

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XIV

OCTOBER 1943

No. 10

RECONSTRUCTION IN EDUCATION

No reform can compare in importance with that of the education of the young in any plan for creating a world from which wars shall be banished. In the immediate future, builders of the new society will have to depend very greatly on the adult population for intelligent co-operation; as years go by, the youth and the children of today will take the place of leaders and followers alike. If educated properly they will strengthen the foundations and erect the edifice of a civilization compared with which our modern one will look like savagery. It is by making their own individual lives dynamic but contented, at once creative and co-operative, that men and women will establish a lasting peace and an order in which progress is harmonious and increasing. If war in the international world is to be banished, class struggles within nations must cease; this does not mean capital-labour strife only, but also conflicts due to competitive forces at work in all social spheres.

Reconstruction in education is therefore the most important, and has the primary claim on human thought and imagination, and already useful discussions have been taking place on important phases of such reform in Britain and the U. S. A., as books and periodicals coming from these States well show. Presumably this must be taking place elsewhere.

Religious sectarianism is apt to blame the secular nature of the education of the last decades for the present troubles of humanity. Sectarians loyal to their creeds are apt to overlook the very substantial contributions they themselves have made, by supporting competition, in bringing on this war. History will regard Rome, Canterbury, Mecca as armament factories in the world of mind; these, like Hindu orthodoxy, in the name of Eternal Truth, have infected human thoughts with false notions which are the roots of hatred. If there is one enemy more than any other whom educational reformers will have to fight it is

religious sectarianism and orthodoxy; the upholders of creeds will demand the introduction of so-called religious instruction in the reformed system of education. Below we publish two articles on the subject—both dealing with the problem of religious education, the one in India, the other in Britain. They are written by thoughtful men. Rajasevasakta A. R. Wadia has just retired after a distinguished career in the educational field and he suggests, as “the only correct method,” pointing to the truth that

all religions have a core of universality, and that again implies how a student of religion must study religions, for only in that way can he see the thread of divinity running through them all.

Therefore sectarian institutions must be done away with. One class of these consists of institutions which impart instruction in a particular creed to whosoever comes, *e. g.*, the many missionary schools teaching the Bible to non-Christian children. Sectarian institutions of a second type are Parsi schools for Parsi boys, Hindu schools for Hindu boys, Muslim schools for Muslim boys, etc. Religious instruction given in both types of schools is in a very real sense irreligious. Indians must abolish religious sectarianism in education, institutional as well as doctrinal; then only will other absurd symptoms of communalism vanish. Even when religious instruction is undenominational, there are aspects which make it undesirable. Our esteemed friend Shri A. R.

Wadia says:—

Religions are many, but Religion is one. Religion in this highest sense runs right through human history and particular religions are only historic manifestations of that universal religion which consists in the Quest for God.

But this Religion must perforce include science, philosophy, occultism, as branches of knowledge, not of mere belief or speculation.

The second article we publish carries us one step further—from the effects of religious instruction on national problems to its effects on world problems. Mr. Adam Gowans Whyte is an authority on the subject who published a few months ago *The Church and Education*, which amplifies and brings up to date the careful work of the late Mr. J. M. Robertson. Mr. Whyte points out that British citizens cannot fulfil their responsibilities, say, towards India, without studying the main principles of the organised religions of this land. And going outside the boundaries of the British Commonwealth he asks:—

How can British citizens contribute to that foundation if they approach the factor of religion—one of the most powerful in uniting and also in dividing communities—with an established bias in favour of Christianity and a complete ignorance of other religions? To put the matter in a specific form: what hope is there for unity of spirit between Great Britain and Russia and China if all British citizens maintain, in Queen Elizabeth's words, that the “creative and dynamic power of

Christianity" is the essential leaven of industrial, social and political life?

We fully agree with Mr. Whyte that "students of comparative religion invariably acquire a sympathetic and philosophical outlook on *all* religions" but will such study alone prove sufficient to remove the real difficulty he points out?

In history, geography, science and all the ordinary school subjects, he [the teacher] teaches objectively, encouraging the child to observe and to think; in religion he teaches subjectively, encouraging the child to believe.

In the third article, Mr. George Godwin describes a most interesting experiment in educating his own children and draws its moral by stating that the basic need of the world is that education which aims at making our children citizens of the world, with a full appreciation of the curse of national sovereignties and all the hollow and foolish claims of superiority put forward by the teachers of the world's children.

So we need to re-educate our teachers. And is there any other item more important for the teacher to comprehend than the nature of the human constitution? If the chief fault of sectarian religious instruction is a twisted idea about the genesis and origin of the human soul and its relation to Deity, that of secular education is disbelief in any soul, or a vague view that soul is the flame on the candle of the body and that with the death of the latter the flame becomes extinct.

The nature of the human being

and the interrelation of his constituents—Spirit, Soul, Mind and Body—should be understood. The path of human evolution winds uphill to perfection through the process of Reincarnation which takes place according to the Law of Causation, Karma, and not through the caprice of a God or Gods. Every teacher should understand this, for in handling a child he is dealing with a soul of more or less experience, coming to dwell in a new body, bringing with him faculties and powers already acquired and envired by self-created limitations. Right education must integrate the whole man, establishing a harmony between his hands and his head, between the irrational tendencies of his sensuous nature and his reason, between his arguing mind and his disturbing conscience, between his acquired knowledge and his intuitions of Divinity. Neither religion, nor science, nor philosophy; neither ethics, nor empiricism, nor logic—will work. When all branches of knowledge are properly correlated by an adequate use of both the inductive and the deductive methods then will arise a synthesis wider and deeper than their sum-total.

Reformers must see the imperative need of a *synthetic* education which will regard all life as a unit; the nature of man as unitary; which will recognise that there are no spiritual *and* moral *and* intellectual, unrelated to and independent of one another; but that there is One Life expressing itself through all

these various faculties. In considering moral education to be possible by itself, we prove our ignorance. In the last analysis, religion and education have failed because they have thought man had a soul, as a thing apart, which must be saved. Man is a soul—the soul is the man.

The soul manifests as mind, as feeling, as body, and only when we educate and use all the faculties for the purposes of the immortal soul, will either the school or the world find its true place in the great evolutionary and educational Scheme of Nature and of Man.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS

I.—IN INDIA

No criticism has been more persistently levelled against the present system of education in India than that it is godless and materialistic and that our students lack in that moral fibre which should be the distinguishing feature of every man of character. While this is the general impression among the public at large both Indian and European, among the educationists themselves there is a curious antipathy to religious instruction, an antipathy which is unconsciously passed on even to moral instruction. In many schools there is provision for moral instruction, but it is notorious that it is given in a very perfunctory fashion and I have noted that whenever extra periods are needed for subjects like English or mathematics, the axe always falls willingly and easily on the periods allotted to moral instruction!

This antipathy is not unreasonable, even though it is not justifiable. The main reasons for it may be briefly summarised as follows :

1. The first reason is somewhat general and goes against any relig-

ious instruction whatever : Religion is essentially a matter of faith and it is so individual that it is impossible to teach it.

2. In India there are so many religions that it is impossible to provide for teaching in all of them. It would be unfair to have it only for this or that particular section and leave the other sections to themselves.

3. Even if it were possible to provide religious instruction for all, is it desirable? Does not India suffer too much from religion? Will not religious instruction perpetuate and accentuate just those differences which have retarded the political growth of India? The munshi thundering against the kaffirs in one room and the pundit fulminating against the mlechhas in another, will only serve to fan religious fanaticism and will divide the Indians more than it will unite them.

4. All government schools should maintain religious neutrality, and this could best be done by leaving religious instruction severely alone.

Logically the same principle should apply to schools which receive grants from public funds. And since education is not, and should not be, a commercial concern and practically every school has to look to government for some form of financial support, it follows that practically every school will have to go without religious instruction.

In this connection it is rather interesting to note, as pointed out in Mr. Whyte's article in this issue, that even in England "the first prominent advocates of secular education were clergymen of the Church of England." It was argued that religious instruction would prove "an eternal bone of contention in the schools." If this argument weighed in England with practically only one dominant religion, though divided into different sects, it should weigh much more in India where there are so many different religions with very marked differences.

5. Nor need we omit to mention that among educated parents in India there is a marked indifference towards religious instruction. This is clearly borne out by the fact that Indian children are sent to European schools where Bible teaching is compulsory. To most of such parents the teaching of the Bible is a matter of total indifference: it would be all one to them whether it was taught or not. In other words Indian children are sent to European schools not because of their religious atmosphere, but because they often stand for better tuition in English and better

discipline generally.

As already stated above, it would be futile to deny that all these reasons are more or less cogent and so *prima facie*. We seem to be confronted with a stone wall to baffle the will of the religious to have children grow up in a certain religious atmosphere in their schools. These difficulties are all the more accentuated when we are confronted with the opinion of our educational experts that religious instruction is quite inconsistent with all our modern education. All real education must aim at the development of our thinking powers, whereas all religion is dogmatic and so religious instruction can only make us believe, and not think.

So *prima facie* religious instruction seems to be a lost cause and a matter of impossible loyalty! And yet such a conclusion seems at variance with all our innermost convictions. Its intellectualism seems at war with our heart, and yet must the dictates of our heart skulk away like a dog with its tail between its legs? Is there not a saner approach possible?

If this dilemma is to be solved at all we shall have to begin with a clear understanding of what religion means. If it means this or that particular religion with an emphasis on its dogmas and miracles and rites, all the arguments mentioned against religious instruction will have to stand except in schools where all the pupils are of one religious denomination. But there

is a sense in which religion transcends all particular religions. Many will agree with the statement that *religions are many, but Religion is one*. Religion in this highest sense runs right through human history and particular religions are only historic manifestations of that universal religion, which consists in the Quest for God.

It was fashionable with a certain type of thinkers in the nineteenth century to take for granted that science had permanently succeeded in dethroning religion from the hearts of men. But in the twentieth century science itself has become more modest in its claims. It is not ashamed to acknowledge its limitations and while it is as intent as ever on mastering the secrets of nature, it is prepared to look beyond itself to metaphysics and religion and seek in them a natural complement of its own achievements. How else can we explain the metaphysical excursions of men like William James and Henri Bergson, of Whitehead and Eddington and Sir James Jeans, and even more of Max Planck? Nor can we be blind to the studied humility of the great Einstein, who has said again and again that he is only a scientist and is not responsible for the philosophical interpretations of his theory of relativity. Today—shallow scientists apart, and unfortunately we have a fair number of them in India—most scientists are not obsessed by a sense of any inherent incompatibility between science on the one hand and philosophy and

religion on the other. But very likely they would have nothing to do with religious dogmas, though even here one dare not say that a good scientist will not also be, *e.g.*, a devout orthodox Christian.

If this attitude to religion is accepted, it follows that we need not take very seriously the educational incompatibility of knowing and believing. There is room in this world for belief even as distinguished from knowledge. If a scientist of Sir Oliver Lodge's eminence can be a spiritualist, ordinary mortals need not be ashamed that they cannot get away from a haunting belief in the divine. If religion even in the twentieth century has not become superfluous, and if all human history shows the power of religion as one of the most dominating traits of human nature, it would be futile to imitate the ostrich and say that religious instruction is a superfluity or an absurdity. If the fact of religion is as incontrovertible as sex or hunger or thirst for knowledge, it is necessary to provide for its healthy growth as we seek to provide against the dangers of sex or economic competition. And that can only be done by devising a correct method of religious instruction. *And the only correct method is to slip over the particulars of religions and bring out the universal in all religions.* This can be done only by successfully pointing out that all religions have a core of universality, and that again implies how a student of religion must study religions, for

only in that way can he see the thread of divinity running through all of them.

This must inevitably lead to tolerance, but I am sure it will lead to something more and that is real appreciation. Tolerance is not enough. It implies an attitude of mind which says to itself: "The other fellow's beliefs are palpably wrong, but it is not my concern; he is welcome to his beliefs so long as they do not interfere with what I believe to be true." The attitude of appreciation is of a far higher type: it implies a capacity to understand and sympathise, and this may go a long way towards admiration.

The political troubles in India have often been diagnosed as being religious at bottom. If so, there is all the greater reason why religious instruction should no more be treated as the Cinderella of the educational world of India. And let it not be forgotten that genuine religious instruction will also automatically imply moral instruction in the highest sense of the term. The Mysore Government a few years ago displayed statesmanship when they appointed a committee of a very

representative type to prepare a text-book of religious instruction. The Committee resolved that this text-book should take the form of selected passages from all the leading religions of India: Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism and Zoroastrianism. The selection of passages from different religious scriptures was left to persons professing the religion concerned, but they had to be approved by the Committee, and the Committee approved only such passages as were universal in character. The book was published as far back as 1937, and it constituted an interesting experiment. But unfortunately it has not been made use of by educational authorities, as there is such a deep-seated prejudice against religious instruction both among teachers and inspecting officers. And so India still remains divided into hostile religious factions, and our educationists delude themselves into the belief that it is no concern of theirs. They naïvely trust that secular education will so kill religion that there will be no need to have religious instruction! A fine sample of the wisdom of the ostrich!

A. R. WADIA

II.—IN BRITAIN

Religious education in schools has been the subject of controversy in Great Britain for many generations. Indeed one may say that in no part of Christendom and at no stage in the history of the Christian Church has the field of education been free

from "the religious difficulty." When Christianity first established itself as an organised religion, converts were confronted with the difficulty in almost the same form as it presents itself to parents in England today. The educational system then existing

in the Roman Empire was based on the Greek model; its curriculum and its outlook were wholly Pagan. Christians who wanted their children to be well educated were therefore faced with a dilemma: either they must expose the young mind to the dangerous influence of a Pagan atmosphere or they must withhold their children from school.

