

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly,
and lost among the host — as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XXVII

NOVEMBER 1956

No. 11

"THUS HAVE I HEARD"—

Even sages have been deluded as to what is action and what inaction ; therefore I shall explain to thee what is action by a knowledge of which thou shalt be liberated from evil. One must learn well what is action to be performed, what is not to be, and what is inaction. The path of action is obscure. That man who sees inaction in action and action in inaction is wise among men ; he is a true devotee and a perfect performer of all action.

—*Bhagavad-Gita*, IV. 16-18

We need insight for the comprehension of the terms "Karma" and "Dharma." Among philosophical texts and treatises, the *Bhagavad-Gita* offers profound thoughts, and by its light different persons form their own concepts of the two words, which are archetypal in character and enshrine a compact and consistent philosophy which affects every aspect of man's being. Naturally, therefore, each tends to emphasize his own interpretation. The monotheist, the polytheist and the pantheist; the philologist, the *littérateur*, the philosopher and the mystic; and even the politician and the social reformer—these and all others formulate contradictory philosophies of life in the light of their own partial understanding of the grand Poem, which expresses a sub-

lime allegory and a profound practical philosophy.

The Occultist who tries to realize what he has heard from the Wisdom of the long line of illustrious Sages and Their Living Peers is humble and cautious in presenting his own understanding of the archetypal aspects of Karma and Dharma.

Here we are confining ourselves to a consideration of what is advanced in the above-quoted verses. They deal with the Path of Action, *Karma-Marga*; they offer the philosophy of what not to do as well as of what to do. And yet the Path of Action remains obscure for most. One reason for this is the failure to see that for actions to be truly righteous and beneficent one must possess knowledge and also

devotion. The dire heresy of separateness has compartmentalized the much-spoken-of three paths—*Karma*, *Gnyana* and *Bhakti*. The result is that none of the three ways is correctly comprehended.

In examining the Religion of Works as it affects man's own routine life and his relationship with his fellow men, a few "do's" and "don't's" have to be considered in the light of the *Gita* teachings.

Not to be inactive is the first of the negative rules. Bodily laziness, moral lethargy, mental indolence, are grave dangers which touch the very soul of man. Strong is the cosmic principle of perpetual motion, and so it is stated, "No one ever resteth a moment inactive." To loll about idly is a deed in itself.

But what actions must we perform? First, our congenital duties, duties which are ours by our very birth. Dharma is the fulfilment of our destiny built by ourselves through a long past; it offers us opportunities for further unfoldment through the elimination of defects, for which the most suitable environment and conditions are provided as part of our destiny. To determine what are our congenital duties we have but to look at our own mental and moral capacities and limitations.

The second "don't" reiterated in the *Gita* is—don't ever attempt the duty of another. What is implicit in this? The Law of Necessity. Those deeds which it is not *necessary*

for us to do cannot be our obligatory duties. The Rule of Necessity helps us to avoid many a pitfall, and saves that most precious of possessions—time.

The third "don't" is—don't be tempted by desires and lusts. The universe is surrounded by compassion—a divine, gracious power. Human beings, listening to the urges and the inclinations of the senses, grab at compassion-power without knowledge, selfishly and egotistically, and find passion in their brains and blood. This tempts a man so often to abandon the very path of duty which is righteous and good.

Now let us turn to the positive aspects.

The first of these is—renounce the fruits of action, not action itself. Even when we have determined to fight our passions we need the field of duty, *Dharmakshetra*. Not looking for fruits or rewards implies labouring without being impelled by likes and dislikes. Are not our sense-impulses, our fleshly appetites, part of our destiny and Karma? Should we not allow them to function? No, says the *Gita*. They were built by us in the past, and in the present they are to be overcome. Our Karma is related to our Dharma; if our destiny points to a defect in us, our duty requires that we correct it. Therefore the remedy is suggested.

There are three motives for right action, and, when the motor-power

of wish and will is used to guide us aright in the daily routine of life, we walk fast on the Path of Good Works. *Dana*, Charity; *Tapas*, thoughtful Control; and *Yagna*, enlightened Sacrifice, are called Krishna's own deeds. There are two main stages connected with the deeds which are Krishna's. First, we must establish the habit of performing acts of right charity which hurts no one, of right asceticism which harms neither body, mind nor soul, and of sacrifice which does not require special rites or elaborate ceremonials but endows certain small deeds with the purity of water, the humility of a leaf, the beauty of a flower, the nourishment of a fruit. This habit of doing daily a few acts of *Dana*, of *Tapas*, of *Yagna*, leads us to perform all our duties for the Ray of the Supreme Spirit at the core of our consciousness. Acts of daily life, whether at home, at the office,

or at the club, should be pure in motive, humble in execution, orderly and tidy so that they are beautiful, and helpful to the soul of everyone. Thus man becomes "a perfect performer of all action."

We must not be hasty; the art of performing Good Works, like true knowledge, is not acquired easily or speedily; our aspirations should go hand in hand with ever-deepening devotion which makes the waters of wisdom spring up spontaneously. Good acts require knowledge; true assimilation of knowledge requires devotion; these three ever go together.

Thus only will the aspirant of Right Living realize in time the instruction of *The Voice of the Silence*:—

Both action and inaction may find room in thee; thy body agitated, thy mind tranquil, thy Soul as limpid as a mountain lake.

SHRAVAKA

RELIGIOUS UNITY— A FELT NEED OR A FACT?

[We bring together here three thoughtful articles by writers who, despite the differences in their approach, share the sense of the importance of religious unity and integrated living.—ED.]

I.—THE MEETING OF RELIGIONS: A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW

[The writer of this article, the Reverend Dr. William Montgomery Watt, Reader in Arabic at Edinburgh University, has made a deep study of Islamic subjects. His published works include *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali*, *Muhammad at Mecca* and *Muhammad at Medina*. By steeping himself in a religion not his own, Dr. Watt has made his own contribution to the "meeting of religions" which he sees as "preparation for that religious awakening of the world for which even a sociologist may hope."—ED.]

When the sociologist considers religion and its manifestations, he is chiefly interested in the function of religion in society. What is the specific contribution of religion to the life of society? What is it that religion does for society that nothing else does or that nothing else does so effectively? One short answer to this question would be that religion integrates society. The word "integrates," however, is not altogether clear, and requires some explanation. For a society or community to be integrated, all the various subdivisions within it must be living together harmoniously, and must be conscious of their relation to one another in virtue of which they constitute a unified whole. The bringing into being of such a whole requires an expenditure of psychical energy, and it is further the function of religion to effect the release of such psychical

energy and to direct it into sound and healthy channels. All this has to be understood, then, when it is said that it is the function of religion to integrate society.

This account of the function of religion is specially relevant to the situation in the world as a whole at the present time. It is a commonplace to say that we live in "one world." What is not so frequently emphasized is that this unity is not the unity of an integrated whole, but only an external unity. The improvement of communications which characterizes the present age may be said to have begun when European sailors acquired the skills and techniques which enabled them to sail to India, the Far East and America. Now journeys which before Vasco da Gama were impossible are accomplished in a few hours, and East and West find themselves willynilly the closest of neigh-

bours. While this has been happening, East and West have naturally come to have more dealings with one another. The era of colonialism, with its economic and political implications, has almost passed, but it has not been succeeded by a return to the comparative isolation of the past. On the contrary, it is very noticeable that Asian countries are now more fully incorporated than ever before into the world political and economic structure.

Such unification of the world, however, is largely external. Instead of harmony between nations and states there is tension and strife. Instead of an awareness that all nations are partners for the realization of the common purposes of mankind, there are feelings of hostility. Certainly, Asian and African peoples are adopting something of the intellectual outlook of Europe and America; but it is the more superficial aspects of European thought which chiefly attract them, and in deeper things their minds have not changed. In short, then, though there is unification, there is no integration.

Here is the challenge of the present situation. On the one hand, mankind is coming more and more to form a single entity in a geographical, economic and even political sense, but it still lacks integration. On the other hand, it is suggested that the function of religion is to integrate. How is religion to integrate this "one world" in which we live into a

genuine community? How is religion to set about releasing psychical energy to overcome all the tensions and oppositions that exist?

The first thing to be said by way of answer to these questions is that the release of psychical energy is something that cannot be planned. It amounts to the revival of an old religion or the appearance of a new one, and no human intellect is able to predict when the message of a preacher or prophet is going to stir human hearts to their depths, still less when a man is going to find in his heart a message which turns him into a preacher or prophet. The sociologist, if he is honest, must admit that he cannot tell when and how human society will be integrated; he cannot even be certain that full integration will ever be achieved, though he may hold that there is a probability that it will. The most he can do is to show the conditions that have generally been fulfilled where there has been a release of psychical energy, and to suggest ways in which men may profitably prepare for such a release as would lead to the integration of world society.

This is not the place to embark on a sociological analysis of the conditions generally necessary for the occurrence of a vital religious movement. It will suffice here to make two simple points. The first is that the leader of a vital religious movement is a man who has been deeply concerned with the problems of his own age and environment. The

second is that either in the life of such a leader or in his background there has often been a "meeting of religions." Let us consider these points in turn, and see whether we can derive from them some practical suggestions.

The first point, then, is that the great religious leader is deeply concerned with the problems of his time. It does not follow, of course, that a concern for the problems of his time turns a man into a religious leader. Most of us have some such concern, but we are not leaders. The mark of the religious leader is that he sees beneath the superficial features of the problems to the essentials. Different segments of a society may have problems which appear to be different. If the leader's analysis of the problems of these segments shows that they are fundamentally the same, and if he is also able to show how the fundamental difficulty may be overcome, then he has not merely enabled men to solve problems (and so to release psychical energy), but has effected a fuller integration of the segments of his society, since in overcoming their difficulties they have shared a religious experience.

How is this point to be applied in the present situation? If there is to be a religious leader capable of starting a new movement which will rapidly spread to most of mankind, he must obviously be concerned with the problems of our time. His chief interest, however, must not be the superficial aspect of the

problems, which may differ from one segment of mankind to another, but the essentials, which are alike for most segments.

These matters bring us to the second of our two points, about the "meeting of religions," for they raise the question whether the religious movement which is to integrate world society is to be a movement in one (or more) of the old religions, or is to be a new religion. However we answer the question, a "meeting of religions" is presupposed. What, then, precisely, is to be understood by this phrase, a "meeting of religions"?

One thing that is not to be understood by the phrase is a formal meeting between official leaders. A conference between leading dignitaries of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism, if it could be arranged, might be very interesting, but it would not lead to a great religious awakening of the world as a whole. Similarly, contacts between average members of different religions, though they are becoming increasingly frequent, seldom lead to any real "meeting." The participants are usually not enthusiastic adherents of their own faith, and are familiar only with its superficial aspects. Consequently they can appreciate only the superficial aspects of the other man's religion.

The "meeting of religions" with which we are here concerned implies an interaction and interpenetration at deeper levels. Values from one

religion must somehow or other be grafted into the stock of another. While this cannot be said to be a necessary condition of a vital religious movement—the great prophets of Judaism, for example, seem to have been rooted entirely in their own tradition—some real “meeting of religions” lies behind many religious movements, especially behind resurgences to new life in old religions. Thus Augustine of Hippo, who became a great Christian leader in the fifth century, was in his earlier life steeped in Neo-Platonism, at that time a philosophical religion associated with polytheism and with opposition to Christianity.

A new religious movement, then, such as we hope for in the near future, is most likely to occur where there has been a real “meeting of religions.” Moreover, if there has been this “meeting of religions,” it does not much matter whether the new movement is an independent religion or a revival within an old religion. Already there are in the world many embryo movements of both types, and there will doubtless be more in the future. Eventually one of these movements will triumph over its rivals, grow to maturity and embrace most of the human race. The movement which is thus successful will almost certainly be the one which most fully assimilates the truths and values contained in all the great religions and expresses them in a form capable of being widely appreciated. On the whole it seems most likely that this

successful movement will be a revival within one of the great religions.

In the modern world there has been comparatively little “meeting” so far between the great religions. Between outstanding religious leaders there have been few contacts of the kind which lead to mutual illumination. Few great religious leaders have made a deep study of another religion. The aim of such study as has taken place, especially in the West, has often been to find polemical arguments against the other religion, not to try to appreciate it.

A useful course of action at the present time, then, and one open to every adherent of a religion, is to steep himself in some other religion. In this way he contributes to the “meeting of religions.” If he is able to meet religiously-minded people of the other religion, well and good; if not, much is to be gained from the reading of books.

An Asian Christian once remarked that he had steeped himself in Hinduism “until it fertilized his Christianity.” In the Islamic Middle Ages al-Ghazali, the great thinker and ascetic, deliberately set himself to master (from books) the thought of the Arabic-writing monotheistic Neo-Platonists of his day, and thereby brought increased vitality to his own faith. Again, in modern times Sir Muhammad Iqbal set himself to master European thought, particularly the living thought of his own age. He steeped

himself in European writings, especially in those trends, such as the philosophies of Bergson and Nietzsche, which were just coming into favour; and as a result his writing and his whole life acquired a dynamic quality.

In some ways, of course, it is dangerous to steep oneself in an alien religion. If a man is to appreciate the alien religion, he must open himself to it and be ready to learn from it. This means that he must be ready, if necessary, to become a convert to it. Even if he thinks his conversion unlikely, he should not rule it out *a priori* as impossible. This is not to be taken, however, as implying that the sociologist encourages conversion. On the contrary, he discourages it except in those cases where individuals are driven to it by an imperious urge. In general there seems to be a more real "meeting of religions" where a man who is attracted by another religion con-

tinues in his own. Conversion tends to shut him off from the old, because it is accompanied by a reaction against the old and in favour of the new. Only when it has become intolerable for a man to remain in the old should he make the change.

This suggestion of steeping ourselves in an alien religion is here presented as a piece of sociological wisdom. None of us, however, is merely a sociologist. He is also either an adherent of some religion or an apostate from it; and this religion may make demands on him which he must accept or reject. In most cases, nevertheless, this sociological suggestion is reconcilable with the demands of a religion; and the tiny efforts of individuals to bring about a "meeting of religions" are seen to be significant as contributing to the preparation for that religious awakening of the world for which even a sociologist may hope.

