



"Man is sacrifice. His first 24 years are the morning, and the next 44 years the midday, Libation."

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WHAT IS GOD?

There dwelleth in the heart of every creature, O Arjuna, the Master—ISHWARA—who by his magic power causeth all things and creatures to revolve mounted upon the universal wheel of time. Take sanctuary with him alone, O son of Bharata, with all thy soul; by his grace thou shalt obtain supreme happiness, the eternal place.

—BHAGAVAD-GITA, XVIII. 61-62

In our last issue (pp. 582-83) we referred to the interest of many people in the subject of God as a basis of life and conduct. We revert to it here, drawing attention to an article by Mr. J. D. Beresford appearing elsewhere.

There are two directions in which men have sought for God: outward and inward. We look outside ourselves, and ask what is the reality that must lie behind the ever changing appearances of the phenomenal

world, in which all things are extended in space, are constantly arising and passing away in time, and in which each event is at once an effect and a cause; and the great question has found many widely differing answers. Some men have seen a reflection, as it were, of their own personalities behind the various forces of Nature and have dreamed of pantheons full of gods; others have conceived that, just as on a small scale a weapon or a cooking pot needs a human

artificer to bring it into being, so the universe must have owed its existence to a creator—a sort of cosmical mechanic, of vast power, but still man-like. Thus both polytheists and monotheists have made for themselves gods in their own image, and have regarded deity as a personal being outside themselves, outside the universe. Other, and more philosophical thinkers have looked deeper into the heart of the mystery, and have postulated a reality at the back of appearances unknowable and inconceivable by the human mind—a permanent substratum underlying this universe of constant change. This ultimate principle has been called by various names: the primordial substance, “the thing-in-itself,” “the One Life,” “the Rootless Root,” “the Absolute”; the Christian mystic Eckhart spoke of it as “the Godhead”; Indian thinkers called it *Parabrahm*—that which is beyond Brahma; some of the Northern Buddhists, anxious to avoid even the shadow of anthropomorphism, have denoted it by a word for which the nearest English equivalent is “Suchness”. Being, by hypothesis, unconditioned and absolute, all speculation about It is useless.

The second way by which we may approach the problem of God, is the inner or subjective way. When a man begins to wonder about himself, his first naïve and superficial impression is that he is identical with his physical body; then further reflection convinces him that

this theory is fallacious, for he discovers in himself much that is obviously not the body, nor of the body: in fact as soon as he forms the conception “my body,” he is implying a distinction between that body and himself. His next idea is that he is a soul inhabiting the body; and by soul he conceives of a subtler form in the likeness of the physical; and then he finds that behind that subtler body is his mind, or thinking principle; and for a time he identifies himself with that. But with still deeper reflection, he discovers that, just as he can say “my body,” so he can say “my mind,” thus distinguishing between himself and his mind. In this manner we can think away, or rather objectivise, one constituent after another of our very being; but always there is left an ultimate, irresolvable element, that can never be thought away nor objectivised for it is the subject of all thinking—the real essential SELF, about which reason can say nothing save that It Is. But while reason cannot help us, experience can; and for this we have the united testimony of the mystics of every age and every clime. They may give us different explanations of the lofty states of consciousness to which they have attained; but as to the nature of their inner experience they are substantially at one. Some have called it “union with Christ,” others “union with the inner God,” others still, “realisation of the SELF”. All are agreed that the state in question brings,

with an enormous expansion of consciousness, a burning love for all beings, a vision of truth unveiled, and bliss that is unspeakable.

This reaching up to the ultimate principles of the outer and inner worlds is older than any written history, for nowhere is it more clearly and nobly described than in the Upanishads, which are among the oldest of books, and have been thought by some to have been translated into their present Sanskrit form from an unknown original some time back of 1000 B. C. The sages, whose teachings are recorded in the Upanishads, sensed at the

back of the Universe an ultimate principle; and they discovered in themselves an ultimate principle; and then by a sublime intuitional leap, they bridged the gulf between these two ultimates. There cannot be two Absolutes, they said in effect, but One. The innermost SELF in man is one with the fundamental principle of the Universe. Man—the essential man, and not his outer garments of body and mind that seem to separate him from his fellows—is literally one with God and with all other men; and it is at once his task and destiny to realise to the full all the implications of that unity.

When, years ago, we first travelled over the East, exploring the penetralia of its deserted sanctuaries, two saddening and ever-recurring questions oppressed our thoughts: *Where, WHO, WHAT is GOD? Who ever saw the IMMORTAL SPIRIT of man, so as to be able to assure himself of man's immortality?*

It was while most anxious to solve these perplexing problems that we came into contact with certain . . . sages of the Orient . . . They showed us that by combining science with religion, the existence of God and immortality of man's spirit may be demonstrated like a problem of Euclid . . . The Oriental philosophy has room for no other faith than an absolute and immovable faith in the omnipotence of man's own immortal self . . . This omnipotence comes from the kinship of man's spirit with the Universal Soul—God! The latter, they said, can never be demonstrated but by the former. Man-spirit proves God-spirit, as the one drop of water proves a source from which it must have come . . . prove the soul of man by its wondrous powers—you have proved God!

In our studies, mysteries were shown to be no mysteries. Names and places that to the Western mind have only a significance derived from Eastern fable, were shown to be realities. Reverently we stepped in spirit within the temple of Isis; to lift aside the veil of "the one that is and was and shall be" at Saïs; to look through the rent curtain of the Sanctum Sanctorum at Jerusalem; and even to interrogate within the crypts which once existed beneath the sacred edifice, the mysterious Bath-Kol. The *Filia Vocis*—the daughter of the divine voice—responded from the mercy-seat within the veil, and science, theology, every human hypothesis and conception born of imperfect knowledge, lost for ever their authoritative character in our sight. The one-living God had spoken through his oracle—man, and we were satisfied. Such knowledge is priceless; and it has been hidden only from those who overlooked it, derided it, or denied its existence.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY in 1877,

RAJA RAM MOHAN RAI

"No country can boast a purer or holier son than was this Indian reformer."

—H. P. BLAVATSKY.

[On the 27th of this month, in 1833, this great Indian religious reformer died in England, and was buried at Bristol on the 18th of October.

On the occasion of this Centenary we print two articles, the first dealing with the Founder of the Brahmo Samaj, and the second with his influence on the religious mentality of the United States of America.

In introducing these two articles we reprint an appreciation by H. P. Blavatsky of Ram Mohan Rai* from *The Theosophist* for March 1881.—EDS.]

I

AN APPRECIATION

The Brahmo Samaj, as is well known, was founded by the late Rajah Ram Mohun Roy, a Rarhee Brahmin, son of Ram Khant Roy of Burdwan, and one of the purest, most philanthropic, and enlightened men India ever produced. He was born about 1774, was given a thorough education in the vernacular, Persian, Arabic and Sanskrit, and, later, mastered English thoroughly, acquired a knowledge of Hebrew, Greek and Latin, and studied French. His intellectual power was confessedly very great, while his manners were most refined and charming and his moral character without a stain. Add to this a dauntless moral courage, perfect modesty, warm humanitarian bias, patriotism, and a fervid religious feeling, and we have before us the picture of a man of the noblest type. Such a person was the ideal of a religious reformer. Had his constitution been more rugged and his sensi-

tiveness less acute, he might have lived to see far greater fruits of his self-sacrificing labours than he did. One searches the record of his life and work in vain for any evidence of personal conceit, or a disposition to make himself figure as a heaven-sent messenger. He thought he found in the elements of Christianity the highest moral code ever given to man; but from first to last he rejected as unphilosophical and absurd the Trinitarian doctrine of the Christians. The missionaries, instead of hailing him as an ally to win the Hindus from polytheism, and bring them three-fourths of the way towards their own standing-ground, bitterly attacked his unitarian views, and obliged him to publish sundry pamphlets showing the weakness of their cause and the logical strength of his own. He died in England, September 27, 1833, and was buried on the 18th of October, leaving behind him a circle of

*In *The Theosophical Movement* for 17th August 1933 other extracts from articles on the Brahmo Samaj are reprinted from the same journal conducted by H. P. Blavatsky.—EDS.

sorrowing acquaintance that included some of the best people of that country. It is said by Miss Martineau that his death was hastened by the anguish he felt to see the awful living lie that practical Christianity was in its stronghold. Miss Mary Carpenter does not touch upon this point in her Memoir of his Last Days in England, but she prints among other sermons that were preached after his decease

one by the Rev. J. Scott Porter, a Presbyterian clergyman of Belfast, Ireland, in which he says that "Offences against the laws of morality, which are too often passed over as trivial transgressions in European society, excited the deepest horror in him." And this is quite enough to give the colour of truth to Miss Martineau's assertion, for we all know what the morals of Christendom are.

H. P. BLAVATSKY

II

INDIA'S AMBASSADOR TO THE WEST

[**Ramananda Chatterjee**, the venerable Editor of *The Modern Review*, gives in this article a good picture of the learning and the sterling character of Ram Mohan Rai.—EDS.]

An accredited political ambassador carries with him credentials from the State he represents. Whatever his capacity for the office, it invests him with the authority necessary for the performance of his duties. A spiritual ambassador from one country to another does not hold any formal office and cannot expect to have credentials from any earthly authority. His only credentials are his *sādhana* and *siddhi*, his spiritual endeavour and attainment, his character and spirituality.

Raja Rammohun Roy went to England as an ambassador or envoy from the Court of the Emperor of Delhi, such as it was in 1830. At first, the East India Company refused to recognise him either as a Raja or as an Envoy. The ministers of the British Crown, however, re-

cognised his embassy and his title of Raja. But, what is more significant, "the people of England, in their own spontaneous way, acknowledged him as ambassador from the people of India". Their subsequent cordial and enthusiastic appreciation of Rammohun Roy, the man, showed that, consciously or unconsciously, they had found in him India's spiritual ambassador to the West.

Mysticism, asceticism, and *sannyāsa* or renunciation of the world are generally associated with Indian spirituality.

Rammohun Roy was a mystic. His mysticism has not been perceived even by many of his admirers and *bhaktas*, on account of the rational cast of his mind, the polemical character of the bulk of his writings and the fact that he was the first political

agitator in modern India. But he was in reality "above all and beneath all a religious personality. . . . The root of his life was religion. He would never have been able to go so far or to move his countrymen so mightily as he did but for the driving power of an intense theistic passion." His Bengali hymns give some indications of his mysticism. Poetry springs from a deeper source in the soul than anything that is merely didactic, controversial, doctrinal, or philosophical. Referring to an article in *The Modern Review* for October, 1928, on *Rammohun Roy the Devotee*, by Dhirendranath Vedāntavāgīś, Romain Rolland has observed that therein—

The mystic side of his genius has been brought to the fore. . . . The freedom of his intellect would not have been so valuable if it had not been based upon devotional elements equally profound and varied.