The conflict between secular learning and Christian teaching was a source of trouble to the Church leaders themselves. Some of the most influential of them denounced all knowledge or study apart from the new religion; others endeavoured to discipline Greek and Roman culture to serve the interests of the Church. The result was that, as the Church grew in power, the school system under which most of the early Christian Fathers had been educated was allowed to die out and the educational effort of the Church was confined to the training of priests. This movement for the suppression of the education of the people was intensified by the conviction that the ability to read, which enabled people to study the Scriptures and other books for themselves and to form their own opinions, opened the door to heresy. What the Church desired was that the masses should take their instruction solely from the priests. The same motive operated when in later years the Roman Church established schools in connection with the monastic orders. Christian theology was the sum and substance of the curric-

ulum, and everything was subordinated to the training of the clergy for the performance of their duties.

The Protestant Reformation opened a new chapter in the history of religious education. While the Roman Church claimed that Christian truth was embodied in the tradition of the Church and the creeds drawn up by Church councils, the Protestant Churches maintained that the Bible was the supreme revelation of the will of God. They called upon the people to "search the Scriptures"—a policy which implied that the laity as well as the clergy should be taught to read. Both Luther and Calvin were active in promoting popular education, and the translation of the Bible into the vulgar tongue was encouraged. It is important, however, to note that the purpose animating the Protestant zeal for education was precisely the same as that which led the Roman Church to confine education within the narrowest limits—to increase the number of converts and to discourage heresy.

The adoption by the two main branches of the Christian Church of diametrically opposite policies in education is an illustration of the basic feature of the history of religious education in schools. At all times, and in all circumstances, each Christian Church has sought to protect and develop its own corporate interests, and with that object in view both the provision of learning and the organised suppression

of learning have been adopted by various Church organisations as expediency suggested.

There is, of course, nothing inherently objectionable in a Church pursuing its corporate interests with vigour and even subtlety. In the case of education, however, the intrusion of Church interests into a general scheme of instruction raises critical questions on more than one point. For example, how far is it advisable to impose upon young children, with the authority of teacher and priest, religious dogmas which are the subject of endless controversy among adults? At what age does the average child become capable of understanding, even dimly, the abstract and transcendental conceptions of supernatural religion? Where there are several competing religions or religious sects, how are their rival claims to be accommodated within the framework of a public educational system?

That these are not merely academic problems is proved by the troubled history of religious education in England. Its modern phase began with the introduction in 1807 of the first Education Bill, which was designed to establish in every parish a school maintained by the local rates. Interest in popular education had been stimulated a few years earlier by the founding of schools by a Quaker teacher, Joseph Lancaster. The undenominational religious teaching given in these schools was very unpalatable to the Church of England, which supported a rival

teacher who used the catechism of the Established Church. The declared attitude of the Church of England was that "a system which professedly rejects the established religion is the destruction of all religions," and as the Church had many supporters in the House of Commons and still more, proportionately, in the House of Lords, it was able to make this attitude so effective that not only the first Education Bill but also a succession of educational measures up to the year 1863 were rejected on the ground that they did not meet the wishes of the Established Church. Conversely, any scheme which favoured the interests of the Established Church was violently opposed by the Nonconformists.

It is candidly admitted by Christian writers that these sectarian quarrels gravely obstructed the progress of popular education. Indeed many leading men within the Churches nearly a hundred years ago came to the conclusion that no permanent settlement of the education problem was possible so long as religious instruction remained in the curriculum of schools maintained out of public funds. The first prominent advocates of secular education were clergymen of the Church of England. All that has since happened serves to confirm the soundness of their belief that religious instruction, as it is generally conceived, would prove an eternal bone of contention in the schools. The Elementary Education Act of 1870,

which laid the foundations of free and universal school education in England, was a compromise which permitted progress to be made in general education without removing the religious difficulty. It laid down that no religious catechism or formula distinctive of any particular denomination should be taught in any school wholly dependent upon public funds. At the same time Government grants were provided for the maintenance of schools belonging to the Church of England, at which full catechetical teaching was given under direct clerical supervision. Thus was established the "dual system" which still remains to keep alive the fires of sectarian controversy and to prevent the development of a unified system of elementary education in England.

An effort is now being made by the Government, as part of its post-war plans for the development of national education, to clear away the religious difficulty and achieve a final settlement of sectarian differences. The Churches themselves have contributed something towards the settlement by the production of "agreed syllabuses" of religious instruction. There are a dozen or more of these syllabuses, each prepared under the auspices of a public education authority by the cooperation of clergymen and others representing the Church of England and the various Nonconformist Churches. (The Roman Catholic Church, it may be observed, holds aloof from all these interdenomina-

tional activities and insists that Catholic children shall attend Catholic Schools.) The agreed syllabuses do not agree among themselves; they are all compromises similar to that arranged for the South Indian Church, where an appearance of unity is secured by vagueness in phraseology, by giving a wide latitude of interpretation, and by substituting "general assent" for the unconditional assent to creeds. The Board of Education appears to hope that a more or less uniform and acceptable system of religious instruction can be established in all publicly-owned schools on the basis of such agreed syllabuses. On the other hand, an amorphous form of Christianity does not satisfy those who want full doctrinal teaching at the public expense, any more than it pleases those who are opposed to the teaching of any form of supernatural religion. Further, the Church of England, which has failed to maintain its schools at a tolerable level of efficiency, is fighting to retain its rights of catechetical instruction while transferring the financial burden of its schools wholly to the shoulders of the public.

The attitude of the average parent to these sectarian manœuvres is one of indifference—as might be expected from the fact that four-fifths or so of the adult population do not attend Church or share in any form of religious activity. He is willing that children should receive some sort of religious instruction in school, partly because he received it himself,

partly because he considers that religion is a moral corrective and partly because he does not want the trouble of instructing his children in a subject about which his own notions, if any, are vague and confused. On the other hand, the average parent is keenly interested in the development of general education—the raising of the school-leaving age, the improvement of secondary and technical training and the opening of educational facilities from the school right up to the university for all children, irrespective of means or social position. In his zeal for better secular education he treats the religious question as a side-issue.

Thanks to the prevailing apathy there is little appreciation of the fact that what the Churches are attempting is to make up for their declining influence among the adult population by a new campaign of missionary work among the children. The avowed object of intensified religious instruction in schools is to ensure that the rising generation will be definitely and actively Christian. Like the Nazis and the Fascists, the Churches realise that much, indeed everything, can be done by persistent pressure on the plastic mind of the child from the earliest years to adolescence. Such a method of moulding the child-mind is, of course, absolutely opposed to modern educational principles. The religious beliefs of teachers are very diverse, ranging from Fundamentalism to atheism, but there is

virtual unanimity in the demand for freedom from clerical control in religious instruction or any other part of the school curriculum. Many teachers have had their hopes of promotion made vain because their religious views did not conform to the standards adopted by the clergy connected with their schools, and apart from this factor the teaching profession as a whole feels that it cannot and will not be treated as the obedient instrument of the clerical or any other profession.

In this clash of professional interests lies the only hope of achieving a broader conception of religious instruction than that advocated by the Churches in their corporate interests. Behind the teachers' claim that, where religion is included in the curriculum, they must be free to teach it in their own way, lies the growing conviction that the method hitherto adopted in teaching religion is fundamentally unsound. In all subjects other than religion the teacher is expected to instruct, to awaken interest and—at least among the older children—to rouse the reasoning faculties. In religion, the most controversial and speculative of all subjects, he is expected to instruct, but only with a view to securing acceptance of the Christian point of view. In history, geography, science and all the ordinary school subjects, he teaches objectively, encouraging the child to observe and to think; in religion he teaches subjectively, encouraging the child to believe.

From the purely educational point of view this is a most unsatisfactory situation. From the point of view of the British citizen of tomorrow it has, however, a peculiar danger. The new world order, we are told, must be based on international understanding and amity. How can British citizens contribute to that foundation if they approach the factor of religion—one of the most powerful in uniting and also in dividing communities—with an established bias in favour of Christianity and a complete ignorance of other religions? To put the matter in a specific form, what hope is there for unity of spirit between Great Britain and Russia and China if all British citizens maintain, in Queen Elizabeth's words, that the "creative and dynamic power of Christianity" is the essential leaven of industrial, social, and political life? Again, these citizens have solemn responsibilities towards the inhabitants of the Dominions, Colonies, and other parts of the Empire. How can they fulfil these responsibilities unless they have at least an elementary knowledge of the faiths that govern the outlook and aspirations of the various peoples concerned? The first step towards an intelligent grasp of the Indian problem, for example, is a study of the main principles of Hinduism, Mohammedanism, Buddhism, and the other organised religions. Similarly, every effort to encourage the more backward Colonial races in education and self-government must be guided by

a sympathetic appreciation of their religious traditions.

Sound reasons, therefore, can be advanced for a radical change in the motive and method of religious education in schools. Instead of the motive being to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion or religious sect, it will be to reveal the characteristic features of all the great religions of the world. Instead of the method being that of the propagandist, it will be in complete harmony with the teacher's usual method of presenting the facts in a clear and interesting fashion and with the minimum of bias. Already a number of teachers have dealt with the subject of religion on these lines, introducing accounts of beliefs, rites and customs into historical and geographical lessons and also giving, when describing the ages before history, an outline of the religious notions of primitive man. Treated in this way, religion has proved to be a much more attractive subject than when only one form was presented in ceremonial and dogmatic form. The imagination of the children has been stirred by the variegated strangeness of faiths in other countries and other times, and their understanding of history and of the complex world of today has been illumined by learning something of the part that religion has played and is still playing in social, political and intellectual developments. Such knowledge is indeed an essential element in a liberal education, and beyond its

direct educational value it has the priceless advantage of encouraging a spirit of toleration. No one can become acquainted, even superficially, with the evolution of religion and the almost endless variety of manifestations of the religious impulse without some effect on the

instinctive tendency to see nothing but ignorance and error in religions other than one's own. It is a significant fact that students of comparative religion invariably acquire a sympathetic and philosophical outlook on *all* religions.

ADAM GOWANS WHYTE

EDUCATION

BASED ON SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS

The Editor has asked me to write upon scientific education, a request I interpret as meaning education based on scientific considerations rather than science education.

Now, I propose to break away from usual practice: I propose to be personal, and I do this because education for many years has not been for me a matter of theory, but of practical decision-making for a large family. I have a large family, four boys and a girl. Because my own education—if the maiming I suffered from the years of thirteen to seventeen could be so termed—remains memorable in my mind chiefly for the spiritual loneliness I suffered in my soul and the many beatings I suffered in my person, I determined to attempt something better for my children.

Because, in England, education, like most other institutions, is organized for private profit, it was not so easy to work out a scheme somewhere near the objects I had in mind—objects in which my wife shared my views.

In England it is accepted as natural that parents of the middle and upper classes should send their children away from home to boarding-schools, assigning to educators their own duties as parents, trusting to the best on such heads as proper diet, an atmosphere of kindness and so forth.

As I remembered the inadequate diet of my own school and to it attributed later ill-health, I determined to send no child of mine away from home. For, aside from this basic consideration, I came to the view that strangers, however well-meaning, cannot take the place of parents, and that the child-parent relationship is essential to the normal unfolding of the child's emotional and mental life.

Now education in England, as in most other countries, tends to be insular wherever it touches the subject of race, history, and geography. It tends, also, to develop the class sense which is, in my view, one of the major obstacles to the good life in the Western scheme of things.

What, then, I wanted was a school which should fulfil certain conditions very clear in my mind. It had to be a school which would not seek to impose religious training on my children, because true religion is a matter of behaviour and not, as it was inculcated in my day, a matter of attending compulsory church services, learning a weekly collect and sitting through so-called "Divinity" lessons.

Next, I wanted a school where my children would meet and mix with children drawn from as many different strata of society as possible. Last, I wanted them to be taught without any nationalistic bias. I did not want them to develop the belief that God, having made the British, launched out on an ill-advised policy of creating "foreigners."

In the end I found in the French Lycée in London the nearest school to this ideal I could find. It received children of a good many nationalities, it was secular—for the late French Republic had broken with the Catholic Church and secularised its State schools. Lastly, this school was not limited to a single class: its pupils included the children of hotel chefs and of ambassadors, a nice vertical cross-cut which promised my children a catholic outlook as to their fellows.

Because French teachers have two advantages lacking in most categories of English school-teachers, I felt some confidence that my children would be well launched by this institution. French school-teachers

have first to pass a State examination of a high standard and, thereafter, they have to take a diploma in pedagogics. Consider that approach to the difficult art of teaching as contrasted with that of the average English Public School (which is, of course, a private school and open only to the sons of the comfortably-to-do). In those schools the choice between two candidates for a mastership, the one offering a Double First, the other a double Blue would go inevitably to the latter.

The French recognize that the job of teaching is a science and that before a graduate can take over a class he or she must learn how to teach. I consider that the scientific approach; just as I consider unscientific the clouts by means of which my own form master (whom I hate to this day) attempted to teach me mathematics. That man I hate in retrospect as Samuel Butler hated his father—which is saying a good deal.

The first thing, then, in education is that the teacher should know his or her job and have it in his head that what he does is a difficult, intricate and subtle undertaking.

Next, given such a school as I have indicated, the question arises: what should be taught?

