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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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I MEET LIN YUTANG

[In our January issue we printed "I Meet Pearl Buck" by Dr. S. Chandrasekhar, M.A., Ph.D. At present he is serving India in the U.S.A. but hopes to return to his Motherland in the near future. He has been lecturing in Indian Economics both at the University of Pennsylvania and the School of Asiatic Studies in New York.

In this very interesting interview with China's famous writer we come upon more than one important point applicable to India. We wish to draw the pertinent attention of Indian political leaders to the relation subsisting between classical studies and Russian Communism, and also between the former and the tendency to overrate vocational and scientific education.—ED.]

"No matter who is responsible for the idea of Pakistan, I am opposed to the division of India," emphatically declared Lin Yutang, Chinese author and philosopher, to my question concerning the fate and future of India, in a recent interview in his apartment in New York.

"At that rate, we would have to dissect China into a Confucian China, a Christian China, and a Moslem China!"

Dr. Lin, author of such widely read and best-selling books as *The Wisdom of China and India*, *My Country and My People*, *The Importance of Living*, *Between Tears and Laughter*, and, currently, *the Vigil of a Nation*, camouflages his wit and his

piercing observations behind a serene countenance and round-rimmed spectacles. Despite his extensive studies in Europe and America—he is a graduate of Harvard and Leipzig Universities—he continues to see things, he claims, from a Chinese point of view.

"It is my personal opinion that the British have created Pakistan by harping on it, encouraging it and publicizing it, while, on the other hand, they have minimized and hushed all efforts of other leaders towards unity." (This was before the British Cabinet Mission decided against Pakistan and announced their plan for a united free India.)

Some time ago, Dr. Lin had a

brief stay in India where he met Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, Mr. Sapru, Mr. Jayakar and Professor Radhakrishnan.

“Oh, these Indian names are so difficult!” He smiled apologetically as he stumbled over the last one. “The Professor is perhaps India’s foremost intellectual. We talked of many things and I came away agreeing with everything he said! His powerful mind struck me as clear and original.”

To Dr. Lin, Democracy is a hard thing to learn, both for the rulers and for the ruled. “It implies the ability of the majority to rule,” he explained, “and the ability of the minority to criticize and abide by the majority.” “Any Indian unable to subjugate self-interest and religious differences as a price for freedom is not a true patriot,” he declared with fervour. “Hindus and Moslems should get together to obtain freedom first.”

I asked Lin Yutang what his answer would be to those adolescent imperialists like Churchill who deplored India’s imminent independence, fearing she was “not ready for it.” India, he admits, has not had the time to develop along the well-planned pattern of an enterprise in a democracy at peace. Like China, she is passing through a transition. “But she has no time to lose,” he warned. “Everything must be planned and sped up into a general, national programme.” He did not, however, advocate rebellion. An immediate revolution would delay

the chances of progressive and orderly development. It would lead to the imprisonment of Indian leaders—“And you can’t help your country from prisons,” reminded Dr. Lin.

II.

Lin Yutang, born in Changchow, China, in 1895, became associated with the masses of China at an early age through his father who, before becoming a minister in the American Reformed Church Mission, sold bamboo-shoots and rice to the local prisons. Educated at mission schools and St. John’s College in Shanghai, Lin thought of becoming a minister but found himself unable to accept certain religious precepts. He now calls himself “happily a pagan.”

Following his graduation, Lin taught English at Tsinghua College, the American Boxer Indemnity college. He later married a girl of a mission family. He pays her his greatest compliment of a “perfect housewife!” The Lins have three daughters, Adet, Anor and Meimei—all of them young and already successful novelists and writers.

After receiving his M.A. degree from Harvard University and his Ph.D. from the University of Leipzig, in Germany, Lin returned to China to join the faculty of the Peking National University. Because of his “non-violent” participation in student demonstrations, Dr. Lin was classified as a “radical” and spent many months in hiding when his name was black-listed.

When rebellion broke loose in China, Dr. Lin joined the new

Wuhan Government as secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But he soon discovered that while he "liked revolutions" he could not say the same of all revolutionaries. He quit politics when he discovered, "I was vastly better at minding my own business than that of others." Since then he has been resident in the U. S. A., devoting his time entirely to writing.

III.

Of the civil strife in China today, Dr. Lin has much to say. He is bitter toward the Communists in China. If they want to be a political power, Dr. Lin contends, they should first give up a separate army and not carry on an armed rebellion.

"The Reds won't come out and say they are for Communism," he complained. "They try to confuse democratic opinion by saying they are democrats. This Communist strategy is practised in all countries," and he gave as example the Communist Party revolt in the Azerbaijan Province in Northern Iran. "The Communist Party there goes under the name of the Democratic Party in order to get the sympathy of Western democracies."

What were his feelings toward Indian Communists? Not too cordial. "Indian Communists are all wrong. They ought to fight for political freedom first, see what it is the people want, and then have their own party in a democratic set-up."

We discussed Atlee's Labour Government and what part it could play in this post-war world, particularly

in Asia, "—but, judging how it has handled the situation in Indonesia, I despair," said Dr. Lin. "I hope," he added, "the question of Hong-kong will be reopened by the Chinese Government. And I hope the British Government will have the judgment to settle the question peacefully and strengthen good-will between these two Governments."

World War II had very evidently been a fight for naked imperialism, not for principles,—“Everyone knows that,” admitted Lin. “As Huxley put it, and as Churchill planned it, all Asiatic countries are in a squeeze between colonial and Communist imperialism. That leads to war.” He sank back into his arm-chair resignedly, with the remark: “But I have given up educating block-heads.” I asked him if he thought the United Nations Organization was the answer to the world's ills. Dr. Lin shook his head.

“The big Powers killed the United Nations Organization before its birth by the veto power, by refusing to let it become a truly democratic organization with all nations as equals before law and justice.”

There was so much I could ask and discuss with Lin Yutang—dealing with personal matters, his likes and dislikes as well. He is like a suppressed volcano, bubbling within. He himself admits his interests are most catholic, “from literature to electric shavers, from atoms to pretty girls” and his ambition still is to invent the “best Chinese typewriter,” which I believe he has

almost completed, though I do not know about the commercial possibilities of such a typewriter.

"What about the United States and her rôle in the affairs of the East?" I asked.

Americans, Dr. Lin is convinced, are thoroughly confused by Chinese politics. What America can do is to promote unity in China under Chiang Kai-shek and not "become involved in a Chinese civil war."

As for India, Lin Yutang is struck by the similarities between his country and India, particularly in the "helpless frustration among the people" regarding the political situation. He is certain that in a reconstructed, free Asia, India and China can get together.

"Once India overthrows the British, she will learn not to look to England as the only civilized country in the world. India has the splendid leadership of Gandhi and Nehru, no matter what the West may say," concluded Lin Yutang. "All they ask is that they be given a chance to solve their own problem. But India cannot solve her internal problem unless she has her political freedom!"

As far as China is concerned, Lin is happy that China along with the Allies, particularly the United States, has emerged victorious from the long struggle in which she fought Japan almost single-handed for a while. He was happy over the transformation. According to Lin, the seven years of war that ended last year, but not conclusively (for

the Communist trouble is still there), have changed China from an "Open Door" country to a "Front Porch" country. The Open Door policy meant that the door of China was to be kept open for anybody to go in at any time of day, like a house without an owner, or, if there was an owner, it was not his business to inquire about the visitors, who they were, what they came for and what they did inside when they entered the door. Now the owner has returned. China has reached maturity. Her sovereignty is restored. There are no more extraterritorial rights. And now a sign is hung on the door reading: "Please knock before entering." The era of the front porch is this: Like good neighbours China's neighbours drop in at the front porch, light their pipes, exchange gossip until the moon is high and then bid good-bye and turn in for the night.

But this does not mean all is well with China and that she has become a unified sovereign nation. There is the well-known problem of Yenan. Besides this political conflict—the Kuomintang-Communist clash of ideologies—there is a greater battle, a battle of ideas, a rift deep and almost unbridgeable. Behind that seemingly incurable political fight are the fundamental opposing attitudes regarding the survival of Chinese culture. The question today is whether the traditional Chinese culture should be saved and salvaged or whether it should be uprooted and discarded completely. This intellectual conflict probably is not

known abroad, but it is a seething and swift current invading the minds of men and women in modern China. This is bound to affect the face of the coming China.

"But is there anything worth saving from classical Chinese culture? Has Chinese culture outlived its utility?"—I wanted to know. Lin is no feudalistic old fogey, for he is a deeply humanized and modern-educated scholar. But when the radical extremists say in all seriousness that Chinese students should not study the classics and that all the classical Chinese books contain poison, feudalistic and fatalistic, it makes Lin mad, very mad.

Lin holds the old Chinese philosophy of life and national culture to be worth defending and preserving. All Chinese history is not a stink-pot of corruption and exploitation of the masses. What will be the outcome, one wonders. But Lin does not wonder, for he feels he knows the outcome. If the epitome of China's intellectual struggle is the never-ending bout between the quiet, mellow, wise and silken-bearded Confucius and the crusading, vitriolic, dialectical-minded and bushy-bearded Karl Marx, China is bound to come out pro-Confucius. Why? Lin's reasoning is simple. China can never be Marxist and Communistic because the humanistic view-point of Confucius is far, far away from the turbulent message of Marx. China can never embrace Karl Marx of her own free-will.

Lin declared blandly that the

Chinese Communist Party is not *Chinese* at all, for the *modus operandi* of the Communists is anything but Chinese, different as it is from the broad Chinese humanism. It is not Communist in the Leninist sense of the term, that is, no more Communist than the present-day Soviet Russia is Communist. It is, however, Marxian in ideology because its whole intellectual outlook is based on materialistic dialectic. It believes in the necessity of class struggle and social revolution. It is inimical to the popular conception of family and religion and all bourgeois institutions. It talks and thinks in Marxist symbols and *clichés*. Finally, to Lin, the most distressing thing is its anti-nationalist and yet essentially totalitarian attitude toward China.

If Lin is so intensely opposed to Communism, it is not because *he* is totalitarian in outlook or too uncivilized to brook opposition or tolerate another and opposite point of view. He is for the Communists, operating as a legal political party without a separate army and other governmental paraphernalia. He is for a free press and a Chinese *Daily Worker*. Speaking of freedom of the press, he said that it was more important than the enactment of laws and constitutions. People who did not know how to talk against their government did not deserve democracy. "And the best government in the world, when it is deprived of the goading of democratic gadflies soon gets bored with its own virtues and dies of inanity. I sometimes think

God himself created Satan because He was so sick of the singing and flattering angels and wanted to save himself from boredom ! If the Kingdom of Heaven cannot do without opposition, how much less can a human secular government !” That is Lin.

IV.

Lin Yutang wanted to know a few things about India, that most foreigners, even Chinese scholars, are puzzled about. After answering his queries, I found myself wondering what people can do to bridge mentally the ever deepening chasm between Eastern and Western outlook and ideologies. I wondered what Lin Yutang had accomplished. He has acquired fame and a fortune through his books. But is that all?

There was a time, not long ago, when China was perhaps the most misunderstood country in the world, sharing that doubtful honour with India. The little “Chinatowns” all over the great cities of the world were openly looked down upon. The United States was perhaps the worst sinner in this respect. The first Chinese Exclusion Act debarring Chinese nationals from immigration and citizenship rights was passed at the close of the last century. In California and on the West Coast in general, the Chinese, cultured and otherwise, were all classed with laundry-men or at best with the owner of the corner chop-suey restaurant. A stereotyped Chinese character in American pulp magazines was the drugged, slender-bearded, Chinese

denizen of the under-world. Whether a Chinese national was a Harvard graduate or an Alcatraz Prison inmate, he was definitely a second-class citizen.