Possessing a comprehensive view of human nature, a faith in its varied elements—intellectual, imaginative, emotional and æsthetic, and in the utility, inter-relation and inter-action of all of them, he could not become a *sannyāsi*, an ascetic, renouncing the world and mortifying the flesh as almost an end in itself. This was not because the world and the flesh had superior attractions for him.

Dr. Alexander Duff's biography gives some idea of the Raja's mode of life in India :—

In a pleasant garden-house in the leafy suburbs of Calcutta the Raja Rammohun Roy, then 56 years of age,

was spending his declining days in meditation on divine truth, broken only by works of practical benevolence among his countrymen, and soon by preparations for a visit to England.

Dr. Carpenter wrote in his biography of the Raja after his death :—

Possessed of the Raja's unbounded confidence, acquainted with all his movements and enabled to judge with complete accuracy of his habits and dispositions, the unhesitating and unequivocal testimony of this [the Hare] family, one and all, to the unvarying purity of his conduct and the refined delicacy of his sentiments is as decisive as it is valuable.

In the earlier part of his life, Rammohun Roy had undergone austerities as a part of his spiritual endeavour and discipline. Early in life he wanted to become a *sannyāsi*. His mother dissuaded him from adopting that course. As a boy he made bricks with the mystic syllable *Om* imprinted on them, and with these built a *vedi* or platform, on which he would sit for hours together engaged in spiritual exercises. It is related that years later, when he had grown up to manhood, he performed *puraścharana* twenty-two times. *Puraścharana* consists in taking a *mantra*—the name of a god or an attribute of God—for mental repetition, and concentrating the mind on the name in such a manner that at every repetition the thing connoted by the name may be perceived by the *sādhaka* or devotee as present. If there is no such perception, the mere repetition of the name is considered invalid. The *sādhaka* is to rise early and, tak-

ing his seat with the rising of the sun, he should go on repeating the *mantra* till the sun reaches the meridian. While so engaged, he must not allow his attention to be diverted. If concentration fails but once, the whole thing is spoiled and he must begin anew. Through the whole of this spiritual exercise, one is required to strictly observe twelve rules of austerity, such as the vow of silence, sleeping on the ground without a bed, *brahmacharya* proper, etc. The devotee must complete the prescribed number of repetitions of the name, which may be "ten, twenty or thirty thousand, culminating in thirty-two thousand of the *Mahānirvāṇa Tantra*". (D. Vedāntavāgīś.) That Rammohun performed *puraścharaṇa* twenty-two times shows what great concentration of mind he was capable of and what austerities he underwent.

In the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* (vii, II) Prajāpati teaches Indra of "a state of supreme enlightenment, the highest state attainable by the Self even before death, when it is not necessary to separate itself from the mundane existence, nor even to deny itself the enjoyment of mundane pleasures." By his spiritual exercises Rammohun Roy had attained to this state, he had achieved direct apprehension (*aparokshānubhūti*) and vision of the Oversoul (*Atmasākshātkāra*). These he held to be equivalent to *samādhi*. And he taught (in Bengali), "When *samādhi* is attained, it is to be realized that all things are

in God and God is immanent in all." This makes it clear why his God-vision and God-realization did not lead him to renounce the world, but led him rather to engage in all mundane activities for *lokaśreyas* or the good of the world. This *Brāhmī-sthiti* ("dwelling in God") of the Raja explains his habit of constant prayer noted by his close associates in England. His multifarious activities do not conflict with his acceptance of the Vedānta. He accepted it according to his own interpretation, *not* according to the interpretation to which reference is made in the following sentence in his *Letter on English Education* to Lord Amherst:—

Nor will youths be fitted to be better members of society by the Vedāntic doctrines which teach them to believe that all visible things have no real existence, that as father, brother, etc., have no actual entity, they consequently deserve no real affection, and therefore the sooner we escape from them and leave the world the better.

That so great a *sannyāsi* as the Swāmi Vivekānanda did not see any conflict between God-realization and activities for *lokaśreyas* (good of the world) appears from the following passage in Sister Nivedita's *Notes of Some Wanderings with the Swāmi Vivekānanda*, p. 19:—

It was here, too, that we heard a long talk on Rammohun Roy, in which he [Swāmi Vivekānanda] pointed out three things as the dominant notes of this teacher's message, his acceptance of the Vedānta, his preaching of patriotism, and the love that embraced the Mussulman equally with the Hindu. In all these things, he claimed himself to have taken

up the task that the breadth and foresight of Rammohun Roy had mapped out.

That Rammohun Roy's view of the relation between the world and spirituality is not necessarily in conflict with the ideas of the very orthodox Hindu household—er is evident from the following passage in the speech delivered by the late Sir Gooroo Dass Banerjee as Chairman at the Rammohun Roy Anniversary, 1889 :—

But one thing, I believe, we all will be agreed upon—all sects, whether orthodox Hindus or progressive Brahmos, whether Mahomedans or Christians—that to Rammohun Roy is due the credit of forcibly pointing out to learned Hindus that religion does not require one to be a *yogi*, a *suttee*, or to go to the forest, but that home and society are the best surroundings of appropriate worship.

The manner in which Raja Rammohun Roy prepared himself for his comprehensive mission in life makes it clear that he was the spiritual ambassador to the West, not merely of Hinduism, but of all the main religions prevalent in India, whether indigenous or not.

Born in an orthodox family, Hindu culture was his earliest social heritage. But it was Islamic culture which first woke his mind in boyhood. The foundations of his Persian and Arabic studies were laid at Patna. It was then that he became acquainted with Euclid's geometry, Porphyry's logic and the philosophy of Plato ("Aflatun") and Aristotle ("Aristuh") in an Arabic guise. And then also it

was that he felt in his blood the raptures of Persian 'ghazals,' though in those years of his boyhood he could but dimly apprehend them. Later in life he studied the Koran and other Muhammadan scriptures and became well versed in Muhammadan law and jurisprudence and in the polemics of all the seventy-three schools of Muslim theology. The free thought and universalistic outlook of the Muhammadan rationalists (the *Mutazilas* of the eighth century) and the Muhammadan unitarians (the *Murwahidin*) contributed their share of influence to his mental growth.

His acquaintance with Sanskrit learning followed by some years his introduction to Persian and Arabic letters. He had a general knowledge of the Vedic *Samhitās*, though probably he never made a scholarly study of them. But he very carefully studied and mastered Hindu *Smriti*, including Law, Jurisprudence and Social Institution, the *Darśanas* or Systems of Philosophy, and the entire body of religious literature including the *Brāhmanas*, the *Upanishads*, the *Purānas* and the *Tantras*. It was, however, the *Upanishads*, the *Brahma-sutras* and the *Gītā* that influenced him most profoundly and shaped his personal religion and his philosophy of life.

The Jaina scriptures and the Buddhist tradition in the *Mahāyāna* version were also known to him, but more through his travels and personal contacts than through closet studies. He was

also familiar with the cults, practices and doctrines (and perhaps also the literatures) of the various mediæval Indian religious movements of reforming sects like the Kabīr-panthis, the Nānak-panthis, the Dādu-panthis, and the Rāmāyat sects of north India, with all of whom he claimed fraternity as a fellow-monotheist.

The study of the Jewish and Christian scriptures came last of all. He mastered Hebrew, Syriac and Greek in order to study the Old Testament in Hebrew and the New Testament in Greek, and the Talmud, the Tarjum, and the Syriac versions, both for exegetical purposes and for tracing the development of Jewish and Christian doctrines and thus laying the foundations of Comparative Religion.

His Semitic studies had been preceded by those "directed to the literature of Rationalism in Religion and Liberty in Politics. He accordingly cultivated the literature of empirical philosophy and scientific thought from Bacon to Locke and Newton, as well as the propaganda of free thinking and 'illumination' in Hume, Gibbon, Voltaire, Volney, Thomas Paine and others among the Coryphæi of Rationalism and Neotheophilanthropy."

Thus the Raja's mind was enriched with the highest and best in Semitic culture in both Hebraic and Arabic traditions, and above all he imbibed in an unbiased spirit the Christian culture, which he traced to a blend of a Hebraic stock with Greek, Roman and heathen grafts. But true to his first initiation,

he always maintained against the missionaries that modern Western civilization had another basis besides the composite Christian tradition. This was the scientific and economic basis which he traced to the Advancement of Science and the application of scientific knowledge to arts, industries and machinery for the expansion of man's prerogative and power over Nature, a movement associated with the Baconian revolution in the seventeenth century. In later life he more and more directed his studies from doctrines to institutions, and his efforts from Polemics to Reform, and with the help of economic, juristic and political literature made a comparative study of social institutions with the same easy mastery that he had shown in the comparative study of Religions. (B. N. Seal.)

It would be entirely wrong to assume that the various kinds of knowledge and culture which Rammohun Roy acquired were merely juxtaposed and mechanically combined in his mind. No. The unity of the human race had been already borne in upon him. And he had a highly synthetic genius. In his day he found in India a conflict of three bodies of culture, three civilizations, the Hindu, the Moslem and the Christian or Occidental. He mastered and assimilated the three and made a harmonious blending of their many excellences in his unique personality, thereby pointing "the way to the solution of the larger problem of international culture and civilization in human history, and became a precursor, and archetype, a prophet of coming Humanity. He laid the foundation of the true League of Nations in a *League of National Cultures*."

It is only necessary to add that he included not only Hindu, Moslem and Christian theists in one theistic fraternity as brothers in faith; he extended this fellowship and co-operation to those who by whatever name would acknowledge some Principle of the universe, the need of meditation on that Principle as good, and the love and service of man as the guiding principle of the conduct of life. Buddhists and Jains and believers in a Law of Nature he would therefore acknowledge as not against the theistic fraternity but with it. (B. N. Seal.)

So, had he been living in our day, non-theistic humanism and philosophical communism would have been included within the wide sweep of his fraternal monotheistic sympathy.

The more a political ambassador sincerely appreciates and respects the polity, civilization and culture of the country to whose Court he is accredited, the greater is his real success. This is much more true of a spiritual ambassador. From what has been written above about Rammohun Roy's conscious and unconscious preparation for his life-work it would perhaps be easy to understand that he was in a position to appreciate and respect the religion and culture of all civilized peoples of the East and the West. His attitude in the West was not that of a teacher standing on a high pedestal. Though he was really a superman, he felt and conducted himself sincerely as a brother. For, he had found that "the core of religious truth, comprehending the Unity of God as Spirit, His worship in spirit and in truth, the

immortality of the soul, and the ethical discipline as the basis of spiritual life, formed the central teaching of the canonical scriptures of the historic religions (the Hindu, the Moslem and the Christian)". To him at first,

There was only one Theism with certain historical varieties, *e.g.*, a Hindu Theism, an Islamic Theism, and a Christian Theism, each variety being centred round a particular scripture,—whether it was the Veda and Vedānta, the Koran, or the Bible.