W. MONTGOMERY WATT

II.—THE UNITY OF RELIGIONS

[**The Reverend Sidney Spencer**, Principal of Manchester College, Oxford, is a Unitarian student of comparative religion and of mysticism. His book, *The Deep Things of God: Essays in Liberal Religion*, appeared in 1955. Beliefs and forms differ and unique claims are urged, as he brings out here, but he finds the sense of awe before the "Numinous" and the "Transcendent" to belong to the very heart of religious experience. Formulations differ with the type of prophet or religious teacher, but these types all proceed from one archetype. Every great teacher is a man conscious of his own innate Divinity, moved by compassion to point the way to the realization by others also of the unity of all.—ED.]

One of the most evident facts about religion is the extraordinary variety of the forms which it has assumed. The question which any

thoughtful person has to consider is whether these different forms have anything in common, and, if so, just what it is. Undoubtedly the fact of difference is a serious barrier to understanding and so to the discovery of a common element. In Bernard Shaw's play *Androcles and the Lion*, Lavinia says: "When I meet really religious people we are friends at once, no matter what name we give to the divine will that made us and moves us." Those words are the expression of an unusual gift of sympathy and insight, and unfortunately they cannot be regarded as typical of the attitude of religious people.

Religious dogmatism sometimes leads men to say that there is only one form of true religion—their own; all other forms are false and unworthy to be called "religion." We have a classical illustration of this attitude in the words of the person, Mr. Thwackum, in Henry Fielding's famous novel, *Tom Jones*. "When I mention religion," Mr. Thwackum says, "I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion, but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church of England." Such an attitude is, clearly enough, the outcome of mere ignorance and prejudice. Yet even today there are many people who have not gone far beyond this standpoint; there are many people who, when they men-

tion religion, "mean the Christian religion" only—who regard all other forms of faith as false. In modern times there has been an immense enlargement of knowledge in the field of religion, as in other spheres. Yet, surprising as it may appear, in the last generation, there has been among orthodox Protestants a certain reaction against the wider sympathy and the larger understanding which are the natural outcome of this greater knowledge. The Swiss theologians, Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, regard Christianity as standing entirely by itself as the one form of religion through which God has revealed Himself to man. And, even apart from the fundamental cleavage which divides Christianity from religion generally, Brunner refuses to admit that the various forms of "unrevealed" religion have in reality anything in common. "There is no such thing," he declares, "as a common 'essence of religion.'" On the contrary, what is disclosed to us by the historical facts is a great variety of religious phenomena fundamentally differing in structure."¹ Is Brunner right in this respect?

Certainly there can be no easy or simple solution of the problem. The student of religion is undoubtedly confronted by "a great variety of religious phenomena." In the last century these phenomena have come to form the object of the study

¹ *The Philosophy of Religion from the Standpoint of Protestant Theology*. By EMIL BRUNNER. p. 105.

known as "Comparative Religion." How far does this study help us?

Comparative Religion helps us by bringing before us a clear and comprehensive view of the facts to be elucidated. In doing that, it helps us to see what they have in common. One of the most illuminating works of modern writers is *The Idea of the Holy* by Rudolf Otto. Otto takes as his starting point the phenomena of primitive religion. These phenomena are themselves strikingly diverse. Among undeveloped peoples we find numerous types of religious faith—the belief in totems and fetishes, the worship of animals, of ancestors, of nature spirits, of a tribal "All-Father." But Otto points out that everywhere in primitive religion there is a common attitude—a spirit of awe in face of mysterious and unseen forces. Everywhere there is a sense of mystery in the world, pointing men to Powers that lie beyond it—Powers on which men feel themselves to be constantly dependent, so that they seek to enter into communion and contact with them. Whatever strikes men as specially mysterious evokes the religious consciousness. It may be a great rock, a waterfall, a mountain, a strangely shaped tree, the encompassing vault of the sky; it may be the magical power of the medicine-man or the spirits of the dead. Wherever, in early times, men are confronted with such things as these, they are moved by the sense of awe; they feel that they are in the

presence of something supremely mysterious, something "sacred," "supernatural," "divine"—something possessed of wonder-working power.

It is interesting to contrast Otto's view of the origins of religion with that of many earlier students. It has often been supposed that religion had its beginnings in the desire for intellectual understanding. Sir Edward Burnett Tylor, for example, in his work, *Primitive Culture*, offers as "a minimum definition of religion" "the belief in spiritual beings." He works out the theory of "Animism" as the earliest form of religion. Otto recognizes the importance of belief; he acknowledges the significance of Animism as a stage of religious thought. But he goes deeper. Men do not, as he sees it, first of all form a theory of the universe, like the "belief in spiritual beings." For him, the fundamental factor is not thought, but rather intuition and feeling—the perception of mystery, the sense of the Divine, the "Numinous," the Transcendent. Religion as we see it in its dim beginnings is essentially an attitude of the human spirit to the deeper aspect of reality, man's reaction or response to the Transcendent.

It is the great value of Otto's work that it serves to illuminate, not only the nature of primitive religion, but also the essential quality of religion itself in all its phases. Otto does not in any way ignore the fact of religious growth; he does not ignore the progress of religion

through the ages. He recognizes fully the crudity of the primitive outlook. Yet he contends that the sense of the "Numinous" or the Transcendent, the sense of an unseen Reality which by its very nature is supreme mystery, baffling all our attempts at definition or conceptual understanding, arousing in us an unutterable awe, belongs to the very heart of all genuine religion.

This is, I believe, the clue to the unity of religions. Men have often failed to find unity among the religions of the world because they have looked for it in the wrong place; they have looked for it in a common formulation of belief. On the plane of belief the religions of the world differ widely from one another. But at the heart of them all is something deeper and greater than belief. At the heart of them all is an experience, a sense of "something far more deeply inter-fused," a contact with unseen and eternal Reality, a vision of that supreme and central mystery which passes all understanding. "All religion," writes Christopher Dawson, "is based on the recognition of a superhuman Reality."

It is sometimes said that in one of the great historical religions there is no such recognition. According to some modern exponents Buddhism, in its original form, is simply a system of ethical culture. But, as a matter of fact, in every phase of its teaching, Buddhism involves

the recognition of a transcendent order of being. The world in time and space is not, for the Buddhist, the sole reality. The world as he sees it is essentially a moral order; the shifting phases of experience are linked together by a supreme Law—the Law of Karma—which works through time and space, but is beyond them. Beyond the world of the senses, moreover, there are many realms of being in which, in the course of their evolution, men are reborn. The end of their being is to attain *Nirvana*. And *Nirvana* is not simply a state of being which men may realize in themselves. It is an eternal Reality, beyond time and change, permanent and secure, inexpressible in words. From the first the sense of the Unseen played a fundamental part in Buddhism. In some of its later forms this intuition gave rise to a type of experience to which the supreme Reality is known as the "eternal Buddha"—the infinite Heart of Knowledge and Compassion which includes all worlds in its embrace.

I referred earlier in this article to the view which regards Christianity as divided from all other forms of religion. In religion generally, it is said, men have been seeking God; in Christianity alone, God is seeking men. Such an interpretation betokens an amazingly limited conception of God and His revealing activity. This conception is quite incompatible with the facts of religious experience. In all religion there is an element of revelation.

It is the divine Life in men that underlies their apprehension of the Transcendent.

Modern study serves to emphasize the part played in all religions by those who are peculiarly sensitive to the Unseen. In primitive religion it directs our attention to the leadership of such individuals, who are known as "medicine-men" or "shamans."¹ In the higher religions we see everywhere the importance of the work of prophets and seers. In the religion of Israel the outstanding figure is the prophet. And the essential fact about the prophet is his inner experience, his sensitiveness to the Unseen, his receptivity. The prophet comes to his fellows with a vital message. That message is not a thing which he has consciously discovered for himself. It is a thing which he claims to have received from God. How does this revelation come? If we study the records which the Hebrew prophets have given us, it is clear that it comes from their own inner experience. The prophet is an organ of the Voice of God, because he hears that Voice in himself. The secret of revelation is receptivity. It is the divine Life uttering itself through him (in the measure of his insight) which is the basis of the inspiration which he receives.

What is true of the Hebrew prophets is true of Jesus. The crucial

fact in the life of Jesus was his experience on the banks of Jordan, when the heavens were opened to him, and he saw the Spirit descending upon him (or "into" him, as an ancient manuscript has it), and he heard the voice of God speaking to his soul. We are told that Jesus "spoke with authority and not as the scribes." He spoke with authority, because in him the inspiration characteristic of the prophets was renewed—because he was one who lived in immediate contact with the divine.

The same fact was at work in other ages and other lands. Bergson has suggested that the main dividing line is between "static" and "dynamic" religion.² Religion is dynamic so far as the revelation which lies at its root is a living power, actively at work in the souls of men. The great creative movements in religious life are movements initiated by men whose souls have been illuminated by the divine Light, kindled by the fire of divine Love. So it was, in varying degree, with such men as Zoroaster and Mohammed; so it was with the seers of ancient China and India and Greece. And the movement of the Spirit is everywhere the same. It was the greatness of the Hebrew prophets that they strove to lead men beyond the limits of a merely national religion. They proclaimed (in effect) that God is One, and

¹ See especially *Le Chamanisme* by MIRCEA ELIADE and *Prophecy and Poetry* by N. K. CHADWICK.

² See *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. By HENRI L. BERGSON.

that He calls men to a life of fellowship and unity. So it was with the seers of other lands. The deepest fact of the religious life is the vision of the One. "He who is in the heart," says an Indian seer, "and He who is in the sun are one and the same; and he who knows this becomes one with the One."

The light of truth is one. The more fully we grow towards it, and are illuminated by it, the more clearly we shall realize the fact. The goal of our spiritual growth has been compared to a mountain peak.

We ascend towards the peak from different levels. On the lower ranges men may be far apart; religion may be a cause of acute hostility and conflict. Yet underlying all religion is the same quest of the soul, the same journey of the spirit towards the One. The higher we climb in that journey, the more fully our paths converge. The nearer we come to our goal, the closer we are drawn to our fellow pilgrims of whatever name.

SIDNEY SPENCER

III.—FUNCTIONAL RELIGION

[Dr. John E. Owen, an English-born sociologist whose field as an educator has ranged from the University of Helsinki to Florida Southern College at Lakeland, presents here a strong plea for a religion that *works*. Religion is essentially a bond of unity, a way of life, demanding ever-deepening moral insights, ever-widening applications; or it becomes a collection of dogmas demanding blind acceptance, or of rituals whose significance has been lost. The world needs no sectarian church, but it does need a functional religion such as Dr. Owen describes.—ED.]

Religion can function effectively, both in individual and social experience, only within the framework of the moral imagination and perception of its adherents and their leaders. Too frequently in the past it has been conducive to a personal and collective complacency and placid acceptance of the customary; at times combined with an unfortunate tendency to strengthen the self-righteous ego and to rationalize

the prejudices by which men seek to justify their selfish urges. Rather than becoming a means by which individuals might acquire a greater understanding of their own natures and the nature of their world, religion has often lent itself to the conservative function of merely sanctioning the customary and so giving its moral prestige to practices and arrangements which later ages, with the accumulated ethical insight

born of historical experience, have recognized as essentially barbarous and unjust.¹

The origin of man's moral ideals has posed a long-standing problem to thinkers, yet sociologically it is undeniable that these ideals arise out of individual and group experience. The moral is a product of the *mores*, but this does not imply that the *mores* or customs are the sole or ultimate criterion of moral values. The social system of slavery as practised in the early civilizations of Egypt and Rome was upheld by the religious philosophy of those times; it was customary and the customary was considered right, in the current view of the age. Looking back on that era of man's past in the greater humanitarian perspective of the intervening centuries, no thinking person today, regardless of his religious beliefs, would give his moral approval to such a system. The advance of religion has thus consisted, at least in part, in its transcending custom and pointing to an ideal; whether this ideal be a better human world, personality-integration, a wider fellowship, a richer quality of living or all these combined. While respecting the value of tradition, a high religion does not succumb to

traditionalism, to blind habit entrenched by institutionalized dogma and the prestige of the supernatural.²

A functional religion, as the phrase implies, is one that *works*. It would work to provide the actual foundation for behaviour. It would have human meaning and relevance to life as it is lived; and rather than merely sanctifying the current materialistic and egoistic values of the prevailing culture, it would be sensitive to the moral assumptions on which it was based, be critical of those areas in which its ideals were abrogated or violated. It would actively seek to close the gap between the ideal and the actual, rather than lose itself in "other-worldliness" or in doctrines evolved in earlier eras, doctrines whose relevance and truth might be vehemently espoused but whose validity would be open to question.³

A religious ideal is, by its very nature, unattainable immediately, yet paradoxically it stands as the greatest spur to dedicated efforts toward its ultimate approximation. Man's entire moral evolution, on this view, has consisted in his gaining greater insight into the significance and dignity of human personality and in the gradual diffusion

¹ *Morals in Evolution*, by L. T. HOBHOUSE (1906 and later editions) provides an excellent comprehensive summary of man's changing moral concepts and codes.

² Dr. Radhakrishnan writes as follows: "Blind belief in dogma is not the faith which saves. . . . Hindu thought has no mistrust of reason. There can be no final breach between the two powers of the human mind, reason and intuition." (*The Hindu View of Life*, pp. 16-17)

³ "The intellectual representations of the religious mystery are relative and symbolic. . . . Not one of them is full and final." (*Ibid.*, p.36)

of this insight into all areas of life among ever-widening sections of mankind. And it has been largely through the prophets of every generation and culture, the men whose ethical perception was keener than that of the general level of their age, that the enlightenment and amelioration of society has occurred.