Today, after some thirty years, America’s attitude toward China, her people and her institutions, has remarkably changed for the better. What wrought this welcome change of heart ? It is difficult to be precise about the factors responsible. Quick transportation is definitely an important reason, for today China and America, both Pacific Coast countries, are not really far apart. Every day, planes take off from San Francisco for Shanghai. The small, hard-working, law-abiding Chinese communities in all American cities have contributed no end to the mutual good-will, for it is this common man in the traditionally forgotten Chinatown that forges unity at the bottom. Then there is the ubiquitous Chinese restaurant and the delectable, if spurious, chop-suey that seems to please the American palate so well. The recent common enemy, Japan, drew China and America closer than ever before. But for the war America would have taken probably another hundred years to understand China. Important as these factors are, I believe the most significant reason for the change of attitude is the remarkable writings of Lin Yutang for the last decade, for it was in 1935 his history-making *My Country and My People* appeared. Perhaps I should say, Lin Yutang and Pearl Buck.

Pearl Buck's novels and writings about China have been indispensable in dispelling many a popular misconception about the China of our day not only here in America but in the English-speaking world. While we all like a country described by a national of that country, we seldom like that country's being defended by a national, for obviously he will be prejudiced in favour of his country. But if a country is defended by a non-national, people give more credence. The "why" of this phenomenon I do not know but it is so. If a Chinese writer pleaded for the abolition of the extraterritorial rights, nobody cared very much, for what else could a Chinese say? But if an American pleaded the same cause, people took notice. I have noticed this particular human trait often in this country during the last five years of my sojourn here. During the war, when the British Official Information Services here spread the canard that Gandhi was tremendously pro-Japanese, the American hysteria about Japan being what it was then, Gandhi was easily the most unpopular man in the United States. All the writings and lectures of all the Indians here, including the present writer, only increased American scepticism. We had to wait for the appearance of Louis Fischer's little book *A Week with Gandhi* to do the trick. Fischer said the same thing that Indians here had been shouting about, but he was an American and so couldn't be pro-Indian without

good reason. And there you are! So Lin Yutang described China and Pearl Buck defended her, and jointly they did the trick of changing the American national attitude toward China. Yes, that is what Lin has accomplished in the last ten years. And changing a national attitude is no mean task.

When China produced a Lin Yutang and converted Pearl Buck to her cause she acquired a pair of most articulate, mellow and moving voices in what had been before a voiceless wilderness, at least to the Western world. Lin's works—his ideas and his rare ability to combine sound scholarship with popular exposition—in explaining, defending and criticizing his country have made more friends for China than all her diplomats and Ministers of Information put together.

As I took leave of Lin in his well-appointed and book-lined study, I wondered who in our own India came closest to Lin. I was non-plussed for a moment, for it seems as though we have yet to produce a Lin. Perhaps Radhakrishnan comes closest but I am afraid the comparison is superficial. Radhakrishnan is too much of a scholar and an ivory-tower dweller to wield the great popular appeal that Lin's writings have. *My Country and My People* and *The Importance of Living* are only ten years old but each of them has gone through some twenty editions, not to speak of translations.

But Radhakrishnan has another appeal, which Lin lacks. When

Radhakrishnan begins to lecture—as he recently did in this country to crowded audiences—one is completely swayed by his forceful eloquence and by the flow of his measured and well-rounded sentences. Lin is rather uncomfortable on the platform and lectures only on occasion, for I suppose no Chinese has yet mastered the English accent as some Indians have. As for his abilities in addressing an audience in the Chinese language, I have never heard him in his mother-tongue and even if I did

I would be least competent to have an opinion about it. While hearing Radhakrishnan is to witness a steady, subdued Niagara Falls, Lin's talks have the quality of a reposeful, confiding, fireside chat. Had he entered politics he might have become China's Nehru. But as he decided that he was much better at minding his own business than others', he has become China's Radhakrishnan, the Radhakrishnan he so very much admires.

S. CHANDRASEKHAR

WANTED: OPEN COVENANTS

“Why not a truth-in-securities act for governments,” forcing them to live up to standards of veracity at least as rigid as those which the railroads or other corporations must accept when putting out a bond issue? The question is raised editorially in *Fortune* for May under the caption “And the Truth Will Drive You Mad.”

Half-truths have, of course, always been the language of busy diplomats. But convention...used to delimit admissible from inadmissible double talk.

The number of falsehoods or half-truths which are “becoming commonplace and, worst of all, accepted” is claimed to be mounting. The fictions offered in the Russo-Iranian dispute, the camouflaging of the facts behind Pearl Harbour, the suppression of captured secret diplomatic documents in Germany lest they tell too much—these are all cited. And “Yalta represented something less than ‘open covenants

openly arrived at.’”

Perhaps it is too early yet to lay bare the whole terrible and complicated story of the events that led up to World War II. Or perhaps the time has come when man should bid the muse of history, Clio, go pack, leaving her children forever to the blare of propaganda...perhaps there is something to be said for it if democracy wants to abdicate.

Alas for the many, including its idealist formulator, who took seriously, as an early realisable objective, the first of President Wilson's Fourteen Points!

Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international undertakings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

Such an Act as *Fortune* calls for must await the UNO's demonstration of effectiveness in action. Meanwhile, in individual probity and in pressure of public opinion lies the only hope for Governmental loyalty to truth.

A STATEMENT OF BELIEF

[The creed which the well-known English novelist, **Mr. J. D. Beresford**, puts forward here has been even more succinctly phrased as “ ‘ Good ’ and ‘ Harmony, ’ and ‘ Evil ’ and ‘ Disharmony ’ are synonymous. ” Selfishness in one form or another lies at the root of all inharmony ; from it all pain, all suffering springs. As an ethical formula Mr. Beresford’s statement is unexceptionable, since he gives us by implication the metaphysical basis of the law of action and reaction without which no ethical formula is more than a pious hope.—ED.]

The abandonment of the “ self ” is a fundamental principle, whether implicit or explicit, that dominates all true religions. It is the basis of all forms of Yoga and of the Chinese Tao ; it is implicit in the esoteric teachings of the New Testament, and is the foundation of the Sufi form of Mohammedanism. It is the hardest of all principles to follow, because it necessitates the abandonment not only of all bodily desires but also of spiritual and mental complacence, and of every worldly ambition, including that of becoming a popular evangelist. The aspirations of those who would make the great refusal are not primarily concerned with the leading of “ a sober, righteous and godly life, ” the highest goal of the orthodox Christian, for all such commonly accepted virtues are but the transient effects that will inevitably follow the pursuit of the final Truth, one and indivisible.

To understand what is intended by this principle, we have first to consider the nature of the “ self ” that is to be abandoned. The easiest approach to this is to realise that aspect of it which is known to modern

psychology as the “ persona. ” Broadly speaking, this persona is the kind of person we believe ourselves to be and are therefore most anxious to present to the world about us. In its simplest form it becomes a process of self-dramatisation that may find expression in such extreme forms as gangsterism or religious devotion. The initial impetus to such forms of expression derives from a balance of mental and physical characteristics, mainly congenital, but influenced and developed by our reactions to the circumstances of early life.

This idea, or ideal, of the self may be fixed and steady from a very early age or may vary greatly in the life-history of each individual. The first type is that which is more prominently successful in world affairs, and derives from the realisation of personal ability in this or that direction and pride in its exercise. It is mainly intellectual and the process of self-dramatisation is for the most part unconscious. The second is more emotional and, although it may be allied to a high degree of intellectuality, largely introspective. The result in every case is a presentation

to the world of some aspect of the infinite variety of character that we recognise in our fellows.

This, then, is the human concept of the "self," whether virtuous or vicious, that we are called upon to abandon, for all such manifestations of "character" are no more than the ephemeral misconceptions in space-time of the immortal principle.

This immortal principle has been inferred, and frequently misrepresented, throughout the history of religion, under such labels as the soul or the true ego; and the ostensible aim of Yoga is to bring it into consciousness. It has, like God, been endowed with many attributes, but again, like God, is indefinable in those terms that are derived from our conception of human character. Only one thing may be safely posited, and this is its desire for ultimate unity with that one enduring reality which we speak of, for lack of a better term to reach the worldly understanding, as "spirit," or the One Mind.

On the material plane, as exhibited in the transitory expressions of human character, the influence of the immortal principle is recognisable as an aversion to "evil" and the desire for "good," the former term representing devotion to the service of the ephemeral "self," the latter what is often spoken of as "self-sacrifice." The expression of evil takes shape in such forms as hate, cruelty and the satisfaction of personal desire in any form, from

the lowest animal lusts to the will for power, temporal or spiritual. Good is represented by the urgency to express universal love without any thought of personal advantage.

These are the simplest possible premises for the basis of a world-religion and, as was stated in the first paragraph of this article, are fundamental, either implicitly or explicitly, in the teachings of all the great Masters. There can be but one confutation of them, and this lies in the demonstration that, although they have been known and practised by a few inspired individuals for at least 5,000 years, the world today is not further advanced spiritually than it was at any known period of historical time. Indeed, it would seem that among all civilised nations, our present ethic is lower than it was in the Middle Ages.

Nevertheless, if we were to accept this argument as a denial of our premises, all human life would become purposeless and utterly without meaning. If we fail to accept any distinction between good and evil save in terms of the commonweal and for the establishment of relatively stable social conditions, mankind must inevitably lapse into a decadence even more marked than that which characterises the world of today. If we are to assume that man is only some kind of slightly superior animal, he will end by reverting to an animal life,—an experiment of the creative purpose that has failed to achieve its object.

But, having assumed, as we very

safely can assume, that our initial premises are true beyond all dispute, it will be worth while to examine very briefly how our present state has come about, beginning on what may be termed the highest plane with a reference to a form of Yoga.

Now, by our definition, any form of Yoga will fail in the true expression of the immortal principle when its practice demands the separation of the individual from the mass of humanity. The Yogi in separation from humanity may succeed in a complete domination of his physical body and desires and, in achieving that, may rise to the exercise of certain, to us, abnormal powers. But, having attained full spiritual independence, he will still be alone, unable to enter the unity, and his works are therefore evil, according to our definition, since he has failed to lose his separate sense of self in the One. The same failure is found also in most forms of asceticism and monasticism.

We see a lower and more common expression of this separatism,—and it is one of the causes for our present state of irreligion and brutality,—in any form of sectarianism. When any body of belief asserts its particular form of righteousness and, whether openly, as in most Christian churches, or by implication, as in others, condemns those of different opinions, such a body proclaims its separation from the One Mind. The effect of this is shown on the material plane by the insistence on dogmas that have no foundation in

the teachings of such great Seers as Gautama or Jesus, and this results in such gross forms of evil as persecution and religious wars. The simple statement of Jesus, "Judge not, that ye be not judged," has very rarely been put into practice by any of the Christian churches that profess to follow the precepts of their founder.

On the material plane, the evils of self-aggrandisement without respect to the welfare of others, whether in national ambitions or in the egotism of the individual, are too evident to need more than a passing reference. From this devotion to the desires of the false "self" derive all the wars, crime, misgovernment and poverty of our present civilisation.

This, in the briefest summary, is a statement of the belief that is the genesis of all faiths founded on the affirmation of man's spiritual origin. It is, however, very rarely put into practice, since to do that necessitates a mental effort, combined with a detachment from all worldly values and satisfactions, of which the mass of mankind is quite incapable. As a consequence, the disciples of the Masters, and subsequently, with decreasing regard for the original teaching, the priests of such religions as, say, Buddhism and Christianity, sought to make their gospel more acceptable to the people by preaching some form or another of an easier way to the final attainment. In the case of the Buddhist, this, logically enough, took the form of gradual advancement throughout a long

series of incarnations, a teaching that failed in its effect upon the multitude chiefly by permitting the practices of temporising and procrastination. It became so tempting to put off the arduous disciplines of Yoga until the next life !

