



He who wishes to find his true Self, yet is engrossed with the feeding of his body, seeks to cross the river grasping a crocodile with the thought that it is a log.

—*Vivekachudamani*, 86.

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IMMORTALITY

Immortality, or everlastingness, must be distinguished from *survival*, for it is quite possible to conceive that some portion of our very complex spiritual and psychic make-up might survive the death of the physical body for a while, and yet itself be subject to gradual decay and death. It is probable indeed that this is what happens to the purely psychic elements in us—to the lower or personal part of the inner man; and that the "messages" of the séance-room, when they do not come from the subconscious minds of the medium or sitters, may be derived from the disintegrating psychic remains of the dead.

If any part of us be immortal and everlasting, it is clear that it cannot be the outer, personal being—the name, bodily form and memory of events which give that personality its shape, as it were, and which are regarded

by most people in the West as constituting the real man. That personal, habitual self cannot be immortal, for it very obviously came into being in time; and Father Time, as the old Greek fable narrates, devours all his children. The theory, once so widely accepted, that the man who began at birth, will by some supernatural miracle continue to exist for ever, is at once contrary to reason and repugnant to our sense of fitness. Are any of us so pleased with our outer selves that we desire to be identified or associated with them for ever? To pass eternity as John Smith or Ram Gopal—what an appalling prospect! No. What is born must surely die; and, if we are to ascertain what in us will survive death, we must first find out what part of us antedated birth, for we may reasonably expect to take with us out of life what we brought with us into life.

Now what we brought with us into life was a collection of tendencies, aptitudes, affinities—in a word, character, which has been called “the memory of the soul”. Our deeds and thoughts during life go to modify and develop that character either for good or ill; and, providing there be any survival at all, it is character as thus modified that we shall take with us through the portals of death.

But character itself, though permanent as compared with personality, is yet only relatively so: it is, as we have seen, subject to change and growth, and therefore, like personality, fated to become the prey of Time the Devourer. We must look deeper still into the innermost recesses of our being for an *immortal* principle.

Nothing that is liable to change can be immortal; but, when by introspective thought we analyse our inner nature, and one after another objectivise—or think about—the various elements of which we are compounded, we find that all of them are phenomenal, relative, subject to time and change, and therefore not immortal.

But this is not all. The very conception of ourselves and the universe as a flow of changes, a complex of relativity, would be impossible unless there were at the back of all change and relativity, an unchangeable noumenon. If we and the universe were nothing more than temporary compounds of matter or mind,

for ever moving from one state or form into another, we could not be conscious of change any more than a man afloat on the current of a river, whose banks were out of sight, could be conscious of motion.

When in introspection we probe deeper and deeper into ourselves, we progressively discover that the body, the emotions, the mind, the will, and so on, with which we begin by identifying ourselves, can all be objectivised, and are therefore not the Self. But, however far we may carry this process, there is still an I that is making the analysis, a Self in the background, a subject to which all else is object. In the process of thus dis-identifying the real Self from all possible objects of thought, we have stripped away all the barriers and bounds that shut it in and seemed to separate it from other Selves and from the Universal. The Self is One. In the language of the West, the Spirit is one with God. Or, in the words of a very ancient Eastern scripture:—

It (the Self) is the unchanging Eternal, it is the unchanging Supreme . . . It is the excellent foundation, the unchanging foundation; knowing that foundation, a man is mighty in the eternal world.

Smaller than small, greater than great, this Self is hidden in the heart of man Understanding this great lord, the Self, bodiless in bodies, stable among unstable, the wise man cannot grieve He who has ceased not from evil, who stands not firm, whose emotions are not at rest, cannot obtain it by knowledge.

THE MAGIC OF DETACHMENT

[Everybody has been talking about **John Cowper Powys** because of his new book, an extraordinary novel—*A Glastonbury Romance*. Critics are much puzzled as to the meaning and the purpose of such a piece of writing. Perhaps one kind of clue may be found in this essay founded on Mr. Powys's ideals and his endeavour to practise them. He writes of the Buddhistic Paramita, the Great Virtue of Dispassion—Viraga. The *Voice of the Silence* defines the faculty, the method of its cultivation, and its importance :—

“ Viraga [is] indifference to pleasure and to pain, illusion conquered, truth alone perceived.”

“ Stern and exacting is the virtue of Viraga. If thou its path would'st master, thou must keep thy mind and thy perceptions far freer than before from killing action.”

“ Mara's arrows ever smite the man who has not reached Viraga.”

H. P. BLAVATSKY, in a foot-note explains that “ Viraga is the feeling of absolute indifference to the objective universe, to pleasure and to pain. ‘ Disgust ’ does not express its meaning, yet it is akin to it.”

In the essay on “ Karma ” in the other little priceless gem *Light on the Path* it is said :—

“ Learn now that there is no cure for desire, no cure for the love of reward, no cure for the misery of longing, save in the fixing of the sight and hearing upon that which is invisible and soundless. Begin even now to practise it, and so a thousand serpents will be kept from your path.”

The *Bhagavad-Gita*, however, is the book *par excellence* which gives instruction about all aspects of Vairagya or Desirelessness.—EDS.]

Real Detachment begins when we think of our soul as a wayfarer from a far-off country, lodged for a while, “ hospes comesque corporis,” “ guest and companion of the body,” among the tribes of men and upon this satellite of the voyaging sun.

In the spirit of a visitor to this whole Cosmos we thus think of the “ I am I ” within us, in large measure alien, though not unsympathetic to the traditions of this astronomical Hostelry of our temporary sojourn, in large measure alien, though not hostile, to the customs, ways, habits, mythologies, of the human race into which, by some cosmic chance or

cosmic law, we have come to be born.

Scrutinizing its planetary surroundings it grows aware of the possibility of a certain illuminated happiness, of a certain ecstasy even, that it can reach, and help other sentiences to reach, by various detached ways of handling all these things. It soon indeed arrives at the conclusion that one of the chief causes of personal unhappiness in this world is the soul's lack of the power of detachment.

At any given moment of night or day there are qualities, essences, emanations, adhering to the chemistry of the primordial ele-

ments around us, calculated to fill us with a thrilling ecstasy. But it is only by detaching ourselves from almost all of the idols of the market-place that we can be thus transported. These qualities, inherent in the various substances around us, need not reveal what is loosely and popularly known as *beauty*, unless you are prepared to take that word in a very comprehensive sense. It is enough that they are what they are, in a perfectly ordinary, natural, normal way.

Thus for instance it is not necessary that the section of road, or mountain, or desert over which we may chance to be travelling as we experience this mysterious ecstasy, should be in any particular fashion remarkable. If when we look down at our feet we see dust or sand or gravel or earth-mould, it is entirely unnecessary that it should be beautiful dust, beautiful sand, beautiful gravel, beautiful earth-mould! The "I am I," inhabiting its clothed-upon skeleton, in contact through its senses with dust, sand, gravel, earth-mould, air, fire, water, if it uses its mind in a certain particular way can feel from the mere touch of these primeval things an incredible vibration of mystical happiness.

It may indeed be said that the first step in our approach to the only secret of happiness that does not fail us as we get older, is not an ascending step, but a descending step. And Detachment is necessary from the very start in this descent which is also an

ascent; yes! we have to detach our soul from everything that exists in order to learn the art of creating existence and of dispensing with existence. And we have to begin with our own body. Only by detaching ourselves from our bodies can the magnetic currents of life-to-life that reach us from these inanimate things be saved from troubling hindrances and gross impediments.

By detaching the soul from the body I do not mean leaving the body. The detachment I speak of consists in a motion of the mind by which the mind feels itself to be independent of the body even while, like a hand in a well-fitting glove, it is still intimately and inseparably wearing the body. And just as the mind, to get the full effluence of the life-to-life flowing into the soul from earth, air and water, must make the interior motion of freeing itself from the body while it still wears the body, so the particular phenomenon of earth and rock and sand and water and vapour and fire that we are contemplating at the moment must be detached from its claim to form part of any pattern of beauty and must be regarded in its integral texture, colour, smell, sound and taste as a unique essence, itself, *itself alone*, just as our own soul is a self alone!

To give a practical and concrete illustration of what I am hinting at, in this first step to the art of detachment, consider for the moment that you are sitting on a large stone by a rapid

stream, with your feet on the margin of a slope of smaller stones, past which the water flows. And now what are the present hindrances to any calm happiness of contemplation offered by your existing circumstances? Your body is a little uncomfortable. Well! if you have not acquired the trick of detaching your mind from a slight discomfort of your body, you are certainly handicapped at the start. Then you are teased by the fact that the water that flows before you where you are seated is not beautifully checkered by sun-splashes or sun-flakes falling through overhanging foliage as are the same river's waters a little way below.

In the other direction too—so you now begin teasing yourself with aggravating comparisons—there are much more comfortable stones to sit upon, and these smaller stones by the water's edge are sprinkled by exquisite moss or interspersed by delicate grass. The restless craving for beauty of the poet in us would be driving us on, up the stream, down the stream, ever in search of lovelier spots, of more perfect natural pictures. But a Being who is beginning to understand the secret of Detachment remains where the accident of his wayfaring has led him to rest. Enough for him is the mere primal fact that water—that miracle of miracles—flows by, at his feet, clear and fast, that the stones beneath it gleam with the broken lights, darken in the shadows, gather about them the mysterious suffusion of the aqueous

twilight, have the impenetrable aloofness simply of being what they are, fragments of the substructure of our earthly home, parts and parcels of the primordial virginity of matter.

Suppose the sun to be setting as we sit alone by this flowing water and by these naked stones, the sensuous exigency of the poet would be fretting for the clouds to be touched with some especial glory; but the soul in us that is acquiring the secret of Detachment would find in the pure fire of the great orb itself a living fountain of that life-to-life, that breath of the "inanimate" going out to the "animate," and *vice versa*, which is the ultimate reciprocity of our present world.

The beginning of the art of Detachment is the isolation of the central identity within us. It matters not how you name this inner Self. Call it the soul; call it the breath of life; call it the mind, the consciousness, the "I am I" of our inmost being. The name is nothing.

"Feeling," as Goethe says, "is all in all. The name is sound and smoke, obscuring heaven's clear glow."

But once arrived at the feeling of the detached "I am I," it matters nothing whether you call this feeling "Soul," "Self," "Mind," "Consciousness". To use it, to practise with it, to train it, to discipline it is the essential thing. It grows more and more of an integral entity—whatever it is and wherever it comes from—as you concentrate upon it or as, if you

will, it concentrates upon itself. To use it, to work it, is the thing! It grows in the practice thereof. Its reality lies in its interior motion.

The grand advantage, from the viewpoint of personal happiness, of this art of Detachment, lies in the escape from restlessness and from unfulfilled desire which it offers. In the simple instance I have given above, of a living man crouching on a naked stone above flowing water, and detaching his mind from any fretting, chafing desire to change a position thus given him by the accident of the way, it can be seen how the soul can enjoy the material world around it by a process of austere simplification.

Let it not be supposed that I am advocating any self-punishing puritanism in all this, or any auto-cruelty, or asceticism for the sake of asceticism. The natural test of all these tricks of the mind is the test of great creative Nature herself—namely the simple feeling of happiness.

If the Detachment I am describing does not, very soon after the tension of the initial effort, bring you a flood of happiness, you may be sure that something is wrong and that you are on the wrong path. Such happiness cannot infallibly or invariably be procured; but by the art of Detachment and by a drastic simplification of the relations between the Self and the Not-Self it can be procured in a constantly increasing measure.

Returning for a moment to my imaginary man or woman seated

on the stone by the water, suppose as you contemplate this water, feel this stone, and gaze at the great orb of flame going down in the West you are aware of no answering flood of happiness—what then? But are you at the end of your resources? That is the whole point. Not until you have exerted your *will*, or what used to be called “will,” to the utmost of your strength, have you a right to cry out in the popular American slang, “Nothing Doing!”

All mortal creatures, men and women along with the lower animals, experience moods, under certain conditions, of exultant, flowing, luminous, thrilling happiness. Such happiness—what Wordsworth calls “the pleasure which there is in Life itself”—is surely the most wonderful and desirable thing in the world! Put anything else, out of all mortal experience, in the scales against it, and it will outweigh all. When such happiness flows through you, transforming, illuminating, inspiring your whole being, you feel at once that you are in touch with an “absolute,” with something absolute any way, if not with *the* absolute.

Now the whole and sole purpose of the art of Detachment is to supply a practical technique for the attaining of this rare mood.

The great thing is to begin with the deliberate isolation of the soul without teasing ourselves to prove the soul’s “existence”. To “exist,” to

be "real," to be "true" adhere like varying tones and colours and odours to the soul's creative life; but the soul's life has many aspects; and among those which are nearest the centre of its revolutions are certain magical powers that though they only "exist" in the imagination are more precious and more alive than "reality". All these logical conceptions of solid, outward, unmalleable, inflexible, unporous objects, "marching," as Walt Whitman says, "triumphantly onwards" are conceptions from which it is necessary for the soul to detach itself.

But it is in relation to individual human beings that Detachment is most necessary of all. The wise man spends his life running away. But luckily he can run away without moving a step. We are all—men and women alike—teased by the blue-bottle flies who want to lay their eggs. These are the people who have never learnt and never could learn the art of detachment. They are blue-bottle flies—as my sister Philippa says—and they want to lay their eggs; and they can only lay their eggs in carrion. Not

one of us but has carrion in him, carrion in her; and the buzzing blue-bottles, among our fellows, smell this afar off, and fly towards it, and would fain settle upon it and lay their eggs.

Here indeed, here most of all is it necessary to exercise the very magic of Detachment, that magic that makes it possible for you to be in one place—like the man seated on the naked stone by the flowing water—and yet to be in the heart of the flaming sun and at the circumference of the divine ether. For if you fail to exercise the magic of Detachment upon the blue-bottle flies who infest your road they will really lay their eggs—the eggs of the maggots of civilization—in your soul. And then you will believe in the justifiability of vivisection; in the sacrosanct importance of private property; in the virtue of patriotic war; in slaughter-houses, in brothels, in slavery, and in the great, noble, scientific, gregarious, loving, human, undetached art of—Advertisement.

Rousseau was right. It is only by detaching yourself from human civilization that you can live a life worthy of a living soul.

JOHN COWPER POWYS

HAS ASIA ANYTHING FOR THE WEST?

[George E. Sokolsky, author of *The Tinder Box of Asia* left New York in 1917 to witness the Russian Revolution. After fourteen years he returned home. During the period he gathered experience as editor of an English daily in Petrograd; as a reporter in China, meeting Sun Yat Sen and other leaders; as Chinese correspondent to American, English and Japanese papers, and as an adviser to the chief of police on the one hand and organizer of a students' strike on the other. In Russia he was put on the famous "Express Get-a-way," and reached Harbin with only about one dollar of American money in his possession. Thus his contact with Asia began, and we may well see its culmination in his marriage to a Chinese lady who, in her turn, has assimilated the West sufficiently to gain a distinction at the Royal Academy of Music, London.—EDS.]

For the human race, there is no East, no West. Racial differences are crudely artificial, for during most of the centuries, the races of man have been merging, uniting, intermarrying, mixing, until racial "purity" has become altogether a myth. Who can ignore the passage of armies across continents? Alexander to Asia, Hannibal to Rome, Cæsar to Africa, Attila to the Rhone, the Huns to the Black Sea, the Magyars to Central Europe, the Golden Horde of Genghis Khan's descendants to Russia!

On these soldiers have marched—Hsiung-nu and Yueh Chi, Tatar and Mongol, Aryan and European. Equally aggressive, equally without regard to geographical divisions have marched ideas and aspirations, religions, and religious practices. Not only Judaism, Christianity and Islam, but Buddhism, Nestorian Christianity, Manichæism and even Shinto have influenced and affected the personalities of distant peoples. That has curiously enough been Asia's contribution to the human race in the

past. That perhaps will be Asia's contribution again.

I believe in the machine age. I believe that the materialistic civilization of Europe has been a boon to mankind. Too many years have I lived in the squalor of Chinese cities, in the disease infested fields of China to believe that a civilization which disregards the human body, the very skin of man, can be sound. Too long have I witnessed the callousness of the great at the sufferings of the miserable; the leper walking unprotected; the blind unaided; the sick uncared for; the mad laughed at; the dying left to drain their lives on the roadside. If I am to compare that with the hospitals and asylums, the social service, the fine roads and clean cities of the West, then I have no alternative but to hope that Western materialism may come to Asia, yes even the factory and the mill, even the high building and the hydro-electric dam.

But our materialistic civilization in the West, even in its finest aspects, has missed something. The individual human being is

lost; he has missed one of his good roads. He spends his life in hard work and fast play; he has hurled himself into a fierce *tempo* which not only moves but moves him. He stands erect and clean; his teeth are white and strong; he knows about vitamins and prophylaxis. But he has no peace. There is no peace for the individual man in the West.

After a long residence in China, I find this psychological chaos oppressive. Human relations seem to be utterly askew. What is a father or a wife? A sojourner in the house, a passing personality? What are the obligations of a son? What has become of marriage—is it merely a tryst with love, a legalized but temporary sexual arrangement, a joining of bodies without union of personalities?

Westerners, when they have achieved means or distinction, speak of their families or their ancestors, as though the possession of a genealogy is as adorning as a jewel. Yet, actually, the family is disappearing. Not only in Soviet Russia where, for political purposes, the family is being extirpated, but throughout the Western world, the family is disappearing. Lightly conceived marriages, trivially caused divorces, the utter disrespect for parents as the hindmost of a dull generation, have left the family without a core. Its place is being taken by insurance companies and social clubs, by loyalty to a corporation or a college fraternity.

Even loyalty to the state is no longer a virtue. Surely in every Western country, loyalty to the state ought to be a normal concomitant to Nationalism. But since the Great War, men have wearied of the cost in human life, of such loyalties. A generation is appearing which even questions the value of Nationalism. Without loyalty to the state, without loyalty to the family, with a resistance to religious formulæ, the Western mind finds itself engaged in absorbing knowledge, just as the Western person seeks to acquire multitudes of things. Yet his knowledge and his things do not bring him contentment.

Therein lies the crux of the problem. Man cannot eat money or even the machine. He cannot consume all that scientific agriculture produces. He cannot wear all the cloth that his machines make. He cannot house all the things that he can acquire. There comes a moment in the life of every individual when he wants to sit back at peace with himself and his neighbour, contented that he is living, that he has lived. Such contentment does not come to the life of a Western person. It is to be found nowhere in America or Europe. Women's faces harden young; men's hair is tinged with grey too early. Yet, they know no poverty such as is evident everywhere in Asia.

Religion when it is not a matter of form and ritual alone affords man contentment. But religion tends to grow static; reli-

gious teachers always look backward. They seek authority and encourage superstitions. They avoid cerebration and hope to acquire addicts rather than believers. Religious thought has hardly moved in the Western world in the past few centuries. Hocus-pocus sects have been founded to stupefy the incurably stupid, but there has been no religious thought, no synthesis of human knowledge, no broadening of the base of human experience.

Perhaps only out of Asia can such a new world come. Asia, curiously, has retained its sense of personality, its feeling for the sanctity of individual liberty. Even if only the intellectual aristocracies of Asiatic countries are free human beings, the fact remains that in countries like China and Japan, all men may rise and all men may remain themselves. The regimentation of human life in the West, the curious insistence upon the inviolability of laws promulgated by mere legislators, who are at the business a year or two and then are passed by at a general election, must appear to an Asiatic to be altogether without reason. For if Man is to be distinct from the chattering ape, his personality must be free to express itself unmolested by vaguely conceived prohibitions. I do not know India, but such impediments to the growth of personality do not exist in China or Japan.

Japan has conquered the secrets of the machine age. She has mastered all the methods of the Westerners. She has even

defeated, by war, diplomacy and trade, great Western states. Yet, the individual Japanese has, in his private life, not succumbed either to the Western suppression of personality or to the chaos of a life without contentment. The Japanese dons his kimono, sits on his haunches on tatami and forgets the roar of the machine—which he can operate as well as any Westerner, who, however, never forgets his machine and is frightened when it ceases to roar. I have watched Japanese, in their country houses, sit motionlessly, contemplatively, utterly at peace. In Western countries, men dare not contemplate. Perhaps that explains the vogue of Bridge; when there are no calculations, play at calculations!

In China, freedom of personality has resulted in political and economic anarchy. The Chinese makes no sacrifice to the state because he lives within the family. He has lost his feeling for faith, because the rule of reason has made him so eclectic that he cannot easily distinguish between form and substance. Going through revolutions in every form of human activity, he moves compassless and often hopelessly. Yet, look at the individual Chinese, not the mass, but the man! He remains at peace with himself; he has found a reasonable basis for life, namely, that human exertion should be pursued only as long as personality is not being destroyed. He stops and contemplates the paths before him. He retains not only his personality but his free-

dom as a human being. Perhaps that is why all Westerners love the individual Chinese whom he knows. He loves men who have found contentment in spite of back-breaking labour and unbelievable physical suffering. There, in China, men know an inward peace in the midst of a chaos which no other people have ever known.

Asia, then, has this to contribute: that while the Western man is creating a new physical world, the Asiatic is holding tightly to the advances of the human race in the development of personality. The time will come, perhaps the time is here now, when the Westerner will pause to question his own wisdom, to discover that he is rapidly becoming a robot. He will seek peace. He will again turn to Asia, he will gaze Eastward, as Greece and Rome and the blond tribes of the North, gazed Eastward, to find that peace.

