David, the Anointed One, foretold by the prophets. Or the Son of God proclaimed by St. John the Baptist, the son of the Virgin, born and grown up amidst miracles like the Buddha of the Mahayana and the Child Krishna. At last, the word became flesh, the divine *avatāra*, "the way, the truth and the life," but by whom "no man cometh unto the Father."

These interpretations of individuals and of schools account for many contradictions in the Gospels, but only for a fraction. For though there are many facts, many sayings, which are repeated in all four orthodox Gospels, and have all the appearance of being genuine when we try to co-ordinate them, we are faced with a hopeless confusion, even with contradictions. Many theologians have tried to discover the key, some building up a syncretistic, some an eschatological, others a purely ethical and others again a rationalistic interpretation.

What is the truth? Our personal attitude towards Christianity hinges

on this question. The hearts of millions today are attached to the words of Christ, but their intellects have been estranged by the theologies built up on those words. The gulf between science and religion springs from the conflict between what, on all the principles of critical research, we accept as truth, and the systems which have been constructed, in a traditional, allegorical or rationalistic spirit, on a co-ordination of all the traditional sayings of Jesus, accepted as equally authoritative and equally important. This conflict is at the root of the half-heartedness which today demoralizes Christianity. A religion which is built on *irrational blind belief* is dishonest; and a dishonest belief will never survive a great cultural crisis like that in which we are living at present.

But, we may ask, is that which we are accustomed to call Christianity, really Jesus's message? There are only two passages in the Bible which Jesus has expressly described as authoritative statements of his teachings, *viz.*, his definition of the great commandment, given to the Pharisees (St. Matthew, 22: 36; St. Mark, 12: 29; St. Luke, 10: 26) and "the Prayer of the Lord" (St. Matthew, 6: 9; St. Luke, 11: 2). They contain absolutely nothing that conflicts with our modern scientific ideas, nothing that conflicts with the best in any of the other great religions of mankind. But if these might be the only exact formulations of Jesus's teachings, how have we to explain his other discourses and ser-

mons? For they, too, appear genuine. The whole problem hinges on the question whether Jesus could always preach in such an authoritative form that his words may be accepted as teachings in the absolute sense, valid without qualifications, without taking into account the circumstances of the moment.

This absolute acceptance is the average theological approach. In trying to understand any poet, artist, philosopher or sage, we normally make allowance for his character, his life circumstances, his moods, his personal experiences, the development of his personality and his ideas, and thus do not attribute the same importance to every saying or other form of expression. If, however, anyone believes that Christ was the one, unique Son of God incarnated to save mankind, he has likewise to accept the inevitable implication that, as Jesus had to bear all the burden of mankind, he had to find not only a public able to understand him, but even a public willing to listen at all to him, the little, unknown Galilean. His message is too lofty for many even today. What then of his time, agitated by violent nationalism, ritualism, idolatry and scepticism? Endlessly repeated through the Gospels we find the statement that the public did not understand Jesus, nay, that even his own followers did not understand him. Numerous are Jesus's words about those who have eyes and see not, who have ears and hear not, about those who love darkness rather

than light when light is come into the world.

If, then, Jesus had all his life to struggle with non-comprehension and if he nevertheless was anxious to spread his message, would it not be natural to conclude that he must have tried to adjust himself to the level of his public, and to find familiar forms of expression and concepts which could be carriers of his unique experience? If we accept such a consideration, even as a possibility, we can interpret the majority of Jesus's words no more as infallible, absolute dogmas, but merely as publicity, a message adjusted to the intellectual capacities and accustomed ideologies of his listeners. Then, however, we cannot treat them as absolute constituent elements of a Christian theology but merely as supplementary sayings which have to be interpreted in the light of the respective circumstances in which they were uttered. Such an interpretation, of course, has to be cautious. We cannot simply reject as spurious any sayings that do not fit into our own concepts. We have first to find out what had been Jesus's fundamental teachings. And next we have to discover Jesus's changing relations with his public, the development of his own personality under this impact and finally his adjustment to the outlook of that public.

Such an approach is the key to the tragedy of Jesus's life. For the development of the heretic Galilean preacher into the Messiah, the Lamb of God offered for the sins of man-

kind, follows a very definite psychological pattern. And the figure of a Jesus who at last surrendered himself voluntarily, though in fear and trembling, to a horrible death in the vague hope that then, perhaps, his message might at last be understood, is greater and more convincing than the human sacrifice accepting a ritual death in an unquestioned act of atonement. For it means a greater expression of love, a greater sacrifice and likewise a more human destiny fulfilled. "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends."

What, then, had been Jesus's essential message? One answer is Jesus's own definition in reply to the question: "Which is the first commandment of all?"

"And Jesus answered him: 'The first of all the commandments is... Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind and with all thy strength.... And the second is like.... Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.'"

Now a definition preserved in three practically identical versions is something very succinct, comprising everything essential, permitting perhaps of elaborations, but not of additions and alterations.

And the second is "the Prayer of the Lord." Jesus had taught his followers only this one prayer, not to be repeated carelessly as a formality, but to be absorbed, experienced in solitude, in fullest concentration, in relationship to all our life. But this,

too, contains nothing of traditional Christian theology; instead, it is a psychological education with the purpose of bringing man into harmony with God, with the universe, with mankind, into the profoundest experience, the highest wisdom. "The Prayer of the Lord," therefore, is more than a definition, it is the nucleus of a theology and it is worth our while to pay some attention to what it contains, and what it does not contain.

God is not defined, except by the one expression "Our Father...in Heaven," *i.e.*, an all-comprising cosmic force (maybe, even, the integral field of energy of modern physics), creating, life-giving, loving. He is personal, in so far as the innermost life-force in man (which is a-personal in the everyday sense) is consubstantial with Him ("child and father"). But God is not anthropomorphous, for He is spirit. Now this concept is identical with both the teachings of the Rishis of the Upanishads (*Jīvātman* and *Paramātman*) and again with the latest conclusions of science (Einstein, Eddington, Jeans, Stromberg, etc.). "Hallowed be Thy name." If this be not taken as a mere ritualistic formula—an idea loathsome to Jesus—it can only mean the respect and love for all that are implied in God's epithet of Heavenly Father; love for all, for every creative urge and every creative achievement, from the growing grass to the child and its mother, every vision, every thought, every act in search of

Truth. For Jesus promises to send the Holy Ghost which is "the Spirit of truth." (This seems to be in harmony with Albert Schweitzer's definition of ethics as "respect for life.")

"Thy kingdom come," then, cannot refer to any church, an idea originally not in Jesus's mind—even if we accept the isolated and spurious blessing for St. Peter. The "kingdom" can only be the sphere of creative life, of open-mindedness and receptivity (whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child "shall in no wise enter therein"), of understanding, love, growth, creation. This "kingdom" is the actual crux of Jesus's message. "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." And life is something always growing, changing, creating, nothing permanent, nothing established, nothing to be caught in forms and formulas. Real life even needs physical death, for death means the recreation of the growth process though in new forms, whereas "eternal" existence would be eternal death, ossification, petrification. Eternal life can be only in the cosmic process as a whole, in God. The very acceptance of the "Kingdom of God" implies the acceptance of change and of death. "Whosoever will save his life, shall lose it; and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it."

"Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven," does not, therefore, imply submission to an inexorable fate. It is a positive identification

of one's own life experience and life hopes with the working of the living cosmos, a positive acceptance of all good things as creative opportunities, of evil as a challenge. For evil is the necessary force of death, destroying whatever has ceased to be creative, whatever has become a hindrance to the growth of life, however glorious its dead monuments may appear; or it is the force stimulating all forces of life which had slackened in the seductive slumber of easy-going existence.

Therefore, "Give us this day our daily bread." This restricts providential care to the very day of our prayer, as the parables of the fowls of the air and of the lilies of the field likewise proclaim. For it is the many walls of self-protection, of precautions for tomorrow, of a thousand defences against possible dangers—of which the first is that of lack of subsistence—which choke man's capacities, his creative inspiration, his understanding and love for other beings, all the wealth of life experience open to those who are as "little children." Because "where your treasure is, there will your heart be also, therefore, lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth."

"And forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors." Because we fear, we regard every wrong really or apparently done to us as a breach in our walls of self-defence; we feel weak and humiliated. And we generate new evil in hitting back, forgetting that often enough our adversary had acted out of mere igno-

rance, clumsiness or the same fear which is possessing us. For the fear-obsessed can feel safe only when no potential enemy is left, *i.e.*, when he has destroyed or broken all other life around himself. The first step towards a creative life is to accept and understand the life and the weaknesses also of others, by realizing that they commit exactly the same mistakes as ourselves.

With this "the Prayer of the Lord" touches the very problem of sin: "And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil." How could the very force of life lead us into temptation? The end of the prayer explains this paradox: "For *thine* is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, for ever." The temptation lies in the creative capacities given to us, individually as well as collectively, *e.g.*, as races, nations, civilizations; the evil is that we regard them as our own merits, our achievements, as our right and property, our successes as our own glory, forgetting that they form no more than a tiny spark in the creative process of the universe, subordinate to its more prominent trends; that our own successes may be no more than a sparkling bubble of foam on the waves of time, and that our failures may prove fruitful beyond our life and knowledge. In the last instance our life and our work are important only in so far as they are a creative part in the creative world process.

This is a message of utter simplicity and clarity, laid down with per-

fect logic and correct psychology. But it is also a message upsetting all the ordinary reactions of man, his fear of life, his greed, his envy, his vanity. Like Jesus's definition of the first commandment, it contains nothing of our accepted Christian theology. No description of God, of the Trinity, of angels, or of hell, no word about Christ the Saviour, of salvation by Christ's death, of the Day of Judgment, absolutely nothing of all those details that once antagonized many Christians and drove them to other religions and that today bring them in conflict with science. Instead, there is a statement

of psychological relationships in harmony with what the greatest saints of Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism have taught us, what, in cruder form, the old nature religions had already experienced. It simply adjusts man to the universe and to his fellow creatures, but is not concerned with any of the old magic and animistic urges of mankind, nor with the archetypal images in which man always had sought consolation. Jesus's message proper contains absolutely nothing conflicting with modern science, it is more in harmony with it, in contrast to official church theology.

HERMANN GOETZ



BERNARD LEACH

BRITAIN'S MASTER POTTER

[This essay by **Mr. Denys Val Baker**, who is a British novelist with the editing of several literary journals to his credit, will be encouraging to many who deplore the shackles laid by mechanization and mass production methods upon the creative spirit of man. For Bernard Leach has completed William Morris's demonstration that utility and beauty could still be combined in modern days in objects of daily use. He has proved that hand-production, besides serving as an outlet for the creative impulse and giving æsthetic satisfaction to both maker and user, can be made to pay. He has shown, moreover, that it can make a profit not only for the organizer of the enterprise but also for the participants in a " ' we job ' instead of an ' I job, ' " that would have rejoiced Morris's heart. Hand-workers in India and other countries can take encouragement and perhaps pattern from Bernard Leach's success.—ED.]

In a few weeks' time a tall, grey-haired, keen-eyed man in his late sixties will leave the sunlit beaches and straggling streets of St. Ives, Cornwall, on a journey almost to the other side of the world. Behind him he will leave perhaps the most famous pottery in Britain, which during its 30 years of existence has turned out not only some of the best pots but also some of the best potters in the Western world. Ahead of him will lie a fascinating period of re-contact, of taking up the threads of a former close association between the potter's craft of the East and that of the West.

It will not be Bernard Leach's first visit to Japan. He spent his childhood there, in the care of grandparents. Later he came to England and studied painting under Henry Tonks at the Slade School of Art, besides being trained in etching by Frank Brangwyn. But the

strange spell of the East was upon him still and, when he was 21 and newly married, he went back to Japan " to find out for myself what this strange Eastern art, and the life behind it, meant."

In Japan Leach found a world where the artist was recognized and accorded a dignity he seldom attains in this country. He found a country where there were not only numerous highly trained craftsmen—many of them attached to the Court—but where also the traditional country crafts were a natural part of the life of the peasants. Prominent among these crafts were weaving, lacquering and pottery.

