

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly,
and lost among the host — as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XXVII

OCTOBER 1956

No. 10

"THUS HAVE I HEARD"—

Gandhiji will be specially remembered and spoken of on the 2nd of this month, that being his Natal Day. The roots of his life and the tree of his being bear the name—Simplicity. How many among us are endeavouring sincerely to live a simple life of self-discipline? In this age sensual pleasures and their continuous enjoyment are the be-all and end-all of life; it looks upon the artificial stimulation and multiplication of wants as the sign of progress; its highest worship is of Mammon. History shows that living the simple life in accordance with Truth and Love has been difficult in any cycle; it is more difficult today. It entails penance and suffering. In the Gandhian philosophy the ideal man is he who has definite moral and social principles of asceticism.

What kind of asceticism did Gandhiji practise and advocate? He was not a *hatha-yogi*. He saw "no inherent merit in the mortification of the flesh."

Mortification of the flesh is a necessity when the flesh rebels against

one; it is a sin when the flesh has come under subjection and can be used as an instrument of service.

He did not believe in running away from the din and disturbances of life. His asceticism consisted in the regulation of desires for the purposes of the soul, in disciplining the body and the mind in the light of reason and intuition. His principle of simplicity made him avoid the two extremes—indulging the senses and forcefully suppressing them.

Objection has often been taken to Gandhiji's love and praise of poverty and suffering. But the fact that these are to be voluntary endows them with deep soul-significance. No one has fought more valiantly than Gandhiji against the enforced poverty and misery of the Indian masses. What he pleaded for was the *deliberate* and *voluntary* restriction of wants; this promotes inner contentment and happiness in one's environment and increases the capacity for service. His aim was to identify himself with the poorest and the

lowliest and thus to realize the feeling of Brotherhood.

Non-possession is allied to non-stealing. A thing not originally stolen must nevertheless be classified stolen property, if one possesses it without needing it. Possession implies provision for the future. A seeker after Truth, a follower of a Law of Love cannot hold anything against tomorrow.... If each retained possession only of what he needed, no one would be in want, and all would live in contentment.... "Take no thought for the morrow" is an injunction which finds an echo in almost all the religious scriptures of the world.

Gandhiji held non-possession to be applicable not only to things but also to thoughts. He who harbours impure and selfish thoughts, and craves power or possession, violates simplicity. "A man is the product of his thoughts; what he thinks, he becomes." Throwing away possessions without the eradication of desires is not the way; lust of every type is the womb of evil.

The conquest of lust is the highest endeavour of a man or woman's existence. Without overcoming lust man cannot hope to rule over self. And without rule over self there can be no *Swaraj* or *Ram Raj*.... No worker who has not overcome lust can hope to render any genuine service to the cause of Harijans, communal unity, Khadi, cow-protection or village reconstruction.... *Brahmacharya* must be observed in thought, word and deed.... Its root meaning may be given thus: that con-

duct which puts one in touch with God.

Gandhiji's conception of real living can be summed up in this single phrase: "That conduct which puts one in touch with God." He wrote in his *Autobiography*:—

What I want to achieve—what I have been striving and pining to achieve these thirty years—is self-realization, to see God face to face, to attain *Moksha*. I live and move and have my being in pursuit of this goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field, are directed to this same end.

He translated this devotion to God, to the Ishwara-Allah seated in the hearts of all, and zeal for union with Him into love and active service of his fellow men. Service of the suppressed classes is the very essence of the simple life according to Gandhiji. He describes his gospel of selfless action thus:—

It is wrong to call me an ascetic. The ideals that regulate my life are presented for acceptance by mankind in general. I have arrived at them by gradual evolution. Every step was thought out, well-considered, and taken with the greatest deliberation. Both my continence and non-violence were derived from personal experience and became necessary in response to the calls of public duty.... I have not the shadow of a doubt that any man or woman can achieve what I have, if he or she would make the same effort and cultivate the same hope and faith.

SHRAVAKA

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND HAPPINESS

The only statement that has to be examined is, whether it can be laid down as a law of universal application that material advancement means moral progress.—GANDHIJI

The Government of India has made industrial enterprise its first concern. Large-scale industries are receiving primary attention. The motive is noble: the democratic Welfare State is being built for the masses; whatever is undertaken is for the betterment of the citizen. But in what does betterment consist? It seems to be taken for granted that industrialization spells prosperity. But what is prosperity? These two questions should receive primary attention and pertinent answers. What is the philosophy underlying industrialization?

In trying to make of India an economically "forward" nation like the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R., is the Government of India guarding against some of the giant ills which industrialization has created in the U.K., the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and elsewhere? India may achieve complete success and become financially as rich a nation as any other, but should she try to do so at the price of mental confusion and moral degradation?

In spite of sanitation and hygiene the U.S.A. is not enjoying real physical health; in spite of splendid progress in education she is suffering alarmingly from mental ailments, venereal diseases, juvenile delinquency and the like; in spite of

great luxury there is wide-spread moral obtuseness. The U.S.A. is conquering the whole world, but to some she seems to be losing her own soul. The people of the North American continent, however, are a young and growing race; so they can and will conquer their weaknesses and vices very quickly. Moreover, G. D. H. Cole showed insight when he wrote: "We shall need leaders who are masters of themselves, as Gandhi is, but masters after the Western fashion, which is not his, or India's." Young and vigorous North America is likely to beget such true leaders.

But Gandhiji is for India—his philosophy and technique will prove most suitable for us. Is industrialization as planned suited to India? Is it according to the Gandhian teachings? Will India's best interest be served by running in the race of industrial planning? What steps are being taken to infuse into the people the power of right morality when grafting industrialization on an aged civilization in which millions of fatigued and famished villagers are toiling on an impoverished and exhausted soil?

These thoughts come to us as we read a report of the Study Conference on the Human Problems of Industrial Communities, inspired

and presided over by the Duke of Edinburgh. The Conference was held at Oxford for three weeks in July, when some 280 citizens from all parts of the British Commonwealth gathered to study a few problems at first hand, to listen to lectures, to ask questions and get answers. These were employers and technicians, workers and trade unionists, and others engaged in different activities; they represented a cross section of tomorrow's industrial leadership in the Commonwealth. We quote from the Report of the Conference prepared for THE ARYAN PATH by our good friend, Mr. J. C. Hunt:—

It is rare to find modern society question the axiom that industrialization is necessarily a good and therefore should be encouraged. The solution to many of the most glaring discontents of our time is supposed to lie through the advance of technology. Even the ideological struggle between Communism and Capitalism, and the problem of race relations are often reduced to these terms. Upholders of one side or the other claim that their methods are the most suitable for bringing about the greatest possible enjoyment of the fruits of technology and industry. Blemishes in a given society are put down either to an unfortunate legacy of the past, when men were less wise and more selfish, or to the unavoidable consequences of the attempt to hasten the process of industrialization.

How refreshing it is therefore to find the Duke of Edinburgh saying "I see no advantage in a prosperous, powerful State if it is to be achieved at the expense

of human freedom and happiness." The Duke made the point at the opening of his Study Conference on the Human Problems of Industrial Communities within the Commonwealth. He made it clear that during his travels he had seen sufficient through the façade of splendour specially prepared for such occasions to impel him to use his unique authority to convene such a conference as this devoid of political overtones.

The Conference was not conclusive, nor was it meant to be. It dealt generally with industrial relations, the atmosphere in factories, the happiness of ordinary people and how to help them lead fuller lives. Much has been written on these matters, but the attempt is seldom made to deal with them on a personal level.

The Duke established two premises for the examination of these matters. First, he stressed that industry was not an end in itself, adding "It may not be very easy to decide what we are aiming at in this modern world of ours, but whatever the target we must take into account that all people are primarily citizens and not just workers with a bit of private life." Secondly, he argued that environment was by no means the determining factor in the happiness of workers. Delegates to the Conference learnt this for themselves when, apparently to their surprise, they found the London sewermen to be amongst the most contented workers that they met.

The spiritual and moral needs of modern society were thus the guiding principle of the Conference. Twenty-five background papers developed this theme in specific terms. A paper on the Rhodesian copperbelt discussed the

consequences of the break-up of tribal structure; another considered the priority required, where resources are limited, as in India or West Africa, for the training of an industrial *élite* at the expense of general education; three papers dealt with model communities, such as the Tata steel town of Jamshedpur, and showed how they tended to become isolated; and several papers showed how little had been achieved in the way of adapting religious ideas and popular morality to the results of advanced technology. These are on the whole negative points; they concern the lack of roots in modern society and the way traditional roots snap in primitive communities which are now learning new methods of producing things. Nevertheless, it is good we have achieved so much as this. The Conference, it may be hoped, will contribute to a more mature approach to a key problem of our time. This effect will be of value no matter whether the methods adopted are expressed in religious, political, industrial, institutional, managerial or personal terms.

The Conference is a sign of the times. But a further step needs to be taken. G. D. H. Cole, whom we have quoted above, wrote in 1938 about the ideas and teachings of Gandhiji's *Hind Swaraj*:—

Gandhiji's case against the West looks, then, infinitely stronger than it looked, to us Westerners, thirty years ago. For it does seem as if all our material advances in machine mastery were unloosing upon us, not the plenty for which we hoped, but an overmastering capacity for destruction. Nor is it merely that we have grown more effi-

cient in dealing out death and mutilation. We have also grown more cruel—or some of us have; and those of us who are untouched by the recrudescence of cruelty know not how to prevent its spread without dire risk of falling ourselves under its spell.

And our esteemed friend Hugh I' A. Fausset, commenting upon the same book in 1938, said:—

This in fact is a profoundly revolutionary little book and the fact that it is addressed to Indians and concerned with their specific problems does not make it less relevant to Englishmen, though it may be harder for them to accept it. *For the whole purpose of the book is to save India, not from Englishmen, but from the modern civilization which is eating into the vitals of the West.*

Gandhiji's message has value for the entire Occident. Should not our leaders in India at least take heed from such a warning?

If the Duke of Edinburgh were to use his royal influence to convene another conference of Commonwealth thinkers to consider the applicability of the principles of Gandhiji to modern industrial conditions great benefit would accrue to every country in the world.

India is copying the West; the Gandhian philosophy on a machine-made civilization remains to be adequately examined, not only elsewhere, but in the land which proclaims Gandhiji "the Father of the Nation." Will India take the lead?

After the above was in type came to hand the following interesting piece of news. The New York Correspondent of the *Hindu* sent the following message on the 30th of August. To us it looks like a strange coincidence! Are the first fruits of industrialization in India to be psychosomatic patients? "Anxiety Neuroses" are already reported. Is there no message in this for industrial plan-makers and social welfare organizations?

Anxieties similar to those which have caused the high incidence of psychosomatic illnesses among Americans may soon be a penalty which Indians may have to pay for industrialization, according to Dr. Ottati, a research scientist of Lederle Laboratories. He

You cannot serve God and Mammon is an economic truth of the highest value. We have to make our choice. Western nations are today groaning under the heels of the monster God of materialism. Their moral growth has become stunted. They measure their progress in £. sh. d. American wealth has become the standard. She is the envy of the other nations. I have heard many of our countrymen say that we will gain American wealth but avoid its methods. I venture to suggest that such an attempt if it were made is foredoomed to failure. We cannot be wise, temperate and furious in a moment. I would have our leaders to teach us to be morally supreme in the world. This land of ours was once, we are told, the abode of the gods. It is not possible to conceive gods inhabiting a land which is made hideous by the smoke and the din of mill chimneys and whose roadways are traversed by screeching and puffing engines dragging numerous cars loaded with men mostly who know not what they are after, who are often absent-minded and whose tempers do

said research reports from India indicated that "anxiety neuroses" were developing among urban populations and this trend might intensify as the country advanced towards full industrialisation. "Competition between individuals will tend to rise leading to sharpening of anxieties in susceptible individuals or in those classes bearing the brunt of the change," declared Dr. Ottati.

In the opinion of the scientists the cause for this increase in anxiety neuroses might lie in the difficulty experienced in adjusting traditional living patterns to the radically new framework of developing an industrial society. "This is a particularly difficult adjustment for Indians who were brought up to live at a much slower pace," he said.

not improve by being uncomfortably packed like sardines in boxes and finding themselves in the midst of utter strangers who would oust them if they could and whom they would in their turn treat similarly....

We need not be afraid of ideals or of reducing them to practice even to the uttermost. Ours will only then be a truly spiritual mission when we shall show more truth than gold, greater fearlessness than pomp of power and wealth, greater charity than love for self. If we will but clean our houses, our palaces and temples of the attributes of wealth and show in them the attributes of morality one can offer battle to any combination of hostile forces without having to carry the burden of a heavy militia. Let us seek first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness and the irrevocable promise is that everything will be added unto us. These are real economics. May you and I treasure them and enforce them in our daily life.

—GANDHIJI (1916)

CHRISTIANITY AND CONTEMPORARY EXPERIENCE

[The Rev. E. G. Lee is the author of *Christianity in Chains* and other books including two novels. He is a Unitarian and his article is written with impartiality and insight. The need of the hour, "a new universalism," can be supplied if church leaders accept the principle of the Universal Brotherhood of Humanity and begin to study the source of all creedal and institutional religions in the light of the latent and developing powers of the human soul. Much information and inspiration is available for every sincere seeker in the writings of H. P. Blavatsky and W. Q. Judge.—ED.]

A revolution of an inward kind is almost imperceptibly taking place within the Christian religion. The ancient conflict between churches and sects, very real and bitter up to the beginning of this century, is tending to disappear. This is not a mere social change, or one that arises out of religious indifference; it is one that springs from a real need for a new adjustment to the nature of religion. Between the churches there is a great debate taking place about the nature of God. And the debate is not of the old proselytizing type; it is a genuine effort to share thought. Perhaps the most remarkable demonstration of this is on the Roman Catholic side. A large number of books are coming from Catholic writers upon the theme of the possible unity between all churches. None of the writers, of course, assume that "truth" has departed from the Roman Church, but there is a genuine change of approach. It is assumed that the different sects and churches should each maintain their own cultural practices and traditions and only by implication find their way back to

the presumed unity of the Roman Catholic Church. This from the Catholic side.

In Christendom generally most people—as is apparent from the general religious climate—accept the divisions between the churches without a proselytizing need to change or convert. There are probably exceptions to this generalization but on the whole it is true. Toleration, as between the different branches of the Christian Church, has become eminently respectable. The respectability, there can hardly be any doubt, hides a real debate about the ultimate nature of God. There is an unconscious admission that there is a universal God above Christian divisions.

