

EAAS

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence*

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DEITY

Many Asiatic philosophers trace the religious and moral confusion prevailing so widely in the Occident to the faulty concept of God which the churches impose upon the people. What is God according to the former?—Life.

It is the omnipresent and impersonal Reality, containing all and everything. From one aspect it is the mysterious power of evolution; from another, the law of harmony the immutable law of cause and effect under which evolution takes place. Attributes can no more be ascribed to Deity than to space, its symbol. Space cannot be excluded from any conception, but neither can one grasp the thought of boundless space. However far the mind goes out, there is always space beyond. But the space of the Asiatic philosopher is not a void; it pulsates everywhere with motion which is life. The essence

of every atom of matter is life and Universal Life is Deity.

The whole universe is animated with Spirit, the real unseen Presence whose garment is nature. Matter is the illusory reflection of the Ever Unknowable. But though the Divine Presence cannot be intellectually grasped, it can be sensed within himself by the awakened soul, for the Supreme is "the Ego seated in the hearts of all beings."

Worshippers of such Divinity visit their heart as the only shrine, making their good actions the only priests, their evil intentions the only sacrificial victims, and their own Spirit the only mediator between them and the Universal Spirit.

The personal God of theology, outside the universe, above the law, appears in sorry contrast to the radiant Presence of which a man can only say, *It is and I am that.*

THE HUMANIZING EFFECT OF THE STUDY OF SANSKRIT

[**Franklin Edgerton**, Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at Yale University, has well anticipated our motive and purpose in putting to him the question which he calls "challenging." His answer extensively brings out some of our cherished ideas, as, to take one example, his conclusion that a study of Sanskrit literature so broadens the mind and deepens insight that even a cultured Occidental ceases to be biased in favour of European civilization as the highest form of culture yet evolved by man. But all Sanskritists will not agree with Dr. Edgerton, for there are those whose interest in the language of the gods is merely philological and technical. Among such there are academicians who play the part of a dessicated pansy between the leaves of a volume of great poetry! Dr. Edgerton is not of that class—that is why we approached him with our question.—EDS.]

The Editors have asked me to write an article on the beneficent influence of Sanskrit literature on the life of an individual. I take it for granted that they had in mind effects on the individual's mind and character, rather than informative, practical, professional advantages. Of the latter there are not a few, and they vary greatly according to the interests of the person concerned. For instance, a man interested in linguistic science, descriptive or historical; a student of comparative religion or philosophy; a student of literary art as such, of *belles-lettres*; these and many other specialists will find practical advantages in the study of Sanskrit. But such matters are reasonably familiar; and it was evidently something else that the Editors intended. Something more subjective, intimate, and intangible. I think I see the meaning of the question, which is an interesting and challenging one. It is not easy to answer, and perhaps there would be almost as many answers as persons to whom it might reasonably be put. I know,

from my reading, that some would answer it in very different ways from that which follows. If I seem to ignore those other answers, this does not by any means imply a suggestion that they are unimportant, or less important than mine. It is quite possible that they are more important. At least it is likely enough that some of them are more typical of the feelings of the general run of students of Sanskrit. But I feel that in order to have real value, the answer to such a question must be given in terms of the writer's own personal experience. Even if he is not typical—and I am very probably not typical—it will hardly be profitable for him to try to describe and evaluate the experiences of others in such a subjective field. It is hard enough to feel sure that one is correctly describing and interpreting one's own inner experiences. That is what I shall now try to do; be it clearly understood, then, that it is and claims to be only one Sanskritist's impression of some effects which the study of Sanskrit

has had on his own mental outlook.

If I were to try to sum up that effect in a word, I should say it was humanizing.

We all, at least practically all of us, start with an assumption (unformulated perhaps, but instinctive and real) that humanity in the fullest and realest sense is a direct function of closeness to ourselves. The savage regards the adjoining tribesman as not only his natural enemy, but a somewhat lower order of being; in many primitive languages the word for "man" is used as the specific name of the speaker's tribe (the only real "men") and foreign tribes are often called by opprobrious words meaning that they cannot talk like human beings (Greek *barbaroi*, "stammerers"; Russian *niemtzy*, "Germans," literally "dumb people"), or are otherwise below normal human status. The child is the centre of his own universe. Small boys despise the boys in the next block. The average citizen of each community is convinced that the neighbouring village or city has a definitely lower culture than his. To the average American, his country is "God's country," and in his heart he despises all "furriners." External expressions of this spirit may differ in different countries, but it exists everywhere; no land is free from it.

Even men who pass as highly educated often retain, as it seems to me, clear vestiges of this irrational prejudice; though they would of course deny it strenuously, and with entire honesty. They are quite unconscious of it. In general the tendency of education is, we may

hope, to mitigate its strength. It could in fact hardly be otherwise. For any education, even the most rudimentary, broadens the mental outlook to some extent. It brings one into contact with at least some things that lie outside one's own immediate environment; it opens the eyes to wider horizons.

The extent of this widening influence varies greatly with several factors, among which must of course be recognised different attitudes and aptitudes in the individuals concerned, but I think also, with equal certainty, the content of the education to which they are subjected. I am far from wishing to depreciate the value of education in the natural and mathematical sciences; but it seems evident that that value, while certainly very great, must lie chiefly in other directions than the one now under consideration. The data of those sciences are relatively abstract and are not so likely to lead to sympathetic comprehension of other human cultures as are humanistic studies.

But there are great differences among humanistic studies themselves in this regard, and in the spirit in which they may be pursued. Sometimes the motive behind their pursuit is or has been a sort of abstract curiosity not very different from that of the natural scientist. Just as a geologist collects and studies his specimens, some ethnologists, for instance, have collected and tabulated data about so-called "primitive" peoples as if they were museum specimens, interesting because "queer," but hardly human

in the fullest sense, which the investigator associates with his own culture. This procedure is, happily, not so fashionable nowadays as it used to be. Ethnologists are more and more tending to minimize the difference between "primitive" and "civilized" men, or rather to regard such differences as relatively external and accidental, and to attribute more fundamental importance to underlying similarities. Some even turn the tables about and profess to find the manner of life of "primitive" peoples, or of some of them, more admirable than "civilized" life, either as a whole or in some important respects.

So far as this latter school has any influence, it clearly tends to diminish the spirit of provincialism. The same is true of historic studies, conducted in the proper spirit. They may be made to reveal the fact that men remote from us in time, no less than in space, were after all men, in essentials not so very different from ourselves.

At this point, however, another consideration enters, which may tend to diminish the value of historic studies for the special purpose we are now contemplating. In most countries, historic studies usually, and quite naturally, centre about the country's own cultural past. In Europe (and America, which belongs culturally to Europe), people study chiefly the background of European civilization. Indeed, such studies are very commonly justified precisely on this ground. It is argued that we need to know our own cultural ancestry, in order to understand our own selves. So history with us generally

begins with Greece and Rome (with a few cursory glances at the Near East, justified by its influence on Greece and Rome), and proceeds to trace the growth of European culture therefrom. There is nothing unnatural or improper in this, of course—quite the contrary. But after all, it is only a mild extension of the study of ourselves. If a European says, "I am interested in this because it relates to my own ancestors," he is quite within his rights, and no one should throw stones at him. As I said at the outset, almost all of us are really more interested in ourselves than in others. But it is fatally easy, though illogical, to go on and say (consciously or unconsciously): "Not only I but all men ought to be supremely interested in this, because it is the most interesting and important historical field in existence." The question I raise is: except that we happen to be Europeans, is there really any reason why European history should dominate our historical learning so heavily as it does?

Now, I suspect that most Europeans, even scholars, would unhesitatingly say "yes!" to that question. They believe, unconsciously if not consciously, that European civilization is *intrinsically* superior to any other. They think that it is more worth studying, not simply by Europeans because it is their own, but by all human beings because it is the "highest" form of culture yet evolved by man.

The study of Sanskrit has led me to the conviction that this claim cannot be proved. I do not say that it can be disproved, either. It seems

to me, scientifically, incapable of either proof or disproof; and therefore I think an objective scholar should leave it out of account altogether, as having no scientific meaning or value. I believe further that few other humanistic fields are so well adapted as Sanskrit to bring Europeans to this realization.

For this purpose it has certain obvious advantages over the study of so-called "primitive" languages and cultures. For one thing, it is historic. To Europeans, there is something respectable about a lengthy history; and "primitive" peoples have practically no history. But the Indian people has a long and continuous history, relatively independent of outside influences. In this respect it is rivalled only by the Chinese.

With the exception of the Chinese again, there is no people on earth, outside of the European cultural sphere, which can show as many products of intellectual culture of the sort which Europeans consider marks of a high civilization. Perhaps it is unreasonable to set so great a value on such matters, and on length of history. Perhaps the "primitivists" are right in suggesting that the "savage" is as well off as civilized man, or better, and that his *mores* are as admirable, abstractly considered. The fact remains that few Europeans will be found willing to admit it. They will not respect a foreign culture unless it appears to them "civilized." But no one who has any real knowledge of Sanskrit literature and Indian history can doubt that the Hindus have been highly civilized for millennia,

and that their intellectual products compare on the whole very favourably with those of Europe, even judged by European standards. If in modern times the technological advances of Europe have surpassed anything that India has achieved, this is a very recent development, and may be regarded as counterbalanced by other features which, in the opinion of many thoughtful Europeans, are at least as important, humanly speaking. As examples may be mentioned the religious tolerance for which India is historically famous, and on the whole justly so, in contrast with Europe, which cannot match Asoka for instance; and the ethical principle of *ahinsa*, the sanctity of all life, which even as an ideal can hardly be said to exist in the West, and which despite all imperfections in its observance has been a real humanizing force in India for many centuries.

If all this be granted, the question might still remain in some minds: Is it necessary to study Sanskrit literature in the original? Would not translations or interpretations in other languages suffice to impress on Europeans the human value of Indic civilization?

The answer, which has been borne in upon me more and more by years of study, is that no one can really understand a writer unless he knows his language. And the more remote in space and time he is, the more hopeless is an attempt to do so. Concrete statements of objective facts may be understood, though sometimes a commentary is needed even with them. But the moment one gets into the realm of

cultural, psychological, or emotional matters—and how can one avoid them completely, even in the simplest piece of literature?—it becomes impossible to “get under the skin” of the writer, if one has to rely on a translation. As a simple instance: how can any English word or phrase reproduce what the Sanskrit word *buddhi* means to an Indian? But it is not even a question of such technical terms alone. The story of Nala and Damayanti is composed in extremely simple Sanskrit, and for that reason is a favourite text for beginners. I have read the opening chapters of it with my elementary Sanskrit classes probably twenty-five times. Yet I hardly ever fail, even now, to discover some little nuance, some fine shade of meaning, some new light on the exact psychology of the author, which I had never noticed before. And every

such discovery adds to my sympathetic understanding of the author, as a man. This is far more important with more abstruse works. The more one reads them, the more one gradually comes to feel with them; to approach a genuine understanding of their authors' personalities. The general effect of this process is to bring us to the realization that we are dealing with—*men*. Men like ourselves, on the average neither greater nor less; men whose external background is often very different from ours; but whose humanness can be appreciated once we have penetrated the veil of those superficial differences.

This is to my way of thinking the most fascinating kind of study open to man. And its great value is that it brings us to a realization of the essential oneness of mankind.

FRANKLIN EDGERTON

What I feel convinced of, and hope to convince you of, is that Sanskrit literature, if studied only in a right spirit, is full of human interests, full of lessons which even Greek could never teach us, a subject worthy to occupy the leisure, and more than the leisure, of every Indian Civil servant; and certainly the best means of making any young man who has to spend five-and-twenty years of his life in India, feel at home among the Indians, as a fellow-worker among fellow-workers and not as an alien among aliens. There will be abundance of useful and most interesting work for him to do, if only he cares to do it, work such as he would look for in vain, whether in Italy or in Greece, or even among the pyramids of Egypt or the palaces of Babylon.

MAX MÜLLER

CAUSATION AND FREE WILL

[A. J. Ayer is a young Oxford philosopher who belongs to the school of thought of which Schlick and Carnap of Vienna and G. E. Moore of Cambridge are protagonists. He is the author of *Language, Truth and Logic*.—EDS.]

Have we reason to accept the law of universal causation? And if we do accept it, are we logically obliged to deny that our wills are free? If we can succeed in answering these questions we shall be in a fair way to solve the ancient philosophical problem of the freedom of the will.

Before we can profitably discuss the validity of the law of universal causation, we must give an analysis of it. What exactly is implied by the statement that every event must have a cause? Most determinists would take it to imply that every event must be, or must have been, predictable. But this does not mean that every event can actually be predicted by us. What is maintained by those who believe in the law of universal causation is not that we actually have, or can ever hope to have, foreknowledge of every event, but only that we could theoretically have it if we knew enough. They claim that if we knew the exact state of the universe at the present time, and also the nature of the laws by which it was governed, then we should be able to infer the nature of every event which ever had occurred in the past or would occur in the future, and that this would apply to the thoughts and actions of human beings no less than to the behaviour of objects in the material world.

What these determinists do not

realize is that by adding the proviso "if we knew enough" to their assumption that every event could be predicted, they make this assumption tautologous. For all that they are then asserting is that we are entitled to predict the occurrence of an event E when we know the occurrence of a set of events C1... Cn and also know some general proposition which makes events of the kind E a function of events of the kind C. Which is to assert no more than that if we knew facts from which we could see that it followed analytically that a certain event E would occur, then we should know that E would occur; a proposition that is true indeed, but trivial. To this the determinist may reply that his assertion that all events are theoretically predictable may well be tautologous, given the assumption that the universe is governed by laws, but that this assumption is not itself tautologous; and it is this that he finds incompatible with the freedom of the will.

I do not think that this reply can be accepted. Here again we must ask ourselves what exactly is meant by saying that the universe is governed by laws. The use of the word "law" in this context is unfortunate. For by its moral and political associations it suggests an animistic view of nature, as if events were somehow compelled or forbidden to occur. If we ignore all

such associations and consider only the logical content of the expression "law of nature," we find that the essential characteristic of a proposition which is said to express a law of nature is that it states what universally and invariably occurs. From this it follows that to say that the universe is governed by laws is to say that all events can be fitted into some general framework, or, to speak more precisely, that for any given system of events we can formulate general propositions which will enable us, given any one state of the system, to deduce all the rest. But this too is a tautology. For it would be self-contradictory to speak of a system of events which could not be described in any general terms. In order to give his principle a definite factual content the determinist must specify the kind of laws by which the universe is supposed to be governed. It would not be a tautology, for example, to assert that every system of events was subject to the laws of Newtonian mechanics. But then we know now that it would not be true.