The answer must necessarily depend on at what age the child is to be taken from school. If at an early age, then one may assume that it will be to begin earning, in which case it is clear that there is much to be said for utilitarian education.

Such instruction, however, is not education in the true sense of the word; rather is it preparation for economic servitude. No truly civilised state would permit children to leave school before eighteen years of age.

Children who are to be left at school until their eighteenth year and, perhaps, thereafter are to receive further education at technical institute or university, will have to decide at what point they are to break off general education and turn to specialized work.

Here the choice is between purely vocational education and cultural education; or between education for practical ends and education as an embellishment and enrichment of life. I think that here the practical problem is to secure before specialization as wide a cultural background as possible. Because I lack it, I greatly value the classical foundation, feeling that along that path so many of the finest minds of our race have found their way to self-fulfilment. Before I found by chance the French school referred to, I sent my eldest son to St. Paul's School as a day boy. I stipulated that he should not receive Church of England religious teaching, having broken away from that institution myself at the earliest possible moment, *i. e.*, when it was in my power firmly to decline to be confirmed.

There my son was on the classical side and thus acquired knowledge of the Bible as literature by way of the

Greek Testament. Obviously, whatever one's attitude towards orthodox Christianity, one cannot educate a child to understand European culture, without telling it something of the cult of Christ and the impact of Luther upon European history.

At that ancient seat of learning my son's performance was mediocre and his reports bore a strange resemblance to my own, though none was so bad as those. At eighteen he was on my hands with a smattering of Latin and Greek and the usual "subjects." It was an imperfect and patchy background, but it had a cultural significance and the discipline of the dead languages did more than was at that phase apparent.

If you talk about learning to a child its mental response is something like this: What for? I prefer play. Learning begins in earnest when the child or adolescent has a definite objective. To provide that as early on as possible is, I think, tremendously important. Looking back I cannot recall once being told why I should work at school, or to what job in life I should direct my small talents. At eighteen my eldest son declared his intention to take medicine. No sooner was this objective clear in his mind than a dramatic change came over his habits. He worked into the small hours and qualified without loss of time. He once told me that his "little Latin and less Greek" had been of great use to him, rendering easier the memorizing of anatomical terms.

I think of even greater use was the discipline involved in acquiring some knowledge of those languages.

General principles one can lay down, I think, but the handling of each child is an individual matter in which the parent and teacher must aim at the development of trends and aptitudes and even recognise their presence, where possible, before the child has conscious knowledge of their existence. This can be done only by intelligent watching.

Now I have always reckoned my experience with my daughter's education to be uncommonly interesting. She went as a small girl to an English girl's public school as a day scholar and she had bad reports, both as to work and behaviour. As she seemed bright and intelligent at home, I concluded that it was the repressive atmosphere of this typical English girl's school which was at fault and, having heard of the French Lycée, I transferred her there. The change was dramatic. The child learned the language swiftly and swiftly rose to the top of the school, thereafter passing to the Sorbonne, where she graduated with honours in Arts, later proceeding to Newnham, as a Research student, working for the Ph. D. degree—work suspended for other work connected with the war. One other child, a boy, matriculated at Lille and went on to Cambridge with a State and University scholarship—the war once more ruining a scholastic scheme. Another boy, after finding the acquisition of a new

language difficult, settled down and did well until, because of changes made necessary by war, he had to be transferred to an English school (much to my regret). There remains one son to account for. He firmly declined to fit into my scheme for him and, wisely, I think, I let him go his own way, which was to the sea and ships. It is possible to push a theory too far with education, for too much of the scientific approach may be unscientific in the final analysis. This boy developed a flair for writing that owed nothing to any little he had been taught. In my view the cultivation of any such talent is almost always self-education.

I have trespassed on the patience of the reader to outline how one man tackled this very interesting and very difficult problem in his own case—and, after all, it is what we do rather than how we theorize that counts. So now, having related what I did, I will take leave to theorize.

I believe that at this juncture in the tortured progress of mankind one of the basic needs of the world is internationalized school text-books and, in particular, history books.

When I was a small child I was taught to consider Boers as the most detestable of mankind: I have lived to see one of them, General Smuts, honoured throughout the world. It is that sort of bias—the German child learning to believe that Winston Churchill is a monster; the English child that every German

is a beast, and so on, that lays the foundation for future wars. History, as it is taught by nationalized history books, is one of the greatest breeders of war in the world today. It is part of the greater general evil of nationalism which cannot indulge in pride save by denigrating other peoples, other nations.

For any scientific approach to education in the future surely we must aim at making our children citizens of the world, with a full appreciation of the curse of national sovereignties and all the hollow and foolish claims of superiority put forward by the teachers of the world's children. Only in this way will they ever achieve the capacity to think clearly. When I look back over the years I see what a large part of the self-education I attempted after leaving school consisted in unlearning general ideas that had been pumped into me by ignorant and foolish pedagogues.

I have written this article without really possessing any qualification for writing it. What I have set down are merely the half-formed theories of a man preoccupied with the ever-present economic problems of the *paterfamilias*—now, *Gott sei Dank*, somewhat easier. Yet, simple and common-sensical as they are—in fact, I would dare to say, utterly obvious, they are often the cause of alarm among my friends who reckon

me a crank.

Yet I have known boys, the sons of my friends, go from exclusive and costly Public Schools (which are not public) to one or other of the ancient universities, not as scholars, but as commoners, and emerge ignorant, stupid and dull members of society. I often think that had I submitted my own brood to the same influences the result might well have run on parallel lines. And so I am very glad that I did not. I have children able to think clearly, with minds uncluttered by superstition or class or nationalistic bias, natural, normal, young human beings; youngsters, moreover, who can speak the two great tongues of the Western world with equal ease and fluency.

I have set down 2,000 words under the ambitious title, "Scientific Education," and I see that what I have done is to indicate, in skeletonized form, just one experiment in that general direction. I could do no more, but perhaps the reader who has done me the honour to follow me, will find in the experience I have set down the germ of an idea and see that the general direction has been towards what I will term, because that term has been given me by the editor, "scientific Education." I must leave the specialized presentation of the case to others more skilled, more learned, and more wise than myself.

GEORGE GODWIN

THE EVER-MODERN OLD

[Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, M. A., D. PHIL. (OXON.), is a lover of Sanskrit culture, rendering it useful service in many ways.—ED.]

Very often I have heard the remark that Sanskrit is out of date and does not satisfy the needs of modern civilization. But Europe, which is the birthplace of this very "modern civilization," has not found Greek and Latin out of date. The fact is that Europe is modern because it has not cut itself away from association with the ancient Greek and Latin. India, cut away from its ancient Sanskrit, is not able to become really modern, and is left far behind by the other nations.

The genius of ancient India, as preserved in Sanskrit records, is its ability to be ever modern; on account of this mobility, this adaptability, Indian civilization has not met with the fate of many other civilizations. The Greek civilization and the Greek Empire flourished only for a few centuries; the Roman civilization and Empire did not fare better. There were the other still older civilizations of China, Babylon and Egypt. They all have disappeared. Indian civilization started life before these very ancient civilizations, passed through the periods of the Greek and Roman civilizations and continued bright even during the so-called dark Middle Ages. It is only during the last few decades that the light of its civilization has become slightly dim.

While other civilizations flourished and faded, Indian civilization remained evergreen. At every stage when signs of decay appeared, a great personality arose as the true representative of the old civilization and gave it a new impetus. Thus, like the device of rockets within rockets, in which a fresh one with an enormous velocity is discharged when the velocity of the previous one diminishes, Indian civilization has kept on its steady march through the ages and still keeps moving.

I may explain the nature of this freshness in Indian civilization through some typical examples. The grammar of Panini continued through the various stages in the development of Sanskrit grammar and was never discarded nor superseded, and though it was written centuries prior to the Christian era, it was still "fresh and modern" in the eighteenth century of that era. The Upanishads, composed even earlier, continued ever "fresh and modern" through century after century and still remain objects of admiration for the great thinkers of the modern age. The theme of the *Mahabharata* and of the *Ramayana* goes back perhaps to a much earlier age still, and has provided "modern" ideals for the Indians throughout its history.

The fact is that what is old is

only the theme ; the interpretation of the theme was ever fresh to satisfy the needs of all ages. The story of Pururavas and Urvasi in the *Rigveda* is re-presented in an original way in the *Mahabharata* and in quite a different way in the drama of Kalidasa. The story of Sakuntala in the *Mahabharata* is interpreted in quite an original way by Kalidasa in his world-renowned drama. The great poet Bharavi takes a well-known episode from the lives of the Pandavas in exile, when Arjuna won the Pasupata weapon after propitiating Siva, and he constructs out of this an epic interpreting the nation's aspirations in his time. Visakhadatta takes the story of the victory of Chandragupta over the Nandas with the help of Chanakya and writes a drama that can appeal to the audience of his day. I can cite hundreds of instances like this.

In this way, the leaders of the nation never allowed the old ideals to decay ; they always gave them fresh and original interpretations. Conservatism conserved and preserved but never allowed stagnation and rusting. In poetry the theme was always ancient and well-known ; but the form, the presentation, the interpretation was always new and original. The same was the case in science and in philosophy, in law and in religion. There was no period in history when there was poverty of material or poverty of genius to present that material in a form suited to the new age. The other civilizations had to find out

the material and also to devise the form ; and when the form could no longer hold the material, the material dropped out instead of a new form taking it up, and the civilization vanished. This is the secret of India's civilization having remained young from the earliest period in man's history up to recent times. If, instead of attempting to catch new foreign materials, modern Indians had tried to present the material of their old civilization in a modern form, perhaps Indians would have been well in the forefront among the nations of the modern world.

The grammar of Panini can appear in the form of modern philology ; the Upanishads can appear in the form of modern metaphysics ; the notions of elements and of matter in relation to the knowing subject, as propounded in the Sankhya philosophy, would be of considerable help in opening the doors of mystery in modern science if interpreted in terms of modern speculative science. The stories and the heroes of the Puranas would give political inspiration to modern Indians exactly as they did in the days of Kalidasa, Bharavi and other poets.

"The ever-modern old" was the ideal of the exponents of ancient Indian civilization. The seven Rishis and Veda Vyasa are eternal ; Suka, Markandeya, Dhruva and Sanatkumara are eternally young ; the perpetuity of the Vedas and of Dharma exhibits the same doctrine of civilization being eternal. In the

modern world we are losing the game because we have to look for matter as well as the form in which the matter is to be presented; instead of being modern, we are now left ever behind the times. If we follow the ideals of our ancients, take up the old material from our profuse storehouse and put it into new forms, we can still catch up and overtake our rivals. Otherwise, like

the many other civilizations, our ancient civilization too may drop down and in a future age Indian civilization will remain what the Assyrian civilization is to us now. The only way in which we can preserve our civilization is to take the example of our ancients with their ideal of "THE EVER-MODERN OLD."

C. KUNHAN RAJA

POLITICAL DRUNKENNESS

Lin Yutang is alarmed over the growing substitution of naturalistic for human values. "Geopolitics: Law of the Jungle," he claims in *Asia and the Americas* for April, is increasing in favour among the intellectuals. It is "primarily politics, the politics of world conquest or at least of world struggles, consciously built on strategic concepts of geography" and as consciously aloof from human values. A recent book by Prof. Nicholas Spykman of Yale has passages that parallel *Mein Kampf* and yet *America's Strategy in World Politics* has received enthusiastic praise. Mr. Lin Yutang quotes from it:—

The statesman who conducts foreign policy can concern himself with the values of justice, fairness and tolerance only to the extent that they contribute to or do not interfere with the power objective. They can be used instrumentally as moral justification for the power quest, but they must be discarded the moment their application brings weakness.

Passionate repudiation is the only proper answer to this libel upon statesmanship and upon Humanity. Yet the President of Johns Hopkins University would have every Government official responsible for policy read this book once a year for the next twenty years.

"A moral prostitution of the academic point of view" indeed!

Geopolitics has a set of values, Mr. Lin Yutang concedes, but they are naturalistic values and!

the trouble with naturalism is that too many things are becoming natural. The law of the jungle has become natural to our academic minds. Manslaughter has become scientifically natural. The bombing of school children has become natural also. We have had enough of naturalism.

The answer of Confucius to naturalism was that "truth must not depart from human nature. If what is regarded as truth departs from human nature, it may not be regarded as truth."

Members of a cynic generation laugh, Mr. Lin Yutang writes, at those who speak for the freedom of India or who plead for a complete break with power politics or who believe "that sincere co-operation and good will between the western democracies and Russia are possible by an act of human will."

Those who are telling the world to go down the bloody path of national suspicions and balance of power call themselves "realists." At bottom it is only a question of freedom of the human will versus determinism, the question whether good will has the power to change the world we make for ourselves. Peace on earth is an act of faith, and without faith we shall not be saved.

THE PLEASURE OF PAIN

[It is a profound psychological truth that the South Indian writer and advocate **Shri K. Chandrasekharan** touches upon here. Pain and pleasure are always two sides of the same medal, though that is easier to recognise in retrospect.—ED.]

It was a breezy evening and I was sitting on my verandah to enjoy reading a book. The book in my hand had the odour of fresh paper and print so pleasing to me. Also some of the pages of the book remained uncut. There is a quaint joy in cutting pages of a new volume and one feels often more absorbed in that act than in the reading. Sometimes the thrill one experiences in the virgin freshness of a printed page opening out its hidden treasures is such that it cannot even be shared with another.