There is a profound change, too, in the relationship between Christianity, from the Christian side, and the other great world religions. The conflict of the past has subtly changed, if it has not disappeared. There is an intermixture of thought and experience between East and West as never before. The beginning of the year marking the 2,500th

Anniversary of the passing of the Buddha was recognized in Britain by a number of explanatory talks over the B.B.C. on Buddhism. An interest is being taken in world religions, particularly by young people, as never before; there is in existence a climate of opinion that recognizes that there is a truth—and in terms of religious experience, a realization of the nature of God—not totally expressed by any of the separated religions.

This is bound to have an effect upon Christian doctrine, for although Christianity is an historical religion—that is to say, traditional Christians believe that the main events of the Christian story woven into Christian doctrine did actually take place on the plane of history—nevertheless, the historical events partly depend for their validity upon the nature of God. It belonged, for instance, to the nature of God that Jesus Christ should appear in history as the revelation of God. So Christians do not merely argue from history for the events recorded in their religion; they argue from God's nature also. Belief and history are inextricably mixed; and any change in belief about God is likely to have an important effect upon what is believed about history.

The present contemporary debate about the nature of God is proceeding not so much from doctrine to God as from God's nature to doctrine. What is the nature of God? The answer to that question will, it is supposed, settle the nature of

doctrine. That this position is tacitly taken up by all the participants in the debate is a revolution of some consequence.

This question can influence Christian doctrine in the following manner: The doctrine of the Crucifixion of Jesus may be taken as an example. As generally believed the historic events of this central Christian fact took place in the following way: Jesus Christ was betrayed by a disciple called Judas. He was arrested in a garden surrounded by his disciples, who offered no resistance. He was tried before the High Priest and eventually sentenced to death by Pontius Pilate. The only disciple to show any faithfulness to Jesus was Peter, and he denied his Master in the end.

Now supposing the Crucifixion followed from the nature of God, which is supposed in one way or another by all the doctrine about it, not one detail of the above story could be anything other than it was. There is not the slightest room for historic doubt, a doubt which belongs to all historical investigation. What happened had to happen in that way and no other. The arrest of Jesus could not have taken place through chance, accident or the hap of human affairs. It was designed by God. The High Priest and Pilate were forced to act in the manner ascribed to them in the drama. At the end Peter was forced to deny his Lord, for only in that manner could the ultimate loneliness of Jesus be emphasized. In construc-

tion and meaning not one point of the story can be altered, historically, without destroying its meaning. It had to be what it was.

But the question must be asked: Did it all happen historically in that way? Were there no possible alternatives open to the actors in the drama? And the answer to that latter question will partly depend upon what one believes about the nature of God. It is reasonable to affirm that alternatives in action are always placed before human beings; and these alternatives could not have been refused to the actors in the great drama of the Christian religion. The nature of God himself throws doubt upon the validity of the Christian doctrine, if the doctrine affirms that what was, had to

be. Historic doubt can be reinforced by a new knowledge of God's nature, and in Christianity that new knowledge is assumed if argument proceeds from that nature, lifted above all divisions, to doctrine itself.

God's nature itself, if known, can judge the doctrine of the Crucifixion; and if historic doubt is allowed as well, then the doctrine may very well be regarded as religious myth—myth, of course, of the kind that gives access to truth in its own manner.

This is a trend in contemporary Christianity. And if it is a trend elsewhere in other religions may not a new universalism be dawning?

E. G. LEE

FORBEARANCE

O ye, who under many skies
 Honour the Buddha 'neath His tree,
 Do not forget that Other who
 Died on His cross to set us free.

And ye who, with the Holy Book,
 Devoutly tread the Christian way,
 Spurn not the Buddhist with his wheel,
 Treading the Path from day to day.

HESPER LE GALIENNE HUTCHINSON

INDIAN INFLUENCE UPON ENGLISH LITERATURE

[We publish here the second and concluding portion of this interesting study by **Shri A. Venkappa Sastri** of the contribution of India, direct and indirect, to English literature.—ED.]

II.—THE RETURN MOVEMENT

IV. And now we come to a phase of real influence, and that has to be traced far back from modern India. It is associated in the first instance with a noble band of Englishmen who under administrative necessity betook themselves to the learning of Sanskrit and who, once having begun, made discovery upon startling discovery of the wealth of this language in almost all branches of knowledge—a process that is still not over.

The *Sanskrit* language, whatever be its antiquity, is of wonderful structure; more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either.
—SIR WILLIAM JONES¹⁵

If I were asked what I considered the most important discovery of the nineteenth century with respect to the ancient history of mankind, I should answer by the following short line: Sanskrit Dyaus Pitar=Greek Zeus Pater=Latin Juppiter=Old Norse Tyr.—MAX MULLER¹⁶

These testimonies should give an idea of the shock of surprise and delight with which the discovery of the language and literature of

Sanskrit and their bearings broke upon the world of scholars and poets in the West.

The *Bhagavad-Gita*, which has had a decisive influence on many English writers, as shown, was first rendered into English by Sir Charles Wilkins (1786). Sir William Jones among his other writings translated Kalidasa's *Sakuntala* (1789). Goethe's praise of *Sakuntala* is too well known to need reproduction here. Some lines in Keats's *Endymion* are tentatively attributed by Lascelles Abercrombie to the inspiration of this work:—

Inspired realization is perhaps the commonest, as it is also perhaps the most useful, of the workings of genius in poetry. There is a fine example in the beautiful Indian drama *Sakuntala*: the chariot of the god Indra driving through heaven passes over a cloud, and at once the wetted rims of the wheels begin to spin moisture off in sparkling showers. Of course. That is exactly what would happen. Keats has the very same thing in *Endymion*, but he may have looked into Sir William Jones' version of Kalidasa:

... a silver car, air-borne,

¹⁵ *Modern India and the West*, p. 546.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 548.

Whose silent wheels, fresh wet from clouds
of morn,
Spun off a drizzling dew. . . .¹⁷

It is no part of this article to detail the research of the Orientalists. The lifelong labours of Indologists like Henry Thomas Colebrooke (1765-1837), Horace Hayman Wilson (1786-1860), Sir Monier Monier-Williams (1819-99), Max Müller (1823-1900), E. B. Cowell (1826-1903), "the first holder of the professorship of Sanskrit at Cambridge, from whom Edward FitzGerald learned the language of Omar,"¹⁸ A. A. Macdonell (1854-1920), F. W. Thomas and Professor T. Burrow of Oxford University, to name but a few in the field, have established a permanent interest in Indian studies and set up a current of influence which is bound to grow with time.

It is in this connection that we should refer to the impressions Indians themselves began to make upon the English. Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1774-1833) is the very first of them. During his stay in England from 1831-1833 he came into contact with English intellectuals¹⁹ and impressed every one of them with his calibre, learning and catholic spirit, which entitle him to be regarded by common consent today

as the founder of the study of Comparative Religion and as an exemplar of Eastern wisdom and Western modernism. Keshab Chunder Sen, who followed in 1870, impressed the English public no less favourably, adding an emotional accent to the New Dispensation.

Martineau observed that he showed Christian England that the essence of Christianity lay, not in the doctrinal and historical machinery of the churches but in the spirituality of which that machinery was merely a vehicle.²⁰

The next great assault was delivered by Swami Vivekananda, the eloquent apostle of militant Hinduism. His work has materialized in the establishment of Vedanta centres in America and England which conduct classes, publish books and journals and propagate the faith through the example of clean, selfless votaries of the mission.

The Theosophical Society founded in 1875 by Madame Blavatsky, Colonel Olcott and W. Q. Judge needs to be mentioned in this place as one of the prime agencies for expounding and extending the truths of Indian religions, particularly as a result of the addresses and writings of Dr. Annie Besant, who worked for the regeneration of India in other spheres as well.²¹ Nor should we

¹⁷ Quoted in an article on "Kalidasa's Similes," *Triveni*, June 1944.

¹⁸ *The Concise Cambridge History of English Literature*, p. 690.

¹⁹ *Vide* "Ram Mohan Roy and English Intellectuals" in *The Modern Review*, August 1937.

²⁰ *Modern India and the West*, p. 805.

²¹ "Theosophy with its comprehensive combinations of old and new beliefs and its appeal to ancient spiritual and psychic systems, has everywhere exercised an influence far beyond the circle of its professed adherents. Opposed for a long time with obloquy and ridicule,

fail to mention Ananda Coomaraswamy, whose gifts of scholarship and competent exposition of Indian art, culture and religion promoted India's standing in England and America.

Then, in a class by himself, is Gandhiji, whose impact upon the world was the impact of India, for no one could claim to represent his country or countrymen so completely as he during his life. Engaged in a direct tussle with England, he spoke his word—political and protestant *in accent* but basically human and ruthlessly moral *in appeal*—directly to every Englishman and to English society as a whole, including its statesmen, thinkers and writers. He has changed the outlook of thousands. Out of the avalanche of literature on Gandhiji attesting his influence just three books may be named referring to the *man*, the *cause* and the *word*: *Mahatma Gandhi, Essays and Reflections on His Life and Work*,²² as representative of the world's homage to this great soul; the "Gandhi Memorial Peace Number," *Visva-Bharati Quarterly* (October 2nd, 1949), as representative of the cause with which Gandhiji's name will be ever associated; and three, *Reflections on Gandhiji's "Hind Swaraj"* by Western Thinkers,²³ as represen-

tative of the reaction of front-rank thinkers, scientists, philosophers, mystics and others to the booklet Gandhiji wrote in 1908. For this credit must be given to THE ARYAN PATH.

In the same succession occur Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan. Pandit Nehru, the least enigmatic of modern Indian leaders to the West because of his upbringing and rational temper, has worked his way to the hearts of thousands of men and women in England through his *Autobiography*, which is as much a revelation of contemporary India as of the man himself. The most wide-spread intellectual influence of our time, however, is that of Dr. Radhakrishnan, who has interpreted historic and renascent India to the world, the English-speaking world in particular, in terms intelligible to them. C. E. M. Joad has written a whole book on Dr. Radhakrishnan's philosophy, entitled *Counter Attack from the East*.²⁴ In the introduction to *Radhakrishnan, Comparative Studies in Philosophy Presented in Honour of his Sixtieth Birthday (1951)*, the editors say:—

The West has begun to realise that there are spiritual depths in the Orient which it has not yet plumbed, and that

it has done much to spread the belief in Karma, reincarnation, other planes of existence, the evolution of the embodied soul through intellect and psyche to spirit, ideas which once accepted must change the whole attitude towards life."—SRI AUROBINDO: *The Foundations of Indian Culture* (New York, 1953), p. 20.

²² Edited by S. RADHAKRISHNAN. Second enlarged edition, 1949.

²³ Theosophy Company (India), Limited, Bombay, 1948.

²⁴ George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1933.

if these were understood a way could be found to overcome its frantic competitiveness and achieve the inner and outer peace it has hitherto lacked. . . . What is needed, it is now more and more clearly perceived, is a wider and profounder pooling of human resources That this situation has appeared, and has become as hopeful as it is, is largely due to Radhakrishnan's genius, understanding, energy and undiscouraged endeavour.

Then, in this direction, in the realm of thought there are the works of Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, *The Human Cycle*, *The Ideal of Human Unity*, *Essays on the Gita* and *The Synthesis of Yoga*, which are gaining a wider and wider public in America and England. They embody a whole *Weltanschauung*, are masterpieces of integral exposition and systematically deal with contemporary problems and point the way to a new order of existence.

V. We come now to a review of the output of Anglo-Indian poetry heralded by Sir William Jones, whose role as an Indologist has already been glanced at. He is the author also of hymns to the various Hindu deities, among them the inspired "Hymn to Narayana" describing

the remote, primeval deity, the Saturn of the Hindu Pantheon. . . . in a passage which recalls Aristotle's "thinking

upon thought" and might also have suggested the opening lines of Keats's "Hyperion."²⁵

Wrapt in eternal solitary shade
Th' impenetrable gloom of night intense,
Impervious, inaccessible, immense,
Ere spirits were infused or forms display'd,
Brahm his own mind survey'd.

Professor Hewitt points to the "Hymn to Narayana" as inspiring Shelley's "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty."²⁶ Writing in general about the influence of Sir William Jones on English poets, Marie E. de Meester says in her *Oriental Influences in the English Literature of the Nineteenth Century*:—

His translations were read by most literary men of the nineteenth century, and their influence is visible in the most famous poets of that period. Southey and Moore often quote Jones's work in their copious notes; that Shelley and Tennyson borrowed from him in their *Queen Mab* and *Locksley Hall* has lately been proved by Prof. E. Koepfel. Byron also seems to have read some at least of his works; and besides this direct influence that he had on various English poets, there is the indirect one of having generally drawn the attention to Oriental literature.²⁷

John Leyden, that "lamp too early quenched," Reginald Herber, Bishop of Calcutta, Sir Alfred Lyall with his meagre but finished output, lending classic utterance to the recurrent nostalgic mood of the Anglo-Indian in his "Land of

²⁵ "Anglo-Indian Verse" by SIR HENRY SHARP, in *Essays by Divers Hands* (Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, London), Vol. XVI, p. 100.

²⁶ *Asiatic Jones*. By A. J. ARBERRY. p. 36.

²⁷ Quoted by A. J. ARBERRY, *loc. cit.*

Regrets" and catching up a high religious tone in "Siva," and many another Anglo-Indian poet must be passed by.

Sir Edwin Arnold marked an era in Anglo-Indian poetry by the publication in 1879 of *The Light of Asia*. For the first time an insight was given into the religious soul of India in captivating strains throughout lofty in tone and genuine in inspiration. Oliver Wendell Holmes expresses the following opinion about the general merits of the poem:—

It is a work of great beauty. It tells a story of intense interest, which never flags for a moment; its descriptions are drawn by the hand of a master with the eye of a poet and the familiarity of an expert with the objects described; its tone is so lofty that there is nothing with which to compare it but the New Testament....²⁸

Henry Louis Vivian Derozio (1809-1831) and Toru Dutt (1856-1877) both died young before their genius could flower into perfection. Their deaths inspire in one the same feeling of wistful affection and admiration as the early deaths of Keats and Shelley, the great "inheritors of unfulfilled renown" in English song. The Anglo-Indian muse represented today by a medley of poets—among them Mr. R. L. Bartholomew, Mr. Leo Fredericks, Mr. M. C. Gabriel, Mr. John Bayliss, etc.—has caught the modernist note

of disenchantment, realistic observation and stylistic novelty.