Then, at a party of artists in 1911, Leach for the first time saw pots being fired, after being painted by the guests, including himself. He was so fascinated with this medium, which seemed to him to offer such an exciting combination of the

imagination of the artist with the practicality of the craftsman, that he determined to become a potter.

In Japan there are various schools of potters, each headed by a master. Leach was fortunate enough to be introduced to Ogata Kenzan, sixth in succession to the founder of one of the most famous Japanese lines of potters, and he became his sole pupil. From Kenzan he learned all the traditional knowledge and recipes, with which passes mastership. For nine years, latterly in company with a brilliant young Japanese artist, Tomimoto, he served an exacting but inspiring apprenticeship. It was an exciting period, too, for both Leach and Tomimoto were mentally and culturally far removed from their master. They were young and flexible, ever searching for new ideas. They had little knowledge of craft movements in other countries, and therefore were bound by no set guide to thought and prowess. They were determined to avoid mere imitation of old styles. They searched constantly for new forms and patterns, and in so doing bought their experience expensively—but, as Leach says, "What we learned thereby we really knew."

In 1920, accompanied by a young Japanese potter, Hamada, Bernard Leach returned to Britain, determined to found a pottery of his own which would in some way fuse the æsthetic ideas of his Japanese training with the natural traditions of British pottery. He had heard of the development, in Cornwall, of the

St. Ives Handicraft Guild, and it was finally in partnership with the Guild's founder, Mr. Horne, that Leach and Hamada started their pottery at St. Ives.

From its very inception, the Leach Pottery was an *artist's* pottery. Leach has written:—

For some years our main revenue came from enthusiasts in London and Tokyo. We worked hard, but with the irregularity of mood. We destroyed pots, as artists do paintings and drawings, when they exhibited shortcomings to our own eyes. We only turned out two to three thousand pots a year between four or five of us, and of these not more than 10 per cent. passed muster for shows. Kiln losses in those days were quite high—20 per cent. at least. The best pots had to be fairly expensive. What was left over was either sold locally or went out on that usually unsatisfactory arrangement of "sale or return" to craft shops up and down the country. Nevertheless, our work became known, students arrived, critics were kind, my Japanese friends held repeated exhibitions of my pots and drawings and sent all the proceeds to help establish our new pottery at St. Ives.

The background of thought behind the new undertaking was that of the artist turned craftsman; or, at least, that of the educated and thinking man perceiving the largely unconscious beauty of material, workmanship and general approach which had preceded the industrial revolution, and desiring to recapture some of the lost values through the work of his own hands. It was, in

effect, a continuation of the great tradition of men like Ruskin and William Morris.

In those early years Leach's pots were shown at many national and international exhibitions; between 1920 and 1931 there were about seven "one-man" shows in London. While these were moderately successful, it became increasingly clear to Leach that it was not enough to make and exhibit expensive personal pottery—that the solutions to the contemporary problems of the craftsman were "not likely to be discovered in the expensive precincts of Bond Street—that springboard of virtuoso and showman."

The next step, then, was to balance the artist's pots, made simply for their own sake, with a basic production of what is called domestic ware, *i.e.*, teapots, porringers, egg-bakers, pitchers, soup bowls, beakers, etc. These were generally made in the English slip-ware technique, using chocolate-coloured clay obtained from Fremington in North Devon. So popular did these domestic lines prove that sometimes the kilns at the St. Ives pottery would be fired half a dozen times without a break. Originally these brick kilns were fired with wood, but in 1937 oil-firing was installed, and today there is also an electric kiln.

During the 1930's, though Hamada had returned to Japan, the Leach pottery developed considerably under the general direction of Bernard Leach, now aided by his sons David and Michael and several

other young potters, among them Michael Cardew and Harry Davis, both of whom have since established highly successful potteries of their own. In 1938, the pottery took on its first two local apprentices, a good move which has been carried on. (Indeed, today there is a waiting list of nearly 400.)

The future looked bright, but the war brought its setback. One night in January 1941, a parachuted landmine, intended for an airfield several miles away, fell in the garden of the pottery. It blew down a cottage, shook or sucked off slate roofs, glass, doors, etc., and broke pots worth about £2,000.

Personal injury was light—what to do next was the problem. With difficulty we hired canvas to cover the pottery proper, but the house was condemned by St. Ives, Plymouth and Bristol (three times). Not only that, but we were blamed for the happening by local people, and were not permitted to protest in the press that the pottery had *not* been signalling to German planes by kiln-fires!

Eventually our Member of Parliament took the case up, and it was fairly and sympathetically reviewed by the Board of Trade, after three years' uncertainty, during which we had lost all but one of our workers to the Forces. Repairs were thorough, and we were even granted a special licence to make and sell outside "utility" regulations, and to employ seven workers—if we could find them! We did—twelve in all at different times—but only two or three partially trained, so production lagged.

But after the war, with the increased demand for craft products, the fortunes of the Leach Pottery soon revived. Today it is an economically successful business, with a large home and export trade, employing up to 20 people. But a business with a difference, for pottery is a very individual affair: the worker works with his hands, in close contact all the time with his craft.

As might be expected, too, in an enterprise directed by a man of Bernard Leach's vision, there is not the normal atmosphere of a business, with a "boss" and "employees."

At the Leach Pottery we have aimed at a high common denominator of belief, and in the sharing of responsibility and profits. By accepting the Cornish motto "one and all," and by making the workshop a "we job" instead of an "I job," we appear to have solved our main economic problem as hand-workers in a machine age. We have found out that it is still possible for a varied group of people to find and give real satisfaction because they believe in their work and in each other.

To me the most surprising part of the experience is the realization that, given a reasonable degree of unselfishness, divergence of æsthetic judgment has not wrecked this effort. When it comes to an appraisal of various attempts to put a handle on a jug, for example—right in line and volume, apart from purpose—unity of common assent is far less difficult to obtain than might have been expected.

If you look at a Leach pot or, better still, at a variety of Leach

pots, the truth of this statement can be seen. There is a subtle unity underlying the styles, no matter how different they may seem at first glance. In the way of the true master, Bernard Leach has communicated his years of knowledge and wisdom, in the potter's craft, to those who have come to be his pupils and to work with him.

Today this gifted leader of English craftsmen prepares for yet another return visit to the East. The last time he went back to Japan was in 1934, when he spent a year visiting various centres of pottery and working with leading Japanese potters. During that visit he helped his Japanese fellow craftsmen to gather the funds and materials for the establishment of the National Museum of Folk Art in Tokyo.

Here in Britain there is still no such centre, though there is now a British Craft Centre in London, which Bernard Leach helped to form. He is tirelessly active in the cause of such ventures, and was also one of the founders of the important Penwith Society of Arts in Cornwall. Until recently he taught pottery at the Penzance Art School, and is in great demand as a lecturer. He recently returned from a lecturing visit to the United States of America, where he found much to interest him in the efforts of the new schools of American potters.

Wherever he goes, Bernard Leach's keen and learned mind absorbs new facts and ideas: much of this knowledge he has expressed in *A Potter's*

Book, published in 1940, and in *A Potter's Portfolio*, issued in 1951. But he would be the first to testify that, for a potter, a book can be only a second-hand means of expressing his ideas. Beyond a point, he says, it is unnecessary and unwise to use words—they are poor substitutes, halting lamely behind what the potter actually does in his proper medium, clay.

The hand is the prime tool and it ex-

presses human feelings intimately; the machine serves for quantity, cheapness and, at best, a marvellous efficiency, but it turns man into a modern slave unless it is counterbalanced by work which springs from the heart and gives form to the human imagination.

That is the creed of Bernard Leach, master potter: and in it may well lie the only hope for the survival of our modern civilization.

DENYS VAL BAKER

PENAL REFORM

The summary in *The Hindu* of September 25th of the voluminous Report of the Madras Jail Reforms Committee mentions several commendable recommendations relating to structural, administrative, dietary and prisoners' wage reforms, the segregation of juvenile and first offenders, etc. There is, however, a hint of defeatism in the Committee's remark that "jails rarely reform and so imprisonment should be resorted to only if other alternatives are not suitable." Jails *should* reform; that is their primary job. If that basic concept is grasped, prison officials of the right type, firm but humane; proper education, including vocational training; the availability of cultural and ennobling literature and other recreational opportunities, including athletic competitions which develop the team spirit; moral instruction free from cant and appealing to the nobility innate in every man—these can do much. *Bhajan* singing may be useful but certainly the paid teachers of particular religions recommended by the Committee seem inconsonant with the requirements of a secular State.

Fines to suit the status of the culprit

as well as the nature of the crime, as recommended, however fraught with complications, might well gain in their deterrent effect, if impartially imposed. The Committee's recommendation, moreover, of added support to and activity of the Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society is sound. Special attention is needed to prevent the stigma of former imprisonment handicapping a released convict attempting to go straight.

The recommendation that "whipping for grave offences should be retained" is reactionary and most regrettable. A single infliction of this savage penalty seems well calculated to undo years of constructive effort at moral rehabilitation, not for the victim alone but also for many of his fellow prisoners. Certainly this barbarous punishment will go the way of the death sentence when the Committee's most important single finding, one in which we very heartily concur, is implemented, namely, that it is time a competent committee undertook "revision of the Indian Penal Code to bring it into line with modern conceptions of crime and treatment of criminals."

THE LAWS OF CULTURE

[In this article **Shri P. Kodanda Rao, M. A.**, of the Servants of India Society, shows the fallacy of assuming a hard-and-fast division of humanity on cultural lines. This point was made also by the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, in its paper submitted to the same New Delhi conference to which the writer refers here, on "The Concept of Man and the Philosophy of Education in East and West" (published in our January 1952 issue and as the Institute's Reprint No. 8). The fundamental, spiritual unity of mankind is one of our deepest convictions and we should go so far as to say that all differences between even individual members of the human family are superficial or temporary—sometimes both.—ED.]

"East and West can each preserve its own genius without becoming encased in a sterile hostility." This was the first sentence in the Basic Document prepared by the Unesco Secretariat (UNESCO / CUA / 28, Paris, 3 August, 1951) for discussion at the conference held in New Delhi in December 1951 to discuss the cultural relations between the East and the West. The Document referred to the

disquiet and perplexity prevailing among the two great civilizations of yesterday, ready to give birth to the one civilization of tomorrow but cowering under the threat of a world crisis far beyond their capacity to control.

It said that to ensure peace efforts should be made to bring about mutual understanding between the two, "in preparation for that future civilization which should be the common property of all men." It posed the question whether a synthesis was possible. It granted that there was some truth in the traditional opposition between the two, but pointed out that they already

had much in common between them and that each owed something to the other, and urged that each should supplement the other more in the future without losing its own identity and values. Keyserling and Schweitzer would reconcile the two by "Westernizing the East," René Guénon would "Easternize the West," while Rabindranath Tagore and Radhakrishnan would synthesize the two.

These several solutions are significant only if the postulate be valid that there *are two* civilizations, the Eastern and the Western, each with its distinct and distinguishable culture pattern through the ages. But is the postulate itself valid?

Culture or civilization comprehends the whole gamut of human activities and not only a sector thereof, like fine art, good literature and refined manners. If it referred only to the latter, there could hardly be any conflict between the two civilizations involving mutual destruction, political, economic or military.

When culture is divided into Eastern and Western, the *differences* between the two are emphasized, not their resemblances. When we classify living things into animals and plants, we have in mind their differences and not their common factor as living beings. Similarly it is postulated that Eastern civilization has a pattern of culture common to all Easterners, and Western civilization a pattern common to all Westerners, and different from the Eastern one. A well-known American professor even advanced the view that the schism had taken place at the very dawn of civilization, and that the pattern of each then set had governed its subsequent development with an iron hand.

Very often, Western civilization is also called European civilization, white civilization or modern civilization. Now, *west* refers to a cardinal point, *Europe* to a geographical area, *white* to a racial character, and *modern* to the time factor. By contrast, Eastern civilization is presumed to be Asiatic, non-white and ancient. And yet we speak of the civilizations of Greece and Rome as Western though ancient! In the same geographical area, like South Africa, Western civilization is said to be characteristic of the white race as distinguished from that of the non-whites, but the Unesco findings indicate no correlation between race and civilization.