My friend in the opposite house takes a mischievous pleasure in disturbing me whenever I am comfortably reading. He therefore hallooed to me from his window and, not waiting for any response or recognition, dashed across the road and was in an instant on a stool beside me. His eyes caught the beautiful paper-cutter in my right hand. "What a marvellous piece of ivory work that handle is!" he exclaimed and almost snatched it from my grasp to look at it more closely.

I could not suppress my obvious pride and satisfaction in being the possessor of such an art-treasure. The handle of the cutter was all finely carved into an entwining creeper in

thick foliage, with a number of birds pecking at the clusters of grapes on its branches. My heart expanded at the thought of its age and its long association with me. How many uncut leaves have I opened with that ivory knife! What harmless liberties have I not taken with it!

It was a birthday gift of a dear friend of my father, who used it also as his book-mark. He was a voracious reader and no doubt this cutter helped to ensure his speedy turning over of many pages. Among the many personal effects he left us, this one by chance came to me. I have cherished it deeply ever since my father became a fragrant memory.

But memory traces both pain and pleasure though, curiously enough, the memory of pain turns into sweet recollection also. I remember a family-doctor once handled this identical paper-cutter as an instrument to cleanse a fester on my leg. Oh, the pain that was caused to me as the edge of the ivory piece passed and repassed the mouth of my wound!

Remembrance came flooding in and I became all eagerness to communicate to the friend beside me what had happened then. Yes, my doctor, who was more a physician than a surgeon, had mercilessly used the

cutter on me. I bravely put up with the excruciating pain without a single syllable of complaint escaping me. The doctor was not unobservant of my heroism, for he patted me at the end for having shown such unusual fortitude for my youth and inexperience. Recollection assumed vividness and my description gathered effect as the pleasure of pain within me increased.

Can it be, I wonder, that distance of time alone has lent distinct charm to the incident or is it but a mere pose of the mind, deriving satisfaction in fancying joy in a painful past event? The answer may not be so simple or easy of divination. Human experience keeps much in store that strikes one as paradoxical even on superficial consideration. But there is no gainsaying that an inner significance lurks in all this. Else, Kalidasa in his *Raghuvamsa* would not have spoken of the pleasurable satisfaction in Rama and Sita as they gazed at their past sad experiences depicted in paintings on the palace walls :—

Though sorrows had engulfed them while wandering in the wilds of Dandaka, sweet they became when dwelt upon.

Certainly it was the comparative security from sufferings alone that provided them the comforting thought and the communicable satisfaction regarding their past. Otherwise, passing through perennial tribulation, no human heart can relive its own past and recapture the pain of it with present equanimity.

Every day we find men of importance and affluence growing eloquent over their early adversity or reverses of fortune. The flourishing lawyer or the leader of the bar naturally warms up in describing to an audience his bad beginnings in the profession. True, in his case, his present condition being much above want, he derives strength of mind from recounting ancient griefs. It is again a successful writer that can narrate, with a delightful sense of humour, how in the days gone by editors and publishers had returned unceremoniously his manuscripts. We are sure that by no means can a similar past stir up soothing reveries in a breast that is ever shaken by gusts of disgust and defeat in life.

No doubt, then, the pleasure of pain is generated by the absence of actuality of sadness. The difference between an actuality and an imaginative experience accounts for the strange human psychology which grieves not over a painful past event, but receives exhilaration in recollecting it. The domain of art draws a great deal upon this pleasure of pain for chastening human emotions. But for our sweetest songs being "those that tell of saddest thoughts" much that is powerful in poetry and soul-filling in literature will appear quite commonplace and lacking in spiritual quality. Desdemona's tragedy could not be a more enduring classic if the last scene, where Othello stifles her sweet breath with a pillow, had not been introduced by the master playwright. Really none could bear

the sight of such a gruesome murder in actual life and no court of justice could tolerate the culprit as we do Othello for not having loved his wife wisely. Again we feel surprised that Valmiki should have introduced a second exile for Sita towards the close of his immortal epic. But, do we not read and read again the lines of Sita's lament and share her pangs of heart only to feel more elevated with her own resolve to love her Rama through succeeding births ?

Imagined suffering and an actual sorrow are so widely apart that, whereas the one enables the human heart to rise to mental heights unscalable otherwise, the other only pulls the human spirit down and plunges it in gloom. Great writers

are the possessors of such fine imagination, and therefore give us of the best in literature. When we have listened humbly to their speech we are healed of our infirmities and know the peace that comes of understanding. The pleasure of pain is so true that it is a healthy antidote to many a deleterious influence upon life. It can cure the stony heart, which knows of no blue horizon beyond, of its false sense of security and stagnant selfishness. Those that know that assuredly the best people are saved from folly not by the intellect but by the heart, will easily subscribe to the creed of daily increasing the dose of such Pleasure of Pain.

K. CHANDRASEKHARAN

INDECENT BOOKS

"A Bombaite" is to be congratulated on drawing public attention in *The Evening News of India* of 22nd August to a crying evil—the indecent books and magazines displayed in Bombay book-stalls.

That a certain type of sham-erotic literature is now on sale in dozens of little book-shops in Bombay and that it can do harm to immature minds, there is little doubt. [No doubt whatever, we should say!] The police have an unquestionable right to step in and stop the sale of such literature. They also have a more important duty—to stop the wholesale dissemination of such literature from the source of supply, the publishing houses concerned.

The Bombay Municipal Corporation had this evil forcibly brought to its attention as long ago as 1939. At its meeting on the 27th July in that year Mr. Nosir C. Bharucha protested vigorously against it, in the interest of youthful morals. His resolution called on the Corporation to warn book-stall proprietors to stop displaying obscene pictorial "literature," under penalty of loss of licence. His resolution was duly referred to the Law Committee of the Corporation, for consideration and report. That Committee may be still deliberating, as the evil apparently persists unabated.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

WISDOM, NOT AUTHORITY*

Gerald Heard has the great merit of driving his thought deep amid the roots of our discontent. He finds that the very continuity of human history is now menaced by a twofold and reciprocal fissure in the unity of man. The unity of the individual is split, or rather destroyed by a monstrous hypertrophy. Man's consciousness of the external world is no longer counterpoised by any knowledge of, or belief in, the world within. His expansion has outrun all his power of cohesion: indeed his power of cohesion, of control and self-mastery, whether by religious belief or traditional life-wisdom, has now become almost vestigial. He is become a sort of anarchic automaton. Hence, the second fissure. The coherence of human society is threatened as never before: because there is no organic, preconscious cohesion, no instinctive harmony, continuously proceeding from a society of integrated persons. Therefore, a vast enlargement of the state is required merely to prevent social chaos. And this enlargement of the state still further weakens the capacity for individual responsibility.

Mr. Heard's substantial book and Mr. H. G. Wood's compact little volume of lectures have in common a recognition that Western civilisation is now in the throes of a profound spiritual as well as material crisis. Both look for salvation (if salvation is to come) from the rebirth of religion,

though the meaning of that phrase in their thought is rather different. Another difference is that Mr. Heard is more urgent and more desperate. A still more important one is that he thinks more deeply than Mr. Wood into the problem of creating a new political form for a human society. Mr. Wood appears to take a good many things for granted which Mr. Heard cannot: neither can I—for example, the survival of representative democracy in the Anglo-Saxon countries. That is not to say that Mr. Wood's little book is superficial. On the contrary, within its own compass it is fearless and penetrating.

Part of Mr. Wood's thesis can best be summarized in his own words:—

The conceptions of Liberty, Justice, Mercy and Truth which once prevailed have been discarded by great peoples and we are threatened with a paganism worse than of old. . . . These conceptions were derived from Greece and Palestine and . . . our feeling for humanity owed to Christianity a confidence, a range and a depth not previously known.

The new totalitarianism, whether Communist, Nazi or Fascist, is the most formidable menace to the spiritual element in Western civilization. Mr. Wood, like Mr. Heard, is quite impartial in his condemnation of totalitarianism. The total subordination of the individual to the state is as evil in Russia as in Germany. But he does not, like Mr. Heard, face the implications of the contradiction that

* *Man the Master.* By GERALD HEARD. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)
A Dialogue in the Desert. By GERALD HEARD. (Cassell and Co., Ltd., London. 1s. 6d.)
Christianity and Civilization. By H. G. Wood. (Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.)

the present war is being fought with Germany and Russia as the main antagonists; neither does he enquire into the causes of the simultaneous emergence of totalitarian government in so many European countries. He is content with a generalization.

So far as I can see, the failure, intellectual and moral, of our post-war world is universal. We are all involved in it, Bolshevist and Fascist, totalitarian and democrat, the right, the left and the centre in politics, the churches as well as the political parties, pacifist and non-pacifist, all have sinned and come short of the glory of God. To acknowledge our failure and our own part in it is our only hope.

That is true enough, on its own level; yet one is inclined to ask: What does it effectively mean? For Mr. Wood it appears to mean that we have all failed in loyalty to the Christian faith. That may be true. But since when did we all profess to adhere to it? Is it true to imply, as Mr. Wood does, that prior to the war of 1914-1918 Europe was Christian in any meaningful sense? If we say that Europe failed in loyalty to the Christian faith, we must also make it clear that Europe as a whole had ceased to acknowledge the validity of the Christian faith.

Is there any chance of its doing so again? I see but little, though Mr. Wood believes this is the only hope. The Churches are all deeply involved in the present struggle: which is pretty conclusive evidence that the only effective "religion" in Europe today is the religion of assertive nationalism. A Christianity which overrides the claim of the nation-state is practically unknown. It may exist in theory, but in practice it does not. The reason is obvious. The vast majority of

Western men have ceased to believe in Christianity.

Possibly, a minority will come to believe in Christianity, in some sense, again. But Mr. Wood, after declaring that a revival of Christian belief is necessary, indicates that what is required is belief in the same form of Christianity as that which has been abandoned.

For St. Paul and the primitive Church the meaning of the cross depended on faith in the resurrection. Clearly it makes a profound difference in our attitude whether or not we believe that the man who hung and suffered on the cross has been declared the Son of God with power by being raised from the dead.

Clearly it does; but equally clearly it makes a profound difference to the possibility of belief whether the resurrection is understood as a physical resurrection or something different.

Mr. Wood appears simply to ignore this crucial question. Perhaps rightly, he takes it for granted that Christianity must be based on a belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus. If that be so, then I am quite certain that a revival of Christianity is impossible. Western men are not going to believe again in the physical resurrection of Jesus. That is a dogmatic statement concerning the future, which may be proved to be wrong. I can only say that I am convinced it is true.

If effective Christianity, that is to say, Christianity with acknowledged power to override the claims of the state, depends on belief in the physical resurrection of Jesus, there will be no effective Christianity in Europe. At the outside only 10 per cent. of Europeans believe in the physical resurrection of Jesus today, and in the technically advanced countries the

proportion is very much smaller: perhaps not more than 1 per cent. And those who believe in it so implicitly that their consequent belief in the omnipotence of the Christian God is such that they disregard the authority of the state when it conflicts with the commands of God—and that is the only valid test—is much smaller still. There are not more than a few thousand of these Old Believers in the whole of Europe, and they are persecuted everywhere. Mr. Wood, himself, is certainly not one of them.

Unless Christianity purges itself of this radical ambiguity and equivocation, it will have no future in Europe. The attempts that are being made to establish a kind of Catholic totalitarianism are bound in the long run to fail. *Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis*, will the Christian God be established as sovereign in the hearts and minds of men.

Indeed, the only hope for Christianity that I can see, is the hope of a genuine, not an artificial, rebirth of Christianity: that is, the emergence of a Christianity based on a belief in the spiritual resurrection of Jesus, and in this as an event happening within the individual soul, as a consequence of the fearless contemplation of, and imaginative participation in, the life and death of Jesus, understood from the beginning as a man, differing from other men only by his wisdom and the profundity of his belief in the love of God for men. The resurrection of Jesus, thus understood and experienced, is the rebirth of the human soul: the birth of the assurance in ourselves that, if we follow the voice of God, calling us to deeper understanding and greater love, even though it lead us

(as it probably will) to earthly disaster, nevertheless—"in spite of all," as Katherine Mansfield said at the last,—Love triumphs. Before what is revealed, in the very shipwreck and disaster of Love, men ultimately must bow their heads.

That, it seems to me, is a Christianity which is inherently eternal, and which men may come to acknowledge. It is a Christianity which is inherently universal: for the experience it sanctifies and exalts to the highest place in human happenings is a universal experience. Whether it will ever triumph universally is another matter. But perhaps not a very important matter. The important matter is that Christianity of this kind shall not perish from the earth, because it represents the striving of Life for more abundant life; it represents the rejection of the criterion of "success," the repudiation of what works, for what is good, regardless of the consequences; it represents what Keats called "the new birth of human heroism, the electric fire tending to purify" the mass of human dross and inertia. It represents Life conscious and aware in man of its own divine purpose, and obedient to it, and it alone.

I do not clearly see how such a principle of religion and life could ever be organised into an institution, or become the acknowledged source of authority within a human society. Heard's idea is that a humanly tolerable future depends on the conscious formation of a hierarchical society by a spiritual and non-violent élite. That is, no doubt, in theory the solution of man's problem today. But how, in the extreme predicament in which we stand, does high spiritual wisdom

obtain social authority? Heard believes that it will ultimately happen simply because all other principles of authority must fail. They may produce a temporary order as the alternative to sheer chaos; but the order will be superficial, and the concealed violence done to the human spirit intolerable. Every other principle of authority, save the spiritual wisdom which returns good for evil, will be short-lived in the modern world now *in extremis*. It will simply break down. The industrialism which compels men into herd-solidarity, and will in the immediate future enforce Western man into the servile totalitarian state, will nevertheless make totalitarian violence impossible as a permanent solution, because a machine-society, based on applied science, must

continually generate men of disinterested intelligence to run it. Totalitarianism must generate its own nemesis.