In general, we may say that directly the law of universal causation is given a precise empirical meaning it loses its authority. While it is a logical truism to say that every system of events must be describable in some general terms, there is no general proposition, other than a tautology, of which we can say *a priori* that it must hold good for all possible events. We can describe a set of events by forming generalizations which are valid for that particular set. But when we proceed to

extrapolate these generalizations by applying them to events which are not initially given as members of the set described, we are taking a step for the validity of which we can have no logical guarantee. I agree with Hume that it is impossible to prove, either *a priori* or *a posteriori*, that events which we have not observed are governed by the same laws as those which we have. Reliance on past experience as a guide to the future can never make us secure from the possibility of error.

At the same time it should be added that it is always possible for us to find an explanation for any unexpected occurrence. That is to say, we can always modify our accepted system of hypotheses in such a way that the proposition recording the occurrence in question becomes deducible from it. We may not think it advisable to make any such modification of our theories. In that case we speak of the unforeseen event as having occurred by chance. To attribute an event to chance in this sense is to admit that we are not prepared to formulate a hypothesis which will explain it. It is not to say that the event is in itself inexplicable. We could always explain it by the adoption of *ad hoc* hypotheses if we chose to do so. Whether we could sustain our explanation in the face of future experience is, of course, another matter.

This being so, I suggest that the law of universal causation should be interpreted not as a statement of fact but as a methodological rule, an injunction to seek an explanation for every event. The possibility of adopting such a rule rests on the fact

that once an event has occurred it is always a significant question to ask why it occurred, whether or not we were in a position to predict it. This applies to psychological as well as to physical events. It would be impossible in practice for us to predict the whole of any man's mental history, but if his history were known we could formulate hypotheses which would account for every detail of it.

Must we infer from this that our wills are not free? Only if we think that to say that an action is performed freely is to say that it is inexplicable. But this is surely not the case. A man whose behaviour is easy to predict may be considered more reliable and more responsible than a man whose behaviour is a continual source of surprise. He is not considered less free. There is indeed rather an opposition between freedom and unaccountability than a necessary connection.

What is it then that makes an action free? In my opinion a man may be said to act freely when the immediate grounds of his action lie within himself. That is to say, a free action is one which can be explained in terms of the agent's mental and physical states without immediate reference to external events. If I eat because I am hungry, or because I desire to be polite to my hostess, I am acting freely. If I eat because I am in the clutches of a forcible-feeding machine I am not acting freely. If this is correct, those philosophers who have looked upon determinism as a denial of the freedom of the will have been in error. *When we claim that our*

wills are free, we are not claiming that our voluntary actions are undetermined. We are claiming that, in respect of their immediate causes at any rate, our voluntary actions are determined by the nature of our selves.

We can speak here only of immediate causes because, if we carry our explanations further and further back, we must in the case of any action whatsoever come sooner or later to events which are external to the agent. I say that a man is acting freely, because I think that one could give a satisfactory explanation of his behaviour in terms only of his character and his desires. But if I am asked why he has that character and those desires, and then when a reason is given must give another reason for it, I must at some point go beyond the man's own history. Indeed I must eventually refer to occurrences which took place before he began to exist at all. I know that some philosophers have endeavoured to escape this consequence by attributing infinite pre-existence to the self. But even if this were a significant hypothesis, which I doubt, there would appear to be no good reason for believing it.

It may be said that our wills are not really free if we are not ultimately, but only immediately, responsible for our own acts. I should reply that it depended upon the way in which one defined the term "freedom." There may be philosophers who define the term in such a way that no man can be called free, in their sense, unless he is the sole, complete and ultimate cause of his own

acts; and I should maintain that, in this sense of the term, no man was free. But I should also maintain that this was not the sense which was ordinarily given to the term. What we have to consider, if our discussion is to be of any value, is the meaning of the term as it occurs in our everyday moral judgments. If our analysis of freedom is judged, as it should be, by reference to this criterion, I believe it will be found to be correct.

This, however, will probably not be conceded without question. It will be pointed out that our moral consciousness approves of punishment in certain cases, and it will be argued that this involves the assumption that the wrongdoer is not merely immediately but ultimately responsible for his acts. For if we did not credit him with complete and ultimate responsibility we should consider the application of punishment irrational and unjust. The answer to this is that it is only the retributive conception of punishment that is inconsistent with the denial of ultimate, as opposed

to immediate, responsibility. The reformative conception is perfectly compatible with it. And I should claim that in so far as punishment is approved of by the enlightened moral consciousness, it is not as a mere principle of retribution, but only as a means of deterrence and reform. The assumption involved is simply that of the possibility of finding a stimulus which will bring about a change in men's characters and thereby change the nature of their acts.

Much has been made by some philosophers of our inner consciousness of freedom. I do not think that this so-called consciousness of freedom amounts to more than a perception of the absence of any immediate external constraint. It is worthless as an argument against determinism, because our actions may very well be due to causes of which we are not directly aware. But I hope that I have succeeded in showing that it is not necessary to find arguments against determinism in order to sustain a belief in the freedom of the will.

A. J. AYER

[The line of reasoning adopted by our contributor in the above article would be more appealing and become more convincing if he supplemented it by the Indian conception of Karma so ably interpreted in the article which follows. Karma is an undeviating and unerring tendency in the universe to restore equilibrium; it operates incessantly. It operates on all things and beings from the minutest conceivable atom to the highest of human souls. It is not fatalism, as will be seen from what follows.—EDS.]

REINCARNATION AND KARMA

THEIR VALUE TO THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE

[Alban G. Widgery, Professor of Philosophy at Duke University, Durham, (U. S. A.) was formerly Stanton Lecturer on the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Cambridge, and spent nearly eight years in India where he edited *The Indian Philosophical Review*. He regards it as one task of the philosopher to examine traditional beliefs and to aim at a constructive view of existence with definite relation to all sides of the historical process.—EDS.]

Though to most intelligent Hindus, Jains, and Buddhists the title of this article will not appear in any way unusual, to not a few Occidentals it will seem surprising. A contemporary Christian missionary in India is only repeating what has too often been said when he writes that the doctrines of transmigration and of karma have a paralysing influence throughout India, which must be freed from them if it is to progress at all. There can be no doubt that bad consequences may follow, and have indeed followed, misunderstanding of these doctrines. But there have been pernicious results also from the misinterpretation of doctrines regarded by others as important, as for example that contained in the Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen United States of America in 1776, that "all men are created equal." One may, if one is so prejudiced, attend solely to such harmful inferences; but a fairer and more profitable attitude is to investigate what benefits follow from the beliefs correctly appreciated. Both for those who accept the doctrine of reincarnation, and for those who do not, it is well worth while to investigate the

advantages which are implicated in it.

The doctrine of Reincarnation is believed by millions of Orientals and has been maintained through very many centuries. These two facts are no evidence of its truth. For millions of people in the Occident do not hold it, and it has not been generally adhered to there in the past. Yet these two facts are no evidence that it is false. The question of the truth of the entire doctrine, as ordinarily expressed, is not to be discussed here. Nevertheless it may reasonably be maintained that for it to have continued its appeal for so long and so widely it must contain genuine significance. Though on the one hand it may be said that it is not capable of strictly demonstrative proof; on the other it certainly cannot be disproved. There have been in ancient and in modern times Occidental philosophers of eminence who have subscribed to it. The people of the Orient do not appear to be abandoning it.

The doctrine of Reincarnation involves a particular conception of the continuation of human existence: one that may be favourably compared with other views. Many Jews,

Christians, and Muslims have the very vaguest notions as to what they believe (if indeed they believe anything) as to the nature of the existence of the soul after death until the time called "the Last Judgment," "the Resurrection Day," or the attainment of Hell or Heaven. Some Christians talk of an "intermediate state," or of "purgatory," in which the process of development or purification may be continued beyond this life. Some Occidental followers of Spiritism appear to suggest that departed souls are hovering somewhere about this earth, to most people imperceptibly. In Western thought there is insufficient stress on stages of self-development beyond this life. But that idea is one of the valuable implications of the idea of reincarnation. For it affirms a series of lives sufficiently alike and with such continuity that a progress in self-realisation may reasonably be conceived in accordance with it. Though the incidents of births and deaths may appear abrupt breaks, continuity is involved, analogous to some extent to going to sleep and waking up in the same room. One dies and is born again in the same world, and may proceed in largely similar conditions to endeavour to realise the same ideal. The doctrine of reincarnation also gives an answer to a problem which is generally unconsidered in Occidental thought: Why is an individual born with this or that kind of body? Does God put this soul into a body feeble and liable to suffer from painful diseases, and another soul into a healthy strong body? Or is one's body just a

contingency of nature? The Oriental believer in reincarnation would avoid what appears on the one hand as an unworthy idea of God, and on the other as falling back on mere chance. He considers it more reasonable to suppose that each determines the nature of his own body by his essential character built up in previous lives. Inequalities of endowment at birth are not regarded as due to divine (or diabolical) caprice, or to the play of incalculable circumstances.

To appreciate the doctrine of reincarnation adequately involves consideration of the so-called "Law of Karma" with which it is bound up in Oriental thought. Theories of the nature of "karma" differ: there are marked divergences in the Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist accounts. Nevertheless they all agree that the condition in which one is born depends on one's previous conduct. They all agree with the principle that one reaps as one sows. The beneficent effects of belief in reincarnation depend chiefly on this implication of the Law of Karma.

Before considering those effects it is necessary to reject a pernicious misunderstanding and frequent misrepresentation. This is that the doctrine of Karma is one of fatalism or complete determinism, and is in consequence essentially pessimistic. Why critics who call it fatalistic should be so one-sided as to describe it as simply pessimistic must surely be due to some ulterior motive. For even so interpreted karma would certainly involve that the good will inevitably determine good consequences. From that point of view it

would be equally justifiable to call it optimistic. Obviously, however, the logic of the interpretation as fatalism would implicate neither complete pessimism nor complete optimism. But the truth is that fatalism in the sense suggested is not involved in such a manner as to rule out free action. What one did in the past sets conditions for one's acts in the present, and determines in part one's suffering or happiness in the present; but one's present act not only helps to form new karma: it also affects the present. The Law of Karma does not necessitate that the consequences of action shall be wholly in a future life. Nothing in the dominant Oriental philosophies or religions contradicts this view. Rather the very reason for their existence involves it. For these are taught just in order to urge individuals so to act in the present as to obtain a better future in this life and later lives.

The idea of a "Law of Karma" is so central to the Oriental belief in reincarnation that it demands close consideration. Can it be proved to be true? Evidently the experiences of our present lives do not prove it. For apparently it cannot invariably be said that here and now men suffer for their bad deeds and are happy for their good ones. Indeed, the idea of reincarnation is itself associated with this fact: for much suffering and much good fortune not being capable of explanation by reference to conduct in this life, are said to be effects of karma of previous lives. Even in the Christian New Testament it is recorded that Jesus was once asked: "Master, who did sin,

this man or his parents, that he was born blind?" But though experience cannot prove it absolutely, a large number of instances occur in individuals themselves, and they observe similar instances in others, in which suffering does follow wrongdoing and virtue is associated with happiness. And if the pains of remorse and the worth of self-respect are considered, the cumulative evidence even here and now goes far to support the doctrine. That, however, does not establish it absolutely, and yet it is in being accepted as a universal and unvarying law that it is involved in the general Oriental belief and the benefits associated with that belief. If it is not entirely justified by experience, is it a self-evident truth of reason? It would hardly seem so, for it is not inconceivable that existence does not conform with the principle. Reason does not find it to be a necessity of thought.

It must therefore be admitted that the doctrine of a law of karma cannot be shown to be true. On the other hand it cannot be shown to be false; especially if the possibility of reincarnation be acknowledged. And that possibility cannot legitimately be ruled out. How then may the doctrine be justified? That question may be answered by observing that the doctrine has two implications. On the one hand it implies virtually the same fundamental idea of causality as is accepted in natural science: that cause and effect are in some manner equal and allied in essence. Philosophically the doctrine of causality cannot be demonstrated to

be true. Science works with it as a postulate, and does so successfully. The doctrine of karma accepts the same postulate with reference to human conduct, reasonably and also with beneficial moral results. It was one of the features of the enlightenment of the Buddha that he apprehended the chain of causation in human conduct. He taught the importance for the moral life that men should recognise that causality. There is also a second implication in the doctrine of karma, and that an ethical one, the principle of justice. There have been different views about the nature of justice, but the human mind finds difficulty in freeing itself—perhaps it never can do so—from an idea that deed and desert should be proportionate one to the other. It was as an expression of this that some Pythagoreans described justice symbolically as a perfect square. The doctrine of karma contains not only the postulate of causality but also the principle of justice, as so conceived. And that principle appears to be in accord with, to be accepted by, or to be an expression of, man's moral consciousness.

Thus, though the truth of the doctrine of karma cannot be experimentally or rationally demonstrated it finds justification as a postulate. As such it has become, and may well remain, of fundamental importance for the life of the individual, especially on the ethical side. Properly understood it increases the sense of the individual's own responsibility: for it does not allow shifting responsibility on to others or accusing

others for suffering that comes to the individual himself. Acceptance of what comes to one, as "just" punishment or recompense as the consequences of his own conduct tends to cultivate self-respect, a central attitude in morality. It should strengthen character in that it implies that the individual cannot ultimately depend on others for his true happiness or escape from suffering, however much they may be incidental means towards it. Even the bliss of the *bhakta* in his devotion to the lord comes as a consequence of his own attitude of love and expression of it in conduct. Associated with all this, the belief in reincarnation gives the individual a basis of hope and a stimulus to right endeavour in that it promises a better life in future existences for those who will act morally so as to earn it. On the other hand it may act as a deterrent, leading men to refrain from evil under penalty of future suffering: a real deterrent because, unlike the penalties of human social law which are not infrequently evaded, it is regarded as inevitable and inescapable.