The Christian priesthood fell into the far more grievous error of promising the goal of spiritual attainment on the easiest possible terms, by the practice of the worldly virtues allied with faith in the person of Jesus Christ. Indeed, they taught that the latter alone was sufficient at the last extremity, and that one who had led a consistently evil life might be " saved " on his or her death-bed by this long-postponed profession of faith,—a doctrine that to those who accept the premises given above, is the most fantastic absurdity. Coupled with this teaching was the inculcation of the equally fantastic principle of immediate rewards and punishments, to be received at the death of the physical body, an absurdity mitigated by the Roman Catholics by the doctrine of Purgatory. And all these and similar teachings were founded on the assumption of a personal God of all-too-human character, who held the office of judge in the affairs of the particular mite of the universe, known as the Earth.

But, having admitted the failure of these two world-religions to raise the general spiritual standard of the average man and woman, we have to consider the possible alternative, to do which it becomes necessary,

in the first place, to consider what we mean by the inherent spirit of mankind. It has already been referred to as the immortal principle and, as such, must be assumed to have existed eternally, to have neither beginning nor end, to be independent of space-time. By what influence this inherent principle appears to the human mind as having been separated from the One into which it ardently wishes to return, is beyond the reach of our limited intelligence. Although we may speak of the exhalations and inhalations of the breath of the cosmic principle, we cannot pretend to understand the reason for their necessity. These are mysteries beyond the scope of mortal knowledge, which is capable of dealing only with effects and may be endlessly misguided in its inference of prime causes.

Wherefore, abandoning all attempts to define the One Mind, or the Controlling Spirit of the Universe, in the terms of our limited experience, let it be assumed, since no other deduction from our first premises is conceivable, that all the exigencies of the immortal principle (in New Testament language " the Holy Spirit within us " or " the Kingdom of God ") are expressed in what we recognise as " good, " as opposed to all those material attachments that are ultimately " evil, " since they represent those antinomies that contradict the laws of the spirit,—the simplest possible test between these opposites being that

one exhibits the desire for unity, the other, for separation. Thus, on the material plane, the works of the immortal Self are evidenced in wisdom, loving-kindness, generosity and sincerity, those of the false self in every form of personal aggrandisement, whatever its apparent object or justification.

This elementary statement of belief formulates the foundations of a creed stripped of all the dogmas and far-fetched assumptions common to those declining religions that have attracted so great a body of adherents in the course of the past 2,500 years. It is a creed that will never

attract a priesthood, since it gives the priest no power over his congregation by the exercise of threats and promises; and, like the original teaching of Gautama and Jesus, deprecates the founding of a Church. The whole responsibility of final attainment rests upon the individual, whose every thought, word and act help to determine his own destiny, either by the effort to achieve reunion with the single reality of spirit, or by binding himself more closely to those ephemeral illusions of the apparitional world that must eventually fail him.

J. D. BERESFORD

PUNISHMENT OF CRIME

The ineffectiveness rather than the inhumanity of the punitive approach to crime is the line taken in "Revenge Costs Too Much" in *Harper's Magazine* for May. The writer is John B. Waite, Professor of Law at the University of Michigan and author of *Criminal Law in Action*. His findings have their application to penology in India. He cites statistical evidence that punishment fails to deter even its victims from further crimes, to say nothing of its not deterring others. Over half the inmates of United States penitentiaries have been in penitentiaries at least once before.

Crime *can* be more effectively checked. But not by tinkering with the penal laws. Those laws must be boldly discarded. Crime must no longer be defined as an act which is punishable, but as something which demonstrates that the criminal is socially dangerous.

From this approach, the illogic of awarding for a successful crime attempt twice the punishment of an unsuccessful

one must be apparent.

Not punishment, but being "treated in a manner designed to prevent further injurious activity" is the need. This means, *inter alia*, "to keep relative innocence apart from contaminating viciousness." It means finding, if possible, the cause of criminality and eliminating it by any humane method, which in some cases may not involve imprisonment at all. Under proper safeguards against abuse of power, a qualified commission should, Professor Waite holds, be allowed wide latitude, extending even to the segregation of its wards as long as they are dangerous to society.

Especially important is his protest against the heartless indifference to the newly released convict's fate in the critical period when "prevention demands every reasonable provision for helping the individual to abstain" from further crime.

THE ALCHEMY OF ART

[There is something of the heart quality in this essay by **Shri Gurdial Mallik**, as the intuitive reader will discern. His title is well chosen, for self-sublimation ever was the aim of the true alchemist—the transmutation of the base in man into pure gold. Art is one formula of the process ; not the only one, unless we widen its definition to include the art of life.—E.D.]

It is said that St. Francis of Assisi loved a certain lady passionately. This was when Christ had not yet wholly occupied his heart. But for some time, even after the Prince of Peace had claimed him as his own, the Saint's passion for the lady persisted. The result was an emotional conflict of agonising intensity. To resolve it, the prospective "bride of the Lord" prayed hard, but in vain. At last he hit upon a device—it came to him in a flash of inspiration—which extricated him from the piteous situation. One morning, when it was snowing, he slipped out of his warm bed and betook himself to a secluded spot. There, using his fingers as a brush, he drew in the snow a picture of his lady-love and poured into it all the pleasing, but disturbing, poignancy of his passion. No sooner was the sketch completed to its minutest detail than the Saint experienced a calm and a chaste joy akin to what he used to feel whenever, in the chapel, he worshipped Christ.

Here, then, is a helpful suggestion for solving the problem of self-sublimation, for the consideration of educationists in general and of aspirants after the wholeness of life,

usually called the spiritual life, in particular. For the sublimation of passion, let the puritans and the pundits say what they will, *is* a vital problem in the school and at the shrine.

Passion has two aspects : physical and psychical. The former can be dealt with more or less efficiently, though not integrally, by the physician as well as by the pedagogue. The one may prescribe manual work and maxims and the other, medicines and methods, to enable an adolescent to canalize his excess of bodily energy into channels that may conduce to the harmony of his being.

But such a mode of treatment does not cover the cure or conquest of the psychic or emotional-mental counterpart. To eliminate or to annihilate it—if that were at all possible—would be like throwing out the baby with the bath. It has instead to be changed, from lust (that is, inordinate heat of emotion or argument) into luminosity. For it is then that the illusions and excitements conjured up by the senses are replaced by intimations and illuminations of the Spirit. And it is art which effects this transmutation.

In a sense, the spirit of art is the art of the Spirit. The story of St. Francis, which forms the preamble to this essay, testifies to this truth. The first stage in his journey from the love of passion to the passion of love was a fund of strong feeling centred on one particular person, in reference to his own individual happiness, derived therefrom. The second stage was his own self-effacement for the purpose of absorption in someone else. The third stage was the conflict of his intense emotion for this person, *other than himself*, with the tense tugging at his heart-strings by a being greater than his own self and that of the other person. The fourth and final stage was the resolution of this conflict.

It is the alchemy of art which is responsible for this resurrection of the self. For, any "creative activity"—and by the term is meant all such activity as helps to *create*, to carve and churn out, a unitary beneficial value or vision of Life from the medley of emotions and ideas—to be worthy of the artist and his art must compass a reconciliation and a concord between the particular and partial aspect, on the one hand, and, on the other, the universal and all-embracing aspect of Love or Light or Life.

The ministry of art is similar to the ministry of the midwife. It brings to birth, *i. e.*, makes patent, the latent divinity or unity of Life, whether in terms of passion or of principle.

The artist has first a flash of inspiration or of insight or the arousal

of emotion from a particular point or person in the panorama of Life. Then he selects a medium to clothe his reaction or response thereto. The obstinacy and opaqueness of the material medium to the surging of the spiritual in him places in his way, later on, an apparently almost insurmountable obstacle, which serves the purpose of a solvent or a sieve, inasmuch as all that is foreign to the evolving accord between the two is burnt out or banished in the process. What remains as residue is as radiant as the sun, without caste or creed, though not without colour and cadence. The artist's creation has now entered the assembly of the All-pervading, All-purifying, All-perfecting Author and Artist of the Universe.

There is, however, one other truth which emerges from the story of St. Francis. It, too, should be stressed, because very often it is overlooked by the artist. It was the spirit of asceticism which gave strength and stamina to the saint to transcend the tyranny of the elements of Nature, within and outside, with all their extremes and eccentricities. He could have woven an image of his idol while he lay snugly between the folds of his blanket. But, as he shook these off, he shook off also the softness which is usually associated with the artist. The truth, paradoxical though it may seem, is that he who would be an artist must perforce and primarily be an ascetic. For physical self-control is the rock on which he can stand to hear the symphony of the stars.

In short, the alchemy of art lies in its being an effective aid to the attainment of the sense of synthesis, of rhythm, which is the soul of beauty.

GURDIAL MALLIK

A NEW CRITIQUE OF THEISM

III.—AVYAKTHA AND VYAKTHA AND THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

[**Shri P. Chenchiah**, a South Indian Christian interested in inter-religious movements, Retired Chief Judge of Pudukkottah State, concludes here his series of three articles on the background of recent developments in theistic thought. He describes in this article the New Theism of the three distinct yet comparable schools of Sri Aurobindo, Sri C. V. V. and the Christo Samaj. The God-man of the future is a possibility, nay, a certainty. The proof? That the evolutionary process implies and involves such a fulfilment and that such God-men there have been and are.—ED.]

The relation of *Avyaktha* to *Vyaktha* determines to a large extent the form and features of the new critique. That this relationship has always been stated in terms of the Static, by the Advaitin necessarily and by the theist yielding to the fashion of the day, is due to the exaltation of the Static over the changing. The long span of speculation ending with Bergson has made the superiority of the unmoving over the moving the battle ground of philosophers; and the honours of war lie more with the attackers of the Static than with its defenders.

However this may be, a satisfactory metaphysic demands an explanation of their relationship. To hold that *Avyaktha* remains unmodified and that the *Vyaktha* is the *Avyaktha* seen under a mode or a limiting condition is one explanation but by no means the only one. The view that Reality somehow develops a distorting film on its surface which seems to split its white light into the many colours of the spectrum and

that Reality, without losing irrefragibility in itself, gives birth to the spurious child of Maya, is a deduction of reason, a logical necessity and not a necessary inference from experience.

But there is another view, the evolutionary view, which, in a different form from the modern, has a long Indian ancestry. That creation is a process in which the *Avyaktha* is gradually passing into the *Vyaktha*, that Reality is not the one or the other exclusively but that both constitute the whole and that *Avyaktha* lies inside the creation as the potentialities of the created, and outside the process as its future development and destiny, is a formula which meets alike the demands of science and of philosophy. The evolutionary view opens a future to the cosmic process and offers a higher destiny for man than the static view.

The new theism of the three schools of Aurobindo, C. V. V. and the Christo Samaj adopts the evolutionary view as the only one which

covers the facts without forcing them into the moulds demanded by a purely logical theory. The Samadhi experience, rather than negating the evolutionary view, supports it, though it must be admitted that it has not played any essential rôle in traditional theism. Samadhi does not prove the Jagratha condition unreal, any more than sleep disproves the realities of the Jagratha condition. The "critique" adopts from science the evolutionary scheme as a formula of the creative process though, in adopting it, it broadens its range and deepens its significance.

What of the theories of return and of incarnation? The implications of the return in its relation to incarnation have never been fully investigated in Adwaita—or even in theism. Not that the implications have not been dimly perceived, but, even dimly perceived, they were so disturbing as not to invite enquiry from the faithful. The complete encasement of theism in temple worship put a stop to all further development. The return and incarnation present challenges to both Sankarite and Barthian absolutisms which circumambulate the problem rather than solve it. Incarnation is so attenuated in both systems that it ceases to play any vital rôle and loses its meaning after being filed down to a pin-point. Both the return and incarnation refuse to fit easily into the Adwaita system and one can only see their place in the scheme with the eye of faith.

The incapacity of the ego to remain permanently in Samadhi, mentioned in the preceding article, leading to the conception of incarnation as the culmination of the world process, is the cardinal feature of the new theism. Its contribution to the theistic development arises out of the acute perception that herein lies the clue for the recovery of the meaning and purpose of life and the clue is pursued by a courageous facing of the implications of the return.