The day will therefore come when men of the highest wisdom will be called to the place of authority, because mankind will have no alternative. From the false order which now demonstrably ends in death, men will inevitably recoil into the true order which is life. God will be enthroned again. But he will not, and cannot be, the God of extant Christianity. He can only be the God whom Jesus divined and obeyed, whom other great prophets and teachers throughout the world have divined and obeyed, whose servants are known and recognised by what they are, because they are "wise as serpents and harmless as doves."

JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

THE TWIN DOCTRINES*

This is a new addition to the Wisdom of the East Series, and by an author who has long been associated with the activities of the Buddhist Lodge in England. In nine chapters, Mr. Humphreys has essayed to demonstrate the generally accepted principles involved in the teachings relating to *karma* and reincarnation, and to meet some of the better known objections that are often raised when these subjects are discussed. He has performed a prodigy of compression, and, although much that he writes will need qualification or elaboration, the volume is bound to interest many readers to whom the ideas brought forward will be new, and who have not hitherto thought of a third possibil-

ity as between the opposing claims of blind chance and arbitrary governance in matters affecting the evolution of this world and the endless varieties of beings who dwell upon it.

It is difficult to imagine any one who will dispute the author's contention that if the doctrine of *karma* be true it becomes necessary to consider whether any reconstruction of Western civilization is not doomed to failure "unless it is based on conscious co-operation with this ultimate and all-embracing Law." At the same time, Mr. Humphreys is the first to admit that this item in the eleventh of the twelve *Nidānas* (causes of existence), "belonging to the most subtle and abstruse doctrines of the Eastern

* *Karma and Rebirth* By T. CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS (John Murray, London. 3s. 6d.)

metaphysical system" (to quote Mme. Blavatsky), is not without its own obscurities, and that he would be foolish indeed who claimed a thorough knowledge of its operations or implications, even within the limitations of what we know as human life. But why does he confine his reference to reconstruction to "Western civilization"? His bias in this respect is observable also in his brief treatment of *karma* in relation to duty, where, writing of the danger in another's duty, he says that this admonition of the *Bhagavad Gita* "is the basis of the Eastern virtue of minding one's own business which the West, in its enthusiasm for social service and good works, is apt to ignore." It may be thought puerile to mention this point; but the subject-matter of this slender volume is of the highest importance, and the obtrusion of personal views is not helpful to its advocacy. In this connection, Mme. Blavatsky (quotations from whose writings are much in evidence) pointed out that "in sociology, as in all branches of true science, the law of universal causation holds good," and she enjoined each of her students "to do his utmost to help on, by all the means in his power, every wise and well-considered social effort which has for its object the amelioration of the condition of the poor." Her spirited denunciation, too, of vivisectional practices, is widely known. Who of us knows the wider track of *karmic* law? Mr. Humphreys does well to emphasize that *karma* is love as well as justice.

It may be that some of the difficulties encountered by one reader of this book are due to the facility which Mr.

Humphreys displays in shifting the emphasis as between what he calls the "Wisdom-Religion" (plain Theosophy to some) and the philosophical terms comprised in the exoteric schools of Buddhist tradition. As examples, he writes that "Conscience is a Karmic memory"; that "that which reincarnates is not an immortal soul but the product of countless lives, a bundle of attributes called Character," lacking any element of immortality; and at page 36 he quotes from a Japanese scripture, whose name he does not give us, and which expresses the view that "In action there is no distinction between right and wrong, but people make a distinction for their own silly convenience." In each of these cases we think the author will agree that he should have said more, or nothing at all. It would be an impertinence to suggest that he does not know the teaching with regard to the principle of *Buddhi*, and the accepted distinction between what we may call divine conscience, and the human variety; or the exegesis of the Buddhist teaching that "Karma is that moral kernel (of any being) which alone survives death and continues in transmigration"; or the precept from *The Voice of the Silence* that "The self of Matter and the SELF of Spirit can never meet. One of the twain must disappear; there is no place for both." Nonetheless, these matters need reiteration, in the face of Mr. Humphreys's appeal to the "Wisdom-Religion," otherwise he may be caught in the *karma* of misleading his readers upon important issues, while providing a veritable feast of suggestive and provocative thought!

VALUE AND VALUES*

The present volume treats of "General Principles and the Kingdom of Values" and analyses the specific types of value. Most unfortunately, it was not given to the author to complete the work; he has been taken away before his time and almost in the middle of his present undertaking. This is very much to be regretted.

Mr. Sreenivasa Iyengar clearly distinguishes the scope and the problems of a science of values from ethics, with which it is often confounded even by some eminent philosophers. What is "good" in general must be distinguished from what is ethically "right." The latter is only a species of the wider genus of value in general. While this distinction is important, it may not be final. All values must be capable of being subsumed under the highest value. There are people who think of ethical value as the highest or as value *par excellence*. To them the good would be tantamount to moral virtue or what is ethically right. "The good will alone is good," they would say. Mr. Iyengar, however, although believing in some kind of hierarchy of goods, does not hold ethical good to be the meaning of all good. He may be right. But still the unity of all values is a problem which has to be faced, and which he does not face in the present volume. For him values are various or different in kind, and they are only externally related to each other.

The question will naturally be raised, what is value? The author's reply is that the value of an object is its satisfy-

ingness. It is not a quality which is inherent in the object. It is a *property* which is acquired by it through its relation to the subject. It is thus an "emergent." It is because the individual is attached to certain universes of desire that he has different "norms" of valuation; and the value of an object is determined with reference to the norm employed in the appreciation of it. Thus value is both relative and subjective. The object has no value in itself. It has mere validity, which is nothing but its capacity or fitness to satisfy some desire. In this sense we can say that all value is merely contributory or instrumental. A thing has value in so far as it satisfies. There is no "intrinsic" value.

This view is only partially correct. We naturally think of certain values as being merely accessory or means to an end, and other values as being ends in themselves and so intrinsic. As a matter of fact, intrinsic value should be the only real value. That which is good in itself alone is good. Mr. Iyengar thinks otherwise. The reason is that he distinguishes value from being. Being is one thing and value another, and there is a hiatus between the two. A thing may exist in itself, but it has no value in itself. It has value in so far as it subserves an end. But then value hangs in mid-air. It is not grounded in being, and has no necessary connection with it. It is only *attributed* to being by the appreciating subject. Is it not a great illusion? A thing which really has no value is appreciated by us as valuable. This

* *The Metaphysics of Value*. Vol. I. By K. R. SREENIVASA IYENGAR, M. A. (The University of Mysore. Rs. 5/-)

will cut at the very root of all value. Mr. Iyengar fails properly to reconcile value with being. He keeps to the beaten track of common-sense, where we distinguish being which is in itself and value which is for us. A deeper analysis must shake this common-sense view. The real philosophical problem is to find being which is valuable in itself, something like being which is bliss, the very soul of satisfyingness, as in Vedanta.

We said that the value of an object is determined by its conformity or otherwise to a norm or a standard of value. The norm, according to Mr. Iyengar, is the ideal which we seek to realise. It is never fully realised in a fact. It stands for untold possibilities or potentialities of approximation to it. If a thing fully and completely realised it, there would be no sense in discerning its conformity or non-conformity to the norm, which is what we mean by the perception of its value. But can such an ideal be anything more than a figment of the imagination, a will-o'-the-wisp which we can never catch? Its power over us will be delusive.

We contend that the ideal must be based upon a higher kind of reality, which we only dimly and vaguely perceive but which is fully realised in itself and apart from any empirical fact, at every stage of valuation. It is not an empty human fancy, but a higher reality which has power over us. Further, the ideal, being non-empirical, must ultimately be one, the soul of all valuation. Such an ideal alone can completely satisfy. From empirical satisfactions we pass on to a satisfaction which is timeless and eternal. In this way, we can give meaning to the

conception of "eternal values." There is no room for eternal values in Mr. Iyengar's analysis. He starts with different forms of value and different norms employed in those forms. But then we have still to answer the questions,—Can we keep the ideals apart ultimately? Is there no inner unity in them? What is the ultimate form of satisfyingness or the value in all values? These are inconvenient questions on the present hypothesis.

The second part of the present volume is devoted to a detailed consideration of each specific form of value,—organistic, recreative, hedonistic, economic, personal, socialistic, intellectual, æsthetic and moral. Beyond these is worth or worthiness which is the inherent character of spirit, and where value ceases to be external or objective, and so ceases to be value in the ordinary sense.

Mr. Iyengar has something very interesting to say on each of these values. We may note a few instances. He distinguishes recreation from work, and shows how work can and ought to be raised to recreation. In recreation we have the sense of freedom and joy. There is no compulsion. We are disinterested in the results except where sport has itself become, as in big international contests, and as opposed to its own proper nature, a matter of competition and a will to win. Real sport must be completely disinterested and free from any sense of possessiveness with regard to results. In this connection, the author advocates a new social order where instead of the killing work of the factory, the workman will have free scope for his own imagination and inventiveness and where he can change work into play. Such work alone can

develop the man, and give him both freedom and joy which are the characteristics of real spirit.

Æsthetic value has some affinity with recreation. The urge to create here does not come from any perception of beauty. Beauty may result or may not result. It is only a product of æsthetic creation, not its origin. The urge comes from within to express an idea or a truth of life or the play of some human passion. In all cases, it is a desire for self-expression in the object. The joy of the artist or of the spectator, however, is transient, dependent as it is upon the contemplation of, and the recreation of the sentiment behind, the æsthetic object. It is not permanent. It lacks the integration of life. The artist only realises a one-sided value, or value in the object. What he creates in the object may have no relation with his life, which may be on quite a lower plane or the plane of the senses.

What alone can remedy this is moral value. Moral value pervades all our life's activities and not a particular sort of activity only. Hedonic value is good, but it must be moral. So also economic value, æsthetic value etc. In the sphere of morality, man creates not something in the object, but in himself,—he creates value in himself, the virtuous will. A man of virtue has

the right perspective and balance in everything that he does. He always aims at goodness because he himself is good. This moral value culminates in spiritual worth or worthiness, where all conflict between will and desire has ended, and spirit alone rules with its two aspects of worthiness-to-do or righteousness and worthiness-to-be or love.

It is beyond doubt that the author has displayed in this book much erudition, comprehension and high powers of critical analysis. But at the same time, it gives evidence of departmental, and not integral, thinking. Perhaps Mr. Iyengar was himself conscious of this, for he promised to answer the more ultimate questions directly and at length in a second volume. Here his scope is limited. It is a detailed and empirical study of value. It belongs to the middle heights of our value-experience. We also think that reducing the size of the book would have added to its value. As it is, the author is easily led into unnecessary dilation and collateral thinking. There is not sufficient concentration on a few main issues. There can be no doubt, however, of the great competency and the labour which the author has shown in the whole arrangement and in the general level of the argument.

G. R. MALKANI

The Graphic Art of U. S. S. R. By SHEIKH AHMED. (Free India Publications, Lahore. As. 4). Graphic art has developed greatly since the Revolution. State Control, the writer shows, uses art in mass education, assuring the artist economic security. It is

recognised that beautiful illustrations keep up public interest in literature. Said Lenin, "Enrich your mind with the knowledge of all those treasures which humanity has produced." The graphic arts are contributing their mite.

V. M. I.

FACTS—POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE *

In the course of ten chapters, Dr. A. C. Das, lecturer in the Post-Graduate Department of the Calcutta University, has attempted a systematic and thoroughgoing analysis of the concept of Negation and Negative Fact and discussed the concomitant Doctrine of Truth and Error. The volume contains substantially the text of the author's doctoral thesis and there is no doubt that it reveals full and effective control over the schools of different thinkers and system-builders of European philosophy who have had to discuss the nature of Negative Fact and Negation in developing their distinctive doctrines. A professional philosopher generally loses temper or simply pities the poor man-in-the-street when the latter finds it impossible to mount to the dizzy heights of the former's intellectual speculation, but illustrations like "Socrates is not a triangle" and "Two monkeys one with and another without a tail" would attract and enliven the minds even of laymen!

Dr. A. C. Das has endeavoured to maintain two important and significant conclusions:—(1) "There is nothing like negative fact," and (2) in "the situation of negation, the ideal has as important a part to play as the real." Dr. Das has confined his thesis to an examination of the views of leading European logicians and philosophers like Bergson, Bradley and others, and only a passing reference is made to "Indian Logic" and the "Pramana" of "Anupalabdhi" admitted by some schools. I have heard the charge that discussions on Sanskritic texts are arid,

abstract and dry, and I would invite attention to one or two contexts not merely to demonstrate the utter lack of foundation of the charge but to urge that in the matter of aridness and dry-as-dust discussions European philosophy has beaten Indian systems hollow! But the discussion on pages 262-3 and that on pages xviii-xix would easily prove the charge of "Words, Words, Words" levelled by a well-known author against philosophy and philosophers.

Regarding the main conclusion of Dr. Das that there is nothing like negative fact, it should be observed that if there can be a *positive fact*, by the same logic and the same laws of thought and postulates of knowledge—in fact, whatever supports the so-called positive fact—there *must be negative fact* as well. There is absolutely nothing illogical or unphilosophical in that position. I am unable to see why Dr. Das fights shy of admitting the validity of the negative fact.