A pattern is distinguished by its constants. What are the constants of Eastern and Western civilizations,

coeval with them? The Unesco Basic Document suggested that the essential characteristic of Western civilization was Science, and of Eastern civilization, Spirituality. It proceeded at once to say that, as a matter of fact, the East had Science and the West had Spirituality! It did not, however, define Science and Spirituality or explain how it assessed them in each of the civilizations.

Christianity, industrialism, democracy, the freedom of women, technological inventions like phonographs, telephones, sewing machines and electric lamps, and institutions like the Salvation Army, the YMCA, trade unions and Hollywood, are said to distinguish Western civilization from Eastern. But a little examination shows that none of these has been coeval, coextensive, and conterminous with Western civilization. Western civilization is much older than Christianity; it was pagan before Christ. Many Eastern people are Christians, and some of them were such even before the West. Similarly, Western civilization is older than industrialism, democracy, the telephone and Hollywood. These culture-traits do not now characterize all or most of the people of the West exclusively, and never have done so. If Western civilization was Western because of these, what was it before each of them? Eastern?

A group consists of individuals and is such only to the extent that they have things in common. A

number of individuals who have, say, Christianity in common and constitute a Christian group, do not necessarily form a racial group. A group of United States citizens may have only the American nationality in common, and no other culture-trait. The group which has the English language in common consists of the nationals of England, Canada, Australia and America and some of practically all other nations in different proportions.

No single culture-trait has been characteristic of the East or the West exclusively and through the ages. The concept of a Western civilization and an Eastern civilization is, therefore, invalid. There are no two great civilizations to start with. The question of their relations and the need to reconcile them does not, therefore, arise. The proposal to do so makes as much sense as, say, a proposal to reconcile the difference between London and Saturday!

Culture consists of an ever-increasing number of culture-traits, like Christianity and Buddhism, the wheel and the plough, the telegraph and the newspaper, handicrafts and mass production, untouchability and lynching, fundamentalism and evolution, vivisection and Vedānta. None of these is either Eastern or Western in origin or diffusion, invention or imitation. *Each was invented by an individual some time and somewhere, and diffused, fast or slowly, to other individuals, far or near.* Christianity was created by an individual in Jerusalem about 2,000

years ago. From him it spread to his disciples, who carried the message in all directions with varying speed to other individuals, so that by to-day it has spread more or less all over the world. Christianity radiated, as it were, from the centre of origin in time and place to the circumference during the centuries. It has nothing to do with East or West, Europe or Asia, white or black, modern or ancient, male or female.

Nor has the electric bulb anything to do with Western, or European, or white, or modern, or even American, civilization. It was invented by an individual, Thomas Alva Edison, in a laboratory in the U.S.A. And from the individual inventor it spread to other individuals in all directions and with varying speeds. It was not American, because the millions of Americans who were his contemporaries did not invent it jointly with him. Among those who subsequently used his invention were Americans and non-Americans, men and women, rich and poor, theists and atheists, employers and employees, none of whom had any part in the invention. Nor did Edison invent it because he was an American or was deaf, or had sold newspapers in his earlier days. Invented by an individual at a particular place and a particular time, the electric bulb spread to other individuals all over the world and is still spreading.

Each culture-trait divides humanity at any given moment into two groups: the group of individuals who have accepted it and the group who

have not yet done so, but not into East and West or North and South. Christianity is a culture-trait which divides the people of the world into Christians and non-Christians. The electric bulb divides humanity into two groups: those who use it and those who do not use it at any particular time. But the two sets of groups do not coincide. The Christian group is not necessarily, much less exclusively, the group with the electric bulb. The groups cut across, even as do the classifications in a census. Though the individuals enumerated are the same, the numbers in the respective groups vary according to the classification. The age-group will not coincide with the sex-group or the professional group or any other grouping. In short, each culture-trait group cuts across other groups.

Each individual is simultaneously a member of as many groups as he has culture-traits. The same individual may be a member of the Christian group, a trade union, a cricket group, the Chinese National group, a democratic group and other groups at the same time. And each culture trait encompasses a varying number of individuals. The Rotary is a smaller group than the Christian; the Christian group is smaller than the group which uses the friction-match or consumes rice.

All culture-traits do not have the same range and rate of diffusion, even when diffusion is not restricted by external factors. For instance, given the same freedom of diffusion,

the friction-match has a wider and quicker diffusion than, say, the plays of George Bernard Shaw. The diffusion-potential seems to vary with the nature of the culture-trait.

Culture-traits may be divided into three broad categories: the Physical Sciences, the Social Sciences and the Fine Arts. Culture-traits of the first category have, as it were, a maximum diffusion-potential because they have maximum objective validity. Two and two make four for all in time and space. The friction-match has a maximum of objective validity and therefore a maximum diffusion-potential; it has become practically universal. On the other hand, a culture-trait of the Fine Arts category has a minimum diffusion-potential, because, while tastes have a maximum of subjective validity, they have a minimum of objective validity.

The diffusion-potential of culture-traits of the Social Sciences category is greater than that of culture-traits of the Fine Arts, but less than that of those of the Physical Sciences, because their validity is partly objective and partly subjective. Given the same set of objective statistics, the subjective evaluation may vary with each individual, as in politics and economics.

Culture consists of material traits like the electric bulb, and non-material ones like Vedānta. The former can be *owned*, but not the latter.

Conflicts of culture are largely due to claims to exclusive ownership

of culture-traits, as when people speak of "my" language and "your" language. While material culture, like property, can be owned exclusively by an individual, a corporation or a nation, non-material culture, like ideas, cannot be owned. No language, for instance, *belongs* to anybody exclusively. Anybody can learn any language. But a car can be owned exclusively. The professor who freely shares his knowledge with his students will not share his salary with them; he is none the poorer for sharing his knowledge, but he would be poorer if he shared his salary.

While, therefore, there can be conflicts between individuals and groups regarding ownership of property, there is no justification for conflicts regarding non-material culture-traits like religions, languages, customs and manners, arts and literatures, sciences and philosophies. Nevertheless, there are many conflicts of this kind because of the extension of the idea of ownership to such non-ownable culture-traits. For instance, the English language is presumed to belong to the British, and, therefore, Indians are urged to

boycott it. But, does English belong to the British in any sense? No Britisher is born with the English language; he learns it after birth. So does a non-Britisher. If one had to be born in England and be a British national to speak English, no non-Britisher would be able to acquire it. Similarly, Vedānta is not an Indian philosophy; it is a philosophy which anybody may learn who cares to do so.

In schools and colleges all over the world and in all ages those who know the sciences, arts and technology, have taught them to those who at the moment did not know them. Knowledge has no nationality, race or region; there is no European Science and Asiatic Spirituality. There is and there can be no conflict between the electric bulb and Vedānta because the former is "Western" and the latter is "Eastern." Moral values also are universal, and are not correlated with "East" or "West." In short, no culture-trait is "foreign" or "alien" to anybody, though it may be "new." Each individual is unique, because of culture, because of his unique combination of culture-traits.

P. KODANDA RAO

BON—THE PRE-BUDDHIST RELIGION OF TIBET

[Dr. R. de Nebesky-Wojkowitz, Research Associate of the Museum of Ethnology in Vienna, who studied Oriental Philology and Ethnography at the Universities of Berlin, Vienna and London, has specialized in Himalayan and Central Asian cultures. For the past two years he has been engaged in research in the Indo-Tibetan borderland, studying there the various tribal cultures and early Buddhist as well as pre-Buddhist Tibetan beliefs and collecting for his Museum ethnographical objects of the Lepcha and Tibetan cultures. He is therefore well fitted to write this article, which we are publishing in two instalments. He mentions in connection with the similarity of certain Buddhist magical ceremonies to those of the Bons that these are performed especially by lamas of the school which did not accept the reform of the great 14th century teacher Tsong kha pa.—ED.]

I.—TIBETAN BUDDHISM AND BON ORIGINS

The double marriage of the Tibetan King Srong btsan sgam po (629-650 A.D.) to the Nepalese Princess Bhrikuti and to Wen-ch'eng, daughter of the Chinese emperor Tai-tsang, gave an impetus to one of the greatest religious struggles which Central Asia had ever experienced. Both Bhrikuti and Wen-ch'eng were Buddhists and, on their initiative, King Srong btsan sgam po decided to call Buddhist monks into his country to spread Lord Buddha's peaceful teachings among the wild and unruly inhabitants of the Land of Snow, who were professing at that time a primitive, Shamanistic faith known by the name of Bon. As a result of the intensified contact with Tibet's more highly advanced southern and eastern neighbours, the first important reforms were carried out in Tibet by its progressive minded ruler. A new system of administra-

tion was established, by which was achieved greater centralization of the country, up till then only a conglomeration of more or less independent petty kingdoms. Tibetan writing was formed after the model of the Indian North Gupta script and Chinese workmen were invited to Tibet to teach the manufacture of paper; at the same time, the foundations were laid for the development of indigenous Tibetan arts and crafts.

While comparatively quick progress was thus made in raising the cultural level of the country, the Buddhist religion, in whose wake all these reforms were coming, met with numerous obstacles in its attempts to broadcast its teachings in the Land of Snow. In Srong btsan sgam po's time, it found but few adherents, mostly among members of the royal court, while the masses of

the country's population continued to profess the aboriginal Bon faith. Greater progress towards spreading Buddhism was made under King Khri srong sde btsan (743-789 A.D.), who called a number of famous Buddhist teachers to Tibet, the most prominent among them being the famous Tantrist Padmasambhava. The intensified work of the Buddhist missionaries was, however, met by an equally growing resistance from the side of the priests of the Bon faith, who, realizing that their predominance was endangered, began to plot with discontented groups of the Tibetan gentry for the overthrow of the pro-Buddhist royalty.

The conflict between the two opposing parties flared up with full force when King Ral pa chan, a devout Buddhist, was murdered in 839 A.D. by his brother gLang dar ma, who enjoyed the full support of the Bon priesthood and their allies. The reign of gLang dar ma lasted only three years, but it brought Tibetan Buddhism to the brink of annihilation. Under the King's orders thousands of valuable Buddhist scriptures were destroyed, the monks were killed or expelled from their temples and the latter were desecrated and often converted into Bon sanctuaries. At last a Buddhist monk, disguised in the garb of a Bon sorcerer, killed the King and thus turned the tide. Buddhism came to power again and from then on the Bon religion began to lose ground steadily. Today only a few areas, mostly in the border provinces of

Tibet, exist in which adherents of this ancient Tibetan faith can still be found.

The greater part of the present-day Bon priesthood distinguishes itself scarcely at all by its teachings, rites or even by its ecclesiastical garb from the Tibetan Buddhist clergy. Shortly after the first Buddhist missionaries had started their work in Tibet, the Bon priests began to accept those elements of the Buddhist tradition which appeared to them suitable for their own purposes. Thus, using the script which the propagators of Buddhism had introduced, they put into writing some of their own oral traditions but, to a still greater extent, they formed their own religious literature by imitating the style of Buddhist scriptures, often only changing the text by substituting for the Buddhist expressions words of their own terminology.