The doctrine of reincarnation, bound up as it is with the law of karma, also has implications for the State. And these are contrary to those associated with the statement previously mentioned from the American Declaration of Independence, that "all men are created equal." For it affirms that men are not born equal (if and however they may have been created); and this affirmation appears to be more in accordance with the facts and of

real importance to be recognised. Men are regarded as different at birth: the differences being due to the manner in which in past lives they have built up their nature through the action of the law of karma. Owing to these differences they are fit for particular positions in the State. Some are more constituted to be leaders in religion and thought, some to be rulers, some to be guardians of the peace, some to be manual labourers. Thus there is a basis for a hierarchical form of social organisation in which those fit for the various functions in the State are considered as likely (if not inevitably) to be born in corresponding groups. This does not necessitate any artificial restrictions and is no justification for the pernicious attitudes and practices too often found in the Indian caste system. For it is certainly in line with Indian thought and practice in

the past to recognise that individuals may by their conduct in this life raise themselves to fitness for positions in the State higher than those customary in the groups in which they were born. Similarly they may fall to lower positions. And there is the possibility, with reincarnation, of being born into a higher (or lower) group in a future birth. Further, with reference to the maintenance of morality and social order in the State the real deterrence of the reincarnation theory is more effective than any deterrent penalties which externally the State may set up through its judicial and penal systems. Thus from all the points of view considered in this short discussion the belief in reincarnation is seen to be a fundamental one which properly understood has beneficial effects on the individual and in the State.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

Oft in my brain does that strange fancy roll
 Which makes the present (while the flash does last)
 Seem a mere semblance of some unknown past,
 Mixed with such feelings as perplex the soul
 Self-questioned in her sleep: And some have said
 We lived, ere yet this robe of flesh we wore.

COLERIDGE.

KALIDASA AND SHAKESPEARE

[Dr. Ranjee G. Shahani, D. Litt. (Sorbonne), Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature, is the author of *Shakespeare Through Eastern Eyes*, and has ready for publication *The Pale Galilean* and *The Unploughed Ocean*—a collection of short stories of Indian life.—EDS.]

Beauty, for the European, is something very special, very definite, something clear-cut. It is all that embodies the ideal of the race. It is *their* thought, *their* heart, *their* blood, perpetuated in a handful of dust. It is Greece; it is Rome; it is France; it is England. They are quite sure what beauty means. But some of us have our doubts. We find that beauty is as variable as the types of human beings. There is no "it" about it. An English damsel and an Ethiopian damsel may both be called lovely. To put one above another is sheer idolatry.

The fact is, man is not the same everywhere. This is a truth that is often ignored because most men are unaware of it. The output of each social group has a local habitation and a name. In other words, all thought has a history. Whatever man produces is coloured by his surroundings. Even the most original personality cannot escape this fate.

Through Shakespeare speaks the whole of the Elizabethan age; through Kālidāsa, so far as we can be sure of his date, the best of the epoch of Vikramāditya. To compare and contrast the two is, ultimately, to compare and contrast the spiritual adventure of England with that of India.

This is not possible in a brief essay. All that can be done here is

to suggest some contrast and contact between the two poets. Kālidāsa and Shakespeare, although antipodal in many respects, touch each other at more than one point.

* * *

To begin with some points of contrast. These are the most striking.

Shakespeare lived in a semi-barbarous age, when murder, arson, rape, lechery, existed side by side with the free questings of the spirit. He was, as Romain Rolland aptly remarked to the present writer, only the "most wonderful creature in that superb Elizabethan menagerie." Yes, menagerie is the fittest word to describe the ethos and aroma of the epoch. Kālidāsa, on the other hand, passed his days within a period of great culture, when thought and sentiment had attained a singular maturity and beauty. Here we may contrast the blood and thunder, indeed the mere clatter and noise, of many of Shakespeare's plays with the quiet refinement and studied subtlety of Kālidāsa. This indicates that the one was writing for the incult, brutal mob (the rich and the titled were a mob too), while the other for an audience of knowledge and taste. The Indian poet played, like a master-musician, upon a language rich and harmonious, capable of conveying the subtlest nuances of

thought; the English poet hammered into music, now rude, now wildly beautiful, a tongue still in the making. The butchery of Shakespeare's plays, which often end because no one is left alive on the stage, would have seemed to Kālidāsa and his age a barbarous theme for a poet; to Shakespeare, perhaps, Kālidāsa's swarm of divinities (Indra and the rest) would have appeared nothing less than inter-mundane invalids.

Still deeper differences there are, but we cannot afford to linger over them. Suffice it to say that Shakespeare had no belief in God, no faith in immortality, no trust in the betterment of our lot in a future state. For him this life was the only reality: all else was smoke, dimming the glow of truth. (Shakespeare, by the by, was more anti-Christian than even Nietzsche.) He had occasional mystical glimpses, but no steady or continuous vision. In all this he was the very antithesis of Kālidāsa. The English poet, in his outlook, was probably wiser than the Indian; but he was not half so profound. He put too high a valuation upon man: unlike Kālidāsa, he did not see the unity of all sentient life (let us recall the farewell scene in *Śakuntalā*, Act IV).

* * *

But to come to contacts. In their attitude to love and woman and the charmed world of the faëry the two poets see in parallel.

Women are the foundation of Kālidāsa's art: on them he lavished all the colours on his palette. The same, in lesser degree, is true of Shakespeare also. Both poets, in

their different ways, found themselves fascinated by women of two extreme types: the enchantress and the simple girl. The one gave us Mālavikā and Śakuntalā; the other, Cleopatra and Miranda. And both came to feel that, in the end, *amor vincit omnia*. But both also realised, or, rather, knew, that in order to be happy in this world one had to have illusions. Śakuntalā and Miranda triumph over circumstances not because they are particularly resourceful or masterful, but because they have the capacity to surrender themselves completely, unquestioningly, irrevocably. For them love is a form of dedication. And the two poets, gazing, as it were, from on high, saw that victory in love lies with that person who puts self last. True love, according to them, is a feeling that, once aroused, is independent of time and place. It is a gift from the treasury of Heaven, which neither moth nor rust can corrupt. In brief, the two poets have the same philosophy of love.

Whether we think of Juliet or of Jessica, or of Urvaśī or of Mālavikā, the feeling that comes to birth in these flaming hearts is rendered with a freshness and a grace that are inimitable. Just as the corn ripens, the flower blooms and the noonday sun shines, so do they love, these breathing immortal figures, with all the illusions and enchantments of youth. We have seen them fancy-free; we shall find them passionate lovers. All things ripen in due season.

With a deep and tender glance the two poets have explored the

variegated emotions of these loving souls ; and both have painted for us, with matchless art, the same willing abasement before a beloved spirit, the same domination suffered with delight, and the same devotion that knows how to give all and how to forgive all. But every picture has a reverse side ; and the two poets, who saw woman in all her diversity and complexity, have limned for us, with equal mastery, jealousy in all its nuances.

Perhaps the Hindu poet surpassed his English rival in delicacy and penetration: a sigh, a groan, a smile, a blush, an airy nothing of feeling, conveyed to him the very secret of a woman's soul. The restless and unfastidious genius of Shakespeare found it irksome to linger over these delicate and subtle shades of emotion. Yet, on the whole, both poets had a sharp eye for woman's ways. Only, Kālidāsa's heroines are more deeply imagined and more subtly presented. Shakespeare drew men better, far better, than his Indian rival: women he saw as a man sees them, not as they see themselves or are seen by one of themselves.

The surprising thing, in studying the two poets, is not to see them envisioning love and woman in a similar light, but to find among them parallelisms even in matters of technique. (This is an interesting topic, but we cannot go into it here.) And then, just as they are at one, in the main, in their analysis of the human heart, so they seem to delight in the same great simplicities. Open air, magic, moonlight, fairies, the charmed world of the little people—these, these meant not a little to

them. And, above all, music and flowers.

* * *

Certain English critics, and these the most vocal, exaggerate the importance of Shakespeare. It is crude, primitive or fabulously naïve to look upon the poet as "infallible" and, in any case, as superior to every other artist. This veneration for the bard, converting him into a kind of Mecca and Medina, may be said to be merely a form of national eccentricity. Happily, thinkers are more broad-minded. My friend the late lamented Thomas Whittaker, who knew Shakespeare as well as any specialist, considered the *Prometheus Bound* of Æschylus as the most magnificent thing in European literature. Swinburne, it appears, held the same view. Not long ago Havelock Ellis confessed that he was no longer impressed by the sound and fury of Shakespeare's tragedies, while Professor Emile Legouis, speaking of the comedies and histories, admitted to me that they were full of local and perishable elements. The truth is that there is very little in the work of even the greatest men that is of permanent value. Shakespeare has as much that lasts as most men; but to consider everything of his as sacrosanct is, not to mince words, sheer rubbish.

Personally about half a dozen plays and a few sonnets are all that I care for: there are some things, like *The Merchant of Venice*, which, with the exception of fragments here and there, I find I can scarcely read—my fault perhaps. Less and less am I attracted by what deals

with the show of things. In the bulk of his work Shakespeare is too much of an artist, and paradoxical as it may seem, this was his great limitation. I often feel that there is more humanity in a single page of Dickens than in an entire play of Shakespeare. This may sound odd, but is none the less true.

Kālidāsa had his failures too. The *Race of Raghu*, though sprayed with felicities bright as dewdrops, is a little too reminiscent of the fawning courtier. (There is a kind of kinship between Kālidāsa and Kipling, but this is not the place to dwell upon it.) The *Cycle of the Seasons* is a curious and faithful description of the climate of India, but it is not divine minstrelsy. The *Cloud Messenger* is in a class by itself—a delicate and fragrant masterpiece, fresh as a flower, tender as an Indian night, opalescent as love. *Mālavikāgnimitra*, though a social document of the first importance, is a work of minor import. Sometimes a play issues out of the silence like a fawn from a forest, and then enters into the reservoir of dreams. Of such a kind are *Śakuntalā* and *Vikramorvaśī*—gracious creations, at once delicate and durable, uniting earth and heaven. There is nothing quite like these plays in the litera-

tures of the world: they are *sui generis*.

Shakespeare is better known than Kālidāsa, just as Jack Dempsey is better known than Ramakrishna—even in India! Which merely shows that power, however it may express itself, is more easily recognizable than spiritual beauty. Shakespeare represents the aggressive restlessness of the West; Kālidāsa, the calm “inwardness” of India. The one rushed through life like a tormented and agonised Titan; the other threaded his way with the serenity of a god.

Who is the greater of the two? I think the question is stupid. It argues a certain insensibility to attempt to arrange creative artists in order of merit, as though they were schoolboys at an examination. The inquiry has no meaning for me. Nevertheless, if I were to be pressed for an answer, I should quote the following short dialogue between Rossini and an unknown inquirer:—

“Quel est, à votre sens, le plus grand musicien?”

“Beethoven.”

“Et Mozart?”

“Il est le seul.”

Substitute Shakespeare for Beethoven, and Kālidāsa for Mozart. Need I be more explicit?

RANJEE G. SHAHANI

CHESS, SPORT AND LIFE

[**Rudolf Spielmann** has been a first prize-winner since 1912 in international chess tournaments and is the author of *The Art of Combination* which treats of sacrificial combinations in chess. This article specially written for us has been translated from the German by J. du Mont.—EDS.]

The catchword "Intellectual Sport" is comparatively new, and was unknown a generation ago; it is being used with increasing frequency. There are a number of pursuits which could be named "Intellectual Sport" but, in this connection, one would most readily think of Chess. The late Gyula Breyer, whose premature death in 1922 was so deeply deplored, was the first to speak so of chess. Thus was born a definition, which appears to be the only one suitable to our time. It is in direct contrast to the conception of former times, which fluctuated between the two ideas, whether chess should be called an art or a science. The idealists were naturally in favour of calling it an art; their spokesman was Dr. Tarrasch, who died in 1934, whereas Grand master Rubinstein, now unfortunately no longer on the active list, always spoke of chess as a science. Finally, we have the view of the former world-champion, Dr. Lasker, who maintains that in chess the idea of a struggle predominates, and that we have here a special form of struggle.

If one wishes to term certain intellectual occupations as sport, they must include those characteristics which are commonly found in physical sport. What is sport?

Sport is a contest, fought out with equal weapons; for the ama-

teur, it must never be practised for personal gain, but it should steel body and nerves in preparation for the more serious struggles of life. Let me explain this view. A man or a group of men exert themselves to improve upon the achievements of their respective opponents. There is therefore a struggle which, however, remains of a friendly nature in sharp contrast to the struggle for life, which is never undertaken without there being some goal at stake, or carried on without enmity. The ultimate aim of all struggle for existence is the final overthrow of the opponent; the aim of the sporting contest is merely to do better than he does! And this is done without compulsion, therefore in quite a different manner from the trade-struggle between nations or individuals.

The essential premise of equal weapons is also of the first importance in a sporting contest for, in the struggle for life, equality of weapons only occurs entirely fortuitously. In the main, those well-armed fight here against those who are but indifferently equipped, the rich against the poor, etc. As I see it, the main characteristic of intellectual sport is that the individual develops his natural ability to the best advantage, and is thereby enabled to make the best use of it in every-day life. As a contest

does not only depend on muscular strength, but also requires brain-power, it seems to me that sport should not be restricted to the hardening of muscles, but that mental development should also receive its full share of attention.

Only a few of the current intellectual activities can properly be regarded as sport. For example, all card games would have to be excluded, for here the distribution of weapons (cards) is left to chance. A game such as Bridge is no doubt ingenious as well as difficult, but it cannot be termed a sport in the ordinary sense of the word. Incidentally, even chess could not, as a matter of course, be called a sport. If it were simply a question of finding the best move in every position, it would merely be research work, in which those would have the advantage, who could afford to spend the most time. In other words the premise of equal weapons would no longer apply. This drawback has been overcome by the introduction of chess-clocks. In tournaments each player has the same restricted amount of time at his disposal, on an average three to four minutes for each move. The time used is controlled, and an excess of time employed means the loss of the game.

As in physical sport football is the leading game, so also can chess be said to head the list of intellectual sports. Both require bodily and mental discipline; they are both unusually combinative. Both provide much pleasure for the onlooker. There may be physical sports which are more ingenious, there may be

intellectual sports which are even more difficult, but they no longer appeal to the masses; they are for the select few.