But the second conclusion which he has argued, that in a negative situation, or a situation in which the negative element predominates or monopolises attention, the "ideal" plays as important a rôle as the "real," considerably neutralises the philosophic potency of his main conclusion. If Dr. Das had pressed into service the celebrated treatment of "negation" by Indian logicians, he would easily have realized that "negative fact" should be assigned co-ordinate logical and intellectual status with "positive fact." The reasons stated by the Indian logicians are

* *Negative Fact, Negation and Truth.* By ADHAR CHANDRA DAS, M.A., PH.D., P.R.S. (University of Calcutta)

irrefutable. They admit, for instance, "Pragabhava"—negation of anything *prior to its coming into existence*; "Annyonya-abhava"—reciprocal negation such as "X is not Y," "Day is not night" etc.; "Pradhvamsa-abhava"—negation by destruction and "Atyanta-abhava"—complete non-existence. It is impossible to go into details in this brief notice, but the Indian logicians centuries ago emphasized the universal truth that if the different objects of the universe are to be understood in their independence and distinctive individuality, and if the constitutive and intellectual boundaries are to be marked without transgression of frontiers, negative fact should be deemed to be endowed with and to enjoy a co-ordinate status with positive fact. There is no escape from this position.

That is why "Abhava" (negation) was classified as an independent "Padartha," an entity or a category like "Dravya" or "Guna" (a substance or an attribute). A positive fact, like a forged currency note or any other pinch-

beck, notwithstanding its apparent and alleged positive characteristics and its positive appeal to senses and understanding is, as a matter of fact, a *pure negative fact*. Thus a certain amount of "pragmatism" is inherent in the very constitution of the human mind and intellect. It is idle to contend that on analysis the negative fact turns out to be positive. One can maintain equally legitimately that the so-called positive fact on analysis turns out to be negative (as in "Neti-Neti"). It is therefore absurd to believe that "To criticise pragmatism is like flogging a dead horse." Pragmatism, far from being a dead horse, is a very virile and vigorous race-horse, alive and kicking thoughtless and incompetent critics!

None of the fore-noted comments would, however, detract from the general excellence of the treatment adopted by Dr. Das, who has shed some new light on the problem of negation and negative fact. University students engaged in advanced post-graduate research will surely find the volume searching and stimulating.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Indian Architecture (The Islamic Period). By PERCY BROWN. (D. B. Taraporevala Sons and Co., Bombay. Rs. 15/-)

If the first volume of this book (reviewed in the February ARYAN PATH) could be applauded as the fulfilment of a long-felt need, the same can be stated with even greater justification of this second volume. For, since the great discoveries of India's earlier past, Indo-Muslim art has in the last decades met with rather undeserved neglect. Besides the brief

surveys in the *Cambridge History of India* only a few monographs of modest size have been brought out on the architecture of the period. The present volume, with its diligent condensation of the vast material, its useful comparative charts of architectural forms, its chronological lists and its cautious reconstructions will, therefore, prove of great help.

Unfortunately the author has ignored all the pertinent periodical articles, the books published outside India and most of the evolution represented by

modern studies of Islamic archæology and of art in general. Though a few works from these categories are mentioned in the bibliography, they seem to have been without influence on the formation of the text. It would, however, be unjust to throw the whole responsibility for these shortcomings on the author, in view of the incompleteness and disastrous lack of organization of scientific resources in India, especially in the field of art research.

That some important groups of monuments, *e. g.*, Rohtasgarh (Bihar), Sarhind (Punjab), and the interesting North Palace and water pavilions of the Munja Talao in Mandu are not mentioned does not matter so much, as completeness cannot be expected. But in a work dealing with Indo-Islamic architecture the relation both to pure Hindu and pure Islamic art should be brought out clearly. So far as that to Hindu art is concerned, Mr. Percy Brown generally shows a sober and gratifyingly unbiassed judgment. The influence, however, of Vijayanagar on the formation of the later Deccani style, and the Indianization of later Mughal architecture are passed over in silence. As to the relation to Muslim architecture outside India, the Saljuq influence on the buildings of Ala-ud-din Khalji, the Persian on Gulbarga and Bidar, the Ottoman on Bijapur are well marked. But the leading authorities at present trace Saljuq influence further back than the Alai Darwaza, and regard already the Qutb Minar as an indubitable example of the Saljuq style. The small tapering turrets on the quoins of Firozshahi architecture actually are a Persian

innovation of the Ilkhani period. The high maqsura screens of the Sharqi mosques are adaptations of Timurid models. Likewise the domed corner turrets of the Mandu mausoleums go back to Samanid models. Also the Taj Mahal depends directly on late Safavi prototypes, at least in most of its forms, though not at all in its spirit.

The description of late Mughal architecture does justice neither to its stylistic development nor to the driving forces behind it. Neither the influence of Deccani art nor the picturesque dynamism of the evolution up till the middle of the eighteenth century have been realized and the completely new and original development thereafter down to the middle of the nineteenth century has been missed. Lucknow represents an exotism comparable to the "*Chinoiserie*" of the European Rococo. Merely to condemn in the Victorian vein all these late phases, is tantamount to negating the whole trend of art valuation since 1900. Rajput palace architecture has been illuminatingly analyzed by Oscar Reuther, especially the relation between the old panch and sat mahal, the Hawa Mahal, and the palaces of Orchha, Datia, Udaipur, etc.

From the point of view of modern systematic art history the present volume is, therefore, not quite satisfactory, in spite of many good observations. But this will not diminish its value as a diligent synthetic description of a vast and far-spread multitude of fine monuments, and as a handy reference-book. And in this latter respect it will, no doubt, find wide-spread grateful appreciation.

H. GOETZ

Education in World Ethics and Science. By SIR RICHARD GREGORY. Conway Memorial Lecture for 1943. (Watts and Co., London. Cloth, 2s.)

"Efficiency of individual service and right human conduct are the primary social aims of educational endeavour, whatever means or methods are used to promote them," says Sir Richard. He examines the place of modern science as a means and a method and what he says is valuable though at times provocative of argument. But none can dispute this:—

Every branch of knowledge and instruction may be said to be "scientific" if studies of it demand the careful collection of evidence of any kind with the view of arriving at the truth by impartial judgments. The view now generally held is that wherever there are facts to be determined or general truths to be ascertained, scientific method can be applied with advantage to the study of them. Inductive and deductive reasoning may, indeed, be the basis of instruction in almost any subject, and cannot be claimed as the exclusive possession of the natural sciences.

Sir Richard Gregory has some pointed things to say about religious education in the schools. He gives full value to "the ethical principles attributed to Christ and other moral philosophers" but he challenges the notion that religious instruction best inculcates them. He has scant patience with the stand of the Central Council of the Church for Religious Education. It insists "that a full and equal opportunity of education is the right of every child of God and that a Christian foundation is the only essential basis of a real education." Sir Richard objects.

It is not clear whether Hindus, Moslems, Buddhists, Confucians, and Rationalists are regarded as children of God or not, but to assert that they cannot be educated without

Christian principles is to manifest a spirit of intoleration more appropriate to the Dark Ages than to the enlightened views now held as to the meaning of civilization.

Sir Richard cites Sir Percival Sharp's analysis of juvenile delinquency in Liverpool Courts in 1940. The number of juvenile delinquents per 1,000 worked out at 21.6 for Council Schools, where there is no great stress upon religious teaching. The corresponding figures for Church of England and Roman Catholic Schools speak for themselves. They were 35.6 and 45.5, respectively.

A passing reference in Sir Richard Gregory's lecture brings up a mistake of the Church fifteen centuries old and still doing mischief. He mentions Pelagius, a British monk

who strongly opposed the doctrine of original sin and claimed that man was endowed with a free will to cultivate the goodness within him or create what is considered to be sinful. His favourite maxim was "If I ought, I can."

Pelagius was shocked by the low standard of morality in early-fifth-century Rome and countered the plea of human weakness by upholding the powers of human nature. A will capable of good or evil was the prerogative of every man, he held. Even the "heathen" could perfectly keep such law as they knew. He conceded some help to Christians from "divine grace," but that concession was not enough. The view that without its aid the human will was capable of good aroused the opposition of Augustine and finally brought down the condemnation of the North African Synod. Simultaneously with its action Honorius issued an imperial edict in 418 A. D. condemning Pelagius and his followers to confiscation of goods and irrevocable banishment. It was a sad

error in judgment, only less serious than that of the later Council of Constantinople which made reincarnation "the lost chord of Christianity." *The Encyclopædia Britannica* (11th ed.) blamed the opposing belief, that the visible Church was "the sole divinely-

appointed repository of grace" for the pernicious belief in the magical efficacy of the sacraments and the consequent defective ethical power of religion

and other serious evils in the mediæval Church. Those evils still persist to some extent today.

H.

Education for a World Adrift. By SIR RICHARD LIVINGSTONE. (Current Problems, No. 17, Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.)

The President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, sees the root problem of our "Age without Standards" as unsolvable in the absence of a spiritual ideal. Many of the most-read modern writers "have destroyed with great success but have constructed nothing." Cynicism, he declares, can be no less corruptive and pernicious than obscenity.

A sense of direction, a pattern for living—these are vital modern needs which education must meet. Sir Richard agrees with Plato that "The noblest of all studies is the study of what man is and of what life he should live." And he quotes Whitehead with approval: "Moral education is impossible without the habitual vision of greatness."

History and literature may both be drawn upon for such a vision but Sir Richard stresses the importance of distinguishing the great from the good—greatness as a poet from greatness as a man.

According to Sir Richard what is best in English culture has its roots in Hellenism and the Bible. His general

prescription for the present lack of clear values and definite standards is the strengthening of those roots, with less stress on examinations and on "the specialist tendency in education" which he sees as leading to materialism. "The standard insensibly implanted by living with the first-rate" he sees as the best protection against the inferior. As Plato puts it, "some influence from noble works" constantly falling "upon eye and ear from childhood upward."

The Greek ideal of *areté*, aiming at excellence or virtue in every direction, is valuable for our times beyond a doubt. Hinduism long anticipated it, to be sure, with its ideal of dharma to be perfectly performed in every relation of life. But Sir Richard can be forgiven the very common inability to look beyond Greece to the roots of her culture, for the noble concepts that he assembles in this little book. Throughout he stresses education as of more importance than educational systems. He turns to Plato again for his definition of education:—

By education I mean that training in excellence from youth upwards which makes a man passionately desire to be a perfect citizen, and teaches him how to rule, and to obey, with justice.

E. M. H.

Gandhi Against Fascism. Edited by JAG PARVESH CHANDER. (Free India Publications, Commercial Buildings, The Mall, Lahore. Rs. 2/-)

It is the deep tragedy of our times that goodness and sincerity are everywhere at a discount. The welfare of humanity, despite much professed concern, seems only to be of secondary importance. How otherwise could those who see more clearly through the fog, who uphold principles which can make for universal peace, have been either ignored, silenced or deliberately misconstrued? Illustrations are needless when utterances of prophetic fervour like those of Pearl S. Buck, Willkie and Louis Fischer fall on deaf ears. A more concrete illustration can be found in the case of the Christ-like Mahatma Gandhi, the greatest apostle of non-violence since Gautama the Buddha and a living embodiment of the principles he preaches. Miss Buck said some time ago that the world had yet to deserve the peace it so loudly clamoured for. With equal truth and emphasis can it be said that the world is not yet fit for the teachings of the Saint of Sevagram.

It would be idle to detail here the well-known circumstances which have led his detractors to unfounded and unprovable allegations, the gravest of which is that Gandhi is a Quisling in the Fascist cause. Deeper irony perhaps cannot be found on the plane of common experience than that one who reacts against violence with all the fervour of a lifetime's experimentation with non-violence should be identified with a mode of thought that is ultimately based on coercion and force. This book, which brings together some of his writings in *Harijan*, with a view to clarifying the Mahatma's attitude towards Fascism, serves a double purpose. For those who understand him, it reiterates his faith in moral compunction as an incentive to good rather than in the compulsion of physical force; for those who refuse to be convinced it presents a body of evidence which can hardly be challenged, much less disproved. If writings can prove a man, here he is; to question his sincerity would be to question sincerity itself. To strike such a man as this, and when his hands are bound!

V. M. INAMDAR

The Virgin Birth in History and Faith. By DOUGLAS EDWARDS. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

A writer on the alleged virgin birth of Jesus can present his subject-matter in one of three ways, as a dispassionate examination of the evidence, as a hostile critique, or as a vigorous defence. The Rev. Douglas Edwards of the Community of the Resurrection adopts the third method with all the zeal of an intransigent partisan who sets out

to prove what he already assumes. He tells how with "palpitating heart" he keyed himself up to face the evidence against the doctrine until at last, grateful and gasping, he realised he had overrated the opponents' case, that there existed no particle of evidence against the virgin birth which an impartial and instructed jury would not dismiss. Possibly not, if the jury be composed of "impartial" Christians like Mr. Edwards who describes as

“doctrinaire” and hence as heretical every writer who deviates from the foundational creed that “Jesus Christ is God our Saviour” and furthermore avers that in virtue of this climacteric truth the Christian “is living at this very moment a life grander, stronger and more spacious than that accessible to ‘the good pagan,’” and, we suppose, to the good Hindu and the good Buddhist!