By peace I do not at all mean that states should cease to war. That to me is a trivial incident in much confusion. Economic wars are more disastrous than military wars; tariffs and barriers are more damaging than soldiers and cannons; racial and national

hatreds are more poisonous than dum-dum bullets and gas. It is not that peace that Asia has to offer, for Asia can neither make wars nor end them.

By peace, I mean contentment for the individual man. I mean a way of life, a road, the Taoist would say, to peaceful existence. This involves a reconstitution of family relations, a revision of individual moralities, a re-emphasis on human loyalties. That peace to-day does not exist; that peace is no longer understood in Western countries. That peace will come from Asia—perhaps ultimately from China, for there is a people who do not swallow but who do assimilate; there is a people who do not adopt but who do recreate. Out of the chaos in China, a new world form will be born. In that form, not society but the individual, not organization but personality, will be paramount.

The redemption, then, of personality, the recreation of Man as an individual, seems to me, the task before the Asiatic. Historically, that has ever been his task. Perhaps that is why he has persisted during these centuries of apparent decay of his political and economic life.

GEORGE E. SOKOLSKI

THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL

A SURVEY OF 150 YEARS' WORK

[During this month of October in 1783 Sir William Jones landed in India and within three months succeeded in establishing The Asiatic Society of Bengal. Next January the Society will complete its remarkable career of 150 years.

Dr. Kalidas Nag, of the Greater India Society and the India Bureau takes the opportunity of presenting to our readers the following survey.—EDS.]

"When I was at sea last August, on my voyage to this country, which I had long desired to visit, I found one evening, on inspecting the observations of the day, that *India* lay before us, and *Persia* on our left, whilst a breeze from *Arabia* blew nearly on our stern. A situation so pleasing in itself, and to me so new, could not fail to awaken a train of reflections in a mind, which had early been accustomed to contemplate with delight the eventful histories and agreeable fictions of this eastern world. It gave me inexpressible pleasure to find myself in the midst of so noble an amphitheatre, almost encircled by the vast regions of *Asia*, which has ever been esteemed the nurse of sciences, the inventress of delightful and useful arts, the scene of glorious actions, fertile in the productions of human genius, abounding in natural wonders, and infinitely diversified in the forms of religion and government, in the laws, manners, customs, and languages, as well as in the features and complexions, of men. I could not help remarking, how important and extensive a field was yet unexplored, and how many solid advantages unimproved; and when I considered, with pain, that, in this fluctuating, imperfect, and limited condition of life, such inquiries and improvements could only be made by the united efforts of many, who are not easily brought, without some pressing inducement or strong impulse, to converge in a common point, I consoled myself with a hope, founded on opinions which it might have the appearance of flattery to mention, that if in any country or community, such an union could be effected, it was among my countrymen in *Bengal*, with some of whom I already had, and with most was desirous of having, the pleasure of being intimately acquainted."—SIR WILLIAM JONES

In October 1783 a distinguished English Scholar, Sir William Jones (1746-1794), landed in Calcutta to act as a Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court at Fort William in Bengal. A worthy contemporary of Goethe, Rousseau and the French Encyclopædists Sir William brought an encyclopædic mind to bear upon the problem of intellectual co-operation between the East and the West. In sharp contrast to the pathetic pretension to omniscience about things Oriental displayed

by our Western visitors of to-day, Sir William Jones showed an eagerness to learn and a humility that a genius such as he alone is capable of. Within the short span of ten years from his landing in Calcutta, he laid the foundation of a new science of *Indology*; and yet he ever sighed, with divine discontent, because of "the fluctuating, imperfect and limited erudition of life". Through his exertions a meeting was held on the 15th of January 1784, attended by the

élite of the European community of Calcutta: Sir Robert Chambers, the Chief Justice, as Chairman; Henry Vansittart; Sir John Shore; Sir Charles Wilkins and others, who became the founders of the *Asiatick Society* and principal contributors to the pages of the Society's Transactions. On that occasion Sir William Jones had the honour of opening the proceedings with a learned "Discourse on the Institution of a Society for enquiring into the History, Civil and Natural, the Antiquities, the Arts, Sciences, and Literature of Asia."

You will investigate whatever is rare in the stupendous fabric of nature; will correct the geography of Asia by new observations and discoveries; will trace the annals and even traditions of those nations who, from time to time, have peopled or desolated it; and will bring to light their various forms of government, with their institutions, civil and religious; you will examine their improvements and methods in arithmetic and geometry, in trigonometry, mensuration, mechanics, optics, astronomy and general physics; their systems of morality, grammar, rhetoric and dialectic; their skill in chirurgery and medicine; and their advancement, whatever it may be, in anatomy and chemistry. To this you will add researches into their agriculture, manufactures, trade; and whilst you enquire into their music, architecture, painting, and poetry, will not neglect those inferior arts, by which comforts, and even elegances of social life are supplied or improved.

An encyclopædia of Asiatic Arts and Sciences has not yet been undertaken but if it should

ever be attempted it should carry as its emblem the noble words quoted above from the prophetic inaugural address of Sir William Jones.

At the second meeting of the Society, Warren Hastings, the then Governor-General, was requested to accept the office of President which honour he promptly refused with shrewd observations, agreeing, however, to be the patron of the Society, yielding his "pretensions to the gentleman whose genius planned the Institution and is most capable of conducting it to the attainment of the great and splendid purposes of its formation". Thus Sir William Jones was elected the First President of the Society on the 5th of February, 1784, and held that office till his death on the 27th April, 1794.* That was a decade of unique achievements followed by the development of a truly international study,—that of Indo-European linguistics and antiquities. Three centuries ago Vasco da Gama discovered the new geographical route to India and, on the celebration of the tricentenary as it were of that great discovery, the cultural route to the soul of India and the Orient was discovered by Sir William Jones and his learned colleagues.

The Sanskrit *Pañchatantra* had already reached Europe through Pehlavi, Hebrew, Arabic, Latin and German transla-

*Sir William Jones—(1746-1794), d. 1794. April 27, Buried in the "whitewashed pyramid" in the old South Park Street Cemetery. It bears the following noble epitaph written by himself: "Here was deposited the mortal part of a man who feared God, but not death, who thought none below him but the base and the unjust, none above him but the wise and virtuous."

tions. Two of the *Śatakas of Bhartrihari* had also been translated into the Dutch language by the Dutch missionary Abraham Roger who worked in Paliakatta (North of Madras) in 1630 and published a voluminous work: "Open door to the Hidden Paganism." In the early eighteenth century there were literary forgeries and aberrations like the so-called "Ezour-Veda"; but an intrepid explorer like the French Anquetil Duperron had already discovered *Avestan Texts*, which he started translating in 1772, and further published in 1805 a translation of the *Upanishads* from the Persian version of Prince Dara Sheko, the great grandson of Akbar. Sir Charles Wilkins (1750-1833) was the first Englishman to acquire proficiency in Sanskrit and to publish a grammar of that language in 1779; he completed a translation of the *Bhagavad-Gita* and published it in 1785 under the patronage of Warren Hastings. Sir William Jones had illustrious predecessors and successors. His translation of the ordinances of *Manu*, of the *Gita Govinda* and above all of *Sakuntalâ* marked an epoch in the history of Oriental studies. The second President of the Asiatic Society of Bengal was Sir John Shore, the real author of the Permanent Settlement. The next great scholar was H. T. Colebrooke (1765-1837) who by his many-sided genius enriched the science of Indology as a President of the Society, writing on Sanskrit

grammar, Hindu law and philosophy, on the Vedas and on mathematical subjects, finally emerging as the founder of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (1823).

A new turn to the activities of the Society was given by its illustrious Secretary Dr. H. H. Wilson (1784-1860). He reached Calcutta in 1808 as a Medical Officer of the East India Company and served the Asiatic Society for over twenty years (1811-1833) as the Secretary. He became famous by his beautiful translation of the *Megha Dûta* (1813) followed by his *Theatre of the Hindus* and his Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Just a century ago (1833) he was offered the newly founded Boden Chair of Sanskrit at Oxford and consequently left the Asiatic Society in the charge of another great antiquarian, James Prinsep (1799-1840), and his first time *Native Secretary*, Babu Ramkamal Sen, the grandfather of the great reformer and orator, Keshab Chandra Sen. In January 1829 Dr. Wilson proposed the name of some native scholars who were elected members without opposition and within fifty years of the foundation of the Society, with the election of Dewan Ramkamal Sen, the principle came to be accepted that persons of all nations shall be eligible as members of the Society; and very soon, two eminent scholars, Sir Radhakant Deb Bahadur and Professor Bapudeva Sastri were elected Honorary members along with other distinguished European savants.

Starting its career in 1784 as the "Asiatick Society" it was offered in 1829 the privilege of being affiliated to the newly founded Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland; and in that connection the name "Asiatick Society of Bengal" was first used, although the Society did not accept the change. When Mr. James Prinsep started the Journal in 1832 on his own account, he was not authorised either to use the title "Asiatick Society of Bengal," which came to be accepted only when the journal became the property of the Society in 1843.

That brings to our mind one of the most important services rendered by the Society through its publications which may be classified into: (1) Periodicals embodying the researches of the scholars; (2) original Hindu or Muhammadan texts; (3) translations of texts; and (4) separate research memoirs or monographs. Sir William Jones contemplated the publications of a volume every year entitled *Asiatick Miscellany* but, owing to unforeseen difficulties, regular publications of the Annual could not be guaranteed and the first volume appeared only in 1788 with the title *Asiatick Researches*.

In the very first volume we find papers by Charles Wilkins on the Mongyr Copperplate grant and on the Buddal Pillar with the remarks of Sir William Jones. There was also an account of the sculptures and ruins of the Pallava capital, *Mahavalipuram*, as well

as translations of inscriptions on the Pillars of Firoz Shah, by Radhakant Sarman. Thus the scholars of the East and the West started the career of a most fruitful and friendly collaboration. Between 1788 to 1839 twenty volumes of Asiatick Researches were published and the popularity of some of the earlier volumes was so great that a "Pirated Edition" was published in England in 1798, and the demand for the volume from the Continent being very urgent a French translation with the necessary corrections was published in two volumes under the title of *Researches Asiaticques* (Paris, 1805). The French editor characterised the volume as "La plus riche collection de faits qui existe sur l'Inde, ce pays qui attire les premiers regards de ceux qui veulent étudier l'histoire des hommes."

That shows the great enthusiasm about things Indian prevailing in Paris at that epoch, and we remember that Mr. Alexander Hamilton, an English officer from India and a Sanskritist, was detained as a prisoner of war and was giving lessons in Sanskrit to cultured circles in Paris amongst whom we find the remarkable German writer F. Schlegel. The French people have always been deeply interested in the Orient; Anquetil Duperron published his translation of the *Upanishads* of Dara Sheko in 1805 and ten years after, in 1815, the first Chairs for Sanskrit and Chinese languages were established in the Collège de France. Chézy was the first

incumbent of the Chair of Sanskrit to whom Goethe, shortly before his death, communicated his prose rhapsody on *Sakuntala*. It was in Paris again that Bopp studied Sanskrit (1828) just as Max Müller did (1843) under Burnouf, completing the magic circle of Indo-European studies, starting from Calcutta with Sir William Jones, passing through Paris and Berlin back to Oxford where Dr. Wilson was welcomed as the first Boden Professor of Sanskrit in 1833 and where Max Müller would complete his monumental edition of the *Rig Veda Samhitâ*.

From 1829 Captain Herbert was publishing a Monthly under the name of *Gleanings of Science*, in his individual capacity, for the Society lost all its little savings by the failure in 1828 of Messrs. Palmer and Co., who were its agents. The King of Oudh made a munificent donation of Rs. 25,000 which was deposited with Messrs. Mackintosh and Co., but they in their turn failed in 1833, depriving the Society of its entire cash balance! Luckily in 1834 an old member of the Society, Mr. Bruce, left a bequest of £2,000 to the Society which was invested in Government Securities to which was added, in 1875, a big sum received as compensation from the Government in lieu of the claims the Society had for accommodation in the Indian Museum Buildings.

On the retirement of Dr. Wilson (1833), Mr. James Prinsep came to pilot the Society during

its most difficult days. He came to India at the age of twenty as the assistant Assay-Master at the Calcutta Mint under Dr. Wilson, and after serving a few years in Benares returned to Calcutta in 1830. In March, 1832, he changed the *Gleanings of Science* into the monthly *Journal of the Asiatic Society*. In that journal he was on the one hand publishing scientific papers on the *Transit of Mercury*, on the expansion of Gold, Silver and Copper, and on a compensation barometer invented by him. On the other hand he was not only publishing valuable papers on Indology but soon gained immortality by deciphering the *Asokan Inscriptions* of the third century B. C. A new generation of workers came to co-operate with Mr. Prinsep to open new fields of Asiatic research: Dr. Buchanan writing on the statistical survey of Dinajpur, Mr. B. H. Hodgson communicating valuable papers on Nepal and on the hill tribes of the Himalayas and of the Burmese jungles, and lastly the great Hungarian explorer and linguist Mr. Csoma de Körös who was supported with an allowance of fifty rupees per month from 1830 to 1843 for the publication of his *Tibetan Grammar and Dictionary*. From this time the Society began to collect Tibetan and Chinese manuscripts (xylographs) of which the former numbered 256 and the latter 350 volumes. Moreover, the miscellaneous collection of about 125 Burmese, Siamese, Javanese and

Singalese manuscripts testify, if not to a constructive research programme for Asiatic Culture, at least to an attempt to prepare the ground for the same, with an intuitive appreciation of the value of the study of Indian antiquities with reference to the documents of GREATER INDIA and other cultural zones of the Orient. Every one must admire the Society's scheme of *Bibliotheca Asiatica*, *Bibliotheca Indica*, the collection of epigraphic, numismatic and archæological documents with a view to build up a great Asiatic Museum, no less than the valuable researches in the domain of history, literature, palæography, art and archæology, as well as in the domain of mathematical, physical and natural science: astronomy, geology, zoology, botany, geography, ethnology etc. Those varied and learned contributions were classified and presented to us by Dr. Rajendralala Mitra, by Dr. A. F. Hoernle and Baboo P. N. Bose, three distinguished savants of the East and the West, happily collaborating to produce a magnificent survey of the activities of the Society (1784-1883) as the best memento of its *first centenary*. This work was nobly carried further afield by great scholars of the next generation like MM. Pandit Haraprasad Sastri, Rai Sarat Chandra Das Bahadur, Prof. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan and others, continuing the glorious tradition.

The half a century just completed, from 1883-1933, shows,

however, a record not so much of bold excursions into "fresh fields and pastures new," as of an ordered march along the path of conservation and stock-taking of things already explored. While the Society had the privilege of publishing the valuable archæological reports and articles of General Alexander Cunningham, that work of recording and publishing the latest archæological finds was taken up by the Central Government through a separate *Department of Archæology*. So, while the Society published the earlier papers of Mr. George A. Grierson on *Maithili* and early *Bengali* texts, his main contributions came to be published, in the *Linguistic Survey of India*.

The Society was offered, in the early nineteenth century, a few original stones from Java and even a few Javanese manuscripts, but its interest did not grow that way and it was left far behind in *Indonesian studies* by the Dutch savants who had the honour of starting the *Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen*, another Oriental Society in Batavia, a few years earlier than the Society in Bengal. The Dutch scholars opened a new chapter of Asiatic History through the publications from the Batavian Society and the Royal Institute of The Hague, of the great Dutch pioneers like Kern Brandes, Krom, Juynboll, Vogel, Bosch and others.

The Asiatic Society of Bengal had the privilege of aiding the publication of *Dictionarium An-*

namettico-Latinum by A. G. L. Tabara and to collect a few Siamese manuscripts; but it could not push farther afield, into the *Indo-Chinese* peninsula, the researches of one of its brilliant members, Mr. B. H. Hodgson. So the *École Française d'Extrême Orient*, founded in 1900, opened a new chapter in the study of ancient Hindu Colonial culture of Champa and Cambodia and in the history of Asiatic antiquities in general under MM. Finot, Coedès, Huber, Peri, Parmentier and others. The wonderfully comprehensive collection of manuscripts, documents, printed books etc., in the famous collection of Hanoi (French Indo-China) is a veritable epitome of Asiatic culture which few universities of India or any other Asiatic country except Japan can rival.

Lastly, to the credit of the Japanese people it must be said that they have explored thoroughly Asia and her problems from a practical point of view. Thanks to Buddhism connecting India, China, Japan and the Far East, and thanks to the exemplary devotion of great Japanese scholars like Count Otani, Prof. Nanjio, Dr. Takakusu, Prof. Anesaki and others, there are regular lectures on Sanskrit, Pali and Indian history and culture in about a dozen universities of Japan. Moreover, there have developed great collections of

books and manuscripts on Buddhism in particular and Indology in general, under the auspices of the Imperial Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto. India owes an immense debt of gratitude to the Japanese Buddhists, for the publications of the monumental *Taisho* edition of the *Tripitaka*. It is a veritable encyclopædia of Buddhaology and Asiatic Culture, comprising 2633 books bound in 55 thick volumes, all collected, edited and financed by our Japanese friends. It has reproduced not only the principal ancient Chinese editions of the *Sung* and *Yuang* dynasties but has incorporated over 700 new texts and commentaries found in course of the exploration of Central Asia, the *Tun-Huang* and *Tempyo* collections as well as those of the temple libraries of Japan.

Thus at least one Asiatic nation outside India has completely vindicated the claim of the Asiatics to interpret their own culture according to the most up-to-date scientific methods. For the less developed regions of Asia, the various branches of the Royal Asiatic Society (*e. g.*, of Ceylon, of the Straits, of Siam, of China etc.) have done valuable research work initiated 150 years ago by the Mother organization, the *Asiatic Society of Bengal*, to which we wish fresh honours and all success on its entering the second half of its second century of existence.

KALIDAS NAG

RUSKIN'S SOCIAL THEORY

[C. Delisle Burns, D. Lit. (London), M. A. (Camb.) is the author of numerous volumes, the earliest of which, we are told, is *The Growth of Modern Philosophy* published in 1909; his most recent publication is *Horizon of Experience*. In this article he writes about Ruskin's views and hopes of a social order which shine in spite of his limitations.—EDS.]

The material wealth of any country is the portion of its possessions which feeds and educates good men and women in it; the connected principle of national policy being that the strength and power of any country depends absolutely on the quantity of good men and women in the territory of it and not at all on the extent of the territory—still less upon the number of vile or stupid inhabitants. (*Fors Clavigera*, 2nd Series, p. 159.)

So Ruskin summarised his political economy, at the end of his life: and in many different ways he repeated the same general doctrine. His influence depended upon the appeal he made to the conscience of those who could be made aware of the evils caused by the industrial system; and it may be well, therefore, to explain the force of that appeal before criticising its limitations.

He began, as everyone knows, at the early age of twenty-three, by the publication of the first two volumes of *Modern Painters*; and then passed to the study of architecture. But even his earliest published work has in it the passion of a reformer who is urging men to see what is for their good. The influence of deeply religious but narrow-minded parents, who had hoped to see him become a bishop, and his frequent uncritical reading of

the Bible certainly did not predispose Ruskin to the enjoyment of works of art. But his own sensitiveness to beauty in nature seems to have awakened him to the power of great painting. At this stage he was not concerned with social theory: and only when he found that architecture was unintelligible without some study of the social conditions in the midst of which it arose, did he turn his attention to the way of living in his own day. He had inherited a large fortune; and he came to feel that its sources might be contaminated by the pressure of capital-owners upon the poor. His social theory, therefore, is the result of an emotional reaction to the results of the industrial system in England in the 1860's, both in the vulgar uses of wealth by successful business men and in the sufferings and degradation of the manual workers. It is now nearly a century since he made his protest; but some of his teaching is still applicable.

To be moved emotionally by a situation and to try to understand it because one is so moved, is not indeed the normal approach of the economist. And in Ruskin's day, the recognised and influential economists claimed to be unemo-

tional and unprejudiced observers of fact. But emotion does not necessarily obscure; it may illuminate facts. And the attempt to "explain" the treatment of one man by another, without making any moral judgment on either, usually turns into an excuse for whatever happens to be done. Economists are still regarded as apologists for what they study; and sometimes they claim to give guidance in public policy, although by their own confession, they are competent only as observers, not as judges of the moral value of what is done. Ruskin urged that to "abstract away" all the effect of his work on a man's health and happiness or to disregard the difference between good food and bad, if each cost the same amount of money, was not "political economy" at all. The abstraction was misleading, because it left the fundamental reason for production and consumption unconsidered. No doubt he exaggerated the defects of the economists; and he should have admitted that abstraction may be necessary for certain purposes in studying money-values. But he was really contending against the influence of the economists on public policy: for what they did not discuss—the value of education, for example, or the insight due to fine art—seemed to those in power to be of no importance: and this was fatal to any policy for "the good life". As Ruskin put it in *Munera Pulveris*,—

The essential work of the political

economist is to determine what are in reality useful or life-giving things and by what degrees and kinds of labour they are attainable and distributable.

The economist may fairly reply that that is "ethics," not economics; but that reply does not meet Ruskin's main point, if economics is used in public policy as a substitute for ethics.

Ruskin enjoyed playing upon the different meanings of common words. And the economists unconsciously do the same; for they have taken from conversation such words as "value," "wealth" and "utility": and although these words are given strict definitions in economics, the other and vaguer meanings are not in fact excluded when the economist argues about public policy. Thus "utility" tends to be so narrowed in meaning as to exclude any reference to the immense difference between good food and bad. Consumption, as Ruskin points out, depends upon the nature of the consumer: what he uses affects his mental and moral, as well as his physical structure. But if all public policy is concerned only with money-values and if, under the competitive system, anyone may undersell another seller by any trick, however harmful to the buyer, then industry is merely barbarism. It is indeed more barbaric than mediæval robbery, because to cheat a man is more ignoble than to take his money by force.