On the other hand, Tibetan Buddhism itself, seeking quicker diffusion among the rather conservative inhabitants of the country, compromised in many ways by incorporating into its own religious system many of its old, deeply rooted Bon practices; thus the greater part of the magical ceremonies performed nowadays by the lamas—and especially by those who did not accept the religious teachings of the great Tibetan reformer Tsong kha pa (1359-1419 A.D.) can be traced back to the most ancient beliefs of Central Asia. In this way, many of the old Bon gods were received into the pan-

theon of Tibetan Buddhism under the explanation that these deities had tried at first to bar the way into Tibet to the propagators of Lord Buddha's creed, who, however, had conquered those evil spirits easily and released them only after binding them by a solemn oath to become from now on protectors of Tibetan Buddhism. Similarly, the adherents of the Bon faith made many a Buddhist deity their own, even going so far as to claim that gShen rab mi bo, the legendary great teacher of the Bon doctrines, was a reincarnation of Buddha Shakyamuni himself. A short note on this prominent Bon personality might not be out of place here.

gShen rab mi bo is said to have been born in the West Tibetan borderland, at a place called Ol mo lung rings, in the country of Zhang-zhung (corresponding to the province of Gu ge). In the company of his numerous wives, he led a life of luxury, till the day when he suddenly decided to become an ascetic. Inspired by the Bon deities, he succeeded rapidly in obtaining supernatural powers which even enabled him, among other things, to turn at will into the Khyung rung bird, the horned Garuda of Bon mythology. His spiritual training having terminated, he received a mystic baptism in the presence of numerous supernatural beings and became thus the 18th great teacher of the Bon doctrine. The mighty gShen lha h.od dkar, the Bon "god of the white light," acted as his tutelary

deity and, by uniting himself with the goddess Sa grig er sangs, gShen rab mi bo came subsequently into possession of additional supernatural powers. From then on, the legends have it, he is supposed to have undertaken extensive travels, in the course of which he converted 12 countries to the Bon faith; later, he visited the world of the water spirits to broadcast his teachings there also and, having accomplished this task as well, he ultimately returned to the sphere of men, where he died at the age of 92.

To attempt a reconstruction of the form in which the Bon religion must have existed prior to the introduction of Buddhism into Tibet is a most arduous task, one which still awaits accomplishment. A study of this ancient Tibetan belief by recording the teachings and religious practices of the present-day Bon clergy does not lead very far since, in greater part, their religious life is only a replica of that of the lamas and there are only a few elements which distinguish the Bon priests from the latter, such as their heretical, anti-clockwise way of circumambulating sacred objects or their use of the *mantram*—*Om matri mu ye sa le du* in contradistinction to the well-known Buddhist formula *Om maṇi padme hūm*.

Also, the translating of Bon books has so far not achieved very satisfactory results, as most of them have been found to be adaptations of Buddhist scriptures. This work, however, has not yet been carried

very far and important results can therefore still be expected. Up till now only a few Bon texts have been examined by scholars. For example, the great collection of Bon works, comprising some 300 handwritten volumes, which is said to form a heretical counterpart to the Buddhist collections of sacred scriptures known as the Kangyur and the Tengyur, has unfortunately not yet been analyzed, in spite of the fact that a complete set of these rare texts is in the possession of a well-known research institution, the University of Chengtu in Western China.

The study of the practices of the so-called *Bon nag* or "black Bon"—unorganized sorcerers engaged primarily in the performance of black magic, in contradistinction to the previously described Buddhist-influenced Bon clergy, which is known as the *Bon dkar* or "white Bon"—has provided much valuable information. Unfortunately, however, adherents of the *Bon nag* have become rather rare and thus research in this interesting field has not yet progressed very far.

Another way of gathering information about the original Bon faith is by thoroughly analyzing the various components of the extremely complicated religious system known as Tibetan Buddhism. This task would be an easy one, if it were only a question of separating the elements of the ancient Tibetan faith from the pure teachings of original Buddhism; the case is, however, much more complicated. The Buddhist

religion which reached Tibet only about 1200 years after the death of its founder was in a decadent form, full of Tantric teachings and primitive Indian beliefs, accepting subsequently not only various rites of the Bon sorcerers, but apparently assimilating even some theories of the Manichæans and the Nestorian Christians, with whom the Tibetans came into contact in Khotan, an area which was under Tibetan military occupation during the 8th century.

So far, research in the various previously mentioned fields of Tibetan studies has not solved the question of how and where the Bon faith originated. Bon texts mention repeatedly that the western borderlands of Tibet and especially the land of sTag gzig—under which term the provinces of Eastern Persia are understood—were the region from which the Bon beliefs spread all over Tibet, an allegation which apparently contains some truth. Analysis of the various Bon beliefs and practices, however, links the aboriginal Tibetan faith above all with the ancient primitive system of sorcery prevalent in the Siberian region under the name of Shamanism; a few examples, showing this similarity, should be given here.

Just like the Shamans of Siberia, the sorcerers of the "black Bon" are able to despatch their own soul, to guide the spirit of a dead man to the heavenly regions or to free it from the power of a demon who had intercepted it on its way to the

other world; or the Bon magician, like the Shaman, might at night, during a trance, even lend his body to the spirit of the departed, so that he might converse with the surviving members of his family.

Ritual trances, in which a deity regularly takes possession of a medium, have become a very important part of the religious life of Tibetan Buddhism. The deities which manifest themselves on such occasions are the *Sprung ma* or guardian gods of the Tibetan Buddhist church; most of them are converted deities of the Bon, who are said to act now as protectors of Lord Buddha's creed and who, in the course of the trance, deliver prophecies through the mouth

of the person of whom they have taken possession. Best known among the numerous religious mediums of Tibet is the oracle-lama of the gNas chhung Monastery, who acts as the State Oracle of the Tibetan Government. Before any important decision either in the religious or political life of the Land of Snow is taken, the State Oracle is always consulted first. The deity which visits the gNas chhung medium, is the three-headed and six-handed dPe har, an aboriginal Tibetan god, who rides the "white lion with the turquoise locks," symbolic of the glaciers and the greenish streams which flow from them.

R. DE NEBESKY-WOJKOWITZ

THINKING TOGETHER

The line of thinking which lay behind the recent foundation at San Francisco of the Institute of Philosophical Research, directed by Dr. Mortimer J. Adler, is indicated in a remarkable short document entitled "A Dialectic for the 20th Century."

Struck by the confusion resulting from conflicting ideologies with vocabularies incomprehensible outside the groups which respectively hold them, those responsible for this Institute have set themselves a gigantic task, comparable to the effort of the French Encyclopædists of two centuries ago. The intellectual community which they seek implies not unanimity but understanding of each other's divergent views with their presuppositions and implications and of the relation of each theory to all the rest.


The desirability of such a meeting of minds, as distinguished from a superficial and sterile conformity, is as obvious as the range of the project is spatially and temporally vast. No-

thing short of a survey of the whole field of contemporary learning and of the relevant aspects of earlier inquiry is seen as necessary to the re-establishment in our century of such a "capacious universe of discourse" as shall enable men to think together to the extent of being able to understand each other's thought. One hopes that the relevance to modern thinking of ancient Indian thought, as in the fields of philosophy, psychology and ethics, will not be overlooked by the Foundation only because today so commonly ignored.

Not the smallest service of this ambitious project's success in any measure will be the check which it must give to irresponsible and uncritical thinking. In assisting mankind to become a brotherhood intellectually, the Institute of Philosophical Research will, moreover, be laying the foundation for a mutual good-will which should be all the stronger for not having emotion as its principal ingredient.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

PHILOSOPHY



Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. By WALTER A. KAUFMANN. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., U.S.A.; Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, London. 409 pp. 1950. \$6.00 or 40s)

It is an odd fact that all the best (as well as a few of the worst) books on Nietzsche in English have been written by Americans. W. M. Salter's *Nietzsche: The Thinker* (Palmer and Hayward, 1917) was at least serious; G. A. Morgan's *What Nietzsche Means* (Harvard, 1941) was a masterpiece of fidelity and lucidity. Now comes W. A. Kaufmann's *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, the objectives of which are two—first, to demolish the innumerable legends woven about Nietzsche over the past 60 years by propagandists of various creeds and, secondly, to present a new "comprehensive reconstruction" of his thought.

The first of these objectives Professor Kaufmann has achieved admirably. His scholarly study, supplemented by translations of Nietzsche's best poems and a thorough bibliography, should put an end to the epoch of caricature. After all, it is only needful to know what Nietzsche wrote in order to realize how little he had in common with the effigy erected by German nationalists

and burned by Bertrand Russell. Whether he has succeeded equally in his second undertaking is rather more questionable. I myself rate his interpretation lower than Professor Morgan's.

Nietzsche was, before all else, an experimental thinker. "I have always put my whole life and personality into my books," he wrote, "I know nothing of purely intellectual problems." Professor Kaufmann, in his laudable anxiety to vindicate Nietzsche's title to "a place in the grand tradition of Western thought," tends to minimize this experimental factor. Yet not only Nietzsche, but almost every major philosopher is incomprehensible apart from it—the "objective thinker" being a chimera of the common rooms. It might be better, as Karl Jaspers has suggested, to use Nietzsche's approach as a key to the grand tradition itself.

Nietzsche's entire being was involved in the quest for truth—a truth to live by. It was this that drove him to call in question every accepted judgment, even the apparently best-established; and the decisive event in his life was the conclusion which he eventually reached, that "there is no such thing as truth": in other words, that the only "reality" we know or ever can know is a reality "interpreted" by our own fundamental urge to survival or to the acquisition of power. To Nietzsche, this conclusion spelt the defeat of his deepest desire, and blank despair. It was out of that despair that he emerged reborn, as the prophet of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*.

How did he emerge? Briefly, through his realization that even his will to truth was nothing more than a faculty implanted and developed by generations of moral discipline; and that to condemn the nature of things for its

refusal to gratify that will was simply an all-too-human presumption. Since, however, this very realization involved an act of detachment, the will to truth was found to be justified after all—as the means to man's self-transcendence (*Selbstüberwindung*). Reintegrated into nature, Nietzsche was reintegrated himself; and the spontaneity of the consciously reintegrated is what he both exemplifies and proclaims in his great poem.

Professor Kaufmann's analysis of several of Nietzsche's cardinal conceptions, such as the "Will to Power" and "sublimation," could hardly be bettered; he grasps the dialectical character of Nietzsche's philosophy; and, although he underrates the influence on him of Wagner and Schopenhauer, he performs a really valuable service in tracing his affinities with Socrates, Plato and, above all, Hegel. But his interpretation has two serious defects. In the first place, he neither expounds nor criticizes Nietzsche's epistemology—and no reconstruction can be truly comprehensive that ignores the arguments that led Nietzsche to his radical scepticism. In the second place, he misapprehends the nature of the "new" Good proclaimed in *Zarathustra*: contending that Nietzsche reaffirmed the supremacy of reason, whereas what he actually stressed was its instrumentality—not, indeed, to impulse (as often alleged), but to the total Self. It was precisely his working out of the historical, philosophical and religious implications of this Good that Nietzsche signified by the "transvaluation of all values" (*Umwertung aller Werte*). Owing to his misapprehension, Professor Kaufmann is reduced to defining the transvaluation as a mere negation of current morality.

There is some justification for this view. Embittered by the incomprehension of his gospel (like many mystics in the first flush of their illumination, he had confidently expected an immediate response), and convinced that the salvation of Europe depended on its acceptance, Nietzsche undoubtedly did

relapse into loathing and desperation, and his later polemics are coloured by a sheer lust for the destruction of the existing order. Nevertheless, Professor Kaufmann's emphasis on these polemics obscures the fundamental challenge of Nietzsche's philosophy.

For—and this is what constitutes his unique distinction—even after he had overcome his despair of truth, Nietzsche never repudiated the reasoning that had led him to it. Consequently, even his own gospel was advanced, not as a revelation, but as a personal interpretation of reality. "I am a seer," he once confessed, "but my own consciousness casts an inexorable light upon my vision, and I myself am the doubter."

He believed that once scepticism had reached its term in nihilism, it would never again be possible for a prophet to claim possession of "the truth." Whether mankind would degenerate through its disbelief, therefore, or generate a new and superior culture, depended ultimately upon whether or not its leaders could positively rejoice in the thought that they themselves had projected whatever meaning the universe contained. This was the problem which he devoted himself to solving, in the only way in which it could be solved—by personal experiment; and it is by this, in the last resort, that his significance has to be assessed.