The quality of human experience has been progressively enhanced and purified through the practice and precept of those who possessed a more sensitive conscience, a keener intelligence and a wider humanitarian sympathy than the majority of their contemporaries. The teachings they gave and the functional religion they sought to espouse were not widely acclaimed in their day, yet in nearly every case the time came when their insights became embodied in more enlightened and humane customs and what had been once savagely attacked became accepted as the norm, while in the meantime the epithets of the less ethically enlightened were being thrown at new pleaders for a juster and more decent world.

It may well be asked why religion, despite its valid achievements, to date, has not been more effective in transforming human relationships more closely to its ideals. Several reasons could be cited. One pertinent cause lies in the fact that religion has tended, historically, to underestimate the value and worth of intelligence. This charge applies, however, not

merely to religion but also to almost all aspects of human culture. Although civilization is a decidedly intellectual and moral achievement, it is only a very recent human experience, while habit is as old as life itself. In becoming rational, man became moral, but it is perhaps only natural (though not inevitable) that an area of life as highly charged with emotion as religion is should give less place to the critical faculty. In this connection, Dr. John Dewey has said that "the separation of warm emotion and cool intelligence is the great moral tragedy" (*Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 558).

Another pertinent factor has been the widely held view that the "truth" in religion has been "revealed" once and for all and that religious devotion consists in being loyal to this revealed truth, rather than in seeking new areas of knowledge and understanding outside the bounds of its doctrinal framework. Yet the whole history of religion, as of science, indicates that knowledge can never be compressed within the hard moulds of an intellectual system and remain "true" to itself. A growing experience produces, or should produce, growing levels of awareness. In contrast to the idea of static dogma and doctrine, the concept of deepening insights, wider horizons and developing perception is both more intellectually inspiring and more in accordance with the realities of psychological experience. "Expansion of consciousness" and

“degrees of awareness,” far from being mere academic phrases, are coercive social forces, both in personal life and in the life of cultures. Lack of vision, for example, and ignorance of the basic principles of social and psychic health can wreck a society as easily as can a persistent indifference to the realities of world affairs.

A related reason for traditional religion not being as functional as ideally it might be lies in the dualistic idea, partly Greek in origin, that religious faith applies to another world and that there must be in consequence an eternal gap between the real and the ideal, an everlasting Platonism that cannot be bridged. The ideal, in this view, becomes a *mere ideal*, incapable of realization. Religion then finds itself encased in a separate mental compartment, divorced from the everyday world of harsh struggle and heartache and thereby rendered less potent in transforming the values and motives of a sensate civilization. For the dominating drives and preoccupations of human culture today are not in any real sense religious. They are, as perhaps they have always been, egoistic, sensate and economic. In the contemporary “thing-minded” atmosphere an other-worldly religion becomes almost an anachronism, yet, as Arthur Koestler has reminded us in *The Trail of the Dinosaur*, the gap between man’s religion and his actual experience is

such a long-standing one that the very idea of closing this gap has come to seem well-nigh blasphemous.

Will a functional religion ever evolve to furnish to men and women a greater sense of the creative possibilities of experience, to give them a keener recognition of the responsibility for becoming *aware*, to liberate them from the inertia of blind habit and to make the world safe for intelligence? It is perhaps too extravagant a hope that the *immediate* future will produce any startling upsurge of ethical insight or rational enlightenment in the great majority of mankind. Creative developments in religion have nearly always begun with the few. And yet, on a long view, if history is a valid guide and if the present crisis in human history can be transcended, constructive changes in man’s religious outlook can be confidently expected. The elimination through scientific technology of poverty and age-old insecurities may mean that qualities of the spirit will have a greater area in which to exercise themselves. In a more perfect environment, psychic malformations would have less occasion to arise. A new, gradual but very real “transvaluation of values” may eventuate in enhancing the æsthetic quality in living; and the hard moulds of theological orthodoxy yield to a new religious symbolism in which the moral aspirations of man may find expression in terms

that will not violate the reaches of his reason.

JOHN E. OWEN

INSANITY

Inquiry into the causes of insanity, the most insidious and least understood of maladies, has led both scientists and philosophers into blind alleys. But both agree that there has been a recent increase in the incidence of mental diseases coincident with the progress of modern civilization along material lines.

A Nobel Prize Winner, Linus Pauling, chemist of the California Institute of Technology, holds the view that insanity is probably caused by genetic factors; and to carry out research on this thesis the Ford Foundation made recently a grant of \$450,000. This famous chemist argues that mental deficiency arises when defective genes cause the body to manufacture abnormal molecules. It is interesting in this connection to read what another Nobel Prize Winner, Dr. Alexis Carrel, has to say on this subject. He frankly admits in his *Man, the Unknown* that physicians are completely ignorant of the nature of mental disorders. He points out, however, that insanity is rampant wherever moral discipline has been suppressed and selfishness and irresponsibility are prevalent. He goes on to observe that it is not strictly speaking heredity, that is responsible for mental disorders, for they sometimes occur in lineages free from such afflictions.

When two such eminent scientists disagree, it is obvious that the cause or causes of insanity are not yet determined. Perhaps the secret lies not in the genes but rather in conceiving correctly the relation of the body to the

inner Man. According to ancient teachings all illnesses—physical, psychological, mental or moral—are caused by a lack of balance between these two. Unbalanced conditions of many sorts must exist till this inner conflict is resolved.

Such knowledge of the body-mind relationship as ancient India possessed is a safeguard against a dangerous disturbance of the balance.

Insanity, then, either partial or complete, can be described as a break in the connection between the inner being and the personality it uses. It should be observed that the number of insane patients has increased with the progress of material civilization, which glorifies selfishness and encourages sensuous desires. Misdirected desires tend to disturb the mental and moral balance.

A telling statement of what happens when the sensuous personality is victorious over the higher aspect of man is to be found in the *Bhagavad-Gita*. When the human consciousness busies itself with sensuous inclinations, the downward path leading to the loss of all is being followed. The why and the how of it is to be found in this unequivocal and simple but profound statement:—

He who attendeth to the inclinations of the senses, in them hath a concern; from this concern is created passion, from passion anger, from anger is produced delusion, from delusion a loss of the memory, from the loss of memory loss of discrimination, and from loss of discrimination loss of all! (*Gita*, II. 62-63)

G.B.S.:

DEFENDER OF ANIMAL OUTSIDERS

[Mr. Parnell Bradbury is the author of several plays, among them two collections of children's plays, and a novel, *The Tree Was Quiet*. We are glad to publish below his tribute to Bernard Shaw. It gives due credit to Shaw's active opposition to vivisection. It would have been sad if Shaw's centenary year had passed without mention of this facet of his reformatory zeal.—ED.]

Bernard Shaw, who was born in Dublin a hundred years ago, has been called many things, but even among his admirers, many of whom are now busily engaged in his centenary celebrations, few have acknowledged him as a champion of animal welfare.

As for the distinguished people who acclaim him a literary giant and a great dramatist, I have searched their remarks in vain for some acknowledgment of G.B.S. as a social reformer; as a defender of minorities (animal and human); as the champion of the outsider. Can it be that the truths which Shaw expounded concerning the futility no less than the barbarity of experiments on animals twenty, thirty or even forty years ago are still unpalatable even to those who accept him as a thinker? Can it be that those truths are so disturbing that most people (even those who feel they are on safe ground when praising the dramatist) would run a mile rather than face them? It looks like it.

In the *Sunday Times* of July 22nd, Mr. Colin Wilson describes Shaw as a psychologist and a mystic. Well, that is something.

But no one has dared to see him as what he was, according to his own statements—a professional debunker of the value of animal experimentation; as a man who was moved to both fury and compassion by the idiotic reports that are issued by medical research councils from time to time, and that are, six years after his death, no less idiotic. The implications of this are serious. It looks as though there is a conspiracy of silence against G.B.S. as the thinker who, forty years ago, warned us that cancer would increase if we gave over the study of it to scoundrels who were too lazy or too stupid to search for causative factors beyond the vivisection table—and paid them fantastic sums for being so.

One newspaper which ought to have had more imagination actually printed two of these annual reports side by side with the B.B.C. plans for the Shaw centenary!

It is interesting to compare these reports with the opinions G.B.S. expressed in *Doctors' Delusions* (published in 1931). Obviously medical science (so-called) has, as far as finding the cause and cure of cancer is concerned, progressed very

little. How many animals have been tortured in vain? Money on medical research, we are told, has been well spent—£400,000 by the Cancer Campaign alone. How has it been spent? Several attempts were made to produce cancer in the lungs and skin of rats, mice and hamsters, by treating them with tobacco tars. None of these attempts has so far been successful. What a relief to all those patients who have cancer of the skin or lungs! The vermin and the hamsters are safe! But perhaps G.B.S. would not quite agree, for in a letter to *The Nation* he wrote:—

Those of us who have had cherished friends and relatives attacked by the diseases which the vivisectors claim to be able to cure, know best what value we have had for the guineas their announcements have drawn from our pockets into theirs. Those who are more fortunate have only to look at the Registrar-General's returns to see the rate at which we are still dying of the cures. If the men who have been stultifying themselves over vivisection for the last thirty years had been working in the paths of honour and mercy, and using their brains instead of carving living animals and calling it "Research," who shall say what they might not have discovered?

(That was on May 24th, 1913.)

The Report goes on to discuss the most suitable poliomyelitis vaccine for this country:—

There is no proof, so far, of what value a Salk-type vaccine may have in protecting children under six years of age. Besides, the vaccine contains a

strain of the poliomyelitis virus, whose effectiveness, in humans, is quite unproven, although it is safe and effective in animals. [Animal lovers please note.]

If the Reports referred to the behaviour of lunatics in a mental institution, they could be studied with less concern. As it is, we may tremble for the future health of mankind. And again:—

When one thinks of the Rockefeller funds, the Cancer Research funds, and the rest of the money that has gone down the vivisectors' sinks during the past quarter century, and compares its worse than negative results with the amazing series of discoveries made during that period by physicists doing sheer brain work within the strictest limits of honour, it is difficult to resist the conclusion (not that any normal person wants to resist it) that only imbeciles can be induced to practise vivisection, and glory in it. We give them huge sums to discover why we are dying of cancer at such an alarming rate, and how we can avoid it. They seize the money and buy innumerable mice with it to play with in their laboratories. After years of developing in themselves the mouse mind, they tell us that they have found out how to give a mouse cancer, and that they have found a microbe which is quite harmless, but which, when associated with other conditions which they cannot define, seems to be characteristic of cancer. Who would pull the whiskers of a single mouse for the sake of so pitiful a result?

Shaw asked that question in the *Sunday Express*, on August 7th, 1927—nearly thirty years ago. If

he were here, after reading these reports, he might be moved to ask it again. But perhaps his sojourn among the Immortals would have inclined him to have no more to do

with us since it is obvious that even after many decades of his vigorous teaching we have learned almost nothing.

PARNELL BRADBURY

THE LAW OF COMPENSATION

In commending to the public one of Canon L. J. Collins's recent sermons in St. Paul's Cathedral, in an article in the *Hindustan Times*, Shri C. Rajagopalachari draws special attention to the sway of the moral law of compensation in all spheres of activity. Describing it as the one force which keeps the universe in motion with all its varied manifestations, he points out that this world has "grown and shaped itself under inescapable law—as a crystal forms itself by the laws of mathematics." No one can escape the operations of this law, which is impersonal and universal in its application and includes every speck in the universe, from the minutest atom to Brahma:—

Be they individuals or be they the group that is called a society or a nationality, infringements of the moral law must be followed by permanent damage, whatever be the immediate illusion of advantage. We may hide the infringement by rhetoric and propaganda, but the law that governs cause and effect cannot be deceived.

This universal law of moral retribution is not imposed by an outside agency, call it by whatever name—deity or devil—but is in the hearts of all beings; for, as the writer aptly puts it:—

The moral law is not something aside of

the policies of human co-existence. They ever run together in the same direction, not by accident but by the law of human evolution. It is true of everything that what is bad morality according to the teachings of men of God to whatever nation they may belong, is also bad in the sense of worldly policy. This is so because man's physical, social and moral evolution has been an organic process and necessarily, therefore, a single integrated development. The culture, the civilization, the morality, the religious spirit and all the accepted axioms of life are the result of one intertwined process of evolution.

Every civilization invariably strikes a general average of the amount of moral direction required by the people of the time—this average being represented by its conventions, customs, traditions and laws. And every aberration from this norm gives rise to pain and punishment. This great edifice of moral law built by the experiences of the past is handed down to us in our Scriptures, and Rajaji rightly warns us against the danger of flouting the dictates of the Holy Writ when he writes:—

Let us not foolishly condemn ourselves to the fate of Sisyphus rolling the stone up unendingly, letting it roll down again each time, but let us accept the wisdom of our fathers handed down as the moral law and build our happiness on a progressive upward plan.

THE SPIRIT AND SUBSTANCE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

[Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao offers in this article an understanding and appreciative general account of Indian philosophy. It is a kind of comprehensive view that a student must strive not to lose while he examines the doctrines, and especially the polemic writings, of the great schools that embody the *darshanas*, points of view, in Indian philosophy. Madame Blavatsky has reminded us that they are not only reconciled but spiritually synthesized in the Wisdom that makes the true Occultist and Sage, in the *Gupta Vidya*—the Esoteric Philosophy.]

We publish here the first part of Dr. Nagaraja Rao's article. The second part, together with a Note on the place of Buddhism, will appear next month.

—ED.]

I.—SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE AND REASON

The term "Indian Philosophy" comprehends the groups of philosophical systems that have originated from the spiritual experience of the sages of ancient India, subsequently elaborated into systems of thought and explained in terms of reason and logic. They are called *darshanas*. They are not the fruits of mere intellectual speculation.

The antiquity of Indian philosophic thought has not remained a mere matter of history. It has had a living and growing influence on the thought and life of Indians through thirty centuries. It has preserved its spirit through the ages in spite of repeated invasions, social convulsions and frequent upheavals—through all the vicissitudes of India's fortune. The spirit of Indian philosophic thought has a strange vitality, a strong and sound instinct for life, which has made it *mrityunjaya* (triumphant over death). In

every age has some representative of the philosophic spirit of India been found. No age is without its witness.