Since Jesus is God who for our salvation became Man—and he only is a Christian who fully accepts this—the miraculous birth of Jesus is a matter of overwhelming importance, and disbelief is a baseless delusion of the unregenerate mind. That God became man is a historic fact. Thus the virgin birth of Jesus is a fact of *history*. The apostles assumed it even before the Gospels of Matthew and Luke were

written. Dogma begins in fact.

Rather we should say that, in this instance at least, the dogma created the “fact.” Yet Mr. Edwards may be right in saying that the ascription of virgin birth to Jesus eases the difficulty of believing in Jesus as God. But why strain at the gnat if the camel be swallowed? Given the assumption all things are possible. But the assumption is the outcome of a literal-mindedness which fails utterly to distinguish between the realm of myth and symbol on the one hand and the context of history on the other. Confusion of the two under the influence of a closed and credalised Faith has given rise to the misdirected ability displayed in this book. To literalise and localise the universal myth of virgin birth is to debase it and bereave it of meaning.

LESLIE BELTON

The Nayaks of Tanjore. By V. VRIDDHAGIRISAN. Edited by PROF. C. S. SRINIVASACHARIAR. (Annamalai University, Annamalainagar)

This is a thesis approved for the M. Litt. Degree. The theme, as the title of the volume implies, holds little of interest for the mass of lay readers. Tanjore is a dust speck, barely visible, in the long sunbeam of India's annals. And the Nayaks ruled Tanjore for no more than a hundred and fifty years in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries. The historian of South India, however, may extract out of this intensive research a few pages of material to fill in his comprehensive picture.

Vassals of the Vijayanagar Empire, the Nayaks (meaning captains, rulers) have left deep and indelible marks of their rule and benevolence behind... and their age

was after all not far removed in tempo and culture from the modern times.

Further, they formed an interlude between the passing of the Chola rule and the advent of alien powers in the land. A significant epoch, for with it ended not a line of kings alone, but a polity, a conception of the State. The Nayaks were neither democrats, nor autocrats. They followed the guidance of the *Dharmasastras*. Their despotic hands were tied by the traditional moral code as embodied in *Rajaniti* and *Dandaniti*, by the customary law, *achara*, by all the inward checks strewn on the stern track of Rajadharma. And the fulfilment of Rajadharma was in the material, cultural and spiritual progress of the people.

The traditional Hindu ideal of toleration and impartial patronage of

all religious sects remained a cornerstone of Nayak policy. Vaishnavas themselves, they lent their support to Saivism and the Dwaita cult of Madhwa. Sevappa Nayak, in pursuance of this catholicity, granted lands to a mosque at Tanjore and encouraged Christians to settle down in his kingdom. And the ways of Sevappa Nayak were no exception.

The Nayaks were keen patrons of poetry, music and painting. They frequently held literary assemblies. Raghunatha, the greatest of the Nayak rulers, made original contributions to the science of music. Reputed as "an ocean of learning," he is said to have made Tanjore the seat of Vani, goddess

of knowledge. The author of the volume under review has rightly assigned him two long chapters.

Shri Vriddhagirisan is not carried away by the material of his gleanings. He does not over-assess its historical significance. "The Nayak rule in Tanjore," he concludes with commendable moderation, "forms from the cultural point of view, a most pleasing epoch in the history of the South Indian people."

The volume has been expensively produced. Some printing mistakes have been corrected in a page of "Errata," but not all. The historian Dowson, *e. g.*, is spelt, uncorrected, in the Bibliography as Downen.

BHABANI BHATTACHARYA

30 Months in Russia. By D. G. TENDULKAR. (Karnatak Publishing House, Bombay. Re. 1/4)

Mr. Tendulkar believes that the problems of present-day India—agricultural, economic, educational, social, and even political, have much in common with those which Russia had to face twenty-five years ago. He states that he is neither a politician nor a member of the Communist Party. Controversial subjects he has eschewed and while remembering that "there are ugly elements in Soviet life too," he quotes Lenin's words which might be applied equally well to present-day India: "No profound and popular movement in all history has taken place without its share of mud, without adventurers and rogues, without swaggering and noisy elements."

What Mr. Tendulkar has aimed at in his book is to give us a brief word-portrait of Soviet life as he saw it in 1937. His account is superficial but will be read with interest by those whose knowledge of Russia is meagre. The first and second Five-Year Plans

are described and explained and we see the results in the development of industries and the electrification of the country; the conversion of individual small holdings, which were worked by medieval methods of cultivation, into mechanised collective farms; the Red Army which besides being an immense war-machine is described as "a hearth of culture"; and the vast network of *crèches* and kindergartens which look after children and train them wherever women work. Yet the liberation of women has not removed "the cohesive power of love and children" from family life, nor lessened "the mutual obligations of its members." This story of a Phoenix risen from the relics of a disastrous past makes dazzling reading but very little is said about the thought, letters and art of Soviet Russia.

The book is well written in language which is simple if not always graceful. The get-up and printing are very good and there are seven excellent photographs taken by the author. The book is dedicated to Jawaharlal Nehru.

IRENE R. RAY

The Crusade of Free Spirits (A Draft of Peace Conditions.) By The Rt. Hon. ALEXANDER WAMWETZOS. (New Book Co. Bombay. Rs. 14/-)

This is the vivid record of the varied experiences and impressions of a fervent Athenian crusader in the cause of freedom and the establishment of a New Social Order. Amidst the spate of books on the New Social Order, one feels a sense of relief at the advent of a new book that discusses the question from the stand-point of practical politics and in terms of concrete proposals and measures. A plan for the future world order needs to be at once desirable and feasible. The great French philosopher Bergson's message to the world from his sick-bed "that we should act like men of thought, and think like men of action" is vital to political issues.

Mr. Alexander Wamwetzos gives us a detailed blueprint for the new order. One is lost in the innumerable authorities and passages cited. His draft of peace conditions if approved by the belligerents at the close of the war would certainly create a Paradise. But it is not impossible that men should see in these conditions the real environment for the growth of civilization. That way lies the hope for civilization. As usual, our author talks about the world state and the principle of federation and discusses at length the implications of the four-fold freedom of the Atlantic Charter.

But he criticises the vagueness of the Atlantic Charter and its undue restriction to the countries overrun by Hitler. He particularly laments that it is not applied to India.

The present war is a total war and in our effort to win it we should not merely concentrate on the military side, nor should we deprecate discussion of war aims while the fortunes of war are still in the balance. Political realism demands viewing this war as a world-wide process; it must be won on all fronts. Social transformation infusing faith for living, the creation of a just and equitable economic order, sound educational reforms etc., are as important as the military arm in the winning of victory over the Nazis and in the attempt to establish a new social order. The constructive war aims constitute the Peace-offensive. To create a new social order the Allies have before all else to renounce the supremacy of economic values, and the primitive lust for dominions. It is the lack of these religious and ethical virtues that has made us run into two world wars in one generation.

The demand is not for an impossibly austere morality for the nations. The Vice-President of the U. S. A. has put it pointedly: "The era of imperialism is ended." And Wallace added: "The new democracy by definition avoids imperialism." That way lies the avoidance of a third world war and the establishment of a new social order.

P. NAGARAJA RAO

Submission in Suffering: A Comparative Study of Eastern Thought. By H. H. ROWLEY. (University of Wales Press Board, Cardiff. 2s. 6d.)

The problem of suffering is complex

and the responses it evokes are varied. This brochure, concerned with the problem of "innocent suffering," is a brief comparative study of characteristic attitudes inculcated by Eastern

religious systems. Submission to suffering, deserved or not, is found everywhere but the spirit and the character of this submission can and do vary indefinitely. This spirit of submission has often proceeded from the recognition of strict justice either in the dispensations of a divine power or in the working of the law of moral compensation.

Much of the Old Testament as well as the New points to the rigid justice of God, though the Jewish Rabbis stretched "justice" to cover inherited reactions to ancestral sins. Indian thought postulated a causal nexus between sin and suffering. The *Upanishads* bring out the educative value of the latter. Hinduism regarded the operation of Karma as absolutely just and unexceptionable but, recognising reincarnation, saw that sowing and harvest might be in different births. Buddhism taught Karma, of course, but Professor Rowley sees the Buddhist attitude to suffering as one of profound and complete passivity. Courageous acceptance of suffering was the teaching of Confucianism—a fatalism that inspired quiet confidence in misfortune. Many Chinese teachers stressed various

attitudes ranging from passive indifference to ecstatic acceptance. The submission which the Prophet of Islam called forth was touched with faith in a powerful but wise God. The *Quran* presents suffering as a means of testing men and bringing them gain. Suffering may again be endured, not because it cannot be cured, but in "a spirit of consecration that converts the pain into a channel of service."

The reviewer fails to see the merit which Professor Rowley implies in not asking to understand the cause of suffering. The terrible apparent injustice of life demands the explanation which only an undeviating law of action and reaction can satisfactorily furnish. The rigid determinism of Karma has misled many, including Professor Rowley, into over-simplification of what the doctrine implies. Professor Rowley assumes undeserved suffering as a fact of experience and regards the law of moral retribution as an inadequate explanation. In the process of spiritual evolution, the law of Karma in its creative aspect of providing the right moral incentive is a law of necessity.

V. M. INAMDAR

Dighanikayo (A Collection of Long Discourses). Vol. I: *Moralities*. Edited by N. K. BHAGWAT. Devanagari-Pali Texts Series No. 8. (The University of Bombay. Rs. 2/8)

Dighanikayo Vol. I, which is published here in the Devanagari characters, is the eighth in the series of the Devanagari-Pali texts publications of the Bombay University. The publication began in 1935 with *Nidanakatha* and in 1936 were published the *Mahavamsa* and the *Dighanikayo* Vol. II.

In 1937 we had *Therigatha*, in 1938 *Mahjimanikayo*, in 1939 *Theragatha* and in 1940 *Milindapañho*.

This publication is uniform with the other texts of the series and the Bombay University must be thanked for undertaking this venture. The studies of the Pali texts which began very early in this century in India, have been slowly but steadily advancing. The Ceylonese, Burmese and Siamese texts are unreadable to most people and one has to fall back upon

the publications of the Pali Text Society which are not only very costly but are scarce in this country and in times like these absolutely unavailable. Under the circumstances, handy editions in Devanagari of all the Pali texts would be extremely beneficial to the students of Pali. Again, the necessity and importance of the publications in Devanagari is realised when one considers that the orthodox Sanskrit scholars, taken by tens of thousands all over the length and breadth of the country, are unable to read any Romanised version of any Sanskrit and Pali texts. The publication in Devanagari of the Pali texts is expected to introduce the study of Pali to this class of scholars in course of time who are now almost thoroughly unacquainted with Pali literature. Such a publication will lead to the rediscovery of the Pali literature to the indigenous

Sanskrit students who had as a rule despised the study during the centuries of the past—a fact which led to the expulsion of Pali literature with the destruction of the Buddhistic monasteries.

It is desirable that the Bombay University should do something in the way of properly advertising this textual publication and also bringing it to the notice of the various Sanskrit Associations of India like the Bengal Sanskrit Association and the Behar Sanskrit Association etc., with a view to their considering introducing some of the publications of this series as their Examination texts.

It has not been possible for me to compare the readings of the Pali Text Society with the present text but I assume that the learned Editor has been careful in the matter, and so far as I have read, everything goes on well.

S. MITRA, SHASTRI

The Malady of the Century and Other Essays. By NOLINI KANTA GUPTA. (Sri Aurobindo Library, Madras. Rs. 2/8)

* The malady of the century is man's loss of touch with soul. Our minds have gained in breadth and complexity but have lost in depth and integrality. These well-written essays on topics more or less interrelated contrast interestingly the Indian outlook with the European. The last essay, "Tagore—Poet and Seer," shows their reconciliation.

Even Medieval Europe was merely religious while India was and is spiritual. A follower of the religion of Europe is afraid of losing himself in the Divine, while in India that is the ideal. The Humanism of Hinduism is

divine, not mundane. *Bhutadaya* corresponds to Christian charity but Christian charity springs from love for man, *Bhutadaya* from love for Atman, the Self in all.

Similarly Indian art views reality from above. European art gives a sensuous photograph; the Japanese takes us "behind the world of forms, into the world of movement," but the Indian presents reality from the transcendental stand-point.

Leaving aside certain minor points on which a difference of opinion might be expressed, one who has a fair acquaintance with European philosophy and culture may feel that the contrast is somewhat too rigid. After all, man is man, everywhere. Our cultures do not exist in the abstract but in the

life of men. If Eastern and Western modes of life are absolutely disparate, no reconciliation is possible. But the task is to make man in both spheres

what he is inherently capable of being, so that the Occidental will become more spiritual and the Oriental more interested in the values of the world.

P. T. RAJU

The Crisis of the Modern World. By RENE GUENON, translated by ARTHUR OSBORNE. (Luzac and Co., London. 6s.)

The author surveys the decline of Western civilization from the higher intellectual point of view, a decline more especially marked, in his opinion, since the Renaissance and the Reformation. This gradual descent he sees as due to a falling away from the ancient tradition. Owing to this, East and West have become separated in Spirit. The East remains in possession of the ancient knowledge and until it is recovered by the West, there can be no true uniting link.

Several pages of this short study are a diatribe against modern tendencies, social, religious, philosophical and other. In adopting the classical tradition at the time of the Renaissance more was lost than gained in Europe. It was the death of intellectualism in its traditional sense, in exchange for a Græco-Roman culture the life of which, M. Guénon suggests, had departed centuries earlier.