A second point in which Ruskin is right concerns production. It was assumed in the early nine-

teenth century that work was essentially disagreeable and that therefore payment was mainly a bribe for doing what no one would otherwise do. But Ruskin knew from his study and experience of art that some work was desired for its own sake; and he rightly concluded that "production" was not all "cost"—as the economist would say, as "consumption" was not all "utility".* Thus a worker might enjoy and should enjoy his work: and that was no reason for refusing him good payment for doing it. Ruskin, like Morris and Tolstoi, saw the creative impulse finding its proper outlet in ordinary work for the service of other men; but he was not himself so close to the workers as those other reformers were. He remained obsessed with the conception of the Classical slave-civilization, whose literature dominated his education; and therefore he wrongly assumed that hard manual work was in some way degrading. He seems never to have grasped that monotony and compulsion are not necessary in mechanical work; and he was "sentimental" about the traditional labour of agriculture. Nevertheless it was a great advance in the 1860's to see that work in itself was not a curse.

A third principle of Ruskin's is valid: namely that any economic-political system ought to result in a community with fine perceptions for works of art and ability to create them. Ruskin's lan-

guage is misleading. The modern understanding of the arts does not involve the Biblical moralising of Ruskin's phrases.

But his intuition was right. He was trying to explain in the 1860's that works of art were not mere ornaments of drawing-rooms, nor frivolities for spare time. He was trying to show that a larger world than that of breakfast and dinner could be perceived, if one knew how to look at works of art. He was strangely negligent of music; but in reference to the plastic arts, his argument was powerful and valid.

When, however, one comes to consider the ideal society which Ruskin advocated as an alternative to the system he condemned, then doubts as to the teaching of the prophet of 1860 begin to arise. He was opposed to the liberal movements for women's suffrage, for the advancement of physical science, for political equality and democratic institutions. He idealised feudalism. He desired an aristocracy which would control the majority for their good. But he was not blind to the facts of the past.

He says:—

Money is now exactly what mountain promontories over public roads were in old times. The barons fought for them fairly: the strongest and cunningest got them: then fortified them and made everyone who passed pay toll. . . . Once having got money, the fortified millionaire can make everyone who passes pay toll. The poor vagrants by the

* This is worked out more adequately by J. A. Hobson in *Work and Wealth*. J. A. Hobson's book *Ruskin as Social Reformer* (1898) contains the best account of Ruskin's position.

roadside suffer now quite as much from the bag-baron as ever they did from the crag-baron. (*Crown of Wild Olive*, p. 35.)

Thus he admits that the actual aristocracy of the past has been objectionable: but his proposal for improvement is not to abolish control of other people, but to make the controller benevolent! He seems to have had no understanding of concerted action exercised through public authorities. He reduces policy to terms of personal good feeling, which implies ignorance of actual facts in the State and in the art of government of his own day.

Similarly in the relation between organised groups of men, he sees the absurdity of war and indeed quotes with approval Carlyle's gibe at the slaughter of peasants in a quarrel not their own. But with respect to India, for example, he says that the British "possession of India" is good or bad in proportion as "our influence on the native race shall be benevolent and exalting" (*Crown of Wild Olive*, p. 188). He is even so simple-minded as to suggest that "aggressive war," as he calls it, should be undertaken by the powerful "whenever they are assured that their authority would be helpful and protective". So foreign despotism is justified,

if the despot intends to be kind! And further he says that war itself is desirable, but not with modern weapons! "What war might yet be, if we could extinguish our science in darkness"—so he exclaims! But he does not explain whether bows and arrows are better than lances! Obviously he has not thought out the problem.

Ruskin's protest was valid against the oppression and ugliness which were the results of the industrial system. His writings contain many eloquent descriptions of what he saw and felt keenly and many noble exhortations to personal virtue. But they include also some absolutely false statements; and they are most misleading whenever he advocates a policy. He was not wrong in applying the principles of moral action to public policy; but his conceptions of morality were primitive. He seems to be concerned only with the "intention" or "motive" of the individual and to have no understanding at all of social institutions or social development. His social theory contains, therefore, some illuminating and valuable observations, but as a whole it is inconsistent with itself and in many parts positively misleading.

C. DELISLE BURNS

THE WORK OF THE ASPIRANT

[B. M. is an old-world man living by his old-world methods in our era. We are fortunate in having secured a few reports of his talks to his intimate friends. The *Bhagavad-Gita* is the book he has mastered through long years of study and meditation; but further, having lived according to its tenets more successfully than is generally possible, his thoughts breathe a peculiar fragrance. The papers have been translated from the vernacular: it should be understood that they are not literal translations, and the translator has adhered more to ideas and principles than to words. Although B. M. knows English, his inspiration becomes impeded in employing that medium of expression and so he prefers not to use it.—EDS.]

He who while living in the world and before the liberation of the Soul from the body, can resist the impulse arising from desire and anger he is a devotee (*yukta*) and a happy man.

He who is happy within himself, who is delighted within, who is illuminated within, is a yogi; partaking of the Nature of the Supreme he has attained to Brahma-Nirvana.

—*Bhagavad-Gita*, V. 23–24

These two verses describe the condition of the aspirant-practitioner and of the master who has attained. They are strikingly straightforward. They strike us with their depth and simplicity, with their self-evident truth which study and thought reveal as profound. In them we are told what the source of difficulty for the aspirant is, how and where and when the yoke can be thrown off; and with what virtues the Divine Being and the Divine World shine.

The first verse contains the word *yukta* (युक्तः) and it is differently rendered, and it is necessary to render it differently to bring out the real meaning. This word is used in numerous places in the *Gita* and like the term *dharma* is understood appropriately in different places. But

unless some meditation is done on the word, irrespective of its context, in every instance, we are apt to gain only partial understanding of the verses in which it appears.

First and foremost the aspirant must be resourceful, which implies both adaptability with existing circumstances and preparation for improving them; then he must have contrivance and expediency requiring simple trick or magical artifice. It further implies an inner steadiness in executing outer action and a condition of balance and harmony.

The street-conjurer and magician and his young assistant perform two phenomena with the rope: one, to show physical skill and control over bodily balance by walking on the rope; the other is the famous though rare rope-

trick, in which superphysical forces are used. To acquire that balance mere knowledge of the body and the bodily parts is not sought; a physiologist or an anatomist cannot walk the rope. To produce the other kind of phenomenon, more than one law of super-physics is used and often their manipulation is not acquired knowledge but is an inheritance.

Now, compare the Path of the Spiritual Life to the rope; the person must gain that balance; without it the very treading is not possible. The disappearance and reappearance of the boy in the second phenomenon may be compared to the visible climbing by the aspirant in the world, his disappearance from it during the period of his real training, and then his reappearance as the adept-servant of humanity, when he is acclaimed with shouts of wonder, and laughter, and curiosity and questioning, but rarely with the genuine desire to find out the facts and the truths.

Balance, harmony, is that inner equanimity which the aspirant must develop, and the task must be accomplished while living in the world, for it offers an excellent training ground. The Bāla-Yogi, the boy-yogi, is the rarest of occult phenomena; at the end of a long line of incarnations one can be born with the marks of a yogi, all ready and prepared to retire at once from the world and undertake the development of siddhis or divine powers. For most people the struggles of

life, and especially the home (grihastha-ashrama) are most excellent. Therefore our verse refers to "living in the world".

Then the second clause: during incarnation, not after death, can this practice be undertaken. A preta or bhut cannot fight desire and anger, for it is nothing else but a bundle of passions and the Soul is absent; neither in Pitri Loka or Swarga can the exercise be done, for the force to be attacked and endured is absent when man reaches those states. Only here, in the incarnated existence, the complete assemblage takes place, making the spiritual life possible. After death conditions may be compared to the self-imposed truce observed by both the armies of Rama and of Ravana during the nights; only during the day combatants come to grips. In this, however, a very important idea is involved. Spiritual life is not for the man who is but a bhut, a shade, a moving-talking-living rupa but devoid of the qualities of manhood. Also, spiritual life is not possible for the deva, who has not yet left his child-state, who is happy but knows not that he is happy, nor what happiness is. The man of effort and balance (yukta) is called a happy man in this verse. There are forms of yoga (I do not mean hatha-yoga) which bring about the separation of the Soul from the body, before the Soul has learnt why he entered the body, and before he has done his duty by the body and the lower kingdoms in which it is

rooted. Happiness (Sukh) for the body is one thing, for the deva-god is another thing, and the happy-man (sukhi-nara) is neither a bhuta nor a deva, but nara—man. The duty and function of Nara-Man (remember it is one of the names of Arjuna, and every Name contains truth which can be learnt by meditation on that Name) is to experience through contact with good and evil that higher happiness which fears not matter and is free from limitations. People who run after inner peace and happiness often sleep while their bodies are awake, sometimes dream during such sleep and fancy that final liberation is obtained. Beware of such people and their fragile talk!

Krishna says, learn to resist and endure and bear with this force born of desire (kama) and anger (krodha). He who aspires to be a yogi must kill out this force which like smoke envelops the man. (*cf.* iii. 39). He must acknowledge its existence and not ignore it. He must face it and not run away from it. Above all, he must not give way to it saying it also is of the Lord, it also is of Mother Nature.

The conquest of this force with the help of the Soul within brings out the powers of that Soul. Num-

erous are those powers. A man who enjoys the objects of sense is fearful because in the past he has found out that pain follows, or satiation results. Then there is the creative intelligence which enjoys upliftment and while it feels, it does not know what happiness is or whence; it comes and goes. But the Soul who has fought the force of desire, who knows how to endure its presence, nay to bear with it, giving it time to gain transformation, that Soul knows what real happiness is. He knows that that happiness is not the desire-force, but is within himself; repose and light are its two expressions. The Soul's centripetal energy is peace and repose; the centrifugal is service and enlightenment of others. Peace of the Mahatmas and the Maharshis becomes visible to us through Their Light. When an aspirant has resisted the impulse of desires and successfully retained his balance he is ready by the help of the great Gurus to know the Light, Peace and Joy of his own divine nature, which is one with the world of Divinity. Such a man is Brahma-Bhuta—an apparition of Brahman, the Messenger of Brahman, the Sage who is devoted to the good of all.

B. M.

POLYGyny IN PRACTICE

[W. Addison, formerly a Political Officer in the British Colonial service, writes from first hand knowledge of the "savages" in British West Africa. The Protectorate of Sierra Leone, about whose people he writes, brings to our mind an article published in THE ARYAN PATH in August, 1932 entitled "Primitive Religion," by Francis James, who wrote of the primitives of Nigeria. Both the writers speak favourably of the morality among the savages as compared with that of civilized Europe. Mr. James said: "The penalties of theft and adultery in a primitive tribe are so heavy, that primitive society is probably much freer from these two evils than European."—EDS.]

One of the problems facing the advance of Christianity in British West Africa is that of the prevailing marriage custom, namely, polygyny; the beneficent system of several wives sharing one husband, the work of one household, the farm, and the production of raw products for export.

The question may arise, "What is the difference between polygyny and polygamy?" Polygamy is the practice or condition of having several wives or husbands at the same time. It is against native law and custom for an African woman of British West Africa to be married to several husbands; known, also, as polyandry.

Moral, social, economic, and political pressure gave birth to polygyny in British West Africa. Infantile mortality in male children, internecine warfare, and the infamous slave trade were among the factors contributing to the preponderance in women.

In the Protectorate of Sierra Leone, the marriage custom of several wives sharing one husband has the willing consent of the women, the practical result of countless generations of valuable

experience. It is the one and only system which provides a house, protection, food, children, and a husband for every woman in the land; clean, humane, and successful; not drudgery.

Native law does not prescribe the number of wives a man may have, but it does definitely provide against marriages within the blood. For example, a man may not marry his wife's sister, his own sister, his mother, daughter, aunt, cousin, niece, and so forth. Away from civilization, there are few illegitimate children, no prostitutes as we know them, no homes for "fallen women," and "rescue" societies are unnecessary.

If a man and a woman within the prohibited degrees of kinship are intimate both commit the crime of "Simongama," a very serious breach of native law and custom involving heavy punishment for the delinquents and their respective families. Unfaithfulness in a wife is considered an offence, but it is not a disgrace. In certain circumstances, unfaithful conduct in the husband is allowable.

The first wife to be married is, as a rule, the head wife, and she

is sometimes older than the husband. She controls the household, and by virtue of that good sense which is born in the blood manages to do so without undue friction. Jealousy among the wives is not obvious to a stranger, and any untoward inquisitiveness would be strongly resented.

A humane and wise arrangement safeguards the health of an expectant mother and her baby until the child is weaned and, at the same time, acts as a natural, non-mechanical, non-chemical form of family limitation.

As a social unit, the wives and their husband will compare favourably with any other family unit in the monogamic world.

Contrary to popular belief, the bulk of the strenuous activities of life is the lot of the husband. He it is who "walks" up the oil palm tree to obtain the fruit which yields the palm oil and kernels of commerce; he fells the bush and prepares the farm for the next crop; he carries immensely heavy loads of produce to the trader; he hunts for the meat of the family, and he builds his own house with the assistance of the family and friends.

His wives help one another to keep the house clean, prepare and cook the meals, weed the farm, manufacture palm oil from the pericarp of the fruit the husband has gathered, and crack the nuts to obtain the palm kernel. They co-operate in harvesting the crops grown on their farm, clean, spin, and dye their own cotton with the most wonderful shades of

blue, the husband, if he is a weaver, weaving the spun cotton into long strips which he sews together forming the "country cloth" for which the Protectorate of Sierra Leone is noted. There is no machinery; all the operations are done by hand. From this home-made cloth are made roomy and picturesque gowns for men, wraps for women, and bed coverings. What is known as the "Gallinas Cloth" is a work of art in colour, design, and lasting quality. It is a curious fact that the men are the seamsters, and not the women.

The men share with their wives every penny they receive as the result of the joint efforts of the family. The houses are their own property, the land is their own; the land houses, clothes, and feeds them; they pay one direct tax, namely, five shillings per dwellig-house per annum; there are no "rates and taxes," and the income tax is still unknown; every woman can have a child if she wants one, and the child will not be a bastard to carry the brand of shame through all its innocent young days; there is no unemployment, the "dole" is still a stranger, and women do not compete with men for men's work; in truth, in well-administered chiefdoms the drawbacks and hindrances of the vaunted civilization of the countries of the modern white man and woman are difficult to find.

On dark nights, early to bed is the rule. In fine weather, when the moon shines with all the

beautiful splendour of the tropics, the family joins in the village dance to the tune of segbulis, drums, and song; the pipe and palm wine creating in a very happy and pleasant scene an urbane, frictionless sociability difficult to imagine, and which must be seen through unprejudiced eyes to be believed.

For many years, the white missionary of various nationalities, foreign as well as our own, has tried to convince the African woman I know that she is a slave and a mere chattel, "living in sin". In the Protectorate of Sierra Leone there were women Paramount Chiefs, Sub-chiefs, and heads of villages long before the women of Britain obtained the vote. With such a vigorous mentality the people on whose behalf this is written will, one day, if led aright, realize which kind of life is best for them; that of the industrialised white man and woman, or their own.

Under the British Flag these people have no cause to be envious of any other nationality.

Morally, socially, economically, and politically, the artificial substitution of monogamy for polygyny must be accompanied by stupendous changes in the life of the people, inimical to their future welfare, and heavy with never-ending trouble for the people of Britain; not the fulfilment of a great ideal, but the slow, inevitable destruction of what might have

been the greatest friendship the world has ever known, and of much of our trade with them.

Mohammedanism is increasing by leaps and bounds. In time, the bulk of the people of British West Africa will have entered the kindly fold of Islam provided that plural marriage has not been made illegal. Islam makes no distinction between the polygynist and the monogamist, neither is a convert divorced from his tribal life as is always the case with a Christian convert, if the conversion be genuine.

A polygynist and his wives can be just as good Christians as those who profess monogamy. Why not let them become Christian? Christianity is in chains in British West Africa. The white professors of the Faith will not let it march forward. The population is well over 20,000,000, of whom but a few thousands profess Christianity, and this, after several decades.

What is the stumbling block?

In the name of Christianity religious bodies are unwittingly endeavouring to undermine the very foundation on which the whole West African social structure rests: its marriage custom, polygyny. Can they not moderate the system of Christianity *with benefit to Christianity* and to our fellow citizens in the great Continent of Africa? What would Christ do?

W. ADDISON

EPITAPH ON MECHANIST PHILOSOPHY

[A. Newsome has been keenly interested in social matters for the last twenty years, during the early part of which he was engaged in practical trade union administration. His articles on sociological questions, and on the philosophical aspects of sociology are thoughtful and thought-provoking.

The following article uncovers the false position of nineteenth century scientists who tried "to explain the aspirations and affections, the love and hatred, the most private and sacred workings in the soul and mind of the living man, by an anatomical description of the chest and brain of his dead body." (*Secret Doctrine* I. 169-170) To these words of H. P. Blavatsky we will add her positive teaching, bearing on the subject, given in 1888.

"The Universe is worked and *guided* from *within outwards*. As above so it is below, as in heaven so on earth; and man—the microcosm and miniature copy of the macrocosm—is the living witness to this Universal Law and to the mode of its action. We see that every *external* motion, act, gesture, whether voluntary or mechanical, organic or mental, is produced and preceded by *internal* feeling or emotion, will or volition, and thought or mind. As no outward motion or change, when normal, in man's external body can take place unless provoked by an inward impulse, given through one of the three functions named, so with the external or manifested Universe. The whole Kosmos is guided, controlled, and animated by almost endless series of Hierarchies of sentient Beings, each having a mission to perform, and who—whether we give to them one name or another, and call them Dhyan-Chohans or Angels—are 'messengers' in the sense only that they are the agents of Karmic and Cosmic Laws."—S. D. I. 274]

During the nineteenth century the philosophy of *Mechanism* took a very strong hold of the European and American mind. From politics to the existence of God, only the scientific view was respected, and no matter how cautiously expressed, was popularly interpreted to mean that at bottom everything would soon be proved to be mechanical and chemical, from the chemist's atom to the astronomer's heavens, and from the behaviour of microscopic worms in a pool to the brain of the scientist himself. Indeed, the notion actually began to take hold of people that all human feeling and emotion, including love itself, were merely unwanted heat generated as a

result of the brain's mechanical inefficiency, and that if ever the brain became efficient, its reasoning would be as mechanical as the principles of the steam engine.

To see how it was possible for such a terrible misconception to arise, we have to examine, as briefly as possible, the relationship between the mechanical and the mind of man, and afterwards to look a little more closely into the general social conditions in which the misconception arose. Every mechanical thing in the world—definitely *known* to be mechanical and not merely *guessed* so—has proceeded from the inventive genius of man. It is really a part of the body of man given

a separate existence for the purpose of doing his routine work and setting him free. Consider, for example, a bicycle. It can be described as two running wheels to which force is conveyed from a driving wheel. That, however, merely describes the *physical* bicycle. Before it can run it has to be guided and directed to a goal by a rider; and, in addition, of course, the driving-force has to be applied at the pedals. Similarly, every machine serves a purpose imposed on it by its inventor. Bicycle, motor car, airship, none of these can be a satisfactory model for the mind of man or of the universe, for the single reason that each of them is merely a supplement to, or a substitute for, feet and wings. A mind is necessary to guide every machine, and to decide on the goal to which it shall be driven, as surely as to guide feet or wings. One of the mechanisms most resembling in function a human brain, is, for example, the calculating machine. Yet that merely performs a *process* in a manner to reduce fatigue in the human brain. What calculation it shall perform, to what end, when, with the power of fingers or of an electric current controllable by fingers through a switch, all this is decided by the human mind. Every machine, in brief, performs only a *process*. Its motive force and its purpose, essential as they are to complete it, reside never in itself, but always in the mind of the inventing, directing, and operating

human being.

Every act of the mind of man requires all these three things to be combined. Every act, to be specific, depends, first, on an aim, that is, an objective which the act is to achieve when carried out. By our aims, our wisdom and goodness are known. Similarly, every act requires a process, that is, a technique accurately designed for carrying it out. By our technique our ability, our science, is known. Finally, every act depends on a dynamic, that is, sufficient force to carry it through. By our right co-ordination of force, technique and aims, our efficiency is known. No machine can ever effect more than the amplification of our technique and force, as we, by understanding Nature, make use, for those purposes, of Nature's forces and materials. Aim, however, remains for all time a prerogative monopolised by mind, and absolutely non-mechanical. The process of a watch, to give an instance, is carried out by cogwheels and spindles of various sizes. Its dynamic consists of a spring, *regularly wound up by a man*, and replaced when worn-out. The purpose of a watch, the accurate recording of the passing of time is absolutely non-mechanical. It is an aim born in the mind of the inventor of the watch.

The Mechanist Philosophy, which, as we now see, mistakes a part for the whole, was able to grip the mind of man only because it was favoured by social

conditions which, although attributed to the development of science, were only partly thus caused. The nineteenth century mind, particularly in England, largely ceased to be aware of the danger of losing sight of Aim and Dynamic, and foolishly concentrated its attention on Process alone. Although we now recognise the machine as merely *embodied process*, extending the power of one aspect only of mind, the machine became the god of the nineteenth century; because for the nineteenth century Process seemed to be every thing.