Indian philosophic thought has permeated all aspects of Indian life and literature. It has determined and coloured the themes of Indian drama, literature and art, the social structure and ethical ideals; and its influence is lasting. One of the living systems of Indian philosophy, the Vedanta, has become to some Western intellectuals a solace and a solution to the vexed problems of the world. They consider that it offers the central principles of the universal religion we need today.

Tradition divides Indian philosophy into two groups. The orthodox group (*astika darshanas*), which consists of Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Sankhya, Yoga, Mimamsa and Vedanta, believes in the authority of the Vedas and gives allegiance to

it. Of this group of six systems the Mimamsa and the Vedanta base themselves directly on the teaching of the Vedas and accept nothing that goes contrary to them. They make use of reason to explain the truths of revelation, *i.e.*, the body of spiritual experience of the *Rishis*. The other four systems of the group are based more on independent grounds of logic and reasoning, but they, too, are not opposed to the scriptures. Not content merely to swear by the scriptures, they seek to confirm and reassure themselves of the contents of the scriptures through reasoning. The difference is in the distribution of emphasis.

The second group, including Buddhism, Jainism and the Charvaka school, does not owe any allegiance to the Vedas, and hence these systems are called *nastika darshanas*. They originate from the spiritual experience of prophets like Gautama the Buddha and Mahavira.

All these nine systems constitute Indian philosophy. Before attempting a detailed study of them we should try to understand the general characteristics of Indian philosophy, its pervasive climate of thought.

Its range and variety are astonishing. All shades of opinion are there: Realism, Idealism, Pluralism, Monism, Dualism, Monotheism, Theism, etc. In the words of Professor Hirianna, "we have all the different shades of philosophic theory repeated twice over in India, once in the six systems and again

in Buddhism."

Most of the philosophical systems do not make any reference to the personalities that set them forth. In the words of Max Müller, "of the philosophers hardly anything remains to us beyond their names." They cared more for the truths they expounded than for their names.

The Indian philosophical ideal is different from that of the West. The Indian systems seek to attain a state of existence called *moksha*. *Moksha* is the highest good, *parama purushartha*. It is the ultimate value. All the other values of life subserve the realization of the highest good and result in it. The Indian outlook is synthetic, integrated and centred in the attainment of *moksha*.

To the question "Why seek *moksha*?" the answer is the need for the radical termination of the sorrows of life. All the systems begin with a reflective examination of the state of human life and find in it a good deal of sorrow. *Samsara* is full of sorrow. Philosophy originated in India under the pressure of a practical need to overcome and destroy the threefold suffering to which man is heir. It is the master remedy for the ills of life.

Moksha is the master word in Indian philosophy according to Sri Aurobindo. It is a state of perfection beyond suffering. The ideal of *moksha* is not conceptual. It is the result of integral experience. Mere intellectual study will not enable us

to attain it. It requires moral discipline also. It is a religious ideal. It is beyond logic and also beyond mere morality. It is not the mere acquisition of knowledge or mere self-culture, but a certain immediate experience resulting from both. In that state all our doubts and disbeliefs are dispelled and our strife and tensions are overcome. This practical and pragmatic motive is the dominant note in all the systems. This has made some describe Indian philosophy as purely religious.

The object of Indian philosophy is not only to advance in knowledge or to find a correct way of thinking. It is more a right way of living. "It is a way of life, not a mere view of life." It is essentially a philosophy of values. The Indian philosophical ideal is a direct experience of Reality and not a mere intellectual mode of apprehending it.

The ideal is significant. *Moksha* is eternal. There is no lapse from it once it is attained, no return from *moksha* to *samsara*. It is absolute, and never becomes a means to other ends. It is an end in itself. All the systems describe *moksha* as their ideal. The Nyaya declares that *moksha* results from knowing the true nature of Reality. The Sankhya speaks of the destruction of the threefold misery (*dukkhatraya*) as the consequence of the knowing of what the system takes to be the ultimate nature of *Purusha*. The Vedanta declares that the

knower of the Self overcomes all sorrows, that in such knowledge alone perfection lies.

The ideal of *moksha* has overshadowed the logical acumen of the systems. Yet an acquaintance with the polemical texts of the various systems will bear out their dialectical subtlety, logical analysis, formal precision and coherent interrelation of concepts and doctrines. A study of these aspects will convince the student of the philosophical worth of each system. It will regale the most ardent admirer of metaphysics and pure thought, and the untrained may well feel baffled on occasion. So it is clear that there is no want of logic in Indian philosophical systems. Reasoning and logic also are their methods.

Indian philosophical systems pay great attention to epistemology (*pramanas*). Max Müller observes that the very first question that every one of the Indian systems of philosophy tries to settle is: "How do we know?" The Mimamsakas have formulated the dictum that "the establishment or cognition of a thing depends upon the instruments of knowledge." Every system has given us its theory of knowledge, its doctrines of truth and error.

This leads us to the exact place and function of reason in Indian philosophy. Philosophy is not, as in the contemporary West, a mere attempt to analyze and clarify concepts, beliefs and meanings of words. Philosophy is the search for an experience of Reality. The sub-

ject-matter of Indian philosophy, however, is not the entire Reality. It is more the true nature of the Self. One of the postulates of Indian philosophy is that the soul is in its intrinsic nature full of bliss. The realization of the true and native nature of the Self is another name for *moksha*. The Self to be realized is not the individual ego that we are aware of. We mistake the ego for the true Self and that is the cause of our suffering. The ignorance of the true nature of the Self, which is free from all impurities, sorrows, etc., is the cause of bondage. This ignorance is called by different names. Nyaya calls it *mithya jnana* (illusory knowledge). Sankhya calls it lack of discrimination between *Purusha* and *Prakriti*. Advaita calls it *maya* (illusion). Self-realization is achieved either through self-culture or, in some forms of Vedanta, through the Lord.

Every system attempts to demarcate the Self from the not-Self. The Self is the supreme Reality. This is the reason for philosophy in India being called *adhyatma shastra* and *atma vidya*. It is the science of the Self.

Philosophy in the West begins with the analysis of experience with the aid of reason. But the term experience is narrowed to the limits of sense experience. Indian philosophy takes the entire gamut of experience into account. It includes normal and super-normal (*laukika*

and *alaukika*), waking, dreaming and deep-sleep (*sushupti*) experiences. Experience has two sides to it: the objective and the subjective. The systems of Indian philosophy are more interested in the subjective aspects. There are exceptions to the main trends, of course, in both the West and the East.

In Indian philosophy the methods of perception and inference are made use of, but it is held that reason, by its very nature, cannot absolutely and completely comprehend Reality. Spiritual realization is a matter of experience. It is self-certifying and beyond reason. This experience is the ultimate authority. All others are valuable in the measure in which they lead to it. There is no demonstrative knowledge of Reality. The revelations that are set forth in the scriptures are *jnāpaka* (reminders) for us and not *karakas* (makers) of our experience. It is this aspect that has made Indian philosophy scientific. The final acceptance is not based on a second-hand report, or on an inherited authority, but on direct experience. It is hardly fair to describe such a position as dogmatic. The student of philosophy has only fixed a limit for the working of reason. He has no distrust of reason, but he has assessed its limitations. Reason does not supply the premises for Indian philosophy. Revelation sets its working hypothesis, which is finally accepted after spiritual experience. Reason interprets, clari-

fies and works out the implications of the working hypothesis. The spiritual experience of sages is the premise for reason to work on.

Though the omniscience of reason is not accepted, it is made use of at every stage in the interpretation of the scriptures. It is one of the most important determinative marks of purport in finding out the meaning of the scriptural statements.

The Indian philosophers' reliance on scripture is not authoritarian or dogmatic as it seems at first sight. They only tell us that the philosophic ideal of *moksha* is beyond the purview of perception and inference. Sense perception and reasoning do not exhaust Reality—"our reach exceeds our grasp." Revelation is the means of communication to us only in spiritual matters, matters beyond the reach of common experience.

Further, the findings of reason are inconclusive. Reason can be refuted by better reason. Reason follows certain premises. Logic is called in India *anviksha*, i.e., "examination after." It is not an independent instrument of knowledge. Commenting on an important *sutra*, Shankara observes:—

We see how arguments which some clever men have excogitated with great pains are shown by people still more ingenious to be fallacious, and how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn by other men; so that on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to

accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation....

Logic has the intrinsic defect that it cannot comprehend the ultimate Reality or spiritual experience. It can only work within the scheme of the network of relations. All our rational knowledge is relational. Spiritual experience of the Supreme Reality does not admit of divisions. *Relational* knowledge cannot give us immediate experience of the indivisible nature of Reality.

The validity of reason itself rests on something that cannot be demonstrated by reason. If it rests on some other reason, we shall have to go on from one truth to another, which lands us in an infinite regress. Such tests and criteria of truth as non-contradiction and coherence are not themselves obtained through reasoning. They are the presuppositions of reason. Hence it is that reason is given a limited place in Indian philosophy.

Let us sum up the issue. Spiritual experience alone can demonstrate the nature of Reality and the truth of scriptural declarations. Reason adduces the probability. It cannot give us absolute proof. Not all scripture is accepted. Only that which has purport is accepted. Shankara observes that "even if a thousand scriptural texts proclaim that fire is cold one is not bound to accept it." The Upanishads declare that there is no admittance into the shrine of philosophy for those who are intellectually indo-

lent or cannot or will not think. The final position is: Scripture enunciates truths and philosophy seeks to establish them by arguments. Without the material sup-

plied by scriptures and faith, logical reason will be mere speculation and fancy.

P. NAGARAJA RAO

(To be concluded)

THE DUMB DEVOTEE

She was dumb, because she was deeply devoted to the Divine. And has it not been said over and over again by seekers as well as by those who have attained to the truth of life that the moment an aspirant after the Eternal has a glimpse of God he loses the power of speech? Rightly, too, for Silence is the only authentic and eloquent language of the Divine.

Sometimes, however, she could not help breaking her more or less permanent spell of silence. And, when she did, it was with a song, at once touching and tearful—touching, because in it there was a pathetic memory of her primordial perfection, and tearful, because this memory stung her with thoughts of her present separation from that perfect state.

This was borne out by the refrain of her song: "He is my Master, I am but his bondsman. He is my Krishna and I, his Radha." This expressed her heart's ultimate aspiration.

But there were occasions when the refrain of her song varied. Then she would sing: "Only one sorrow have I, the sorrow of separation from my Divine Beloved."

Despite her twofold burden of sorrow and silence—holy and wholesome though a burden—she carried on her daily appointed task with constant serenity and exemplary integrity. No one had ever seen her ruffled even in the least, nor had she been even once found remiss in her work. And she carried herself with impressive dignity and decorum—with dignity born of her consciousness as a self-consecrated entity, and with decorum, because the other side of the shield of self-consecration is chastity of behaviour and conduct.

But who was this enigmatic she, hidden behind the *façade* of forms and buried under the bliss of self-effacement?

It was my Soul.

GURDIAL MALLIK

THE BED OF SPIKES AND SPIRITUALITY

[The writer of this article, **Shri. A. Iswaran**, is a graduate in engineering of the University of Madras. He has felt a strong call to religion and for the last four years he has been serving the Ramakrishna Mission on the staff of its *Prabuddha Bharata*. Here he defends self-mortification as a religious discipline. —ED.]

The other day my brother, a happy-go-lucky young university student, startled the household with his announcement that he had taken a vow to fast every Monday night—purely for “spiritual purposes.” When the seriousness of his intention became known, he was assaulted by opposition from every quarter and in various ways. Sisters reminded him teasingly that only old-fashioned widows fasted on Monday nights. Mother complained that such crazy experiments would ruin his none-too-robust health. An attempt to expose his superstitions from the “scientific point of view” was made by a good-natured uncle. Father did not say a word but gave his son a long, queer look and turned away in scornful pity—something wrong with the poor lad! My brother pocketed everything with quiet humour and nerved himself to the more painful ordeal of facing his friends, which also he stood successfully.

But many of us in modern times are not so fortunate as this young man, especially when our society is not confined to a small household and the students of a college. To be labelled “old-fashioned” or

“superstitious” and shunned by the elect, the moderns, is naturally dreaded by every aspiring and ambitious person, who is most of the time living as a social animal. But the essential Man, a soul with an individual goal to attain, with a life’s challenge to meet, must assert himself in some way or other. It is strange that the modern phase in India which has favoured the Western celebration of individual freedom as sacred has also created barricades of social and personal complexes against the realization of that freedom in a vital field of national existence, concerning India’s deathless mission, *viz.*, in the life of religion and spirituality. Outstanding among these barricades are the misconception and decrying of austerity, considered as the fundamental and foremost criterion of spiritual growth.

The Sanskrit word *tapas* has been translated in so many ways (as “asceticism,” “austerity,” “penance,” “sacrifice,” and even “self-torture”) that one wonders if it has ever been grasped correctly. It is true that the Hindu scriptures use the word sometimes with a special meaning. But it is not difficult to

get at the fundamental idea underlying the various usages.

We know from the Upanishads that *tapas* is the very root of the universe. For it is said that when God desired to create, He performed *tapas* and out of it arose the knowledge of creation. The great Shankaracharya interprets this *tapas* as a concentrated, creative desire, deep meditation; for this alone gives birth to knowledge—a fact well known in ordinary acts of human creation in art, literature and science and even in solving day-to-day problems. This birth, this solution, is followed by a supreme joy. Therefore God is said to have “swelled” with this primeval *tapas* when He created the universe. This is an important factor in determining the true kind of *tapas*—it always leads to bliss and enlightenment, sweetness and light.

Another Upanishad gives definitions of *tapas* by different sages of that time and confirms that study or learning alone is *tapas*. In this portion the Upanishad deals with instructions to students in the *gurukula* (the ancient hermitage university). Hence it defines *tapas* as study, the chief restraint that regulates and rules a student’s life. Other meanings are given to the word in particular instances. But the common factor in all these cases is obviously the “restraint” that causes the scattered forces of the mind to be focused on a point, the immediate goal to be attained.