If in Samadhi the Jiva becomes one with Paramatman why does it return to the Jagratha condition? The Rishi may be in Samadhi for any length of time but invariably, where death has not supervened, returns to Jagratha. Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa went into Samadhi and returned from it so quickly that it became a normal habit with him. He maintained that such return was the condition of healthy spiritual progress, as Samadhi was intended to enrich waking life. However this may be, we are driven to conclude that in Samadhi we are not permanently *en rapport* with Paramatman. The implications of the conclusion are momentous—so momentous that they cannot be explained by the power of *vasanas* (effects of previous births) or by the pull of Maya. The sole means for union with Brahman is Samadhi. If Samadhi fails to achieve that object, the hope of union has to be abandoned. The psycho-analytical method of discrim-

ination does not charm away the "many" even temporarily, as sleep, trance and Samadhi do.

The truth seems to be that in Samadhi the Jiva does not come into contact at all with the *Avyaktha*; if it did it would never return. Moreover, the efforts to reach the origin are powerfully countered by a ground-swell from *Avyaktha* which pushes the Jiva back to where it started.

The return can only be explained on the footing that the evolutionary movement of life in Divine *Sankalpa* is from *Avyaktha* to *Vyaktha* and that all attempts by Yoga to mount up against the current of life are frustrated because they are not in accordance with the Brahmic plan. No pilgrimage to the origin can ever reach the journey's end, by the very decree of the Divine. Yoga, starting with a desire to work out the latent possibilities of man, was diverted to the ambition of nullifying creation and reaching the Reality in its aboriginal and pure condition before the cosmic process began. The ambition, though courageously conceived and carried out, is foredoomed to failure, for no effort of Jiva can negate the divine plan. The ambition to become one with the origin has become so deep-rooted that even in theism *sayujya*—absorption—was the crown of the devotee's ambition. But not only does the plan of creation forbid all regress of the river of life to its source; it bids us seek our destiny in the fulness of perfection of the human personality till it becomes

the image and reflection of divine perfection.

Incarnation, both in Hinduism and in Christianity, has been interpreted as a temporary and singular phenomenon, with the result that we have sent away the God who sought to be with us, just as God returns to earth "man" who seeks to be one with him in heaven. Incarnation is the union of man and God in the creative process and it can take place only on earth and not in heaven. Any one incarnation, as an isolated phenomenon, can only be the prevision of human destiny the realisation of which has started with the single person regarded as God incarnate, as the type form of humanity, but spread it must to all men who do not deliberately reject the offered crown. The *Mahawakya* (great text)—*Tattwamasi* (That art Thou)—My father and I are one—will be fulfilled, but not according to our anticipation or effort. The goal of evolution is Sons of God—men who hold the fulness of God in flesh. Towards such, creation is moving. It is not given to us to change the pulse of life or to reverse the evolutionary current.

Much as we derive from the experience of our ancestors, we cannot neglect the revelations that have come through other religions and other sciences than theirs, for they also throw light on the divine plan. Therefore, leaving aside all narrowness that comes from excessive zeal for tradition, and acknowledging in humility that God fulfils himself in

many ways, the three schools gather in, all the rays of light and construct the divine plan in these positive terms.

The cosmic process may be described satisfactorily only by the evolutionary formula—of wider scope and sweep than that of the biologist—whereby the *Avyaktha* passes into the *Vyaktha* in accordance with the predetermined *Sankalpa* or time schedule. The static Adwaitic formula of *Avyaktha*, the only Real, appearing as many by the eternal operation of Avidya (cosmic ignorance or empirical knowledge) does not do justice to the facts and to the movements of the world process.

The Jivatma embodies only three levels—physical, astral and mental.

None of the supra-mental levels have passed into creation and the Jiva is in fact cut off from the *Avyaktha* by adamantine doors. No Yoga, however deep and profound, can go beyond the mental to effect union with what lies beyond, the *Avyaktha*. The Yogic experience of Samadhi recovers for man the breadth and the infinite area of Reality but does not take him to the deeps. It uncovers the Universal Self but not the Overself, *Avyaktha*. It takes us also to the confines of existence, to the sluices that cut off *Avyaktha* from *Vyaktha* and, by making us realise our limitations, set bounds to the capacity of Yoga. Yoga releases the potentialities of man on the three levels—and thus fulfils a great purpose. It is a major

science exploring the *Vyaktha*. But Yoga cannot overstep its own limits and unite us with *Avyaktha*.

The grand movement of evolution is from *Avyaktha* to *Vyaktha*. The doors of creation open towards *Vyaktha* and open only to *Avyaktha*. Yoga, as said, has always entertained an ambition beyond its capacity—that of reversing the rhythm and the flow of life, of taking the flowing stream to the source. It endeavours to dismantle physical, astral and mental. This adventure, as we have seen, is doomed to failure as it is against the divine Sankalpa. We may knock at the doors of life and try to open them by force. We shall only succeed in hurting ourselves. Many attempt to take the Kingdom of God by force but none succeed. As *Kaka Bhujandar Nadi* puts it, "Kakayar knocked at the adamantine walls that guard the *Avyaktha* but found them unyielding." He was told that they open not to man but to *Avyaktha* alone.

What passes from *Avyaktha* to *Vyaktha* is determined by *Avyaktha* itself—as an act of pure grace—a gift prompted by love, not as a reward for our *tapas* (penance). In the next stage of evolution man will retain the human form but will gain divinity such as he does not now possess. The integral Yoga of Sri Aurobindo calls the new element "Supra-mental life," Taraka Yoga, "Merchery," the Amrita Yoga of the Christo Samaj, the "Holy Spirit." In the new development, evolution reaches its zenith and the fulness of

the Godhead will dwell in the new body. Incarnation is the goal of creation, its crown and its completion. As St. Paul reveals, into man entered the breath of God as soul, into Jesus, the spirit of God. An immortal body—knowing neither decay nor death—is the form in which the eternal Spirit expresses itself fully. "The Word was with God and the Word was God....And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory," as the Gospel according to St. John announces.

The "*neti*" (not this) stream of thought—finding its culmination in Sankara's Adwaitism—is the negative phase, the antithesis in the dialectic of creation. The theism of Siva and Vishnu is the synthesis in the religious movement of India. This is the claim of theism, though it may not be conceded by the Adwaitins. The future of creation and the destiny of man find fulfilment in the "*idam*" (this) stream which reaches its climax in the Avatar (Incarnation).

The Avatar is not a singular, temporary, isolated event. It is the working out of the destiny of man and belongs to humanity as a whole. The second coming of Christ, according to the Christo Samaj, when relieved of the pictorial setting, means that such men as are prepared to receive it, will attain Christhood. The Avatar is not an individual but the earnest of a new order, connecting a new species of humanity, Sons of God, a new universe, the kingdom

of God, a new earth and a new heaven, a new body—a resurrection body—in fact, a new creation.

Yoga, in so far as it seeks to assail creation, is rejected by all three schools. The only Yoga pertinent to the grace of God is the Yoga of penitent receptivity. It is the Yoga not of effort but of attitude. Once the new power passes into men, then a technique of development of the new powers may be revealed to us. Jesus directed His disciples to proclaim the advent of the Kingdom of God, calling upon men to be ready to receive it. This Yoga of receptivity is the integral Yoga of Sri Aurobindo, the Taraka Yoga of Sri C. V. V. and the Amrita Yoga of the Christo Samaj.

The new critique has already rendered two great services. First, instead of attempting the futility of uniting men by a restatement of dogma and doctrine, bringing us together in churches, temples and mosques which embody the past, it turns our faces to the things that are to come, our gaze towards the dawn. Here at least we can unite in spite of our past. The new as the completion of all religions and 'isms, is the common desire of all. Secondly, it takes us out of temple and church and mosque worship and sets us before the grand anicut of life, wherein gigantic sluices stand to let in the still uncreated reservoirs of Brahman. It bids us all fold our hands in the prayer, "Lord, let thy Kingdom come on earth!" For thus only we can see hope for the nations.

P. CHENCHIAH

THE SPIRIT OF CONTEMPORARY INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

[Truly, "modern speculation cannot get out of the circle of ancient thought." The conceptions of the ancient Aryans—as is brought out here by **Shri Benoy Gopal Ray**, Lecturer at the Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan—honeycomb the philosophical thought of modern India. Resting on the firm foundation of facts in nature, on knowledge of the properties, functions and laws of matter, physical and metaphysical, they afford a synthesis of science, religion and philosophy upon which thought in every age has built.—ED.]

The expression "contemporary Indian philosophy" has often been misused and misunderstood. Doubt arises, perhaps rightly, as to the very possibility of anything like original philosophy in contemporary India. By Indian philosophy we are accustomed to think of the Vedas, the Upanishads and the six systems of the hoary past. We call them high philosophies because they are unique in many respects—in loftiness of ideas, in comprehensiveness, in logicity and, above all, in satisfying the whole man. These criteria, I believe, should be used to assess the philosophy of any person, age or clime.

And who is a philosopher? Philosophy is an attitude to life and the philosopher lives according to his teachings. Mere theories divorced from practice are clever traps to bluff and hoodwink the unthinking crowd. One may talk or write of high ideals and values but mere verbal expression does not entitle one to the sublime status of a philosopher. Him shall we call a philosopher who has realised his philoso-

phy in his life, in his mind and in his body. A Kapila, a Sankara, a Jaimini, a Plato, a Spinoza, or a Kant is a philosopher. But I am disinclined to call him a philosopher who has simply written a doctoral thesis, published some books by piecing together the sayings of the great philosophers and adorned the professorial chair of a modern university. Realisation, we should not forget, is the hall-mark of a philosopher.

Judged by the above standards, is there anything like contemporary Indian philosophy? The popular saying that every Indian is a born philosopher has done more harm than good. Most modern Indians have ceased to lead life in the spiritual way which was their forefathers' virtue. They crave after material pleasures and, whenever these are denied to them, they console themselves by saying: "We are the sons of Amrita. We hate material gain and happiness. We worship only the spirit." They point the finger at the West and condemn her as the materialist *par excellence*.

But in their heart of hearts they are worse materialists.

In contemporary India there are persons who are philosophers in the real sense of the term. They are never academic professors of philosophy who care for the presentation of well-written theses. They have realised their philosophy in their lives and this fact alone lifts them to the rank of immortals. Space will not permit me to name all of them. I shall mention only a few who, in my opinion, have founded distinct schools of thought. Contemporary India begins from Raja Rammohun Roy, who was at once a philosopher and a social reformer. The philosophy of the Raja formed the nucleus of the Brahmo Samaj, a religious institution made to grow to its fullest extent by Maharshi Devendranath Tagore and Keshabchandra Sen. When the Brahmo Samaj was flourishing there arose Ramakrishna, the God-intoxicated man, to teach human beings the gospel of sincerity and love. His philosophy was carried on by his disciple, Vivekananda, who added vigour and force to his master's teachings. Side by side with the Brahmo Samaj, there arose the Arya Samaj, which was founded on the philosophy of Dayananda Saraswati. Three more philosophers of contemporary India deserve mention because they too have founded different schools of thought. They are Rabindranath Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi and Sri Aurobindo.

The question arises: Are their philosophies original? The answer to

this query has to be in the negative, for all of them have drawn their philosophies from the ancient Indian lore. The Vedas, the Upanishads and the six systems have been the primal source of their teachings. The Vedas and the Upanishads are like shot silk that admits of many colours. A monist and a pluralist, a pantheist and a panentheist, a materialist and an idealist can cite the Vedas and the Upanishads with equal aptness and relevancy. Borrowing an expression of A. N. Whitehead's, we may say that the whole of contemporary Indian philosophy "is only a series of foot-notes" to the Vedas and the Upanishads. But the foot-notes have their own worth so far as elucidation is concerned.