Later,

He perceived that the universal Truth was stressed in different ways, had different accents and different historic utterances. The Vedānta he always considered as strongest in Jñāna, the knowledge of the Unity of all souls and of the world in Brahma;—Islam he considered as strongest in the sense of the divine government and a militant equality of man with man; and Christianity he considered as strongest in ethical and social guidance to peace and happiness in the path of life each in his view was to preserve its historic or traditional continuity, though each was to grow by *mutual contact and assimilation and by convergence, to a common ideal.* (B. N. Seal.)

The Raja's views underwent still further evolution, but that is outside the scope of this article.

It has been stated above that it was the *Upanishads*, the *Brahma-sutras* and the *Gītā* that influenced Rammohun Roy most profoundly and shaped his personal religion and his philosophy of life. Hence, though his was a synthetized multiple personality, his spirituality was racial of the soil and Hindu in character in its essence. For,

The victory of *ātman*, of the higher

self of man, has never been proclaimed from the heights of manhood anywhere except in India with such an unhesitant voice. It was this message that Rammohun Roy brought anew, when in the India of his days it had become narrow and perverted, disclaimed in practice The strange thing is that Rammohun Roy was eager to invoke the message of the spirit not merely within the narrow boundaries of his own self-forgetful land; he assayed, by the test of the spiritual ideal, every great religious community which had in any manner obscured the true form of its own inner self in mere external forms and in irrational rituals. (Rabindranath Tagore.)

It remains now to give some idea of the impression produced by his personality in the West. Miss Sophia Dobson Collett writes in her biography of the Raja :—

Rammohun Roy's presence in this country made the English people aware, as they had never been before, of the dignity, the culture and the piety of the race they had conquered in the East. India became incarnate in him, and dwelt among us and we beheld her glory. In the court of the king, in the halls of the legislature, in the select coteries of fashion, in the society of philosophers and men of letters, in Anglican Church, and Nonconformist meeting-house, in the privacy of many a home and before the wondering crowds of Lancashire operatives, Rammohun Roy stood forth the visible and personal embodiment of our Eastern Empire . . . We can hardly fail to see in Rammohun's visit a landmark in the general history of modern civilization. The West had long gone to the East. With him the East began to come to the West. India has followed in his wake, and Japan and China have followed in the wake of India. Leading scions of the hoariest civilizations are now eager pupils in the schools of the youngest civilization.

As a consequence, the East is being rapidly occidentalized, and there are signs not a few of the gradual orientaling of the West. This movement towards the healing of the schism which has for ages divided mankind and the effort to intermingle more thoroughly the various ingredients of humanity are rich in promise for the humanizing and unifying of man. The rôle which Rammohun had played in this world-drama among his own countrymen was fitly crowned by his appearance in the chief city of the globe.

According to Miss Mary Carpenter :—

The highest honours were publicly accorded to him, and a place was awarded to him among the foreign ambassadors at the coronation of the sovereign; persons the most remarkable for their social standing and literary eminence sought his society, and highly esteemed the privilege of intercourse with him;—he was received into our English homes not only as a distinguished guest, but as a friend; and when he was prostrated on the bed of sickness and death in a foreign land, he was surrounded with the most loving attentions, tended with the most anxious solicitude, and finally laid in the grave surrounded with true mourners who felt him akin to them in spirit, if not connected with him by the ties of earthly relationship.

Mr. Sutherland says :—

The scene at Manchester when he visited the great manufactories was very amusing. All the workmen struck work, and men, women and children rushed in crowds to see "the king of Ingee". Many of the great unwashed insisted upon shaking hands with him.

At a special meeting of the Unitarian Association held in his honour, Sir John Bowring observed :—

They have endeavoured to imagine what would be their sensations if a Plato or a Socrates, a Milton or a

Newton were unexpectedly to honour them with their presence. I recollect that a poet, who has well been called divine, has drawn a beautiful picture of the feelings of those who first visited the southern hemisphere, and there saw for the first time, the beautiful constellation, the Golden Cross. It was with feelings such as they underwent, that I was overwhelmed when I stretched out in your name the hand of welcome to the Raja Rammohun Roy.

Miss Lucy Aikin wrote in her letters to Dr. Channing of America :—

With very great intelligence and ability he unites a modesty and simplicity which win all hearts.

He is indeed a glorious being—a true sage, as it appears, with the genuine humility of the character and with the genuine sensibility, a more engaging tenderness of heart than any class of character can justly claim.

Miss Carpenter has recorded the following little incident :—

The infant son of the Rev. D. Davison, M. A., was named after him "Rammohun Roy". The Raja subsequently evinced a lively interest in the little fellow. Mrs. Davison wrote :—

"His visits to me were generally paid in the nursery, as he insisted on coming up, so as to visit his namesake at the same time, and not to interrupt me. For surely never there was a man of so much modesty and humility. I used to feel quite ashamed of the reverential manner in which he behaved to me. Had I been our Queen, I could not have been approached and taken leave of, with more respect."

The Raja's English biographer beautifully observes in reference to this trait :—

This glimpse of the stately and courtly Brahmin in the nursery, eager to see the baby and thoughtful of the mother's convenience, will be treasured up by his followers to the very last of them as one of the sweetest and most beauti-

ful memories of their founder. Probably no index of character is so decisive as the attitude assumed to mother and child; and specially of religious leaders does this rule hold.

This reminds one of Christ's love of little children, and of Gandhi's in our day.

Dr. Boot, an American physician of London, wrote in a letter to Mr. Estlin on November 27, 1833 :—

To me he [the Raja] stood alone in the simple majesty of, I had almost said, perfect humanity. No one in past history, or in present time, ever came before my judgment clothed in such wisdom, grace and humility. I knew of no tendency even to error.

Calling himself "a sincere follower of Rammohun Roy," Professor Max Müller has observed :—

The German name for prince is *Furst*, in English first, he who is always to the fore, he who courts the place of danger, the first place in fight and the last in flight. Such a *Furst* was Rammohun Roy, a true prince, a real Raja, if Raja also like *Rex*, meant originally the Steersman, the man at the helm.

Miss Lucy Aikin has left on record the following significant story :—

An interesting conversation took place between the Raja and a Scotch gentleman. The question happened to arise, "if two persons were drowning of whom you could only save one and one were your countryman, would you not save him in preference?" "Certainly I should," said the Scotchman. The Raja reprobated the idea of making a choice between the lives of any two fellow-creatures at such a moment—he should save the nearest. But, after a pause, he added :—"No; there is a case in which I should make a choice. If one were a woman, I should rescue her."

I conclude with the following passage from the Raja's biography by Miss Sophia Dobson Collett:—

We stand on the eve of an unprecedented intermingling of East and West. The European and Asiatic streams of human development, which have often tinged each other before, are now approaching a confluence which bids fair to form the one ocean-river of the collective progress of mankind. In the presence of that greater Eastern

question, with its infinite ramifications, industrial, political, moral and religious, the international problems of the passing hour, even the gravest of them, seem dwarfed into parochial pettiness. The nearing dawn of these unmeasured possibilities only throws into clearer prominence the figure of the man whose life-story we have told. He was, if not the prophetic type, at least the precursive hint, of the change that is to come.

RAMANANDA CHATTERJEE

III

EMERSON'S ORIENTAL READING

[Arthur Christy is the author of *The Orient in American Transcendentalism* and is at present engaged in investigating the extent of the oriental influence on American men of letters. To our June number he contributed "Whittier and the Brahmo Samaj," and in the following article he writes about Emerson whose outlook was affected by numerous currents of Oriental thought, one of them being the influence of Raja Ram Mohan Rai. We hope to publish further results of Mr. Christy's interesting line of research.—EDS.]

In the review of Mr. Van Wyck Brooks's *The Life of Emerson* which appeared in a recent number of this Journal are these words:—

Mr. Brooks shows him [Emerson] as a leader of men whose strength lay in the magnetism of his nature which all felt, but few appreciated or understood. How this came to be we are not told, though Emerson himself left a record of his indebtedness to the philosophy of the Ancients. Disgusted with church and dogmatic religion, Emerson turned Eastward and lit his lamp from the ever brilliant fire of the *Bhagavad-Gita* and the *Upanishads* as well as the Greek philosophers. It is pre-eminently to India that we must turn to find the inspiration of the *Over-Soul*, and *Cycles*, of *Spiritual Laws*, and *Compensation*.

I quote this passage because it serves as an admirable indication of the fact that the Oriental

world is not blind to Emerson's indebtedness. I would only supplement it with very pertinent sentences from Protap Chunder Mozoomdar's eulogy, delivered in Concord not long after Emerson's death: "He seems to some of us to have been a geographical mistake. He ought to have been born in India. Perhaps Hindoos were closer kinsmen to him than his own nation."

The space at my disposal precludes discussion of the implications of these statements and the degree to which Emerson's philosophy was tinged by the Orient. I have attempted to examine these subjects fully in a doctoral dissertation entitled *The Orient in American Transcendentalism* which appeared under the imprint of the Columbia University

Press. In this essay I propose only to present the bibliographical sources of Emersonian thought so that informed Theosophists and Orientals may determine for themselves with some degree of accuracy the extent of Emerson's indebtedness to the Vedanta. Evidence of these sources was found in an examination of Emerson's personal library as it exists in Concord to-day, in the published writings, and in the loan-records of the Harvard College Library and the Boston Athenæum.

I shall omit mention of Mohammedan and Confucian literature as well as descriptive books about Persia and China, which Emerson read. These exerted some influence on his poetics and politics, the Sufi poets influencing his theories of verse and Confucius's ideal of government seeming to him admirable and worthy of emulation. But it was the literature of the Vedanta in which Emerson found his own intuitions most clearly stated, and this was the reason he read it so avidly. It is my conviction that the close student of Emerson who is guided by facts will come to the conclusion that no system of thought, no man, and no body of literature ever really influenced him in the usual sense of the word. It was only when Emerson recognized a personal affinity with the spirit of a literature that he turned devotedly to it and adopted the things in it that agreed with his own beliefs. This is the explanation of the constant

interweaving of allusions to and quotations from the Vedantic books in his prose. He frankly admitted this fact in his *Journals*: "For good quotations, then, there must be originality in the quoter, —bent, bias, delight in the truth and only valuing the author in the measure of his agreement with the truth, which we see, and which he had the luck to see first." Here was Emerson's starting point frankly stated. With it in mind, let us take note of the Hindu books which it is known passed through his hands.

Arbitrarily accepting the classifications of histories of Sanskrit literature, we commence with the Vedas. Of these, it is known that the *Rig Veda* and the *Sama Veda* passed through Emerson's hands. The former was in the English translation of Horace Hayman Wilson, published in London in 1850; the latter in John Stevenson's translation, which appeared under the imprint of the Oriental Translation fund in 1842.

So far as I have been able to ascertain, Emerson read none of the Brahmanas. Even if they had become accessible to him, it is improbable that he would have been attracted. The situation was entirely different, however, when he came to the Upanishads, for in these he found most congenial thought.