In Indian influence upon English poetry, if the initial notes were struck by Kipling and Edwin Arnold, the authentic impact is marked by the advent of Rabindranath Tagore on the scene with the award of the Nobel Prize for *Gitanjali* in 1913. Manmohan Ghose (1867-1924) had affected a circle in England including Laurence Binyon, Stephen Phillips and others, having been introduced to the literary world by Oscar Wilde. Romesh Chunder Dutt had familiarized the English public with the substance of the Indian epics through his facile versions of the *Mahabharata* (1898) and the *Ramayana* (1900). But the hour and the man chimed with Tagore. After the great Continental influences upon English literature—of Italy during the Renaissance, of France after the Restoration and of Germany in the nineteenth century—an influence nearer home, the Celtic, had come to prevail.

George Russell and W. B. Yeats linked up the natural mysticism of the Celt with Theosophy, besides contributing to the [Celtic] movement poems of rare beauty.²⁹

When Ezra Pound went to Yeats's room he "found him much excited over the advent of a great poet, someone 'greater than any of us,'" and that was Rabindranath Tagore. In the same article, which originally

²⁸ Quoted in "A Survey of Anglo-Indian Poetry" by LEO C. ROBERTSON, in *The Modern Review*, June 1930.

²⁹ *The Eighteen Nineties*. By HOLBROOK JACKSON (Pelican Books). p. 134.

appeared in *The Fortnightly Review* of March 1913, Ezra Pound further writes:—

To find fitting comparison for the content of the volume before us I am compelled to one sole book of my acquaintance, the *Paradiso* of Dante.³⁰

Evelyn Underhill says in her review of the first edition of *Gitanjali* which originally appeared in *The Nation* (London) of November 16th, 1912:—

Only the classics of mystical literature provide a standard by which this handful of "Song Offerings" can be appraised or understood. Many a phrase is here which might have been written by the Christian contemplatives, by St. Augustine or by Eckhart, by Mechthild of Magdeburg, or Juliana of Norwich and nothing perhaps which these contemplatives would have failed to understand.³¹

Yeats's own reactions are well known through his Introduction to the *Gitanjali*. His own poetry discloses his native Celtic susceptibility to myth and fantasy, his eye for the occult, which drew him to Theosophy, and his bent for mysticism, which inclined him to Tagore and, later on, to the Upanishads, in the translation of which he collaborated with Shri Bhagawan Purohit. Some early lyrical poems Yeats wrote,

"Anashuya and Vijaya," "The Indian upon God," "The Indian to His Love," "Mohini Chatterjee," etc., bear out the presence of an Indian element in his work, just a surface element, it would seem, to judge from the actual compositions, yet there.* The influence of Indian philosophy cut deeper still in Æ., who regarded India as "his spiritual Fatherland." Out of his selected poems one could name "Oversoul," "Indian," "Krishna," "Incarnation" and "Karma," which are disguisedly Indian in inspiration. The gravitation of both Yeats and Æ. to Theosophy must be taken as a gravitation to Indian idealism.

After Tagore, space permits only a passing reference to Sarojini Naidu and Harindranath Chattopadhyaya. Three of Sarojini Naidu's poems, "To a Buddha Seated on a Lotus," "The Soul's Prayer," and "In Salutation to the Eternal Peace," have been included in *The Oxford Book of English Mystical Verse* (1916), which is in itself an endorsement of merit. Her songs of the seasons, life, love and death now collected in one volume, *The Sceptred Flute*,³² with their birdlike quaver of melody, will long retain their charm to the English reader, recreating as they do scenes at the

³⁰ Reproduced in the "Tagore Birthday Number," *The Visva-Bharati Quarterly*, October 1941, p. 297.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 306.

* Readers may be interested in the different view offered in "The Impact of Theosophy on the Poetry of W. B. Yeats," by K. BHASKARA RAO, in *THE ARYAN PATH*, December 1955, p. 545.—ED.

³² *Hind Kitabs*. 1946.

temple, the mosque, streets in the city, processions amid the sound of bells, and music and dance, all laden with the scent of *champak* and *ashoka* blossoms, "with the odorous breath of *henna*, *sarisha* and *neem*." Harindranath's poetry with its splendid dawn in *The Feast of Youth* has somehow missed its noon-day radiance, and but for the sparkle of single lines or stray stanzas in his later collections, *The Magic Tree*, *Perfume of Earth*, *Ancient Wings*, *Grey Clouds* and *White Showers*, etc., the bright promise awaits fulfilment.

The younger Indo-Anglian poets of today, like their Anglo-Indian contemporaries, are trying to catch up with the time-spirit by assimilating current idiom and new techniques, but nothing very original or unmistakably Indian has come from them. It is no longer doubted that Indians who choose to write in English can do so with felicitous effect. The test is not whether Indian writing is indistinguishable from the writing of an Englishman but whether it carries any imprimatur of its own—correct in usage but individual in evolution and inevitable in rhythm. Whatever the mastery of English attained by the Indian, it is not by form, stylistic innovation or any mere technical audacity, that we can hope to impress or influence the English reader or leave an enduring mark on English literature, but

only by the triumph of Spirit, the infusion of an Indian ethos, the expression of something characteristically Indian. Perhaps it will be in some rich regional language that some great and enduring work will come to be written, and it may be through translation that it will affect the English reader as did Tagore's *Gitanjali*.

After Tagore, the great voice in poetry is Sri Aurobindo's. Besides two volumes of *Collected Poems and Plays* (1942), we have the prodigious epic *Savitri*.³³ Sri Aurobindo's chosen medium has been English, and he has offered in bulk and quality something that is at once new and age-old, something that is Indian to the core, yet transcendent in Spirit, drawing its inspiration from regions not accessible to the poet who is not at the same time a Seer, as in the Vedic and Upanishadic conception, which happily marries poetry and philosophy, Truth and Beauty at their highest. The reader may be referred to the striking review of *Savitri* by Sri Krishna Prem appearing in THE ARYAN PATH, December 1948, which concludes with the words:—

Such poetry can only be written either in the early days before the rise to power of self-conscious mind or when that particular cycle has run its course and life establishes itself once more in the unity beyond, this time with all the added range and power that has been gained during the reign

³³ Sri Aurobindo International University Centre Collection Series. 1954.

of mind. It is an omen of the utmost significance and hope that in these years of darkness and despair such a

poem as *Savitri* should have appeared. Let us salute the Dawn.

A. VENKAPPA SASTRI

WILD LIFE AND WILD MEN

The balance of power in Nature, continually disturbed by human ignorance is as continuously restored by the silent yet intelligent Law of Compensation or Karma. There is mathematical exactitude in this adjustment. This even the best brains among the scientists do not understand, for they never study the universe from the point of view of its Moral Order. One ghastly method by which "civilized" men enjoy themselves, disturbing Nature's balance, results in the destruction of wild life to which "Critic" of the *New Statesman and Nation* draws our attention in the issue of August 11th.

Alan Moorehead, who has come back from Africa filled with informed and justified anger, says the destruction is going on so fast that outside the national parks it will soon be impossible to see anything wild larger than a rabbit. But the most horrifying fact that he gave in his talk on the Granada TV Network the other day was that even in the game reserves organized gangs of poachers are daily engaged on the work of extermination. In one Kenya park, he says, 50 elephants are being killed each month. The job is done with poisoned arrows; the poor beasts dash away to die in agony. Their tusks are sawn

off and smuggled out of the country mainly by Indian traders. When the Africans who do the job are caught they are fined or gaoled, but nothing is done to the traders. Giraffes, which are of all animals the loveliest to see in a state of nature—if you go into the park just outside of Nairobi a herd of them will come and put their noses down to examine your car—are being murdered at an appalling rate for the sake of the few shillings that can be got for their hair, which is made into twine; and whole herds of wild beast are being wiped out so that their tails may be made into fly-whisks. A particularly macabre detail is that herds of zebras are being hamstringed so that they can be killed off at leisure by the poachers. Forty of them, Moorehead says, were found the other day limping about looking for water.

"Wild life" in the accepted sense (though debatable whether such traders and sportsmen are not wilder than the beast!) is precious for human existence. Wanton destruction of animals is sheer cruelty, a sin which is ghastly to contemplate, and dire in its reactions. Vivisection in the name of courage, tradesmen in the name of commerce are still allowed to perpetrate butchery, and to indulge their cowardice and avarice.

MY LONDON

[Mr. R. M. Fox draws here an interesting picture of the London of his memories—a London which, for all its grimness and drabness, stood, as it still stands, as a doughty champion of freedom of thought and of speech. Contrasting with London's spirit of free inquiry the orthodox climate of opinion in Dublin, he quotes the closing lines of an appeal "On Behalf of Some Irishmen Not Followers of Tradition" by the Irish poet and practical mystic Æ., whose own fealty as a Theosophist was given to the perennial Wisdom of the ancients. Our readers will appreciate our quoting a few more lines:—

They call us aliens, we are told,
Because our wayward visions stray
From that dim banner they unfold,
The dreams of worn-out yesterday. . . .
The generations as they rise
May live the life men lived before,
Still hold the thought once held as wise,
Go in and out by the same ancient door.
We leave the easy peace it brings :
The few we are shall still unite
In fealty to unseen kings
Or unimaginable light.
We would no Irish sign efface,
But yet our lips would gladlier hail
The firstborn of the Coming Race
Than the last splendour of the Gael.

—ED.]

The London I recall is a city of crowds, masses of people pouring over Waterloo Bridge, in the morning sunlight or the evening gloom, like grim, unseeing soldiers of a great army. They carry umbrellas and dispatch cases stiffly, like weapons. Nobody speaks to his neighbour, nobody smiles, nobody wants to lag behind. On their tightened faces is written, "Beware of Pity," for this is a city of pitiless, silent struggle.

In the murk of Charing Cross Station red and green signals flash. Trains rumble in with discordant, despairing shrieks. Crowds seep in but more people struggle through the smoke and shadows. On the

Underground they squeeze through the sliding doors or move like mechanical dolls up and down the escalators.

At first it was hard for me to compare cities, for I came to London as a child from Leeds, so long ago that I hardly remember that northern city with its satanic mills. My father was a half-timer in one of these and he told me how, during his boyhood, he worked in the mornings and went to school in the afternoon, often falling asleep with his head on the desk. He became a clever engineer and in his spare time was physical instructor of the Leeds Y.M.C.A. His fellow workers brought letters for him to answer

for them. Engineering drew him to London, for he was given charge of the mechanical and repair department of Stollwercks, the German chocolate firm, which had slot automatic machines in stations and at holiday resorts. He invented several of these machines. But he was not a businessman and remained a clever workman with a knack of managing men.

As a child London was to me just another place to live, without questioning its merits. I exchanged the narrow streets of Leeds, with its back-to-back houses and shawled factory girls, for a dull little house in Tottenham, part of the swarming dormitory district in North London where some of London's millions came nightly to sleep. They called it going home. In the evenings these labouring men crowded tram-cars and buses. Many did not wait to get home before they slept, for I have seen them wedged together, chins down on their chests, eyes closed, with work-worn, lined faces expressing utter weariness, like tired animals. Besides their long hours they had, in addition, journeys of an hour or so, to and from work.

London was mysterious and fascinating as I grew up. Its great buildings, its alleys, its dark masses, its shadows and lights, streets and shops, held my attention. My curiosity was roused. What goes on behind all this? was the question that rose in my mind. "All this" included the Sunday night piano tink-

ling behind drawn blinds, the marching of Salvation Army bands, the preaching in the tin Gospel Halls, the bustle of Saturday night markets with street vendors and flaring naphtha lamps. When I reached the age of fourteen I was working in a small ramshackle factory, part smithy, part carpenters' shop, from six till six. This was a violation of the factory acts—the Ten Hours Act for women and juveniles—but very early I came to understand that power and not law determined what kind of treatment was meted out to those who served the industrial machine.

A few years later I worked in Walthamstow at a factory where motor lorries were being turned out. The hours were not so long here but I had about an hour's walk from Tottenham each morning to reach the works. I had to travel along the marshy Lee Road which was frequently flooded in bad weather. In the low-lying fields on each side were cows that seemed to be floating on banks of mist. The district I passed through was known as Tottenham Hale. On the adjoining marsh land were what were called "desirable factory sites." Close by was a flourishing boot and shoe manufactory and a big woodwork factory. Most of the workers in these two factories were foreign Jews. They came from Poland, Lithuania and various parts of central Europe.

The houses I passed were packed with people who chattered in alien

tongues. In the summer, hordes of wild-looking children, nearly naked, ran out into the streets. These people were used to primitive conditions and found it hard to adjust themselves to English town ways. They aroused some racial animosity. But, of course, they were employed because they were ready to work very cheaply. Many of them had to sleep out on the marshes until they were taken into the factories, for they arrived without any resources. English workers going through this district gave themselves superior airs and talked loftily of "Little Jerusalem." But there was not much to choose, for most of them were covered with oil and grime and worked hard for little money too.

During this Walthamstow period I had begun to write fragmentary sketches and verses about factory life. My first little book, *Factory Echoes*, written in my teens, appeared, to my surprise, in a Russian version, for I received six copies from the translator in Moscow. Apparently there it had a larger circulation than in Britain but, as a rule, the Russians did not pay for books they translated, except in the case of prominent people like Lloyd George.

I worked hard, if intermittently, at these sketches, writing till after midnight, though I had to rise very early for my factory work. I would set out for Walthamstow and the tall factory chimneys often just seeing the sun rise as the black factory smoke poured across it, leaving the

works after the sun had set. Always I resented the cancelling of another day by that thick scrawl of smoke.

Because I was young and filled with a sense of the wonder of life I enjoyed seeing those marvellous crimson sunsets in London, the effect of which is heightened by the smoke and dust. By degrees I extended my knowledge of the city, getting away when I could from the mean little streets of the suburbs, seeing the glimmering lights on the Embankment, the column and fountains of Trafalgar Square, the great, lighted clock of Big Ben, with its tower standing sentinel on the river, alongside the delicate tracery of Westminster. I explored Charing Cross Road and browsed over the books. I remember still the thrill of finding a damaged copy of D. H. Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers* in the fourpenny box. I loafed round Soho and along Charlotte Street, drinking strong coffee in little *cafés* where bearded men played dominoes and swore strange oaths.

I thrilled to cosmopolitan London, the London of Marble Arch where apostles of every known religion, philosophical speculation and political thought talked freely while men and women of every race and colour gathered to listen and take part. I talked with David Nichol, one-time editor of William Morris's *Commonweal*. David, when I knew him, had a wandering mind. He had suffered imprisonment and persecution for his ideas of freedom.