According as the goal varies, the nature of the restraint, the character of *tapas*, also varies. But without this concentration of mind the most laudable restraint becomes negative and the greatest *tapas* mere torture. On the other hand, any form of restraint which leads to this collected state of mind that gives rise to luminous knowledge is acceptable. In this way all kinds of physical and mental exercises came into vogue. We find Shankaracharya, in many places in his commentaries, giving the example of *krichracandrayana* (a particular rule of fasting) in explanation of the word *tapas*.

But in the silent flow of time the overgrowth of weeds and moss covers each shining truth. Every age has its own superstitions and its malpractices, but also its great souls, the redeemers, who come to wean the world from them. Time and again the principle of austerity has been confused with its external forms, resulting in hypocrisy, self-deception, cheating of society. As early as the time in which the *Gita* was written we hear the ringing of the axe that, later, the Buddha laid effectively at the root of this evil. But the path of the “Golden Mean,” preached nowadays by every public speaker, cannot be followed at all times in the same way. The leaders of the past hundred years, from the Brahmo-Samaj to the Ramakrishna Mission movement, have dealt sledge-hammer blows at every form of priestcraft, mystery-mongering and spiritual debauchery.

That was very good. But, now that people are swinging to the other extreme, it seems necessary and wise to stress the other side of the picture. The progressive group, especially the youth of the country, not only has taken to a convenient form of the "Middle Path" but also looks down upon and sometimes violently attacks the "austere" group. It is a pity that even those who are seriously devoted to religion and spiritual culture join the ranks of crusaders against the so-called weakening influence of physical austerity and other such observances. This has actually led to a softening of moral fibre, a loss of stamina. The least foregoing of normal comforts and conveniences upsets a man.

It is time that people realized that the Middle Path is not very easy to tread. First, you have to find the Path before you follow it. You cannot blindly imitate anyone in this. For it is an individual experiment with distinct results which everyone has to work out for himself. The moderate or even austere diet for an elephant will be rank gluttony for an ass.

Again, who succeeds in finding his own Middle Path? Only an expert musician can tune the strings to the correct pitch, neither too low nor too high. And in the period of training that precedes this perfection one will play with sometimes slack and sometimes overtaut strings. Generally, it is safer to lean to the side of self-denial rather than self-

aggrandizement, for the natural pull of human depravity will restore the balance. Life is not a straight road that we can ride always in the middle—only an accomplished and advanced soul can do that. With most of us the road is a sinuous mountain path swept with terrible gusts of passion, and when we take a sharp hairpin bend the vehicle must swerve to the safer edge. To keep to the centre would be perilous then. So every powerful instinct of evil should be met with a more powerful impulse of good, and in giving this impulse a "holy violence," if such a forbidding word may be used, has to be offered to the desire-mind.

It is said that soldiers of the American Air Force have to suffer a gruelling period of intensely severe training deliberately imposed with a view to making them fit to endure through extreme wartime emergencies. The soldiers go through the experience quite cheerfully, knowing that it is only a preparation, and that a brief hardship will save them from terrible suffering, probably from death. Now, the demands of the battle of life are much greater, and everyone who aspires to fight it successfully must volunteer to endure more strenuous training. The right conception of austerity as a means to a great and inevitable end takes all bitterness from the struggle; the self-imposed discipline leaves no sting. This psychological fact has been overlooked by those who view the pro-

cess objectively and condemn it with their pity. Even when they recognize in it a subjective experience that is contrary to pain or sorrow, they attribute it to "nerves" or to some emotional perversion. This is nothing but total blindness to the nature of spiritual life, its deep currents and course, its pulse and pleasure.

It is a curious fact that austerities, physical and mental, have played an overwhelming part in the lives of all great spiritual luminaries, including those who have preached against them. And this has not been confined to Hinduism only. We wonder if the Buddha's Golden Mean would have convinced us, or, for that matter, convinced the Buddha himself, if he had not earlier undergone tremendous austerities. Bayazid, the famous Sufi mystic, said that he attained gnosis "by means of an empty stomach and a naked body." The asceticism of some of the Christian saints is well known.

So the first step towards remedying this fault is to remove the prejudice that all forms of external austerity are unscientific, hypocritical and positively harmful in the long run. Significantly, this has been one of the contributions of Mahatma Gandhi to modern India in the crucial stage of her crystallization. As the prophet of this new age he indeed put his finger on the right spot and cast his own life in a mould of such severe simplicity and constant penance

that it ought to have left no doubts in any of us as to the efficacy and everlasting need of austerity in life. It was his unique genius that made it a twice-blessed means to personal spiritual enlightenment and the service of humanity. He chastened his body and mind by the disciplines of fasting, silence, prayer, abstention from and acceptance of certain things, and vows of various kinds undertaken to meet different situations. It was this sort of hard training that endowed him with the necessary spiritual energy to shoulder the awesome responsibility of being the Father of the Nation.

The country is not yet in safe waters; dangers are ahead, more disastrous and overwhelming than ever. Since the Mahatma has been taken away from us, who are there to meet the situation, and how are they going to meet it? Hardy men are necessary at the helm, strong with the strength not of muscle and nerve but of a pure and self-effacing mind prepared to undergo any privations, a strength which the frail sage of Sabarmati revealed to us. If we wish to acquire his strength, we must imitate his life.

So it seems that the ideal to be preached is not that of a Janaka, a saintly king, with his princely state and perfect detachment, but that of a Gandhi, a kingly saint, an ascetic and an intense worker. There are more chances for me to play the hypocrite in the former role than in the latter. It is true that one who

wears a hair shirt or lies in comfort on a bed of spikes may be as far from spirituality as any other man, but he at least develops a certain hardiness and pays heavily for it, whereas it costs nothing to enjoy a cosy life and pretend to be a great saint.

In conclusion, let it be noted that we do not advocate everyone taking to sackcloth and ashes. What is needed is to give sackcloth and ashes their due place and to remember that mental austerity must express itself in physical forms also, and that the process that leads to bliss and enlightenment must sometimes

be very painful. We have to realize the necessity of the times, which requires everyone to be more hardy, renouncing and brave in order to face crises in the personal world of spirituality as well as in the world of humanity teeming around—in short, to preserve the Aryan ideal of *tapas* and to give it the vital place which it enjoyed in the ancient scheme of life, as an integral part of *Dharma*.

“Truth, great and stern law, consecration, austerity, prayer and sacrificial rites—these uphold the Earth” (*Atharva Veda*, XII. I. I).

A. ISWARAN

WORLD CITIZENSHIP

Reference was made on p. 288 of our June 1956 issue to the Commonwealth of World Citizens and the proposed adoption of its Provisional Constitution at its August Assembly. This was held at the Temple of Peace, Cardiff, Wales, from August 27th to 30th. There are many movements whose purpose is to foster world unity. This one has, however, a character of its own, in its stress on “the human touch” over and above the administrative, its emphasis on the service aspect of citizenship rather than on privilege. Founded in 1950 by Hugh Schonfield, the historian, after ten years’ preparation its three objects are Service, Mediation and Example. The work already done with limited resources and few influential contacts is praiseworthy, especially the help given to Stateless people.

Since the last prior Assembly, World Citizenship has increased by approximately 30%. Partly owing to exchange-control difficulties, finances are still a problem but something has been done towards the essential establishment of relations between the World Citizens and various governments. The Commonwealth has a vast task, but it is endeavouring to find the middle path between wordy sentimentalism and arid organizational impersonality—the two snares that destroy the spirit of so many humanitarian schemes; and it seems to be a movement deserving active encouragement. We understand that copies of its Provisional Constitution, a thought-provoking document, are obtainable from Messrs. Dennis Dobson, Ltd., 42, Great Russell Street, London, W.C. 1, at 3s. 6d. a copy.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

GANDHIJI—TESTING HIMSELF*

It has been worth waiting for, Shri Pyarelal's biography of Mahatma Gandhi. Its first volume has come later than had been expected. But it fulfils all the hopes that have been raised by the delay. The work has called for, as the author himself puts it, "Job's patience, a faculty of divination and some deft sleuth work." Suffice it to say that Shri Pyarelal seems to have spared himself no pains to make his record of Gandhiji's life during the period from his release in 1944 up to the time of Lord Mountbatten's arrival in India as full, detailed, vivid and authentic as seems possible. In the years to come, an increasing number of readers will be grateful for his immense labours.

This is not to suggest that Shri Pyarelal is happy with the book as it now is or thinks that not much can be added to his narrative. When he speaks of the colossal nature of his task, he indulges in no hyperbole. For one thing, there are serious gaps in the source material that he could command. Many "phases of delicate and intricate discussions" have gone unrecorded. Even where these existed, they often were inaccessible and even withheld.

Ironically enough, the very journal which Gandhiji began specially to keep for Pyarelal to make up for his absence could not be traced in the original. It only remains to be hoped that some of its parts, which Shri Pyarelal thinks are "irretrievably lost," are still extant somewhere.

Gandhiji is naturally the main theme. But to write about him is to chronicle all the major political developments and social movements of these years. Thus *The Last Phase* is also a history of our

own times. Here we get the background to the events leading to the "Quit India" resolution adopted at the Bombay session of the All-India Congress Committee in August 1942 and the Mahatma's last incarceration; the tortuous turns in negotiations with Wavell and Jinnah; the anti-national role of the Communist Party during the "Quit India" movement; the antecedents of the communal triangle, beginning with the command performance by the Aga Khan and other members of a loyalist Muslim delegation which waited upon the Viceroy, Lord Minto, on October 1st, 1906; the Cabinet Mission; the revolting Calcutta killings; the communal riots of Noakhali and Bihar, and Gandhiji's mission of peace there; and the formation of the Interim Government.

* * * * *

"You must watch my life—how I live, eat, sit, talk, behave in general. The sum total of all these is my religion." This is what Gandhiji once told a missionary friend. Truth thus meant to him truthful living—complete accord between word and deed, profession and practice. His whole life was an experiment in discovering the law of love and persuasion, an unceasing search for the means of applying this law to the solving of all the problems that might arise in personal dealings and public affairs. Whether it is in his negotiations with Lord Pethick-Lawrence and Sir Stafford Cripps or his regard for the little comforts and graces of life like a wash-basin or a commode for Jawaharlal Nehru, who visited him in Noakhali, we find him applying the same basic principles in each particular and peculiar situation. Shri Pyarelal has done

* *Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase*. Volume I. By PYARELAL. (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad. xxix+750 pp. 1956. Rs. 20/-; 30s.; \$5.00)

well to bring in many incidents and anecdotes which adorn his story even as they point a moral. It is some measure of the success he has had in giving the book an architectural unity that these asides, while illuminating the narrative, usually fall in place and add to the interest of the main theme.

So here we have the convincing picture of the Mahatma continuously trying and testing himself, content with the next step but never taking his eyes off the final destination. We find him, at the age of seventy-eight, studying Bengali. He burns life's candle at both ends: on some days he hardly sleeps for three hours. Yet he is fresh and fine. He gets rid of all his companions and does all his own work. We see how his profoundest feelings are stirred by the contemplation of the lives of the poor. Without effort, without artifice or varnish, Shri Pyarelal's story unfolds before us the Mahatma's goodness and greatness in all its varied facets.

Although there is no sign of despair and despondency, we find that Gandhiji does not carry all his colleagues with him in his spiritual Odyssey. The members of the Congress Working Committee ignore his advice. There are occasions when they do not take him into their confidence. And they drop the pilot. This drift in different directions was perhaps inevitable after the Congress assumed the cares and burdens of office while the Mahatma was left alone to pursue his experiments with truth. It is none the less tragic for that—especially the differences between him and Sardar Patel.

One of the contributory factors was Gandhiji's essays in control of passion—*brahmacharya*—through which he sought spiritual advance even when he found himself in the midst of political and communal storms. For the first time we have an authentic version of the moving story of the Mahatma's inner questionings; the consternation among and desertion by his so-called

colleagues; their attempt to suppress his writings; his loyalty to his ideals.

It has been suggested that Shri Pyarelal's version is incomplete, if not misleading. This could not be so for the very reason that his sources of information are more reliable than those of his critics. He also deserves to be congratulated upon his boldness for publicizing the facts about an episode which had set many filthy tongues wagging. In his analytical and historical study of sex sublimation, it is a pity that Shri Pyarelal relies essentially on Western authorities and experience. There is much that is most relevant here in Jain and Buddhist literature. But of this he seems to take no notice.

Although the style is not stilted or abstruse, it is heavy, if only with learning. Shri Pyarelal does not always leave epochal events to speak for themselves. In consequence, he weakens their impact on the reader's mind by the occasional use of a hackneyed adjective or a *cliché*. An Indian reader often wonders if the book is written for him or for an Occidental reader. For there is much allusive and evocative writing—the result of Shri Pyarelal's vast reading and virtuosity—the relevance of which may be lost on those who have none of the author's literary interests and associations. Indeed, is not the very title—*The Last Phase*—borrowed? If one remembers aright, that was the title given by Lord Rosebery to his study of Napoleon's captivity and incarceration on St. Helena.

The book is beautifully and lavishly produced. One's only regret is the photographs—too many and too small. Fewer photographs, of larger size, would have done better justice to their theme. The number of minor slips and spelling mistakes is remarkably small for a publication which promises to be as monumental as the Mahatma's memory. The reader will look forward to reading the second part, which will take the story to the end of the Mahatma's life.

M. V. D.

“A FIRST-RATE SYMPOSIUM”*

In September 1953, a conference was held at Liège and Spa (Belgium) under the co-sponsorship of the Universities of Chicago and Liège, to discuss the problem of “the relation between Islamic civilization and the local cultures of the areas which in the course of time have become more or less Islamized.” Under the chairmanship of Professor von Grunebaum, such well-known Western scholars of Islam as Professors Cahen, Caskel, Minorsky, Lewis and J. Schacht, among others, participated. This volume publishes the papers read at, or prepared for, the conference, together with summaries of the discussions which occurred.