Just as the physical atom was accepted as the fixed and final motive force of the chemist's universe, and the cell as the fixed and final dynamic of the biologists' universe, the will-to-self-preservation was accepted as the fixed and final dynamic of the evolutionists' universe; and finally, "human-nature," called in the text-books "the economic man," and readily allowed without censure all such vices as acquisitiveness, avarice and ambition, was accepted as the fixed dynamic of the sociologist's universe. Physical atoms, it was naïvely asserted and genuinely believed, had no aim in combining, yet all beauty, from snow-crystals to the jewels of the King's crown, had sprung automatically from their molecular combinations. The cells of the living organism, it was asserted, and just as confidently, could know nothing about the organism as a whole, and yet tigers and flowers and lovely women had arisen automatically

from their will-to-live. Human nature, it was concluded,—and experience was alleged to confirm it,—need have no aim, no vision at all, because private greed so obviously led, by creating and accumulating wealth, to the public good. The economic man's worst behaviour, it was believed, nevertheless surely swept all mankind along the up-hill road of Inevitable Progress. So the chemist was merely interested in the investigation of chemical processes, the biologist and evolutionist in the process of Darwinian natural selection; and the sociologist in the processes of economics to the neglect of the social purpose of the economic system and, as a consequence, of how to make it serve for the realisation of any human vision whatsoever.

It was inevitable that so partial a philosophy should be followed by a crash of civilisation. Since the European War, however, it has been gradually dawning on the less insensitive, the less fixed in mental habit, that the affairs of mankind will never again come right of themselves; that purpose, will and co-ordination are indispensable to the achievement of civilisation, prosperity, or any other desirable estate. In consequence, philosophy begins to move towards the truth. Scientists, working out their philosophical principles as a background for their work, are ceasing to be Mechanist. Professor Haldane observes that the distinctive feature of the living organism is not its mere will-to-live, but its mysterious

power of internal co-ordination to accomplish a desired aim. There is no greater mystery than the *decision* of travelling blood cells that they must not merely repair normal wear but must build new tissues, in say, a simple cut-finger. Dr. Smuts was welcomed when he told the British Association for the Advancement of Science that an organism was not a mere fortuitous bundle of cells, but a co-ordinated whole. Dr. Whitehead, in immensely difficult language, is trying to prove that "experience does not consist of a bundle of perceptions," but of perceptions *co-ordinated from within* to serve the aims of the mind.

It is, of course, quite impossible to cling to a philosophy that contradicts experience, and when Dr. Johnson pronounced as the fact about determinism "that all logic

is for it, and all experience against it," he wrote the epitaph on the philosophy of Mechanism; for logic is only *mind-process*, whereas experience is compact of the whole of mind, including dynamic, process, aim, and the mysterious power of co-ordinating these. Dr. Johnson could not, of course, foresee that nineteenth-century Europe would be deceived by easy success into limiting its experience to process alone, nor that the philosophy of Mechanism, the *reflection* of that limitation, would thus have its day. Our own experience, however, includes the historical fact that nineteenth-century Europe crashed as anything blindly driven must; and we ought, therefore, to permit the Mechanist philosophy, which was held to excuse blind driving, to rest in peace as a mere historical curiosity.

A. NEWSOME

The Secret Doctrine teaches that every one of the higher, as of the lower worlds, is interblended with our own objective world; that millions of things and beings are, in point of localization, around and *in* us, as we are around, with, and in them; it is no metaphysical figure of speech, but a sober fact in Nature, however incomprehensible to our senses.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine* I. p. 604

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

EVOLUTION AND REDEMPTION*

[J. D. Beresford reviews a new presentation of the old problem of evil in evolution. Attention may be drawn to two pamphlets just published from the writings of Madame H. P. Blavatsky on this subject: *The Origin of Evil* and *The Fall of Ideals*, U. L. T. Pamphlets Nos. 26-27.—EDS.]

I have more than once defended the cause of Science in these pages, and propose to do so again in the course of this article; but only on certain grounds. The first of these is general. I believe that it is well for the human mind to avoid any form of bigotry. There is no doctrine more stultifying than that principle of the dogmatic religions which asserts that in them alone lies the truth, and that the refusal to believe this assertion constitutes an Evil, *ipso facto*. It is a principle that denies the innate virtue of the Immanent Will, and by its promotion of Evil to god-like powers lays such perpetual stress on the theory of Duality that the great ideal of Unity is lost sight of. It is equally dangerous, in my opinion, to reject dogmatically any method of thought, scientific or philosophical, because its conclusions do not appear compatible with our own. There must be truth in the method, since all mental activity, all human reason derives from the same source.

Nevertheless we must believe that certain trains of reasoning are unfruitful, and my second ground for defence is that this is

not wholly true in the case of science. In 1933 by its own, as it may seem to us, devious methods, science is arriving at many of the conclusions first published in *The Secret Doctrine* in 1888. Modern physics has had the effect of breaking down many traditional habits of thought, and the result of that process is always favourable to progress. And although it is obvious that the methods and pronouncements of science can have no value for the student of the ancient Wisdom-Religion, they serve a valuable purpose in their effect upon the public mind which may often be stirred to wonder by a half-truth though it be incapable of understanding the whole. I use the word "incapable" with deliberate intention. The great truths can be fully comprehended only by those who have reached the necessary stage of initiation.

The book under review has inclined me to write again on this subject. The author is a Doctor of Medicine and is in the main a Christian. He accepts all the miracles of the New Testament, and, if I have rightly understood his final chapter, believes

* *Evolution and Redemption* by Dr. A. P. Newsholme (Williams and Norgate, London, 8s. 6d.)

that Christ's sacrifice was at least a powerful instrument for the redemption of mankind. Nevertheless he has by earnest thought, partly scientific in its nature, attained conclusions that accord reasonably well with Theosophical principles.

His opening chapters are almost entirely concerned with what is known theologically as the "origin of evil". He begins bravely by saying, "I shall apply boldly and in its fullest sense Prof. Arthur Thomson's phrase *that there is nothing inanimate*" (original italics); but seems to have had some difficulty in grasping the full implications of this statement as he refers in more than one place to "non-living matter"—at the best a loose term that tends to confuse his argument. From this he proceeds, a little tediously at times, to show that, (I quote one of his more definitive statements), "there is something in the inertia of matter itself which obstructs the emergence of the fundamental qualities of living substance and of man". And from this he goes on to assume that the overcoming of this fundamental inertia or resistance to the active force of the spirit presents the inner meaning of the struggle commonly described as that between Good and Evil.

This comes near enough to the truth for general purposes, and Dr. Newsholme, having admitted (p. 77) that it is difficult "to suggest any way of proving or dis-

proving" the criticism that "the inertia of matter may be something quite other than that inertia in man which hinders evolution in him," proceeds to an argument by analogy which presents the similarity of inertia in the two cases.

Accepting that conclusion provisionally we find that Dr. Newsholme has arrived at what seems to him a sufficient explanation of many physical and psychical phenomena that he has no doubt encountered in his own practice. He has suggested in an earlier book* that "disease is associated immediately or remotely with a descent from the elasticity of living matter towards the inertia of non-living matter; a descent affecting the physical frame and initiated either there or at the higher levels of sense, intellect or conscience," and he has there, he tells us, related disease, even that described as "constitutional" with a "failure of the intellect or heart, and fundamentally of the soul to grapple with its problem".

So far we have no fault to find with his inferences, but his account of what he terms the "Nature Miracles" is less convincing. He has taken various examples from the New Testament, the story of the barren fig-tree, the rebuking of the tempest on the Lake of Gennesaret, Peter's attempt to walk on the water, the miracle of the loaves and fishes, but not the turning of water into wine. His explanation of these phenomena demands an

* *Health, Disease and Integration* (Allen & Unwin).

elaboration of his hypothesis of inertia as representing the force of evil. In his account of the stilling of the storm, for example, he has further to hypothecate "a sense implying moral responsibility in the elements of spirit within the matter" exhibiting such forces of nature as "earthquake, tornado, drought or miasma". But since this suggestion definitely demands the conception of evil spirits in active antagonism to good, it may be argued that they, too, would have to struggle against the inertia of matter; and this inference would lead us to an impasse by the inclusion of its third term. For if we divide the purely spirit force into two elements, say, good and bad, that resistance inherent in matter at once becomes ambiguous, for we cannot assume it to be of such a nature as would be more easily overcome by the evil spirits than by the good.

Such anomalies as these inevitably arise from theories based on those half-truths to which I referred earlier in this article. Just so did Newton's principles work admirably up to a point. They gave a practical basis for computation and led to such mathematical achievements as the calculation of the orbit and position of Neptune before that planet had been found by observation. But they were, in effect, only half-truths and contained a margin of error which needed a further and, in some sense, a different explanation.

The whole truth, in the present

connection, it is impossible for me to state. It contains terms that I cannot yet understand. But I may suggest a closer approximation from a reference to certain passages in *The Secret Doctrine*. On page 258 of Vol. I, for example, will be found various quotations from the Book of Dzyan, which suggest at least one of Dr. Newsholme's omissions. Thus "Whatsoever quits the Laya State" (the Laya is the point of matter where every differentiation has ceased) "becomes active life; it is drawn into the vortex of motion (the alchemical solvent of Life); Spirit and Matter are the two States of the One, which is neither Spirit nor Matter, both being the absolute life, latent."

What Dr. Newsholme has failed to infer will be found by implication in this reference. He has not in the first instance gone far enough back to realise that there is something behind spirit, which he assumes as primary. In the sequel to the above quotation, however, we learn that "Spirit is the first differentiation of (and in) Space; and Matter the first differentiation of Spirit." This necessarily gives another aspect to the whole argument. It is true that we have grounds for the deduction that with each differentiation, the primal all pervading element becomes grosser and more resistant, presenting what is known to Science as inertia and is spoken of by Madame Blavatsky (S. D. I. 280) as the "irrational brute-energy

inherent in matter". But we can find no warrant here for any suggestion of "a sense implying moral responsibility in the elements of spirit within the matter," such elements appearing, as it were, wilfully rebellious in such forces of nature as a tempest.

Another of Dr. Newsholme's terms that seems to me to need further elucidation is that which he speaks of on p. 123 as "the force of Fear". I am ready to grant without any question the concept of "Fear" as an antithesis to faith,—it is spoken of in this connection with reference to Peter's failure to walk on the waters. I accept further the suggestion of many failures due to fear, physical as well as spiritual, in various other relations. But I would postulate that fear is not in itself a positive force but rather a failure of the active spirit to manifest itself. Physical fear is largely due to the instinct for self-preservation persisting from the more animal stages of the first years of life. Peter's fear of sinking was no doubt of this order; and if we can accept the whole story as a statement of fact, we must conclude that the resistances suddenly set up by the sudden emergence of this primitive instinct checked the power of the spirit that had until then upheld him. Indeed any secession to the lower impulses has this effect.

Dr. Newsholme, in fact, has gone almost as far as anyone can

go by the inductive process of Science, and has fallen as short of the truth as we should expect him to fall. A fuller self-consciousness of the spirit is required before we can penetrate the deeper mysteries. Nevertheless, to return to my text, I believe that such sincere, unprejudiced books as these serve a valuable purpose. They awaken the curiosity of those who, lacking such stimulation, might slip into the rut of orthodox belief, and may encourage them to search still further; and at this time when the surface of public life presents to the newspaper public so many deplorable aspects of national egotism and self-seeking, we may gladly welcome any contribution to thought which has, at least, the right orientation.

Finally, Dr. Newsholme's concluding passage indicates that he has a full appreciation of at least one essential, for he writes:—

If the path found and followed in these pages has been that of truth, may the Scanning of the track have helped and in no way hindered fellow-pilgrims in their own journey! If the way prove to be in part one of error, the conclusion just reached, that the law of the road is the Law of Love, implies at any rate that the error is not wholly astray from truth.

With that statement we could not possibly have any quarrel. But, alas, how great a difference there is between the acceptance of that Law and a realisation of its vast applications to the conduct of life!

J. D. BERESFORD

VIVEKANANDA*

[**Clifford Bax** is the author of *Twenty-five Chinese Poems, Twelve Short Plays*, and is the biographer-essayist who has created living pictures of such diverse figures as those of *Leonardo da Vinci* and *Socrates* on the one hand and of *Bianca Capello* and *Pretty Witty Nell* (*Nell Gwyn*) on the other.—EDS.]

These volumes form a revised and abridged edition of the biography in four volumes which appeared in 1912, and the probability that some of the anonymous authors are no longer alive makes it easier for a critic to discharge his duty in pointing out some of their shortcomings. The work was obviously a labour of love and reverence but this factor ought not to lower our literary standard. Unfortunately, most books that deal with the spiritual life are badly or poorly written, the reason being, no doubt, that many people at a certain stage of religious development assume that literary art is a mere plaything—just as others persuade themselves that “the body” is unimportant. People of this kind should realise that only skill enables a writer to convey a mood or a meaning, that earnestness alone cannot achieve its purpose, that, as Charles Lamb remarked, “easy writing makes damned hard reading”. When, as in this book, several inexpert authors have collaborated, we are certain to find ourselves travelling over a very uneven road, and no one will be surprised to find that the writing in these volumes varies from the straightforward to the embarrassingly emotional, from plain prose to unlucky attempts at a poet-

ic style. The opening writer, for example, not content with “Hushed in silence was the household, hushed in silence and rest,” actually progresses to “Came the morning”. Another writer observes of someone that “he shook the dust of his feet”. Vivekananda’s life and personality offer superb material for a biography and it is disappointing, therefore, that this memorial to him should be twice as long as it ought to be if it was to achieve its maximum effect, that it is put together without any sense of attractive presentation and that the authors had not skill enough to lure the reader effortlessly from paragraph to paragraph. An expert writer, in sympathy with the subject, might have made this “Life” a classic, and this does not mean, as many earnest people will suppose, merely that it might have been “better written”. It means that it might have interested not only the few who are already attracted by Indian philosophy but also the whole literary world. It means, too, that it might have been certain of lasting for generations.

We all know that there are persons in Europe, and even more of them in America, who are ready to regard any Hindu with superstitious awe. We know also that several mountebanks have

* *The Life of Swami Vivekananda*. By his Eastern and Western Disciples. Two Vols. (Advaita Ashrama, Mayavati, Almora, Himalayas. Rs. 8, or 12s.)

taken advantage of this foolish attitude. Vivekananda, however, was probably the finest representative of any Eastern religion or philosophy who ever visited the West. His sincerity is beyond question. These volumes convincingly destroy the old rumours that in America he succumbed to the physical charm of women. They show too that his intellect must have been exceptionally powerful. We need not accept the story of how, having read straight through eleven volumes of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, he was capable of answering any question upon their contents, but we have here overwhelming evidence of his philosophical acumen. Indeed, whenever the authors quote from his letters, his conversation or his discourses, we recognise at once that we are listening to a man of intense aspiration, great beauty of life, tremendous energy and high mental voltage. The vitality of these *ipsissima verba*, even on the printed page, is astonishing. They come to us, across thirty years, with a stronger sense of his personality than any gramophone record could have captured.

The early part of the work, treating of Vivekananda's childhood and discipleship, conveys a rich impression of Indian life as it must feel to an Indian; and in the long concluding section any imaginative Westerner will find himself carried all but physically into the atmosphere of a vivid and unfamiliar world. He will realise, for instance, how in 1900

(and it may still be so) the arrival of a saint at an Indian town or village would draw the multitude toward him as spectacularly as the arrival of a champion prize-fighter at Newcastle or a film-star at Victoria Station. In the preface, however, we gather that the book was written with an eye to the occidental reader, and it was certainly a mistake to use so many Sanskrit words without any hint of their meaning. A novice might take some time to discover, for example, what is meant by "mahasamadhi".

Between these two accounts of Vivekananda's life in India, we read of his sensational debut as a public speaker at the Parliament of Religions held in Chicago in 1893 and of his two sojourns in America and in London. It is always pleasant to find that saintliness and commonsense can go together as when, for example, he admitted that "the spirit of one of his relations had appeared to him now and then, bringing news of far-off places," adding the remark "On enquiry, I found that its words were not always true." Still more reassuring is the courageous statement, in later life, that "behind my work was ambition, behind my love was personality, behind my purity was fear, behind my guidance the thirst for power. Now they are vanishing, . . ." And if we want to realise how engaging a person he was we need only read how, being asked "Have you seen God?", he replied "Do I look as though I had? A fat man like me?"

The profoundly reverent tone in which most of this Life is written may weary, if it does not alienate, most Western minds, but no unprejudiced reader could finish these volumes without feeling that he has been in touch with a really great man—great, no matter whether or not the world should soon forget him,—without a sense of that spiritual quickening

which comes from physical nearness to such a personality, or without wondering whether it is not very much as though St. John or St. Paul, or a combination of both, had been living in the world between 1863 and 1902. Many Western readers will be startled to find that the virtue which this Hindu saint extolled above all others was energy.

CLIFFORD BAX

TESTIMONY OF FAITH AND CREEDS OF THEOLOGY*

[**Marmaduke Pickthall** is an English Muslim and the author of *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran*. His review shows his inclination towards the original teachings of Muhammad and away from theological accretions. The student of Theosophy will read with interest his remarks about the free-will of angels and of men; it is a teaching of the Esoteric Philosophy that man can rise superior to angels. Again the hierarchy of Jinn to which Satan belonged and who along with men possesses free-will, and not the angels, is another teaching of that philosophy. The interested reader will find a full explanation of the rebellious Satan-Lucifer, possessing free-will, in an article entitled "The History of a Planet" by H. P. Blavatsky in *Lucifer*, I. p. 15.—EDS.]

The title of this learned work is misleading. The documents here quoted and explained were never binding upon Muslims in the way that the Apostles' or the Nicene Creed became binding upon Christians. The only formula which has the value of a Creed in that sense for the Muslim is the *Shahâdah* (Testimony): "I testify that there is no God except Allah and I testify that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah."

The *Fiqh Akbar* and the Testament of Abû Hanîfah (so called) which the author has chosen to consider as the Muslim Creed are, as he justly remarks, statements of belief drawn up in face of certain heresies; they may possibly have been applied as tests to prove the orthodoxy of newcomers to the school or circle of their authors; but the great majority of Muslims were ignorant of their existence at the time, and to-day they are only of historical interest. The

convert to Islâm from another religion was then, as now, called upon to recite the *Shahâdah* before witnesses, instructed in the duties of a Muslim (*Pillars of Islâm* by Prof. Wensinck, second chapter), and asked expressly to abjure the special error of his former faith. If he had been a Jew he had to affirm his belief in Jesus as a Messenger of God; if a Christian, to affirm his belief in Jesus as a Messenger of God and nothing more.

This last requirement probably accounts for Art. 8 in the *Fiqh Akbar* I, though Prof. Wensinck is inclined to reject this explanation (which is that of the Arab commentators) because he finds no other clause directed towards non-Muslims. The article, as quoted by him, runs:—

Whoso believeth in all that he is bound to believe except that he says: I do not know whether Moses or Jesus (peace be upon them)

* *The Muslim Creed, Its Genesis and Historical Development*. By A. J. Wensinck, Professor of Arabic in the University of Leiden. (Cambridge University Press.).

do or do not belong to the Apostles, is an infidel.

Why Moses should be introduced at all is not clear unless it may have been to show the equality of the two revealed and tolerated religions in the opinion of the Muslim. Professor Wensinck's use of the word "Apostle" here and elsewhere to denote the great Prophets is a little irritating. It is true that the word means "Messenger" as does the Arabic word *Rasûl*; but "Apostle" has become appropriate to the messengers of Jesus Christ, who are called in Arabic *Hawâriyûn*, while Jesus himself is called *Rasûl* in the Qur'an.

Islâm, in the first period of zeal and conquest, was religion without theology, a religion of clear, one might say, honest, faith and practice without doubts, disputations or subtleties. When the Muslims had established themselves in Syria and Egypt they began to hear the arguments of subtle Christian theologians, though it may have been only from the mouth of converts to Islâm. Professor Wensinck rightly emphasises the point that the Christian influence was indirect and the growth of theology among Muslims quite indigenous. They began to arrange and formulate their own ideas, attempted to define the indefinable. But these attempts could never with them have the force which the Creeds of Christianity acquired so easily, because of the deep reverence of the Muslim community as a whole for everything that existed in the early days. Nothing of later date could win the same acceptance. As Professor Wensinck admits, the plain *Shahâdah* was never superseded or discarded. What he really depicts for us, and very ably, is the development of that theology up to the time of Al-Ghazzâlî's magnificent repudiation of it, before it hardened into cold scholasticism. The devout, with notable exceptions, always disapproved of it. Says Al-Ghazzâlî:—

It must be recognised, that *Kalâm* (theological discussion) by itself does not belong to what is prohibited or recommended. In one respect it is harmful; it usually leads to zealotism. As to its use, it is often thought that it reveals reality and lays bare the foundations

of things. This, however, is far from being the truth. If this were said to you by an adherent of Tradition or of anthropomorphism, you might think that people usually hate what they do not understand. But I speak as one who has descended to the bottom of *Kalâm* (theology) and who has reached the highest rank of the *Mutakallimun* (theologians) and has been inspired with a hatred of it; as one who has dived into the depths of other cognate sciences and has come to the conviction that the way to the foundations of knowledge is blocked up on this side. Certainly, in some cases *Kalâm* is not void of all light and guidance. Nay, it may be said that its use is limited to a single case: *Kalâm* may serve to prevent the dogmatic belief of the masses from being disturbed by disputations with schismatics. For the masses are weak-minded and easily troubled by the disputes of schismatics, however weak they may be. So the weak may be combated by the weak. The masses may cling to the '*aqidah* we have given them . . .