Chess and football are combinative games; their aim is sharply defined, scoring a goal or administering checkmate as the case may be. The highlights are provided by combinations. For outstanding achievements in chess, physical fitness is of far greater moment than is generally supposed, but the co-ordination of brains and brawn is seen far more clearly in football. It is not altogether by chance that many of my younger colleagues are enthusiastic followers of football, first and foremost the new world-champion, Dr. Euwe. At the same time I know amongst football players many lovers of chess. Here in Austria, for instance, several football clubs have their own chess-circle. It is the delight in combination which brings together the followers of these, at first sight, so utterly different sports.

The keen enjoyment of combination is inborn in men, for combination is the deciding factor both in sporting contests and in the fight for existence. Here the mind battles against matter and David has a chance of vanquishing Goliath. Beautiful combinations have an attraction for man, because he is for ever fighting against the forces of nature and he must for ever evolve combinations in order to hold his own. His work, his inventions, his fight for bread or love and his desperate struggle against death—everything depends on combination.

It would lead us too far to discuss

this interesting theme from a general point of view. The chess-board, however, affords us the opportunity of studying the nature of combination. In studying properly annotated games, we can follow accurately the various forces which are opposed or which work together, how their effect can be increased or neutralized, how weaknesses can be masked or the enemy weaknesses can be exploited forcibly. Similar situations may occur wherever there is a struggle, be it in any kind of sport or in real life. The variety of forces on the chess-board, which is a consequence of the different ways in which the pieces move, produces in chess-combinations both beauty and colour and offers practically unlimited possibilities for talent and phantasy. Combination is the soul of chess, and in a broader sphere, the secret of all human successes. One can say that the art of living consists in the art of combination.

Curiously enough, little has been done in the past to popularize the art of combination. Concerning combination in chess, there are numberless books which can be said to be collections of brilliant combinations, but there is lacking an explanation of the nature of combination. I had good reasons for devoting my attention not to combinations in general, but to sacrificial combinations in particular.

Experience has taught us that nearly all chess-combinations are based on some kind of sacrifice. The player gives up material at the outset, but after a more or less compulsory sequence of moves, he reaps some benefit, either by the

favourable recovery of the material sacrificed, or, alternatively, by obtaining an equivalent advantage in position, such as, for instance, a mating attack. A sacrifice demands the correct appreciation of the position at the time; it demands practice, but above all, courage and self-reliance. For the sacrifices which I term "real sacrifices" cannot, at the time of sacrificing, be calculated to the bitter end. The player must take a certain risk and, beyond that, he has to rely on his judgment of the position being correct. The most beautiful combinations in the history of chess have been evolved on this basis and in this way immortal victories have been gained. Not in exact calculation but in the correct appraisal of the situation and of the risk does genius manifest itself. He who never takes a chance may achieve good average successes, but he will remain a schoolmaster and must renounce immortality.

What is said here about chess applies also to life. In life also there are sacrificial combinations and here too they depend on expert knowledge, courage and self-confidence. The hazard is here even more important than in chess, for opposing factors are of far greater influence, the coefficient of security is far smaller, and the principle always to be on the safe side is an idle dream. Bets belong to this category, and their attraction lies in fact in the uncertain result. Quite rightly, therefore, it is considered unfair to bet on a certainty. There is a German saying "He who dares wins." The word "dare" contains

the idea of the sacrifice.

In every-day life we constantly meet the most varied sacrificial combinations. It is of daily occurrence to see a man giving up part of his assets of his own free will, without obtaining at first anything in exchange in the hope that the sacrifice may profit him later on. In most cases the sacrifice is made from desire of increasing worldly wealth, but fame and honours, patriotism, freedom and the like, are frequent grounds for sacrificial combinations, to say nothing of those sacrifices which the believer makes in order to affect the new life after death.

Questions of faith, however, are sacred and for this reason we shall not discuss them here. But there are countless other types of sacrifice. What else are investments, or expenditure incurred in advertising? They are sacrificial combinations undertaken away from the chess-board. Many other instances could be cited.

The game of chess has frequently been described as an image of life. In actual fact sacrificial combinations are in all circumstances subject to the same laws as are those on the chess-board. From the first a distinction has to be made be-

tween a real and a temporary sacrifice. The real sacrifice contains an element of risk; not so the temporary type.

Temporary sacrifices in chess or in life are those in which, at the time of sacrificing, the object aimed at is secured as far as human foresight can anticipate. In chess it is usual to classify such enterprises as sacrifices. In effect this is a misnomer, as we have here nothing more or less than a profitable piece of barter. In speaking of sacrifices in the ordinary way, only real sacrifices are meant. The amount involved and the prospective returns must be in proportion and moreover the risk must not be such that failure of the combination necessarily entails immediate and complete ruin. "Va banque" play, or, in other words, staking one's all on one card is as reprehensible and damaging as is timorous mental diffidence. The desperate play "Va banque"; the unskilful play timidly.

In the fight for existence man must for ever evolve combinations. It is very useful for him to develop the gift of combining. For this he must have presence of mind and driving force.

RUDOLF SPIELMANN

THE SONG OF THE HIGHER LIFE

X.—THE ROYAL SCIENCE AND ROYAL SECRET

[Below we publish the tenth of a series of essays founded on the great textbook of Practical Occultism, the *Bhagavad-Gita*. Each of these will discuss a title of one of the eighteen chapters of the Song Celestial. The writer calls them "Notes on the Chapter Titles of the Gita"—but they are more than notes. They bring a practical message born of study and experience.

This particular study is on the ninth chapter entitled Raja-Vidya Raja-Guhya Yoga.

Sri Krishna Prem is the name taken in the old traditional manner prevailing in India by a young English gentleman when he resolved to enter the path of Vairagya, renouncing his all, including the name given to him at birth. He took his tripos at Cambridge in Mental and Moral Sciences and is a deep student of Indian Philosophy. Away from the world but serving it with faith he lives in the Himalayas, and is esteemed highly for his sincerity, earnestness and devotion.—EDS.]

The One Swan is in the heart of the world;
He verily is the Fire that has entered into the Waters.
Having known Him one crosses over Death;
There is no other Path for going there.

Shwetashwatara Upanishad.

The Royal Secret is not one that can be told in words. Throughout the world runs a tradition of a wondrous Secret sought under different names by men through all the ages. The Philosopher's Stone, the Elixir of Immortality, the Holy Grail, the Hidden Name of God, all these have been the objects of men's quests and all are one if rightly understood. Many have "followed after wandering fires" and others have sold their quest for gold or fame but throughout all ages there have always been a few who trod the Path and found the Shining Secret.

No pen can ever write down this Secret nor can any lips reveal it, but it is written in the inmost heart of man and has lain there through countless ages awaiting the day when the disciple, tearing aside the

veils of ignorance, perceives its blazing letters in his heart. There is no man, however mean or sinful, in whose heart it is not written, but few there are who read its life-giving words.

This is the meaning of the statement that it is *pratyaksh-āvagamam*, to be directly known. On this Path there is no such thing as blind belief. The various faith-mongering creeds urge their adherents to take everything on trust, to believe without question what is written in "revealed" scriptures. But the *Gita* proclaims man's inherent freedom from all such fetters. The man who treads the Path sees for himself the Truth, not in some promised heaven after death, but here in this very life. Here are no books demanding blind unreasoning obedience, no priests waving the

keys which unlock heavens and hells. The Truth, once seen, shines by its own resplendent Light and he who drinks of its waters "shall never thirst again."

No doubt faith is required to reach this Knowledge but that faith is not an intellectual belief in any set of dogmas nor in the efficacy of any priestly rites. The faith required is the inner conviction that sent the Buddha on His lonely quest, the faith that "Surely at last, far off, sometime, somewhere, the veil will lift for his deep-searching eyes"; that *somewhere* there is a Knowledge that will save the world from sorrow, and a determination to rest not till that Knowledge be attained. This is the faith and this the will that has sent out the Seekers of all ages. Its life is rooted not in intellect but in the inner Knowledge itself and thence its rays shoot out, though dimmed by matter, to draw the hearts of men towards the Goal.

How far this Knowledge soars beyond the reach of words is shown by the contradictory descriptions cast on the beaches of our lower worlds. The Upanishadic Seers termed it the knowledge of the Full, the *Atman*; the Buddhists, knowledge of *Anātman*, of the Void. Yet both descriptions were attempts to express the same transcendent Truth, Truth that was known to both but which, when dressed in words, appears in these conflicting forms.

The *Gita*, too, has recourse to paradox (verses 4 and 5), the paradox that all beings dwell and yet do not dwell in the One Supreme. In order to understand this at least

partially—for full understanding only comes with direct knowledge—it should be borne in mind that, throughout the *Gita*, Krishna speaks from different levels. In verse 4, He is speaking of His Great Unmanifested Form (*avyakta mūrti*), the *Parabrahma*, Rootless Root of all. By that Supreme all this world is pervaded; Itself rooted in naught, all beings dwell within its bosom.

Beside or above me naught is there to go,
Love or unlove me, unknow me or know,
I am that which unloves me and loves; I am
stricken and I am the blow.

But in verse 5, Sri Krishna speaks from a "lower" level. We have seen in the previous chapter how from the One spring forth the Two, the Unmanifested Self or Subject and the Unmanifested Root of objectivity. It is the interplay or union of these two that constitutes the Sovereign *Yoga* (*yogamaishwaram*) and in neither of them can "the beings" be said to dwell. Not in the *Mūlaprakriti*, for, though that is indeed the support of beings, itself stands not in its own right but is the appearance of the *Parabrahma* "seen" by the One Unmanifested Self. Like space, It is the great container of all beings and yet, like space, It is not touched by them.

Neither can beings be said to dwell in the Unmanifested Self. That Self is the "nourisher of beings" for, by its creative gaze (*īkshana*) It brought them forth from the unmanifested matrix and holds them in existence; yet they are no more rooted in it than the forms we see are rooted in the sunshine which illumines them. Like space again, It holds them all and

yet is touched by none.

Perhaps the best way to gain some understanding of the mystery is to remember the Hermetic axiom and study the creative process in the microcosm, for, as it says in the *Zohar*, "esoterically the man below corresponds entirely to the Man above." Consider a creative writer in the act of creation. If we look into his "mind" we can see there a number of figures playing their parts with semi-independent life, each with his separate character and deeds, all issuing from a dark unconscious matrix, all lit up by the light of consciousness. These beings seem to live their independent lives (though over all a certain moulding power wields sway). Their creator cannot kill them off at will, nor shield them from the consequences of their acts. They take their being from the seeds of past experience, personal or racial, buried deep within the dark unconscious matrix which is the stage on which they play their little parts. But that dark stage is not their real root. The dark is but the appearance which the root puts on when watched by consciousness, and veils the deep reality which is alike the source of forms and the witnessing consciousness.* But it is time to return to the Macrocosm. By a Mystic union the *yogamaishwaram*

of verse 5, the Unmanifested Self, unites, as it were imaginatively, with the Unmanifested Nature, the *Mūlaprakriti*. The Self leans on or "embraces" (verse 8) the Dark Nature and, at that embrace, the seeds of being buried within from previous universes shoot into life and the Great Descent begins. This descent is a graded perception of increasing objectivity. As the Self "gazes" at each level a further objectivisation takes place resulting in plane after plane of being. Through the mystic union with these levels† the whole cosmic Machine, down to the so-called gross objective matter, whirls and revolves with the indwelling Life, for, as Hermes says, "not a single thing that is dead hath been or is or shall be in this Cosmos."

Nor is this process one which is accomplished once, and then remains for ever. Again and again, as described in the last chapter, the mighty Outbreathing takes place and all the countless beings thread their tangled ways throughout the worlds, to be absorbed again at the next Cosmic Night in which "only the One breathes breathless by Itself."

This is the Truth: As from a blazing fire thousands of sparks of like form issue forth, so from the Imperishable, O friend, manifold beings are produced and thither do return. ‡

* It is not intended to assert that this account of the microcosmic creative process is true for all artists (though it is for some, e.g., R. L. Stevenson) and it is only meant as a suggestive outline. Neither is it intended to equate the *Parabrahma* with the collective unconscious of some modern psychologists nor with the metaphysical unconscious will of Schopenhauer or von Hartmann. The higher levels of being only seem dark to us because their Light is too intense to register through our brains, just as a room blazing with ultra-violet light seems dark to our eyes though not to a camera.

† "Having entered into union (*yoga*) with principle (*tattva*) after principle." (*Shwetāshwatara Upanishad* 6. 3.)

‡ *Mundaka Upanishad* 2. 1. 1.

All that has here been written, all that can be written, is but a web of words, a ladder by whose help we seek to scale the ramparts of Eternity. Viewed by the eye of wisdom all this clash of world with world, the Sparks which fly from the Eternal Anvil, are but a vast phantasmagoria. Nothing is outbreathed nor anything descends to rise again. All are the visions of the Eternal Mind; the changing finite centres that are us ourselves being but the countless points of view within that mighty Whole, "for there is naught in all the world that is not He."*

But few there are whose souls are of such stature that they can look upon the highest Truth and live. In him who sees before his soul is perfect, love and compassion die, killed by that freezing Knowledge, and all the strivings of a million lives are lost, and he who might have been a lamp to suffering men chooses *Nirvāna* and is lost to us as though at no time had he ever been.

Let us take up our web of words again lest too much knowledge, like the Gorgon's head, should freeze us where we stand. Though the One Self projects the Cosmic Wheel and fills it with Its life-blood, yet is that Self not bound upon its whirling spokes. Filled by the One Life, countless beings strive, enjoy or

suffer, die and come to birth again, and yet that One Life is for ever free, "seated like one indifferent, unattached to actions" (verse 9).

I saw the King of Kings descend the narrow doorway to the dust
With all His fires of morning still, the beauty, bravery, and lust.
And yet He is the life within the Ever-living Living Ones,
The Ancient with Eternal youth, the cradle of the infant Suns.

Men sin and suffer, act and reap the fruits and yet the *Atman* seated in their hearts, the Self whose life moves all that is, impelling all to action, feels not the sting of death but lives forever, free and unattached even in the very web of deeds. This is the mystery of the Divine Action; he who knows its secret comes not to birth again (ch. 4, verse 9). The little figures on the writer's inner stage, ensouled by him, made of his very being, weave out their destinies, bound by their own past acts, and yet his contemplative consciousness is free.† So is the *Atman* free though through Its life the Cosmic Wheel revolves. "He ever is at work, Himself being what He doeth. For did He separate Himself from it, all things would then collapse and all must die."‡

Two types of men are found in the world. The first are those who unite their being with the deceitful outer nature (*mohini prakriti*) the ever changing world of transient

* Hermetic Corpus 5, 9. (Mead's translation).