But, because he seemed to represent the Morris idea of escape from industrial tyranny, I was drawn to him. Sometimes I had the rare pleasure of hearing intellectual protagonists of the calibre of Bernard Shaw or Bertrand Russell challenging conventional views.

One evening after a discussion on the relative merits of Mikhail Bakunin and Karl Marx, next to a group where an earnest young man was advocating the principles of Buddhism, I went with a bookseller, Charles Lahr, to his shop in Red Lion Street. He had a great collection of Bakunin literature there and we examined it by candlelight, for it was after midnight. He introduced me to the Continental writers: Knut Hamsun's *Hunger*; Israel Querido's *Toil of Men*; Gabriele D'Annunzio's *Child of Pleasure*. I read the logical French, the analytical Russians and the gloomy Scandinavians. I took them home in sackfuls. I listened to excited discussions on literature—"Nietzsche, I love and next to Nietzsche, Art," declaimed a pale-faced youth. Later, owing to a difference of opinion with the military authorities during World War I, I was able to catch up on my English reading in the prison library. Then I took literature in a three-year course at Oxford where I gained a scholarship. But I must confess I learnt more in London from people who had a keen interest in literature and social thought.

After *Factory Echoes* I wrote three more books dealing with industry and humanity. *The Triumphant Machine*, *Drifting Men* and *Smoky Crusade* were all published by the Hogarth Press. These books were proletarian literature, that is to say, they were the writings of a factory worker who could not conceive of a more degrading, debasing, hideous mode of life than that of a factory serf tied to a machine, his limbs regulated to fit in with mechanized production.

Never for a moment did I assume that the reaction of the majority of factory workers was the same as mine. If it had been, those factories would not have lasted a day. Certainly I knew that my father would hurry home from work and spend his evenings busy with his tools, devising some delicate system of weights and balances that he could use for his automatic machines. He was able to express his personality in his inventiveness. But he worked as a skilled craftsman. I always preferred to think, to dream, to write and to live.

Inevitably I was drawn into the Labour struggle for a more human life, a life of colour and reasonable leisure. In my Labour activities, London was a great help. I loved the anonymity of London. It was hard to victimize anyone for his thought or activity. I had my name on posters stuck up in the factory where I worked but neither the foreman nor the manager knew

of this. There were so many people in London that no one could know what the others were doing. And no one cared. I believe that out of this indifference grew a true liberality of thought which is the very aura of London. One does not find it in Berlin or Paris. It is one of London's most precious possessions.

At one time London was the centre of world finance, the international money exchange. It has lost that pre-eminence now but it remains the centre for the international exchange of ideas. During the lengthy period I spent in the city I became thoroughly indoctrinated with the belief that the free exchange of ideas is a good thing for humanity. London, in my mind, stands for freedom of thought, freedom of speech and a free press. Having responded to those influences in London, in my formative years, I could never accept the totalitarian idea whether from the Right or the Left. The spirit of free enquiry is the angel that mounts guard over London, for, among the city's teeming millions, the crowds that hurry over the bridges and scramble on to the trains, there are very few who would not laugh at the idea that

any man or set of men have the right, by ukase, to fix the boundaries of their thought.

Now that I live in Dublin I am conscious of a different atmosphere. Here, as is often said by Dubliners, one is like a goldfish in a bowl, always on view and always expected to have strictly orthodox ideas or none at all. For those who are temperamentally unorthodox this can be very tiresome and the feeling of frustration may account for heavy drinking and occasional gun play. G. W. Russell (*Æ.*) the Dublin poet and philosopher, was hitting at this evil when he wrote:—

No blazoned banner we unfold—
One charge alone we give to youth,
Against the sceptred myth to hold
The golden heresy of truth.

Besides books about industry I have written several books dealing with Irish history, biography and struggle, but an important element, even in these, is the tolerance and freedom of ideas that I learnt during my London years. London, as I know well, can be a deadening as well as a dynamic influence, but I gladly acknowledge the debt I owe to that spirit of free enquiry which I found and loved in London.

R. M. Fox

SOME ASPECTS OF EXISTENTIALISM

[This informative paper on a much talked of but less generally understood philosophy of our day was read by its author, **Professor C. V. Srinivasa Murthy**, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Sociology in the University of Mysore, at the Nagpur Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress last December.—ED.]

The purpose of this essay is to elucidate the meaning and implications of a certain tendency in recent philosophical thought which had its origin and development in Germany and France. It has come to be described as "Existentialism." Existentialism has already spread to England and America, and is peeping into philosophical circles in India as well. To express oneself in this field of philosophy is not easy for one who is keenly conscious of the overwhelming limitations from which he suffers. A very large portion of the literature on the subject is in French or German. Further, for one who has always lived in the mental climate of India, it is difficult to realize the enormity of evil and suffering and the ruthless shattering of personality caused by the disastrous effects of the two world wars. One has to remember with effort that the great upheavals that have taken place in the Western world and the intensity of suffering of the common man as well as of exceptional individuals have set on foot a train of independent and vigorous thinking and acting.

Existentialism is one of the fruits of great and creative minds groping in the dark to secure a firm foothold in life and existence. We may begin

with a brief consideration of the meaning and definition of Existentialism.

The question "What is 'Existentialism'?" is often asked but rarely answered. Even the powerful personalities who are made to bear the banner of the philosophic movement are restless and anxious to shake off the title. They would rather be described by some other label of their own choice. Gabriel Marcel, the Theistic Existentialist, for instance, would prefer to describe his philosophy as "Neo-Socratism." There is still another difficulty. There is no accepted body of knowledge which could be called "Existential Philosophy." The Existentialist thinkers do not believe in a closely argued system of philosophy. They revolt against the construction of architectonic systems, however majestic they may be. But there are Existentialist philosophers who strike a definite attitude to life in spite of their distrust of thought and thought systems. They express certain fundamental ideas born of the rightful experiences of their life, age or country. The emotional intensity of the sense of guilt in Kierkegaard and the utter insecurity, anguish, despair and abandonment experienced especially in

Occupied France, bringing home to the last man not merely the futility of existence but also, what is worse, the doubt whether there is existence at all, have thrown up a new philosophy.

One characteristic feature of this new philosophy is its exciting appeal to many of the people of the countries in which it has developed. Some of the Existentialists are musicians, poets, dramatists and novelists. So far as this particular movement is concerned, philosophy is no longer the closely guarded preserve of the intellectual in the scholar's den. Perhaps this philosophy expresses as no other has done so far the travail of each soul to achieve for itself a feeling and certainty of the reality of its own existence.

Kierkegaard, who could not secure a response from the people of his own age, let alone a place in the main stream of philosophic thought, is now described as the forerunner of Existentialism. Existentialism is hailed as a "Kierkegaardian renaissance."¹ The number of Existentialists is legion. We may consider the spirit of the thought as expressed by Jean-Paul Sartre against the background of the speculations of Kierkegaard, who "seems to be the titular father of the school."²

Sören Kierkegaard addresses himself not to the reader "as such" but

to each individual and establishes an intimate and personal *rappor*t with the other person. It is for this reason that contemporary Existentialism is drawn to him. The modern man, with the experience of a great crisis threatening human existence with extinction, the huge technological machine assiduously built up, brick by brick, creating in him the feeling of utter helplessness and insignificance in his inmost being, born of suffering, dread, anguish, despair, abandonment and death, leans back on Sören Kierkegaard for support and inspiration. Sören Kierkegaard strikes the true note of *subjectivity* and the importance of human existence. Philosophy emerges in him, not as an intellectual pastime, not as a solution of problems, by analysis and synthesis, but as a necessity of life. Philosophy is not a matter of thinking, but a matter of living. In this respect Kierkegaard is one with the Indian conception of philosophy as a way of life. The "sin-conscious," solitary and tormented soul of Sören Kierkegaard rose in powerful and intensely passionate revolt against the conventional Christianity in the atmosphere of which he lived and the traditional philosophy of Hegel by which he was fed and nourished. Contemporary Existentialism is nothing but the soul of Sören Kierkegaard magnified, universalized to cosmic dimensions. It is a philosophy of crisis.

¹ PAUL FOULQUIE: *Existentialism*.

² PAUL FOULQUIE: *Existentialist Philosophies*.

How is this crisis in the human person to be overcome? It is an intensely emotional, passionate and personal problem. The problem that life presents to Kierkegaard is a religious problem. He protested against the idea that any person *is* a Christian. He believed that every man if he wished to participate in *eternal happiness* must *become* a Christian. Though brought up under the spell of Hegel in his student days, Kierkegaard came to distrust the speculative philosophy of Hegel and of the Hegelians. The majestic dialectic of *thesis, antithesis* and *synthesis* is through and through mediated, and takes one away from the concreteness of personal existence. Kierkegaard believed that in Hegelianism the realm of thought is an abstraction from the realm of existence. It is only a dialectic of thought divorced from life. Hence he rejected the Hegelian dialectic and presented himself with the principle of "Either-or." The "Either-or" has reference to existence and not to thought,

If the champions of an "either-or" (says Søren Kierkegaard) "invade the sphere of pure thought and they seek to defend their cause, they are quite without justification." Like the giant who wrestled with Hercules, and who lost strength as soon as he was lifted from the ground, the either-or of contradic-

tion is *ipso facto* nullified when it is lifted out of the sphere of the existential and introduced into the eternity of abstract Thought. On the other hand, Hegel is equally wrong when, forgetting the abstraction of his thought, he plunges down into the realm of existence to annul the double *aut* with might and main.³

Kierkegaard cannot conceive how the finite and temporal existence can think of the infinite and eternal:—

To think of existence *sub specie æterni* and in abstract terms is essentially to abrogate it, and the merit of the proceeding is like the much-trumpeted merit of abrogating the principle of contradiction.⁴

But what is existence? Answered in simple terms, it is movement, becoming, process. "It is impossible to exist without passion," says Kierkegaard. Further, movement necessarily implies continuity. To exist is to act, to be in continuous motion.

The goal of movement for an existing individual (says Kierkegaard) is to arrive at a decision, and to renew it. The eternal is the factor of continuity; but an abstract eternity is extraneous to the movement of life, and a concrete eternity within the existing individual is the maximum degree of his passion.⁵

The individual is to realize his existence and this means to be in

³ *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, pp. 270-271.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 273.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

“passion,” within the movement of life. According to Kierkegaard:—

Existence constitutes the highest interest of the existing individual, and his interest in existence constitutes his reality. What reality is, cannot be expressed in the language of abstraction. Reality is an *inter-esse* between the moments of that hypothetical unity of thought and being which abstract thought presupposes.⁶

According to Kierkegaard all thought is a mere possibility. How does it issue in actual existence? He says that this is an ethical question. The ethical has a claim on the individual.

This claim is not that he should abstract from existence, but rather that he should exist; and this is at the same time his highest interest.⁷

The principle of “Either-or” does not apply to every case. It comes into being only when the “ethical” makes a powerful claim on the individual, in a moment of “crisis,” in an hour of decision. It is the individual that decides. The individual is free to choose: but choose he must. When a man decides he takes a “leap into the absurd.” “What now is the absurd?” asks Kierkegaard, and he answers:—

The absurd is—That the eternal truth has come into being in time, that God has come into being, has

been born, has grown up, and so forth, has come into being precisely like any other individual human being, quite indistinguishable from other individuals.⁸

Before passing on to a consideration of Existentialism in its modern form two striking features of the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard may be noted:—

(1) He has drawn pointed attention to the importance of history and the uniqueness of each individual:—

The true is not higher than the good and the beautiful, but the true and the good and the beautiful belong essentially to every human existence, and are unified for an existing individual not in thought but in existence.⁹

The individual as the bearer of the fundamental values of life is recognized.

(2) Kierkegaard has given clear expression to the idea that life is something essentially itself. It is thought, feeling and will. The ethical claim on the individual is the realization of the fulness of life in and through hazards, uncertainties, dread and anguish. The individual has opened out before him different possibilities. He is free to choose. But there is necessity as well. He must choose. He is condemned to be free. This fact of freedom and uncertainty recalls to

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 279.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Anthology*, p. 220.

⁹ JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 311.

one's mind Bergson's *élan vital*. This thought inevitably leads us to Existentialism in its modern form.

We may consider the fundamental tenets of Existentialism in the light of Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy. Sartre's fundamental dictum is that "existence comes before essence."¹⁰ What does the statement "Existence precedes essence" mean? The terms "essence" and "existence" are quite old in philosophy. But they are used in an entirely different sense by the Existentialists.

We mean (says Sartre) that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards. If man as the Existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing.¹¹

Man does not appear on this planet whole and entire. "Man is nothing else but that which he makes himself. That is the first principle of Existentialism."¹² Man is "subjectivity." "This means," says Sartre, "that man is of greater dignity than a stone or a table."¹³ Man is different from a fungus or a cauliflower in the sense that he primarily exists. "Man is, before

all else, something which propels itself towards a future and is aware that it is doing so."¹⁴ Sartre observes:—

The word "subjectivism" is to be understood in two senses and our adversaries play upon only one of them. Subjectivism means, on the one hand, the freedom of the individual subject and, on the other, that man cannot pass beyond human subjectivity. It is the latter which is the deeper meaning of Existentialism. When we say that man chooses himself, we do not mean only that every one of us must choose himself, but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he chooses for all men.¹⁵

Any decision that the individual makes is a decision that bears on the entire human race. Sartre says:—

I am thus responsible for myself and for all men, and I am creating a certain image of man as I would have him to be. In fashioning myself I fashion man.¹⁶

Truth consists in "one's immediate sense of one's self."¹⁷ Sartre further observes: "It is not only one's own self that one discovers in the '*cogito*' but those of others too."¹⁸ We find ourselves in a world of "inter-subjectivity." It is in this world that man has to decide

¹⁰ *Existentialism and Humanism*, p. 26.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

what he is and what others are.¹⁹ From this follows, according to Sartre, the meaning of the familiar concepts of Existentialism.