For the '*aqidah* (statement of belief) of Al-Ghazzâlî, Prof. Wensinck refers us to the work of another well known Arabist, Prof. Macdonald. Yet it is more deserving to be called the Muslim Creed than the documents here quoted *in extenso*, and is (what these are not) undoubtedly authentic.

Anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur'an (of which Prof. Wensinck, following the theologians, makes too much) are covered for the plain believer by Sûrah III, v. 7:—

He it is who hath revealed unto thee (Muhammad) the Scripture wherein are clear revelations. They are the substance of the Book—and others which are allegorical. But those in whose hearts is doubt pursue, forsooth, that which is allegorical, seeking (to cause) dissension by seeking to explain it. None knoweth its explanation save Allah. And those who are of sound instruction say: We believe therein; the whole is from our Lord; but only men of understanding really heed.

The same verse disposes of much of the theological discussion and discredits it, in the opinion of the pious. Prof. Wensinck, in a reference to this verse, instead of "allegorical" has "doubtful," a mistranslation and decidedly misleading. Indeed often his translation seems unsympathetic, as for instance his choice of the word "infidel" where "disbeliever" would have been as true a rendering, giving a slightly wrong direction to the reader's thoughts.

He seems to regard the whole literature of the Traditions of the Prophet as of later, more or less deliberate, fabrication. Such a view is hardly tenable. After the Prophet's death people, faced with any difficulty, naturally sought to know what had been his opinion and example. They questioned his Companions and, if they could, wrote down the answers they received. These inquirers in their turn became authorities for the succeeding generation and so on. Written notes of *Ahâdîth* were of very early occurrence as the late Prof. Horowitz showed in "*The Earliest Biographies of the Prophet and their Authors*".* That there should be different versions of the same traditions is but natural; and that fabricated *Ahâdîth* exist is admitted by all Muslims; but great care was taken to weed them out, and the mass of the selected traditions is deserving of a great deal more respect than Prof. Wensinck seems inclined to pay to it. A tradition which happens to fall in aptly with the requirements of a later time is not therefore necessarily a fabrication. In one passage Prof. Wensinck seems to imply that Muslims believe free-will to be given to the angels as well as to mankind. That is not so. The usual explanation of the order to the angels to prostrate themselves before Adam is that Adam had been given a measure of free-will, by the right use of which some of his descendants would come to rank above the angels who have no choice but to obey their Lord's commands. Satan's choice of disobedience rather than bow down to anything except Allah is explained in Sûrah VIII v. 51, where it is stated: "He was of the Jinn; so he rebelled against his Lord's

command." The Jinn, not the angels, share with mankind the responsibility of a measure of free-will. The theme is a favourite one with the *Ikhwân us-Safa*, and is illustrated in many folk-tales notably in the legend of Hârût and Mârût, the two angels who were given free-will at their request.

Prof. Wensinck follows other eminent Orientalists in stating that the Qu'rân disclaims for the Prophet the power to perform miracles. The statement is not quite correct. All that the Qu'rân really declares is that miracles were not at his command. They belonged to Allah and would come for him only when Allah willed. Muhammad could not perform them on demand as the soothsayers and conjurers did, nor as some of the Prophets before him were empowered to do.

On p. 241 "Muhammad relates" etc., referring to a passage in the Qur'ân, is the only sentence in the book offensive to the taste of Muslims.

The system of transliteration from the Arabic employed is foreign. The combination "Dj" is meaningless in English. It is used in countries where "j" is pronounced soft as in French or with the sound of "y" in order to suggest the sound of English "j" and Arabic *jîm*.

The work is rich in detail but appears to me defective in proportion and design, so much so as to convey, through overcrowded detail and in view of the title, the impression that Islam is difficult, complicated and irrational, which it certainly is not, as compared with other faiths. I have already indicated that the author lays excessive stress upon supposed analogies with Christianity. His book, however, is indeed a perfect mine of information on the early growth of dogmatism and scholasticism.

MARMADUKE PICKTHALL

* *Islamic Culture*, Vol. I, No. 4, Oct. 1927.

St. John of the Cross. By FR. BRUNO, O.D.C. Edited By FR. BENEDICT ZIMMERMANN, O.D.C. with an Introduction by JACQUES MARITAIN. (Sheed and Ward, London. 18s.)

In strict obedience to the two categorical imperatives of history and the historical method that one should "not dare to tell a lie" and that one should "not fear to tell the truth" (p. xxix), Fr. Bruno has written what is perhaps the first full-length biography of St. John of the Cross, making profitable use of the Roman documents while not ignoring or minimising the value of those preserved at Madrid. It is a systematic study of the Doctor of the Universal Church and an authentic account of his life which will facilitate a better understanding of the spirit of his teachings. After a critical and careful exploration of the Carmelite archives, the author has narrated the details of the life of St. John of the Cross in an arresting manner so as to focus attention on charity and love which were the mainsprings of that life.

Perfection of charity and love or a Union with God constitute the goal of man's spiritual effort, according to St. John of the Cross. His doctrine is the pure catholic doctrine of the mystical life. But no man is a hero to his valet, and St. John encountered an opposition from amongst the members of his own Order. He was thrown into prison where he found inner spiritual freedom.

To students of Indian thought the following teachings of St. John will make a direct appeal. In the course of his letter to Juana de Pedraza, St. John is said to have exclaimed: "Nothing—nothing—nothing—even to strip oneself of one's very skin and all else for Christ." In this glorification of charity one hears resonant echoes of the spirit of *vairagya* (non-attachment) and readiness to sacrifice even the most precious possession of life including his own self (*Atm-arpana*). Secondly, St. John's readiness to suffer and bear all things with rare patience and in profound silence will be appreciated by students of Indian philosophy who believe in inexorable

"Karma" and who see in present suffering the outcome of one's own past deeds. Thirdly, St. John's Mysticism was not a quietistic swooning into the Absolute. It was activist, with a dynamic programme of burning aspiration for union with God and loving service to God's creatures.

The Vedantic scheme with its emphasis on *Tyaga* (sacrifice), *Daya* (mercy), *Seva* (service), and other *Atmagunas* (spiritual characteristics) ending in *Sakshyatkara* or mystical realisation of Divine Immanence, advocates practical mysticism out of which indolence and spiritual lotus-eating have to be strictly eliminated. St. John observed, when musicians were summoned to cheer him up while he was suffering from a severe abscess, "If God has given me the great sufferings I am enduring, why wish to soothe and lessen them by music?" (p. 347.) Sri Madhva counsels suffering without a murmur, without a complaint, without even so much as a passing allusion to one's suffering. The Acharya says:—"*Vishnave-tapa-ityeva— . . Karyam-apadyapi— Brahma—tenayati-aparokshyatam*". All suffering is to be viewed as penance undergone in the hope of mystical union with the Supreme, or realisation of Divine Immanence. Even in the time of dangers and difficulties, acute crises, excruciating pain, etc., one should concentrate devotional attention on God.

Jacques Maritain, deeply touched by the only too obvious irresponsiveness of some of the modern Christians to the doctrines of St. John, asserts: "There are other souls, separated from God and tortured by those evil powers that are overwhelming modern life who find in him the instrument of their salvation" (p. xxv). The League of Nations has not yet prevented wars and exploitation. The World Economic Conference has adjourned *sine die*. Perfection of charity and love do not seem to have been made active determinants in the regulation of social and international concerns. The lives of saints such as St. John are a standing inspiration to some few at

least who may honestly endeavour to walk in their footsteps, and Fr. Bruno's biography, so attractively written, will make modern men and women search

their hearts, will kindle introspection in them, and enable them to take stock of their spiritual achievements.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

The Orient in American Transcendentalism. By ARTHUR CHRISTY. (Columbia University, New York. \$4.)

The burgeoning of American interest in the philosophy and literature of the East is traced, in this study, in the Orientation of three outstanding exponents of Transcendentalism in the United States—Emerson, Thoreau, and Alcott. The book not only evidences a thoughtful survey of the writings, published and unpublished, of these men but it enumerates the books of or about India, China, and Persia which there is record of their having drawn from public libraries or which are known to have been in the private collections of their friends and so presumably available to them. To these three friends and neighbours in mid-century Concord, the Orient made a profound appeal, to which each gave characteristic response. Emerson, the chief spokesman of the group, drew freely on the Eastern literature for a refutation of the current rationalistic philosophy so distasteful to his native idealism. The *Bhagavad-Gita* had a great attraction for all three. In it Emerson found "nothing small or unworthy; but large, serene, consistent, the voice of an old intelligence which in another age and climate had pondered and thus disposed of the same questions which exercise us." One striking passage from Emerson's diary describes a dream of a Pundit instructing him in the Oriental doctrine of Emanations. "As a river flows," he told him as they walked, "and the plant flows (or emits odours), and the sun flows (or radiates), and the mind is a stream of thoughts, so was the universe the emanation of God."

The Yoga philosophy appealed especially to Thoreau, humanitarian and mystic, whose ideal it was to immerse himself completely in Nature. He wrote

to a friend in 1849: "Depend upon it that rude and careless as I am, I would fain practice the *yoga* faithfully To some extent, and at rare intervals, even I am a Yogi." "Thoreau's sense of kinship with trees, his brotherhood with every living object, his identification of personal life with universal life, permeate all his work."

Alcott, who called himself a "propagator of the things of illuminated Mind," was inspired by the Oriental influence with a great zeal for disseminating a knowledge of the world's scriptures. "Very desirable it were since the gates of the East are now opening wide and giving the free commerce of mind with mind, to collect and compare the Bibles of the races for general circulation and careful reading."

The reciprocal interest in the East in the writings of Emerson and Thoreau, and especially the influence of the latter on M. K. Gandhi, are interestingly brought out.

Mr. Christy shows sincere appreciation of the beauties of Oriental literature and philosophy. It is the more regrettable that he shows a lack of more than a surface understanding of some of the fundamentals of Hindu philosophy. There is, for example, no hint as to the metaphysical basis of the doctrine of Transmigration, and we find the surprising inference that the Upanishads sanction moral laxity drawn from quotations the gist of which is that "for him who has attained the philosophical view the ethical is transcended". The author specifically disclaims any attempt at "propaganda for any modern theosophical movement," but his book, nevertheless, represents a definite contribution to the purposes with which the Theosophical Movement of our time was launched.

ELEANOR M. HOUGH

The Religious Foundations of Internationalism: A Study in International Relations through the Ages. By NORMAN BENTWICH. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

Norman Bentwich, well known as a scholar in international law and as an ardent Zionist and Jewish patriot, has published in this book the course of lectures he gave at the inauguration of the Chair of the International Law of Peace in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. This interesting book bears witness both to Mr. Bentwich's scholarship in international law and to his Jewish patriotism. It deals with the influence of the different religions of the world, mainly of Judaism and Christianity, on the furtherance of peace between nations and on the development of international law. The author has adopted the historical approach to the subject and traces the influence of religion through the ages to the present day when he thinks that there should be a League of Religions parallel to the League of Nations, and that it is a function of religions in the West and in the East to raise nationalism to the recognition of a single humanity and so to be the spiritual foundation of Internationalism.

Unfortunately we see religion to-day rather formed by nationalism and subservient to nationalistic and patriotic interests. Judaism has always known this entanglement of religion and nationalism; and although some of the prophets like Jeremiah rose to a universalistic conception they remained solitary and persecuted amidst their people; and it was the greatness of this unique race to cling ferociously to its nationality and to defend it as vehemently as they could and whenever they could. On the other hand Buddhism was a pacifist religion, and Christianity and Islam were, in their conception, universalistic and supra-national religions offering to men an inclusive world-wise fellowship.

Mr. Bentwich seems to us much too

optimistic about the value of Universities, League of Nations and official religions and churches as instruments for genuine internationalism. If he proclaims Jerusalem a city of peace, that may be true of an ideal Jerusalem but the real Jerusalem on earth has always been a city of bitter and fanatical struggles, and even to-day Arabs and Jews are there engaged in a fierce struggle for what they consider their right to this city and its country. But even if we disagree with the author in some of his evaluations we shall learn much from his book. Mr. Bentwich does full justice also to all other religions and philosophies. He recognizes that Socrates and the Greek philosophers of the Stoa have considered themselves as the first citizens of the world and he quotes the Roman poet Claudius speaking of Rome as having received the conquered into her bosom like a mother and not as an empress, summoning those she defeated to share her citizenship, and drawing together the distant races with bonds of affection. With greatest fairness and a scholarly impartiality Mr. Bentwich shows us the lofty ideals and the shortcomings of Christianity and Islam; he shows us how Saladin, the Moslem hero, after his triumph over the Crusaders, spared most of their lives, and declared in his dying advice to his son: "Do the will of God, which is the way of peace. Beware of blood; trust not in that, for spilt blood never sleeps."

The want of a true internationalism, of a brotherly fellowship of men, was never as urgent as to-day, but unfortunately we seem far away from it. The national movement is everywhere, especially in Europe, taking an extreme and exclusive form, and it becomes clearer from day to day that any road to a higher communism of men, to a world unity of races and peoples can lead only through the complete discarding of nationalism which is the curse of present day humanity.

HANS KOHN

Some Aspects of Vayu Purana. By V. R. RAMACHANDRA DIKSHITAR, M. A. (Bulletin No. I of the Department of Indian History and Archæology, University of Madras.)

The Puranic lore is less studied both by Western Orientalists and Hindu scholars than the Vedic or the Upanishadic. To those for whom myths and allegories of the Puranas are not worthless, because not meaningless, such a Bulletin as this is of significant value. We congratulate the General Editor of the Series, Mr. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, for beginning his task with such an interesting number. The author has done his work thoroughly and has given us a sound exposition of the contents of the *Vayu Purana* but he has also succeeded in raising some puzzles in the matter of *lokas* and *dvīpas* and other items of the cosmogony of this Purana. We look to him and others like him for further and deeper research, especially in the department of anthropolgy-ethnology, as the Puranas treat of the evolution of not only historic, but also pre-historic human races.

The explaining of the Puranas is a most difficult task, for as H. P. Blavatsky points out "taken in their dead letter, the Purānas read as an absurd tissue of fairy tales and no better" (*Secret Doctrine* II. 320). What she wrote of the *Vishnu Purana* applies to the *Vayu* also—"the reader is likely to throw the book away and pronounce it a farrago of nonsense." She goes on to explain that "Purānas are written emblems" (*Secret Doctrine* I. 306), and that "an emblem is usually a series of graphic pictures viewed and explained allegorically, and unfolding an idea in panoramic views, one after the other." (*Ibid*) She further says that "in the days when the Purānas were written, the true meaning was clear only to the Initiated Brahmins, who wrote those works allegorically and would not give the whole truth to the masses." (*Secret Doctrine* II. 320.) In another place she gives an example: "Just as in old

alchemical works the real meaning of the substances and elements meant are concealed under the most ridiculous metaphors, so are the physical, psychic, and spiritual natures of the Elements (say of fire) concealed in the Vedas, and especially in the Purānas, under allegories comprehensible only to the Initiates;" (*Secret Doctrine* I. 520), and she quotes *Vayu Purana* on the topic of "Personified Fires".

These quotations are from a work published in 1888. Then, and for many years after, only a literal and material interpretation of the Puranas had been attempted, with the result that little attention was paid to them. The author of this Bulletin, we are glad to note, is more inclined to take what he names "the philosophical view". He says: "The concept underlying the creation is according to unambiguous statement of the Purana, philosophical and not material." He takes this "philosophical view" (not a happy term; would not "symbolical interpretation" be better?) of the seven lokas, the seven dvīpas, etc. Not content with doing this he makes a very important suggestion: "There is room for the belief that genuine tradition has been mixed up with the mythical, and an endeavour to separate fact from fiction may not prove unfruitful." But what is a myth? Who or what will determine "genuine tradition," and should not due precaution be taken not to simply throw away as "myth" something not understood? Is it not likely that Purānic statements and stories may have more than one meaning? H. P. Blavatsky was a great student and lover of the Puranas and she maintains that "there is not a statement in the Purānas . . . which has not several meanings . . . Every name in the Purānas has to be examined at least under two aspects; geographically, and metaphysically, in its allegorical application." (*Secret Doctrine* II. 403).

The line of study, greatly neglected so far, is also indicated in *The Secret Doctrine*—comparative study of the ideas presented in the Puranas, and

their equivalents in other lands. For example the seven dvipas with which our author deals can well be compared to the seven *Karshvars* of the Avestic lore; often the very word *Karshvar* is rendered by *Dvipa*, e.g., Dastur Darab, the translator of Dr. Wilhelm Geiger's work—*Civilization of the Eastern Iranians*—tells us in a foot-note that Neriosengh, the translator of the *Yasna*, describes *Qaniratha-Karshvar* as *Jambu-dvipa*. In that connection mention may also be made of the "coincidence" pointed out by Geiger—"The *Dvipas* form concentric rings, which, separated by the ocean, surround *Jambu Dvipa*, which is situated in the centre" (Vol. I, p. 130); "according to Iranian view the *Karshvar Qaniratha* is likewise situated in the centre of the rest.....each

of them (the other six *Karshvars*) is a peculiar, individual space, and so they group themselves round *Qaniratha*" (*Ibid* I, p. 131). Or take the *Zohar* full of Puranic phraseology, or *Midrashim*,—old writings of the Jews, the very title "Ancient" corresponding with the title "*Purâna*." It is said that the Bible and the Puranas analysed and read in the same light afford cogent evidence that they are two copies of the same original—made at two periods far distant from each other.

We sincerely hope that Mr. V. R. Ramchandra Dikshitar will "exploit" the Puranas more, so that not only he but also his readers may "be introduced to the culture and civilization of Ancient India".

B.

The Truth About Dreams. By M. L. COWDRY. (The Houghton Publishing Co., London. 2s. 6d.)

The author has recognized one truth about dreams, namely, that each dreamer creates his own particular symbols and analogies. Unfortunately her enthusiasm for that fact has made her overlook other more important ones, thus limiting her classification of dreams into wish-fulfilment and analogy dreams, both dealing with the activity of the ephemeral personal Consciousness. For Miss Cowdry's idea of the symbolism of dreams is simply the translation into analogies of the personal thoughts, desires and feelings, conscious or sub-conscious. The true symbolical dream, the translation of the soul experiences into terms of personal consciousness, is never considered. The interpretation of the series of dreams described, all concerned with learning music—taken to mean learning to interpret dreams—is also ingenious rather than convincing, because of the arbitrary limitation of the viewpoint adopted. Investigators will never understand the subject until they study all the aspects of man's make-up and the

various states, good and bad, of the "astral light," the memory of nature. In that invisible, interpenetrating matter is held the record of every thought, feeling and event, the images of which may impress the inner senses.

So much time and energy is spent in the West in the endeavour to discover what has already been known and systematically classified in the ancient Eastern psychology—the three planes of human consciousness, *jagrat*, waking; *svapna*, dreaming; and *sushupti*, deep sleep; and the correct methods of equilibrating the mind, so that real use may be made of those "dreams" that are soul experiences, when the remembrance of them is not obscured by the "dreaming" activity of the personal mind. The main difference between the ancient and the present day psychology is that the first considers the soul and its instrument in relation to one another, while the latter divorces the two. It tries to ignore the higher and has therefore only a disproportionate view of the lower. It is caught in its own ingenious speculation and dreaming. But some day the dreamer will have to awaken.

W. E. W.

The Religious Philosophy of Baron Von Hügel. By L. V. LESTER GARLAND. (J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., London. 5s.)

The philosophy of religion is always a more interesting subject to the lay reader than philosophy proper or metaphysics. The subject matter of both may be said to be God or Ultimate Reality. While the former starts with God-consciousness, the latter starts only with ordinary human experience. The philosophy of religion has thus an initial advantage over metaphysics. Ultimate reality is already a datum for it. Metaphysics can only reach this, if at all, through devious reasoning. But this advantage of religious philosophy involves a certain limitation of outlook. It provides no answer to the question: Is religious consciousness the consciousness of something that actually exists or of a real God? Baron Von Hügel himself is aware of the difficulty of an answer. Therefore, faced with that question, he has to admit that our knowledge of God is not clear knowledge, and that it cannot have this clearness because of the very nature of the case. He distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge, the intellectual knowledge of abstractions and the intuitive of ultimate reality. The latter, he says, is not capable of definition, because ultimate reality is indefinable. Though our knowledge of it lacks clarity, it is rich with suggestiveness. Ultimate reality in his opinion is on the one hand incomprehensible and on the other indefinitely apprehensible. It is however evident that a knowledge which admittedly lacks clearness of objective reference can never prove objective reality, or escape the charge of anthropomorphism.

Baron Von Hügel, it seems, is not afraid of this charge. He even admits a certain anthropomorphism in the apprehension of God. How could man, he asks, apprehend God if God were entirely unlike man? The image of God may therefore in a sense be said to be man-made. But that is only because "everything that is apprehended by an

apprehending being is apprehended according to the manner of this being's apprehension." It does not mean that God is no more than this image. There is a clear suggestion in our knowledge of God of what cannot be fully grasped or apprehended; and therein God is transcendent and unlike man. The question that Baron Von Hügel fails to answer is the epistemological value of this seeming suggestiveness,—Does this suggestiveness amount to knowledge of objective reality in which man has no share, or is it simply a human conceit?

Systems of Indian thought rarely attempt a proof of the reality of God. A personal God is in fact incapable of being proved. It is also a contradiction in terms; for personality is nothing if it does not involve a certain limitation. Indeed according to Von Hügel true personality must be infinite and without limitations. Human personality is imperfect just because it is finite. But he unnecessarily restricts true personality to the perfection of moral nature or the incapacity to do wrong. He does not face the metaphysical issue. To think of personality, we must think of other persons or other things, and these cannot but limit the most perfect person in so far as they have any nature of their own. We cannot give personality to God, and take away all personality from man and reality from nature. But if that is so, the most perfect god will be a finite or a limited god, which is no god that any religious consciousness will accept. Here is a great inherent contradiction of religious philosophy.