The originality that may be claimed for the contemporary Indian philosophers lies in their explaining the truths discovered by the sages of ancient India, who shone by the inner light of self-realisation. One pertinent question arises in this connection: Is it possible for an Indian philosopher to do without the help of the Vedas and the Upanishads?

The answer is surely in the affirmative, for in India there have been heterodox systems that have rejected the Vedic authority. The Baudhas, Jainas and Cārvākās arose mainly by opposition to the Vedic culture. The Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools were based on independent grounds though they too had accepted the Vedic authority. But the philosophers of contemporary India have carried on the

old tradition of Vedic and Upanishadic authority. Raja Rammohun Roy and Devendranath were influenced by the Vedas and the Upanishads though the latter could not regard the Vedas as infallible. Swami Dayananda wanted to revive the Vedic authority and culture. Vivekananda built his philosophy on the bed-rock of Vedanta. Sri Aurobindo has drawn his from the Vedas, the Upanishads and the tantras. Again the sources of the philosophies of Gandhi and Rabindranath can be traced to the Upanishads.

But each philosopher has his own perspective. Rammohun stressed the monotheistic aspect of the Upanishads and wanted to build a theistic fraternity of all men. He was disgusted with idol-worship and preached the doctrine of the formless Absolute. Devendranath completed the unfinished work of the Raja by building a full-fledged cultus known as the Brahma Dharma. Keshab wanted to synthesise the philosophy of the Upanishads with that of Christianity. But his synthesis was only an intellectual one. Sri Ramakrishna was not conversant with the ancient Indian philosophy. But he imbibed the Vedic and Upanishadic tradition as if by heredity. His disciple Vivekananda was fully alive to the growing changes of his time and explained the Vedanta as a practical philosophy. Dayananda wanted to revive the Vedic age but he too was not indifferent to the revolutionary changes of his age. Rabindranath viewed the Upa-

nishads from the stand-point of a poet-philosopher. He found the central truth of the Upanishads in "Man" and in the "Religion of Man," which is a religion without a tenet or a dogma. Gandhi's philosophy can be summed up in one word, *viz.*, truth. The ultimate Reality, for him, is Truth and the aim of his Satyagraha is to attain that goal. Gandhi and Tagore aim at lifting man to God but the philosopher who wants to bring God down to man is Sri Aurobindo. He always lays emphasis on "Divine descent." According to him, *mukti* or salvation is never a one-sided affair. It is effected only when the human being ascends to God and God descends to man.

Though the above schools of contemporary Indian philosophy present a diversity of views regarding the explanation of the ancient wisdom, certain common characters cling to them all. Religion and philosophy have been intertwined in contemporary thinking in India. All the philosophers from Rammohun to Aurobindo are religious-minded. In each philosophy intellectual realisation of the Absolute has been enlivened by religious emotion. Contemporary Indian philosophers have always preferred intuition to intellect. They have understood and realised the Vedic and Upanishadic truths more by sympathy than by logic. They have never approached philosophical problems through an elaborate and pretentious epistemology or a critical metaphysics. They have faced the problems directly and solved them from the Vedic and Upanishadic stand-points. Philosophy, to them, has been the knowledge and the realisation of the Absolute.

BENOY GOPAL RAY

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE VEDA THROUGH A SWAMI'S EYES *

The book is divided into twelve lectures numbered 90 to 102, being the continuation of previous lectures already published. It is followed by a glossary of Sanskrit words and, in an appendix, by a translation of Śhaṅkarāchārya's commentary on the *Bṛihad-āranyaka Upaniṣhad* IV-3-7.

The subjects of the lectures are given as (90) "Indo-Aryan Civilization Throughout History"; (91) "The Holy Scriptures of the Indo-Aryans: The Vedas and the Upaniṣhads"; (92) "The Upaniṣhads"; (93) "The Place of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* in Hindu Thought"; (94) "Perception According to the Sāṅkhya"; (95) and (96) "Ontology of the Vedānta: (The Concept of Pure Being according to Śhaṅkara) and (Reality as 'Sat')"; (97) "The Concept of *Yajña* in Hindu Religious Life"; (98) "Hindu Mysticism"; (99-101) "Ontology of the Vedānta: (The Concept of *Cit*), (Being as Pure Intellect) and (The Ānanda Concept)"; (102) "What Philosophical Conclusions May Be Drawn from the Study of Dreams?"

As can be seen from its contents, the title of this book is rather misleading, since the author deals with many aspects and branches of Hindu philosophy as well as with history, anecdotes, etc., which are subjects quite distinct from Vedānta. But that these learned and often rather abstract lectures on

Hindu philosophy have been delivered in a French provincial University and printed in Paris is a very welcome sign of the growing realisation in Europe of the importance of Hindu philosophy.

To explain Hindu philosophical conceptions to the matter-of-fact Westerner, brought up in quite different habits of thought, presents a fascinating but often an arduous task. The way of making extreme concessions to Western beliefs and prejudices is often chosen as the easiest. But there is also a risk that, by doing so, one may sever the very root of Hindu philosophy, leaving its flowers to wither and dry, unable to take life again in the hearers' minds.

Swāmī Siddheshwarānanda follows strictly the views of some Western scholars on ancient Indian history. He seems to forget that these views are not unbiassed. Except perhaps in very rare cases, the Western scholar denies altogether that such a thing as Revelation can exist or, if he admits of Revelation, it will be only in its Christian form. Besides, the Westerner usually believes in the evolution of man from a primitive savage towards a superior intellectual being. These data are absolutely contrary to the Hindu conception, which considers that the human state cannot exist without Revelation, which appeared therefore with the first human being. The Hindu tradition also affirms that the ancestors

**Quelques Aspects de la Philosophie Vedantique* (Some Aspects of the Philosophy of Vedanta). Fourth Series. Lectures Delivered at the University of Toulouse. By SWAMI SIDDHESWARANANDA. (Collection "Vande Mataram," Adrien-Maisonneuve, 11 rue Saint-Sulpice, Paris (VI^e). Price not indicated)

of man were seers, beings still so near their creator that they hardly can be differentiated from angels or gods. To explain Hindu philosophy, it would seem only fair at least to mention this difference in outlook, leaving readers free to draw their own conclusions.

In the field of history, most of the dates now attributed to the ancient Hindu scriptures were established in a period of the nineteenth century when most scholars sternly denied the existence of any great civilisation in India anterior to the first millennium B. C. Archæological discoveries have since pushed further and further back the tangible limits of the history of India. It seems very likely that many Hindu works may some day be proved to be hundreds if not thousands of years earlier than is now thought. These debatable questions should, however, be left to historians and need not appear prominently in an exposition of Vedantic philosophy.

Swāmī Siddheshwarānanda believes the Sāṅkhya and the Mīmāṃsā to be "older systems than Vedānta" and condemns them as "systems in which Hindu thought has not yet found its full development." This view seems contrary to traditional teaching.

One of the greatest achievements of Hindu philosophy is this very conception of the philosophical points of view or Darśhanas, which assert that Reality can be approached from different standpoints, each of which, by its own premises, leads necessarily to distinct conclusions. Hence the conclusions of some of the "points of view" are atheistic, of others pantheistic, deistic, etc. Since each is strictly true in its own field, one hardly sees why Swāmī Siddheshwarānanda should wish "to

remain free to criticise the philosophical position of Sāṅkhya." It is only by co-ordinating the conclusions of the different Darśhanas that we can have a grasp of the true nature of Ultimate Reality. Vedāntic truth, applied without proper understanding to everyday life, leads to no less absurdity than the method of materialistic rationalism applied to the study of mystical experience.

From the Hindu point of view the most debatable of Swāmī Siddheshwarānanda's theories must undoubtedly be his conception of the Vedas. According to him, the Vedas "exalt the pleasures of existence, life is good, the earth a place of delight."

The Vedas ordained the celebration of the cult, the accomplishment of the sacrificial act in the hope of obtaining after death a place in paradise. The *Bhagavat-Gita* does not fear to oppose this belief.

We thus see the Gītā represented as opposing the Veda; a statement with which no Hindu could agree. Further:—

In the Vedas appear side by side, in the most familiar disorder, hymns to this or that deity, . . . prayers or incantatory formulæ to obtain according to need fair weather, rain, or sunshine. From thoughts which bear the mark of the highest spirituality we pass, without transition, to strictly practical advice . . . the sacred and the profane are here hand in hand, are treated on an equal footing.

This seems a rather curious assertion. Either the Vedas, as the Hindus assert, are sacred books, of which every word contains the whole essence of Revelation, or, as modern historians believe, they are merely human works. They cannot be both at the same time.

The whole of Hindu religion is based on the Veda: it is disbelief in the Veda and not in God which is called *Nāstikatā*, irreligion. Yet if we are to be-

lieve Swāmī Siddheshwarānanda, it is Śhaṅkarāchārya who invented the higher meaning of the Veda.

He interpreted the Vedas and Upanishads as if the sages of former ages had themselves had a glimpse of non-dualism, a theory which is his own creation.

After discarding the Veda in so summary a fashion, an attempt to make the Western reader believe that the *Bhagavad-gītā* and the teaching of Śhri Rāmakṛishṇa represent a direct revelation of the Supreme Being seems a rather difficult enterprise. Speaking of Śhri Rāmakṛishṇa, Swāmī Siddheshwarānanda tells us that "entering in this atmosphere of purity and sanctity we must silence in ourselves our critical sense." This is very true; the reader only wishes that Swāmījī would extend this respectful attitude to the whole of the Hindu Scriptures and to the experience of other mystics.

Swāmī Siddheshwarānanda is quite naturally attached to the founders and friends of his Order, but they may not necessarily occupy in the history of Indian thought the exclusive place he gives them. If we want to know about

the "special powers called siddhis" "to read Swāmī Vivekānanda's *Rāja-Yoga*" is not our only recourse: we may just as well read Patañjali or the *Gheraṇḍa Samhitā*.

Girish Chandra Ghosh was no doubt a great disciple of Śhri Rāmakṛishṇa, but to say that "modern India sees in him a modern Shakespeare" and that "he has had a considerable influence on the development of Hindu theatrical art" seems a rather sweeping statement, since modern Hindu theatres are so conspicuously absent.

What is meant by "all Hindus" is also not clear in such remarks as "Rāmakṛishṇa was born in the year when the learning of English became compulsory for all Hindus."

These considerations, like the book itself, take us rather far from Vedānta. The book has, however, much clear exposition which makes it interesting and useful. The French, although heavy, is generally correct. Lecture 102 on the states of dream and deep sleep makes excellent reading.

ALAIN DANIELOU

A CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY*

The democrat at the table is the author, we must suppose, though the others—comprising a schoolmaster, a communist, an Indian, a business man, and a man described as a pig specialist and poet—would all lay claim to the same title. They discuss the problems of the day. Each is led on and when possible squashed by Mr. Brogan. The dialogue is scarcely Socratic. For Plato did not suffer the invasion of that Giant who in real life intrudes himself upon

most discussions—Giant Irrelevancy. But Mr. Brogan is not content merely to advance a principle; he wishes also to show how principles are received and discussed. For example, Mr. Brogan said that "a man's own faults are more important to himself than other people's faults" and that while marking the beam in other people's eyes we should not ignore the mote (or beam) in our own. But Mr. Levi, the Communist, did not think so.

* *The Democrat at the Supper Table*. By COLM BROGAN. (Hollis and Carter, London. 8s. 6d.)

He said if some of the common people were slack and lazy (which he by no means admitted), there were very good reasons for it. They suffered from malnutrition, lack of opportunity, social contempt, miner's nystagmus, bad education, stulted artistic instincts, bad housing, low wages, niggling compensation, unemployment, blind-alley occupations, denial of initiative and responsibility, low-grade entertainment, a dishonest Press, shoddy clothing, a cheese-paring medical service, a very insufficient provision of public baths and libraries, misrule by the men of Munich, a growing sense of futility and betrayal, and the knowledge that many people in high places were only too willing to do a deal with Fascist forces at any time, and to wreck the Russian Alliance by any means in their power.