The earliest translation of any Upanishad that came to Emerson's hand was probably Ram-mohun Roy's *Translation of the Ishopanishad* (Calcutta, 1816). It

is generally known that Rammohun Roy aroused a tremendous interest in New England when he lectured there, and that an aunt, Mary Moody Emerson, had in correspondence mentioned Roy's work to her nephew. But definite information exists that a more important work by Roy was known in Concord—the London, 1832, edition of his *Translation of Several Principal Books, Passages, and Texts of the Veds, and of Some Controversial Works on Brahminical Theology*. Readers acquainted with this work will be aware that it contained the best portions of the *Kena* and the *Katha Upanishads*, besides several excellent expository essays on the Vedanta. As a leader of the Brahmo Samaj, Rammohun Roy wrote for the explicit purpose of defending the eclectic's attitude and position. Himself an eclectic, Emerson could not have failed to be sympathetic with Roy's purpose and to read his work with supreme interest.

It is also definitely known that Emerson read Anquetil Duperron's *Oupnek'hat* as early as 1830. This was the Oriental work which Schopenhauer designated as having been of great influence in shaping his own beliefs. Its importance for Emerson was that, besides other valuable material, it contained translations of the *Brihadaranyaka* and the *Chandogya Upanishads*.

The chief medium of Emerson's Upanishadic information, however, was an 1853 volume of the *Bibliotheca Indica* which

contained E. Röer's translations of portions of nine Upanishads—the *Taittiriya*, *Aitareya*, *Svetasvatara*, *Kena*, *Isa*, *Katha*, *Prasna*, *Mundaka*, and *Mandukya*. It was in this volume that Emerson found the model for his poem "Brahma" and the long, beautiful quotation which so appropriately concludes his essay "Immortality," an essay no student of his Orientalism can afford to overlook.

That Emerson read portions of the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana* is certain, although it is difficult exactly to determine the translators and the editions. More definite information exists, however, with reference to the classic interlude of the former epic. It is said that Emerson's personal copy of Charles Wilkins's translation of the *Bhagavadgita* (London, 1785), which came into his hands in 1845, was more widely read than the copy in the Harvard Library. J. Cockburn Thomson's translation (Hertford, 1855) was also in Emerson's personal library. Perhaps we should not leave the *Gita* without quoting Emerson's beautiful tribute to the book, written in a letter to a friend: "I owed—my friend and I owed—a magnificent day to the *Bhagavat Geeta*.—It was the first of books; it was as if an empire spoke to us, nothing small or unworthy, but large, serene, consistent, the voice of an old intelligence which in another age and climate had pondered and thus disposed of the same questions which exercise us."

Sir William Jones's classic translation of the *Laws of Manu* (London, 1825) was on the shelves in the Emerson library. How it came there is not known, but next to the *Gita*, it probably exerted the most profound influence of any Oriental work on American transcendental thought.

Another extremely important work was H. H. Wilson's translation of the *Vishnu Purana* (London, 1840), for it served as the contextual basis of the essay "Illusions," and the poems "Brahma" and "Hamatreya," the latter containing lines which paraphrase the famous sentiment: "the words *I* and *mine* constitute ignorance."

Space forbids extended discussion of Emerson's use of each work and the significance of such statements about Eugène Burnouf's *Bhagavata Purana* (Paris, 1840) as: "Ah! there is a book to be read on one's knees!"—or Henry Hart Milman's *Nala and Damayanti* (London, 1835): "Thus Milman's translation . . . is nearer to my business and bosom than is the news in to-day's *Boston Journal*. And I am admonished and comforted, as I read. It all very nearly concerns me."

Any complete list of Emerson's Oriental reading must also contain H. H. Wilson's *Megha Duta* (London, 1814), of Charles Wilkins's *The Heetopades of Veeshnoo-Sarma* (Bath, 1787), an anonymous translation of Jaimini's *Aphorisms of the Mimansa Philosophy* (Allahabad, 1851),

another anonymous translation, *The Bhasha Parichchheda* of Bhatta (Calcutta, 1851), and two renderings of the *Sakuntala*, that by Sir William Jones (London, 1790) and that by Monier-Williams (Hertford, 1856).

Among the books of the specimen and commentary type which came to Emerson's hands were H. H. Wilson's *Select Specimens of the Theatre of the Hindus* (London, 1835), Thomas Erskine Perry's *Cases Illustrative of Oriental Life* (London, 1853), the *Complete Works* of Sir William Jones himself (London, 1806), Eugène Burnouf's *Introduction à l'histoire du Bouddhisme indien* (Paris, 1844) and *Le Lotus de la bonne loi* (Paris, 1852). H. T. Colebrooke's *Two Treatises on the Hindu Law of Inheritance* (Calcutta, 1810) should also appear on the list, although it might seem foreign to the interests of a mystic.

Emerson did not read the Oriental translations alone; he also had the benefit of handbooks and general studies. Conspicuous among these was George Small's *Handbook of Sanskrit Literature* (London, 1866), William Ward's *View of the History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindoos* (Serampore, 1818), and J. H. Garcin de Tassy's *Histoire de la littérature hindoui et hindoustani* (Paris, 1839). He also read the following pamphlets: J. R. Ballantyne's *A Lecture on the Vedanta* (Allahabad, 1851), William Brockie's *Indian Philosophy* (London, 1872), and David

Urquhart's *The Sraddha* (London, 1857).

Of Buddhist literature as a whole Emerson read very little. This is easily understood. A happy, optimistic individual, living in the first bloom of the new American civilization, there was little reason for him to be touched with world-weariness. The outstanding Buddhist work, containing Max Müller's translation of the *Dhammapada*, was T. Rogers's *Buddhagosa's Parables* (London, 1870). The London, 1850, edition of Spence Hardy's *Eastern Monachism* was also well known in Concord. But these works, together with Eugène Burnouf's which have already been mentioned, left practically no precipitate in the mind and writings of our sage. His interests were those of the Vedantist, not the Buddhist.

It may be profitable, for the sake of giving a semblance of completeness to this list, also to mention that Emerson read the standard histories of India written by James Mill, John Clark Marshman, J. Talboys Wheeler, and the reminiscent biographies of soldiers, such as those by W. H. Sleeman and W. E. R. Hodson.

Finally, it need only be pointed out that Emerson's Oriental in-

terests were far from those of the professional scholar. It is a singular fact that when in 1842 the American Oriental Society was founded in Boston, the event seems not to have even been noticed in Concord. Nor does Emerson's name appear on the list of charter members. And this at the time when his Oriental enthusiasm was white hot! The explanation may have been that he knew no Oriental languages. Perhaps a more satisfactory explanation is suggested by a sentence from the essay "Books":—

There is no room left,—and yet I might as well not have begun as to leave out a class of books which are the best: I mean the Bibles of the world, or the sacred books of each nation, which express for each the supreme result of their experience.

Except for this humane interest in the spiritual experience of the race, Emerson's Orientalism would be as dead to-day as that of the founders of the American Oriental Society. Instead, it is to-day widely regarded as one of the most influential factors which have determined the religious mentality of the modern United States, infused as it has been with the theosophic teachings of the Vedanta.

ARTHUR CHRISTY

MAN AND HIS GOD

[This article of Mr. J. D. Beresford would prove more interesting if read in conjunction with the opening editorial in this issue.—EDS.]

All the false and misleading ideas about God are begotten from our ever present illusions concerning the reality of matter, and no one who is in bondage to that illusion can have any true concept of such words as God and Spirit.

Mr. Shaw amused himself recently, in a little work entitled *The Black Girl in Search of God*, by tracing the Evolution of the various aspects of Him, presented in the Bible. He did the thing clumsily, in the manner of the cartoonist, and at the end of it we were given nothing to replace the various idols he had satirised. But anyone who set out to write of the *aspects* that God has taken through the centuries, could do no more than Mr. Shaw has done.

Wherefore by way of introduction to any understanding of the nature of God, I want to say something of the aspects of what we regard as matter. Our approach to it is necessarily by way of the physical senses, and the corroboration of these senses by one another leads to the conception of an idea. For most of us the more important of these senses is that of sight. Light is reflected from all material surfaces in varying degrees, and produces certain reactions in the mechanism of the eye which

we translate into ideas of form and colour. If all the light were absorbed by the objects on which it fell, the whole material world would be wrapped in darkness and we should see nothing. If all the light were reflected we should still have no sense of either form or colour. The only information regarding the nature of matter that reaches us through the eye is dependent upon the relative degrees of light's reflection and absorption, and it is probable that no two people register precisely the same impression.

Our next important approach is through the exercise of touch, taste and smell, the first of these being that most frequently used to check an ocular inference. The combined exercises of these four senses enable us by association to build up certain concepts with reference to the nature of material objects, concepts that serve us reasonably well in the conduct of ordinary life. We are, it is true, liable to error as a consequence of the too rigid application of these associations. In any new experience, there may be apparent discrepancies between the evidence of the sense impressions. The perfect imitation of a flower, for instance, may confirm previous associations by its appearance or even by its texture when handled, but fail to

produce the expected reaction by its smell; and in such cases a new concept has to be formed in the mind to distinguish between natural and artificial flowers. But the majority of the images of material objects conceived by the mind are so steadily confirmed by experience that we commonly think of them as presenting a fixed reality.

The fifth sense, the sense of hearing, is somewhat isolated from the other four. The external means for translating sound,—that is to say a succession of air-waves,—into an idea, is by way of an ingenious but relatively simple mechanism, and the loss of it would not have any far-reaching effect on our inferences with regard to the nature of matter. Thus, apart from its æsthetic value in relation to music, hearing would appear to be, in most connections, the least essential of our approaches to material reality.*

Lastly, and most importantly, we have to deal with our method of translating sense impressions into ideas by the means of memory and reason. The former provides the necessary associations, the latter the conclusions to be drawn from them. Memory, in this operation, has some analogy to an automatic telephone exchange, connecting almost instantaneously the various lines of the sense impressions and registering the result in the form of an association. In this process it may happen that a line of sense

impressions may be automatically connected although it has not, in fact, been stimulated. The sight of that perfectly imitated flower, for instance, may produce the illusion of its distinctive smell; this element being so necessary to complete the association, that we are momentarily unable to distinguish between a present and a past experience.

Practically all our inferences and decisions, however, are ultimately submitted to the test of reason which, guided by memory, is then able to form an interpretation of the impressions conveyed by the senses. Retaining the illustration of the flower, we might in that case proceed to convince ourselves of its artificiality by applying further tests. If, for example, its appearance and texture had been perfectly imitated and it had been artificially scented, we could, in the last resort, examine the structure under a microscope when our memory of older associations connected with the structure of natural flowers would demonstrate differences only to be accounted for on the grounds that the specimen under examination was not a natural growth.

This, in the briefest summary, presents an inclusive account of our contact with the objective world. Such knowledge of it as we may add by reading is in the same category, since it is but a second-hand experience of something recorded by another ob-

*The peculiarly important part played by the ear in occult training was explained by B. M. in an article "On Hearing" in our May Issue, to which attention is drawn.—Eds.

server, to be accepted or rejected by applying the touchstone of our own reason and personal experience. Thus the single test of truth that we have in this connection, is that of probability. If like causes have invariably produced like effects during the whole history of human knowledge, we are justified in recording those effects as the inevitable consequence of the antecedent causes.