† Those whose hearts may feel tempted to revolt at the idea of the free Self calmly watching the bound selves should remember that it is not any personal extra-cosmic God who is here spoken of but *our own* true Self, seated within *our* hearts. Were He not ever free we could not break our bonds. In Him alone is freedom, truth and immortality. The analogy of the writer should not be made to yield the inference of a personal Cosmic Author. Even here, genuine artistic creation springs from a level quite beyond the author's personal self.

‡ Hermetic Corpus 11-14 (Mead's Translation).

forms (verse 12). These are those foolish ones (verse 11) who disregard the shining *Atman*, seeing only the perishable bodies which It ensouls. Therefore are they said to be empty of hope, for there can be no hope in forms that come and go; and empty of deeds, for deeds can have no meaning save as the service of the One Eternal Life.

In contrast with these are the wise ones who unite their being with the *daivi prakriti*, the Divine Life which flows like *Gangā* through the triple world ensouling all the forms, the stainless living Radiance streaming from the imperishable Source of all. Ever united with that living Light, firm in the vow* which offers self in service of Self, they turn their gaze within and see the radiant Source as One beyond all forms and yet as manifold within the hearts of all.

From that Source, the Father, Mother, All-supporter of the Cosmos, comes forth the fire of life and the creative waters of desire (verse 19). All that is manifest, as well as what is still unmanifest, comes from that wondrous Treasure House (*nidhānam*).

The higher up the Path of Light a man ascends, the more gloriously radiant are the forms which It ensouls, and there are always many who climb a certain height only to lose themselves in heavenly enjoyments.† But, if this temptation is yielded to, the energy of the ascent is dissipated among those fair crea-

tions and when it is spent, the pilgrim soul is carried down by the unresting cycles and must, the circumstances good or ill, start on this earth once more its upward climb. The seeds buried in the darkness of earth shoot up and bear their fruit in the free air, the corn seven cubits high that grew in the Egyptian Fields of *Ahloo*, and then return as seeds once more to earth.

Though this is called the Path of Darkness in the previous chapter, yet is it only such in contrast to the glorious Path of Light. It is the normal cyclic path of human life throughout the long ages of evolution during which the souls, lured by desire (*kāmakāmā*), must know and suffer all before they take the Homeward Path.

It is only for the grown soul of the disciple that this path becomes a snare to be avoided, for he is one who has renounced desire and may not without shame yield to the lure of heaven. His duty is to offer up himself in sacrificial service to the One Great Life that is the Lord of all (verse 24); all other worship is an obstacle for him. Forms in the psychic world, spirits of the blessed dead, the shining Gods themselves, all these exist beyond the world of men and all have drawn the souls of men in worship. But the result of worship is assimilation to the being who is worshipped and no God, limited himself by name and form, can give the Soul that State which is beyond all limitations. These

* Compare these "firm vows" (verse 14) with the vow of the Bodhisattvas: "As the chain of births is endless, so long shall I live the holy life for the well-being of all creatures." (Shantideva).

† At the time when the *Gita* was written this gaining of heavenly enjoyments after death had come to be considered the path taught by the Vedas (verses 19 and 20).

shining forms may serve to lead men upwards and make them blossom in the higher worlds; but blossoms fade and must return to earth, this drab but wondrous earth in which alone the plant of life can grow.

The Path of Liberation is for men alone. The Gods are stopping-places on the way, fair forms for most, but veritable Moloch mouths for him who treads the Homeward Path, since, once assimilated to their being, there is no onward path save through the womb of earth again. The disciple at this stage must leave the forms and see the Light that shines through all for it is by that Light that all are glorious. The worshippers of Gods are ignorant for they see but the forms and not the Light of that Unknown Eternal without which they are nothing.

But, comes the question, how can that Light be worshipped? Stainless, serene, eternally transcendent, "That from which speech turns back together with the mind, unable to attain," * how can we soar to that Eternal Krishna? The Way to Him is not through any complicated rites or ceremonials but through sheer giving. The disciple must reverse that process of grasping which builds up a personal self and strive to give away instead of getting. First with symbolic gifts of leaves and flowers and fruit but afterwards with the gift of self (verse 27), the consecration of all acts to Him. Nor should any think his gifts are not accepted. All gifts, however small, are

"accepted" because all giving is a breaking down and weakening of the barrier which, like some iron egg-shell, cuts off the soul from the wide life outside. The smallest act of giving is a step upon that Path and leads the soul by easy steps to that sublime stage where the whole personal life with all its acts and thoughts and feelings is dedicated to the service of the One in all, where acts can bind no more since self is dead and naught remains that can be bound by them.

The Way is taught but each must tread it by himself. "The same am I to all beings; there is none hateful to Me nor dear." No special privileges can be found upon this Path. He who seems to climb with glorious ease to-day is not a favoured darling of the Gods but one who reaps the fruit of arduous struggles yesterday, while he whose breath comes hard upon the mountain path may know for certain that, if he persists, a time will come when he too will gain the athlete's grace and mastery.

There is no other way to Krishna than giving of the self to Him in service. By his own efforts each must climb the Path, but always Krishna stands within the soul and none who seeks to offer up himself can be refused the chance. Though he must climb in weary loneliness, striving alone with his own heart, yet is that loneliness a mere illusion, for there, unseen, "closer to him than breathing, nearer than hands and feet," stands his eternal Friend and inmost Self. Nothing inter-

* *Taittiriya Upanishad* 2. 4. 1.

poses between him and his inner God except the veil of egoism which he himself has made and which is thinned and weakened by each unselfish act of giving.

Therefore is it said that even if the most sinful of men turns to Him and serves Him with undivided heart, he too must be accounted righteous for he too has entered on the Homeward Path. True, the self-assertive acts that constitute the evil of his past have left him with a legacy of tendencies that he will have to struggle hard to overcome, for nothing can annihilate deeds that have once been done. To seek to have their consequences washed away by any magic or by any prayers is merest superstition but, even so, no man is ever fettered utterly. A man may sin a thousand times and by those acts so strengthen his lower self that it is almost certain he will sin again next time. Almost, but not quite certain, for in everyone shines the free *Atman* and, where That exists, no bondage can be absolute. Always a man *can* turn and climb the upward path, for the Divine Freedom that is in his heart can never be annulled, and even the very power by which he sins, traced

to its source, springs from the Stainless One.

Once the resolve is made *and kept* to act in future for the higher, not the lower self, progress is speedy* (verse 31) and the Path is entered on, which leads at last to the Eternal Peace. Though there will many times be fallings off and failures, yet, once the link with the Divine Self has been established, the disciple cannot fall again into the utter darkness. Something has awakened within him which will never let him rest again in matter, and, though at times he may even fight against it, the inner pull will ever and again be felt, and, like a big fish held on a slender line, he will eventually be brought out of the stream to land, for, as Krishna says, "know thou for certain that my devotee perishes never." †

The *Atman* dwells within the hearts of all and therefore is this path open to all without distinction of race, caste, or sex. The *Vedic* path needed a wealth of learning and therefore was inevitably closed to those, such as women and the *Sudra* caste, who were debarred by social rules from *Vedic* study. ‡ This Path, calling only for sincere self-giving, needs no scriptural or

* The word "speedy" must be interpreted relatively since we know from chap. 7 verse 19, that the Path is one which takes many lives to tread. The process is called speedy here in contrast to the age-long wanderings in the wilderness of self. This is of course all past history for the disciple who has reached the stage represented by this chapter.

† The symbolism of the soul caught on the line of the Divine Fisher is found in many ancient mysteries and underlies the statement of Jesus about "fishers of men." For details see Eisler's "Orpheus the Fisher."

‡ Verse 32 must not be taken as sanctioning the relegation of woman to an inferior place in society. When the *Gita* was written (as to a large extent even now) women were in fact depressed and practically deprived of the advantages of education. Sri Krishna is not supporting this but pointing out that even with these handicaps, this Path is open for them. The phrase "womb of sin" refers to the fact that the *karmic* penalty for wasted opportunities is loss of opportunity in future, and so a birth in one of those sections of society which, *at that given time and place*, suffer in fact from lack of freedom and opportunity. It should not be taken as justifying such a state of society.

philosophic learning and so is available to all, since all the Knowledge that is needed comes of itself to him who gives himself.

Therefore the Teacher sums up all that He has said in one brief verse, a verse whose great importance may be seen from the fact that the same verse (with an insignificant variation) is used to sum up the completed teaching at the end of chapter eighteen.

On Me fix thy mind ; give thyself in love to Me ; sacrifice to Me ; prostrate thyself before Me ; having thus united thy whole self (to Me), with Me as thy Goal, to Me shalt thou come.

The disciple must with his pure

mental vision see Him, the One in all, and with his heart offer himself in love. His active powers he must use in sacrificial service and, as prostration, see the personal self as naught before that mighty Whole. Thus in balanced union, avoiding any one-sided intellectualism, emotionalism or activity, head, heart and hands all fixed on Him, filled with Him, transmuted to His nature, he treads the Royal Path on which the Soul, dying to self, rising again in Self, knows the Eternal Swan and, having known, crosses beyond all death.

SRI KRISHNA PREM

My foolish love went seeking Thee at dawn
Crying *O Wind, Where is Kanhya gone ?*

I questioned at noonrise the forest glade
O rests my Lover in thy friendly shade ?

At dusk I pleaded with the dove-grey tides
O tell me where my Flute-player abides.

Dumb were the waters, dumb the wood, the wind,
They knew not where my Playfellow to find.

I bowed my weeping face upon my palm
Moaning *Where art Thou, O Sweet Ghanashyam ?*

Then like a boat that rocks from keel to rafter
My heart was shaken by Thy hidden laughter,

Then didst Thou mock me with Thy tender malice,
Like nectar bubbling from my own heart's chalice.

Thou saidst, O faithless one self-slain with doubt,
Why seekest thou My loveliness without ?

And askest wind or wave or flowering dell
The Secret that within thyself doth dwell ?

I am of thee, as thou of Me a part,
Look for Me in the mirror of thy heart.

SAROJINI NAIDU

AUTHENTIC LEADERS

[In this article **Dr. Kalidas Nag**, Editor of *India and the World*, makes an appeal to leaders of Asiatic thought to rise from their lethargy and bring to light for the benefit of posterity the undying legacy they have gained from their authentic leaders in the past.—EDS.]

From the earliest mytho-epic speculations to the latest scientific deductions we find a striking uniformity in judging Life as something moving, something not lacking in "go." Opinions differ with regard to the direction of the movement towards some mysterious goal and to the delineation of the graph of progress. But we are sure that the whole creation, a living entity termed *Jagat* in Sanskrit, is part and parcel of a colossal *going* concern.

Where are we going? Are we going unaided, naturally, automatically, mechanically, or are we being led, guided, directed? These are questions which agitated the mind of our remote Vedic ancestors as they are agitating us to-day, developing so many conflicting theories of progress.

A study of the facts of our progress, however, leads to a definite conclusion that very few of us are born leaders, while most of us are being led, raising naturally the difficult psycho-ethical question of the *Guru*. However corrupted to-day, the institution of the *Guru* was noble and uplifting. Its pristine condition may be well described thus:—the *Guru* was not there to command, though the *Chela* lived by obedience. The *Guru* did not pull-and push the *Chela*, now here, now there, but ever instructed by suggestion and hint, enabling the pupil to see deeper so that he might

live more intelligently. Thus in every *Yuga* in India we find spiritual leaders in one form or another, as Vedic Gods, as Divine Rulers, as Wise Sages—ever the compassion-aters of men. Ever and always the Celestials and the Terrestrials mixed and mingled, not only in the individual practitioner of the Righteous Life but in the corporate society as well.

Already in the pearly light of the Vedic dawn we appealed to the Shining Ones:—

O Agni ! take us by the good path
leading to welfare and blessing.
(*R.V.*, I. 189,1)

O Varuna and Mitra ! lead us forward.
O Venerable Indra and Maruts !
Show us the best way to prosperity.
(*R.V.*, I. 90)

Direct me O Rudra ! that I may not
deserve thy wrath. (*Y.V.*, xv. 15)

Let my inspiring hymn go forth to
Vishnu the all-pervasive One.
(*R.V.*, 124,3)

Thus a veritable pantheon of primordial leaders surrounded our Vedic ancestors who philosophised with a sublime agnosticism wherein we guess their answer through their challenging question itself:—

He who gives breath or soul (*atmada*),
who gives strength (*balada*), who
commands or leads all (even) the
gods ; whose shadow is Death as well as
immortality (*Yasya cchayamrtam yasya
mrtyuh*), to what God shall we offer our
oblations? (*R.V.*, x. 121,2)

Coming down from the remote
Samhitās to the *Brāhmanas* of the

later Vedic period, we find that Daivic leaders like Indra came to be consecrated into quasi-human Ruler-Leaders. The grand coronation ceremony of the *Mahâbhiseka* shows this. In the eternal fight between the spirits of Good and Evil, there is no victory except through the King-Leader. Hence *Râjan* comes to arrest anarchy and Indra and Varuna are styled *Smrât* or imperial rulers (*R. V.*, v. 85; vii. 82).

Occasionally the sacerdotal texts present us with the portrait of a human ruler-leader like Sudas in the section of the "Battle of Ten Kings" and the Vedic Sudas has his epic incarnations in Sagara, Raghu and a host of other leaders of men crowding the epic canvas of Vâlmiki and Vyâsa. In the *Râmâyana* and the *Mahâbhârata* we read about not only the deification of the human hero kings, but the humanization of the gods as well. In the opening cantos of our premier epic *Râmâyana* we find a wonderfully poetic narrative of creative evolution from the geological formations (*Ram.*, I, 36—37) to the descent, under the guidance of Bhagîratha, of the Ganges to the earth. We also read of colossal feats like the excavation of the ocean beds and the churning of the ocean, finally leading to the creation of the archetypes of life and society (*Ram.*, I, 40-45). The Vedic or possibly pre-Vedic Rudra-Śiva and Vishnu-Krishṇa came to dominate the stage of Hindu leadership, with such a brilliant gallery of leaders (*netṛ nayajñā*) and with such a sublime improvisation on *nîti* (Science of Polity) in the *Sântiparvan*.