Although papers and discussions on Islam in India and Pakistan are unfortunately absent, the book embodies a most valuable contribution to the understanding of Islam. In the context of the contemporary turmoil in the Muslim world, it poses the whole question of what is now involved in being a Muslim. Certainly, with an independent Turkey, or Indonesia, or Pakistan, a dependent East and West Africa and an Algeria in revolt against European rule, being a Muslim does not denote membership of one Islamic universal state. Nor does it mean the use of the language of the sacred scripture, Arabic, in daily life. Nor, with sectarian differences, the quarrels between Sunni and Ahmadiya, the “dis-establishment” of Islam in Turkey and the disputes in Pakistan over the nature of the true Islamic society, does it denote a unity of faith.

The problem tackled by the conference confronted Muslims themselves early in their history. For Islam burst out of Arabia as a set of simple religious imperatives, without a theology, without clearly defined traditions and indeed without experience of govern-

ing vast areas—vast areas which the Arabs were soon to conquer. Indeed it can be argued that it was the conquered peoples who created the highly articulated Islamic civilization of the time of Harun al-Rashid. Even so, Muslim culture was then, and is now, more than the sum of its different regional expressions and variations. For, through whatever scenery they travelled, Muslims always advanced into the future looking back to the days of Muhammad and the ideal polity of the first four “Rightly-Guided” Caliphs for inspiration.

Professor Schacht in his paper on Muslim law makes a strong case for regarding the *shari'a*, even though itself partly an amalgam of local customs sanctified and made Islamic by the *Hadith*, as the formative expression of the Muslim urge for a total, unique religious view of life. Muslims of all regions and climes, and of whatever race and language, still believe passionately that law must be ruled by religion. Professor Schacht believes that Muslims today will have to arrive at a similar synthesis and that if this synthesis

is not to be a break with their past, if it is to be true to the whole history of their religious law, it will have to be neither a mechanical and arbitrary reshaping of their traditional sacred law nor the erection of a temporal structure concealed behind an alleged Islamic façade; it will have to be the evaluation of modern social life and of modern legal institutions from an Islamic religious angle. The real problem poses itself at the religious and not at the technically legal level.

Professor Cahen too notes that, even after the political disintegration of the Muslim world by the eleventh century, Muslim jurists hankered after sultans who would perform the religious functions of the Caliphs; he feels, however, that the truly Muslim State was always

* *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization*. Edited by GUSTAVE E. VON GRUNEBaum. (Comparative Studies of Cultures and Civilizations. The University of Chicago Press, U.S.A.; Cambridge University Press, London. xii+385 pp. 12 plates. 1956. 45s.)

more of a vague aspiration than a fact.

Professor Francesco Gabrieli also sees the common religious motif in Muslim literature, despite, for example, the specially Persian contribution to the heroic and romantic epic. But even in the *Shah-Nama* with its glorification of pre-Muslim Iran

it remains true that the social and cultural reality of an already Islamized Iran sometimes shines through even the archaic Firdausian poem and does so even more in Nizami's various exquisite romantic poems, all impregnated, although to different degrees, by Muslim culture and piety... Nor can one divorce the Persian historians of the Mongol period from their Islamic world view.

Most of the regional formulations of Islam, studied in papers on Islam in Indonesia, North Africa, Tropical Africa and so forth, bring out the importance of the *ulama* and their role as guardians of the message of the Koran and the Sunna of the Prophet in an often suffocating environment.

Professor Lewis in his paper on Westernization in Turkey sees the Muslim tradition as only one and not necessarily the major one influencing Turkey today. He emphasizes the importance of the Anatolian and Turkish strands in the history of the country. Professor Lewis believes that the Turks grasp two concepts central to modern Western civilization, the notion of progress and the notion of organism:—

The capacity for analysis and synthesis of the modern historian and the feeling for the development of character and plot of the modern novelist may have their precedents in the Ottoman chroniclers and memoranda writers, with their discussion of causes and analysis of effects.

Professor Lewis suspects that these deeper affinities with the West, together with Turkey's long history of political independence, go far to explain Turkey's present foreign policy and her progressive Westernization in her internal life. However, even Turkey has, in recent years, been undergoing an Islamic revival.

This collection of papers is not perhaps the easiest of reading for the non-specialist, but it is a first-rate symposium of modern Western Islamic scholarship which appetizes with every mouthful. It does suggest that the Western challenge to Muslim culture will provoke, and indeed is provoking, a specifically Muslim response. The book brings out the deep attachment to traditional Muslim values and the fierce desire among all Muslim peoples to re-establish Muslim civilization in its old pre-eminence. The question of what constitutes a Muslim, the question with which the book is chiefly concerned, may perhaps be answered by saying that the aspiration to be a Muslim constitutes a Muslim today.

P. HARDY

GEORGE BERKELEY

The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. Vols. VII and VIII. Edited by A. A. LUCE. (Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., London. 389 pp. 1955. 30s. and 312 pp. 1956. 30s.)

That George Berkeley was an incisive thinker whose idealism is still a living force in contemporary speculation no one can deny. The philosophy which once shocked his contemporaries and seemed to have robbed the external world of its substance has ceased

to irritate the common man. Now his thought enjoys popularity even with some men of science and no less a one than Sir James Jeans sought refuge in his idealism. It was indeed the religious motive that was primarily at work in him. But his philosophic status has eclipsed his significance as a religious thinker. His idealism is really an attempt to give the deathblow to materialism once for all and pave the way for a belief in God and in religious verities. Though

materialism is not yet finished it has certainly lost most of its lure.

In Volume VII we find collected together his sermons, his essays in the *Guardian*, a letter to Sir John James and some other works, which are of minor significance. The sermons and the essays are of main interest to us, though not marked by any outstanding qualities, because they reveal the man and his character. As the editor observes about these sermons, "there is no fire in them, but neither is there froth." The sermons are sustained by genuine conviction and faith, and it is as true of religion as of art that what comes from the heart goes to the heart. The sermon on Charity especially reveals the good Christian that Berkeley was. He pleads for the inner transformation of man on the basis of love:—

There must be an inward, sincere disinterested affection that takes root in the heart and shews it self in acts of kindness and benevolence. My little children, saith St. John, let us not love in word but in deed and truth.

It is but natural that the Bishop is preoccupied with Christianity. The almost childlike innocence with which he compares his own religion with the ideas of the "heathen" world deserves our indulgence. His worst enemies, however, are the Free Thinkers of his day and it is against them that he gives vent to his just indignation without any restraint.

This seventh volume of Berkeley's works is commended to those religious souls who are not so much interested in the academic questions of philosophy as in the inward life of the spirit.

S. VAHIDUDDIN

The eighteenth-century philosopher of an anti-materialistic idealism, into which he gradually imported theology and something related to pantheism, the Irishman, Berkeley, who became Bishop of Cloyne, was like all Irishmen up to Bernard Shaw almost incapable of being dull and certainly one of those writers whose personal correspondence is interesting to posterity.

Volume VIII of *The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, Letters*, edited by Dr. A. A. Luce, Berkeley Professor of Metaphysics, Trinity College, Dublin, has just appeared in Nelson's Bibliotheca Britannica Philosophica at 30s., and much of the contents are the man himself talking of interesting things to interesting people, a few of them distinguished contemporaries like Alexander Pope. The majority, however, are to Thomas Prior, his agent in Dublin, and Sir John Percival, a close friend to whom the philosopher dedicated an important early work,

The New Theory of Vision.

Among the outstanding biographical themes of which we are reminded by some of the 270 letters in this volume, which the editor refers to in his Introduction, is Berkeley's social conscience, as we should call it today, which made him actively concerned with the problems of poverty and ignorance; and particularly his surprising stay in America to further a scheme of missionary education of the American Indians, based upon a projected college in the Bermudas.

The only known letters of Berkeley which are not in the collection are those few which have already been printed in previous volumes of this series of his "Works." This collection begins with letters written in 1709 when he was a Junior Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin, and continues until the year before his death.

R. L. MEGROZ

The Living Lotus. By ETHEL MANNIN. (Jarrolds Publishers (London), Ltd. 320 pp. 1956. 15s.)

Asian readers, who frequently hear rumours from Britain that the English novel is at death's door, will close *The Living Lotus* with a sigh of relief that it is taking an unconscionable time a-dying. Miss Mannin's new book has not only the qualities we expect of a good novel, an interesting story well and sensitively told, but it has something rare in English writing on the East—detachment.

No doubt the last thing even a devout Burmese Buddhist would expect an Englishwoman to bring back with her after a brief visit to Burma is illumination. Perhaps Miss Mannin took it with her. At any rate, she has caused its light to shine in her novel, and a very uncomfortable feeling that can be for those who live under what she symbolically calls "The Judas Tree."

She draws the picture of an all too recognizably British Forest Officer in Upper Burma, Christopher Finching, who, in pre-Independence days, is lord of all the natives he surveys. Lonely and unhappy, he marries a young Burmese village girl, and treats her with proper care, like any other precious article of utility and convenience. He is, of course, determined to do what he believes to be the right thing, mould her to the English pattern, and bring up the children of the marriage as respectable Church-of-England Chris-

tians. But their daughter Jennifer wants to wear a *longyi* like her mother, and shys away from "the dark ugly clothes of an English schoolgirl."

Having set this scene in brilliant colours, Miss Mannin unfolds the drama with the skill of a fine writer who detachedly sees the truth of people and situations. She does not flinch from revealing the weakness of the conventionally religious who, under duress, so often prefer the shade of the Judas to the Bo Tree.

The moving story is beautifully told, but we suspect it will appeal more to intelligent Asians than to the English readers for whom it is primarily intended. This is a pity, since it is just the kind of book that Imperialists, making their final exit, need. We fear, however, that the average reaction to Miss Mannin will be that of Jennifer's British Auntie, who took such pride in demonstrating the aspects of the Welfare State in London's East End. "Even the people looked grey, like corpses walking," comments Miss Mannin through Jennifer's eyes. Auntie replies, "The district is drab, but really the people are quite comfortably off."

If this book holds nought for the comfort of Britain, it gives hope of enlightenment. That one English novelist can write of Burmans and British so brilliantly and detachedly is in itself a good sign for the future.

DENNIS GRAY STOLL

An Anthology of New Zealand Verse. Selected by ROBERT CHAPMAN and JONATHAN BENNETT. (Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, London. xxxii+341 pp. 1956. 21s.)

The most obvious feature of this anthology is that the overwhelming bulk of the material comes from the last thirty-five years. New Zealand was slow in discovering her literary identity. Yet the pattern of that discovery is more or less the same as that seen in other

colonial cultures. First of all there was the poetry of exile, a good deal of which, in this case, was in the Scottish vernacular. Then came the poets who—in the words of the excellent Introduction—expressed "what it means to be a New Zealander." The very earliest stage of this process seems to have been missing in New Zealand. There is no equivalent of the Australian ballads of the "outback" or of the American folklore of the Wild West.

But the poets who first wrote of the New Zealand landscape tended to view it as pioneers. They may have been born there, but it still looked rather strange to them because their literary inheritance was predominantly English. Even so comparatively sophisticated a writer as R. A. K. Mason fills his scene with figures which, for all his irony, are stubbornly heroic:—

His body doubled
under the pack
that sprawls untidily
on his old back
the cold wet deadbeat
plods up the track.

Throughout the twenties and thirties poets continued to explore the New Zealand landscape, learning from T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and W. H. Auden how to isolate the significant detail and how to point and sharpen their technique. Denis Glover (who

learnt also from Yeats), Allen Curnow, and Charles Brasch have written very good poems which enlarge the topographical range of English verse.

The pioneer stage, needless to say, is now coming to an end. The youngest contributors to this collection are less conscious of themselves as New Zealanders and more conscious of themselves as poets, though this does not make them better poets. The most prevalent mood, perhaps, is that made familiar by the stories of Frank Sargeson. Of the younger writers, Kendrick Smithyman and James K. Baxter show that the art of poetry is still alive. This is an anthology of which no country need be ashamed and of which a country with so small a population as New Zealand has every reason to be proud.

NORMAN NICHOLSON

Vilwamangal: A Play in Five Acts. By GIRISH CHANDRA GHOSH; translated by SWAMI PRABHAVANANDA and FREDERICK MANCHESTER. (Vedanta Press, Hollywood. 119 pp. 1956. 50 cents)

Girish Ghosh's Bengali play, *Vilwamangal*, first produced about seventy years ago, has maintained its popularity ever since. The reputation of the author, the character of the hero and the message of *Bhakti* (Devotion) which the play so powerfully conveys have given *Vilwamangal* an enduring place in modern Indian drama. The central theme is the miracle of transition from earthly to divine love—from *Vilwamangal's* infatuation for Chintamani, the prostitute, to his love of Krishna, the divine cowherd and flute-player of Brindavan.

Love under any circumstances is a form of madness. Does not *Vilwamangal*, in his wild anxiety to join Chintamani, jump into a river in spate, embrace a floating corpse and mistake a snake for a rope? When Chintamani fails him, he turns to the Divine; he is Krishna-intoxicated as earlier he had

been Chintamani-intoxicated, and all his thoughts are now centred on Krishna. For the true lover, redemption is thus always possible because all love must ultimately lead to God, and the all-knowing, all-powerful Lord is also—and principally—the Saviour of the Fallen. Not human love or even lust, but hypocrisy and deceit, are the unforgivable sins.