And from the premises afforded by these instances of high probability, man has built up the whole body of his learning and beliefs. There are no other grounds for what is known as "exact knowledge," which is founded solely upon these records of fallible sense impressions, none of which can be proved to correspond with any absolute reality. To take an instance from modern physics, we now believe as the outcome of a long train of observation and reason that matter, the thing in itself, corresponds in no particular with the concepts of it signalled by the senses. It has no colour although it reflects certain colours to the eye; it is not hard and impenetrable although it conveys that impression to the touch; it is not inert although for all practical purposes we may so regard it.

But when we seek God, we are, *ex hypothesi*, searching for that absolute reality of which, as we have seen, we can obtain no proof by the means of the physical senses; and the cartoons of Mr. Shaw, referred to at the opening of this article, provide us with

an outline of the kind of god inferred by man from his sense contacts with matter. His primitive aspect is that of the tribal chief, a jealous, bigoted creature to be propitiated by gifts and sacrifices in order that his favours may be extended to his worshippers. And although with the extension of the "exact knowledge" defined above, such qualities as mercy and love have been increasingly attributed to him, the primitive conception of the tribal chief can still be traced in the god of the Christian churches. Their congregations are taught, for example, that he is a god of love and that "perfect love casteth out fear," but at the same time, since the authority of the modern priesthood not less than that of the savage "medicine-man" can only be upheld by a threat, emphasis is continually maintained on the precept that we must "*fear* God".

There are obviously many other anomalies and contradictions in the creeds of all formalised religions, but the above instance will serve as a type. What concerns us here is the evidence provided that all these conceptions of God are derived by reason working upon the data provided by sense impressions, and that such conceptions cannot correspond to any absolute reality. This god of the Churches, in fact, is the Eidolon of Epicurus, an atomic emanation, subsequently rationalised so far as may be within the limits of a philosophical and ethical system. And

since all such systems are founded upon premises unsusceptible of any proof save that of the greatest probability, none of them can have more than a relative value.

We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion not that reason itself is an imperfect instrument, but that so long as its workings are confined to the material provided by sense experience all its deductions are open to question. The principle of probability is of no service when we are seeking an absolute which must include every "rule" and every exception. And although observation may show that within human experience certain causes have followed certain effects any conceivable number of times short of infinity, we still have no final ground of proof that an exception is impossible, so long as all our instances are derived from this fallible source of sense impressions.

The first deduction to be made from this argument is that God is unknowable; and that, within the material restrictions so far considered, is undoubtedly true. He may be inferred in various contradictory shapes from the data at our disposal, and the majority of mankind has so inferred Him. But from the same data many able minds have rejected that inference. In either case it is impossible to *know* Him unless we are willing to postulate that God is only a greater kind of man. Indeed if we were to go a step further and claim that God was the summation of all human

knowledge and experience, including that which is still to come, it would be absurd for the most gifted human being with an experience of a few thousand years behind him, to claim any understanding of One who was eternal and all-knowing, even in the material sense.

Nevertheless there is a way of approach to the outskirts of such an understanding, which cannot be found by the route of sense impressions. In the first part of this article, I endeavoured to produce the picture of an essential being inhabiting a limited material body through whose imperfect mechanisms he receives, and then tries to collate, a long series of disconnected pieces of information relative to the objective world about him. And the first and by far the most important implication of this picture is that there must be an essential being to do the work of reception and collation. Indeed here for the first time in this essay do we come upon *a piece of knowledge, common to every human being, that is not received in the first instance through sense impressions and is not dependent upon them for verification,—the knowledge embodied in the statement "I am"*.

This, the single premise of conscious life, is never learnt in the ordinary sense and cannot be forgotten. It is not the outcome of experience and therefore precedes all other knowledge. There may be moments when it does not appear to be present in

thought, but this "I am" is a perpetual affirmation whatever form such affirmation may take. And since this single piece of knowledge derives from a source demonstrably different in its nature from any other, none of the arguments so far brought forward can apply to it.

Nevertheless having decided that matter is the agent and not the principal, that there is an individual consciousness which is other than matter and antecedent to it, we have to reckon with the belief,—towards which science, also, is now tending,—that every atom in the universe is endowed with a measure of life and consciousness. And if we accept this belief, though we may still maintain our contention that consciousness is the antecedent, motivating force, we are driven to the conclusion that matter is derived from it and partakes of its essence. Nevertheless we may still assume that whereas spirit may know itself, its derivative, matter, cannot, seeing that it is

but a temporary, ever-changing expression of consciousness, life, spirit, or if we may give it an inclusive designation, God.

God, in this sense, therefore, can only be conceived as the Universal, "unrelated and unconditioned,"* the All-thing, present in every expression, and gaining a small measure of Self-awareness in Man; and although "a man can have no god that is not bounded by his own human conceptions, the wider the sweep of his spiritual vision, the mightier will be his deity."†

And it is this conception of God, alone, that I personally can accept, a God that is in His nature unknowable, but who must continually increase in wonder and glory with the development of the human spirit. God may never be defined save in the terms of our own limitations, but by the development of those terms is registered the evolution of consciousness and the growth of our independence of matter.

J. D. BERESFORD

द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणो रूपे मूर्तं चैवामूर्तं च
मर्त्यं चामूर्तं च स्थितं च यच्च सच्च त्यंच ॥

—बृहदारण्यक अ. २ ब्रा. ३, १

There are two modes of Brahman,—the manifest and the unmanifest, the mortal and the immortal, the static and the dynamic, the one we know as existence—Sat and the other we say is beyond—(tya)

—BRIHADARANYAKA UPANISHAD II, 3, 1.

* *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 295, footnote.

† *Isis Unveiled*, ii. 567.

THE LIMITATIONS OF SPECULATIVE THOUGHT

EXPLORING THE INFINITELY GREAT

[**Edmond Holmes** concludes his study of the methods of approach to the understanding of the minute and the vast in Nature and in Man.—EDS.]

Shall we find the wider field of experience in the inner world, the world of self or spirit, the world which self-consciousness reveals to us, the world to which, as we have just seen, the outer world owes its semblance of reality? Perhaps. But how is speculative thought to pass from the one world to the other? The transition from sense-experience to self-experience is so abrupt that premature attempts to bridge the intervening gulf may well lead, as they have often done in the West, to a barren word-bound idealism, which, having no field of experience to interpret commensurate with the range of its thought, tries to realize Aristotle's dream of finding a central metaphysical principle from which the whole constitution of the universe can be logically deduced and duly formulated in human speech. Is there no better way than this of exploring the Infinitely Great? No better way of guessing the Supreme Riddle which is ever challenging and ever baffling our thought?

Is there no way of passing from sense-experience to self-experience, which shall bring the two fields together and make them one? The riddle of the universe cannot be solved within the limits of the normal experience of the normal

or standardized man. The attempt to do so leads at last to two comprehensive dualisms,—the dualism of sense-experience and self-experience; and—as a reaction from this—the dualism of nature and the supernatural world. Of the latter I need not speak in this paper. By dividing the universe into two dis severed worlds between which natural intercourse is impossible; by subordinating speculative thought, nominally to Divine, actually to ecclesiastical authority; by teaching us that the truth of things has been miraculously revealed to us and must be accepted as given, and therefore that the free exercise of thought is disloyalty to God—Supernaturalism places an absolute veto on the supreme adventure of the human spirit, the quest of ultimate reality, the attempt to understand the universe. But the dualism of sense-experience and self-experience may correct itself, if the word “sense” is given a fuller meaning than it usually bears, and the field of sense-experience is correspondingly enlarged. Can this be done?

Here we come to a question which is of vital importance and opens up new and far-reaching vistas of thought, but which philosophy in the West, perhaps for that very reason, persistently

ignores. May not sense-experience be *supernormal* as well as normal? May there not be senses dormant or at least latent in all of us, which are awake and active in some of us, whether as the result of natural endowment or of systematic self-discipline, and which reveal to us new vistas of experience, new aspects of existence, new planes of being, new conceptions of the range and resources of nature, new forces, new laws? That there are such senses is no longer doubtful. The evidence for them is overwhelmingly strong and is accumulating from day to day. Telepathy,* television, clairvoyance, clairaudience, spiritualism, occultism, mysticism, magic—are these all empty names which have nothing behind them but hallucination or imposture? No one who has seriously studied the evidence for supernormal happenings, evidence which has an immense and ever-growing literature of its own, will rule it out in its totality as inadmissible, and meet with a sweeping negation all reports of the existence of fields of experience which lie beyond the horizon of sense-bound—*physically* sense-bound—reason. Yet so well content is philosophy in the West with the world which is bounded by that narrow horizon, that tidings of other worlds are usually met by it with blank incredulity

and contemptuous refusal to examine the available evidence.

But it is notoriously difficult to prove a negative. And the value of positive evidence is not impaired by refusal to examine it on the part of those whose peace of mind the mere report of it disturbs. The thinker who rules out the supernormal, whether by denying it on *a priori* grounds or by ignoring it, builds on a perilously insecure foundation. And his structure, when built, will lack the strength and stability which inward harmony and coherence alone can give it. The abrupt transition from sense-experience to self-experience involves, in the last resort, the denial of validity to one or other of the two kinds of experience, and the consequent denial of reality either to the outer or to the inner world. If this dualistic *reductio ad absurdum* of speculative philosophy is to be avoided, a way must be found for the two fields of experience to merge in one; and the supernormal is the only causeway along which speculative thought can travel in safety from the one field to the other. For supernormal experiences, as they unfold themselves, lead by degrees from without to within, the world which they reveal becoming increasingly spiritual as they explore it, till at last, in the mystic's vision of his own innermost reality,

*When telepathy, or thought-transference, first began to be talked about, Professor Helmholtz, one of the leading scientists of the day, said of it: "I cannot believe it. Neither the testimony of all the Fellows of the Royal Society nor the evidence of my own senses would lead me to believe in the transmission of thought from one person to another. It is clearly impossible." Since then telepathy has been worked to death, as a means of explaining away evidence for personal survival, by persons who have made up their minds to remain unconvinced.

sense-experience and self-experience find the vanishing point of their respective movements, and speculative thought finds fulfilment in oneness with its ideal goal.

But whatever may be the thinker's attitude towards the supernormal, he must realize that if his attempt to understand the universe is not to abort at the outset, it must be preceded by a provisional assumption—whether instinctive, reasoned, or accepted on authority—as to what is meant by the universe; and that in committing himself to that assumption, implicitly or explicitly as the case may be, he does in some sort predetermine the issue of his enterprise.

Hence the futility of the dream of which I have already spoken—the dream in which Aristotle indulged, and which his followers in all ages have shared,—the dream of finding a central principle, from which the whole constitution of the universe can be logically deduced; and therefore of arriving at an interpretation of the universe which, when formulated in human speech, shall be true in itself, true, whatever those who formulated it may have meant by the words that they used, true, whatever meaning those who read it or recite it as a creed may find in those words.