Anguish originates in the hour of decision. When a man chooses, he is choosing for the whole of mankind. His decision becomes a law universal. One is reminded of Kant's categorical imperative. But there is a fundamental difference, inasmuch as the categorical imperative originates in reason while that of Sartre originates in passion and anguish. Anguish is not mere distress or suffering. It is a state of intense and powerful tension. It is a tension born of "profound responsibility" on the part of the individual, for he makes a decision which determines all other individuals. This is anguish. It is the "anguish" of Abraham. We may say it is the anguish of Arjuna on the battlefield of Kurukshetra. Anguish is the condition of action. Men, in their efforts at realizing existence, are faced with numerous possibilities. They have to choose, must commit themselves, and in choosing one of these possibilities, they realize that it has value only because it is chosen. "Far from being a screen which could separate us from action, it is a condition of action itself."²⁰

Of *Abandonment*, Sartre writes:—

...and when we speak of "abandonment"—a favourite word of Heidegger—we only mean to say that God does not exist, and that it is necessary to draw the consequences of his absence right to the end.²¹

In the absence of the protective hand of God and the assurance of *a priori* values, man is thrown on his own responsibility. "Thus," says Sartre, "we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse."²² Man did not create himself. That is why he is condemned. But he is free. He must realize existence. Sartre remarks, "That is what abandonment implies. That we ourselves decide our being. And with this abandonment goes anguish."²³

The concept of *Despair* does not mean helplessness and inaction. Man is faced with possibilities and uncertainties. He must choose and act. Despair simply means that man should not have sweet illusions such as that of a designer or a God. He cannot abandon himself to quietism either.

First (says Sartre), I ought to commit myself, and then act my commitment according to the time-honoured formula that "one need not hope in order to undertake one's work."²⁴

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

This may be compared to the doctrine of *Nishkamakarma* of the *Bhagavad-Gita*. The teaching of Sri Krishna is: "Your concern is solely with action, never with its fruit." The Existentialist's life is an intense life of action. Thinking simply leads to pain and misery, and to get over it man harps on excuses, such as lack of leisure, opportunity, etc. But for the Existentialist there is no genius that is unexpressed, no love apart from the deeds of love. To have illusions is *mauvaise foi*—bad faith or self-deception. Sartre describes Existentialism as the "ethics of action and self-commitment." "The destiny of man is placed within man himself."

It is clear that the basic and most significant concept of Existentialism is: *Existence precedes essence*. There is no universal essence of man; but there is a human universality of condition. By "condition" is meant all the limitations, subjective and objective, to which man finds himself subject. "The universality is

not something given; it is being perpetually made."²⁵ By whom? By man himself. Here we enter upon the characteristic feature of Sartre's doctrine—the doctrine of freedom. Man is thrown on the shores of existence. He happens to be in a certain condition or situation. Choose he must, but he is free to choose. As Sartre writes, "in one sense, choice is possible, but what is not possible is not to choose, but I must know that if I do not choose, that is still a choice." He regards freedom as ultimate.

Furthermore, observes Sartre, I can pronounce a moral judgment. For I declare that freedom, in respect of concrete circumstances, can have no other end and aim but itself; and when once a man has seen the values depend upon himself, in that state of forsakenness he can will only one thing and that is freedom as the foundation of all values.²⁶

Herein we find Sartre's reconciliation of Existentialism with Humanism.

C. V. SRINIVASA MURTHY

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

A TRAVESTY OF ZOROASTRIANISM *

The avowed object of this little book is to "present the educated public with a synopsis of all the main beliefs of the Zoroastrians." Coming from a student of Pahlavi language and literature, it should be, as it is subtitled, a "Compendium of Zoroastrian Beliefs." One cannot, however, help saying at the outset that one feels greatly disappointed and mortified to find that, instead of being a guide to Zoroastrianism, it confounds the reader with a medley of truths, half-truths, fallacies, phantasies, even untruths, found in Pahlavi commentaries written in days of darkness and ignorance when the original teaching of the Prophet had been forgotten. "By Zoroastrianism, I understand arbitrarily," says the author, "the dualist orthodoxy which seems to have been established under Shahpur II in the fourth century A.D. on which the surviving Pahlavi books are mainly based." That is the most fatal assumption arbitrarily arrived at. The result is that the "teachings of the Magi" as presented to the reader give an erroneous and grossly distorted view of the religion as preached by the Prophet of Iran and observed till this day by the Parsis. The author himself should have known that the term *Magi* as used throughout the book is entirely misleading. The appellation *Maghavan* met with in the Gathas indicated the high status attained and respect commanded by the religious teachers of the day. During the subsequent period of the Yashts, also, their exalted position as *Moghu* was recognized. Anyone molesting the *Moghu* was put outside the pale of those who shared the sacrament. Subsequently, however, owing to schisms

and suspicion of participation in conspiracies against the throne, they were under a cloud. Their massacre during the reign of Darius marked their downfall and later during the Sassanian period they practically faded away. No bible has undergone such mutations, mutilations and distortions as the Avesta. The works written, some time before and after the suppression of the Avesta by the Quran, by those who were not and could not be called *Maghavan* do not at all give a clear idea of the main doctrines and tenets of the religion preached by Zarathushtra for the simple reason that by that time the religion had ceased to be the religion of the State, and the *Magi*, too, had ceased to influence the religious thought of men in Iran. It is well known that in the Pahlavi commentaries all sorts of speculative and conflicting views were expressed by the religious preceptors of the day, ignorant of the true tenets and the philosophy behind the pristine doctrines and beliefs. They were not *Magi*. Their exposition of Zoroastrian beliefs and rites never has been recognized by scholars as representing true Zoroastrianism. Yet the works of such teachers are quoted with approval by the author and even their texts, misleading as they are, are in many places misread, misquoted and misinterpreted, so that we have before us not a compendium of Zoroastrians' beliefs but a farrago of grotesque fancies, fallacies and heresies of the later epoch; in one word, a travesty of Zoroastrian tenets and beliefs.

The Pahlavi texts such as the *Bundehishn* and the *Shikand Gumani Vazar*,

* *The Teachings of the Magi*. By R. C. ZAEHNER. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 156 pp. 1956. 10s. 6d.)

on which the misguided if not the misguiding author relies, are given no importance by those who know that the works were composed when the faith of Zarathushtra, corroded by lapse of centuries and corrupted under alien influence, was followed by a handful of people adhering to their ancestral faith. *Bundehishn* could not have been completed in its present form, as pointed out by Dr. West, until after the suppression of the Avesta by the Quran. Similarly, *Shikand Gumani Vazar* could not be assigned a date earlier than the ninth century of the Christian era. The author of this work, Mardan Farrukh, calls himself a layman having no pretensions to the knowledge of the original Avestan writings. This, however, does not deter Professor Zaehner from holding up the contents of the book as reflecting "Zoroastrian beliefs"!

Starting with the assumption, as he did in his earlier work, *Zurvan*, that Zoroastrianism preached dualism which the Zurvanites tried to explain away by making Zurvan the origin of both Ahura Mazda and Ahreman, the author harps on the same idea in this book. In some places even the original Pahlavi text is misquoted. For instance, in his first chapter on "A Catechism," quoting *Chitak Anderz-i-Poryotkeshan*, he deals with the question: "Do I belong to the gods or the demons?" There is no reference whatever to "gods" in the Pahlavi texts.

One would expect to find in a book put forward as "A Compendium of Zoroastrian Beliefs" the old, purely monotheistic teaching of Zarathushtra as expounded in the Gathas and as reflected in the beliefs and tenets of the present-day followers of the religion—the modern Parsis. Dr. Zaehner says he has, where possible, left the Zoroastrians to speak for themselves. But what he quotes is taken from texts written centuries after the promulgation of the religion, differing considerably from the teaching of the Prophet both in language and thought. One is

amazed to find the very first chapter beginning with the statement: "Over against God stands the Devil, Ahreman. He, like God, is a pure spirit. He and Ohrmazd are eternal antagonists." Thus is the doctrine of dualism put in the forefront. How very different is the interpretation of the same text by J. H. Moulton in *The Treasure of the Magi*! In the first chapter of that book we find the words: "Over against the spirit of Good there stands 'Falsehood,' the power of evil which fights against God, destined to be utterly destroyed at the last."

Confronted by the problem of the eternal conflict between good and evil, the Sage of Iran furnished a solution by positing two primeval powers at war with each other. One of these is called Spenta Mainyu, the Beneficent Spirit, and the other Angra Mainyu, the Evil Spirit, whereas Ahura Mazda is Spenishta Mainyu. Zarathushtra conceives Spenta Mainyu as the son of Ahura Mazda, the first in creation, occupying the first place in the celestial hierarchy. It is through him that the Prophet longs to approach Ahura Mazda, and it is through him that the human mind receives divine illumination. Good thoughts proceed from him and good words and good deeds are the outcome of good thoughts. At the opposite pole stands Angra Mainyu, the Evil Spirit, who is allowed to introduce discord and death into the world. The daevas, the offspring of the Evil Spirit, have chosen him as their lord; and he teaches them to mislead man through evil thought, evil word or evil deed, and to lure him by their wiles to the path of wickedness. Whoever falls a victim to Angra Mainyu finds his thoughts enslaved by him. Man must avoid him as he would a pestilence. The best way to avoid the Evil Spirit is to think of and to espouse the cause of the Good Spirit. It is only when man's mind is not filled with good thoughts that it becomes an easy prey to Angra Mainyu. This doctrine of eternal polarism may best be stated as put by Pro-

fessor Jackson: "The two spirits do not exist independently, but each in relation to the other. They meet in the higher unity of Ahura Mazda." Spenta Mainyu existed before the beginning of the world. Angra Mainyu came into being with the beginning of the corporeal world. Their opposition finds expression only in the world that we see.

In the texts from which copious extracts are given in the book under notice, the antagonist of Ahreman is, however, Ohrmazd (Ahura Mazda) Himself. Far from presenting to the reader the doctrine of the two primeval spirits, Professor Zaehner proceeds to consider the "philosophical basis on which Zoroastrian dualism rests" and turns to the *Shikand Gumani Vazar*, which according to his reading presents arguments in favour of a dualist solution to the cosmic riddle "both clearly and well," but which according to Avesta and Pahlavi scholars of repute is valueless. Was it at all necessary to turn to such a source of information even as a curiosity of literature? Here is a sample of the stuff to which the reader is treated throughout this work:—

According to the Zoroastrian the Moslem God is not good, neither does he pretend to be, while the Christian God advertises Himself as Good, and plainly is not. Once you admit the reality of evil, then God is re-

sponsible for it unless Evil is an eternal principle co-existent with God and irreconcilably opposed to Him.

The author may quote chapter and verse in support of his misstatements and claim that they are based on later writings. But he might well be asked: Are the quaint beliefs and practices referred to therein purely Zoroastrian? Have they the remotest connection with the teachings of the Prophet? Did those who professed the faith at and for some time after the death of the Prophet hold such beliefs? Do those who now profess it subscribe to such beliefs and practices? If not, should the book find a place in a series intended to place before the public "the chief ethical and religious masterpieces of the world" with a view to promoting "a deeper understanding and appreciation of other peoples and their civilizations"? Are the texts quoted by Dr. Zaehner classics and masterpieces? Surely, he does not enhance his reputation for scholarship by writing such a misleading book. Starting with preconceived notions, if not positive bias, he endeavours to sustain them throughout the work and seeks evidence in support of his contentions from sources abounding in unfounded assumptions and distortions of the original message of Zarathushtra.

R. P. MASANI

Mahavira and His Philosophy of Life. By A. N. UPADHYE. (Transaction 25) *Gautama Buddha.* By S. L. BHATIA. (Transaction 26) (The Indian Institute of Culture, Bangalore 4. Each: 12 pp. 1956. Re. 1/-)

These lectures, delivered at the Institute on the birth anniversaries of Mahavira and of the Buddha, show the striking similarity between their doctrines. The sixth century in India and the world was an age of great intellectual quickening; Buddha and Mahavira in India, Plato, Confucius, Lao Tze and Zoroaster were all contempo-

raries. The Buddha cured not merely ailments of the body but also of the mind. In his prescription, "Though my body is sick, my mind shall not be sick," he sounds the wisdom which even modern doctors are beginning to accept. He also was compassionate to the sick in body, telling His followers, "He who would wait on me, let him wait on the sick."

Mahavira and the Buddha taught the ideals of Truth and Non-Violence. Jainism and Buddhism with their high ethical principles stand as signposts to ignorant, suffering humanity.

U. S.

Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings of BENJAMIN LEE WHORF. Edited and with an Introduction by JOHN B. CARROLL. Foreword by STUART CHASE. (Published jointly by The Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York; Chapman and Hall, Ltd., London. x+278 pp. 1956. 56s.)

This volume of published and unpublished writings by a remarkable scholar and thinker will be of interest to many students of psychology and religion as well as to those whose real field is that of linguistics.

It is by no means an easy work, for Whorf is not an easy writer, although a great part of his writing is to be grasped by any normal reader who cares to give it his best thought. The Introduction by John B. Carroll, Associate Professor of Education at Harvard and a friend and student of Whorf's, gives a fascinating picture of this man who achieved scholarly eminence solely by reason of his leisure-time pursuits. For Whorf spent his entire business life as a fire-prevention engineer.

Although several offers of academic or scholarly research positions were made to him...he consistently refused them, saying that his business situation afforded him a more comfortable living and a freer opportunity to develop his intellectual interests in his own way.

The contents of this volume include those researches that he made into the Hopi Indian language, and also a great deal on what is called the Whorfian Hypothesis—that the structure of language influences thought processes and our perception of the world about us. In connection with this theory he says:—

...through this sort of understanding of language is achieved a great phase of human brotherhood...It causes us to transcend the boundaries of local cultures, nationalities, physical peculiarities dubbed ("race")...

In following up his researches the author declares that many language systems have order, beauty and subtlety,

and that this may be independent of any state of evolution, material culture, civilization, moral and ethical development:—

...a thing most surprising to the cultured European, a thing shocking to him, indeed a bitter pill! But it is true; the crudest savage may unconsciously manipulate...a linguistic system so intricate, manifoldly systematized, and intellectually difficult that it requires the lifetime study of our greatest scholars to describe its workings.

The moment we begin scientific, unbiased RESEARCH into language we find, in people and cultures with the most unprepossessing exteriors, beautiful, effective, and scientific devices of expression unknown to western Indo-European tongues or mentalities.

Finally, in one short paper, "On Psychology," Whorf puts forward some ideas and opinions that could be the basis for an endless course of study or discussion. For instance, he states that there are "certain courses that psychology has elected to follow that have estranged it, perhaps permanently, from the truly mental field." After a brief survey of various schools of thought he adds:—

All the schools then have been surveyed and found wanting, and the seeker for knowledge about the human mind is forced to fall back on the long-collected mass of empirical observations sometimes called "the wisdom of the ages," on the works of keenly intuitive authors, on his own insight...