The author is a student of Hindu doctrine. He combines this comprehensive teaching with his conception of the Western tradition, employing his own terminology and not that usual with Sanskrit scholars. This may prove a little difficult for some readers to associate with the accustomed terms. Such an expression, for example, as "intellectual intuition" seems at first sight to suggest a conflict of terms. There are other similar compounds.

M. Guénon interprets the four periods of a Manvantara as representing the Golden, Silver, Bronze and Iron Ages. The present Kali-Yuga, corresponding to the "dark night of the soul," is the age of descent into materiality, of

departure from Principle, of loss of the ancient Tradition. "Truths which were formerly within the reach of all men have become more and more hidden and inaccessible." But the lost tradition will be sought and rediscovered at the end of the cycle and will mark the commencement of a new rhythmic period.

This forms the comprehensive view of the centrifugal and centripetal motion of the universe, but the author is more immediately concerned with the present and the causes of the decline from the ancient tradition.

M. Guénon notices that the sixth century B. C. was an important world turning-point, when many changes and adaptations took place in various parts of the globe, as, for instance, the coming of Buddhism to India, the Babylonian captivity and adjustments in China and Persia. This period also marks the commencement of the strict historical measure, for prior to this era chronology is unreliable and only vague approximations obtain. This causes the modern world to regard prehistoric events as largely legendary.

Enquiry is thus limited to classical antiquity, a period when many of the truths of the older world had been lost. But M. Guénon points out that classical antiquity is a purely relative antiquity and much nearer to modern times than real antiquity, since the former does not date back even to the middle of the Kali-Yuga.

The author refers frequently to other studies now in course of translation which make up a series of short works. Their perusal would probably correct any tendency towards generalization found in this book.

L. E. PARKER

A Short History of Chinese Civilisation. By TSUI CHI, with a Preface by LAURENCE BINYON. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

To attempt a history of China from the third millennium B. C. to the end of 1941 in less than 350 pages and provide at the same time such helpful guides as tables of dynasties, political and ethnic maps, a diary of the last hundred years and a formidable bibliography must surely be considered a triumph of compression and clarity. We must thank China's present travail for a book which gives in popular form an organised and organic picture of the history of China through the ages.

But the book is much more than a history; it has collated a great mass of information derived from legendary lore, archæology, literature and the arts.

Ancient Chinese history, where we do not see it through the eyes of romance, seems but a ghastly epitome of "old, unhappy, far-off things, and battles long ago." But it is necessary to remember that life continued to be lived at normal levels with the great bulk of the people engaged in the pursuit of liberty and happiness. China was the pioneer of inventions and discoveries which have enriched the world with the triumphs of peace no less renowned than those of war. The mariner's compass proves her maritime genius; she gave printing to the world. And her contribution to the art of painting has remained unique and inimitable. And yet, the corresponding periods of her political history were marked by storm and stress. The

secret of this is worth pondering over. The roots of Chinese civilisation are essentially rural, and they account for the resilience of the country which by virtue of its age-long devotion to first things first has not only survived thus far but has in itself a principle of perpetual self-renovation.

It is of interest to us to note that the early myths of the Chinese have a family resemblance to our own. They point to prehistoric contacts which have not yet received attention. Chinese dynasties with all their faults were sooner or later transformed into national governments, the exception being the period of Mongol rule, which was a naked imperialism and which therefore has left far fewer traces on the people than others. The hold of Buddhism on the Chinese is a tribute to their balanced view of life and their right apprehension of the middle path. China is a country like India where the greatest varieties of experiment were tried in every department of human action and thought.

The last point of interest to which we may draw attention is that, though China and Japan were known to each other from the beginning of the Christian era, their rivalry is of very recent origin. It synchronises with the forcible entry of the West into China and all the consequences of that great modern event in the history of the Chinese. The author's account of the last hundred years is so discreet that he leaves the facts to speak for themselves.

A pleasantly written, informative and agreeable book.

P. MAHADEVAN

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“_____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS

Sir Mirza M. Ismail in his convocation address to the Nagpur University on the 14th August offered sound and practical advice. He characterised a university as a place for the acquisition, advancement and dissemination of knowledge, in a liberal spirit and as a preparation for leading life in the right manner. Sir Mirza covered many points of criticism against Indian universities—overcrowding the syllabuses, over-specialised courses, over-stressing of examinations.

We are coming to a time of national rebirth, when university leadership will be needed in every sphere, both of external progress and inward health, enlightenment and inspiration.

It was, he said, for academic men to foster the unity of Indian culture and to emphasise the true kinship beneath all our differences. A university should induce catholicity of mind. Not less important was his insistence that the universities must above all things “help their students, by means of all their studies, to penetrate to the life of things and to view in the widest relationships the facts and forces.”

Referring in brief to the needs of the contemporary situation in India, Sir Mirza's emphasis on a spirit of right compromise and mutual understanding, on a more friendly atmosphere, deserves attention. He pleaded for a concerted development of body and mind, for a finer zest of intellectual activity, for the honourable and generous conduct of life, for “a religion, not of dogma

and diversion, but of that spirit which recognises all mortals as of one family.” Sir Mirza has outlined an ideal code which, if lived up to, cannot but lead towards all that man aspires for.

We regret space forbids our extracting at any length from this admirable address full of valuable advice and practical suggestions.

The inevitability of socialism of some kind for India, recognised in our August editorial “Socialism—What Kind?” is underlined in *The Indian Journal of Political Science* (July-September 1943). The entire section on Political Theory is devoted to socialism for this country, from three different points of view. Shri Ajit Kumar Sen of the Dacca University finds guild socialism, and not collectivism or syndicalism, compatible with the social structure of *varnasrama*, with its functional division of society. Equity in distribution and not an unattainable rigid equality in distribution must, he thinks, be the aim. Dr. E. Asirvatham gives full weight to the difficulties in the way of peaceful transition to social justice. The majority are illiterate; hence if the lives of the people *en masse* are to be reordered the initiative must come from above—from the State, Dr. Asirvatham believes. The extension of such discipline as the people submit to in war-time rationing could probably be effected but pressure of some sort may be necessary

before socialism can be fully realised. The nationalisation of railways, mines and large-scale industries and even of land, however attractive to the "have-not's" cannot be expected to find favour in the eyes of the "have's" on intellectual grounds alone. The provision of a civic minimum below which none shall be allowed to fall may meet with ready enough assent, but the inevitable corollary of a civic maximum is another story.

Dr. Asirvatham recalls Machiavelli's saying that "man much sooner forgets the loss of his father than the loss of his patrimony." Many a man is ready to exclaim "Justice though the heavens fall!" if he is allowed to add "so long as my private fortune remains unaffected." The arch-cynic knew man's lower nature well. But the lower nature is not all there is to man; else there would be no hope for us indeed. Convince a man that that in him which constitutes his essential humanity is the same as that which animates his fellow-man and you have convinced him that his brother's good is his own. Injustice to the underprivileged is seen to hurt in the long run the one who seems to profit by it no less than it hurts its victims now. An injury to any man is recognised as injury to all. Socialism of the right and lasting type is more than a way of existence; it is a fundamental attitude to life.

The Annual Report for 1942-43 of the United Provinces Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society brings out the value of the new approach to penology in which that Province is leading the way. The Probation Officer is primarily a friend and a guide of the erstwhile delinquent. He arranges for suitable employment,

clears all embarrassments such as debts and introduces him to an environment calculated to win him over to a better way of life. From October 1939 to December 1942, failure is reported in only 7.5 per cent. of the 722 cases admitted to probation. Forty per cent. were still on probation at the end of the period but 52.5 per cent. had successfully completed the probationary period and been discharged. To eliminate one bad cause is to prevent incalculable bad effects. To have saved to society 379 individuals is no small achievement. The scheme is an approach in the right spirit to the problem of the rehabilitation of the delinquent.

The reformatory aspect of legal punishment is more accepted in theory than exemplified in practice. None with his eyes open can fail to see that punishment in a retaliatory spirit rarely, if ever, achieves the desired deterrent effect upon either the individual or the community. Vengeance is an unworthy motive for the State no less than for the individual. The shift of emphasis to the reformatory side of penology is a step forward. A realistic approach to the problem will reveal that crime too often is inspired by economic distress. The habitual offender is a misfit in his world, with legal machinery and social ostracism arrayed against his chances of reform. The Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society of the United Provinces works on the faith that the individual can overcome his antisocial propensities if he is shown better ways and how to follow them. The Society is doing what is eminently worth doing. Law is there precisely for those who do not want it but there must be some other machinery which should persuade them that law is

necessary for themselves as for the common social good.

Last October there was quite a furor about attempts on the part of the Sophia College for Women to convert students to Roman Catholicism. It was the Bombay University Senate's discussion in mid-August of the proposed disaffiliation of that College from the University that brought the subject up again. And the allegation of a renewed attempt at proselytisation by the same institution fanned the flame. The Senate did not think there was no case for the disaffiliation and referred the matter back to the Syndicate. It further approved, as we understand the Syndicate had recommended, the proposal of Mr. K. T. Shah that the Senate would think it desirable

to affirm the fundamental policy of the University which was not to permit any activity in educational institutions which had for its object the conversion from one religion to another.

The opposition to this resolution raised by the Principal of another missionary college is understandable, but prejudiced testimony carries little weight. The Rev. Mr. McKenzie of Wilson College, in pleading for academic freedom from restrictions which would prohibit an honest teacher from "opening his full heart to his students," is reported to have insinuated, quite unfairly, that no doubt the intention was to safeguard the principle that it was a sin for any one to change from one religion to another. No reasonable person can deny the right of an adult to adopt any faith of his choice. But the colleges are trusted with the moulding of immature and malleable minds. They should impart a liberal

outlook and catholicity of culture; but is that aim consistent with denominational propaganda or sectarian pressure on unfolding minds?

True, the University is no guardian of particular religious creeds. But it cannot connive at deliberate conversions effected in its affiliated colleges without sharing the onus of the offence. And an offence it is, against the very spirit and purpose of university instruction. The view which the University has adopted is that which any one with a sane outlook must adopt in respect of conversions of youth which are morally unfair and often socially disastrous. It is not "intolerance" as the *Times of India* editorially comments. *Bona fide* educational institutions are not affected by the University's affirmation of policy. It can affect only those whose activities have conversion as their object. But what missionary school or college is there whose activities do not?

Hardly a week had elapsed since the discussion when the Sophia College figured in a Police Court case. A Parsi girl aged 20, Dhun Minocher Kalapesi by name, a student of the Intermediate class, under the influence of the Roman Catholic Nun-teachers, went against her parents and demanded her legal freedom. The Chief Presidency Magistrate sympathised with the parents, persuaded the girl not to leave them, but legally declared her to be free. At her age the girl has the right to her freedom—but the moral of the case? The folly of non-Christian parents to send their children to missionary institutions. The Missionaries are here to proselytize the "heathen" and they cannot be blamed for attending to their

business. We are against sectarianism and creedalism and would like to see all Indian Universities help in destroying religious sectarianism in educational institutions.

Dewan Bahadur P. Venkataramana Rao Naidu, Chief Justice of the Mysore High Court, in his Convocation Address at the Madras University put his finger on the cause of all the "contradictions and calamities of our civilisation." They have, he said, their roots in the fact

that modern societies are primarily competitive and their main method of self-expression is struggle; their main endeavour is aggression. Hence...our happiness [depends] on the misery of others, our liberty on the enslavement of someone else, and our high standard of life on the low economic level of less developed peoples and countries.

He sees as the only way out "making the world idea the foundation and in building the lesser units of nation and community on its basis. He likens the new order to the Aswattha tree of Indian symbology, with its roots in heaven, growing downward to the earth.

In the architecture of the new world we reverse the principle of the old. We begin with the conception of world society and go down to nation, community and citizen. We must make the world consciousness and unity permanent terms of our thinking and the basic factors in our social life. Thus alone we can save the new society from the dangers that menaced the old.

Dewan Bahadur Venkataramana Rao Naidu's appeal to the young, just taking leave of the university, to see that narrow communal concepts and creedal loyalties do not nullify the realisation of world-wide human solidarity is timely and appropriate.

India has a lesson for the fighting West, but it is for us to see that the

message is properly delivered. Can there be any better means than showing by example a society built on the basis of common human understanding and sympathy for fellow-beings? The convocation address, though specifically for the Madras University graduates should find echoes in the hearts of all who hope for a peaceful and pleasant future for the world.

Writing on "What Education Is" in *The Spectator* of 28th May 1943, Mr. G. W. White warns that with our present educational methods, with their insistence on efficiency, we stand in danger of gaining the whole world and losing our own souls. The study of the humanities is expected to give the students some breadth of intellectual culture and toleration. But beyond this indirect incentive, too little is done to impress upon the young mind the need for interdependence and co-operation, the need for a spontaneous willingness to subordinate self by the realisation of universal fraternity. Mr. White sees the corrective in philosophy.

What is needed and what education must achieve for the young is an all-round and harmonious development through its study and practice. And when we say philosophy, what is meant is not abstractions, about things in general but that body of knowledge which can help us to realise ourselves in the world, and our relations with it. Says Mr. White:—

Our love of wisdom and beauty must not teach us effeminacy and extravagance; we must cultivate self-control without producing the evils of repression; courage must go hand in hand with meekness; width must not be sacrificed to depth nor depth to width; certainty must not breed intolerance nor tolerance lack principle; fitness of the body must not cause atrophy of the spirit. Without balance "our steadfast purpose trembles like as the compass in a binnacle" and we cannot keep steadily on our course toward the Good. And balance is most easily maintained through the study and practice of philosophy, which is the crown or coping stone without which no education is really complete.