The dream is futile, for the simple reason that it is impossible to eliminate personality from speculative thought, when the latter is engaged on the higher and

more arduous of its two main tasks—that of exploring the Infinitely Great. If a man's philosophy, in this sense of the word, is his own, if it embodies a serious attempt to understand the universe and is not a mere echo of what he has read or heard or been taught, it will, as I have said, be preceded by a preliminary outlook on the world, in which the thinker subconsciously sets himself his task, and, in doing so, goes far towards predetermining its issue.

Here personality comes in. And not here only. If a man's philosophy is his own he will inevitably react, as I have already suggested, in conduct and character to the general conceptions that he forms; and in doing so he will, in some sort and some degree, transform himself—transform himself as a thinker, transform his paramount conceptions, transform his standard of inward satisfaction, transform his whole outlook on the world. And in this interaction between thought and life there is no finality. Here the faith of the independent thinker about great matters differs profoundly from that of the "orthodox believer". The former is—or at least may be and should be—active and self-transcendent; the latter is stagnant, if not dead. If a man's philosophy is not his own he will react to his faith in it so far at least as he takes it seriously; but his reaction will probably be final. If he refuses to think for himself, he has committed himself to a life of tradition and routine; a life

which may be well-regulated and even virtuous, and to that extent formative of character, but in which there will be no return to that free exercise of speculative thought which plays so vital a part in our spiritual development, releasing us, as it does, from imprisonment within the fixed horizon of thought and purpose that has its counterpart in the life of tradition and routine, the life of lowered vitality, of arrested growth.

We are now in a position to compare with one another, in respect of the conditions under which they are carried on, and of their leading features, the two great tasks which speculative thought sets itself. The function of speculative thought is to explore what I may call the circum-polar regions of existence, the regions which surround the negative and the positive pole respectively, the pole of the Infinitely Little, and the pole of the Infinitely Great. In its approach to the former pole speculative thought can afford to be purely intellectual, purely impersonal, wholly impartial, wholly unemotional; for (to make a general statement) it is sure of its base of operations, sure of its methods of working, sure—if it does not go too far—of its results. In a word, it is *scientific*. Its starting point is acceptance of the material world as being at least provisionally real. This is what the scientist, as a scientist, means by the universe. He does not necessarily limit his own outlook

on the universe to the material world. But analysis of the material world—the world which is woven by sense-experience on the space-time framework—is the task which he sets himself; and until he has arrived at the ultimate elements in that world, at the ultimate constituents of matter, he will regard his task as incomplete. His task is as yet incomplete; and it looks as if it would never be completed, at any rate along his line of approach. For as we have seen, he cannot carry his analysis of matter beyond a certain point without changing what he is observing, with the result that his ultimates, just as they seem to be within his reach, “quicksilver-like, elude his grasp”. There we must leave him for the present—baffled by the instability and indeterminacy which seem to be characteristic of the region into which his intrepidity and ability as an explorer have led him. What the future may have in store for him we cannot say.

What of his fellow-worker, the explorer of the Infinitely Great? If the scientist, with everything in his favour, cannot accomplish his self-imposed task, what chance is there of the *philosopher*, as we may now call him, arriving at a final understanding of the universe as a whole? From first to last he will have nothing in his favour. He cannot, if he would, be impersonal, impartial, unemotional. And the more he is in earnest about his work the more difficult it will be for him to divest him-

self of his personality, with all that this implies.

He has no fixed base of operation. His starting point is his preliminary assumption as to what is meant by "the universe"; in other words, as to the boundaries (if any) and the general character of the field of experience which he is going to explore. The conventional conception of the universe which the scientist accepts as provisionally valid, he must either accept as absolutely valid, or reject as inadequate. In the former case he will make the conception, whether his acceptance of it be conscious or merely instinctive, his own. In the latter case his preliminary assumption, whatever form it may take, will obviously be his own. In either case his choice of a starting point will go far towards determining the issue of his quest.

If his method of investigation is to be effective it must not be dictated to him; it must be his own. This means that it will be intuitional rather than logical, emotional rather than intellectual. For our thoughts about the higher realities that challenge us are necessarily "steeped in feeling"; and if they are to find adequate expression they must free themselves from the trammels of a word-bound logic and a quasi-scientific terminology, and choose their words, as best they may, for themselves.

Above all, if the scientist, in his quest of what is ultimate in analysis, fails on the very threshold of success, because he can-

not carry his researches further without changing what he is observing, what hope is there of success for the philosopher, who cannot think, deeply and earnestly, about what is ultimate in synthesis without changing himself—changing himself as a man, and therefore as a thinker, changing, with reciprocal interaction, the general trend of his conduct and the general trend of his thought? If the scientist is baffled, in the last resort, by instability and indeterminacy in the objects of his study, how much more will the philosopher be baffled by instability and indeterminacy in himself.

A French moralist has well said that "our taste declines with our merit". He is using the word "taste" in its widest sense. What is true of our taste is true of our judgment, our insight, our vision of reality, our standard of values. If these decline with our merit, they will also advance with it, so that the better we become the more we shall know and the more *really* we shall know it.

Thus the attempt to understand the universe in its totality resolves itself into a process of self-transformation, in which, as in the attempt itself, there can be no finality. It is the self, the whole man, who is the explorer of the approaches to the positive pole of existence; and the nearer he is to finding his own real self the nearer he will be to the goal of his great adventure. Ultimate truth will not allow itself to be imprisoned in a theory, or a

system, or a formulated creed. If we are to win it we must live our way into the heart of it; and, instead of deluding ourselves with the idle dream of possessing it, we must be content to be possessed by it and enfolded in its light. And the more closely we are enfolded by its light the more

intimately will it be our own. To him who has wearied himself with much thinking, and who asks despairingly where the key to the riddle of existence is to be found, there is an answer which is at once a consolation and a challenge:

“Go seek it in thy soul.”

EDMOND HOLMES

THE CHRISTIANITY OF THE CHURCHES

Jesus taught the law of mercy and forgiveness, but the leaders of the Church more often show themselves ardent followers of the distorted Mosiac law of punishment. The Bishop of Durham, in a lecture on “Ethical Conditions of Scientific Method” (*Times* 16th June 1933), after dealing with the question of animal vivisection, said:—

Putting the question whether in no case might man be subjected to vivisection in the interest of science, Dr. Henson asked if there was any moral objection to the vivisection of criminals who by the laws of their country had been condemned to death. In their case the issue of inherent human rights could not be raised, for these had already been cancelled. We said, very justly, that the criminal by his crimes had forfeited his rights, and we dealt with him penally on that hypothesis. Why should not his punishment take a form which was serviceable to the community? Why should he not at least be given the opportunity of making in this way some atonement for his sins against society?

In the case of the criminal whose natural rights had been cancelled much might be legitimate which in the case of innocent persons like the slave and the child would be altogether inadmissible.

Ethically and scientifically, both vivisection and capital punishment—indeed any punishment *qua* punishment—are wrong. A little more scientific knowledge about the actual destructive and constructive power of thought and feeling would lead to an understanding of the dangers to which such practices expose society. A little more ethical brotherliness would bring about the compassion that sees it has no right to punish, but only to restrain when necessary, and to educate rightly both the criminal who has been found out and society in general. Only then will we have the right to call ourselves Christians.

W. E. W.

RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA

[Below we print two articles both written by New Yorkers. In that large and influential centre of civilization, the ideal of a good life fashioning a great society is being discussed. Economic depression has forced many to consider why plain living and high thinking go together.—EDS.]

I

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE SPIRITUAL LIFE IN AMERICA

"The wisdom long known in the East, is beginning to be heard in the West."

[Irwin Edman, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, New York, draws the above conclusion in this article in which he examines the moral influence of the economic crash which began in 1929.—EDS.]

The spiritual life is the same in all ages, if it is genuinely spiritual, and the economic crisis is, save in detail, for the moment the same all over the world. That sustained absorption by timeless and immortal things in which the spiritual life consists is impeded, menaced and even paralyzed by the "poverty amid plenty" which is being experienced in all lands facing all seas. The nature of spiritual interests is no different in essence in America than it is in India or Norway, nor are the financial and industrial ills it faces altogether unique. But an observer in America is perhaps placed at an especially advantageous position for observing what the crisis has done to the nobler preoccupations of the race, and what hope the crisis holds forth for their renaissance. For the fact is that America, by virtue of its almost fantastic economic triumphs and equally fantastic economic debacle, both in prosperity and in poverty offers a cardinal case of the relation

of material conditions to ideal interests. And though contemplation and aspiration have no local frontiers, the life of the spirit, like other lives, has native lineaments; though mind be invariable, the language of the mind varies in different corners of the earth.

It is to some degree surprising that spiritual interests should have had as much of a career as they have had in America. The frontier is no place for leisure, for the brooding that turns into poetry and the dreaming that turns into thought. The frontier has passed away from American life but only within a generation or two, and the temper of physical conquest and material success until very recently dominated the American scene. Yet the very ardours and endurances of pioneer life contributed elements to the life of imagination and thought. It is impossible to appraise with exactitude the amount that the necessary individualism and adventure of a frontier civilisation contributed to the thought of

Emerson and Thoreau, nor how much being an American in the nineteenth century made Whitman the poet that he was. The very absence of distraction by tradition and luxury made it not only possible but imperative that gifted Americans should very early have learned to live in the mind and to dare with it as so many of them had perforce to dare with the body. The simplicities of a pioneer civilization, in so far as that civilization permits leisure at all, are no enemies of the soul. Rather they teach it that "self reliance," those "spiritual laws," and that converse with the "over soul" about which Emerson was so eloquently to discourse. They save it from corruption by matter and involvement in snobbery and success. Plain living and high thinking have not for nothing been hailed as natural adjuncts of each other. The enemies of the soul in America came later. They rose when the ardours and endurances were ending and when America was beginning to stand to the world as a symbol for the unparalleled triumph of mechanism in things and of materialism in the way of a philosophy of life. Ingenuity in America by the beginning of the twentieth century had come to take the place and the honours more properly belonging to wisdom. Whatever lip service might be paid to traditional religion, the animating religion of most people, those who were successful and those who wished to be so, was Success it-

self. Nor was Success very much more generously or beautifully conceived than pecuniary gains or narrow social distinction. Indeed in America the two went until very recently hand in hand, the successfully acquisitive were the respected and honoured. Possibly nowhere in the world, not even in thrifty France, would a man be the subject of full and fulsome obituaries simply because he was a multi-millionaire.

Nor was it only the very rich who were corrupted by the temper of a mechanical civilization and of material gain. For it was one of the illusions, long cherished and only recently exploded, that ingenuity might make anyone wealthy and that wealth, the fruit of ingenuity, was the only and the final goal. The hopes of the frontier lingered after the frontier had passed away. The summit of success in life in America was bare and bleak enough but it was ardently supposed that anybody could reach that summit. And there were enough true stories of magical rise from poverty to riches to nourish that belief and make it plausible.