He then stresses the

...great and perhaps basic importance of the principle we denote by the word "meaning." Meaning will be found to be intimately connected with the linguistic: its principle is symbolism, but language is the great symbolism from which other symbolisms take their cue.

The book includes a Foreword by Stuart Chase, as well as an Introduction by John Carroll, a well-set-out Contents and an excellent Bibliography, listing the published writings of Whorf, unpublished manuscripts, and also some books and articles relating to Whorf's writings. We must indeed be grateful to those who have made these studies more readily available to all who will value them.

ELIZABETH CROSS

Contemporary Philosophy: Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism. By FREDERICK COPLESTON. (Burns and Oates, London. ix+230 pp. 1956. 18s.) Received through the courtesy of the British Council, London.

Father Copleston's studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism have already been published as articles and reviews. Some of the chapters are based on lectures delivered to various societies. The book therefore has all the defects usually associated with compilations of this nature. In this discussion of contemporary British philosophy he deals with the fashionable trends prevailing in the universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London where the tendency has been to reduce philosophy to linguistic analysis and the number of constructive metaphysical works has been relatively small. In political philosophy the tendency has naturally been to analyze the foundations of the democratic state. The philosophy of history has been covered by the publications of Toynbee, Collingwood and Butterfield. The author's account of these trends resembles a critical bibliography appended to a PH.D. thesis and, as such, will hardly be intelligible to the layman.

The chapters dealing with Logical Positivism, verification and the function of metaphysics are too short to be of much use to either the student or the general reader.

The best chapters are those concerned with contemporary continental philosophy, but they presuppose a detailed acquaintance with the works of Sartre. The author does not confine his account of Existentialism to the atheistic philosophy of Sartre but includes theistic Existentialist philosophers like Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Marcel. He contends that "existentialism is a serious type of philosophy in the sense that it deals with questions which cannot be dismissed as trivial."

Although he criticizes some of the very questionable propositions on which Sartre's philosophy is based we should have liked more argument from the author in favour of God's existence. Naturally the author as a Roman Catholic father is more in sympathy with the philosophy of Jaspers and Marcel, but the whole trend of the book is fair and critical and he writes as a philosopher and not as a theologian in disguise.

C. COLLIN DAVIES

Welsh Short Stories: Selected and with an Introduction. By GWYN JONES. (The World's Classics, No. 551. Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, London. xv+330 pp. 1956. 6s.)

These short stories are indeed Welsh short stories, and "Welsh" spells both their success and their failure. They are at once the flower of a small nation's minor art and evidence that that art is only rarely comparable with that of other nations in the same field, whether for technical achievement or vision and subject-matter. Only four or five of these eighteen writers escape the limitations of their nationality, and even these hardly merit an appearance in a volume of the World's Classics, being neither quite the world's nor likely to become

classic.

A Welsh short story is not a good short story simply because it is Welsh in atmosphere and diction. The Welsh write much as the Irish talk, fluently, vividly and with a touch of natural poetry; but this puts them as much in danger as the Irishman of using too many words too startlingly, and of falling out of poetry into facetiousness. In other words, most of those whose stories are collected here are neither conscious artists nor professional writers; their work is good amateurism, like the major part of the choral singing and football-playing which are other aspects of Welsh national life (inevitably the subjects of several of these stories).

This is to say nothing against amateurism, which may well be better in certain respects than professionalism. It is only to say that writers like Rhys Davies, Richard Hughes, Alun Lewis, Arthur Machen (who is badly represented here, however) and Gwyn Thomas are the ones who emerge from these pages as men who understand that an anecdote recounted at the fireside or in the pub is not a short story, and that native speech is not style; that is, that simply to write down a story is not to make a work of art.

Nevertheless, and in case these remarks should seem ungenerous, it must be pointed out that they are also implying that the great majority of these

twenty-six stories are at least as beguilingly entertaining to read as a Welshman is to listen to, and that they are as expressive as he is of his towns, countryside and domestic life; which is to say that this collection as a whole is a delightful and revealing encounter. If the range of subject, character, sentiment, atmosphere and diction of these stories is narrow enough for the reader to be forgiven if he feels that most of them might have been written by one and the same person, this collective Welsh anecdotist is excellent company, vital, genial, earthy, comical and more aware than many of his fellows in other parts of Britain of the realities of human experience.

R. H. WARD

Lives and Legends of the Georgian Saints. Selected and translated from the original texts by DAVID MARSHALL LANG. (Ethical and Religious Classics of East and West, No. 15. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 180 pp. 1956. 13s. 6d.)

The intention of this series, of which a number of volumes have already been published, is to place before intelligent readers "the chief ethical and religious masterpieces of the world" with a view to demonstrate that man's approach to God is much the same, at least in essentials, in all religions.

This volume consists of selections and translations of the lives and legends of Georgian saints, remembered by the Georgian Church. This church is one of those small pockets of Christians which exist here and there in Christendom, which have existed since the early days of Christianity, and for one reason or another have been left out of the main stream of the developing Christian

religion. Georgia is now a part of the U.S.S.R., situated between the Caspian and Black seas, and although it is under Communist domination the church apparently still exists and is active. It has had a continuous life since the time of Constantine the Great, having been founded in about 330 A.D.

Like all such churches it has its own traditions and tales of the saints. But it is doubtful whether the general reader can really be interested in the hagiography of these foundation heroes. No doubt the tales and the legends are of religious value, and of particular value in showing the shared background of various religions, but for the general reader they require particular telling and interpretation. This volume, no doubt with excellent intent, attempts to allow the translated histories and legends to tell their own story. This, for those for whom the volume is primarily intended, is rather a harsh limitation.

E. G. LEE

The Philosophy of Truth or Tatva-gnana. By V. SUBRAMANIA IYER. (Shrimati Rukmani Kuppanna, "Sudharma," Rajagopalachari Road Extension, Salem. 459 pp. 1955. Rs. 9/-)

This is a collection of the philosophical essays and addresses of the late V. Subramania Iyer of Mysore. Here is a rational exposition of the Advaita Vedanta. The thirty essays combine wide learning and great logical acumen, and are rich in delicate distinctions, often overlooked. Shri Iyer's analysis of the three states of consciousness is significant for a proper understanding of Shankara's philosophy.

Shri Iyer refutes the cheap and superficial criticism that Advaita is a facile intuitionist type of philosophy, based on dogmatic scriptural declarations. He advances rational arguments in support of every one of Shankara's doctrines. It redounds to Shri Iyer's credit to have made a strictly philosophical approach to the study of Shankara. The remorseless logic of the three major tenets of Advaita, *viz.*, the non-dualism

of the Absolute, the non-reality of the World and the non-difference of Brahman from Atman, as seen in Shri Iyer's exposition, must regale the most ardent lover of metaphysics. It occasionally baffles the ordinary reader. Shri Iyer concludes that the Advaita of Shankara is not an opinion (*mata*). It is a truth (*tattva*).

He brings out clearly the unique nature of Shankara's idealism. It is not nihilism, illusionism or mentalism, and certainly not a type of subjective idealism.

Though the essays deal with different aspects, they do not lack a unity of outlook. Shri Iyer believes that Shankara's philosophy at once satisfies the demands of reason and the needs of humanity. Shri Iyer, by his rational defence of Advaita, has done great service to Indian thought.

The volume carries an appreciative Foreword by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and a touching personal memoir by the author's family.

P. NAGARAJA RAO

On the Veda. By SRI AUROBINDO. (Sri Aurobindo International University Centre Collection, Vol. V. Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry. v+671 pp. 1956. Rs. 10/-)

The valuable writings of Sri Aurobindo lie scattered in several numbers of the *Arya* and elsewhere, and it was a good idea to collect relevant papers on particular topics and present them in book form as different volumes of the Sri Aurobindo International University Centre Collection. This book contains the writings of Sri Aurobindo on the Veda, which were originally published in the *Arya* during 1914-1917 in different series, besides the draft of an article on "The Origins of Aryan Speech."

As it is not possible within the limited space to do full justice to this important work, the reviewer has to content him-

self with giving a bare indication of the nature of the contents, so as to stimulate the interest of the readers.

The first part, entitled "The Secret of the Veda," is the most important part of the book. It gives an exposition of Sri Aurobindo's views on different aspects of the Veda and on various modern theories, methods and interpretations. In order to determine the sense of the whole *Rik Samhita* Sri Aurobindo closely scrutinizes the Angirasa legend and the Vritra myth, which, according to him, "are two main pillars of this ancient structure" (*i.e.*, the *Rik Samhita*). Sri Aurobindo finds that the Veda is neither a mere symbolism of natural phenomena personified in the figures of Gods and Rishis and maleficent demons, nor a poetical and legendary account of the invasion of Dravidian India by Nature-worshipping

barbarians; but a symbolism of the struggle between spiritual powers of Light and Darkness, Knowledge and Ignorance. According to Sri Aurobindo the Aryan is he

who does the work of sacrifice, finds the sacred word of illumination, desires the Gods and increases them and is increased by them into the largeness of true existence; he is the warrior of the light and the traveller to the Truth.

In the next three parts appears the translation of some hymns from the

Rigveda with annotations and a commentary. It should be noted that when these papers were written the discovery of the protohistoric civilization of the Indus Valley was still to be made.

The book provides stimulating and interesting reading. The paper, printing and get-up are excellent and the price is moderate. We strongly commend the book to libraries and private collections.

A. D. PUSALKER

A History of Indian Philosophy. Volume V: Southern Schools of Saivism. By SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA. (Cambridge University Press, London. xiv+204 pp. 1955. 25s.)

Students of Indian philosophy all over the world will be pleased to see this long-awaited book published. They will, of course, feel sad that this is a posthumous publication. It treats of the Southern Schools of Shaivism only, while the author's plan was to include in it the Northern Schools of Shaivism, the Philosophy of Grammar and the Philosophy of some selected Tantras. This we learn from the touching memoir of the author written by his wife, Dr. Surama Dasgupta. It gives a short sketch of the author's life, career and personality, from which we gather that Professor Dasgupta had also conceived a two-volume work on his own philosophy. Those who have read his most interesting essay in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* will surely be sorry that he should not have lived to complete this task.

The method followed in this work, which includes expositions of Vira-Shaivism, of the philosophy of Shrikantha and of the Shaiva philosophy in the Puranas and in some important texts like the *Pashupata-sutras*, the *Tiru-vachaka* and Shripati Pandita's commentary on the *Brahma-sutras*, is the same as that of the previous volumes of this *History*. It is a straightforward exposition of the leading ideas of the

texts. Since his own intention was not to write a critique but a history of Indian philosophy, the book should be treated as such and the sparseness of critical material should not be held against the author.

The book starts with a survey of the literature of Southern Shaivism, followed by a section which gives briefly the philosophical perspective of the Agama literature. It is a convenient summary of the references to Shaivism found in philosophical literature. We should like to say that an attempt to trace the Agamic ideas of Shiva in their correlation with the Vedic descriptions of Shiva would have been very welcome.

Many among the Southern Shaivite philosophers accept the authority of the Vedas and the author himself refers to Vedic Shaivism. And one would have expected at least a brief exposition of the conception of Shiva in the Vedas and a comparison between that and the Agamic conception of Shiva and of his relation to the world of Souls and the natural world. For there is no conception of Shiva as God or the Ultimate Reality which is not found in the Vedas. The name Pashupati itself is Vedic and is one of the designations of Shiva in, for example, the *Shatarudriya* of the *Yajurveda*. Professor Dasgupta rightly calls Shaivism a religious philosophy. There is a philosophy, in the sense of a world-view, in the Vedas too; and a comparison of the kind we have referred

to would have certainly contributed to a fuller understanding of Southern Shaivism.

Shiva is the giver of knowledge and happiness and good fortune; he cures disease, etc. Could it not be that Shiva in the Vedas is the Supreme God in one aspect—and also that he himself is called by various names in accordance with the different functions he fulfils? And could it not be that different sections of people made one or the other of these different aspects of the self-same Deity their special object of seeking and thus derived their own designations from these aspects?

Coming to details, we are surprised to find *Shiva-jnana-siddhi* described as an Agama (p. 40 and p. 159 fn). Writers on Shaiva-siddhanta mention this work as an authoritative book of the School but not as an Agama.

Writing on Shrikantha's philosophy, the author says:—

Srikantha describes Siva on the one hand as being the category of *aham* or egohood which forms the individual personality, and at the same time regards it as being of the nature of "pure being," "pure consciousness," and "pure bliss." He thinks that this individual personality can be regarded only in unlimited sense to be identified with the infinite nature of Siva.

Now *aham* need not necessarily mean individual personality, at least not in Shaivism. If Shiva is individual at all, it is in the sense Bosanquet's Absolute is the perfect individual. What Shrikantha says is that Shiva is conscious of Himself as the all-inclusive "I" and that this self-consciousness is the very nature of Shiva. In the third volume of his *History*, Professor Dasgupta writes: "In the sixth chapter of the *Ahirbudhnya-samhita* . . . It is said there that the power of God as the supreme ego is at once one and different from Him" (p. 42). If God can be the supreme ego in the *Ahirbudhnya-samhita*, why not so according to Shrikantha? It is surprising that Professor Dasgupta should have missed this vital point.

Another misunderstanding of this

kind is found in his description on p. 100 of *purusha* or Shiva in the *Kailasa-samhita* of the *Shiva-mahapurana* as being of an "illuminating nature" and of Shakti as "pure consciousness." It would be more correct to say that *purusha* is illumination and Shakti is the illuminating part in the unity of *sat-cid-ananda*. Throughout the book the author has described Shiva as pure consciousness and Shakti as power and energy, and we fail to understand why he should have done otherwise in this passage. It is well known that *prakasha* in Shaivism is revelation or illumination and Shakti is that which actively illuminates.

On p. 109, explaining the *Vayaviya-samhita* of the same Purana, Professor Dasgupta writes: "*Vidya* or knowledge is here defined as that which manifests space and action (*dik-kriya-vyanjaka vidya*)." Surely it is *drik* and not *dik*, *drik* meaning "sight," i.e., knowledge. In Agamic philosophy knowledge and power or action go together and are two phases of the same Shakti, as the author himself says many times. It is a wonder that a Sanskritist of Professor Dasgupta's stature should not have detected this, and all the more surprising as he himself gives the right reading and interpretation of the phrase in his treatment of Shakti in the *Paushkara-gama* on p. 33.