F. A. LEA

The Great Philosophers: The Eastern World. By E. W. F. TOMLIN. (Skeffington and Son, Ltd., London. 299 pp. 1952. 18s)

Readers of Mr. Tomlin's earlier book, *The Great Philosophers: The Western World*, will know that for him philosophy is essentially a means to wisdom; not for him the "disembodied intellects" brooding over abstractions. In the present volume he remarks how the great Oriental thinkers persistently "dwell on common themes" and "never lose sight of the fundamental

problem, namely that which concerns life's meaning and purpose....In the Orient it is impossible to be a philosopher without being also a sage." He makes short work, moreover, of that distinction between religion and philosophy dear to Western academic minds but almost foreign to Hindu thought.

Few religions are self-enclosed. All great faiths interpenetrate. Church may persecute church...but the impulse behind every faith is identical....Religion [is] not the competitor or even the extension of philosophy, but the basic element in the Perennial Philosophy.

It is from this standpoint that Mr. Tomlin—treating his readers neither as fools nor as specialists—explores the history of Eastern thought from the Egyptians, the Babylonians and the Hebrew prophets and poets, through Zoroaster and the great Indian and Chinese thinkers, to Mohammed. While few can have expressed more sensitively the great debt of the West to the East, Mr. Tomlin sees the perfection of the drama of love as being achieved only in the Christian Revelation.

The major difference between Eastern and Western thought, regarded very broadly, resides simply in that which happened to Eastern thought when, as a result of the Christian Revelation, a new spiritual principle entered the natural sphere for the purpose of transforming it.

He is aware, however, that the doctrine of the Incarnation, of Word-made-Flesh, of Spirit choosing to inhabit Matter, has been accompanied in Western social life by a *Sturm und Drang* foreign to the East. "We may hope that the much-heralded 'awakening of the East' will not prove to be an awakening from a private dream of bliss to somebody else's nightmare."

Lastly, he believes that some *rapprochement* between Eastern and Western thought is possible. He sees a point of contact between the faith of a man like Kierkegaard and those many Eastern thinkers who have preached the possibility of "divine connection"; and he cites the importance to Western minds of the *Gita*, "with its emphasis

on *Bhakti*, or devotion to a personal God." He concludes:—

For it is in the revelation of Sri Krishna to Arjuna that we find the noblest message ever to have issued from the Oriental world: the summons to face the future and its perils with humility, with awe, even with a touch of anguish, but without fear.

J. P. HOGAN

Spinoza Dictionary. Edited by DAGOBERT D. RUNES; with a Foreword by ALBERT EINSTEIN. (Philosophical Library, Inc., New York. xiv+309 pp. 1951. \$5.00)

This is a fresh addition to the ever-growing Spinoza literature launched by the "Back to Spinoza" cry in the first quarter of this century and reinforced by the historic event in 1932, on the tercentenary of his birth, of his being "publicly taken back into the Jewish fold by a duly representative assembly at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem." History never allows us to forget that the Jews cast him out of their ranks when he was only 26. But, with the passage of time that makes history, his way of viewing the world *sub specie æternitatis* has become recognized as a classic inheritance which men cannot willingly let die. If the philosopher is, as Plato has taught us, "the spectator of all time and all existence" and time is but "the moving image of eternity," Spinoza has, in and through the philosophic motivation of his "love to a thing which is eternal and infinite," effected a transvaluation of Philosophy as a meditation upon Death into a meditation upon Life Eternal. A "free man," to quote his memorable words, "thinks of nothing less than of death; and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life."

In Spinoza the Indian mind discovers an unflagging interest. For to the Oriental, specifically the Indian, mind a life dedicated to Truth and consecrated by suffering for its sake, has a perennial attraction. Further, a philosophy which is inspired by the recognition of the sorrows of life, and which

finds in intensive knowledge or wisdom the only sheet-anchor, appeals to him irresistibly. Finally, "an intellectual love of God," attuned to a blessedness that is "unmingled with any sorrow," as the Indian thinkers would say, and which looks upon the highest knowledge or truth as the only path to that blessedness, must needs be welcomed as distinctly Oriental in conception.

What is most remarkable is Spinoza's discourse on falsity and truth, particularly the concluding reflection, wherein he seems to echo the age-old version of Truth sponsored by Indian thought. Says Spinoza:—

...it follows, therefore, that truth at once reveals itself and also what is false, because truth is made clear through truth, that is through itself, and through it also is falsity made clear; but falsity is never revealed and made manifest through itself. So that any one who is in possession of the truth cannot doubt that he possesses it, while one who is sunk in falsity or in error can well suppose that he has got at the truth; just as some one who is dreaming can well think that he is awake, but one who is actually awake can never think that he is dreaming. These remarks also explain to some extent what we said about God being the Truth, or that *the Truth is God Himself*.

With no loss of meaning every line of this illuminating extract could be attributed to any of the master-minds of India through the ages, to Shankaracharya in particular. The somewhat oracular utterance on Truth in the last line finds its best confirmation from Mahatma Gandhi, the legatee of Indian thought and culture, who wrote:—

I often describe my religion as the Religion of truth. Of late instead of saying God is Truth, I have been saying Truth is God, in order more fully to define my religion.... Denial of God we have known. Denial of truth we have not known.

Similarly Indian in tone and conception is the oft-quoted dictum of Spinoza's *Ethics* (Bk. V): "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself." It recalls inevitably the Vedantic, specifically Shankarite, prescription of cultivated apathy towards enjoyment of the fruits of one's labour as a philosophical prerequisite to the study of Vedanta.

Another priceless legacy from Spinoza

is his conception of "Peace": "not mere absence of war, but... a virtue that springs from force of character." That "Peace" is not a privative but a positive concept, arguing back to an inward tranquillity born of the steadfastness of will. The derivative meaning of the word "*Shāntih*," which is the Sanskrit equivalent of the English word "Peace," confirms our construction of it in this positive sense. The root "*Sham*" (to control the inner sense), from which the word *Shāntah* is derived, may usefully be contrasted with the root *Dam* (to control the external senses) from which the word *Dāntah* is derived. The etymological construction of the word, supplemented by a psychological and radical treatment of it, ensures the right appraisal of "Peace"—an appraisal which seems to have impelled the United Nations Organization to the redemptive remaking of the war-weary world through the Unesco with its recognition that "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed" and that "peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind."

On the question of citizenship, its rights and obligations, Spinoza has some instructive remarks to make. "A State is a society established with laws and the power of preserving itself" while "those who live under its protection are called citizens." For the State, as much as for the individual citizen, "the effort for self-preservation is the first and only foundation of virtue."

That a statement of such foundational importance has a truly Oriental touch about it, no one can deny. It is this effort of self-preservation, in Spinoza as well as in Indian philosophical thought, that finds its consummation in the blessedness of self-realization or "self-recognition"—not in the formal definition of God as Substance but in the intellectual love of the mind towards God, with which Spinoza closes his system.

SAROJ KUMAR DAS

Humanistic Ethics. By GARDNER WILLIAMS. (Philosophical Library, Inc., New York. xii+293 pp. 1951. \$3.75)

One important phase of contemporary thought is the revival of Humanism, particularly as a result of the attacks on supernaturalism by the philosophers of both Communism and Democracy. According to them the centre of interest of all philosophy is man and the chief values are the human ones. There are many forms of Humanism, depending on how man is understood. The standpoint of Professor Williams is that of Naturalistic Humanism; for him, man as an individual is primary and as a member of society, secondary. Emphasis on the primacy of the individual, not only in politics but also in ethics, is a good antidote to totalitarian philosophies, though extreme forms of either individualism or socialism are unjustifiable.

Professor William's book is provocative. It is true that there is no satisfaction in the abstract but only the

satisfaction of the individual. But from such a factual statement as "Each man seeks his satisfaction" how are we to derive the statement that "Each man *ought* to seek his satisfaction"? This common criticism of Hedonism, from Mill onwards, Professor Williams has not answered. Again, if "ought" is relative to each individual, no way can be found to resolve the ethical conflicts within the individual and between individuals.

This book, however, deserves the serious consideration of ethical thinkers; it helps the re-thinking of ethical issues from the standpoint of man as an individual.

P. T. RAJU



ANTHROPOLOGY

The Book of the Jaguar Priest: A Translation of the Book of Chilam Balam of Tizimin. With a Commentary by MAUD WORCESTER MAKEMSON. (Henry Schuman, New York. 238 pp. 1950. \$3.50)

To students of prehistoric lore, this is a rich account, emanating from Maya Indians, of their "legendary history, customs, prophecies and religion" and of their fortitude under conquest by the "bearded adventurers," the European conquerors whom the Jaguar priest termed "strutting turkey-cocks."

The destruction of the Maya civilization and manuscripts was a tragedy in cultural history; by 1593 there were few tribal elders left who could decipher the Maya records and the education of children in the ancient lore was prohibited.

It was at this stage that, in the "Books of Chilam Balam," the Mayas recorded the wealth of their culture and their way of life in a wonderful testament, conceived in cultural frustration and wrapped in secrecy.

The most important chapters of the commentary are those relating to the "Gods and the Calendar" and "The Count of Katuns." An annotated translation, a very useful bibliography and an index complete the monograph of 238 pages.

In India, there is a school of thought holding that the Maya civilization was an offshoot of ancient Indian culture. But this volume, we are afraid, does not provide any sound facts that will warrant the hypothesis of a primitive culture-contact between the Indian and the Maya civilizations.

The Maya calendar, we are told, "constituted the framework of the Maya religion and one cannot be understood apart from the other." It may be observed without fear of contradiction that the very foundation of the Maya civilization rests on its wonderful independent establishment of the calendar in a perfected form. In one respect only, the translator writes, the Maya calendar resembled the Egyptian:—

...each considered the year to be composed of 360 + 5 days. In the Egyptian calendar, the 360 days were divided into twelve 30's, whereas in the Maya one, the division was into 20's.

We commend this remarkable monograph to the world of arts and letters.

CHARULAL MUKHERJEA

The Life-Giving Myth and Other Essays. By A. M. HOCART; edited, with an Introduction, by LORD RAGLAN. (Methuen and Co., Ltd., London. 252 pp. 1952. 15s.)

To borrow an apt compound word from the Fijians, this is no "watery-souled" collection of essays. The late A. M. Hocart was an anthropologist of independent and forthright mind, and he did not hesitate to call a time-honoured tradition a habit whenever it seemed such to him. The striking qualities revealed in these essays, brought together so adeptly by Lord Raglan, are world-wide knowledge, intellectual honesty and dry humour.

The style is full of axioms made fresh by the author's shrewd view-point. In the essay "Are Savages Custom-bound?" he dispels any superior preconceptions with his:—

If we think that the savage is a greater slave of custom than we are, it is because we see the mote in the other man's eye, but not the beam in our own.

As an anthropologist, Hocart digs deep into his amazing collection of human credulities on every subject from cabbages to kings.

In dealing with "Snobbery" he allows himself some bold and witty gen-

eralizations. Americans, he declares, "know money; they don't know you." This reverence for wealth, or for creating an impression of it, he attributes to the huge fluid population of the United States. He argues that in more settled communities social status tends to depend on private merit or birth.

We are not wholly convinced by his argument that it is because reformers ignore the force of snobbery that they fail. He maintains that utilitarian publicists have wasted a great deal of time trying to prove that war always results in loss and not in gain. His thesis is that nations, like individuals, care most for the *status* which victory and possessions bring them. He refers to Great Britain as "a society-leader among nations," taking pride in her colonies as a hostess takes pride in having a country residence as well as a town house!

It is one of the main theses of the book that all ritual consists in investing some person or thing with power to confer life, health, wealth and fertility. Hocart develops it with skill and relentless devotion to example.

Indians do not escape a good anthropological shaking at the author's hands. For instance, he claims that "Hinduism works with snobbery, not against it."

The anthropologist is, of course, not infallible. One regrets Hocart's readiness to assume that the Greek myths influenced the *Ramayana* and the *Puranas*. His contention that the "best people" of Hinduism would revert to *suttee* when the British withdrew force, has been proved manifestly untrue by the event since the essay was written. But the merits of this book far outweigh any minor shortcomings. Hocart makes lively and challenging reading, and no one who cares for truth rather than superstition will wish to carp.