In the domain of intellectual and moral leadership also we get now the personal touch. The hymns of the Sage Dîrghatamas prepare the way for the profound speculations of Yâjñavalkya and specially of his noble wife Maitreyî who uttered the sublimest prayer of humanity:—

Lead us from the unreal to the Real,
from darkness to Light, from death to
Immortality.

What a lead to Humanity from
this prophetic daughter of India!

Rulers of men from our *Kshattriya* group (and not the *Brâhmanas* only) have often emerged as great leaders of thought and spirit like Janaka and Bhîṣma, Mahāvira and Buddha. Our people have expressed their gratitude by the poetic deification of their Hero-Kings *par excellence*, Râma of Vâlmiki and Krishṇa of Vyâsa. These are some of our authentic leaders and it is difficult to find in literature a more noble characterization of temporal leadership than that of Râma (*Ram.*, I, 1) or of spiritual leadership than that of Krishṇa in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* of the *Mahâbhârata*.

Quasi-legendary and literary apotheosis apart, India has produced, throughout her well-differentiated historic epochs, authentic leaders like Mahāvira and Buddha, Asoka and Vikramāditya, Śankarâchârya and Râmânuja, Nânak and Chaitanya, Kabir and Dadu, Tiruvalluvar and Tukârâm, Akbar and Sivaji, to mention only a few of the great galaxy of our classical and mediæval epochs. Even during the disintegration of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the nation was at its lowest ebb of

political and social consciousness, we have had Baji Rao and Ranjit Singh, Rammohun Roy and Swami Narayan, Ramakrishna and Vivekānanda, Tagore and Gandhi. Statecraft and politics, religious reform and social reconstruction, creative genius and service to suffering humanity, almost every noble and edifying cause has developed its master leaders to rouse the flagging faith and to awaken the creative urge of the prostrate nation. It could not always follow the exact terms of their teaching on account of its stunted intellect and semi-paralysed will; but the directions of our authentic leaders, through centuries of successes and failures, are written in characters of fire, illuminating even the darkest pages of our history.

Political triumph, imperialistic expansion and economic exploitation have characterized the march of the Occident along the so-called path of progress. The will-o'-the-wisp of that progress is confounding Western humanity to-day, caught in the grip of violence and suicide by the hypnotism of unholy leadership; so much so, that progress appears but a path of endless rapine and slaughter of fellow beings! Through the fumes of the blood-bath, the West is getting now and then a draught of fresh air purifying the lungs; the pure air of Peace and Fraternity blown from the infinite horizon of Oriental spirituality—Buddha and Lao-tze, Confucius and Jesus amongst others as our leaders heralding a new

Dawn. Self sublimated through self-sacrifice, possession transformed into renunciation, the immediate merged in the ultimate, nationality in humanity, the temporal in the eternal—what a marvellous transvaluation of values, what heights undreamt of! Such visions and realizations of our authentic leaders may, for a few years more, rouse the cynical laughter of our pseudo-leaders. But through unheard-of suffering and degradation, violence and cataclysm, Humanity, let us hope, will shake off the obsessions of the present and look for help to its never-failing leaders of all ages and climes. A new consecration of violence, in the form of Fascism, Nazism and their breed, in this scientific age, is slowly but surely undermining the faith of mankind in the so-called Progress and the cult of Efficiency. This is just the time when the small fraternity of "Clairvoyant Star-gazers" of all lands, especially of the immense horizon of the Orient, should remember one another and reopen the deathless scriptures written and unwritten, the grandest legacies of our authentic leaders. Let their name be in the rosary of all men and women of faith and let their messages live again in our rejuvenated will and reawakened soul! May the blessing of our spiritual leaders encourage us, in this very Age of Rebarbarization, to strive for the re-establishment of the kingdom of the compassionate mind and the enlightened heart!

KALIDAS NAG

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE*

Different systems of philosophy constructed to render intelligible man's place in the Universe, his relationship with the Supreme and the real goal of existence, have emphasised that understanding or philosophy involves a programme of practical discipline. Still Indian thought is unique in having given the world the highly organized scheme of Yoga (*Yoga-Darsana*), the practical pursuit of which is believed to secure freedom from transmigration. In the four volumes under notice, the scheme of "Sadhanas" is explained by Aurobindo, by the first Disciples of Ramakrishna and by Swami Rajeswarananda. These cannot be dismissed as mere doctrinaires. They have put the scheme into active practice with varying degrees of success and realization.

In the *Bases of Yoga* extracts from Aurobindo's letters to his disciples are brought together. They contain information regarding mind-control with a view to enjoying bliss of the spirit. It is an error to suppose that Aurobindo's Yoga is anything novel. It is the eight-limbed (*ashtanga*) Yoga attributed to Patanjali. The Yoga system demands severe discipline of mind and body. Students would like to have answered: What is the theory of Yoga? What are the details of the practical programme? What is the goal? The literature available in Sanskrit on Yoga, the Yoga-sutra, Bhashya and some Upanishads and the *Hatha-Yoga-Pradipika* give some definite answers, but Aurobindo's letters teem with terminology which obscures the truth.

The whole principle of this Yoga is to give oneself entirely to the Divine alone and to nobody and nothing else and to bring down into ourselves by the union with the Divine Mother-Power all the transcendent light, force, wideness, peace, purity, truth-consciousness, and Ananda of the supra-mental Divine. (p. 164)

Or again, touching the advanced practice of releasing the latent energy by awakening the "Kundalini-Sakti," Aurobindo writes, "When one does Yoga this force rises upward to meet Divine Consciousness and Force that are waiting above us" The advice tendered is nebulous. "Get the psychic being in front and keep it there." (p. 83) "Develop the cosmic consciousness." (p. 84) "Let the power of the Mother work in you." (p. 86) "What is needed is psychic opening in the physical consciousness." (p. 195)

Readers are bound to be struck by the heart-to-heart directness and simplicity when they turn from Aurobindo's letters to "Spiritual Talks" and "The Message of Our Master." They deal with the same subject-matter of freedom from the troubles of life and existence. Some of the disciples of Ramakrishna emphasise the Path of Devotion, others the Paths of Knowledge and Action.

The volume "Words of Wisdom," written from the author's diary-notes, also contains choice counsel on self-realization.

These volumes will kindle the interrogative urge in critics and aspirants alike. Philosophy is not abstract speculation or dogmatic doctrine. Philosophy essentially involves practice which

* *Bases of Yoga*. By AUROBINDO. (Arya Publishing House, Calcutta. Rs. 3.)

Spiritual Talks. By the First Disciples of Ramakrishna. (Advaita Asrama, Calcutta. Rs. 1-12.)

The Message of Our Master. By the First Disciples of Ramakrishna. (Advaita Asrama, Calcutta. Rs. 1-4.)

Words of Wisdom. By SWAMI RAJESWARANANDA. (Adhyatma Prakasa Karyalaya, Bangalore. As. 12.)

has a double movement—towards the Self and towards one's fellow men. A rational regulation of this double movement is contemplated by the system of Yoga which is yet to be studied by modern minds in its proper perspective. That attitude of modern mankind is essentially practical. Pure science is losing its hold on men's minds, and applied sciences are claiming all attention. *Yoga is an applied science.*

If the promise Yoga holds out and the goal of Yogic discipline are to be properly evaluated, the postulate has to be admitted that the values and attractions of life are enslaving forces, and that

detachment from them is the only liberating agency. The goal of philosophic endeavour is escape from births and deaths. For those who deny transmigration and those who passionately cling to sense-satisfactions, Yoga and its discipline will hold no fascination. Only one who sternly refuses to yield to the blandishments of life can appreciate the value of Yoga. The future of the applied science of Yoga must depend on the response it elicits from modern mankind. The response in India and other countries seems lamentably poor. These volumes will have served their purpose if they quicken that response.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

The Coolie: A Novel of India. By MULK RAJ ANAND. (Lawrence and Wishart, London. 7s. 6d.)

In an earlier work called *Untouchable*, the author sought to depict the break-up of the caste system. The present novel deals with the "working" class, which has come into being with the rise of industrialism in India, and in a later book, *All Men Are Equal*, the author will deal with the break-up of the old village economy. In this way he expects to depict the social revolution that Britain has effected among the poorer classes in India.

The author chooses for his hero an unsophisticated cowherd boy of fourteen and within practically a year takes him through the most varied scenes and experiences. The boy leaves his village for work as a domestic in a small town, from which he soon runs away to serve in a pickle factory in a feudal city, from there to live as a mill hand in the slums of Bombay, and finally to die in Simla, having worn out his lungs as a rickshaw coolie. The author is at his best when describing the boy's hopes and fears, his joys and sorrows, his unconscious impulses and desires. He shows an amazingly detailed knowledge of the conditions in which "working" people live in India, and of the way their minds work. This is all the more remarkable seeing that the writer lives

and writes in England. His description of them is vivid and true to fact, but so far as his other characters go, there is a tendency to exaggeration amounting often to caricature. Thus for example is the abject servility his characters show to the "white" man. The behaviour of Sir and Lady Todar Mal is crude in the extreme. The author's sympathy being with the poor, he evidently sees nothing but greed and coarseness in the life of the rich. The reader unacquainted with life in India will certainly be misled in regard to conditions in this country if he forgets this tendency of the author to caricature and satire. The book is also marred by suggestive and sometimes open references to sex matters.

Hopes rise high when one comes across a book in English on India by an Indian, for one is disappointed with the volumes written in English by foreigners who either paint the picture in too bright or too dark colours. Further, a novel can more truly give an insight into the actual conditions in which people live than an essay or philosophical treatise on the subject. The book therefore has much in its favour, and when in addition to this the author has a style that grips and will not let the reader put it down till he has read it from cover to cover, one is sure that the book will find a wide market.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

In the Shadow of To-morrow: A Diagnosis of the Spiritual Distemper of our Time. By J. HUIZINGA. Translated from the Dutch by J. H. Huizinga. (Heinemann, London. 7s. 6d.)

Dissertations upon the various "distempers" of Western civilization are two-a-penny in these days; the difficulty is to select among their numbers those which really touch the root of the matter. Professor Huizinga's volume takes its place with the few by reason of two qualities: his insight, based on great knowledge, and a brevity which compels him to keep his outlines clear. His essay is, from first to last, a very general statement, pointed by indications rather than examples, but it is the better for that. The reader who does not shy from his downright opening sentence: "We are living in a demented world," will himself already have recognized many or most of the symptomatic aspects of that insanity, and will prefer this setting forth of them side by side, the drawing of the threads together in a convincing if alarming pattern, to the further elaboration which is what most such books attempt.

The evil, as Professor Huizinga sees it, is the increasing dominance of a "will to exalt *being* and *living* over *understanding* and *valuing*," to declare existence—that is, survival—the only criterion, to assert, in short, that *Might is Right*. Symptoms of such an attitude are discernible everywhere, in the general decline of the critical spirit, the cheapness of popular judgments, the deterioration of personal and public morals, the deification of the militant "hero," the prevalence of superstition and "puerility," the movement of art and literature away from reason towards a formless emotionalism, the wide acceptance of the moral

as well as political autonomy of the arbitrary national State—a total drive on every level towards a sometimes outwardly regimented but always inwardly chaotic anti-intellectualism.

The whole book is a passionate plea for that true intellectualism which is so much more than nineteenth-century rationalism. Man, for the author, is human by virtue of his "understanding," and "valuing" faculties, and to deny them is to return to the beast.

What then would he set against these powerful disintegrative forces? Here, alas, is the book's weakest part. So far as it goes it is moving in the right direction: "A return to reason and rationalism is not enough to help us out of the whirlpool. The counterweight to the co-operation of destructive factors can only be found in the highest metaphysical and ethical values." "What is required is an internal regeneration of the individual." We are "to purify the heart." We are also to "cultivate internationality" wherever we may come upon it.

All these things are good, and true. But stated so they lack force and, save in the most general sense, direction. One must regenerate, one must purify, in relation to something. Internationality is not enough. One must have religion. Professor Huizinga seems to recognize that, in writing of "the recognition or retrieval of eternal truths, truths that are above the stream of evolution and change," but the time for such generalities (pointed by no more than a passing reference to Jesus) is over. In so desperate a situation we are entitled to ask that men shall preach their faiths in terms of particularities—what *they* believe—and of action—what *they* will do.

GEOFFREY WEST

Freedom and Culture. By SIR S. RADHAKRISHNAN. (G. A. Natesan and Co., Madras. Re. 1.)

This brochure brings together lectures delivered between 1927 and 1935. In these days of unemployment and depression for men with university careers,

the definition of a university as "a society of seekers of truth who believe that there are things in life of vastly greater importance than wealth and comfort, necessary as these are" and the statement that "to belong to a University is to share this way of looking

at things and feeling about them, to acquire this largeness of view which can assuage the asperities of life," (p. 31) may sound like platitudes. "Every student of a University," Sir S. Radhakrishnan declares, "should know in a general way the things that give value, meaning and dignity to human life, the arts and pursuits that give man his vocation on this planet." (p. 35) It is good to ponder how far our Universities help towards this end.

Various fields of educational and national reform are covered. Universi-

ty youths are advised to train themselves for leadership in the new democratic social order in which they have to move, always keeping true to the heritage of the glorious past. The concluding lectures relate to the responsibility of our leaders in educating public opinion and of women in the fields of educational and social reform. "To liberate individuals from the bonds laid on them by external authority is good and necessary"; but liberation from "the servitude to one's own passions and desires is equally necessary and urgent." (p. 156)

S. V. V.

The New Culture in China. By LANCELOT FORSTER, with an Introduction by Sir Michael E. Sadler. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

This is a collection of miscellaneous articles and essays rather than a book with a central theme to it. They lack coherent unity, and the author's own opinion on the numerous questions which he raises is not easily discoverable. He is fond of gliding over subjects without really discussing them. After reading about the Revival of Confucianism we find ourselves wondering whether it is or is not reviving, or likely to revive, or whether it is desirable that it should do so. "The Moral Issue in China" deals with much the same problems as the next chapter, "China and Western Science," but there is little in either of them that one can get one's teeth into, so to speak. These essays, in short, are generally suggestive, but also a little rambling and inconclusive. However, the book improves as it goes on. The disquisition on "America and China" does make us understand why the Chinese of to-day turn to the Republic of the West, in preference to any European country, for their new ideals in education, economics, and politics. The account of Sun Yat-sen is shrewd and penetrating and the character of the Pater Patriæ is not unjustly summed up in the words, "he felt rather than thought." But nothing is said about the "Three Principles" he enunciated, which form the heading to this

chapter. The general reader has some cause of complaint against Professor Forster for omitting to tell him what they are.