It had struck me before that whenever Mr. Levi leaves the point of an argument, which he does very promptly, he talks exactly like Hitler. He is copious, violent and confused. Nothing that he had just said, literally nothing, touched on the matter I had raised.

"To return to the subject," I said firmly....

I make the above quotation because it is unfortunately true, and too easily forgotten by readers, that the average man does not seek the truth of a matter, does not listen, does not calmly think out what he is really saying, but is nearly always, quite simply—a *bigot*. Every man over thirty is a bigot, because by that time he has channelled out for himself a path in life and dares not endanger his journey. Truth has to fight fiercely to get any sort of footing.

People tend to think that the truth concerning a given problem is always a question of this or that, and the best policy, to do this or that. You must take one view or the other, and thus belong to one or the other party. But how if the matter will not go into an either/or category? Take education; and take it in terms of the slogan "Equality of Opportunity." All should have

equal opportunity. Granted. But here the trouble begins. Your thoroughgoing equality man will wish to keep every child at school until an advanced age. Your reactionary will wish to give opportunity only to the scholarship child. But the truth is that very few people are capable of education, and the proper course, in terms of equality, would be to give opportunity to all: to force none to go on with education who do not wish to do so and to let all who want to go on do so, irrespective of parental or other irrelevant considerations. In due course all the elder students would be keen workers, and there would not be an unwieldy number of them. Such a policy would allow for fundamental principles and do justice to the subtlety of life. Mr. Brogan brings this sort of thing out very forcibly.

At the end of the book, the hostess, Mrs. Beveridge, has her innings. She accuses them of having talked all the time of Problems instead of People. You won't do any good, she says, by Acts of Parliament, if you only deal with problems and not human beings.

"Look at Mr. Chatterjee. Why, when Mr. Chatterjee came here first, I was a little doubtful about having him. It wasn't personal at all, but I had heard a lot about the Indian Problem when I was a girl. My uncle was a major in the Indian Army, and he used to say, 'East is East and West is West.' He thought that explained why he always threw his boots at his Indian batman whenever he lost money at the races. I must say I thought it was rather a queer argument, but it must have had some effect, for I was inclined to think Mr. Chatterjee must be a Problem, all by himself.

"Well he isn't. He's just Mr. Chatterjee. He is a human being, not exactly like any other human being. We get on very well, but we wouldn't if he thought of me as a White Woman and I thought of him as the Indian Problem."

But Mr. Brogan, never once out to play for popularity, does not pretend that that is the whole truth of the matter.

JOHN STEWART COLLIS

THE MOTE AND THE BEAM *

In this pamphlet, the author makes an earnest plea for the Big Three to cease distrusting each other, and to work side by side for promoting peace and good-will among the nations. They cannot do this, however, so long as they are divided into opposite camps, Capitalism *vs.* Communism, each regarding the other as its mortal foe. The author finds in the Communistic creed of the inevitability of war against Capitalism a great obstacle to peace. He also believes that there is a cleavage in ideology between the Anglo-Saxon faith in democracy and the totalitarianism of Russia. The one believes in obtaining the consent of every citizen, the other does not, and imposes discipline from above. If the two are so fundamentally opposed, there is indeed little hope of their coming together.

What, then, are the author's solutions to the problem of preventing war? One is international control of atomic energy. He believes that "if such international control were really established, world-war would be impossible." This seems a remarkable statement, in view of his recognition that the causes of war are fear and distrust. So long as these remain, will a nation, say, like Russia, be prevented from waging war against America merely out of fear of the United Nations Organisation's using the atom bomb against her? Russia may in self-defence devise as deadly weapons of destruction as the atom bomb or invent counter-measures to ward off effects. What seems impossible now may not be impossible in a few years. World peace cannot be had, it would seem,

by so simple a means as international machinery to prevent war, as we know from our bitter experience with the League of Nations; and especially not when "international" means only the big Powers.

The attitude betrayed by the author towards Russia is, one suspects, just the kind that makes for war. He evidently believes, as most Britishers do, that the Anglo-Saxons have a monopoly of democracy, and that unless other nations learn democracy from them, it is going to be difficult to co-operate. If, instead of taking this insular and self-righteous attitude, he could have seen that there is democracy in the Russian system also, though of course not of the British brand—that the people of the Soviet are never being driven about with a whip by the dictator, that he is their dictator only because of their faith in him, and that they regard their Government not as something external to them but as really only themselves—he would have helped to bridge, instead of widening, as he has done, the gulf which separates Russia from the Anglo-Saxons.

The author is right in hoping that if America and Britain do the right thing, Russia may not believe in the inevitability of war. For this, however, he thinks that it might suffice if America gave Russia a substantial loan for reconstruction of her devastated areas, and if Britain proclaimed that she would not go to war again. By giving Russia a loan, America might bribe Russia to refrain from war in the immediate present, but what of the future? And as for Britain's proclama-

* *Trust or Perish.* By JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY. (Riverside Press, Edinburgh. 1s.)

tion of her peaceful intentions, Russia will know what value to put on it. Besides, Russia is probably so confident now of her own strength and so conscious of the weakness of Britain that she would not be likely to be other than amused at Britain's saying that she would not fight again. So one is afraid that neither method suggested by our author is going to help abolish war.

Strange that the only obvious solution does not strike the author ! The solution, *viz.*, of Britain's relinquishing immediately her imperialistic hold on other countries and demonstrating *in practice* that she really believes in the democracy and self-determination for all, which she loudly proclaims to be her peculiarly Anglo-Saxon heritage.

It is, one is inclined to believe, because of the imperialistic game that, contrary to this heritage, Britain plays in the East, as she plays power-politics in Europe, that Russia is forced in her turn to follow a similar policy of expansion, in self-protection, not out of selfish greed but out of the desire to establish a more equitable economic order for the downtrodden. So long as even Britishers of such high ideals and eminence as our author do not see this, and fail to realise what is so obvious to everyone else, that the real stumbling-block to peace and to the brotherhood of nations is not Russia but the British Empire, there seems little prospect of an end of war in the near future.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

The Great Daughter of India: An Appreciative Study of Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit and Her Ideas in the Background of Nehru Family's Heroic Struggle for the Political Emancipation of India. By ABDUL MAJID KHAN, M. A. (Indian Printing Works, Kacheri Road, Lahore. Rs. 5/8)

It would not be surprising if the embarrassed heroine of this rhapsodic tribute were reminded by it of the man whose confirmed habit of writing biographies of his deceased friends was said by an acquaintance to have "added to the terrors of death." But by no means all the entries can go in the debit column. True, the praise is fulsome; the author leans heavily upon familiar published autobiographical material; there are a few regrettable lapses in taste and many in diction; the

arrangement of the material leaves much to be desired; and, finally, the get-up of the book, in spite of its interesting illustrations (not all felicitously or even correctly labelled) will reflect no credit upon India abroad.

But none of these defects, nor all of them together, prevents the emergence from these pages of a dauntless patriot, as brave as she is gracious, shown in a family setting of unusual charm and culture and courage, and against the background of the mighty drama of India's struggle to be free. Prof. Majid Khan's views on several subjects, such as *purdah*, and his ideals for Indian women are eminently sound. The book, moreover, holds the reader's interest and arouses admiration for the objects of the author's homage.

E. M. H.

We Who Teach. By JACQUES BARZUN. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

Jacques Barzun is "one of America's brilliant young philosophers and historians" (he teaches at Columbia) and he has certainly written a readable, entertaining, thought-provoking book. He speaks from experience, but has little but generalisations to offer the teacher of younger children, dealing mainly with the college student and the adolescent. We are given, perhaps unconsciously, a somewhat terrifying picture of the average American college with its round of engagements, breathless busyness and general atmosphere of "hustle."

Professor Barzun is indeed critical of the organisation of present-day education and is able to bring a knowledge of French, Scottish and English systems to bear on modern problems. For instance, with reference to the rush in America he says, "In England they arrange things somewhat better. Terms are shorter and vacations longer. More people loaf and teaching is on the whole as active and probably a good deal more effectual." He also states that "the effective agent is the living person" and that it is the giving out of the teacher, the response from the student or the class, that is so fructifying. Again he emphasises the diversity of persons needed for a successful educational whole, some being born lecturers, others discussers, others tutors, while others are at their best in research.

Some of the most interesting passages concern the needs and relationships between tutors and students. He says "Friendship between an instructor and a student is impossible" and goes

on to explain why and to demonstrate the kind of help that should be given to the adolescent by the wise tutor. He deals, too, with the problem of the education of women, and of the mistakes that have been made in the past. He is not, however, very clear as to what our aim can be for the future, which is hardly to be wondered at in the present chaotic state of Western society!

At times one is depressed by the feeling that Professor Barzun attaches overmuch importance to the material. He feels that teachers need higher salaries, fewer economic worries, vaster and more lofty buildings, gracious living accommodation. In fact it would seem that "high thinking" needs equally high living. It does not occur to him that a teacher might care to ignore the conventions of "dressing well" or "keeping up appearances." Yet at heart he has the right spirit, for he says later "All are, or should be, artists. . . . Unless this is true, unless the teacher feels that besides bread-winning he has 'his own work to do' he is cheating himself of freedom and joy, and reducing the worth of his toil as a teacher."

Again, in drawing to an end he says, "The intellectual life justifies itself when, having embraced the common facts, it asks and answers the question, 'What does it all mean?'"

What is, perhaps, saddening, and also significant, is that the writer seems to have no thought for, or makes no mention of, the fundamental basis of life, that is, agriculture and manual work of any kind. His teachers and colleges seem divorced from this common life. Surely this cannot be desirable or good?

ELIZABETH CROSS

The Living Thoughts of Confucius.
Presented by ALFRED DOEBLIN.
(Cassell and Co., Ltd., London. 3s. 6d.)

This is the second edition of a book published in 1942 in the Living Thoughts Library—compendiums of the thoughts of master-minds, ancient and modern.

In his introduction, Alfred Doebelin gives a clear and reverential account of the great master's life, his character, his teachings, and his posthumous influence. Confucius occupies a position between the founders of religions and the builders of states. He was a practical dreamer, concerned with the better ordering of society. In this he is far more representative of the Chinese mentality—"a man made of solid Chinese wood"—than his contemporary Lao-tse, the philosopher and mystic.

Confucius did not found a school of philosophy or a religion. A practical man, solely interested in the application of his many schemes of administration, he got only a fleeting chance to carry them out. That made his life seem to the man himself a sad failure. An onlooker, seeing him once awaiting his disciples at the gate of a Chinese town, described him as "a man of majestic appearance, looking as troubled as a dog that has lost his master." When Confucius was told of this remark he replied with a smile: "The description of my figure is of little importance; but the comparison with a dog is most appropriate."

And yet this man, who died with the despairing cry: "No intelligent ruler arises to take me as his master. My time has come to die," has contributed more to the shaping of China's destiny than any one else. His doctrines have

entered into the very bones of his people. He has become the patron saint of the literary as well as of the official class. He is revered all over the land as the "most sage ancient teacher."

His doctrines are set forth in the books of ancient wisdom that he edited. The selections chosen and arranged from these ancient works form the major part of the book under review. They give a good idea of Confucius' thoughts under headings like "The Doctrine of the Mean," "The Laws of Heaven," "The Superior Man of Wealth and Honour" etc.

The realism and the practicability of his teachings are their outstanding characteristics. Not for him the high idealism of the Buddha or of Jesus, both of whom advocated returning good for evil. When Confucius was asked, "Should bad be rewarded by good?" he questioned "With what should good then be rewarded?"