On p. 108 he translates another phrase in the same section, *jnanam vastuparicheda*, by saying that knowledge is "limitation by objectivity." This also seems to be a serious misinterpretation. In the previous sentence Professor Dasgupta says that, according to the Purana, "All sorrows proceed from ignorance, and they are removed through knowledge." Now the description of knowledge as limitation by objectivity does not seem to mean anything in the context; nay, more, it seems to contradict the idea of knowledge as the remover of all sorrows. The phrase should be rendered by "limits of objectivity" or "objects." In other words, knowledge is the awareness of the true

nature of things. It is well known that true knowledge delivers.

The author's estimate on p. 120 of the difference between the monism of Shankara and that of the *Shiva-mahapurana* is very good and to the point. He is, however, not always so careful in showing Shankara's difference from other Shaivite philosophers. For example, explaining the doctrine of Shrikumara's commentary on Bhoja's *Tattvaparakasha*, that Shiva as associated with *maya* is both the instrumental and the material cause of the world, Professor Dasgupta says that Shrikumara's theory makes it the same as that of Shankara. But, though it is true that Shankara says Brahman is both the instrumental and the material cause of the world, it is not his last word on the subject. Surely his doctrine is that if the world's existence is at all to be accepted and explained, then Brahman must be regarded as both its instrumental and material cause. But in the last analysis it is only an *adhyaropa*, an imposition which must be followed by the *apavada*, the retraction of the theory. In other words, Brahman as such is not the cause of anything at all, simply because the world is not, as an effect. The Shaivite, of course, is averse to any such conclusion and that is his main difference from Shankara. And it is also important to remember that Shankara does not admit any such thing as *chit-shakti*, or consciousness as energy, which all Shaivites do.

Professor Dasgupta's treatment of the Shaiva-siddhanta proper leaves much to be desired. We can take note of one or two points only. On p. 157, he writes that "the souls which pervade the body are themselves inanimate" In view of the fact that he himself, in

explaining the ideas of the *Siva-jnana-bodha*, on p. 26, says, "*Pasu* is defined as pure consciousness (*cinmatra*) covered with impurities The pure consciousness is of the nature of *jnana* and *kriya*," his other statement that souls are inanimate rather takes one's breath away. It may be true that there is no unequivocal statement in the literature of the Shaiva-siddhanta that the soul is in essence *chit* or conscious. On the other hand, *Siva-jnana-siddhi*, in III, IV, 11, 14, denies that the soul is *achit* and also that it is *chit*; in III, IV, II, 20, which explains the true nature of the soul, it is said that "its eternal intelligence and power is eternally concealed by *Pasa* (bondage)" In III, IV, III, 40 of the same work, it is said that in the "pure state," the soul ceases to be finite in intelligence and becomes omniscient. The Rev. G. U. Pope, in his note on the *Tiru-vachaka*, says that "the soul must have a power of vision . . . a divinely-given faculty of using those (sense) organs" (p. LXXXVI). We do not know if this faculty is *buddhi* or *chit*. It is certainly said that the soul's capacity to know and to act is ultimately derived from Shiva's power, as Professor Dasgupta points out immediately after the passage we cited from p. 157 of this book. The soul is also said to be like a mirror which reflects anything that is placed before it.

The book gives an impression of being rather sketchy, which is due partly to the fact that the author does not deal with all the material of a particular school at one place, and it also lacks finish. But we are grateful that it had been brought at least to the form in which it has been published, and not left as notes.

A. BASU

Democracy in America. By ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE; edited and abridged by RICHARD D. HEFFNER. (A Mentor Book. The New American Library, New York. 320 pp. 1956. 50 cents)

Alexis de Tocqueville, a brilliant young Frenchman, visited the United States of America for nine months from May 1831 to February 1832 to appraise the meaning and actual working of democracy in that country, in order to ascertain how far it might serve to replace the decadent aristocratic *régimes* in Europe. The results of his observations were embodied in a two-volume work entitled *Democracy in America*, which is undoubtedly the most profound and valuable study ever to be made by a foreigner of the American way of life. By the broad sweep of his observations on American traits of character and the modes of operation of American institutions—observations which, taken by and large, are true even to this day—his work has become a classic study, perennial in its freshness and wide appeal to students of political institutions and sociology. Mr. Richard D. Heffner has edited and abridged it into a small pocket volume, retaining not only the spirit and flavour of Tocqueville's classic but also the most important descriptive and analytical passages in the original.

Though Tocqueville belonged to a proud old Norman family, he was no reactionary out of tune with the democratic spirit which was sweeping through

the world in his day. Tocqueville's concern in his work was not to discredit democracy but rather to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the new impulse. He was anxious that freedom *and* democracy should be the goals of human endeavour and that freedom should not automatically be equated with a dull equalitarianism or democracy (or majority rule) with liberty. He has made many shrewd observations in his work which are valid even today. For instance, speaking of the independence of the press, Tocqueville observes:—

The more I consider the independence of the press in its principal consequences, the more I am convinced that, in the modern world, it is the chief and, so to speak, the constitutive element of liberty. A nation which is determined to remain free is therefore right in demanding, at any price, the exercise of this independence.

He also stresses the need for decentralization of power on a wide scale so that ordinary folk may develop a sense of responsibility and self-importance instead of being lost in the crowd. His generalizations concerning politics, religion, government, art and even literature are astonishingly shrewd and thought-provoking.

Both Richard D. Heffner and the New American Library deserve to be complimented for having provided within a small compass the very cream of a distinguished political classic.

M. RAMASWAMY

GOOD ADVICE

Mr. N. Raghunatha Aiyar, Assistant Editor of *The Hindu*, speaking at the Vivekananda College Sanskrit Association at Madras, advised the students "to develop the habit of reading extensively and with enjoyment. They should not confine themselves to their textbooks. They would find that Sanskrit literature was by no means exclusively preoccupied with the solemn or serious aspects of life. It had humour and irony, often of a very subtle kind. Great romances like *Bana* were full of

curious and recondite learning and reflections which lit up the author's personality, thus often reminding us of the pioneers of the English novel and the personal essay. The appeal that Sanskrit men of letters had for us was unique as they were grounded in our own culture and tradition. The study of such literature was really a source of potent enjoyment and an instrument for raising their moral tone."—*The Hindu*, September 7, 1956.

THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF CULTURE

[The interesting paper which we publish here was delivered by its author, **Acharya Bhikkhu Buddharakkhita**, as a lecture at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on July 21st. The lecturer expounded the point of view of Hinayana Buddhism on the non-existence of an enduring self. He enunciated some provocative thoughts. The Buddha's saying in the *Dhammapada*: "The Self is the Lord of self; what higher Lord could there be?" makes clear it is the little self that has to be forgotten, not that Inner Light which is the real Self. It has been written that "real Buddhism can be appreciated only by blending the philosophy of the Southern Church and the metaphysics of the Northern Schools." The Special Meeting at which the paper was read was for "Vassana Purnima Day" traditionally sacred in India from olden times.—ED.]

BUDDHISM AND DEVOTION: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY

Theravada Buddhism based on the original Teachings of the Buddha, that is the Pali Tipitaka, is often said to be dry and intellectual, to have no devotion or emotional satisfaction in it, and so forth. This allegation may be true for those who have limited themselves to a somewhat superficial and intellectual study of it and have not tried to apply some of its tenets, even in a humble way, in their everyday life. Dhamma, said the Buddha, may be compared to a snake which if caught by the head is brought under control, but if by the tail, carries death. Anything one-sided cannot last long and is always harmful, often self-destructive. If we are to accept that Buddhism starves emotion and lays emphasis on reason alone then it would have been impossible for Buddhism to flourish for 2,500 years as a "Living Religion," providing the spiritual and cultural requirements of millions of human beings. Countries like Burma, Siam, Ceylon, Indochina, etc., cannot conceivably be supposed to have quenched their spiritual thirst with mere dry abstractions. Further, emotion, as a distinct mental factor, cannot be just suppressed; it is bound to express itself. In point of fact, the balancing of these two mental faculties, emotion and reason, is considered in Buddhism most essential. Harmony, moderation and steady growth are tenets that run through the entire system of Buddhism.

In the theistic conception of *bhakti* and faith, devotion is always accompanied by practices like prayers, rituals, vows and unquestioning obedience to a creator God, his earthly incarnation or some deity. There is fear of being punished if the command of God is either questioned or not followed with submission. Hence conditioned by this fear there may arise blind faith, dogmatism, superstition, ritualism, intolerance and such other evil consequences, because fear restricts mental growth, and makes the mind insular. Prayers, rituals and vows lead man to ask and crave for worldly boons and sensual pleasures while still living, and a pleasurable state of existence, like heaven, after death. In this kind of devotion the element of love creates "affection" (*sneha*) and a physical relationship between the devotee and his or her lord, which in many cases may turn out to be carnal. Being associated with religion, such indulgences remain undetected and become a holy affair, which can be practised unhindered. But they lead to mental impotency. One gets, as it were, a free licence to roam in the wilderness of vague imaginings. One waits for the saving grace of God in all activities, thereby losing self-confidence and often becoming indolent and a slave to superstition. In this context, if devotion is wholly emotional, it may have a positive danger in that the devotee may turn fanatical

and be easily upset by little mishaps or gains.

Devotion, from the Buddhist standpoint, is *Nanasampayutta*, i.e., accompanied by knowledge, so that it is both philosophical and emotional. The philosophical aspect calls into play two important mental faculties, viz., the rational and the volitional. The emotional aspect has, as it were, many facets, bringing together several mental factors, such as gratitude, reverence, love, faith or confidence, and joy. Forasmuch as devotion is a culture of the mind, it sets on foot a harmonious development of all the mental faculties, thereby bringing integrity and wholeness of character, as required for the attainment of *Nibbana*.

The object of devotion is what is known as the "Triple Gem" *Ratanattaya* or the "Three Refuges," the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha, that is, the Enlightened One, His Doctrine and the Order of His Noble Disciples, i.e., the Bhikkhus and Ariyas, *Mukta purushas*.

The practice of devotion consists in reflecting on the qualities or attributes of these Three Refuges. These qualities are embodied in most simple yet profound formulæ familiar to all Buddhists from the time they learn to speak, and which they recite on most occasions even in the simplest form of *Buddha-puja*. The practice of *anussati* is meditating on the meaning of the attributes as they are recited.

Buddha comes first in the Triple Gem, worshipped and followed as the Spiritual Master. "Buddha" is an honorific expression implying the attainment of Supreme Enlightenment. In other words, it implies a state of perfection and not a person. It is an attribute of a perfect and holy guide, who, by virtue of having discovered the Truth through long and painful struggle, points out and makes known to beings, out of great compassion, the nature of Truth, known as the Noble Truths, briefly embodied in these words:

"It is this fact of suffering and the deliverance therefrom that I make known." Buddha, therefore, is not considered as a personality, God or an avatara, an incarnation of a God, and has no command to give which need be accepted without question. Thus, prayers to Him or rituals, vows or blind faith in Him have no meaning whatsoever. There are many other epithets used to address the Buddha, all being attributes of high attainments, e.g., Possessor of the Ten Forces (i.e., of the Perfections); All-Knower or Omniscient; Master of the Truth; Lion among men; Conqueror, Knower of the Truth, Supreme Teacher, Perfect One, etc.

The same holds true in the case of the Dhamma and the Sangha. Dhamma in this context is the Transcendental Truth, i.e., *Nibbana* as well as the Supermundane Path leading to that Perfect Truth which has been discovered and proclaimed by the Buddha. Reflection on the Dhamma means reflection on the nature of its transcendental attributes. That is to say, reflection on that state of perfect deliverance which is freed from all worldly turmoils, is a blissful condition of Peace and the attainment of which means the end of deaths and rebirths.

The Sangha is the Order of noble disciples who have entered the Path which leads to the Goal. It represents the "living example" for the worldly.

In brief, Buddha is the Way-finder, the Teacher, the Guide. "Dhamma" is the Way, the Teaching; and "Sangha" refers to those who are actually treading or have trod the Way, i.e., the real followers of the Teaching.

In the actual practice of devotion, however, these three embody and culminate in one idea, one Truth. Hence it is said:—

Since the Teacher is the Truth-embodiment,
So is the Truth the very Teacher,
And the Noble Order being established on
the Truth,
Also goes by the name of the Teacher.

Thus, the act of devotion is directed to a single object which forms the Guide as well as the Goal, independent of and unmixed with the notion of any personality or incarnation, a god or Paramatman, but purely as an aspiration to an ideal of absolute perfection and purity, attainable through self-control, proper discipline and mental culture. Devotional acts with such a background and based on the realization of these great attributes create mental dispositions favourable to the attainment of similar qualities in one's own mind, in however small a degree. At first, such an act is a cause but the cumulative effect of a series of them grows and transforms itself until it becomes of the very stuff of these great attributes, *i.e.*, of the very Truth. Further, this form of devotion, with mental faculties well-balanced, maintains itself as a habitual frame of mind and not as an act spasmodically indulged in, thus ensuring steady progress. When devotion reaches a very high point, the distinction of Subject-object, *i.e.*, the "self" notion, disappears and what is realized is the very substance of the Triple Gem. Hence, devotion is directed towards an ever-present reality and not merely towards a dead teacher or empty abstractions.

A devotional act calls into play many forces and faculties of the mind. The most important of these is faith, conviction or confidence in the Triple Gem, which is associated with other factors such as gratitude, love, joy and deep reverence, forming as a whole what I prefer to call here the emotional aspect. Inasmuch as this faith or confidence born of knowledge contains no element of affection, no personal relationship, no blind faith, it differs essentially from the concept of *bhakti* in Hinduism or in the Christian creed. Faith has the background of a wise understanding with regard to the nature of *samsara* and also with regard to the significance of the Triple Gem. At the least it must be accompanied by a deep conviction of the law of Karma as a factor that

sustains and perpetuates this endless course of life and existence. Since faith is the one indispensable factor that governs all spiritual growth, it is called the Seed from which is born the tree of wisdom that bears the fruit of deliverance.

There are five spiritual powers or faculties—faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and intuitive wisdom. Of these the primary factor is this Faith which, if properly cultivated, conditions the development of the rest. In its highest, *i.e.*, supermundane, sense faith is unshakable faith in the Triple Gem, achievable through the attainment of the noble Path. And only in this sense is it true "self-surrender" which is the culmination of devotion. Self-surrender, in the Buddhist sense, is not a spiritual unification with some other entity, but it is the entire abandonment, down to the last vestige, of all "self-notion" and "personality-belief." This, if accomplished, brings to pass the overcoming of at least two other mental fetters—sceptical doubt and clinging to rites and rituals.