The presence of evil in the world is another source of weakness in Von Hügel's theistic philosophy. He admits that evil is something positive, active and rebellious. It is not merely the absence of good. Can we say that certain forms of evil such as pain and suffering are necessary for the attainment of good? But evidently suffering is intrinsically an evil. "If its effects are good that is not because there is anything good in suffering but because there is a power which is able to transmute it." But if that is so, how can we

reconcile the fact of evil with the idea of God as all-good and all-powerful? Von Hügel's has no answer to offer.

The truth is that there can be no philosophy of religion as apart from pure philosophy or metaphysics, unless we accept a limitation of vision which will be found ultimately to be opposed to any rational presentation of the subject. *In Indian thought, philosophy of religion has never been separated as a distinct branch of thought from general philosophy or metaphysics.* Indeed there can be a theistic metaphysic. But it will be found to lead up to an idea of god very unlike the God of the religious

man or the God that is accepted on blind faith. This book may be of use to the devout Christian for it supplies him with a scheme in conformity with his beliefs. But for the student of philosophy it clearly demonstrates the impossibility of a *philosophy* of religion based on the facts of religious life alone. What is wanted is an interpretation of the common human experience and the solution of problems it gives rise to. Religious consciousness may reinforce the conclusions thus arrived at, but it can never be itself the ground for solving ultimate questions.

G. R. MALKANI

Living Tissues in the New Testament.
By C.A. ANDERSON SCOTT (Cambridge University Press.)

The Heart of Christ's Religion. By CANON RAVEN (Longmans, London.)

Science and Religion: Broadcast Talks. By PROFESSOR HUXLEY and others. (Howe, Ltd., London. 1s. 3d.)

Dr. Anderson Scott attempts in this book to deal with a number of vital questions which are ever engaging the minds of New Testament students.

Is there, he asks, any grounds for the theory that there is a difference between the teachings of Jesus as found within the Synoptic Gospels and those of the Apostle Paul?

Carefully he summarises the essential points in the propaganda of both Master and Apostle and comes to the view of Karl Holl: "If we lay the teaching of Paul as a whole alongside the teaching of Jesus we cannot but marvel at the firmness with which Paul has grasped what was distinctive in his gospel." Says Dr. Scott,

Paul confirms the Gospel portrait of Jesus in his most essential features. He registers the experience of the living Christ as it was apprehended by the Primitive Church. He clarifies it, interprets it in the light of the Cross and the Resurrection, and confirms the reality of experience by the harvest of the spirit whether manifested in his own character or joyfully recognised by him in his fellow believers.

With this question considered and a conclusion come to, the author deals with the mystical factor in salvation which leads inevitably to the Fourth Gospel and the riddle ever associated with it. Dean Inge has said that to understand this Gospel, a knowledge of Hellenic philosophy and the teachings of Philo in particular, are necessary. There is much truth in this. Dr. Scott is apt to dismiss rather too readily the likelihood that John was influenced by Philo or that his teachings concerning rebirth indicate contact with the Orient or mystery cults of the time.

He makes a profoundly instructive comparison between the similarities, differences and divergencies of method, instruction and teaching as found within the Synoptic Gospels and the Gospel of St. John. The contention of Paul Feine is dealt with that "Paul stands on the shoulders of John," and the author finally proves there is little ground for the argument that Paul and Jesus are in conflict. John makes explicit the essential thought that inspires John's Gospel, "the oneness of the Son with the Father".

The importance of this doctrine is emphasised too by Canon Raven in his *The Heart of Christ's Religion* :—

If man is created to be the counterpart of God, he must develop to the fullest degree along that twofold path, till all mankind too

becomes a perfect unity, bound together by the perfect power of love yet possessing still within that unity, a plurality of perfect personalities. No less than this can be the ultimate goal, for it is the faith of evolution: it is the path of love: it is the Path of the Holy Spirit.

Canon Raven writes to the ordinary man while Dr. Scott's work will appeal to the scholar and student. Both books, while their appeal is different, merit consideration for both reveal the welcome tendency to get down to a discussion on points of religious belief concerning which much bewilderment and disagreement prevails.

I admire the honesty of purpose behind this book. There is no attempt to try and hide the omissions and failings of the Church in the past. The Canon readily admits a measure of the criticism directed against the Church was justified. "The Gospel of Christ" he writes, "has not been proved false but our own interpretation of it has been shown to be too narrow, too much restricted by the purely personal limitations of our own predilections."

A significant admission—and a significant book. Read in conjunction with Professor Huxley's broadcast on "Science and Religion" it becomes the more interesting, for both reveal welcome tendencies. Listen to Canon Raven:—

Every fresh discovery must be examined and tested by its aid: it must reject what is false and accidental: it must sift out what is right and true, until at last new knowledge can be fitted into its proper place in the whole fabric of accepted truth. Religion is no exception to this rule, and in forcing religion to accept this searching test of human reason rationalism fulfilled a useful purpose.

Says Professor Huxley:—

What man shall do with the new facts, new ideas, the new opportunities of control which science is showering upon him does not depend upon science, but upon what man wants to do with them: and this in turn depends upon his scale of values. It is here that religion can become the dominant factor for what religion can do is to set up a scale of values for conduct and to provide emotional or

spiritual driving force to help in getting them realised in practice.

It would seem that Professor Huxley realises the truth of Canon Raven's comments regarding the failure of agnosticism. Philosopher and priest are agreed that the bridge between science and religion is not as wide as once it seemed. The philosopher realises the purely negative attitude is not enough, the priest perceives that the dead hand of theology has hid much of the truth and beauty of religious idealism. The philosopher says the aim of mankind must be to make life more truly and more fully worth living. The priest labours to bring the Kingdom of God on earth.

They may differ regarding the way to go, but the ultimate quest and purpose is the same. To quote Professor Huxley once more:—

Religion has usually been slowly and grudgingly forced to admit new scientific ideas: if it will but accept the most vivifying of all the scientific ideas of the past century, that of the capacity of life, including human life and institutions, for progressive development, the conflict between science and religion will be over and both can join hands in advancing the great experiment of man—of assuring that he shall have life, and have it more abundantly.

It may be thought that I have quoted too freely but my keenness has been to indicate this new approach, to emphasise what leading minds of various schools of thought are saying.

These three books indicate a spirit of tolerance. Rationalist and Christian, Priest and Philosopher are perceiving the folly of the old claims that each had the only revelation of truth. They recognise now that Truth is their only revelation. Old attitudes are being abandoned. New influences are at work. Let us trust these may succeed in bringing all fields of religious idealism back to the teachings of the Primitive Church of the whole Human Race and that the truly religious spirit may become displayed more and more in the daily life of the world.

W. A. PEACOCK

A Century of Emancipation. By Sir JOHN HARRIS (J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London. 5s.)

Sir John Harris is a recognised authority on the subject of slavery. He was one of the representatives of the British Government at the Versailles Conference in 1919, and took part in the deliberations on the subject of slavery prevailing in certain parts of the world. His book, therefore, is not only authoritative but also opportune in this centenary year of the abolition of slavery by Great Britain by legal enactment.

Lecky described this act as "among the three or four perfectly virtuous acts recorded in the history of nations". But what bitter opposition the very idea of abolition aroused from powerful vested interests and also the Churches in England! Sir John Harris points this out in the first few pages of his book. The fight in Parliament for the abolition of the slave trade lasted for 18 years, and that for the emancipation of slaves for another 26 years. It does one good to read Sir John Harris's graphic and inspiring narration of how Wilberforce, Buxton and their friends carried on this great fight for nearly 45 years, until it was crowned with success.

The great measure of emancipation of 1833 led the planters to turn wistful eyes towards India, and before long the question of Indian coolie labour, as slavery in another form, came into prominence, against which Buxton had to take up the cudgels. The author says:—

Buxton began the struggle in 1837, but it took his successors in the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society nearly eighty years to reform it out of existence. Aided by the political consequences of the Great War

its abolition was at last achieved.

But can it be said that this chapter, which Sir John describes as "a not very creditable or satisfactory chapter in our colonial history," has finally closed—to the satisfaction of all concerned?

The middle portion of the book describes England's efforts to put down slavery in various disguises in various parts of the world, e.g., the terrible atrocities committed on the natives of the Congo Free State and of the Putumayo and on the African natives shipped by the Portuguese to their cocoa-producing Islands. There are lurid and heart-rending pictures showing what barbarities the "civilized" West is capable of perpetrating for the satisfaction of its greed.

One chapter deals with international efforts culminating in the Slavery Convention of the League of Nations. Sir John Harris points out that his book will fail in its purpose if it does not focus public attention on systems of oppression which are in operation to-day. There are at present 5,000,000 men and women living as slaves. In *THE ARYAN PATH* for May 1930, Sir John Harris wrote a trenchant article on "The Mui Tsai Slaves," about the dilatory policy pursued in regard to this abominable form of slavery. More than three years have elapsed since then, but it would appear that there has been no mitigation of that evil. It is pointed out that the League of Nations will succeed in its task of setting free the slaves of the world if only a real international conscience be brought into active being. There can be little doubt that Sir John Harris's admirable book will contribute materially towards that consummation.

J. P. W.

The Music of the Growth. By COLLUM, with a foreword by SIR ARTHUR KEITH. (Eric Partridge Ltd. London. 3s. 6d.)

In the course of this sincere and thoughtful book, an attempt is made to

indicate a guiding principle in life "for the plain man of action who is willing to think before he acts". The author who has lived in the Far East and searched for wisdom there, and is conversant with the latest scientific deve-

lopments of the West, considers himself competent to point out the flaw in the modern conception of life: the failure to consider life and culture as a unity still in the making, a growth towards a More. The unity of life must be grasped. The compartmental division of life into living and dead matter, into plants, minerals, animals and *homo sapiens* is both arbitrary and unsound and stands in the way of realising its unity, of having a mathematical approach to Reality. Recognition of a proper understanding of a rhythm in Nature of "alternance between the two phases of one unity, —between the positive and the negative, the male and the female, the active and the recreative element," is the need of the hour. Nearly half of the book is devoted to the maintenance of the thesis that life is a growth, is "Becoming"; copious illustrations covering three special sections clearly

exhibit the author's familiarity with the latest discoveries.

The last part enunciates the author's philosophy of life: "To grow, to progress, to move on: to move in a rhythm of delicately poised activity: to move with a frank delight,—this is the kernel of the philosophy of life founded on growth." Growth must be attuned to a pattern. It should not be erratic and aimless. Subordination to some code, some pattern, and co-ordination of impulses toward this end are necessary; and this implies an ethical code. Subordination further implies sacrifice,—the sacrifice of individual aberrations to the common achievement of the ideal. Growth presupposes fitness of body and mind. The author says that in his philosophy of growth there can be but one motive for doing right and that is the desire to do right because it is right. It is not the journey's end that delights the adventuring heart of mankind; but the voyaging.

B. N. KRISHNAMURTI SARMA

Moral Laws. By EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN. (The Abingdon Press, New York. \$2.50.)

There are all sorts of theories about morals. There is, for instance, the Aristotelian theory, holding the good life to be that in which man's powers come to the fullest and most harmonious development. There is the epicurean theory claiming pleasure as the supreme good, which is unsatisfying, as Dr. Brightman points out, not because pleasure is a low ideal, but because it is too vague a definition of value. There is the Christian theory which stresses love and sacrifice, and the Kantian theory, holding that morality is a matter of the will itself, not of the success of the will in attaining its ends. There are all sorts of theories, but there is little "law and order". The science of ethics, says Dr. Brightman, is in a very unsatisfactory state—not for lack of interest, but for lack of scientific approach:—

We have plenty of practical application, without clear ideas of the principles that ought to be applied, . . . plenty of information

about the *mores* of primitive man, but little light on the duties of civilised man, plenty of isolated studies about special problems of morality, united by no common laws into a genuine science.

There are two kinds of sciences, the purely descriptive, and the discriminating or "normative" sciences that try to determine standards. Since ethics tries to discover the *best types* of voluntary human behaviour it is "the normative science of morals—or of the principles or laws of the best types of human conduct". In this definition are embedded three basic concepts—law, value, and obligation. All human beings compare and choose and decide that at least some moments of life are worth living. Hence they can say: "I value." All have a sense of duty (though of greatly varying delicacy)—all say some times at least: "I ought." And from a sense of values and duties, all come to some generalizations—within them is born the germ of recognition of moral laws.

And what is a moral law? It is "a

universal principle to which the will of man ought to conform in its choices." Every code is subject to its criticism. It is underpinned by logical law, the base of all laws, without which "the mind would be in a perpetual whirling chaos". Dr. Brightman indeed holds that the good life is the only *rational* life, and stresses the importance of knowledge in morality, though careful to state that knowledge alone is not virtue. "Compulsory education," he says, "comes much nearer than does constitutional prohibition to a direct attempt on the part of the legislative power to control the moral life." His first and basic moral law is the "Logical Law"—that all persons ought to will logically, *i. e.* be

consistent with their own intentions. Thence he proceeds to build—or rather, to reveal—a whole delicately interlocked structure of laws for leading the "best possible" life, and shows how the words "best possible" in themselves demand as much knowledge and judgment as a man may ever possess.

Here is a fresh and effective method of attack. Dr. Brightman turns the the X-ray of logic upon his dense and complex field of observation to good purpose, and describes the skeleton thus illumined in straightforward, vigorous prose. This is a significant contribution to a subject that will never cease to hold men in thrall.

HELEN BRYANT

A Scholar's Testament: Meditations of Adolf Von Harnack. Translated from the German. (Ivor Nicholson and Watson Ltd., London. 6s.)

The Sermon on the Mount: An Interpretation. By PEKKA ERVAST. Translated from the Finnish. (T. P. H. London.)

The first author, a reputed German scholar and religious leader of Europe, faces with orthodox fervour the problems that confront the modern interpretation of Christianity. The second, a Finn, gives a liberal exposition of the teaching of Christ by a comparative study of texts in different languages. The authors, especially the former, are predisposed to their professed creed, and therefore have not been able to bring out the latent universality of Christian doctrines. The light of the Upanishads and the Sermons of Buddha would deepen their understandings. The Christ was an Oriental, and his teachings would be better understood in the light of the wisdom of the East. Pekka Ervast has, however, shown in his interpretation, both historically and logically, that the Eastern doctrines of Karma and Reincarnation are implied in the

Sermon on the Mount. He says that during the first centuries the doctrines were accepted by various Christian sects and that later they were condemned as "dangerous" heresy, specially by the Synod of Constantinople convened by the Emperor Justinian in 553 A.D.; they were also anathematised by the medieval clergy in their councils.

Von Harnack has very wrongly condemned pantheism and deism. In his opinion Christian Theism alone can "satisfy a soul with deep inward aspiration". It is a pity that a learned Divine like Harnack misunderstands the Indian doctrines. The strength of a religion lies not in its crude narrowness; Christ's teachings are in reality synthetic but they have not been so far interpreted in such an universal way; for the first time, it was H. P. Blavatsky who showed this; she was iconoclastic in her *Isis Unveiled*, but as logically constructive in her *Esoteric Character of the Gospels*. Christianity will shed unforeseen lustre when it will be explained in the light of Indian wisdom. This is perhaps the greatest task before the Christians in the new age.

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

The Psychological Teaching of St. Augustine. By JAMES MORGAN, D. D. (Elliot Stock, London.)

In the belief that St. Augustine accomplished for Christian psychology what Athanasius achieved for Christian metaphysics, and that it is on psychological problems that St. Augustine has shed most light, (p. 21 Introduction), Dr. J. Morgan has reconstructed the psychological teachings of that saint. Tracing the influence on St. Augustine's mind of ancient writers, the teaching of St. Paul and of Manichæism, in the first three chapters, and indicating the substance of some of the important works and writings of his, in the fourth chapter, Dr. Morgan has summed up, in the fifth, St. Augustine's teaching "on the human soul". The *vexata quæstio* of the Freedom of Will, the Epistemology of St. Augustine, belief in and proofs for the existence of God are examined in the next three chapters. The concluding chapter is devoted to a record of the author's reflections on the psychological teachings of St. Augustine.

Dr. Morgan has done well in emphasizing that the most remarkable contribution of St. Augustine to Christian philosophy is the doctrine that the human soul is "spiritual in nature" (p. 142). St. Augustine was both a theologian and a philosopher. He championed the teaching of the Church as a theologian and systematised speculative concepts and theories and undertook a thinking consideration of men and things as a philosopher.

Though Dr. Morgan writes in the spirit of enthusiastic championship of the psychological teachings of St. Augustine, he has not succeeded in scientifically substantiating all the claims he makes on behalf of those teachings. I shall mention two crucial instances in support of my contention.

(1) When Dr. Morgan remarks that "The Western type of thought was superior in its psychological aspect, to that of the East" (p. 18), he shoots very obviously wide of the mark. The spiritual or non-corporeal character of the soul is a concept as old as the Vedas

and the Upanishads. When St. Augustine struggles hard to explain the exact relation between the soul and the body and to solve the problem—"why has the soul a body?", and when he asserts that the soul "although it is created in time, will not perish in time" (p. 131), one must feel rather formidable difficulties in maintaining that his teachings contain anticipations of modern psychological doctrines. Creation, according to the Vedanta is not a *de novo* origination. It is just an encasement of the spirit within a nervous mechanism. When did the first encasement of the first spirit occur? It is *anādi*, beginningless in time.

(2) St. Augustine's doctrine of Free-will and the stress he lays on "divine direction of the will" (p. 163) have not been psychologically and philosophically dovetailed into a consistent system. If God directs our first thoughts, there is no reason why He does not direct subsequent movements of thought as well. The existence of Evil has to be accounted for. It is unphilosophical to dismiss it as an illusion or mere appearance. Modern scientific determinism which governs psychology will explain freedom of will and all willed activity or exercising of volitions as responses to environmental or situational demands. There could hardly be any anticipations of a view like this in St. Augustine's psychology.

When, however, Dr. Morgan asks one to believe that "St. Augustine anticipated modern thought so far as to formulate his ideas on the subject of psycho-analysis" (p. 177) he makes an extravagant demand, which in the light of actual and uncontroverted facts is impossible to grant. The psycho-analytic emphasis on unconscious urges, and the free-play allowed to them, and their inhibitions by considerations of social opinion *ad hoc*, could easily be seen to have as little in common with the doctrines of St. Augustine as Einsteinian Relativity with Cartesian Mathematics.

Whether or not one is able to detect in St. Augustine's works anticipations of modern methods and psycho-analysis, one can realise from a study of Dr. Mor-

gan's fine work that St. Augustine has his permanent place in the sun as a powerful personality living and advocating a life of love and peace, in whom there was a happy and harmonious combination of three constituent elements of rationalized Religion—"the personal, the institutional, and the intellectual". Christians and non-Chris-

tians owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Morgan for his illuminating exposition of the psychological teachings of St. Augustine who prayed—"Hear me, hear me, hear me, my God, my Lord, my King, my Father, my creator, my hope, my possession, my glory, my home, my country, my salvation, my light, my life."

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

The Book of the Gradual Sayings. Volume II ("The Book of the Fours"). Translated By F. L. WOODWARD M. A., with an Introduction by MRS. RHYS DAVIDS (Oxford University Press, for the Pali Society. 10s.)

This is the second volume of an entirely new translation of the *Anguttara Nikaya*, one of the oldest portions of the Pali Canon, and therefore valuable as providing the best record available of the Master's *ipsissima verba*.

In a scholarly and provocative Introduction, Mrs. Rhys Davids stresses the evidence of "editorial handling," and comments on the constantly recurring feature of parallel versions of certain passages, but her analysis of the process by which this comes about probably describes the way in which the great proportion of scriptural change occurs. She says:—

If we bear in mind that the teaching was for centuries purely oral, and handed on by repeaters located at centres increasingly distant . . . , the inevitableness of differing versions becomes obvious. Let us now see in the teaching a system of a mantra or text in fixed wording, with exposition of it left to the more or less freely spoken comment of the teacher; the case is strengthened. Let us finally see creeping in . . . a partial forgetting of the episode which may have led to the mantra being uttered, with the making good, at some later date of revising under much changed conditions, and our meeting with inconsistencies and improbabilities is accounted for, if not explained.

The value of the present volume is that it represents a transition from the

presumably purer teaching of the earliest period to the system, claimed by Mrs. Rhys Davids as purely monk-made, which later earned the name of Buddhism. All too soon "ideals are sought in negation, in riddance, in avoidance," instead of in that expansion of consciousness which is the measure of spiritual growth. In the early writings we hear much of the Self and little of the not-self; in later days we read of nothing but the evils of the not-self, and mention of the Self appears almost as an oversight from the erasing tendencies of later and misguided minds. Rightly does the writer say that "where your man is a vigorous growing sprig of the Divinely Real, you do well to weed the bed around him. But where there is no such slowly expanding long-lived plant, it follows that weeding becomes the chief, nay, the only task." As she points out later in this interesting Introduction, and her words cannot be repeated too loudly for modern Buddhist ears:—

The *original anatta* teaching is only a denying of what a man might wrongly hold to be the self—surely a very different thing from denying his reality. Seeking the master among the staff you may say to each servant: "You are not he!" without meaning: "You have no master".

Long may this admirable combination of translator and introducer work together in the interests of an increased understanding of the Message of the All-Enlightened One.

CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS

MY NOTE BOOK

[A. R. Orage has the advantages of one who has educated himself, and therefore is not hindered by old moulds of thought; he used his vision and imagination in the past in editing *The New Era*, and is doing so now as Editor of *The New English Weekly*. THE ARYAN PATH will publish every quarter a few pages of his "Note Book"; in this first instalment, Mr. Orage writes about the ancient culture of India and its influence in the modern world. This theme is very near to our own meditations; we are labouring to restore the use of the forgotten and the abandoned highway—the Aryan Path. Mr. Orage uses the term Aryan in a true sense and it must not be confused with ignominies of the Nazis in Germany who claim for their barbarities the backing of Aryan culture.—EDS.]

It is certainly not with any chauvinist intention that I would stress the Aryanism of India. But in matters of cultural values, words and their association are very nearly all important; and it is of great advantage that in their first presentation a set of values should be described by a name already in good repute. The auspices under which Indian culture has hitherto been presented to the world have not, on a candid examination, been particularly favourable. Forbid that I should under-rate the labours of scholars, Indian and European, in the field of literary research, textual editing, and of painstaking translation. My criticism is that from the very start—with extremely rare exceptions—the scholars on both sides, Indian and European alike, have largely failed to *communicate* the spirit of the originals so as at once to be assimilable to the common understanding of both peoples. And the reason for this failure, I believe, is to be found in the fact that Indians failed to claim and assume common Aryan values, while Europeans in general paid only lip

homage to the community of racial ancestry.

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From this initial error of policy a number of misunderstandings have arisen, the chief being the colossally false assumption that a gulf, practically impassable to the ordinary intelligence, exists between the two cultures Indian and European. It has been allowed to be assumed that somehow or other Aryan India differs so profoundly from Aryan Europe that only the rarest circumstances could breed in either an intelligence that could perfectly understand the other. So totally different was their essence as well as their development and history that virtually the two cultures were as materially alien as the cultures of two different planets, differing from each other not in degree or colour or form only, but in kind and species. It is absolutely necessary, in my judgment, to protest in the name of our common race against this unwarranted assumption. I will allow that it is difficult for the modern mind of any race to ap-

preciate, say, ancient Egyptian culture as the Egyptians themselves lived and felt it. I will agree that even the cultures of the real Orient—China and further Asia—are less readily assimilable by the Aryan mind, Indian no less than European, than, say, the cultures of ancient Greece and ancient Rome. But I simply cannot admit that the Indian and European cultures are foreign to each other; or that, in essence, they radically differ. The difference that has been made to appear radical—to the infinite loss of both communities—is the work of bad translators, and, at bottom, of bad Aryans.

* * *

It has often been remarked that the influence of the Bible upon any given people depends upon the quality of the translation in which it is presented to them. Let it be imagined that the Greek and Roman literatures when they were revived in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries had been first selected, and then translated and presented to Europe, by pedants, with footnotes leagues long and with scholia heaped upon scholia. It is inconceivable that in these circumstances any Renaissance of Humanism would have sprung out of them. They would have been *there*, of course; and a few scholars would have made a profession of reading them; but their assimilation and fructification in the culture of Europe would have been completely frustrated. With the greatest possible respect to

Max Müller, I suggest that that is precisely what he did for Indian culture when he introduced it to the European world some fifty or sixty years ago. In the first place, his selection of literature for translation was arbitrary and misleading; and, secondly, the *style* of his translations, their form and appearance, were calculated to give the impression that Indian culture is exotic to the European mind and, if not entirely without common roots, at least so different in development that virtually it was of another species. It is necessary, I repeat, to protest against this attitude and to change it for the correct attitude. *Except* in inessentials, which it is the work of humane scholarship to smooth down by *creative translation*, there is nothing in Indian culture beyond European understanding to appropriate any more than there is anything in European culture not assimilable by Indian understanding. The Aryan Indian has the advantage over the Aryan European in the exchange of cultures from the simple fact that, as a rule, the Aryan Indian reads European languages as well as his own. On the other hand, the Aryan European must, as a rule, depend upon translation for his contact with Aryan Indian culture. But this only strengthens the need for better translations and in no sense implies any other incommunicability than deficiency of language.

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My own special fields are lite-

rature and psychology, and in each of these I can truthfully say that not only have I had, and still have, much to learn from Indian culture; but, after proper translation, I have encountered no *idea* in either field in Indian culture that is not completely intelligible to me. The frame of reference, so to say, of Indian culture in these two fields, is identical with their frame of reference in my European mind. Let it be granted that in respect of colour, in respect of attitude, in respect of the distribution of stresses and relative values, the differences between Indian and European literature and psychology are considerable. They are not much greater than the differences already bridged between, let us say, French and English or Russian and Spanish cultures; and in any case their standards are common. Given (once again) a common language in which to discuss, I should not find it the least more difficult to apprehend, if not to comprehend, the principles of literature and psychology as understood by the best representatives of Indian culture, than to apprehend or comprehend the principles of ancient Greek or contemporary Latin culture. And always, when I find any difficulty at all that is not due simply to my stupidity, it is due to the inadequacy of translation. Either I have failed to divine the meaning through the gloss of the translation, or the translator has himself failed to convey it. The fault is not in an essential of un-

derstanding, but in an inessential, and therefore remediable, misunderstanding.

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In subsequent Notes I hope to have the opportunity of comparing the principles of literature as exemplified in the two cultures, using, as my main Indian exemplar, what I regard as the greatest literary creation this world has ever seen, the "Mahabharata". Europe, I assert, has not even got to the beginning of the realisation of the literary greatness of this astounding work of art. I hope also, in my other field of psychology, to make a comparison, in due course, and in simple European terms, between some at least of the most representative Indian theories of psychology and those of Europe,—including, for this purpose, America, and with particular reference to the work of my friend, Professor C. Daly King, whose *The Psychology of Consciousness*, was published in the "International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method" a few years ago. Here in this work, if I am not totally mistaken, Indian and European psychology meet on the common ground of reason and science. Without claiming for one moment that Sankara and Professor Daly King are of the same rank in respect of their attainments in psychology, it is nevertheless my opinion that in essence they are of the same school. And that

school, I contend, is our common Aryan school.

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In the meantime I must remark that the misunderstanding already referred to has invaded every field of our common culture. All respect again to men like my friend, Coomaraswamy, Professor Havell, Mr. Laurence Binyon, and now the latest writer on the subject of "Hindu (why not Indian?) Art"—Mr. Mulk Rai Anand*—I cannot allow that the difference between Indian and European æsthetic is *radical*. Mr. Binyon, for example, says that "from the point of view of the Indian artist the religious import was everything—design, colour, composition, all the purely æsthetic elements of their work being left to the more intuitive activities of the mind". Mr. Coomaraswamy says, again, that the Indians never valued their works of art purely as works of art, and had, in fact, no intelligible philosophy of beauty. And Mr. Ananda, in his very able book, embroiders exclusively on the theme that Indian art is "sacred," "hieratic," and in no sense identical with the "art" of Europe. Is not the misunderstanding here the misunderstanding noted before of confusing subject with form and particularly of stressing inessential differences? I challenge the assertion that Indian æsthetic is or ever has been any more "religious" or "hieratic" than many schools of European art. Because in a con-

siderable number of instances the religious *motif* has predominated in Indian works of art, it does not follow that art has been subordinated to religion, though used in its service, and, still less, that design, colour, composition and so forth were left to the merely intuitive activities of the mind. There may not exist, as Mr. Coomaraswamy alleges, any formal treatise in Indian literature on Æsthetic apart from the relation of Art to Religion—though I fancy even this statement is incorrect. But it is absolutely certain that a theory of Æsthetic was the common possession of Indian culture of the fifth century, from the single fact that *Rasa*, "the delight experienced through a work of art," was a term in common use. This "delight" or "*rasa*," it is obvious, was something different from the emotions evoked by the religious associations of the object. It was the purely æsthetic whether in or not in conjunction with the religious. Sri Krishna referred to it when he said "The splendour of splendid things am I"; and even if it was not invariably or even often cultivated for its own sake (that is to say, as a delight without other associations,) it was not because it was not understood as pure æsthetic, but simply because, as a rule, its association with religion was commissioned—as it was in early mediæval European art!

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Nobody less than I would wish

* *The Hindu View of Art* by Mulk Rai Anand, with an introductory *Essay on Art and Reality* by Eric Gill. (George Allen and Unwin, London, 8s. 6d.)

to deny to Indian culture its religious richness. Exactly as elsewhere, all forms of culture developed in India originally under the patronage and from the trunk of the religious emotion. More powerfully than elsewhere the religious emotion in India persisted and remained predominant among its offspring for a thousand years and more. But to deny that side by side with and under the wing of religion, as it were, pure æsthetic remained either unknown or uncultivated, is not only to fall into the old misunderstanding of regarding India as a land of priests but to leave no possible explanation of

the marvellous development of the secular forms of art in poetry, drama, the dance, music, architecture and sculpture. If it is possible for Europeans to separate the motive of the Gothic Cathedrals from the art that went to their building, it should be equally possible to separate Indian æsthetic from Indian religion. Writing with the privilege of a diarist I make the prediction that when Indian religion has resolved like a nebula into its various suns—philosophy, science, psychology—one of its most resplendent suns will prove to be Indian æsthetics.

A. R. ORAGE

[Mr. Orage closes the above with a prediction about Indian æsthetics; to him and to others of his way of thinking the following article will make a special appeal and it is opportune.—EDS.]

ÆSTHETICS IN INDIA

Bhava—Rasa—Dhvani
Emotion—Taste—Expression

[This article by M. A. Venkata Rao, M. A., of the department of Philosophy in the Mysore University, shows that the statement current among western scholars that "æsthetics is a modern science" is not correct. Modern knowledge of several subjects could be advantageously amplified and substantiated by the aid of old Eastern culture, and among these is the science of Æsthetics. —EDS.]

There is a suggestive approach between the leading ideas of current æsthetic theories in the West and the central principles of Indian æsthetic speculation. Indian æsthetics took a definite and coherent shape about a thousand

years ago with the great work of Anandavardhana (IXth. century A. D.) and his commentator Abhinavagupta (Xth. century A. D.), who may be called respectively the Plato and Aristotle of Indian Poetics. The ideas of

Bhāva, Rasa and Dhvani are the chief ingredients of the theory established by them.

Bhava : Psychological Foundation. From the days of Bharata, in the beginnings of the Christian era, the Indian theory of art has founded itself on a clear analysis of sentiment. विभावानुभावव्यभिचारि-संयोगाद्रसनिष्पत्तिः has been the *mahavakya* of Bharata, the seed-concept, which has inspired and guided all later thought. It lays down the proposition (*sutra*) that æsthetic experience (*rasa*) is born of the blend of *vibhava*, *anubhava* and *vyabhichāribhava*. Emotion (*bhāva*) is regarded as an active state of mind in which an innate psychological disposition (*vāsanā*) is called into play by a specific stimulus. Such specific stimulus is called *vibhāva*, and the physical manifestations it gives rise to are called *anubhāvas*. Stimuli (*vibhāvas*) are either central (*ālambana*) or accessory (*uddīpana*).

Let us take an example to understand these terms: A girl in a meadow:—the girl is the central stimulus (*ālambana vibhāva*); sex feeling (*rati*) is the emotion (*bhāva*) evoked; the surrounding atmosphere of the song of birds, the ripple of stream, the fragrance of flowers constitute the accessory factors (*uddīpana vibhāvas*) which heighten the central feeling. Further, these emotions are distinguished into *sthāyibhāvas* and *vyabhichāribhāvas*. *Sthāyibhāva* is the major emotion co-present with the specific stimulus. *Vyabhichāribhāva* corresponds to what Dr. McDougall

calls Derived Emotion. In the example, the hope of engaging the girl in conversation, pleasure if it is realised, disappointment if it is frustrated, and all the changing waves of feeling arising out of the same foundational emotion would constitute *vyabhichāri* or *sanchāribhāvas*. These are emotions within an emotion lasting just as long as the stimulus *vibhāva* lasts. *Anubhāvas* or physical expressions are distinguished into those amenable to our control such as facial movement, general posture of the body etc., and reflexes like tears, blushes, rigidity, palpitation etc., which are largely beyond our control.

The entire emotional life of man is explained on the basis of nine fundamental emotional dispositions (*sthāyibhāvas*):—

Rati	—	Sex
Hāsa	—	Laughter
Śoka	—	Sorrow
Krodha	—	Anger
Utsāha	—	Elation
Bhaya	—	Fear
Jugupsa	—	Disgust
Vismaya	—	Wonder
Śama	—	Peace

Dr. McDougall has expounded a similar classification though he has not utilised it for an æsthetic theory. Fear, anger, positive self-feeling, negative self-feeling, laughter, disgust, tender emotion, wonder and lust is his list. The only omission is peace (*śama*). Perhaps the West cannot think of peace as a fundamental ingredient of the human soul! It is obvious that this theory of emotion is substantially identical with the widely-accepted

views of McDougall. The close association of instinct (*vāsana*) with emotion, the ideas of major and derived emotions, the linking of specific emotions with specific types of stimuli and even the classification of the fundamental drives of human nature constitute remarkable parallels. In many respects, the Indian analysis is more comprehensive; for example, thirty three types of derived emotions are described. The Greek idea popularised by Matthew Arnold that poetry should deal with the permanent or essential feelings of mankind has been incorporated in this analysis from the beginnings of Indian *alankāra sāstra*.

Now in literature (*kāvya*), the poet evokes emotions in us by the skilful presentation of *vibhāva*, *vyabhichāribhāvas* and *anubhāvas*. In witnessing the drama of Shakuntala, we see the play and counterplay of emotion in Dushyanta and Shakuntala aroused by the presentation of appropriate situations and expressed by the skill of the actors, to which ensemble we respond with appreciation (*rasa*).

Rasa: Æsthetic Experience. Emotion, as such, is only the stuff or material of art. For, all expression of feeling is not art, else every pang of grief would be tragedy and every outburst of laughter would be comedy. The "magic" of art is necessary before emotion (*bhāva*) can be transformed to æsthetic appreciation (*rasa*). The word *rasa* has rich associations in Indian philosophy. Literally it means

sap, and also any object which can be tasted. It has come to connote the essence of life. In the *Taittiriya Upanishad* it is identified with Brahman itself (रसो वै सः) Hence its significance as æsthetic emotion must be understood against this background if its full reach is to be realised.

In modern European philosophy, the principles of the æsthetic theory laid down by Kant have remained the framework of thought to the present day. He formulated four principles distinguishing æsthetic from other kinds of judgment. They are:—(1) the *moment of disinterestedness*; (2) the *moment of universality*; (3) the *moment of finality*, and (4) the *moment of necessity*. It is remarkable that all these ideas should be included in the Indian treatment of *rasa*. Disinterestedness refers to the detachment from personal pre-occupations brought about by all genuine art. We are lifted out of ourselves into a serene world. The cycle of ignorance, self-interest and activity (*avidya, kama* and *karma*) in which our ordinary life is lived is broken into for the time being and we are introduced into a *unique form* of experience different from the usual (*aloukika*). *Rasa* thus liberates us from self. Abhinavagupta brings out the essentially transcendental character of artistic experience by his demonstration that it is neither caused by the emotions depicted in poetry nor is it a product of memory. *Rasa* is neither effect (*kārya*) nor reminder (*jnyāpya*).

The world of beauty is *sui generis*. As Mammata, a later systematiser, puts it, it is a form of experience which transcends the distinctions of friend, enemy and neutral and which presents objects for contemplation free from their usual effects of attraction and aversion—in a word, free from all personal reference. Passing on to the next “moment” of Kant, his universality is the exact equivalent of *sādharaṇīkarana*, a process which expresses the mysterious work of the poet (*kāvīkarmān*). Art embodies a principle of universalisation. *All things which arouse emotions are not things of beauty*. The skill (*chamatkāra*) of the poet is necessary before they can enter the world of art. Otherwise, as Bosanquet points out in criticism of Croce, an old travelling portmanteau should be considered a product of art because of the happy reminiscences it may evoke in its owner. It is not art because it has no power of arousing the same emotions in all people.

All great products of genius rise above local colour and appeal to all times and peoples. The *Shakuntala* of Kalidasa is as deeply universal as it is Indian. As S. Alexander points out, the idea of the concrete universal expresses the deepest truth in art, if not in philosophy. Universality does not mean only common attributes with the differences left out. It points to the innermost core of reality working outward into a whole world of quality and relation. Hence it is that the

deeper a man goes into himself, the more *cosmic* becomes his vision. Hence it is that great art is universal in appeal. The recitation of the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* holds spell-bound the most miscellaneous of audiences, consisting of men, women and children, of all ages and all degrees of culture and education. The “moment” of necessity expounded by Kant adds no new principle but only gives a reason for universality by grounding it in the inward constitution of human nature. The appeal of beauty is not accidental but flows from the necessary basis of the human heart. Mammata refers to this aspect of the matter by his phrase *sakalahridaya samvāda*, the power of entering all hearts. The “moment” of finality is an important element of artistic experience. It is delineated with great fulness in the *dhvani* school of writers. It indicates the fact that art is an end itself, *svayamprayōjana*, *chārvaṇīkasārah*, *rasyamānah* etc. It is not a means to anything else. It is a form of creative joy characterised by complete forgetfulness of self and absorption in what Abercrombie calls “pure experience”. “We are laid asleep in body and become a living soul,” in the words of Wordsworth. Just as in the tasting of soup (*panaka rasa*) the taste of individual ingredients is lost in one mass of homogeneous savour and relish, a myriad detail of image and circumstance gives rise to an undifferentiated experience of joy

ineffable, suggesting Joy Divine (*Brahmānanda*) itself. The integral character of the experience is brought out by the phrase *akhandabuddhigrāhya*, and its immediacy is compared to the self's awareness of itself, *svākār-aiva abhinnopi gôcharîkritah*. But lest we should mistake æsthetic emotion to be a form of mere blind feeling, it is pointed out that it is a form of perceiving, of knowing, *avabôdharupiiva, svay-ambôdharupiiva, jnanantarêbhyo, vilaxanaiva*. This is what Croce means by saying that intuition is a form of knowledge "having excellent eyes of her own". Thus *Rasa* becomes the soul and substance of poetry and all art—*Vāk-yam Rasātmakam Kāvya*m. Corresponding to the nine emotions or *sthayibhāvas* emerge nine *rasas* or types of æsthetic experience. Poetry strove to appeal to all these potent moods and came to be judged in the light of its success in realising this aim.

Dhvani: the Theory of Suggestion. The theory of *dhvani* explains the form of expression of art. If *rasa* corresponds to the intuition of Croce and the "pure experience" of Lascelles Abercrombie, *dhvani* recalls their theory of expression. It draws inspiration from the old grammatical philosophy of *sphota*. The *sphota* theory had held that every word is the echo or expression of a transcendental pattern of sound-significance. Every word has three kinds of meaning (*artha*). (1) *abhidhā* or denotative meaning, (2) *lakshana* or indicative or

metaphorical, secondary significance, (3) *vyanjana* or suggested meaning in its widest sense through emotion and association of ideas. In the traditional example, "the hamlet in the Ganges" (*Gangāyām ghôshah*) the *abhidhā* is the literal meaning. But it is unlikely that a village should be situated *in the midst of a river*. Therefore the mind travels to the secondary meaning (*lakshyārtha*)—the *hamlet on the banks of the Ganges*. All figurative meaning is included under this head. But emotion cannot be directly expressed in words. These two meanings are too feeble to transfer or communicate the nuances and shades of emotional life. This function is fulfilled by power of suggestion (*vyangyārtha*). In our example, the word *Gangāyām* suggests coolness and sanctity. This is *dhvani*. Forms of literature in which the wings of suggestive expression are the principal carriers of significance, are superior to those in which "realism" and literalness predominate.

Suggestion is of three kinds according to what it brings before the mind. If it brings a picture, it is substance-suggestion—*vastuvyangya*; if it draws attention to fancy or ornament, it is *alamkaravyangya*; if it communicates an emotional mood by a kind of ineffable "induction," it is *rasa-dhvani*. Poetry includes all three types of *dhvani* though Abhinavagupta is inclined to insist that even description and fancy must induce some feeling before they can be called poetic

—*Rasa eva vastutah atmavast-valamkāra dhvanitu sarvatha rasam pratiparyavasete.* This theory of suggestion, ancient as it is, includes all the results of psychological analysis “of the meaning of meaning” by I. A. Richards and others, and its utilisation for literary criticism by Abercrombie and others. The approach between the two is clear in the following citations. “A statement may be used for the sake of the reference true or false, which it causes. This is the *scientific use of language* (*vachyārtha*). But it may also be used for the sake of the effects in emotion and attitude. This is the *emotive use of language*”—(*vyangya*), cf. Richards’ *Principles of Literary Criticism* p. 267. Abercrombie in his book of the same name in the the Outline Series almost hits upon the *sphota-dhvani* sense of meaning itself:—

As the medium of literary art, the communicative power of language is of four main kinds. 1. *The syntax of the sense*, 2. *the rhythm of the sound*, 3. *the imaginative value of the sound* and 4. *the syllabic quality of the sound*..... Literary art will always be in some

degree suggestion. (39–42).