DENNIS GRAY STOLL

Prelude to History: A Study of Human Origins and Palæolithic Savagery.

By ADRIAN COATES, M.A.; Foreword by GLYN E. DANIEL. (Methuen and Co., Ltd., London, 289 pp. Illustrated. 1951. 22s.6d.)

In this study of human origins and Palæolithic savagery the author, who describes himself as a non-professional archæologist, has provided the general reader with a coherent story based on the results of the latest researches, references to which occur both in the bibliography and in the notes appended to each chapter. It must not, however, be supposed that the book is merely a summary of existing knowledge, for the author makes many shrewd suggestions and occasionally arrives at penetrating conclusions. There is throughout the volume a refusal to accept some of the wilder conclusions of over-enthusiastic field-workers, such as the claim made at first for a Middle Pleistocene origin for some of the fossil material discovered in East Africa. It is interesting to note that since the book was published the Oldoway skeleton, as the author predicted, has been attributed to a very late stage of the Upper Palæolithic.

The book begins with a thought-provoking chapter on the relation of Palæolithic studies to human history in general. As Dr. Glyn Daniel states in his foreword, "Here emerges not only Mr. Coates the prehistorian, but Mr. Coates the philosopher, and the student of the method, content and aims of history and archæology." Since there is a paucity of good books on the methodology of prehistoric archæology, this serves an extremely useful purpose. The first chapter, on "The Framework of Territorial Change," states what is known and conjectured about the geological basis of human geography and paves the way for later chapters on the evolution of mankind and the various ages into which, for convenience' sake, prehistoric times are divided.

The general development of the Upper Palæolithic industries in Europe

and elsewhere from their earliest Chatelperronian phase to the later development of distinct cultures is next surveyed. Special attention is paid to the "Gravettian" culture of South Russia and to the later phases of Palæolithic culture in the classical regions of France and Spain, culminating in the industry and art of Magdalenian times. The book concludes with chapters on "Primitive Mind," "Primitive Society," and "Palæolithic Man and His Modern Successors." Readers desirous of a handy volume relating to India should consult Stuart Piggott's *Prehistoric India* (1950).

C. COLLIN DAVIES

Prehistoric Ireland. By JOSEPH RAFTERY, M.A. (N.U.I.), DR. PHIL. (MARBURG), M.R.I.A. (B. T. Batsford Ltd., London. 228 pp. Illustrated. 1951. 16s.)

In this well-produced and profusely illustrated book, intended for the general reader, Dr. Raftery has given an account of the prehistory of Ireland, based on the findings of archæology. No use has been made of traditional data; all his conclusions are interpretations of material remains. After some remarks on the ice age, the author deals with the changes in climate and in land level since 6,500 B.C., which have resulted in the peat-bogs and raised beaches so characteristic of present-day Ireland.

Dr. Raftery then outlines his system of chronology and gives the evidence on which his dating is based. This is followed by a description of modern excavation techniques, including four photographs of work in progress at various sites. The different types of field monuments are next considered, under the headings: monuments of the living, monuments of the dead, and ceremonial monuments.

The remainder of the book is taken up with a review of Ireland in the middle and new Stone, early and late Bronze, and early Iron Ages of

prehistory. Numerous and excellent photographs of the artefacts and monuments combine with the lucid text to make clear exactly what has been discovered. A brave attempt is made to interpret these material findings and so to give a coherent picture of life in Ireland in those far-off days. It is here that the weakness, not of Dr. Raftery but of the archaeological method, becomes apparent. To take one example: from burial customs we can try to estimate the underlying religious beliefs, but any such attempt is guesswork.

Dr. Raftery deserves congratulations for getting the utmost from an ineffective method, and Messrs. Batsford for the excellent quality of the photographs and the paper.

C. A. WINYARD

Masked Gods: Navaho and Pueblo Ceremonialism. By FRANK WATERS. (University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, N.M. 438 pp. 1950. \$6.50)

The troubled mind of man has ever sought stability in a sphere which lies beyond this eternally changing and evanescent world. This is the one basic motive behind all philosophical speculation, behind all religion, behind those myths and fables which universally represent man as a degeneration of the glorious being he once was. Man's verdict upon himself is that, in some form or other, he is a divine being, in this world but not of it, the glorious child of immortality; and this verdict has been reached by man at all levels of civilization.

In presenting a thorough and scholarly account of the American Indian version of this verdict and the ceremonialism and symbolism in which it is clothed, Frank Waters has rendered a very great service to world cultural thought and to the American Indians themselves, who have suffered so long the handicaps of misunderstanding and misrepresentation.

It is interesting to discover, however, that for this they are themselves partly to blame. For the tradition of strict secrecy about their ceremonialism has led to the victimization of visiting anthropologists as well as of their informants. But there is an explanation. Pueblo secrecy derives directly from the ceremonialism itself. Believing that all outward physical forms have inner psychical forms, it follows that reproductions will also carry away a part of the psychical entity and that even to talk of this power is to lessen it. By refraining from unnecessary violations the author's account avoids this pitfall and serves to complement the work of the ethnologists to whom the general reader has long been indebted for captivating glimpses into American Indian thought.

Dividing his book into three parts, the author has given a brief history of the Navahos and Pueblos, an interpretative analysis of their ceremonialism, and a discussion of the reflection of their religious ideology in their secular life and character, reviewing also the relation between these people, intuitive by nature, and the rational Americans.

The American Indian regards life as a mystery play.

Its players are cosmic principles wearing the mortal masks of mountain and man. We have only to lift the masks which cloak us to find at last the immortal gods who walk in our image across the stage.

The author has sought to link up this thought with Taoist and Buddhist philosophy, but he seems to have overlooked the basic and simple thought of the Upanishads with which it more readily finds analogy.

IRENE R. RAY

The Kamar. By S. C. DUBE; with a Foreword by CHRISTOPH VON FURER-HAIMENDORF, PH. D. (Published for the Ethnographic and Folk Culture Society, U. P., by the Universal Publishers, Ltd., Lucknow. xii + 216 pp. 1951. Rs. 12/8)

This monograph is the doctoral thesis of the author, a former Lecturer in Anthropology at Lucknow University, now in charge of the subject at the Osmania University, Hyderabad. Although he is "only at the beginning of his career as a field-anthropologist," Dr. Dube's venture is not amateurish, for he has already passed the portals of cultural anthropology by collecting the folk-songs of the Kamars and publishing "brief accounts of their life and living" and is at present carrying on research among the Chaukutia Bhunjias of Chhattisgarh.

With an engaging frankness Dr. Fürer-Haimendorf notes in the Foreword that "it is a straight monograph in the traditional style" and rightly holds this to be "indeed the soundest approach to a first study of any primitive community."

Those who have read the colourful accounts of the tribes of Orissa by Dr. Verrier Elwin from special and characteristic angles may regret that such orthodox encyclopædic accounts (like those of Sarat Chandra Roy—to compare great things with small) lack in variety and sustained interest. They will, nevertheless, in this infancy of Indian anthropology, welcome a comprehensive though rather short account of a hitherto little known jungle tribe (cavemen, to be specific), who, in the words of Dr. Fürer-Haimendorf, "in so far as their economy is concerned ... have never advanced beyond the stage reached by early Neolithic men."

Dr. Dube's credit lies in removing the veil of obscurity from these people, (numbering 9244 according to the Census of 1931) in the Raipur district of the Central Provinces, lying culturally between primitive food-gatherers and early agriculturists, of whom scrappy accounts could be read in John Ball's *Jungle Life in India* (1876), Grigson's *The Aboriginal Problem in the Central Provinces and Berar* and

Russell and Hiralal's *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces*. Although one looks in vain for further details, which the plodding ethnologist is never tired of recording for the sake of science and truth (even at the expense, at times, of literary qualities), the author makes up for their absence by the lucidity of his presentation and his sympathetic insight into the life of these tribals who, in the words of Disraeli to Queen Victoria, look like the "blank page between the Old and the New Testament." For these true autochthones of the Indian soil have lost all traces of the older Austro-Asiatic languages and, although they have no inherited taboo on cow-killing, have become so much Hinduized that cow-killing is now an offence with them. None live in caves now; in religion and ritual they are being Hinduized and walking cheek-by-jowl with other tribals of a higher level of culture, yet they retain their hatred for schools, their original feeling of tribal superiority and their love of home, with a rare aloofness from modernism.

Chapter VII of the book, dealing with culture-contacts, and Chapter VIII, concerning problems of tribal adjustment, provide interesting sidelights on the much-dreamt-of fusion of the tribals into the synthesis towards which India is moving. Dr. Dube earns our thanks by drawing public attention to the shattered economy and the oppression of the forest officials and the inevitable money-lender. Many of the chapters are rather meagre in details; the folk-songs deserved better attention; but the pretty illustrations, the useful appendices and the genealogies compensate to some extent.

As a pioneering venture, Dr. Dube's work on the Kamar is indeed a noteworthy contribution to ethnology and we hope that his future as a scientist on Man (the most neglected of zoological specimens) is assured.

CHARULAL MUKHERJEA



The Bridge of Life: From Reality to Mystery. By AUGUSTO PI SUÑER, M. D. (The Macmillan Company, New York. 270 pp. 1951.)

A book quite out of the ordinary. Dr. Pi Suñer, a Spaniard, and a well-known figure in the world of medicine, has here produced an English version of lectures given originally at the University of Caracas. The Spanish title—which Dr. Pi Suñer renders as “Beginning and End of Biology”—has now suffered a significant change into “The Bridge of Life: From Reality to Mystery.” Biology, the “Bridge of Life,” begins with “Reality” (physics) and ends in “Mystery” (metaphysics): such is Dr. Pi Suñer’s thesis. As hardheaded a biologist as any, and at the moment Director of the Institute of Experimental Medicine in the University of Caracas, Dr. Pi Suñer has also taken deep draughts from the Pierian spring, he is at home in poetry and philosophy, and quotes from Shakespeare’s *Sonnets* or from an Andalusian folksong with the same ready aptness as he cites from a medical or biological authority. By easy stages he takes us along the narrow path of the known, and wistfully points at the no-man’s lands and uncharted seas that lie on either side of the path.

In so far as Dr. Pi Suñer’s book is a layman’s guide to modern biology, it is most informative and enlightening. He grips the reader’s attention when he expounds the nature of the cell, or discourses on enzymes and diastases, on heredity and environment, on parasitism and symbiosis, but every now and then the discussion touches or inter-

sects the regions of scientific or philosophical speculation. What is the real origin of Life? What is Time? To what end is all this endless flow of matter, energy and life? “Life itself is Time,” says Dr. Pi Suñer, and neither is static; and as for Life, there is no scientific explanation of its origin. If Life, then, had no actual beginning, could it have any definite end? Dr. Pi Suñer, while keenly aware of these conundrums, does not offer any merely metaphysical explanation. “Life leads inexorably towards death, in both animal and man,” he says in an eloquent passage.

In the latter, however, consciousness bestrides existence, and thus man knows the life he is leading. This knowledge of being, of an existence between inexistence which had no beginning and death which will have no ending, of a moment of being in the nothingness ‘existing for death,’ an inseparable factor of existence, is resolved into the anguish of knowledge.

Yet, from this very “anguish” of the lower knowledge can surge up the higher Vedantic illumination of: “That Thou Art.” But such an experience can come only to the saint:—

something given
And taken, in a lifetime’s death in love,
Ardour and selflessness and self-surrender.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR.

Indian Metal Sculpture. By CHINTAMONI KAR. (Alec Tiranti, Ltd., London. 46 pp. 61 plates. 1952. 7s. 6d.); *Religious Dances in the Christian Church and in Popular Medicine.* By E. LOUIS BACKMAN. Translated by E. CLASSEN. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 364 pp. Illustrated. 1952. 35s.)

We Europeans know little about Indian art and almost nothing about India's "metal sculpture." Mr. Chintamani Kar has given us a small, delightfully written book on the subject and has included 61 illustrations. We should give thanks to his enterprising publisher.