And yet he was far from holding the modern materialistic notion that man is a mere plaything of chance, that this life has no meaning and that therefore one can do what one wills. On the contrary, he believed in a moral universe. The Heaven that lies about us is a moral order and man must conform to that order or Tao. His doctrines of the mean, of the responsibility of rulers, of the duties of the ruled, of filial piety, all derive from this conception. In his discernment of man's relation with the physico-spiritual world, Confucius gives, according to Doebelin, a surer lead than modern thinkers like Nietzsche and Marx, who deny this divine nature in man. A very useful compendium.

S. K. GEORGE

Rousseau: Kant: Goethe. By ERNST CASSIRER; translated by J. GUTMANN, P. O. KRISTELLER and J. H. RANDALL, JR. (History of Ideas Series, No. 1, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J. \$1.50)

This translation into English of a work by a distinguished German writer consists of two essays. The thesis which the first maintains is that Kant was profoundly influenced by the thought of Rousseau. To judge from the outward course of their lives, as now generally understood, no two persons could be farther removed from each other. Kant was methodical in everything that he did, while Rousseau was the most wayward of men. As thinkers, again, they present the same sharp contrast. Kant kept in view from the outset a specific goal, and strove determinately to reach it; but Rousseau had scarcely a definite plan to guide him, and his teaching is full of inconsistencies. If a person's philosophy, as has been observed, depends upon the kind of man he is, we can look for no agreement in the views of these two thinkers. But the above thesis is not therefore to be rejected, for we have the testimony of Kant himself to the effect that he was indebted to Rousseau. Only the indebtedness will not be clearly seen, so long as we keep to the traditional view of the latter's teaching.

Let us take, for instance, what is known as Rousseau's doctrine of the "state of nature." As commonly interpreted, this means that civilisation is an evil and that man, abjuring all the artificial restrictions which it has imposed on him, should get back to primitive life. There may be much in Rousseau's works to support such an

interpretation; but the point of the present essay is that that was not his real meaning. What he meant by a "state of nature," as is shown here with the aid of proper documentary evidence, is not the state in which man once *was*, but that in which he, as a man, *ought to be*. The aim of life accordingly is not to revert to primitive conditions, but to advance further and further on the way to moral perfection which forms man's distinctive goal. Nor did Rousseau condemn civilisation outright. It may help the cultivation of certain social virtues but they may add nothing, he thought, to the inner worth or moral dignity of man, which is what he should prize most. According to Kant also, as students of his ethics know, it is this moral dignity that constitutes the essential character of man, and not the merely social virtues, no matter how glamorous they may seem.

The second essay deals with Kant and Goethe. But what is pointed out as noteworthy in their case is not so much indebtedness as kinship of thought. Speaking of one of Kant's *Critiques*, Goethe wrote: "Here I saw my most diverse interests brought together, artistic and natural products handled the same way." Though thus acknowledged by Goethe himself, this kinship has not, so far, received from scholars the attention which it deserves; and the purpose of our author here is to explain and illustrate its exact nature. But we should not suppose that the book under review, whether in this essay or in the previous one, is concerned with drawing attention only to similarities in the teachings of the great men it deals with. It lays equal stress upon significant differences also between them. The contribution which these studies make to the history of European thought in the eighteenth century is quite important. The English rendering is excellent, and the book hardly reads like a translation.

M. HIRIYANNA

Berkeley's Immaterialism. By A. A. LUCE, M. C., D.D., LITT. D. (Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., London. 6s.)

The philosophy of Berkeley interests everyone and its reputation consists in its being misunderstood. The main interest of Dr. Luce's book, which is a commentary on Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge*, is his interpretation that Berkeley's philosophy is not Immaterialism only, but a Realism. "I take my courage in my two hands and deny that Berkeley was an idealist." I have no quarrel with Dr. Luce, for the terms idealism and realism are but battle-cries and, "matter" and "idea" in Berkeley are ambiguous. It is unwise also to insist that a philosopher's system is only this or only that. Berkeley's "idea" is not the same as Hegel's Idea. In Berkeley, "idea" means an "object of sense-perception." It is an immediate, passive, perceived something. In modern terminology "idea" means "sense datum" or "sense-data." What is "sense-data" today was "sensation" yesterday and "idea" the day before. To say that a "thing," like a table or a chair, is, in the Berkeleyan sense, is to say that it is an object of actual or possible sense-perception. So, to say that things are "collections of ideas," as Berkeley does, is to say that they are groups of actual and possible sense-data. (It follows from this usage or definition of "idea" that while matter is an "idea" Spirit is not. Spirit is not an object of sense-perception. It is not even an object. According to Berkeley we have a "notion" of Spirit.)

When Berkeley denies the reality of material substance, he does not deny the reality of the things that we see and touch and feel. He does not deny

the reality of the world. Berkeley is not an acosmist, or a pan-psychist, or a pantheist. His immaterialism is not a monistic immaterialism but a dualistic one. What Berkeley denies is the reality of an X, an unknown something, the absolutely non-sensible support (as it is claimed), Locke's "the something, I know not what, of the things that we touch and see and feel." With the development of atomic physics, Berkeley's denial of matter must interest the experimental physicist. For he must ask himself the question: Is the sensible with which I experiment in my laboratory composed of the absolutely non-sensible? Is the sub-microscopic totally different in kind from the microscopic and the macroscopic? Is there an ultimate difference in concepts or a dualism between mathematical and experimental physics? Can we regard the concepts of sub-atomic physics as constituting matter, in any sense of the term *matter*, not applicable also to the things that we touch and see?

Idealism is generally associated with the doctrine of the scepticism of the senses. There is no scepticism of the senses in Berkeley, nor does he deny the reality of the world prior to its being perceived by your mind or my mind. Besides, by "knowing," Berkeley does not mean "making" but "finding." Idealism asserts that the mind is more easily known than outer objects. But Berkeley does not put the subject before the object; he puts the object before the subject. If Descartes said: "*Cogito, ergo sum,*" Berkeley would say: "It is thought, therefore, it is."

Dr. Luce has written a useful and interesting book.

N. A. NIKAM

Von den Forderungen einer kommenden Zeit an die gegenwärtige. Prologomena zu einer Metaphysik, die nunmehr möglich sein wird. (What the Future Demands from Us: Prolegomena to a Metaphysic which Will Now Become Possible). ERWIN JOHANN RUSCH. (Schmoelzer and Albers, Casilla 9763, Santiago de Chile. \$60.—m/Chil.)

Though this valuable but rather difficult German book is in the first place concerned with modern civilization under present European conditions, its conclusions are fundamentally valid also for the non-European world. The author regards totalitarianism as not only the most decisive, but also the most dangerous, phenomenon of our time, and one which may develop in every country. For culture does not consist in our technical achievements; these are organically rooted in character, ideals and traditions, and it is these which are threatened by the totalitarian State.

The greatest part of the book is, therefore, occupied with a discussion of totalitarianism: Mechanization and standardization in the service of a pure and undiluted will to power. Totalitarianism is not the exclusive product of any individuals, constitutions, nations, races or civilizations but must be fought wherever and under whatever name it may appear. Nor can it be explained merely by the developments of the last thirty or forty years, as it is the last, degenerate link in a long chain of progressive standardization and mechanization of Western life reaching back to the sixteenth century.

The human type on which alone the totalitarian state can rest is man reduced to a quantitative, normalized entity without individual shape and

amenable to any will imposed on him, the cultural (not necessarily economic) proletarian—in Germany the lower middle class, Hitler's chief supporters. Totalitarianism is not guided by any genuine faith, idea or ethics, but replaces these by a pseudo-mysticism for the masses, *e. g.*, anti-Semitism. This is done by propaganda directed not to forming opinions, but to mobilizing the lowest instincts of the psyche. The realization of this pernicious character of propaganda is one of the most urgent needs of the future.

But this power is reaching its culmination. For the reckless waste of material, social and psychic-energy reserves leaves behind nothing but an apathetic "fellahin" population. What possibilities, then, still exist for people with organically developed outlook and culture? The first postulate is the realization that in our modern world the national state has ceased to be the organic form of society and that nationalism can assert itself only by totalitarian means, *i. e.*, by the destruction of healthy cultural life. To Europe only one way is left: to unite into one Pan-Europe. The other conclusion is: Not reorganization, but reduction of the future power sphere of the State! All the domains of individual life—knowledge, jurisdiction, morals, religion—must again be made independent of the State, but hand in hand with socialism for the masses.

A special value of the book lies in its interesting historical parallels and sociological discussions. It is not easy to read. Written in a rather archaic language, it presupposes a thorough acquaintance with modern philosophical theories and the implications of their terminology.

A. GOETZ

Florence Farr, Bernard Shaw, W. B. Yeats: Letters. Edited by CLIFFORD BAX. (Home and Van Thal, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

The letters contained in this little volume were written by Bernard Shaw and W. B. Yeats to Florence Farr, the actress and verse-speaker, in the 'nineties and the early years of the present century. When she left England to end her days at a Vedantist seminary in Ceylon she entrusted these letters to Mr. Clifford Bax. Apparently she was a poor letter-writer herself and none of her own letters are included. But she certainly had a gift for making her correspondents reveal themselves. Evidently she at once attracted and exasperated Shaw, while Yeats was in much closer sympathy. Yeats found in her "an almost perfect poetic actress"; Shaw, to whom poetry meant little, made desperate efforts, in his own words, "to work up her technique and capacity for hard professional work to the point needed for serious stage work."

Poetry and the poetic play were not serious stage work for Shaw and

his efforts to harness the poet in Florence Farr to the speaking and acting of prose and an intensely sustained realization of character failed. But, however inapt some of his advice was to her talent and unworldly personality, it is sound and urgent for actors of a tougher fibre. For the rest, his letters radiate the wilful wit, extravagance and cocksureness of the man of mental vitality rather than imaginative depth.

With Yeats it is the other way. The dreamer dominates the man of the world. His letters are not entertaining and trenchant as Shaw's. But there is a repose in them and a suggestiveness which Shaw's lack. And he found in Florence Farr a nearer and dearer friend whom he had no desire to lecture but with whom he could enjoy the rare pleasure of shared affection and of being able to talk easily and without restraint, because, as he put it, he had found an equal.

The woman who could delight two such remarkable men must herself have been remarkable, and, slight as this volume is, it should preserve her memory.

H. I'A. FAUSSET

Maxim Gorky: An Anthology. (Kutub Publishers, Poona 2. Rs. 6/8, boards; Rs. 5/-, paper)

Maxim Gorky is one of the greatest of contemporary writers, a product of Soviet Russia. During the first years of the Revolution, he was the outstanding instance of a man of letters who wholeheartedly accepted the new order. He had close personal relationship with Lenin. His works, consisting of short stories and novels, have been translated into many languages. His theme is the common man—the peasant, the

innkeeper, the prostitute, the barber, the thief, the young widow, the baker, the factory-worker. He does not idealise them. He reveals them to us as they are, interesting in their weakness as well as in their strength, in their vices as well as in their virtues. He himself was one of them, as he had worked as domestic servant, gardener, hawker, dock-labourer and factory-hand, and knew also the life of a tramp. He is thus able to identify himself with those who have suffered from exploitation and lack of opportunity for self-de-

velopment. He gives vivid expression to their thoughts and feelings, hopes and fears, and lets us see a little of the attractiveness of their character, enshrouded though it may be at times by what is repulsive and ugly. What he hates most is tyranny and oppression of every kind—not only of the capitalist over the worker or the imperialist over colonial peoples, but also of the muscular bully over the weakling, or of man over woman.

The eight stories in this Anthology are reproductions from his published works. They are representative, and

will help the reader to get acquainted with this "Grandfather of Proletarian Writers." They reveal in a measure his remarkable knowledge of human beings, especially of such as have known suffering and social injustice.

In addition to these stories are published in this Anthology two letters he wrote to Romain Rolland, a lecture he delivered on Soviet Literature, and his views on Pushkin, a Russian poet whom he greatly admired even from childhood. This Anthology provides a happy selection.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

Swift and His Circle. By R. WYSE JACKSON, with a Foreword by Seumas O'Sullivan. (Talbot Press, Dublin. 5s.)