The *mode* of suggestion is the secret of the creative artist (*kavikarmān*). When Homer describes the anguish of the dying hero on the plains of Troy in the single sentence “He saw Argos and died,” the suggested sense is overwhelming in its pathos, which would only have been weakened by direct description. This is the strength of the true classical style-economy and power. The romanticist’s criticism of the eighteenth century poetry in England and the whole controversy regarding “poetic diction” turns round this suggestive function of poetic language. The matter had been settled on Indian soil centuries ago by the *dhvani* school of poet-ics. Thus the Indian school of *rasa-dhvani* has gone thoroughly into the delineation and analysis of æsthetic experience and has constructed a coherent theory without the subjectivist metaphysical implications of Kant and Croce, and free from the anti-philosophical prejudice of psychologists like I. A. Richards and C. K. Ogden.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

CORRESPONDENCE

LEAVE AND PENSION RULES IN OLD INDIA

[Sri Ram Sharma is Professor of History and Political Science in D. A. V. College, Lahore.—EDS.]

The Sukra Niti (Chapter II, Lines 819 to 835) lays down what may be described as civil service regulations—salary, leave, pension, provident fund and bonus. Many of these modern practices in these matters were anticipated by this author.

Casual Leave:—"The king should give the servant fifteen days a year respite from work." Now this fortnight of leave is certainly over and above the regular holidays, for fairs and festivals were celebrated by all, masters and servants, the king and his officials. This provision does not compare unfavourably with modern practice.

Sick Leave:—"He should pay a quarter less than the usual remuneration to the diseased servant, pay three months' wages to the servant who has served for five years, six months' wages to the servant who has long been ill. And if the diseased be highly qualified he should have half the wages. Nothing should be deducted from the full remuneration of a servant who has been ill for half a fortnight. And a substitute should be taken of one who has lived for even one year."

Analysis yields elaborate results. To take the case of one who has served for a year only and is obviously a temporary hand, the law lays down that he is to be given the option of providing a suitable substitute for his work. Naturally this would mean that he would be allowed his full pay for the period for which his substitute was accepted. Of course the royal servant had to pay the substitute himself. Thus he was assured of return to duty on getting well as also the difference between his pay and the allowance he paid to his substitute.

Then the case of one whose period of service was more than a year but less

than five years. He was to be paid three fourths of his salary as sick leave allowance, for—as the following provision shows—not more than three months. But if his period of illness did not exceed "half a fortnight" he was to be paid his full salary. After five years' service a servant was entitled to more consideration. He was allowed three months' sick leave on full pay. This could be increased to six months, presumably according to the length of service.

It seems to have been felt that for a long illness, the State could not be expected to pay its servants' salaries. But even then an exception was made. An expert could be given sick leave for more than six months on "half the wages".

Was any provision made for retaining in service those who fell and remained ill for a period for which they were not entitled to full or even half pay? Our text is silent on the point. But reading between the lines we conclude that probably the provision for accepting substitutes was not confined to those alone who had served for a year. All servants, it seems, could get leave on providing acceptable substitutes. Of course this must have placed a good deal of power in the hands of those who had to pronounce on the acceptability of the substitutes.

Pension Rules:—"The king should grant half the wages without work to the man who has passed forty years in his service for life, and to the son, if minor or incapable, half the wages, or to the wife and well behaved daughters."

This means that the period of active service for a civil servant was forty years, after which he would retire on a pension equal to half his salary. Pre-

sumably when he died his minor son would receive the same pension till he came of age. If he had no son, his wife and daughters would be provided for in the same fashion.

Now this provision is more liberal than modern pension rules though it demanded a larger period of active service. But this is not all. While in service the employee received "one eighth of the salary by way of reward every year". Thus modern provident fund rules were anticipated in India centuries ago.

Another rule makes provision for those who had the ill fortune to die in harness. Their sons as long as they were minor received the same salary. But when the sons were of age, they were admitted to the service, salaries according to qualifications. Of course our author is silent as to what was to happen in the case of those servants who had no sons. But combining this with the provision for pension we may hazard the guess that probably the same benefit was extended to wife and daughters in this matter also.

It may be objected that there is nothing to prove that these rules of the text book were ever put into practice. But we must remember the writers on the Niti and other legal codes did not usually write for entertainment or instruction of their readers but with a view to guide particular administrators. Thus the maxims of these writers reflect the ideal if not the actual practice of their times, and further it is reasonable to suppose that in time these ideals were translated into practice. Even as ideals these rules come very near to modern practice, and the Hindus may well take pride in the fact that, some two thousand years ago, their writers on administration, if not the administrators themselves, laid down such liberal rules in the matter of leave, made provision for a provident fund to be contributed by the State, allowed pensions on a rather liberal scale and, last though not the least, made arrangements for the dependents of those who had the misfortune to die while on duty.

Lahore

SRI RAM SHARMA

THE SUFIS AND REINCARNATION

Do the Sufis believe in reincarnation? This is the interesting question raised in two recent articles in THE ARYAN PATH. Dr. Margaret Smith says in the January number that Islam looks upon reincarnation as a heresy and that the Sufis reject the idea altogether. In the June number Mr. R. A. L. Armstrong cites this definite denial and then proceeds to qualify it on the authority of a "Sufi Sheikh of exceptional powers". This rather subtle qualification amounts to a paradox, at least in the eyes of the average reader who can lay no claim to inner illumination or spiritual insight. To put the Sheikh's considered opinion in Mr. Armstrong's own words: "The mass of men reincarnate; hence roughly, the doctrine of reincarnation is true." And yet, "the *soul itself*, according to the Sufis, can never reincarnate. The personality returns, perhaps: impressed on another soul. But the soul itself, in

its journey from Heaven, through Earth to Heaven again, touches the earth-plane once and once only."

One cannot say if the Sheikh's doctrine of the return of the "personality," and not the soul, has anything to do with the doctrine of the mystical identity of the Sufi Master (Sheikh) with the Logos, as described in Professor R. A. Nicholson's study of a treatise on the "Perfect Man" by al-Jili, a Sufi doctor of the 14th century. It will be seen there that the doctrine is advanced in order to rationalise the esoteric Sufi (and also Shia', whether Ismaili or Fatimite,) belief that the living head of a Sufistic (or Shia) communion is the vicegerent, and in a mystic manner the very incarnation, of the "Perfect Man," the Logos. What is pertinent is to note that al-Jili hastens to add: "Do not imagine that my words contain any tincture of the doctrine of metempsychosis. God forbid!" (Nicholson's *Studies in Islam-*

ic *Mysticism*, p. 106.) This fervent and rather incontinent haste to deny even a "tincture" of the doctrine of reincarnation on the part of al-Jīlī, and the emphatic statement made by Professor Nicholson, in his lectures on "The Idea of Personality in Sufism," that such eminent masters of Sufism as Ibn Sīnā, Ibn-ul, Fārid and Jalaluddīn Rūmī also "reject the doctrine of transmigration of souls (tanāsukh)," ought to put us on our guard against the inference drawn by Mr. Armstrong, from what the Sheikh told him, that it is the Sufi doctrine that "the mass of men reincarnate". If a non-expert outsider may be permitted to draw conclusions for himself from the evidence presented by experts, then it seems positive that all the most eminent masters of Sufism have categorically denied the doctrine of metempsychosis or reincarnation of the human soul, as it is held in India. And this, it would seem, for the simple reason that any such belief would directly and hopelessly cut across the definite Islamic (i.e., Korānic,) teaching on eschatology. There is no mistaking this teaching, and by no dialectic ingenuity can it be made to square with the doctrine of reincarnation of the human soul as we know it in India. How can the human soul return to the earth, in any shape, when it must await in the other world the angel Isrāfil's trump of resurrection on the Day of Doom?

Whether these Sufi masters held secretly the doctrine of reincarnation, we have no means of knowing. But when we see how whole-heartedly the great mystic and poet Rūmī held, and how fearlessly he declared, the faith in transmigration up to the limit permitted by orthodox Korānic Islam, it becomes difficult for any intelligent outsider to believe that Rūmī *really* disbelieved in his heart of hearts in the further reincarnation of the soul of man. In a well-known Ghazal of Shams-i-Tabrīz (in whose name Rūmī wrote his Ghazals), we read in an address to the soul:

Awwal jamād būdī ākhīr nabāt gashtī,
Āngah shudī tu haywān, in bar tu chun
nahānast?

i. e. "first you were mineral, later you turned to plant, then you became animal: how should this be a secret to you?" Passing on to higher levels reached by the evolving soul, the poet sings:—

Gashtī azān pas insān, bā'ilm o'aqlo īmān . . .
"afterwards you were made man, with knowledge, reason, faith"; and, finally:

Z'insān chu sayr kardī bīshak firishte gardī,
Bī in zamīn az ān pas jāyat bar āsman ast:

"when you have travelled on from man, you will doubtless become an angel; after that you are done with this earth: your station is in heaven." (Nicholson's *Divani Shams-i-Tabriz* pp. 46-49.) An exactly parallel passage is aptly quoted in his notes by Nicholson from Rūmī's "Masnavi," and in it too the mystic and poet expresses his firm belief that, having gone through the pre-human stages, when he will die as man he will become angel:—

Hamlaē dīgar bamīram az bashar, tā
barāram az malāyak bāl-o-par.

We may grant, for argument's sake at any rate, that a Rūmī may die to be born immediately again in heaven as an angel with wings (*bāl-o-par*) complete. But surely an ordinary mortal might feel that not one in a million is a Rūmī; grim realist that Rūmī himself was, surely he must have known that myriads of his fellow mortals were too near the animal level—many of them even more brutish than the brutes—to grow angels' wings as soon as they would shuffle off their too gross mortal coils. For, anyone who believes in the evolution of the human soul through the mineral, vegetable and animal stages up to the level of mere humanity must in all honesty admit one of two contingencies for the vast mass of mankind: they must be born again and again in this world till all the dross is purged out of them, or they must be so born again and again in some other world if they must, for some unknown cosmic reason, "touch the earth-plane once and once only". To the uninitiated mind any suggestion that all human beings alive on the surface of the earth at any

given time are likely to jump directly to a state of angelhood after death, sounds like a ghastly mockery. If we had our deserts, how many—God help us—would have to come back as apes or hyenas, asses or swine!

To any person who considers dispassionately the evidence brought forward by experts from the existing works of the greatest Sufi doctors, there is no escape from the conclusion that either they believed in metempsychosis secretly in their heart of hearts; or by a tremendous act of faith in orthodox Islamic teaching, they put aside all logic and reason and denied the return to this earth of a soul that had once risen to the level of humanity, however often that soul might have visited the earth before as a mineral or a vegetable or an animal.

As for the interesting argument that laying too much stress on a belief in the doctrine, even for those who hold it, must lead to spiritual lethargy—Mr. Armstrong's Sheikh was on perfectly valid logical and spiritual ground when he posed the Hindu "Guru" with the question whether "Advaita" (the essential non-duality of the transmigrating and phenomenal "ego" with the only Reality, the "Oversoul,") "which is the principal teaching of the Vedanta, is better promulgated by thinking about the doctrine of reincarnation or by leaving it alone". Too much of

emphasis on this belief, and incidentally on the doctrine of Karma, is generally believed to have had a deleterious effect, temporally as well as spiritually, on the Hindu race. Whether we ourselves believe so or not, there is little doubt that too much thinking and talking and cherishing of the individual ego ("atma," in Pali, "atta") was considered by Buddhism to be an undesirable thing, so that there came into existence the deprecatory term "atta-vada" (belief in soul or self) evidently coined to stigmatise this fond belief. And, perhaps, it was because of this soul-deadening effect of dwelling too much on the ego and its destiny that the Buddha often brushed aside the problem of the soul whenever it was too insistently pressed on him by his inquisitive disciples.

Bombay

J. S.

A CORRECTION

On page 438 of the June issue of THE ARYAN PATH, I have in my article on "Roman Script for India," inadvertently referred to the ॐ-varga (the ॐ group) of the Devanagari consonants as the "palatals." The ॐ-varga consonants, of course, constitute the *linguals*; to which alone reference was made. The error is regretted.

V. S. GANAPATI SARMA

Kumbhakonam

Dr. Rabindranath Tagore, the Indian poet writes in the August *Visva-Bharati News* on "Can Science be Humanised?" and traces the social unrest of the world to the "Anarchy of Spirit".

To-day our homes have dissolved into hotels, community life is stifled in the dense and dusty atmosphere of the office, man and woman are afraid of love, people clamour for their rights and forget their obligations and they value comfort more than happiness and spirit of display more than that of beauty.

He says that great civilizations of the past were at last run to death by men of the type of our precocious schoolboys of modern times, smart and superficially critical, worshippers of self, shrewd bargainers in the market of profit and power, efficient in their handling of the ephemeral who presume to buy human souls with their money and throw them into their dustbins when they have been sucked dry, and who, eventually, driven by suicidal forces of passion, set their neighbours' houses on fire and are themselves enveloped by the flame.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"———ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

A quarter of a century has gone by since the Indian Society of Oriental Art was established in Calcutta. Like so many other cultural movements it also has its roots in the well-known Tagore family. Abanindranath Tagore, with gifted colleagues like Nanda Lal Bose, has already succeeded in showing that the glorious tradition of ancient Indian art is not dead, but that it, like other branches of Indian culture, is vital and viable. The Bengal School and the Indian Society of Oriental Art have not escaped private ridicule or public criticism. But their vigour has not diminished and their steadfastness has given one more proof of their zest. We have before us the first number of the new *Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art* edited by Abanindranath Tagore and Stella Kramrisch; we give it a most hearty welcome. The journal is to be published twice every year (Annual subscription Rs. 7 in India, Rs. 9. foreign; 11, Samavaya Mansions, Calcutta), and the issue before us, replete with excellent contributions, promises a good harvest. It however does not inform us about the present state of the Society whose organ it is. We presume that the advent of this new journal will

mean the disappearance of *Rupam* ably edited by Mr. O. C. Gangoly, to whom we must tender thanks for the rich gifts of the past. It is but meet that the organ of the Society should bring a special message to the interested few; but we hope that it will not entirely overlook its propaganda mission for the larger public. Both the Society and the School have suffered in the past through a lack of adequate publicity. The regular feature of *The Modern Review* which offers every month a coloured picture by some Indian artist, mostly of the Bengal School, is keeping the public in touch with its work. But even that is not sufficient. Time seems ripe for a more systematic attempt by the Society itself to organize its work and make its influence felt particularly in India. Its journal and office should play their parts in spreading the message for which they exist.

It was Edmund Burke who said that "a spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper and confined views. People will not look forward to posterity who never look backward to their ancestors". The School and the Society have acted on principles implied in that statement; they have visioned

the future in terms of the past and it would not be wholly right to pass judgment on their actual achievements without taking into account their ideals. But in India art must begin to play a larger part in educating the public mind and taste. Special cultural work, in its several branches, may be said to have been focused in the personality of Rabindranath Tagore; on the other hand, there is all the labour whose soul is Gandhiji who has awakened the masses to a vision they cannot realize and a longing they cannot satisfy without the aid of that culture. To bring about a union between these two branches of present-day Indian effort is a highly important function and the Indian Society of Oriental Art may well plan to attend to at least one aspect of this work. The Society is potent—more potent than it gives itself credit for. The ideal of stern asceticism and self-imposed poverty which Gandhiji proclaims as a message from ancient India needs to be supplemented by a message from the same old Aryavarta—a message which would colour the drab routine of life, modulate the stern aspect of simple living and endow it with charm and beauty. Unless the Indian artist co-operates in the work of mass-education, to inspire at least the town people now under the influence of the ugly, he must fail in his real mission. In his apparel, furniture, utensils, etc., the westernized Indian murders the soul and mind of ancient India. A hybrid

mentality expresses itself in a hundred ways—khadi wear of European style, for example. The Indian Society of Oriental Art, true to its own original impulse, should plan to remove that mongrel mentality, and it is better situated to accomplish the work than most social and religious institutions.

This question of dress is not unimportant. It is not only true that "the apparel oft proclaims the man," but further that it influences him, unconsciously to himself. When Japan resolved to copy western ways one of the things it did was a change in the style of clothes of its population. The celebrated Hungarian violinist Reményi narrating his visit to Japan in 1886 says:—

On August 8th, 1886, I appeared before His Majesty, a day memorable, unfortunately, for the change of costume commanded by the Empress. She herself, abandoning the exquisite beauty of the feminine Japanese costume, appeared on that day for the first time and at my concert in European costume, and it made my heart ache to see her. I could have greeted her had I dared with a long wail of despair upon my travelled violin. Six ladies accompanied her, they themselves being clad in their native costume, and walking with infinite grace and charm. . . . The Mikado himself was in the uniform of a European general.

A similar step was taken in Turkey only a few years ago, and a like movement is on foot in Persia. National dresses, and time-honoured customs, and everything beautiful and artistic and worth preservation, are fast disappearing from view in these lands.

In India too this danger has to be faced; to lip-enthusiasm for the ancient ideals and modes of thought must be added suitable action, and who is better fitted to instruct the lay man in the ways of that beauty than the Indian artist who has caught the notion of the old world-life and is fixing it in picture or story?

Addressing the sixth Annual Conference of La Ligue Internationale pour la Vie et la Famille in Paris, Dr. Duval Arnauld is reported to have said the following:—

There is no need to speak at length of the injury that follows from contraceptive practices. . . . Gynæcologists of every country,—Professors Dalché, J. L. Faure, and Siredy, in France; Friedlander, in America; Kehrer, in Dresden; Bossi, in Basle; Schockaert, in Louvain—arrive at the same conclusion: congestion, injury, sterility, and often moral crisis. . . . Contraceptive devices involve all sorts of risk: of injury, of burning, or erosion, of congestion and other evils. Professor Labhardt, Director of the Gynæcological Clinic at the University of Basle, thinks that contraceptive practices are often a cause of extra-uterine conception as he has seen the number of such conceptions quadruple itself since the year 1900: he thinks the principal cause of this increase is the increasing use of contraceptive devices. In this opinion he has the support of Professor Suderkoff and Professor Scranbansky of Leningrad, who have ample opportunity in Soviet Russia to observe the consequences of these practices. Moreover, all such practices react, sooner or later, on the general health. . . . And so we have local injury, general disharmony and attenuation of personality; congestion, sterility, predisposition to fibroid growth, and to extra-uterine conception, risk of surgical

operation with its attendant dangers, mutilation and failure. . . . And be it known and proclaimed that all the artificial means which are taken to secure women from the risk of pregnancy involve a great many more risks than the pregnancy they are calculated to avoid.

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This is a picture, drawn by a medical authority, of our civilization in which individuals degrade themselves morally while ruining bodily health and disregarding rules of hygiene. Turn next to the words of a scientist on the attitude and action of organized governments of civilized states affecting human morality.

Prof. J. B. S. Haldane has done a real service by his article on "Biology and Statesmanship" in *The Listener*, reprinted in *The National Life*. He writes:—

The programme of the party now in power in Germany includes, or included till lately, a number of so-called eugenic measures, intended to check the breeding of various types of defectives, and of persons who are not of German race. As they describe people who do not share their political opinions as defective—*minderwertig* is the word—it would seem that a large proportion of the German people are regarded as biologically undesirable. In England self-styled eugenicists have attacked poor relief, and transitional benefit for the unemployed, on the ground that this class is, on the whole, congenitally inferior. Now, it seems to me that the danger of multiplication of the mentally defective is a real one; *but there is a much more pressing and immediate danger. And that is, that people of whom governments do not approve should, on eugenic grounds, be sterilised, segregated or starved. To my mind the attempt to justify such measures on biological grounds is a prostitution of science, far more serious than the manufacture*

of high explosives, bombing aeroplanes or poisonous gases. We biologists cannot prevent statesmen from doing these things, but we can most emphatically protest against their being done in the name of biology, and in countries where speech is still free we can warn the public against this misuse of our science. [Italics ours.—EDS.]

And now listen to a complaint about the modern novel on the same problem of sex.

Allan Monkhouse whose literary criticism graces the columns of *The Manchester Guardian* has put in debt a large number of readers for aught we know, certainly an increasing number, by a very timely "Revolt" against the tendency of the modern novelist to exaggeration of sex-appeal, and on every occasion to drag in "the cocktail, the latrine, the brothel"; "incest and sex perversion have been subjects for great writers and now they are not neglected by the smaller ones". While Mr. Monkhouse admits that "the standard of novel writing is far higher than it was a generation or two ago" and that old respectability "doubtless had its elements of hypocrisy," he raises a voice of warning—"We are getting sadly out of proportion again." He adds:—

The English novel is giving a false impression of English life. There may not be many geniuses at work upon it, but there are many admirable talents, and some of them may be praised without reserve. But vicious, hectic manifestations of life are getting far too much attention. So it seems to me as a constant novel reader. Perhaps this is a provincial view, but the sum of many provinces may equal a metropolis.

We sincerely trust that the "Revolt" worded by Mr. Monkhouse will be echoed from many sides: "We want to read our contemporaries if they will let us," says Mr. Monkhouse—exactly; and we join in his appeal "for less lechery in English novels".

And speaking of novels old and new, we should like to draw the attention, especially of our Indian readers, to *The Golden Book Magazine* (New York) which every month brings reprints of stories, classics of literature. It began its career in 1925, to gather for its readers "fiction and true stories that will live," and during these eight years has fulfilled its purpose in a very laudable manner. The last number before us—for August—brings us the first instalment of a new condensed version of Jerome's "Three Men in a Boat," "The Credo of Love" by Alphonse Daudet, "Tennessee's Partner" by Bret Harte, "Hunger" by James Stephens, "The Wendigo" by Algernon Blackwood, and other good things. Adventure, romance and all the sex-appeal that any decent reader would wish, not only charm away the hour of leisure but add profit to pleasure. The story and the novel influence the public morals to-day perhaps more than any other institution, and such a magazine as *The Golden Book* and such a critic as Allan Monkhouse contribute their share in keeping that institution pure and healthy.