It seems that figure-sculpture in various metals was practised in India from a very distant age, but much of it has been lost through the violence of Muslim fanatics. V. A. Smith, for example, writes:—

The more energetic Muslim sovereigns usually prided themselves on making as clean a sweep as possible of the buildings and art work of the Hindu idolators, who had become their subjects. In pursuance of that policy during the course of five centuries (1200-1700), immense areas were absolutely denuded of all Hindu buildings and of course, at the same time, of all works of art connected with those buildings.

The author of this book enlightens the European (brought up in the ancient Greek tradition) by saying:—

This ideal of the harmonious embodiment of nature in human form did not result from an aversion of the sculptor to flesh or to the natural sensuous appeal in the human figure. It was adopted deliberately in an attempt to fuse the material form with the spiritual and cosmic world. With every aspect of human emotion translated into an æsthetic order, there was very little vulgarity in Indian sculpture. Even the representation of erotic

subjects, in some periods of Indian figure-art, was not attempted for sensual reasons, it only provided excellent sculptural opportunities.

We know that the Buddha taught the necessity of considerable austerity for those who wished to become more spiritual; but in India and in most of the ancient world nobody regarded sex as the principal enemy of the soul. The sexual instinct was considered, on the contrary, as an element of natural religion.

Religious Dances is somewhat disappointing because it ignores the symbolic dances of the East. In fact, the book (extremely learned) concentrates upon the dancing in Christian countries. The book comes from a Swedish professor. He treats mostly of the epidemics of religious dancing, some of it taking place in churches; and he attributes much of it to the effect of ergot, a parasitic fungus upon cereals. He tells us that this religious dancing was thought to have curative value in expelling the devils who were believed to possess sick persons. Backman's work is as minutely documented as *The Golden Bough*, but it would have been a great deal more interesting if it had analyzed the dances of India. The price of the book may seem high: still, it contains a large number of illustrations.

CLIFFORD BAX

Zimbabwe Cavalcade: Rhodesia's Romance. By B. G. PAVER. (Central News Agency, Ltd., South Africa. Gordon and Gotch, London Distributors. viii + 164 pp. Maps and Illustrations. 1950. 20s.)

This book, with a free sprinkling of "mystery" and "romance" over its pages, is not intended for the serious student or specialist. Its purpose is apparently to "find the story behind three great African mysteries," the gold of Rhodesia, and the ruins of Zimbabwe and Inyanga. Those who have not heard any of it will find the historical part interesting, provided they are not repelled by expressions like "the throbbing arteries of the 'hot-

Heart of Africa!'" In his assessment of the controversy between the upholders of what he calls the Ancient and Mediæval Theories, the author has tried to be impartial. But one is left with the impression that he would like to believe in the "Ancient Theory," for Hatshepsut, Sheba, and Solomon suggest a "mystery" and "romance" that is lacking in the stone-cold factual approach of modern archæology.

The trouble about Zimbabwe has been that almost from the first it was invested with an aura of fabulous and quite unprovable antiquity, and linked with names like Solomon and Ophir—all without a shred of solid evidence. To the uncritical mind which must

have its monuments as old as possible, the inescapable and incontrovertible facts revealed by archæology were highly unpalatable, and so the "Ancient Theory" continues to flourish. No dispassionate reader of MacIver, Caton-Thompson, and Schofield (particularly Schofield's "Survey of the Recent Prehistory of Southern Rhodesia" in the *South African Journal of Science*, xxxviii, 81-111, which Mr. Paver does not include in his bibliography) can but accept a mediæval date for the ruins.

Mr. Paver has rather spoilt the effect of his narrative by an apparent uncertainty about some of the names which he mentions. He gives us, for instance, both "Sumer" and "Sumner" and "Sumnerian." "Sabæan"

he writes indifferently "Sabæan" and "Sabaen," choosing "Sabæan" for the Index. (The use of "South Arabian" would have saved him from these errors). "Azania" appears in the Index as "Anzania."

It is perhaps somewhat ungrateful and ungenerous to thus speak of what is evidently a labour of love, written with the best intentions—to interest the people of South-east Africa in their great heritage, the greatness of which is in no way diminished by the attribution of its origin to A.D. instead of B.C. The purpose of the book will probably be achieved so far as those are concerned who want a little light reading about Rhodesian archæology, and are not too critical of method.

G. W. B. HUNTINGFORD

Eight Decisive Books of Antiquity. By F. R. HOARE. (Sheed and Ward, Ltd., London and New York. 247 pp. 1952. 16s.)

Creasy's *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World* suggested to the author a survey of world history from the standpoint not of force but of ideas. He projected three volumes, but he died before the publication of the first, the present volume, which deals with the pre-Christian era. The later volumes were to have dealt with St. Augustine, Muhammad, Machiavelli, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Darwin and Karl Marx among others. Apart from its main theme, the book is significant in the rally of spiritual forces now under way in the West against the demoralizing fascination of Marxism, Freudianism and Pragmatism.

The work traces the shaping of society and state by creative ideas enshrined in the Books of great men in Babylon, Egypt, Israel, Greece, India and China. Greece in the absence of a single Book is shown moulded by Homer, Plato and Aristotle, the last two influencing subsequent eras as well. The Laws of Hammurabi gave to Babylon the framework for a world city, with a

cosmopolitan society emerging from status into contract and freed from theocratic control. The Egyptian Book of the Dead governed the present on the pattern of a future life, with a ritual that rose to great heights of mysticism and metaphysics in the worship of *Re* and *Osiris*. "Thou art the One God...self-begotten...unknowable." "Thou art in me and I am in Thee."

The Jews owe their unique sense of national unity and a national mission (sustaining them through centuries of disastrous vicissitudes) to their Books of Moses. The treatment of Greece is the best in the book, while that of India and China is a lapse from the standards of scholarship. Miss Mayo is taken as the "much abused but never refuted" authority on Manu and Confucius is characterized as "unoriginal, with stupid pride, uninspiring, shallow, pedantic," etc. The core of Manu's Code, the idea of a planned society viewed as a spiritual organism, and the doctrine of the Golden Mean in Confucius are lost on the author. The undiscussed standpoint of Roman Catholic theology from which the work is written limits the value of the treatment.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

Radhakrishnan: An Anthology. Edited by A. N. MARLOW. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 148 pp. 1952. 9s.6d.)

This volume represents an attempt by an admirer and friend to present concisely the thought and message of Dr. Radhakrishnan, who combines in himself the rôles of philosopher, statesman and educationist.

This anthology is representative of the writings of Dr. Radhakrishnan, which include some 20 books on Indian thought and culture and their influence on world thought. He pleads the need for a "universal religion of spirit," which begins within man's own soul and works outward through all relations with men and nature. In Dr. Radhakrishnan's own words:—

The need of the world today is for a religion of the Spirit which will give a purpose to life, which will not demand any evasion or ambiguity, which will reconcile the ideal and the real, the poetry and the prose of life, which will speak to the profound realities of our own nature and satisfy the whole of our being, our critical intelligence and our active desire.

(*Contemporary Indian Philosophers*, pp. 265-266)

The extracts are arranged under various appropriate captions, such as "The Aim of Philosophy," "The Nature of Reality," "True Knowledge," "The Personal God," "Life and Evolution," and "Indian Thought." A large number of the extracts are from Dr. Radhakrishnan's own volumes on Indian philosophy. The passages from *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* are charged with significance, —here is readable righteousness and not dull sermonizing. The volume also includes a short collection of characteristic epigrams.

One misses in this volume Dr. Radhakrishnan's thoughts on education; in his Convocation Addresses at different universities and in the Report of the University Commission, of which he was the Secretary, we get the aim and purpose of education most impressively stated. The volume, nevertheless, succeeds well in introducing Dr. Radhakrishnan's writings to the general reader.

P. NAGARAJA RAO



CORRESPONDENCE

“ THE STUDY OF LANGUAGES ”

[We bring together here a few reactions to Shri S. R. Tikekar's important article under the above title in THE ARYAN PATH for June 1952.—ED.]

I

Shri S. R. Tikekar's article on “ The Study of Languages ” illustrates a recent tendency among our intellectuals which may be termed revisionism. On several problems, the views of foremost nationalists are now different from—in some cases the opposite of—what they were before our attainment of independence.

That Hindi must be our national and official language, and not English, has been the slogan of nationalist India for several decades. We are now faced with the fact that, outside Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, those who know correct English are more than those who know correct Hindi. Yet, outside those two States, more people have a smattering of Hindi than of English. Probably it is this which suggests to Shri Tikekar the idea of making English the official language and Hindi the national or the bazaar language.

There is some point in the distinction which he has drawn between the national language and the official language. But he carries the distinction too far when he says that the one should be Hindi and the other English. There is no precedent for having the national and the official languages differ so widely. It is obviously advantageous that the official language should be the national language itself in its standardized, developed form.

Which, then, should that language be in India? Even in free India there remains a fundamental objection to making English the national language, namely, that to the masses it is a strange language. Comparatively, Hindi with a Sanskritized vocabulary is much nearer to the masses, perhaps even in

South India. A democracy must talk in the language of the people; and if people have no common language, the next best is a national language that is nearest to their own regional languages. So far as the masses are concerned, if the adoption of Hindi is an imposition, the continuation of English is still a greater imposition. The adoption of Hindi imposes a hardship on the educated class of the present day only. It will not do so for the next generation of the educated, if Hindi is taught to boys *in the same way* and *to the same extent* that English was taught to our generation.

The argument that Hindi is an undeveloped language with an inadequate vocabulary would have been strong, and even formidable, but for the fact that Hindi has the advantage of having Sanskrit as a rich source of words. One may or may not agree with Dr. Raghuvir's technical terminology; but he has demonstrated the immense possibilities of the Sanskrit language for coining new words to convey new concepts. Certainly laws can safely be made in Sanskritized Hindi.

It is true that

one great merit of accepting English as the official language is...the equality of opportunity to all Indians alike in the field of public service. With Hindi as the official language there is a distinct advantage in favour of those whose mother tongue it is.

But this advantage will be enjoyed by the Hindi-speaking persons of today only during a transitional period. In future their own language will not offer a special advantage to the Uttar Pradeshians because even the Tamilians will have made Hindi their own.

During the transitional period, the interests of the non-Hindi-speaking

people can be safeguarded by fixing the existing percentage of Uttar Pradeshians in the services of the Central Government as their maximum percentage during the next 20 years.

Shri Tikekar raises a fundamental issue when he says that "languages have not so far grown anywhere according to plan." The same social forces, however, which are bringing planning into vogue in the economic sphere are also doing so in others, including the linguistic sphere. The very complexity of the problem of the national language and the official language calls for State intervention and planning.

Society has always been limiting individual freedom in the matter of language. Every language has a grammar, through which society regulates an individual's language. The language policy of the Government is but another way by which society might regulate and direct the language of individuals. It appears to me that those who advocate the continuance of English as the official language should instead insist on all the necessary aid from the Union Government to different States for bringing it about in the next 15 years that our graduates should be *exactly* as well versed in Hindi as we are today in English. If the Government cannot afford this, owing to financial stringency, it is necessary to extend the period of transition from 15 to 20, or even 25 years.

*Shri Shivaji College, P. J. JAGIRDAR
Amravati.*

II

Mr. Tikekar deserves thanks for publishing in your journal his thesis on Hindi as the national language and on the use of English.

The late Mr. Vishnushastri Chiplunkar was not a particular friend of the English people but he has extolled the English tongue. Bereft of their knowledge of English literature, where would our leaders stand as regards their outlook on the present-day world? Where would our educated people themselves stand?

Another point: There is no doubt that linguistic provinces (States) will be formed. Their language will be the local language. Hindi cannot become the official language in such States. Any attempt to force it upon them would be resented. In non-Hindi areas a modest course in Hindi should be taught in the schools.

Nor is there any doubt that there should be one language for the whole of the country, to be called the national language, and that it should be Hindi with the Devanagari script. Living as I do in Madhya Bharat, I see Punjabi and Sindhi women and children exchanging thoughts in Hindi with local people. It is a pleasure to see that there is a tongue which can be understood by so many different people.