It was beginning to be apparent even before the Great Depression set in, in 1929, that the financial as well as the physical frontier was closed. It is unimportant for our purposes to trace the well enough known story. But increasing numbers of Americans were discovering that consolidations of wealth and industry were making gold a very precious metal indeed

and material success, however dearly and exclusively desired, a prize as romantic for most citizens of the commonwealth as any dreamed of Paradise. Yet the delusion persisted, and during the period of speculative boom and prosperity, there was, if not the hope in the mind of the average American that he might become rich, at least the prevalent impression, expressed by no less a public figure than the President that Americans were destined to know the highest standard of living that had ever been known in the world. The highest standard of living, of course, meant the imitation on a small scale on the part of the man of small income of the standards of comfort and luxury and display set in advance by the very rich. Comfort meant not, on the whole, what it still means in Europe, a certain graciousness and mellowness in the details of life, an English tea in an English garden or a long quiet evening with a book before a fire. It did not mean a ramble on a country road or a leisurely cycling trip over hills and moors. It meant mechanical contrivances, it meant the thrills of change and of speed. One of the most revealing symptoms of the direction of American life was the fact that even in the peak of prosperity, there was little leisure and even where there was leisure there was no sense of it. The American in his freedom had to depend on mechanical devices for his pleasure as he depended on mechanical

devices for his work. His pleasure, too, had to be marked by the same physical tenseness and excitement that marked his work. He had lost the capacity and the desire for peace of the soul.

It is conceivable that American prosperity might have continued at least another decade. It is conceivable, too, that Americans, like other children, might have wearied of their toys and their trivialities, and out of the generosity of their material resources might have generated a moving art, convincing religion, and absorbing thought as the pre-occupations of their lives. It is certainly true that the classic period of Greece coincided with Athenian economic prosperity and that the Renaissance flourished æsthetically on the basis of the wealth of Florence. But the prognosis in America seemed to be different. For all the endowments of education, music and art, the direction of American life was all in the direction of material grandeur and physical comfort and excitement. The American Dream was expressed in motor cars and skyscrapers, not in altitudes of feeling and thought.

It is useless to speculate on what might have happened if an impossible prosperity had not so soon proved itself impossible. By virtue of the grimmest of facts, economic disaster, millions of Americans have learned, if not to seek their treasure outside of material success, at least to see they can no longer seek their treasure in material things with the old

easy assurance. It is the fashion to say, therefore, that a great chastening has come upon the American people, and that in their adversity they have learned to disprize the material values they can no longer so easily encompass. *It would be absurd to pretend that three years of economic disaster have turned America from the ingenuities of the West to the enduring wisdoms of the East. It would be fantastic to assume that a nation marked so deeply by a pragmatism in action and a restlessness of imagination should overnight have turned into a commonwealth of aspiring saints and seers. Having given up hope of a transfigured earth, they have not turned to a remembered Heaven.* But slowly the symptoms of a change of heart and mood are becoming apparent. There has been bitterness, there has been cynicism, there has been delusion. But there has also been a chastening of the whole temper of life. Simplicity has of necessity been restored to the lives of thousands who would a decade ago have despised it. In the midst of a civilization whose basic conditions of life are in a state of precariousness obvious even to the most comatose, the imagination has turned to consideration of a newer and better order of life. Speed, invention, luxury have led, it is now apparent even to the congenitally optimistic American, to physical suffering and moral disillusion. Even those who would long to return to the old orgy of material hope and

excitement are realizing that even in America such a prospect is very dim.

Attention has turned, therefore, where the mind and heart have not been altogether paralyzed and sickened, to a reconstruction not simply of society but of the life of the individual. The quiet voices of traditional wisdom have begun to be heard again now that the tumult of action has been almost shockingly stilled. The inner voices of feeling and thought have had in the individual time and provocation to reassert themselves. There has been much heard of the reconstruction of society along lines in which acquisitiveness would give way to co-operation, of a reconstruction of morals and religion and education so that the values of life would be more generously liberated. But such considerations, often limited to surface political and economic issues, have often gone deeper. *If there is to be a Great Society it will be in the interests of the Good life.* Once again, as in the case of Socrates and Buddha, suffering and scepticism have led to an examination of what the Good life is. Where that searching of hearts has taken place, the Good life, even in America, is seen again to contain elements that the haste and maelstrom of American living had obscured. There are symptoms that even in America, the age of topless towers, of insanities of luxury and speed, of a riotous carnival of the flesh among things is over. It is at least the opinion of this ob-

server that America, the quintessence of the West, has gone as far in the direction of a civilization of Things as is possible. It has found that where Things are in the saddle, civilization is doomed to disaster. The wisdom

long known in the East, is beginning to be heard in the West. The spirit of man, never altogether smothered, is turning even here to contemplation of dateless and deathless things.

IRWIN EDMAN

II

THE FLIGHT FROM ETHICS

"More than a change of system, we need a change of heart."

[Helen Bryant recommends the man in the street to do his bit by retaining faith in honesty and strengthening its practice.—EDS.]

As I sit here writing on an evening in late May, millions of people all over America are hurriedly turning the leaves of their newspapers in avid quest and certainty of sensation. For some months this country has experienced a hailstorm of extraordinary disclosures—revelations of conduct so flagrantly unethical, so fantastically far-reaching, that no fiction writer would have dared to invent it. Not one, but a legion of the country's most prominent men stands revealed as having been utterly callous to the dictates of honour—or even the simplest forms of honesty. Great bankers, great industrialists, great officials, we discover, can be nothing more nor less than great rascals. And the uncovering of their misdeeds has been attended by the uncovering of those of innumerable lesser luminaries. Of course, anyone who has owned property, be it in a big city or a small village, or anyone who has sought a job of

any importance, has been well aware for years of the prevalence of graft and favouritism, but how complete a flight from ethics this country is embarked upon we are only just beginning to realize.

The men involved in these recent disclosures, it must be clearly understood, do not by any means regard themselves as law-breakers. They regard themselves as good fathers, good citizens, good fellows. They have only done "what everyone else has done". "Everyone" has evaded income tax, taken bribes—or given them—with no stigma attached. This means that the whole conception of honour—brought over by those early gentlemen settlers—has changed. We have revised not only our tempo but our temper, to our discredit—and now to our dismay.

How did this come about?

It began to happen, I think, when our controlling class changed from gentlemen to business men. The sense of honour—often

narrow and distorted, but possessed of a valuable rigidity—of a lady or gentleman, waned with the waning of the species, to be replaced with the more flexible and dubious code of business. This code, we see now, was the code of the horse deal—the more successfully one cheated the other fellow, the greater one's pride in the achievement. Meanwhile the great class of the "poor but proud," who were moral partly because they were religious and partly because they tried to copy the code of their "betters," became less proudly honest as they became less religious and less poor and as their models changed. They made the successful business man their god, and reached his estate as fast as they could. This emulation of the controlling class was the first process that sapped the morale of the working class. Then came economic stress clamping a strangle-hold upon them, and shattering the loyalties and honesties that had been rendered fragile. Any landlord will tell you that in these times it is the rare tenant who considers his lease binding, should he meet with even a slight financial mishap. Any gas or telephone or electric bill collector will tell you that the last bills of the tenant's year (when he changes to another apartment) are almost uncollectable. Any employee will tell you that in the struggle to hold jobs, even "nice" people will fight metaphorically tooth and nail. And to-day a third factor is breaking down the few

who have withstood temptation and misfortune . . . this recent enlightenment as to the complete lack of honour of the rich. "Anyone who has played fair has just been a sap," is the general verdict. "An honest man hasn't a chance. The system's rotten all through. . . ."

Rotten all through. That's how it seems. As business spread its tentacles round government, art and even friendship, imperviousness to ethical procedure spread with it. Graft corrupted government, ballyhoo and favouritism corrupted art; self-interest murdered altruism, sensitiveness, sympathy and all the spiritual progeny of human intercourse. Even the flourishing practice of generosity and hospitality drew its sap, in those pre-retribution days, from poisoned soil.

But there is still one class, you will say, unaccounted for—the thinkers, the intellectuals. And in the last analysis, ethical conduct is rational conduct—shall we not, therefore, still find a stronghold of ethics among those who really think?

The answer is still in doubt, but it promises very soon to be a negative. For the intellectuals also are on the verge, after deliberately weighing pros and cons, of discarding honour. They have been disheartened in two ways. First, by the difficulty of maintaining themselves ethically in a commercially corrupted world. "What steps should one take to get a teaching job at such-and-such a university?" I heard one

ask. "One gets to know someone of importance there, I am sorry to say," was the answer. And after certain revelations of "managed" criticism and publicity in the book world, the general conclusion among a group of writers was: "Recognition of really good work cannot be won on the merits of that work alone. Recognition can hardly ever be won by strictly honourable methods. We live in a jungle and must fight with jungle weapons. There is no room for honour in modern life." Second, the intellectual is disheartened by the seeming impossibility of reforming the capitalist world through non-violent means, owing to capitalist control of key positions. Therefore he is becoming more and more inclined to advocate throwing away old-fashioned notions of what is "right," and using any means to bring about a needed change. If he is very radical indeed, he will maintain that it is legitimate to lie and cheat and even kill to "further the cause".

This desertion of ethics by the intellectuals is doubly regrettable because they have suddenly become much more powerful in our national life. Having plunged downhill into chaos we are now turning more and more to the intellectuals and asking them to tell us how to get out. If *they* see no ethical way out, if *they*, in profound weariness and disillusion, see no good reason for clinging to and reinforcing our splintered standards of honour, the future bids fair to be even more chaotic

than our present condition.

Meanwhile, something has to be done. There seem to be two main proposals as to what this something should be. The first proposal is completely to change the system. The second calls for modification of the present system. The objection made to the first procedure is that it will be exceedingly painful, involving whole generations in misery. The objection made to the second is that while it may be temporarily less painful, in the end it will be disastrous because—as the man in the street declares and the intellectual tends to agree—the system is "too rotten" to modify.

Whichever proposal is finally adopted (in Russia they are trying to enact the first, in America, the second, but these choices may be revoked) success it seems to me will depend, not so much on the choice, or even on the cleverness of the new mechanisms set up, as on the principles of the men who devise, operate and obey them. A communist system can be fatally clogged by bureaucracy and sabotage, a capitalist system can be ruined by greed. There are other factors, of course. I do believe that a great deal depends on the system, I do happen to believe that a capitalist democracy still offers—with its regards for individual rights and its machinery for bringing wrongdoing to light—more opportunity for happiness and sane human development than the communist system with its denial of the individual and its autocracy. But the system

alone cannot do everything. More than a change of system, we need a change of heart. *We need all of us to believe again in "being good". We cannot expect to find honest men to administer our affairs if the majority of us have lost faith in honesty and ceased to practise it.* A renewed faith is not a fantastic idea, a change of heart is not impossible. Man's sense of values is always changing. Innumerable times he has placed such things as chivalry, loyalty, chastity, physical courage, religious belief above money, above life itself. By "man," I do not mean a solitary individual, but great masses of men. And to-day the fact that a little band of men in our midst has succeeded, against tremendous difficulties, in laying the rottenness bare, the fact that they cared enough to do so, should make us hopeful and persistent. *This is no time for the man in the street to throw up his hands in despair, it is the very moment when he should deter-*

mine to do his bit to recover the code we have temporarily laid aside. A code of honour is, in a sense, the crystallization of the truths we have slowly learned through long centuries of barbarism and semi-civilisation—that to trust each other, be honest with each other, help each other is the only way the human race can truly progress, the only way it can survive. The bedrock of any system must be a bedrock of ethics, of "good old-fashioned morals". The moment we call our society a jungle and use jungle practices we lose what we have so painfully, slowly gained. The forest stands always ready to engulf the clearing. With immense effort we have beaten it back, though our weapons have often broken in our hands. Religions, inventions, systems, they have broken. Only one weapon in our hands is imperishable, our moral sense, and we are lost if we finally cast that aside.