Dr. Wyse Jackson, whose *Jonathan Swift: Dean and Pastor* (1939) offered one of the most convincing solutions to certain problems which have baffled Swift's biographers, here gives a series of short character sketches of the Dean's Dublin friends. Swift, who described mankind as "the most pernicious race of little odious vermin that Nature ever suffered to crawl upon the surface of the earth"; who, at the end of his life, said that he had been shut up with his rage like a rat in a cage, and whose hatred of the world finally drove him mad, yet loved individual men and women with a surprising tenderness. He was the untiring champion of the liberties of his country and gave away a third of his income each year to the poor, writing pamphlets of a savage irony on the poverty of the Irish peasants. There was nothing personal in his anger; his heart was lacerated by the wrongs and the injustice he saw around him. "If

we would understand him aright," says Dr. Wyse Jackson, "we should do well to see him in his Irish circle, with those whose personality made contact with his."

In this little book, Dr. Jackson not only resurrects Swift's friends for us, but gives vivid sketches of eighteenth-century Dublin. He thinks that there is plenty of contemporary evidence to show that Swift married "Stella" in 1716 and points out that his marriage was accepted as a fact by all the early biographers. He also gives affectionate sketches of Mrs. Dingley, "Stella's" life-long companion, of his parish clerk, the poet, Thomas Parnell, and several other friends of his last years. Above all, he shows what Swift meant to Ireland and the chief value of the book is that it is written by an Irishman who knows the background. Though it is the work of a scholar who has devoted many years to patient research into the lesser-known doings of the Dean, it has the homeliness and vivid simplicity that is absent from many learned monographs on the subject.

PHILIP HENDERSON

Readings in English Literature from Chaucer to Matthew Arnold. Chosen and edited by GERALD BULLETT. (A. and C. Black, London. 7s. 6d.)

Gerald Bullett, who is well-known as a novelist and the editor of one of the most charming anthologies of lyrical poetry, *The English Galaxy of Shorter Poems*, has here made a selection of representative passages from the work of the great English writers from the medieval Chaucer to the Victorian Matthew Arnold, together with an editorial commentary designed for those at the beginning of their interest in English literature. The aim of the commentary is to help those without previous knowledge of the subject to see each author in the context of his time and to assist them towards a preliminary estimate of his quality. Each main period is prefaced by a short essay on the type of literature for which it had become famous. Thus explanatory introductions are given to the work of Chaucer, Mallory, Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton, Fielding, Wordsworth, Shelley and Keats, Tennyson, Browning and so on. The passages are chosen for "group reading" in literary circles.

"Literature," says Mr. Bullett, "is a way of sharing imaginative experience. It is a living and broadening stream of communication." Though it may be thought that the main concern of present-day readers should be with the literature of their own age, we cannot, as Mr. Bullett rightly says, hope to appreciate this justly until we know something of the literature of the past by which to measure it. An interesting instance of this approach is brought out by a comparison of Mallory's beautiful passage describing

the death of King Arthur, written in the fifteenth century, with Tennyson's *Morte d'Arthur*, where the plain vigour of Mallory's prose is transmuted into a gentle, silver eloquence in harmony with Victorian romanticism. Both passages are great literature, but in the difference between them may be seen four hundred years of literary development. Again, Shakespeare's development is shown by a scene from the early *Midsummer Night's Dream* contrasted with a scene from the later *Macbeth*, dark with the pessimism of the Jacobean age. It is an interesting reflection on the development of English literary culture as a whole to notice that Tennyson dominated his age in a way that Shakespeare never did. As Mr. Bullett remarks: "In a thousand Victorian households, for something like half a century, English poetry meant the poetry of Tennyson and no other." Tennyson wrote a great deal of inferior verse, and it was precisely this inferior work that was most popular in the Victorian era. But it was a dual process, for in pandering to popular taste Tennyson debased an exquisite talent, just as the Victorian painters often vitiated supreme technical accomplishments.

The extract from Fielding's *Joseph Andrews* is prefaced by a useful note on the development of the English novel, though the estimate of Fielding himself is inadequate. Eighteenth-century prose is further illustrated by Dr. Johnson's letter to Lord Chesterfield on patronage, extracts from Boswell's *Life of Dr. Johnson* and from Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*. Enough has been given to show the scope and aims of Mr. Bullett's book, which should be of great service in helping beginners appreciate the essential qualities of English literature.

PHILIP HENDERSON

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“ _____ ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS

The Indian Institute for Educational and Cultural Co-operation was inaugurated at Bombay on August 22nd. Its purpose, as outlined by its sponsor, Sir Rustom Masani, is to draw together Indians, men and women, of intellect and good-will; to facilitate their collaboration in enriching the cultural and intellectual life of India; and to prepare the Indian people to co-operate with other nations for the promotion of international good-will and world fellowship. All admirable aims, and the new Institute was launched on a high tide of interest and good wishes from prominent citizens, to which THE ARYAN PATH is happy to add its own.

The disturbances, politically motivated, which marred the gathering were symptomatic, as the President, Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, said, of a growing tendency to intolerance which led rather towards tyranny than towards the democracy which was our goal. The recognition of the essentially synthetic character of Indian culture, which he stressed, would be a long step towards unity. Indian culture, truly, as he declared,

could not rightly be comprehended or appreciated except as an amalgam, except as a tapestry, except as not a mechanical mixture but a chemical combination. Elements had come together and had joined to produce a new thing, and the work of the Institute would be to bring to the forefront the values of this cultural unity of India.

Sir Richard Gregory's Presidential

Address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science on "Civilization and the Pursuit of Knowledge" was remarkable for its breadth, including in its sweep Eastern as well as Western thought, the atom and the stars. It was particularly valuable for its insistence on religion and science as inseparable factors in human development (*Nature*, 27th July). Each is indeed "concerned with the pursuit of truth whether for its own sake or for increasing the contacts of human life with things and forces, visible and invisible, in the heavens and on the earth." As

an attitude of mind towards the mysterious, with instinct as its basis and intuitive feeling as the standard of value...religious experience can claim to be positive knowledge just as much as facts which appeal to the physical senses can be said to represent ultimate reality....

A far-reaching concession, truly, for a great scientist to make! But Sir Richard was even more specific in upholding the truth, which we have always maintained, that there is no antithesis between true religion and true science. He declared:—

The light of truth is a spectrum of many colours to which human consciousness is receptive in varying degrees. In the physical sense, light does not become manifest until it is reflected by matter, and in the sense of a divine influence its truth has to be perceived spiritually. It is through the study of the heavens and the earth from these two points of view of worship and inquiry that religion and astronomy meet in celestial fields.

The causes of objects and phenomena of the heavens could be differently interpreted.

Their creation and maintenance may be regarded as divine designs available for the service of mankind or as elements and forces in a universe of which earth is but a particle. The view that celestial objects are the sources or symbols of the vital force or forces appears at the very dawn of civilization as the foundation of the great religions of the world.

An important point often overlooked was stressed by Sir Bomanji Wadia, Vice-Chancellor of the Bombay University in his Convocation Address on August 21st. It was that the successful working of even the most academically sound constitution depends upon the people's public spirit and discrimination. Democracy had to be humanised and its foundations strengthened.

A democratic constitution by itself cannot usher in a golden age, and the gift of universal suffrage cannot likewise guarantee the success of democracy.

The needs of the people had, he emphasised, to be put before the needs of sections or of groups. The importance of the development of social consciousness was generally overlooked in our university education. But education in a democracy, he declared, was intimately related to the social problem.

What we want is the apprehension of the spiritual brotherhood of man and a resulting social philosophy that seeks to promote individual and collective well-being, irrespective of class or creed.

The Vice-Chancellor struck another timely note when he warned against a narrow-minded nationalism. We must be not only good Indians but also good citizens of the world.

Education has too long been the step-child in India's budget planning. We support Sir Bomanji's contention

that it should be the foremost charge upon the State's finances, "being the State's permanent need rather than a gift."

"Fundamentally the political problem is a problem of human character," declared Sir Richard Livingston, Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University, in an address on "Education and the Training of Character," which is published in *The Atlantic Monthly* for July.

Better institutions are greatly to be desired, but the efficiency of institutions, as of machines, depends on those who operate them. . . . The evils of the world do not come, except in a minor degree, from bad political machinery and will not be cured by improving it. . . . Man is the real problem.

Sir Richard holds, as indispensable, education in the habit of citizenship and the acceptance, as master, of the ideal of excellence, of the first-rate in every province of life and especially in character and conduct. The school or university, he says, which fails to show its students "models of human excellence" such as "religion and the subsidiary realms of literature, history, and the arts reveal. . . sends them into life ignorant of the knowledge which they need most, and neglects the chief duty of education."

To see the vision of excellence, so far as our limitations allow; to get at least a glimpse of the unchanging values of the eternal world as they are revealed in whatever is beautiful and good in the material world of earth; to attempt to make one's infinitesimal contribution towards a society which will embody them more fully than does our own. . . .

That is indeed a vision worthy of the educator's calling and of the consecrated effort of each educated man.

Mr. Louis Fischer makes some valuable comments on the need of East

and West for each other in reviewing Krishnalal Shridharani's *The Mahatma and the World* (*The Saturday Review of Literature*, 29th June). He writes under the challenging title "And Never the Twain?"

"India, as well as the rest of Asia, cannot content itself with being." Bodies in India have needs as well as bodies in the West. "Is it impossible," he asks, "to reconcile the yogi with the machine?"

The East needs more machines, he implies, but he is sure "the West needs more yogis," afraid as the Westerner is of being one. "The West has crucified yogis." But the need is there of recognising that the aim of life is not only doing but also being; that means count, as well as ends. "When the end hallows any means democracy dies."

Modern man's choice is between humanitarianism and totalitarianism, between the free individual and state and private monopolies, between thought and force, between Gandhi who dares to be wrong and to fail and the infallible dictator who must always win.

Deutsche Blätter, a German cultural bi-monthly of high tone, brings encouraging news in its May-June issue of educational developments in the new Germany. *Die Sammlung* is a new pedagogical magazine published at Göttingen in the British Zone, edited by Hermann Nohl with the help of a large group of scholars who have remained faithful to liberal ideas. His moving introduction to the new journal is quoted and may be in part translated thus:—

Our compass is simple morality, an unshakable faith in the eternity of the spiritual world, love of one's neighbour and the living hope that for us too some day the sun of honour and of happiness will again shine...

Prominent among *Die Sammlung's* aims is "to gather together all men of good-will who have faith in the non-violent power of the spirit."

The rise in Germany of individuals and groups inspired by such ideals and aims is a most hopeful portent. But are the winning Allied Powers prepared to match idealism in the former foe with their own magnanimity?

The report that the "confiscation and destruction of Nazi literature" is planned by the Allies in Germany aroused *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, U.S.A.) to vigorous editorial protest. It indeed "follows too closely the pattern of Hitler's infamous burning." That "on every side today the world's victors are being tempted to do the very things they fought to keep out of their lives" spells not victory but moral defeat. The "Burning of the Books," Allied style, can hardly be a more edifying spectacle than was its Nazi prototype.

It is too easy to pick up the weapons of hatred, vengeance, censorship, repression—and much too easy to argue that they are being used in a good cause.... Those who profess the way of freedom are required to show their faith by their works. They must have confidence enough in truth to let it prove itself against error.

If a cause is so weak its only chance of success is to suppress expression of opposing views, it does not deserve to stand. Persecution is a boomerang. As the *Monitor* points out, the confiscation of *Mein Kampf* can at best succeed but partially and will enhance its vogue. And the Germans will not fail to note the endorsement of Nazi methods which imitation implies. With the *Monitor*,

we trust that the democracies will put their real effort into displacing negative Nazi notions with the positive concepts of freedom, justice, tolerance, and mercy.