Lastly, as Faith arouses other concomitant factors, such as assurance, joy and gratitude, in that one realizes the tremendous significance of the Triple Gem as the true refuge from the toils and tumults of *samsara*, a deliberate and conscious cultivation of this one factor really means the development of the entire emotional aspect, that which forms the fount and source of all mental energy.

Thus the emotional side of devotion brings us to the philosophical side with its two faculties, the rational and the volitional. The function of this rational faculty is to investigate and probe into the nature of existence in order to understand, at least intellectually, its reality in the proper perspective. It is the dispassionate and objective study and judgment of things. When one removes the lid of "self" or "ego-centric consciousness" from the jar of life and lays it bare for objective analysis and

observation, only then does true understanding spring up in the mind. Here, it must be agreed that understanding is manifold and of various kinds, so that one particular object may also be explained in quite the opposite way, perhaps reasonably too! Hence, what is intended here is understanding in terms of the Noble Truths, according to which existence is regarded not as something permanent, with a "self" or ego, but as an impersonal process, arising and passing away dependent on conditions; that is to say, as impermanent and subject to suffering.

The most primitive instinct in all beings is the search for happiness and security against danger, disease and death. If life were not impermanent then there would be no need and no craving for security and protection; likewise the search after happiness and pleasure is another proof of the inherent nature of suffering. The same is true of the delusion and emptiness of self, because if there were such a thing as "self" then it would mean that we would be free from the clutches of death and from all misery. "Self" presupposes "ownership" and being the Master or Possessor of this life. Nobody ever wishes to suffer or die. If there were a real self then it would prevent all kinds of suffering, death, etc.

But that does not happen! There is only self-delusion which in reality is the root of all suffering. Conditioned by this delusion, known to Buddhists as a *avijja*, beings engage themselves in this mad bustle of activities, driven all the time by manifold cravings. Actions must produce reactions and these acts of craving cannot but produce results, which means the continuance of this stream of life, of this cycle of births and deaths. But this unsatisfactory state of affairs need not create undue anxiety, frustration or pessimism; in fact, it should be the greatest incentive to optimism, hope and assurance. These activities, albeit subject to suffering, certainly are capable of produc-

ing happiness at least momentarily, depending, of course, on whether they are craving-free. In other words, suffering, as a part of existence, is rooted in craving. Therefore, if this root-cause were removed then there would be no reason why lasting happiness and absolute peace should not be attained. This, a deathless state of everlasting happiness, called *Nibbana*, is the goal of Buddhist devotion.

With this background, the rational faculty is not limited to barren intellectualism; it arouses the volition to transform knowledge into living truth, besides causing a definite enrichment of the emotional faculty. Such understanding may arise as a result of study and hearing of the *Dhamma*, or through deep independent thinking and observation of things and, again, through meditation. Although Faith is generally supported by this factor, nevertheless, true understanding necessarily must also have the support of Faith in order to free itself from the dryness of being merely theoretical. The same is true in the case of will or determination. This must likewise be based on faith in order to maintain its firmness and vigour by which theory is translated into practice.

The function of the volitional faculty as purposive will, resoluteness or determination is the drive, the propulsive agency that transforms knowledge into action. It functions on the basis of understanding as a factor that harnesses mental energy for one-pointed application or singleness of aim. It frees intellect from dryness and prevents emotion from indulgence and over activity, that is, from undue dissipation of mental energy, thus mobilizing purpose and concentrated effort. Although this faculty has been mentioned last, yet it is no less important than the other two. It is volition which invests every action, whether in body, speech or mind, with the potentiality of producing results. In fact, all these three faculties are mutually complementary in the realization of their common goal, *Nibbana*.

Finally, let us illustrate the functions of these faculties by means of a comparison with the construction of a building, for devotion is also a constructive activity after all. Understanding is like the plan and estimate; Will is the actual execution of the work of construction according to the plan; and Faith is like the building materials needed for the construction.

Without a proper plan construction may prove positively dangerous and the exclusion of the other two functions would mean that there would be no construction whatsoever. Thus it is that in Buddhist devotion the task of building a spiritual structure is accomplished with the mutual co-operation and assistance of all the various faculties of the mind.

ACHARYA BHIKKHU BUDDHARAKKHITA

COMPASSION IN MAHAYANA BUDDHISM

When we turn our attention to the deliberately reasoned systems of Mahayana philosophy we find that their appeal is to intellectual understanding and reason, but they gain their *raison d'être* from the motive of compassion. For they represent the attempt, through meditation and reflection, to penetrate further into the supreme truth held necessary for universal good. This can be seen in such a doctrinal scripture as the *Samdhinirmocana Sutra* which Etienne Lamotte has translated as "Explication of the Mysteries." Here, when in the assembly of faithful disciples a Bodhisattva rises to propound a question to the Lord, the Lord responds:—

Thou askest... (me)... on this point for the good of all men, for the welfare of all men, out of pity for the world, for the interest, the good, the welfare, of all creatures, gods and men. Good, very good! Listen then, and I will explain...

This formula occurs many times, in this as well as in other sutras. What follows is often quite technical and scholastic. But repetition of such words of introduction to the philosophical discourses keeps the reader reminded that the professed motive underlying the rational inquiry is pity for the world wandering in its ignorance and error.

We note the same motive appearing in the great Mahayana thinkers also. Thus the shattering dialectic of Nagarjuna, showing the emptiness of all phenomenal determinations, is directed to clearing the mind of illusions that

hinder intuition of final, releasing truth. Likewise, the reasonings of Asanga and Vasubandhu to prove the ideational character of all things are intended to purify the insight of a Bodhisattva so that his great compassion may function to the fullest extent. In his *Mahayana-Samgraha*, Asanga not only expounds an idealistic metaphysics but also sets forth the thirty-two attributes of the Bodhisattva, among which are perfect self-understanding and boundless compassion. Vasubandhu, in his famous treatise in twenty stanzas, compares the final insight into this same metaphysical idealism to the awakening from a dream. The implication of all this is clear. One who is a Bodhisattva, and no longer deceived by the illusions, which haunt his suffering fellows, can the more freely guide them along the way to Buddhahood and truth. Through compassion philosophy thus becomes an instrument for salvation of all the living. Enlightenment is no longer an end for its own sake. It is the highest means of a selfless devotion to universal good. In the scripture known as *Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana* the author tells us that his first and main purpose in writing was "to save all sentient beings from suffering and to bring them to ultimate happiness." The testimony of this author, whom tradition designates as Asvaghosha, is explicit as to his motive.

—CLARENCE H. HAMILTON
Journal of American Oriental Society
July-September 1950

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“—————ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS

Shri Sri Prakasa delivered a most useful Convocation Address to the new graduates of the Madras University on the 23rd of August. Right education for the right type of Democracy was his theme. After describing the power of the people in a real Democracy through their elected leaders, he added that it was

not only a description of one of the many forms of governance; it imposes definite obligations on the individual; it prescribes a specific line of activity for all to follow, and which none can escape that live in it.

Shri Sri Prakasa referred to an important factor which influences the structure and strength of a Democracy, *viz.*, the attitude of the citizen to the problem of choosing his walk in life and of earning his livelihood. He pleaded that “all the professions should be regarded as equal”:—

The unfortunate ideas that have come into existence, of high and low, both as regards individuals and their callings, have to go if true democracy is to be established. We are inclined to believe some professions as honourable, some persons as respectable, but others not so. The great problem of democratic society is to equalize the status of men as well as their means of livelihood. The only difference that can be made and should be made, is in the matter of anti-social individuals, and professions that are also such. Otherwise we must be prepared to give an equal status to all the many professions that go to make it possible for our variegated society in all its facets, to exist and function.

Space does not allow our quoting at length his cogent reasoning and deductions on this point.

In earning his livelihood the citizen is serving the state. This aspect of the duty of the citizen for serving the state *i.e.*, the people, is not widely accepted. Men become servants or shopkeepers, bankers or brokers, mechanics or lawyers, etc., primarily for the sake of

making money. Financial security at least, if not prosperity, is the dominant motive which determines a man's choice of employment or profession. Even the inspiration and the impetus of building a home and rearing a family are ebbing away in the stress of competition. Shri Sri Prakasa stressed the value of home building on another occasion; at Coimbatore, addressing an Educational Conference on August 25th, he said:—

The home was the nexus of human society. Man put himself under the restrictions of home voluntarily, so that he might be able to build a great and desirable society.

The earning of livelihood and the building of the home are the two most vital builders of Democracy. Both secure to the individual citizen his rights, both impose upon him his duties, and both demand of him certain sacrifices. Manu, the ancient Lawgiver, proclaimed:—

As all living creatures subsist by receiving support from air, even so (the members of) all orders subsist by receiving support from the householder.

Because men of the three (other) orders are daily supported by the householder with (gifts) of sacred knowledge and food, therefore (the order of) householders is the most excellent order.

The greatest of sages in historical times, Gautama Buddha, has named Right Livelihood as one of the steps of the Noble Eightfold Path. We would draw our readers' attention to the contribution on this subject with which THE ARYAN PATH for October 1955 opens. A mystical basis is necessary to surround with a moral atmosphere the rite of earning bread and butter.

Shri Sri Prakasa's ideas have brought to mind lines of vital thought to be found in the fourth chapter of *A Serious*

Call to a Devout and Holy Life by William Law, of whom one who knew him intimately in day to day living spoke as "a worthy and pious man, who believed all that he professed, and practised all that he enjoined."

Not many educated Indians are fully conversant with the energizing ideas of this eighteenth-century English mystic; some of these are remarkable and stirring; among them are those which deal with our subject. To begin with, the millionaire and the pauper are told:—

It is not left to the rich to gratify their passions in the indulgences and pride of life, nor to the poor, to vex and torment their hearts with the poverty of their state.

To the atheistic materialist the reference to the Deity in the following extracts may sound like nonsensical superstition; but substitute the World State whose emergence the theist and the atheist, the pantheist and the poli-theist, alike desire today and Law's thought becomes a model of modern expression.

Men may, and must differ in their employments, but yet they must all act for the same ends, as dutiful servants of God, in the right and pious performance of their several callings.

It is this mind of ours which Law calls upon us to mind, the mind commonly governed by our covetousness.

If we are worldly or earthly-minded in our employments, if we are carried on with vain desires, and covetous tempers, only to satisfy ourselves, we can no more be said to live to the glory of God, than gluttons and drunkards can be said to eat and drink to the glory of God.

Most of the employments of life are in their own nature lawful.

The influence of lawlessness in our own nature proceeds to permeate our home and our place of business, and makes us bad citizens. What counts is our motive and how we discharge our obligations to and through the avenue which brings us our daily bread, not what our profession or vocation is.

The husbandman that tilleth the ground is employed in an honest business, that is

necessary in life and very capable of being made an acceptable service unto God. But if he labours and toils, not to serve any reasonable ends of life, but in order to have his plough made of silver, and to have his horses harnessed in gold, the honesty of his employment is lost as to him, and his labour becomes his folly.

Space forbids our quoting more. But all citizens of our Republic in the making, and especially the young men and women to whom the good and patriotic Governor of Madras spoke, should read the literature of universal mysticism; they will derive great aid from it in choosing *their* own employment or profession.

We have purposely quoted an Occidental Mystic. The Indian of today is facing the danger of becoming insular. A wrong view of *Swa-desh* and *Swa-deshi*, of *Swa-raj* and *Swa-tantra* prevails. A right philosophical definition of *Videshi* should be formulated. Only a broad mystical philosophy, universal and true, and therefore neither Oriental nor Occidental, will enable Indians of today to appreciate at their true value the words and deeds of Gandhiji, who is treated as an impractical doctrinaire while being acclaimed as the Father of the Nation!

Something vitally important is contained in the resolution passed by the Executive Committee of the Sarva Seva Sangh on the 5th of August last. We have space only for this extract:—

Democracy today means rule of a Party. Sarva Seva Sangh desires to make it into a rule of the people. It is therefore not interested in the victory or defeat of any particular political party. It aims at a change of heart in all. If it supports or opposes anyone the process of bringing about a change of heart would be obstructed. Sarva Seva Sangh will have nothing to do with the political election. Not only will it keep aloof from seeking election, it will not even help any one in the elections.

Like the Sangh we believe a change of heart in political leaders, and in those who elect them, to be an indispensable condition for lasting political reform. We do not, however, commend the

Sangh's stand, eminently proper for a non-political organization, to the emulation of the ordinary citizen, who must fulfil his civic obligations according to his own best judgment.

The United Nations Social and Economic Council has been discussing a new international convention on slavery, which supplements the League of Nations convention of 1926. This convention adopted by the Council at its Geneva meeting in August gives signatory nations the same right of visiting, search and seizure of slaves as applied to vessels suspected of being engaged in piracy. It was revealed in the course of the Geneva deliberations that even today there are more than 11 million slaves of which 8 million are in Latin America. Saudi Arabia has nearly 500,000 among its total population of 10 millions.

From the report submitted by Mr. Hans Engen, President of the Council, it is evident that while slavery is still practised in the "classical" forms in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Trucial States and Sheikdom of Aden Protectorate, in other parts of the world it takes such forms as the purchase or inheritance of women, debt bondage, compulsory labour and the exploitation of children under the guise of adoption. Mecca, the great centre of religious worship of the Muslims, is one of the few places in the world where there is a public slave market. Independent detailed evidence supplied to the United Nations by the Anti-Slavery Society

shows that many of the Africans sold into slavery in Mecca make the journey in organized groups under the impression that they are on a pilgrimage.

Organizations, in the name of religion, try to perpetuate numerous evils and among them slavery. But slavery has numerous faces. Most civilized men and women are slaves to their own passions. Citizens put up with legal enactments which have an enslaving tendency. "Cultured" society not only puts up with slavery in the form of prostitution, etc., but connives at it and in some measure demands it. The spirit of slavery exploits devotees in the name of religion, as politicians exploit patriots. Ignorance is the womb of all slavery. The single piece of knowledge, that every man is divine and all men are brothers, is capable of breaking the psychic bondage of slavery. Each man, each woman, whatever the age of the body, can by right effort ascend to the mental attitude of true liberty.

We are glad Shri C. Rajagopalachari has returned to the field of battle against the medical superstition about the B. C. G. Vaccination campaign. In *The Hindu* of 8th September he writes about very important pronouncements made by recognized authorities like Dr. Carrol Palmer, Head of the Copenhagen T.B. Research Team, and Professor Waltgren of Sweden. His whole article should be studied by parents whose children, and other adults, are maltreated by enthusiastic but careless medicos.