The author, being Professor of Education in the University of Hongkong, may be allowed to speak with authority on the Mass Education Movement in China. He regards it "not as an unsettling process, to uproot the individual from his environment, but as a system which will give a fuller, richer, and better life to the farming community." This is well said; but why water down his conviction as to the desirability of education by limiting it to "the average citizen"? What is an average citizen? It would be better to say boldly, "every citizen," which is probably what he means. The Chinese have always been intellectually inclined, though so many of them are illiterate, and they will not be slow to grasp any opportunity for self-cultivation that may offer. Already, thanks largely to American sympathy and enlightened co-operation, the progress made is greater than most of us realize. Mere figures, of course, may be misleading, but it is certainly surprising to learn that there are now in China as many as 59 universities containing 33,847 students, 3,500 of whom are women. The book concludes, aptly enough, with an appreciation of Dr. Hu Shih, one of the great protagonists of the modernist movement. From personal acquaintance I am happily able to confirm what Professor

Forster says with regard to his lovable disposition and intellectual honesty.

From a scholar's point of view, there is a good deal of inexcusable slovenliness in these pages. There are some bad misprints and mistakes in transliteration, and the few incursions into Chinese history, language and literature are distinctly unfortunate. To take a single example: in speaking of the "encyclopædia of hundreds of volumes, which forms one of four sets, produced three

hundred years ago," Professor Forster seems to be confusing two quite distinct productions: the encyclopædia *T'u shu chi ch'êng* in 10,000 *chüan* which was printed just over two hundred years ago, and the great collection of works in four divisions, comprising some 79,000 volumes, known as the *Ssü k'u ch'üan shu*, of which seven complete sets were prepared in manuscript towards the end of the eighteenth century, but only four now remain.

LIONEL GILES

The Sayings of Confucius. Translated by LEONARD A. LYALL (Longmans, Green and Co., London. 7s. 6d.)

A landmark in Chinese history, five centuries B.C., is the appearance of Confucius the Sage, whose greatness is enshrined in his life and teachings. immeasurably superior to the ordinary run of mankind, he taught a doctrine which remains as practical to-day as it was in ancient times.

We welcome this new edition of the Confucian Analects as a valuable asset to the storehouse of Oriental literature. Unfamiliarity with Eastern nomenclature has been a common plea for ignorance of Eastern classics. This excuse, however, falls away as such English translations and editions multiply.

The main contents of the *Lun-yü* of Confucius the Codifier are more ethical than religious. The mission of every great spiritual reformer has ever been the transmission of knowledge. Following in the footsteps of his predecessors without claiming any revelation Confucius repeats: "A teller and not a maker, one that loves and trusts the past; I might liken myself to our old P'eng" (p. 27). A footnote here adds—"We should be glad to know more of old P'eng but nothing is known of him." According to legend, however, he is said to have disappeared into the West (*i.e.*, Tibet) in the eleventh century B. C. at the age of eight hundred years.

Like Confucius, his great contemporary Lao-Tse, who indicated the path of Soul-purity, was also a transmitter

of spiritual truths. His influence is apparent in the teachings of Confucius though the latter had met Lao-Tse but once in his lifetime. One finds however the following unfair criticism by the translator in the Introduction: "Lao-tzu taught that in inaction alone peace can be found"—an idea which has often been misunderstood. Lao-Tse's own statement on the subject however provides an understanding of his concept of the nature of action. "To act without acting—to conduct affairs without trouble of them." This is an echo of the teachings of Shri Krishna in the *Gita*. "No one ever resteth a moment inactive," "Although engaged in action he really doeth nothing," etc.

A further trace of similarity is discernible in the qualifications of the Wise Man depicted in the *Gita* and the marks of the Spiritual Man as set forth by Confucius. The Chinese word *Chün-tzü* is an elusive term, and though Mr. Lyall interprets it as "gentleman," it does not approximate to the original. Outer mannerisms regardless of inner culture characterise a "gentleman" to-day—whereas in the definition of Confucius the primary requisites are the noble qualities of mind and of heart. Hence the appellation "Superior Man" for *Chün-Tzü* is more appropriate as we discover from the following statements:—

"A gentleman has no likes or dislikes below heaven. He follows right." "A gentleman is calm and spacious; the small man is always fretting." "A gentleman knows neither sorrow nor fear."

Likewise *Jen* translated "love" is not a happy rendering. The interpretation of a former translator, Mr. Giles, was "natural goodness of heart as shown in intercourse with fellow-men." The following definitions however seem nearer the mark: "Innate virtue," "natural morality," "to rank the effort above the prize."

Another noteworthy feature of Confucianism is its reference to the tremendous influence exerted by the natural leaders

of men on the masses. Confucius in describing this responsibility shows how the ideation of leaders is capable of transforming for weal or for woe the thought-currents of the *hoi polloi*:—

A gentleman's mind is the wind, and grass are the minds of small men: as the wind blows, so must the grass bend.

That Mr. Lyall has taken pains with this translation is evident and the book gives one the impression of a work faithfully and conscientiously performed.

DAENA

An Essay on Landscape Painting. By KUO HSI. Translated from the Chinese by Shio Sakanishi, with a Foreword by L. Cranmer Byng. (John Murray, London. "The Wisdom of the East" Series. 2s. 6d.)

A study of the art and artists of the Asiatic tradition will show that the search for the inner informing spirit behind external phenomena has been their principal ideal. The same ideal is upheld by Kuo Hsi, one of the Master Painters of the eleventh century, whose apt dicta were collected by his son after his death, and are now embodied in *An Essay on Landscape Painting*. Kuo Hsi was a Sung artist, and, like his contemporaries, his chief delight was landscape painting. It is hardly fair to call it delight, for with them it was a fervent mission. All nature was to them symbolical, and all natural phenomena had a secret message to be interpreted and revealed.

"Why does a virtuous man take delight in landscapes?" With this query the essay begins. Landscape serves an important purpose in life, namely, to supply the beholder with an imagined scene to take the place of a coveted objective reality, in which he may nourish his nature, for there are landscapes which one may travel, ramble, or dwell in or gaze upon, says our artist, and it is because of this that people delight in landscapes.

How is the artist to achieve this ambitious result? Two essential points are stressed—technique, and the character of the artist. An artist must study

diligently all schools without being subservient to any school. Having thus perfected his art-language—or technique—he is now ready with the means of translating any emotional experience into concrete form and, in doing so, he will evolve a style peculiarly his own, which will be his contribution to his particular age.

The artist himself must be sincere. He must truly know his subject and must have experienced spiritual exaltation, which is to be enshrined in his work. Kuo Hsi says:—

Let one who wishes to portray these masterpieces of creation, first be captivated by their charm: then let him study them with diligence: let him wander among them: let him arrange these impressions clearly in his mind. Then with eyes unconscious of silk, and hands unconscious of brush and ink, he will paint these marvellous scenes with freedom and courage and make them his own.

One cannot fail to observe the close similarity of this method with that prescribed by the Indian *Silpa-Sastra*, and vividly suggested by Coomaraswami in his *Dance of Shiva*.

The Essay proceeds to illustrate appropriate themes for the painting of a landscape from poems. Of poetry the artist says: "Poetry is a picture without form, and painting is a poem with form"—a truly inspired distinction!

The last chapter contains rules on the details of execution, such as colour, atmosphere, proportion, perspective, etc., and embodies the Sung principle that in order to make a perfect whole, each

aspect even of objective reality, method and technique, must be correct, and so, perfect.

The Foreword, a really instructive one, gives the Essay its social background,

and is followed by a short account of the painter's life and his position among his contemporaries, leaving nothing else to be desired for the appreciation of this essay.

PERVEZ N. DUBASH

On Socialism. BY LEO TOLSTOY. Translated from the Russian by Ludvig Perno. (The Hogarth Press, London.)

Not long before his death, which occurred on November 7th, 1910, Tolstoy was asked by the Editor of a Bohemian newspaper to contribute an essay to a book on social and economic questions to be published by the youth of the National Socialist Party as a protest against persecution. The article written by Tolstoy in response to this invitation was lost and is now printed for the first time. It is of interest not only because it was the last thing he ever wrote, but because it is, also, a kind of summary of his general gospel. He begins by scouting the possibility that any economic theory can cure the evils of civilisation. The activities of humanity resulting from the exercise of reason and free-will cannot, he says, be made the subject of rigid laws "deduced from observations of the external life of mankind." The only basis possible is that of a law common to all people, the law "proclaimed from ancient times by Brahmins, Buddha, Lao-Tze, Socrates, Christ, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, Rousseau, Kant, Emerson, Channing and all religious and moral thinkers of mankind." He goes on to reduce his moral law to the simplest terms—in effect "Do unto every man as thou wouldst that he should do unto thee"—and then passes on to what he calls the "superstition" that "certain people have the right to use violence ... for the purpose of arranging the lives of other people in no way different from themselves," adopting "such aims as suit them best: it may be the state, patriotism, socialism, communism or

anarchy." He concludes by advising the young people of the twentieth century to free themselves from various superstitions—"misconceptions" would be a better word—the beliefs in economic and social doctrines, patriotism, science, and finally the belief that "religion has run its course and is a matter of the past."

Here is the representative Tolstoian gospel, and it fails just as Christianity has failed, because it is a counsel of perfection. Tolstoy had discovered an aspect of the eternal truths in his own spirit. He had suffered a religious conversion, and like so many others who have had that experience believed that it was possible to convert the majority of mankind. The beauty of the principle of Universal Brotherhood—though he did not call it that—was so clear to him that he believed every one must agree with him if the truth were made plain to him. We honour his enthusiasm and wonder at the same moment how a man of his magnificent intellect could fail to realise that he was hoping to succeed where all "the religious and moral thinkers" he adduced, had failed. He did not even succeed in converting his own family to the law of love, and never truly recognised the significance of that failure, which is that the law of love cannot be taught whether by persuasion or example, that so long as it is regarded as a principle to be inculcated it remains a dogma of little greater worth than any other. All that we can do is to help another to find the truth in himself. Religious conversion comes from within. And if Tolstoy failed with his own family, how could he hope to persuade the world?

J. D. BERESFORD

The Hindu-Muslim Problem in India.

BY CLIFFORD MANSHARDT. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 5s.)

Dr. Manshardt brings to his analysis of intercommunal friction nine years of close contact with people in both camps. He supplements a careful study of the records with the results of countless interviews and with his report as an eye-witness of the Bombay riots of 1929. His book is not without flaws—its weakest point is the handling of the Hindu religious background—but, on the whole, the book is eminently readable and sound. It groups the causes of Hindu-Muslim tension into the social and religious, the economic and the political; it paints a lurid picture of militant communalism as the author saw it in action; and then attempts to point to the way out.

Among the causes, varied and complex, economic and political rivalry stand prominent. Too often political leaders of narrow vision deliberately exploit mass prejudices. An irresponsible partisan press is made to share with the demagogue the guilt of such an acute manifestation as the eruption of communal feeling in 1929. There can be no true nationhood for India, Dr. Manshardt emphasizes, until the welfare of the country as a whole is put above that of the communal group.

Conflicting religious rites are another fruitful source of friction. The Muslims' ceremonial sacrifice of a cow outrages Hindu sentiment as seriously as the Hindus' playing of music before a mosque in the course of a religious procession affronts Muslim prejudices. The author anticipates the overcoming of this difficulty as decreasing emphasis is placed on ceremonials and more upon the practical application of religion to the common welfare. He believes that as education spreads communal troubles rooted in religion will decline. "The youth of to-day are looking for a religion which unites instead of divides." (p.123)

But would that process not be vastly hastened by stressing the teachings common to both faiths? The Muslim doctrine of Brotherhood and the Hindu teaching that the One Self shines in all, if given proper emphasis and their implications indicated, would soon break down the false belief in separateness from which narrow and selfish communalism springs.

In the last analysis, as Dr. Manshardt shows, the key to the solution of the communal problem is the individual. "Of what use is a vaunted material civilization apart from the civilizing of men's inner selves?" (p.33)

PH. D.

The Philosophy of the Village Movement. By SJT. J. C. KUMARAPPA. (Sanivarapu Subba Rao, Kovvur. As. 8.)

This collection of speeches of J. C. Kumarappa summarizes the work of the All India Industrial Welfare Association. The lectures cover various items of rural reconstruction, and would give the villager better food and clothing, sanitary housing, ennobling education and improved transportation, and help him to solve his problems and make the village life self-sufficient.

Social life in the village should be

reformed in such a way that co-operation will replace competition, and willing service, the soul-killing labour in a factory. The Panchayat should be so remodelled that it will meet the ends of law and order. The economies of the village should be based on a spirit of non-capitalism, non-communalism and anti-war feeling. Centralized and standardized production which exploits the masses must be avoided, for that has made man a mere slave of the machine. Throughout, there is an appeal to shun violence and class hatred.

S. V. V.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE UNION OF COLOUR

I have read with interest and substantial agreement Mr. N. S. Subba Rao's article in the May number of *THE ARYAN PATH*. With most of it, I am in complete agreement, but there is one paragraph in which lurks, as it seems to me, all of the danger which I tried to point out in my original article. Mr. Subba Rao says:—

In the closing years of the nineteenth century, the success of Japan roused the Kaiser to call upon the nations of Europe through a famous cartoon, to unite themselves against the Yellow Peril, and it is just as easy and unwise to call upon the coloured peoples to league themselves against the white races. Narrow loyalties can be developed, and unholy passions roused, by dwelling on one's disabilities and dangers, which can always be attributed to others. Swift and violent action unhappily appeals to mankind, but if the results are to endure the path towards a new and stable order lies through reason and persuasion. To range the forces of the world into two camps, sullen, suspicious and menacing, is no answer.

We Negroes in the United States have repeatedly passed through this phase of reasoning. We have said: "You must not unite or seem to unite against white people. You must not organize in opposition. You must not even think of yourselves as by any possibility existing apart from them or with an object of your own." The result of this self-denying attitude is easily disastrous. There is no hesitancy on the part of the European peoples in thinking of their own destiny and of their work and future without reference to the rest of the world. And as a result, they go on from strength to strength, and from organization to organization.