Girish Ghosh's *Vilwamangal*, besides being a reincarnation of the fourteenth-century *Bhakta* of that name, is also a self-portrait; only, Girish's Krishna was really Ramakrishna, the Paramahansa. Apart from *Vilwamangal*, there are other *Bhaktas* too in the play; it may almost be described as a study of the dynamics of *Bhakti Yoga*. The stage is alive with a variety of character and incident, but the paths of all the seekers converge in Brindavan and all experience the bliss of ecstatic union with Krishna who is lord, stealer of hearts, sweetheart and child in one. The translators have done their work with competence and their prefatory notes are informative and instructive.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

Painted Tigers: Stories. By MANJERI S. ISVARAN. (Dhanus, Madras. 134 pp. 1956. Rs. 3/-)

Ever since Shri Isvaran published *Saffron and Gold* nearly twenty-five years ago, he has been steadily growing in stature as a poet and as a writer of short stories. The early idealistic mood gave place to what seemed a settled melancholy and bitterness, but this too has passed, and a mellow wisdom is the prevailing note of his recent poetry and fiction. On the other hand, even his stories are characterized by the lights and shadows, the caress and bite, of sensitive poetry. They turn on a wayward mood, a speck of experience, or a recovered spasm of memory. "A true author," Shri Isvaran confesses, "bases his stuff on the facts of his own experience, while one who is not true,

on those of other writers." Shri Isvaran's is always authentic writing, for it is the expression of authentic experience. An incident during the Muharram celebrations, a mad creature who still dreams of the gold on the lips of the man who had ruined her life, the moan of a woman in the throes of childbirth, a nurse's casual report about a confinement to a fellow nurse, the reunion of husband and wife after an agonizing interval, the rival *appam*-sellers of Mango Lane—by no means exceptional items these, but Shri Isvaran renders them anew, with an understanding and a sympathy that are his own. What is most valuable in his work is his feeling for form and his psychological penetration; and that is why his short stories are always so satisfying.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

Pictorial Poetry. By M. M. BHATTACHERJE. (*The Research Bulletin (Arts) of the University of the Panjab*, No. XIV, 1954. 182 pp. Rs. 10/-)

This volume contains eight Extension Lectures delivered in 1953 at the Panjab University College, Hoshiarpur, by Professor Bhattacharje of the University of Calcutta. In the opening chapter he discusses the meaning of pictorial poetry and then ranges over a wide field from Chaucer to Eliot, showing considerable knowledge and understanding of the various authors handled. Some points in these lectures have already appeared in *Keats and Spenser*, an earlier book by Dr. Bhattacharje, published in 1944.

Dr. Bhattacharje brings considerable research to bear upon the subject but

there is not much that is outstandingly new in his early chapters. In the last few chapters one comes across points not noticed before. But one looks in vain for a critical analysis of Hopkins's metrical and linguistic experiments and their relation to pictorial poetry.

Dr. Bhattacharje's book would be better with an index and fewer quotations from other critics. The inclusion of a select bibliography would add to the usefulness of the book.

A scholarly monograph published under the imprint of a University certainly deserves careful proof-reading. Unfortunately printing mistakes recur with irritating frequency. The book, moreover, is rather high-priced.

DILIP KUMAR SEN

Books That Changed the World. By ROBERT B. DOWNS. (A Mentor Book. New American Library of World Literature, New York. 200 pp. 1956. 35 cents)

This volume presents the substance of sixteen books dating from the Renaissance and to the twentieth century

which have influenced the trend of events. In choosing the titles the author is guided by his own criterion:—

There is no intention of offering a list of "best books" or "great books."... The crucial test is whether or not the theories, programs, or ideas advocated eventually win acceptance,

cross international borders, are translated into other languages, cause disciples, imitators, and rivals to rise, and are gradually incorporated into the lives and thoughts of peoples and nations.

Works of religion, philosophy and literature are excluded on the ground that their influence has been so all-pervasive "as to be virtually immeasurable." The study includes six books in the sciences from 1543 to 1915, covering the works of Copernicus, William Harvey, Newton, Darwin, Freud and Einstein, and ten books in the social sciences from 1523 to 1927, written by Machiavelli, Thomas Paine, Adam Smith, Malthus, Thoreau, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Marx, Alfred T. Mahan, Sir Halford J. Mackinder and Hitler.

The genesis of each of the sixteen books is explained with reference to the life of its author and the conditions of the age. The author says that the times

produced the book in nearly every instance. That should not mean that it was a mere reflex of the times; if so, how could it be among the books "that changed the world"? Rousseau and Nietzsche are among those who vitally affected the life and thought of more than one generation and outside the land of their birth, too, and could perhaps appropriately have been added to the list. But all the names here admitted to the canon have, beyond controversy, left their mark on the history of the world. The contribution entitled "Individual versus State" will be of particular interest to Indian readers for its account of "the principles of civil disobedience, as conceived by Thoreau and perfected by Gandhi."

This book can serve as the nucleus for a study of thought in the spheres of history, economics and science during the last four centuries.

A. VENKAPPA SASTRI

A Gallery of Scientists. By RUFUS SUTER. (Vantage Press, New York. 132 pp. 1955. \$3.00)

The book opens with a sketch of Aristotle, who prepared the way for the birth and growth of science by stressing the *disinterested* and *systematic* pursuit of knowledge, which is the spirit of all scientific enquiry and the condition of its advance. In a parenthetical section on China, the author illustrates how science dwindles where the Aristotelian temper of disinterested research is absent or is subordinated to utilitarian considerations.

Besides William Gilbert, Francis Bacon, Copernicus, Galileo and Blaise Pascal, who carry their own credentials as scientists, the gallery includes word portraits of Saint Anselm, Descartes, Hume and Kant. It took centuries to work off the authority of Aristotle in science as in other branches of learning, and then, after a Cartesian interlude,

to evolve the modern laboratory method of experiment and observation.

Mr. Rufus Suter states at the end three conclusions emerging from his survey: (1) That science sprang out of impractical curiosity; (2) that the empirical attitude was important to science from the outset; and (3) that, at a later stage, three alternative interpretations of the basic nature of science and "what it is all about" arose: (a) It concerns the universe of real matter, energy and knowing minds; (b) it concerns a congeries of sense data; (c) it concerns God. With a candour reflecting the spirit of the subject, the author ends on an indeterminate note: "Which of these interpretations is true remains for the future to decide."

Mr. Rufus Suter writes with verve and vivacity. The book is both entertaining and instructive, bringing to a focus much discursive material.

A. VENKAPPA SASTRI

Indomitable Friend: The Life of Corder Catchpool, 1883-1952. By WILLIAM R. HUGHES. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 236 pp. 1956. 12s. 6d.)

"Great things are done when men and mountains meet," wrote William Blake. No saying could more fittingly seal the life of Corder Catchpool. He was a Quaker of immense tenacity and loving sincerity, who died in 1952 on an Alpine peak which it had been his life-long ambition to climb. But the massive ranges which most challenged his spirit were those of international hatred and misunderstanding. To the evils which erupted in two world wars he opposed a loving determination to draw out the best in everyone.

When war came in 1914 Corder Catchpool at once volunteered for the Friends Ambulance Unit. He tended the wounded and dying with unflinching courage, not hesitating to express his pacifist views to the French soldiers. "Go and convert the Germans," was often the reply, a point of view he did not forget later.

With the coming of conscription in 1915 he felt that the ambulance work in France had become part of a great military machine. The real struggle for peace was, he believed, being fought

out by the "absolutists" resisting conscription. So, leaving the Unit, he went back home and served more than two years in prison as a conscientious objector.

From this "apprenticeship to peace-making" as he called it came his dedicated service for peace in Germany between the wars. His convincing honesty, his mastery of his subject, his persistent appeals to the better nature, often won freedom or easement of sufferings for victims of the Nazis. When war came again, despite all that he had worked for, he was indefatigable in relief work for raid victims here while at the same time protesting vigorously against the moral degradation of obliteration bombing. Not long after the war he and his wife, Gwen, were once more back in Germany as unofficial ambassadors of peace, bringing healing through loving friendship to many bruised spirits. Following Corder Catchpool's death, the family received well over a thousand letters—not just polite condolences but in heartfelt gratitude for the "invincible gentleness" of a rare spirit.

William Hughes's biography of his old friend brings us into close touch with a most modest and valiant peace-maker.

G. W. WHITEMAN

Agatha Harrison: An Impression. By her sister IRENE HARRISON. Foreword by MRS. V. L. PANDIT. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 157 pp. Illustrated. 1956. 12s. 6d.)

In her Foreword to this humble, sincere, and extremely readable "impression" of Agatha Harrison by her sister Irene, Shrimati Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit writes: "When I heard she was no longer with us, the world suddenly seemed a very lonely place . . . Could there be a more worthwhile tribute to any individual than that the world was empty without their presence?"

Many of Agatha Harrison's friends had that same feeling when, on May 10th, 1954, she died of an unsuspected heart ailment while attending the Asian Conference at Geneva with her Quaker colleague Gerald Bailey. The sense of a lost source of stability and comfort was overwhelming.

Yet, largely by her own choice, Agatha Harrison was unknown to that great public which pursues film stars, Olympic runners and best-sellers. Pre-eminently she was "the power behind the throne"—though she would have been the first to repudiate the use, in connection with

herself, of the word "power" in any material sense.

She had power nevertheless—the power of the spirit which "bloweth where it listeth"—and like that spirit she worked out of the limelight. Operating quietly in the world's byways, she was content to watch the seed growing secretly and the leaven transforming the lump. She asked for no personal reward; in 1951, when a friend was asked to "sound" her about the possible inclusion of her name in the Birthday Honours list, she stopped the project at once with characteristic words:—

Much of conciliation is of necessity done in the background....I remember a cable he [Mahatma Gandhi] sent me while at sea: "God will direct your steps." And that is exactly what has happened through these years. So it is hardly possible to give a Birthday Honour, is it?

After her death, the memorial meeting at Caxton Hall in London was crowded, like a similar meeting at Friends House, with friends who were not mere polite tribute-payers, but sincere mourners who had co-operated with her in the causes of world peace and Anglo-Indian friendship. From the platform Krishna Menon, who had known her for a quarter of a century as England's unofficial

Ambassador to India, referred to her rejection of worldly acclaim. "She had no office or title, and no flags were lowered for her, but all over India people honour her name."

In India, which unquestionably owes a large measure of its independence to her quiet, persuasive, but implacable influence upon the key figures manipulating the political strings, that name is probably better known than in England. For this reason I should like to see an Indian publisher produce a cheap edition, for wide circulation, of Irene Harrison's book.

I hope, too, that in some not too distant future it will prove possible for a comprehensive volume of her well-informed and sensitive letters—upon which her sister's work is largely based—to be published in both India and England.

This correspondence, much of it with Gandhiji himself, would form a unique source-book of the behind-the-scenes story of Indo-British relations over a critical period, and would be vital to any future biography of the Mahatma, and of Shri Nehru, Shrimati Pandit, and other great personalities in recent Indian history.

VERA BRITAIN

Mind in Life and Death: Review of Recent Evidence of the Survival of Franklin Roosevelt and Others. Records from the Society for Psychical Research. By GERALDINE CUMMINS. Foreword by RAYNOR C. JOHNSON. Other contributors, SIR DAVID RUSSELL, DAVID GRAY. (The Aquarian Press, London. 269 pp. 1956. 21s.)

This book could be useful to anyone wishing to assess the present climate of opinion in the field of psychic research, the various theories put forward, methods used and results gained, as it gives a fairly wide picture. It draws largely from the records of the Society

for Psychical Research in addition to other sources. The groping character of the different attempts to probe the subjective makes one wish that researchers would call more often upon the admittedly more profound psychological knowledge of the ancient East, to clarify such subjects as alleged survival, telepathy, ESP, apparitions, out-of-the-body experiences, automatic writing, paranormal knowledge, psychokinesis, influence of mind on mind, the Field Theory, etc., all of which this book touches upon.

E.W.

Studies in the Epics and Puranas. By A. D. PUSALKER (Bhavan's Book University, No. 36. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. lxviii+225+xxi pp. 1955. Re. 1/12; 3s.; 85 cents)

The Book University series of the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, has been making rapid progress. The main object of this series is to publish literature regarding India, ancient and modern, in a form easily accessible to all. The thirty-six volumes by eminent scholars published so far in this series bear ample testimony to its success in carrying out this main object through literature that reveals the deeper impulses of India.

The two epics, the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*, together with the Puranas, have been the greatest sources of inspiration to the Indian people. Their critical study and evaluation in the light of modern knowledge is of paramount importance in understanding the glory that was Ind. Dr. Pusalker has devoted much of his leisure to

a careful and well-planned study of the epics and the Puranas and to squeezing out their quintessence for the benefit of the scholar and the layman. He gave us his valuable results in some articles published during the last few years. The volume before us contains all these articles in book form, duly revised and brought up to date. The tribute paid by Shri Munshi in his Foreword to Dr. Pusalker's "thoroughness and sanity of outlook" will be endorsed by every reader of the volume.

We hope Dr. Pusalker will give us some more volumes of this type in the years to come in spite of his onerous work in the editing of *The History and Culture of the Indian People* in several volumes, not to mention his other important duties at the Bhavan. The present volume is indispensable to every student of the epics and the Puranas, as its contents are fully documented. In fact it is an unerring guide to the sources of research in the field.

P. K. GODE

Varnaka Samuchchaya. Part I: Texts. Edited by B. J. SANDESARA. Gujarati. (Prachin Gurjar Granthamala, No. 4. Maharaja Sayajirao University, Baroda. 220 pp. 1956. Rs. 7/8)

Varnaka is one of the many forms of prose writing cultivated in the neo-classic stages of the Pali (Buddhist) and Ardhamagadhi (Jain) languages. The traditions of numerous prose forms continued into Gujarati also. For Pali and Ardhamagadhi were being superseded on the one hand by rising regional languages and on the other by Sanskrit. Sanskrit, moreover, was being profusely incorporated into the body of regional compositions; and, apart from the standard language, a vernacular Sanskrit (as a German scholar calls it) also was being used. Evidence of this is provided by the dozen texts of *Varnakas* in Gujarati, here ably and carefully brought together by Dr. Sande-

sara.