There is, however, a bad aspect to the emphasis on Hindi which should be remedied—the fact that it has resulted in the neglect of English. We should see to it that English does not become a dead language in this country as Sanskrit has become. The literature in Sanskrit has become a sealed book. English literature would also become a sealed book. I would, therefore, submit that in all our high schools and colleges a high standard of English must be made compulsory.

It should be made clear by the Government that it does not intend to debar the use of the English language from the offices, the courts, etc. This would assure to all a natural and healthy avenue of expression. The commitment in the Constitution should be suitably amended. The welfare of the country is more important than the Constitution, which can be changed.

Fortunately, our leaders are becoming more sober and Mr. Tikekar's thesis has come at an opportune time. In conclusion, may I be allowed to say that we know the present-day world and the present-day world knows us through the medium of English? Let us not set up an Iron Curtain.

B. S. APTE

Indore.

III

I have read with keen interest the thought-provoking and bold statement of views on a very delicate All-India problem by Shri Tikekar in your journal. I agree in general with his concluding remarks:

For establishing equality of opportunity among all Indians, for raising our own mother tongue to a higher position, for enriching our literature, for taking full advantage of the contact with an international language, for enabling young Indians to be abreast of a fast advancing world in all human affairs... we can do nothing better than retaining English....

As a humble student of history, however, I should like to add:—

Though I do not fully agree with Shri S. R. Tikekar that English should remain indefinitely the national language of India, I do feel that any expediting of the process with imperialistic ardour is bound to harm the future of Hindi as well as that of India as a whole.

A language cannot be "forced" as a plant can be by the horticulturist. The Hindi of the common people should be enriched by the willing contributions of all the peoples of India. But it would grow wild unless an Indian Academy composed mainly of Hindi scholars were to exercise a vigilant censorship over this growing literature in Hindi. No child is born with a beard, and no language comes into being fairly mature. Hindi poetry is very rich but its prose lags miles behind that in some of the other modern Indian languages. So far as literary prose is concerned, Marathi had the earliest start, among the prosaic and utilitarian people of Maharashtra in the last quarter of the 13th century. Before the foundation of the British Empire Marathi prose had passed through all the phases of development through which Hindi must pass in this century. The chaste Marathi prose style of Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao was not equalled in Bengal till the time of Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar and Bankim Chandra; but this constitutes no case for claiming that Marathi should

replace English in modern India.

The English language and the English Constitution are indispensable in a free democratic world. If Bengali is perhaps today the best developed Indian language of the Aryan group, it is because the educated Bengalees successfully mastered the genius of English literature and language. So, what Shri Tikekar says about the place of English in the modern political set-up deserves careful notice. Most of the foreign embassies of India today are manned by South Indians. This is not due to partiality to them; nor to their being more at home in English. It is because their familiarity with English has made them more conversant with the affairs of the outside world; and above all has given them a mental make-up capable of holding its own in diplomacy against the outside world.

At present we are under the necessity of having our technicians and scientists trained abroad for at least 40 years; so, we ought to train them through the medium of English, at home and abroad. The humanities may be left to take care of themselves and to shorten the ultimate tenure of English on Asiatic soil. Otherwise Hindi or Sanskrit would surely take us back to the Age of Aryavarta in science.

It should be frankly admitted by all that Hindi is the only language suited to the political genius of a Federal Republic of India. It is so because, unlike other modern Indian languages, which are of the "unitary type," Hindi has been, throughout its growth, a federation of the languages and dialects of Northern India, and the North and the South can meet only on the platform of Hindi, next to English. So, a sincere attempt must be made to enrich Hindi as our own language—without neglecting English, which is our only weapon for political defence, and for a cultural and spiritual offensive.

K. R. QANUNGO

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ENDS AND SAYINGS

“ _____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS

The joint letter of 26 prominent scientists and educationists to the Indian Prime Minister and the Education Minister, released to the press on September 7th, warning against undue haste in the transition from English to Hindi in Indian education deserves very serious attention. Dr. C. V. Raman, Dr. H. J. Bhabha, the present Vice-Chancellor and two ex-Vice-Chancellors of the Bombay University, and others alleged that standards in all subjects had already suffered from the lowering of the standard of English in the schools; and that the extent of the tendency in certain States and of some representatives on university bodies to hurry the transition from English to Hindi was fraught with grave danger to academic standards.

They recognized that English would in time have to be replaced as the medium of instruction but urged that, without a good knowledge of English, no number of translations would ever completely meet the needs of all university subjects. They warned that if the study of English is killed in our country with an almost indecent haste, the work of a century, perhaps on the whole good rather than bad, will be undone in a few years and this will seriously affect the quality of our education.

Mrs. Naomi Mitchison, one of a group of British writers recently guests of the Soviet Writers' Union in Moscow, reports her impressions of "Writers in the U.S.S.R." in *The New Statesman and Nation* for September 6th.

She finds the Russian writer not only in a very favourable economic position but also in the desirable close touch with the reading public and its reactions which the absence of a class barrier helps to make possible. There is "constant movement, constant

change of creative line."

She admits that "there is certainly not complete freedom of publication in the Soviet Union," though she apparently did not get the dismal effect of over-emphasis on propaganda which the English-language journal, *Soviet Literature*, conveys. There could not, for example, today be published in Russia, she recognizes, the statement that "the over-hasty collectivization of the land," with its "extremely painful results," was a major political mistake, if such it was. But she believes the time may come "when it can be said, and perhaps said greatly and nobly, and by a Russian," provided Russia can be left alone to pursue her internal destiny.

"The good," moreover, a Russian woman novelist told her, "must always win." Ancient Indian dramatists freely accepted that obligation; and its acceptance by modern writers generally, in freeing the stream of literature of much decadent and despairing writing, would not impoverish culture and should raise the moral tone.

Where also other countries might with especial profit take a leaf from Soviet practice is in what children read—and do not read.

Children and adolescents do not stuff themselves with comics and westerns and pulp books and women's magazines. The Russian child gets decent mental feeding including plenty of fairy tales, his own and translations—I saw beautifully produced, and cheap, translations of Hans Andersen and the Just-So Stories—plenty of adventure—I saw Mark Twain, Stevenson, Mayne Reid, among others—and plenty of Russian classics, including poetry.

Undernourishment in youth, and especially unwholesome food, are bound to leave their permanent mark on their victims' physical bodies. It is high time the effect of their mental counter-

parts upon the mind and character of youth throughout the world was recognized and guarded against.

Mr. Louis Fischer answers encouragingly the question "How Much Freedom in Yugoslavia?" in *The Saturday Review* of August 16th. He found there no literary dictator, no censorship of books. Book publishing, until 1951 a State monopoly, was then, like all industrial and commercial enterprises and even the railways, turned over to the employees. Each publishing house is directed by a Workers' Council elected by all the establishment's workers and managed by a specialist whom the Council hires. The greatest variety of books is published and sold—idealistic, materialistic, religious, mystical, etc., though scientific works predominate. Mr. Fischer heard it doubted whether an attack on Marxism would be published, but was told that the decision would depend wholly on the publishers. In fiction a gratifying number of leading writers, of Russia, England, the U.S.A. and several other countries, newly translated into Serbo-Croat, are displayed in the shops.

Most encouraging of all is Mr. Fischer's report that "lively literary controversies shake the Yugoslav air." The veteran Communist Editor of one literary fortnightly, *Svedochananstva* (Testimony), told Mr. Fischer: "We are in a state of permanent civil war with the fortnightly *Literary Journal*." The *casus belli*? Whether literature might be subjective, pessimistic or optimistic, as the author pleased, or should reflect social life. Whether politics might or might not intrude into fiction was also publicly argued by critics. A play condemned by the Serbian Minister of Education and shut down had been reopened five days later, after an article, "The Right to Laugh," condemning the Minister's criticism, had appeared in *Testimony*; and books on both sides of a controversial question appear in the book stores side by side. Apparent unanimity in views and tastes is a danger sign

in these days of totalitarian encroachment and these reports of literary give and take are healthy signs.

The spiritual indebtedness of Italy to the great Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore is acknowledged by the Italian educationist Signor Enrico Pappacena of the University of Bari, the author of more than one study of ancient Indian literature, in his article, "Tagore and Italy" in *East and West* for July. While Tagore's works have deeply influenced the few rather than superficially the many; "his message of Truth," he says, "has helped to make Italy aware of her own spiritual ills"—prominent among which, he suggests, are the divorce between life and both religion and poetry. He has, according to the writer, helped the Italians "to find once more the inner warmth" in spiritual principles which had "become for the West, cold, distant sidereal abstractions."

Tagore, Signor Pappacena writes, has also taught more effectively than had any European Virgil "the notion of reincarnation." "Tagore has enlightened our minds, making us feel that the Gospels do not exclude, but rather include as implicit, the notion of rebirths."

If in Italy today there are some who speak of the Spirit and are really inspired by it; if we have idealists already able to arouse enthusiasms that are no mere illusions fated to evaporate when brought into contact with the serious duties of life; if many have already clearly realized that mutual trust is the essential basis for mutual economic relations and that this trust must be based on mutual comprehension founded on a real spiritual experience; if we have already some excellent writers (not those now in vogue) who are creating works inspired by a conception of the world as a spiritual experience to be lived; if we can still hope that Italy will revive, cured... by a real understanding of the laws of the Spirit, we owe this in a large measure to Tagore.

A new world union was established as the result of the First World Congress on Humanism and Ethical Culture, held in Amsterdam in August. Dele-

gates and visitors represented groups or individual sympathizers from four continents and many who attended were impressed with the earnestness that characterized the meetings. The general trend of the proceedings brings vividly to mind a passage by William Quan Judge in which that student of Oriental philosophy and particularly of the subject of cycles wrote:—

We implicitly believe that in this curve of the cycle the final authority is man himself. . . . The grand clock of the universe points to another hour and now Man must seize the key in his own hands and himself—as a whole—open the door.

This conviction was echoed in essence by the deliberations of the Congress. The basis for all action should be respect for man and the promotion of the interests of man and his rights as a human being.

The President, Dr. Julian Huxley, called for a new creed—one in accordance with science (defined by an American delegate as an attitude and method involving observation, experiment, rational analysis and tentative conclusions). Dr. Huxley envisaged man, although a product of evolution, as carrying the process to new levels, “guiding change by means of conscious purpose in the light of rational experience.”

Others again felt the need of defining man. What was the nature of this being in whom alone there was hope for humanity? The vastness of the task ahead and the urgency of the times were felt to make imperative an international organization which will concern itself with the needs and interests of the great mass of mankind everywhere.

Another example of the copying by the victors of the evils which they have fought seems to be foreshadowed, though not yet fully exemplified, in the “detention centres” reported to have

been provided, mostly in desert areas, in the U.S.A. Under the caption “Concentration Camps in the U.S.?” Charles R. Allen, Jr., writes in *The New Statesman and Nation* of September 13th of the provision in the Internal Security Act of 1950 (the McCarran Act), passed over President Truman’s veto, under which such “places of detention” might be used. This section of the Act does not direct the creation of such centres but it does authorize the Attorney-General of the United States, when, under certain conditions, an “internal security emergency” is declared by the President or by Congress, to apprehend and detain

in such places of detention as may be prescribed by him. . . all persons as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe that such persons *probably* [writer’s italics] will engage in or *probably* will conspire with others to engage in acts of espionage and sabotage.

Indians deploring the apparent necessity of their own “preventive detention” measures, under the pressure of present threats to national security, cannot point the finger of scorn; but there are many Indians, as well as Americans, no doubt, who will deeply regret this advance preparation on a grand scale, by a long-established and powerful democracy, to copy, in principle if not in inhuman practice, the Nazi “thought-control” technique. Thrift and precautionary zeal may have dictated the renovating of old army and air-force camps, prisoners-of-war camps and—unhappy chapter in America’s record—the former Japanese Relocation Centres, while this could be done relatively cheaply and at leisure. The preparation, however, of such bleak accommodation for tens of thousands who may in the future be “detained” without trial and on mere suspicion is not calculated to strengthen confidence in the United States’ commitment to democratic procedures.