If now the Asiatic and African worlds are going to think of themselves only as appendages of the European world; if they are going to refuse to envisage a future quite independent of Europe, if necessary—and even in opposition to

well-known European aims—the result is bound to be weakness, defeatism and lack of all organized power. On the other hand, if the coloured world wants to meet the white world on a plane of real equality and effective brotherhood, and without compromise and doubt evolve and establish a real union of all colours and of races, then first of all the coloured world must be a strong world, strong in its own inner organization, strong in its power of thought and defence. Without this there will come to the council table of the world's interests a cringing beggar instead of an upstanding man.

I know, of course, the implications of all this. It will be said, as Mr. Subba Rao hints: That this means war and struggle and the prolonging of that awful path of blood through which humanity has staggered thus far. I realize all that, but I maintain on the other hand, that unless the coloured peoples are strong and prepared, the path of humiliation and degradation, of insult and suppression, which they will inevitably continue to tread will be much more disastrous to the world's future than anything else could possibly be.

It is too true that only two awful paths seem to face the suppressed peoples of to-day: The path of humiliation, and the path of war. What I am afraid of is that the coloured peoples are going to discount the terrible effects of continued and insistent humiliation. It is impossible to bring up self-reliant manhood if the children of India, Africa and Negro America are going to be brought up under the incubus of colour caste; and what I propose is a hearty and even a desperate attempt to find *a third path*—a path that will not necessarily range the forces of the world into "two camps, sullen, suspicious and

menacing," but which will aim at inner cohesion and understanding among the coloured peoples, and especially organization designed to meet and solve their pressing economic problems. I believe that by consumers' co-operation and production, a thoughtful and scientific blending of the preachments of Gandhi and Kagawa, we can stop the dependence of coloured consumers upon white exploitation; that we can establish new ideals of mutual respect which shall not be exclusively and continually white ideals.

I cannot see that this path must necessarily lead to war unless the white world openly and flatly insists that any organization of coloured folk for the advance of coloured folk is a menace to white people; and in that case, a war of races and of colours is absolutely inevitable; and not inevitable because I and others have raised the flag of warning, but simply because of the impossible attitude of the European and American world. On the other hand, it is just as possible that when through inner

organization and developed strength the coloured worlds grow in power and efficiency, they will strengthen the liberal thought of the white world; help to abolish war and armament, and make all reasonable men among the white nations come to their senses, and come to their senses all the more quickly when they see the inevitable cost of a continued policy of forcible suppression.

I believe in man; in men of all colours and races. I do not want to supplement the hegemony of the white race with a tyranny of black folk or yellow folk or brown folk. I want the best of mankind to be able to work together for the development of all men. But I am not going to let my wish blind me into thinking that this object is accomplished if I proceed to give up my manhood and acquiesce spinelessly in continued suppression. That path leads to disaster and leads just as swiftly as the path of threats and braggadocio.

W. E. B. Du Bois

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A REJOINDER TO DR. DU BOIS

I fear that the difference between Dr. Du Bois and myself is fundamental. *He* is impatient with those that advocate co-operation with the European peoples even when this co-operation means unpleasantnesses of various kinds. On the other hand *I* am apprehensive of his adjuration to the coloured peoples to be strong and united without being aggressive. My attitude probably appears to him to be a parody of the adjuration to turn the left cheek when the right is smitten. To me his desire to be strong and organised without any desire of aggression appears to be a latter-day version of the famous declaration, "I do not bite my thumb at you, sir, but I bite my thumb." Surely history illustrates in a tragic manner the inevitable sliding from the path of defensive preparation down the inclined plane which leads to aggression and war.

Is it expedient or desirable that the coloured peoples should follow the tragic lead of the European peoples?

More. It is not merely a question either of expediency or of the rightness of such a course of action. Does Dr. Du Bois seriously believe that any such united stand is *possible* for the coloured people? Internally they are so divided among themselves that it is hard to believe they will ever arrive at anything like a common understanding, any more than the European peoples have so far succeeded in doing. Let alone the union of coloured peoples in the whole world, but consider the unhappy divisions in a country like India, where the people do not agree about such matters as electorates in the political field or music before mosques in that of religion. It is also idle to expect that any serious and sustained effort on the

part of the coloured people to organise themselves implicitly against the European peoples will be allowed free play by the latter. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has given an amusing account of the Pan-Asiatic Congress held some years ago, which was attended by a number of European spies in the guise of authorised representatives of the coloured peoples.

Therefore to my mind both prudent consideration for ourselves as well as a belief in a world order makes it imperative that the coloured peoples should make the best of their position, insist on their rights where their destinies are cast, and appeal before the bar of world opinion for equal rights and consideration. Ultimately the problem of a better world order and therefore of a better state of things for the coloured peoples can be visualised only in terms of an improvement in the mental and moral stature of the individual. There is no reason to believe that the coloured individual on

the average is superior to the white individual on the average in respect of his capacity of responding to unselfish considerations. All the world over, the average man is under the domination of the strong man or the strong group. So long as the average man does not enter upon his inheritance, the tragedy of conflicts will continue. Lovers of mankind must make it their primary task to help the average man to realise his great destiny, to bring him strength and hope. Plans of co-operation between groups, whether nations or races, whether among the white peoples or the coloured peoples, will be of no avail unless the average man becomes intelligently aware whither the present-day currents are taking him. This means patient education, and mere organisation without education of the individual will lead us nowhere. Indeed it will lack the essential ingredient for its success.

Bangalore.

N. S. SUBBA RAO

WORK CAMPS

The movement for Work Camps began in England about five years ago. At that time, in the darkest days of the great depression, a group of unemployed miners at the small and very hard-hit mining town of Brynmawr in South Wales, got together and decided to try to use their enforced leisure in beautifying their home town. They obtained permission to utilize a small valley on the moor outside the town. For many years this valley had been used as a garbage dump, and was by no means a savoury spot, as I know by intimate personal experience. Here they began to make a swimming-bath, paddling pool and park. The group of men was joined by a number of students both from England and abroad, who were led by Pierre Ceresole, the son of an ex-President of the Swiss Republic and a great internationalist. Some of my students invited me to join this enterprise, and rather against my will I allowed myself to be persuaded. The work was exceedingly arduous, consist-

ing at first in the excavating by pick and shovel of tough boulder clay. My arms and muscles generally ached so villainously after a couple of days of this unwonted exercise that I had to ask to be taken off this work and put on to something easier. I was then requested to hold the ladders for the women students, who were colour-washing cottages within sight of the swimming bath and park. This work, though easier, was not much more pleasant, as the students at the top of the ladders were very careless in the use of their brushes, and I appeared to get more colour-wash than the wall. Finally I was permitted to join up with a gang of two students and three unemployed men who were mixing concrete. I found this a very pleasant form of work, as frequent short rests are possible! We kept on at it till a considerable degree of proficiency was gained. On the last day, I remember, we made and laid 140 barrow loads of concrete in the floor of the new bath.

In 1932 the first schoolboys' Work Camp was held, at this same place, Brynmawr. Some 40 schoolboys co-operated with the unemployed men in carrying on the work on the park and swimming bath. As a new venture (not altogether approved of by headmasters at the time, but so successful as to have been continued ever since), the boys were billeted, two by two, in the families of the unemployed men, paying 3s. 6d. per day for board and lodging. That summer several more Camps were held, but in 1933 those of us who had been living in unemployed families from time to time in this way, began to feel that although valuable work had been done in community service jobs, such as the making of bowling greens, tennis courts, football fields, parks, etc., these jobs were, in a sense, heartless palliatives; for the one great need in the unemployed family is that of more food. We therefore decided to concentrate the efforts of the teams of schoolboys on land work in connection with the new development of the Allotment Movement amongst unemployed men. Thenceforward, most of our efforts have been put into such land work. The ordinary allotment, if well worked, yields its holder an average of 4d. worth of extra foodstuffs per day throughout the year. In many cases a family holds several such plots. Far better economically than individual holdings are the Co-operative Farms for unemployed men, which have arisen in various places as a result of the Allotment Movement.

In 1934 Pierre Ceresole led a small team of Europeans to India to help in the reconstruction of villages in the earthquake area of Northern Behar. They tried, as had been done in England, to live as far as possible on the same level as the peasants for, and with, whom they were working. However, they found that these peasants received only the equivalent of 1½d. per day as agricultural wages, this meaning in practice, three tumblersful of inferior rice for a man and

his family. The European team brought its living standards down to a dangerously low level. Even so they found that they were compelled to consume per head per day six times the value of the food earned by the average local family. The work in India still continues.

In 1935 Work Camps of a similar character were held in France (amongst German refugees), in Holland (also amongst German refugees), in Germany (in connection with a Christian Co-operative Land Settlement), and in Austria. From the last-named country a request had been sent for help in starting the first Unemployed Men's Allotment Association in Austria, at a very hard-hit little industrial town near Vienna. An appeal for volunteers from England resulted in about 70 students and schoolboys making the long journey, and working on the land an average of a fortnight each, under very arduous conditions, in co-operation with a group of Austrian unemployed men. The first Allotment Association was duly started.

This year, 1936, invitations have been received from nine European countries for help in similar work, in some cases amongst needy peasants, in others amongst unemployed men, and also amongst refugees. There are, in addition, 100 places in England, Scotland and Wales, where groups of unemployed men eagerly welcome the co-operation of teams from schools and colleges. A Women's Section of the movement has lately developed, in which women students and schoolgirls, besides doing some land work on Allotment Associations, make their main contribution by the running of Play Centres for the children of unemployed families.

The movement is by no means confined to students and schoolboys or schoolgirls. Any one may share in it who has the good will to undertake such "Franciscan" service. Further particulars will be gladly sent by the Work Camp Clearing House, Woodbrooke Settlement, Selly Oak, Birmingham.

Birmingham

JOHN S. HOYLAND

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“_____ ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

The progressive break-down of the home is admittedly one of the most serious symptoms of the malady of our civilization. The home is outmoded among a class of young people who call themselves progressive and who look upon conventional marriage as a bourgeois drag upon the human emotional urge. The number who openly ridicule inhibitions and denounce conventions is doubtless small when compared to the number who accept the institution of marriage; but in or out of the married state sex immorality to-day honeycombs our civilization to an almost unprecedented extent. The ecstasy of the flesh is exalted and the unworthy practice of birth control by artificial means is very commonly invoked to evade the natural consequences of sensual indulgence. These reflections are born of an article on “Love and Wedlock” by Mr. C. Rajagopalachariar in the August number of *Triveni*.

The Western concept of the home is peculiarly vulnerable to such assaults because its foundations are insecure, as was illuminatingly brought out a few years ago by Dr. Rabindranath Tagore in his contribution to *The Book of Marriage*, under the title, “The Indian Ideal of Marriage.” Whether an individual marries or not is in the West a matter of personal option. No obligation in the matter is re-

cognized. Men and women consult their own convenience, their own comfort, their own inclinations. The attempt is common to erect a life-long partnership upon the shifting sands of mutual infatuation. As Mr. C. Rajagopalachariar remarks :

Love should not be taken as a fever and marriage as a specific for it. If that be so, the fever will go down soon after the wedding is over, and there will be nothing left.

Countless marriages between individuals who start out sure they cannot live without each other end in divorce. And companionate or trial marriage is a repulsive solution proposed.

The root cause of the difficulty lies in the general misapprehension in the West of the purpose of life, and of the part that love and marriage play in subserving that purpose. The distorted Western view is penetrating fast into India. The village folk are not affected as yet by it, but the youth of the towns are more and more falling under its spell.

What is the ancient Indian view? The household life, the ancient law-givers taught, is an essential stage in human development. The home is regarded primarily as a training-ground of character. Marriage presents opportunities nowhere excelled for self-discipline, which self-discipline, when faithfully performed, irradiates the home with a

spiritual atmosphere. This self-discipline arises out of the interdependence of the husband and the wife. No husband can live unto himself, no wife can live unto herself. The two are physically and psychically interdependent, and unless there is mutual co-operation the individual lives will be failures, as far as the discipline of marriage is concerned. In the perfect married state can be seen in miniature the harmonious commingling of Spirit and Matter (*Purusha* and *Prakriti*), each powerless without the other to manifest.

In nothing do the ancient Eastern and the modern Western ideas differ more than in the relation of love to marriage.

The Laws of Manu, as Dr. Tagore brings out, disapprove of marriage by mutual choice (*Gandharva*) and stigmatize it as "born of desire." "According to this," he says, "the bride should be given to a man who has not solicited her." The personal element, which is the ruling element in Western marriages, is thus eliminated; and the conditions of Indian society favour this view. Since in social India intercourse between unmarried youths and maidens is comparatively restricted, prenuptial attachments are naturally rare. But, again, in the towns we find a gradual relaxation of this social code, with its inevitable results.

We see, then, marriage in old India was not a matter of personal wishes but of the good of society to which the institution of the family is indispensable. According to the ancient Indian ideal, still widely

recognized in India to-day, marriage is a sacred and religious bond, and the sex relation is not for selfish gratification, its only legitimate function being procreation. The natural desires of man are not to be gratified freely, but purified, ennobled, and ultimately transcended.

But the fact that normally love does not precede marriage in India by no means implies that Indian marriages are loveless. On the contrary, it is safe to say that the serenity of married love and mutual trust is found much more frequently in Indian than in Western homes. Mr. Rajagopalachariar uses a telling metaphor :—

We do not abandon the fields that have no irrigation through natural means. We work on them relying on the rain and the wells and succeed in raising crops; and all kinds of vegetables, sweet fruits, and flowers are grown thereon. Even where it is not a love-marriage, the couple can love and respect each other and lead their lives in happy concord and comradeship.

Dr. Tagore finds, as is perhaps natural, in the works of Kalidasa a truer and more understanding picture of the Indian ideal of marriage than is to be found in any *Dharma-shastra*. He writes :—

In all three of his works, the *Raghuvamsa*, the *Kumara-sambhava* and *Sakuntala*, India's poet has looked upon marriage as a state of discipline, not intended for gaining individual happiness, but of which the method is the control of desire and the object to bring about the birth of the Slayer of Evil, the super-man who will make possible the achievement of heaven on earth. . . . And the poet sends out his call to bring away the union of man and woman from the realm of *Kandarpa* (*Eros*) into the hermitage of *Shiva*, the Good.