The *Varnakas* are prepared descriptions of several kinds of men and women, places and occasions, the pomp and menus of dinners, clothes, animals and abstract qualities. They were obviously intended to be learnt by heart and adapted to occasion by professionals addressing gatherings—usually, religious assemblies—or by parties to an intelligence test, say between brothers-in-law. In written books, whenever the occasion for a description occurred it was enough to mention the word *varnaka* with the theme or the opening words of it. The Gujarati *varnakas* employ a rhetorical style, called *boli*, replete with internal rhyme, alliteration and assonance. The only similar publication known, in an Indian regional language, is Jyotirishvar Kavishekhara's *Varna-Ratnakara* of the fourteenth century, edited by Dr. Sunitikumar Chatterji and Pandit

Babua Mishra (1940).

The dozen *varnakas* brought together by Dr. Sandesara were composed at different times during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In Gujarati this work is the second publication in *boli* style, the first being the prose story, *Prithvichandracharitra*, published in Gaekwar's Oriental Series, Baroda (1920), and in *Prachina Gadya Sandarbha* (Gujarat Vidyapith, Ahmedabad. 1930).

The present collection supplies considerable material for a student of social and cultural history. But the

literary convention detracts from the strictly historical quality or accuracy of the matter. The second part, which is to follow, will discuss the linguistic and cultural aspects of the matter brought together here. From Maithili to Gujarati is a far cry, and, therefore, the greater value of such collections is in how they point to a continued unity of culture throughout our large land in the so-called dark ages. Some of these *varnakas* eulogize the Muslim Sultans of Ahmedabad and Akbar, the Emperor of Delhi. Clearly, people had learnt the art of peaceful co-existence.

V. M. DESAI

Human Relations and International Obligations: A Report of the Unesco-Indian Philosophical Congress Symposium Held in Ceylon, December 1954. Edited with Introduction and Analyses by N. A. NIKAM. (Unesco; Indian Philosophical Congress. 303 pp. 1956. Price not mentioned.)

A world is emerging which can be regarded as *one world* holding within its territory a *world community*. This calls for a new adjustment of relations, new norms and patterns of communal living. Unesco has done a signal service by preparing a Basic Document on "Human Relations and International Obligations" and inviting the holding of a symposium on the subject by the body of Indian philosophers assembled at Peradeniya, Ceylon, in December 1954.

This book contains seventeen papers, a report of round-table discussions in India and the U.S.A. by Professor Richard P. McKeon, and two appendices giving the text of the Basic Document

and a Summary of the Discussions in Ceylon. Not all the papers provide answers, but they probe the ground and lay bare the implications of living together under the new conditions. A few papers are mainly concerned with the underlying principles and criteria.

Philosophic thinking helps us to formulate the problem. But the puzzle of "Human Relations and International Obligations" can be solved only by a quickening of the consciousness and the discovery of something deeper than dialectics and logical distinctions; by the recognition of something higher, which is their Source; by a perception of the essential identity of human beings and by a sense of common destiny to be attained through fraternity as the primary basis, liberty as the sole condition and equality as the desired end. This book stimulates thinking on these lines and is to be welcomed as an earnest enquiry into the distressing situation of man today.

A. VENKAPPA SASTRI

Christology and Myth in the New Testament. By GERAINT VAUGHAN JONES. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 295 pp. 1956. 21s.)

This book is a courageous and en-

tirely honest attempt to deal with one of the major problems for Christian thinking today. The message of the New Testament, as Bultmann has reminded us, is expressed in terms of a

world-view that, from the modern standpoint, can be described only as "mythological." What is to be our attitude to these? Are we to insist on retaining them as essential? Or are we to attempt a translation into language that is intelligible today? If so, what language shall we adopt? Bultmann's answer is clear: he would have us use the language of Heidegger's philosophy. Mr. Jones ceases at this point to agree with him. Quite rightly, he does not see why Christian thought should shake off the bondage of one world-view to put its neck under the yoke of another, because this is more recent and is fashionable in some circles. Further, he wants a translation of the New Testament images, not as a new self-understanding on the part of man, but as conveying the revelation of God in Christ. His conclusions are therefore more objective than those of Bultmann.

He frankly allows that such passages as the Johannine prologue, the hymn in *Phil. ii* to a divine being who descends to earth, and the birth-stories in *Matthew* and *Luke*, cannot be taken literally. Whatever they were for the writers in question, we must "approach them as boldly imaginative metaphors." In the final section of the book, Mr. Jones emphasizes the necessity of symbol and myth for the expression and communication of religious truth, and that not for primitive peoples alone. We

may not therefore discard such images but only seek how to make their truth live again for our time. He perhaps does not do sufficient justice to Bultmann's claim that, far from whittling away the "offence of the Cross," his aim is to face men with it by first removing other and needless offences that come between it and them. In the important chapter on the problem of evil, he shows how some myths may not permit of translation, because they concern a dimension of life that baffles our minds as much as it intrigues them.

The restatement of Christology that Mr. Jones offers is worthy of close consideration. It is indeed one to which approach has been made from several directions in recent years, as by Bishop Aulén in Sweden and the late Donald Baillie in Scotland. He does not fear the reproach of "adoptionism" that will undoubtedly be brought against him by the orthodox. The imagery of pre-existence yields a conception of Jesus as Son because God revealed himself to him as to no other and drew him into a unique relation to himself. That of the Virgin Birth shows how Jesus, while belonging to the human race, yet transcends it and stands on God's side. The last sentence of the book sums up its findings thus: "The unchanging substance is the New Testament affirmation that Jesus is Lord."

E. L. ALLEN

Original Good. By MACPHERSON LAWRIE. (The C. W. Daniel Co., Ltd., Rochford, England. 92 pp. 1956. 6s.)

Dr. Macpherson Lawrie, formerly Physician in Psychological Medicine, Queen Mary's Hospital for the East End, London, is a follower of Rousseau, in his belief in the natural goodness of man. The six factors, he claims, that make children "difficult" and men "evil" are wrongful example and suggestion, ignorance, depreciation and lack of praise (both of which injure self-respect), and finally, improper

feeding.

He analyzes the inherent mental and instinctive characteristics, self-preservation, tenderness and protection, reaction against injustice, acquisitiveness, etc., and tries to see in each "a potential or an acting source of goodness and progress." He stresses the positive approach of stimulating and nourishing the good aspects rather than concentrating on the suppression and control of the evil ones.

E.W.

CORRESPONDENCE

HEAVEN AND HELL*

[These comments on the paper of Professor H. H. Price, Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford University, on the bearing which the findings of psychical research may have on the concepts of Heaven and Hell are interesting and significant. **Dr. Robert H. Thouless's** name is familiar in the annals of psychical research and he writes from a University which as long ago as 1940 publicly recognized the importance of this borderland science. Its Trinity College in that year established a studentship for psychical research. It is not surprising that Professor Price's ideas have, as Dr. Thouless testifies, "excited interested discussion amongst intellectuals in England" since they appeared in our pages early this year and as a Reprint of the Indian Institute of Culture. Professor Price's commentator shows here the very quality of open-mindedness which so pre-eminently characterizes Professor Price himself.—ED.]

The publication of Professor Price's ideas about the next world excited interested discussion amongst intellectuals in England. This interest may have sprung from the novelty of the idea that a world that was subjective would not necessarily be one that appeared to lack reality to the person experiencing it. I think that the suggestion of such a subjective other world made the idea of survival seem more plausible to some of those whose scientific habits of thought predisposed them against any belief in an after-life.

Professor Price is a philosopher, and philosophy can only suggest what may be the case. What is the case can be decided only by the method of science, that is, by looking at the facts. The difficulty in this problem is that there are so few known facts to look at.

There are some provided by mediumistic séances, and Professor Price also considers these. The fact that different communicators seem to describe the other world very differently suggests to him that the next world is largely plastic to the ideas of those occupying it. This ideoplasticity may not entail that all the worlds of different individuals are wholly separate since telepathy may create common elements in the worlds of different individuals.

Nor does any consideration urged by Professor Price rule out the possibility, which he somewhat neglects, that there may be elements in the next world that are truly objective in the sense of being not dependent on the thought of any individual or group of individuals. That this is the case is suggested if we follow Professor Price in considering seriously the testimony of those who are at a higher stage of spiritual development than ourselves. These seem often to talk as if their experience of a spiritual world were of one which seemed more real, in the sense of being less subjective, than is the world of material objects. If this were accepted, it would not be inconsistent with the next world being ideoplastic to some extent, but it would be inconsistent with it being wholly so. It may be that the more spiritually developed an individual is, the less ideoplastic is his experience in the spiritual field, including his after-death experience of the next world. It may also be the case that those who communicate through mediums are surviving individuals at a relatively low level of spiritual development.

R. H. THOULESS

*Corpus Christi College,
Cambridge, England.*

* *Heaven and Hell from the Point of View of Psychical Research*, published in THE ARYAN PATH for January and February 1956 and as Reprint No. 16 of the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“—————ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS

The creation of the new Ministry of Community Development, announced by the Government of India, underlines the expanding role of Community Development and its possibilities for increasing national production. In spite of the rapid strides in industrialization in urban areas in recent years, Indian life in general continues, as of old, to revolve round the villages. The programmes of rural community development therefore form a vital part of the present attempts to change the economic and social conditions of the nation. It is worth noting that co-ordinated development programmes under Community Projects and the National Extension Service already cover 123,000 villages and affect a population of 80 million. The Second Five-Year Plan, allotting Rs. 200 crores to Community Development, proposes that the entire country should be served by the National Extension Service through the creation of 3,800 additional Development Blocks of which 1,120 should be converted into Community Development Blocks.

In this connection it is heartening to read the tribute paid by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, to the valuable benefits that community-development schemes are conferring on several countries. In a recent statement to the U.N. Trusteeship Council, he pointed out, as more important to the people than the improvement effected in their lives by community development, the lesson it is teaching of the value of self-help and individual initiative:—

The people who practise it are beginning to discover in it a power to effect a total transformation of their lives by gradual strengthening of their own capacity to grow. The evidence of this change lies not only in the larger amenities which they are building for themselves through schools, clinics and roads,

but in the keener incentive for improvement which they now display and the steady enlargement of their material resources which gives assurance for continuous advancement.

In broad general terms each community project implies a composite programme of modest self-help measures for the all-round development of a local group. It pursues a comprehensive objective within each group, aiming to improve the quality of living as an integral whole and not confined to any particular field or fields of experience, such as the production of wealth or the promotion of education or the provision of medical care. It draws its motive power from the awakening interest, enthusiasm and initiative of the local beneficiaries themselves.

While standard aims ensure an underlying resemblance among the many varieties of projects, it is obvious that the success of these schemes depends mainly on the earnest dedication of voluntary workers who give them form and expression. Such workers need not be people of great scientific attainments or of high technical competence. They need only know a few simple skills, which can be immediately applied to make life better and happier for people who now are suffering privations on all fronts.

Welcoming the rise of such a new cadre of village workers in these project areas, the Secretary-General remarks:—

They are animated by a unity of purpose, reflecting the whole of the programme of community development at the point of its direct contact with the people. They have to communicate knowledge and skills in the few elementary requirements which make up the texture of simple living at this level through a medium of intimate human fellowship—all with the integrating purpose of stimulating

improvement in the quality of living. That purpose can be served in a sustained manner only if the creative urge of the people can be articulated, so that they are increasingly able to assume the responsibility for the planning and execution of a programme for their own advancement.

“The Destruction of Buddhism in the USSR” is the title of an article in the July *Bulletin* of the Institute for the Study of the USSR (Augustenstrasse 46, Munich). It makes melancholy reading. Two Mongolian peoples of the U.S.S.R.—the Buryats around Lake Baikal in the Far East and the Don Kalmyks—had been practising Lamaism since at least the eighteenth century. In 1712 about 150 Tibetan lamas had visited Buryat Mongolia and by 1846 there were 34 Buryat monasteries (*dat-sans*) and many Buddhist temples. The 4500 lamas were a considerable portion of the population, but the writer, Professor N. Poppe, claims that their maintenance was not an excessive burden.

Soviet antireligious propaganda makes no mention of the important fact that the *dat-sans* were not only religious centres but also played a significant educational and cultural role. They also took the place of hospitals and clinics, which were completely nonexistent in Buddhist countries at the time.

There are said to have been no secular schools in either Mongolia or Buryat Mongolia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The antireligious policy of the Communist régime was relaxed in World War II, in respect of the Orthodox church, to placate Balkan opinion; and Muslim religious functionaries were left unmolested, allegedly to court Near East sympathies; but Tibet did not need to be considered. The Kalmyk Buddhist Church was destroyed by 1932. The monasteries in Mongolia had all been closed by the end of 1937, in which year all the lamas of the Buddhist Temple in Leningrad were shot and the octogenarian head of the Buryat Buddhist priests, long prevented from living in Buryat-Mongolia, lest he influence

believers, was imprisoned. He was reported to have died in 1938.

The reported recent relaxation of the antireligious policy of the USSR has come too late for its traditionally Buddhist peoples and the world has irretrievably lost part of its patrimony in the artistic and literary treasures which the destroyed monasteries housed.

R. E. Barker's *Books for All*, recently published by Unesco, is a graphic analysis of the availability of books throughout the world. Few would gainsay today that books ideally are for all, but there are serious obstacles to their adequate dissemination. Book production is largely concentrated in a few countries and Mr. Barker writes that

a dearth of printing and publishing facilities in large areas of the world, coupled with a maze of obstacles at national frontiers, impedes the full production and free circulation of books. The difficulties range from tariff and currency restrictions to inadequate copyright protection, from a paucity of translation services to high transport costs.

Some of these difficulties can be minimized with growing appreciation of the importance of the free flow of books and the will to co-operation between nations. The obstacles are regrettable, but it is a matter for congratulation that censorship is not named among the leading obstacles today. The echoes of Milton's ringing appeal to Parliament in 1643 for the liberty of unlicensed printing still are heard in democratic countries. In one of the less familiar passages of the *Areopagitica* which Mr. Barker quotes there is, however, an implied protest against the predominantly commercial approach to things of the mind that merits attention:—

Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolized and traded in by tickets, and statutes and standards. We must not think to make a staple commodity of all the knowledge in the land, to mark and license it like our broadcloth and our wool packs.