HELEN BRYANT

[These two articles deal with U.S.A.; the following treats of the all-world problem of War, in which the British author recommends the same remedy and looks to the East for some effective inspiration.—EDS.]

A SOLDIER-PHILOSOPHER'S REFLECTIONS ON WAR

[C. B. Purdom is the Editor of *New Britain*. He has published *The Swan Shakespeare: A Player's Edition*, and is the author of *A Plan of Life*. In this article he points out that there can be no deliverance from war except a spiritual one; the failure of the League of Nations lends support to this view and proves correct the statement H. P. BLAVATSKY made in 1889: "Peace Societies are Utopian, because no amount of argument based upon exoteric considerations of social morals or expediency, can turn the hearts of rulers of nations away from selfish war and schemes of conquest." *Lucifer*: Vol. V, p. 6.]

The soldier-philosopher is rare, for the soldier is above everything the man of action. Yet the soldier can arrive at the goal of wisdom by following his own path as surely as the ascetic by following his, as that great fighter Arjuna was taught when he sank down in the midst of the battlefield overcome by sorrow and was told to perform his allotted task. The soldier must fight, for that is his mission; but he must also reflect on the results of his fighting, for only through reflection can the light of wisdom be seen.

Such a soldier is Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, C. B., whose book *War and Western Civilization* (Duckworth, 10s.), was published towards the end of last year and should be read and pondered by every serious student of life. In this book General Fuller invites the reader to reflect on the experience of war in the Western world during the last hundred years. He presents a summary and interpretation of a hundred years of history up to the wars that followed the Great War. His book is important because he has an eye for the inner meaning of

events and draws out their significance.

The pivotal fact of the nineteenth century was, he says, that the idea of "liberty" was driven from "the heads of the philosophers into the hearts of the people, and it intoxicated them". Under the influence of that intoxication the spirit of nationalism inspired all political institutions, "it emotionalized war and, consequently, brutalized it," and at the same time the growth of science and industry "delivered into the hands of the masses more and more deadly means of destruction". In the eighteenth century wars were largely the occupation of kings; in the nineteenth century national armies fought nations: "The herd coupling with finance and commerce has begotten new realms of war." Thus he sees "the engine of Western civilization, speeding along the lines of narrow thoughts, roaring towards the abyss," unless we in the twentieth century learn how to control the machine and make wars impossible.

General Fuller gives a sketch of the wars waged between 1832 when the French laid siege to

Antwerp until 1932 when the Japanese bombarded Shanghai. Every year there were wars including, apart from the Great War, some of the most bloody in European history. He shows that the experience of these hundred years proves the futility, waste and inconclusiveness of war as a means of national intercourse. What one gets from his survey is the idea that the military machine seems to have a paralysing effect upon human intelligence, though some of the finest brains have been devoted to its interests from the time of the god-like Napoleon to the English idealist-philosopher, Haldane. War has always been out of date. "As far as war is concerned, statesmen and soldiers are generally two generations behind their time," asserts General Fuller. He gives evidence in support of this statement from French, German and English military practices. The Crimean War, in which "generalship was beneath contempt," should have taken place in the eleventh century not the nineteenth, he declares. In the Indian Mutiny, "the condition of the Army was normal, that is to say it was rotten". "Warfare is closely related to lunacy" is another of his statements, and to show that military mentality never changes he relates that, "In 1930 I knew of a Major-General, aged 53, being adversely reported on for not playing field-games."

War has become inane; but it "cannot be charmed away". Its causes must be removed—

poverty, selfishness, nationalism. There is no other way. To escape the paralysis of war, mankind must create those institutions through which society can function. Until that is done, disarmament would be useless even if it were practicable, for "the peace potential of a nation is its war potential". All the talk about defining "offence" and "defence" in war is waste of time, for "defence is but offence reversed". It is equally idle to try to settle who is the aggressor, for no nation will admit having taken the first step in war. And to attempt to humanise war by prohibiting the most highly developed scientific apparatus of war, such as tanks, gas, and submarines is the most foolish proceeding of all, for it condemns the soldier to the employment of obsolete weapons.

General Fuller devotes a good deal of his book to showing that the increasing bloodiness and destructiveness of war is due partly to inefficiency and lack of ability in the direction of war, partly to the refusal to make the means of war scientific, and partly to the fact that wars are waged under democratic conditions. When entire peoples fight as they do in the present day, nations as a whole devoting themselves to war, not leaving it to the armies in the field, all the evil passions of men and women are aroused, for into the "monstrous organization" of a democracy in arms the Press breathes "the breath of lying fury". That is what one

saw in every country engaged in the Great War.

Until wars as a method of international action are eliminated, the only wise course, says General Fuller, is for statesmen and soldiers to devote themselves to the problem of how "to shorten their length". That means the adoption of scientific methods and mechanization, which is the reversal of the policy put forward by the British Government at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. Science can save lives in war because it hastens decision. "To scrap the newer weapons is to prolong wars," says General Fuller, and he shows how in the Great War the use of tanks saved soldiers' lives and helped to bring the War to an end. Quantitative disarmament and qualitative disarmament are equal follies. To adopt either would not tend to prevent wars but merely to make them longer and therefore more disastrous. The only way in which to end wars is to remove their causes. Until that is done, the soldier must be equipped with the most efficient weapons. Like Arjuna, he must fight and falter not.

That is the teaching of this English soldier. He urges us not to deceive ourselves. We talk about disarmament and peace, but will not take the necessary steps to bring them about. "Fear remains as deep-rooted as ever," he says; and fear is a main cause of war. Fear is created largely through economic uncertainty, which forms a public opinion

which can easily be lashed into war fever. Through the past hundred years wars have been used to make good economic deficiencies. The economic difficulties of Germany in 1914 were one of the primary causes of the Great War. The economic distresses of the present time provide a situation in which war may break out at any time.

Until mankind learns wisdom, "War is a God-appointed instrument to teach wisdom to the foolish," says General Fuller. The transformation of the last hundred years was almost entirely material; *we now wait for a transformation of the spirit of man*. Until that takes place our rapid material advance serves only to increase the insecurity of life, the instability of societies, the destructiveness of war, and economic disturbance, all of which are reflected in the present world chaos. *There can be no deliverance except a spiritual one*, in which material power is subordinated to conscious spiritual ends. All advance is illusionary until there is spiritual illumination.

"This age to my mind is an age of spiritual decay," says General Fuller; but it is a law of nature that decay precedes all new life, the old being destroyed to make way for the new. That a new life and a new order of society will take the place of the present rotting civilization is certain; the only questions are how it is to be brought about, the degree of suffering that will have to be endured, and the time it

will take—time which is so important to individual men and so unimportant in history. Will the catastrophe of war end the old and bring in the new? It is very near. Or will man consciously form his destiny? Man's life depends on forces beyond his control; but room is allowed for choice. A wrong choice means suffering through which we gain wisdom; a right choice means the opportunity to choose again. At present mankind is drifting, there is no leadership capable of accepting responsibility. The law of spiritual life is that responsibility must be accepted and the necessary effort made. *The nations are drifting; but individuals who see their own duty and do it may save them.* Five righteous men can save a city, though their names and what they do may not be known. Thus responsibility is thrust upon us all, though there may be no leadership, and the world seems to be at the mercy of "blind forces and blind men".

"If, in 1832, the world could have seen clearly the progress between that date and 1932, all wars could have been avoided," is one of General Fuller's concluding remarks. Only illumination can cure blindness, and illumination is the reward of disinterestedness, discipline and acceptance of duty. These are within the power

of the individual and a society that sees clearly must be formed of individuals that are illumined. With clear sight we can avoid war. With clear sight we should have real disarmament, because we should no longer need weapons. Armaments are part of the structure of existing political institutions and cannot be abandoned until these institutions are replaced. The narrow nationalist spirit must be transformed. That is the lesson the West is learning.

What is happening in the East? Will the East, descending into matter, have to pass through the fiery furnace of Western experience, while the West ascends to a more spiritual understanding of the relations between nations and the meaning of life? The coming years will test the wisdom of the Eastern peoples. They are discovering the uses of the machine; if they allow the spirit of nationalism to dominate them, as seems likely, they will use the machine blindly, as the West has hitherto done. *If, on the other hand, the East retains its spiritual vision, there is a chance that East and West will at last be able to co-operate in the creation of an International Society or World Order* in which the animal life of man will be governed by wisdom. Then there will be peace, and the soldier's task will be ended.

C. B. PURDOM

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

INDIAN REACTION TO JAPANESE POETRY*

[J. S. is a comparative student of literatures and especially proficient in those of Indian Vernaculars—EDS.]

Appreciation of poetry in any language is not an easy matter even for persons "to the manner born," whose mother tongue the language is. To speak nothing of the necessary amount of education and culture, one has to be by nature attuned to the poet's music in order to enter into the very spirit of the poetry and get the fullest value out of it. For many of us Indians who have since early childhood been reading, writing and speaking English and have almost adopted English modes of thought and expression, the whole house of English poetry has been thrown open. But even for such adopted children of the English language, not every mansion out of the many in that house is easy of access. Our heredity, our *milieu*, our race personality, moulded by numerous influences of which we may or may not be conscious, prevent us from the fullest appreciation and enjoyment of individual kinds of English poetry or individual English poets.

This difficulty of poetic appreciation increases a hundredfold when we are face to face with poetry in a language which is not only foreign to us, but is also foreign in spirit and culture to any language known to us. It is true that human nature is ultimately the same everywhere, that the elemental and basic facts of life evoke similar if not quite the same thoughts and passions all over the world. But it is no less true that every developed language has its own historical and cultural background, and that every literature worth the name evolves its own modes and conventions which are rooted in this racial and traditional background. Hence the common human failing of inability to appreciate an alien

literature, even on the part of earnest students and professors of that literature. Matthew Arnold, who knew French better than most cultured Englishmen of his time, found it difficult to enjoy the fullest aroma of French poetry; and a highly educated Hindu Professor of Persian (himself something of a poet in his own vernacular), who has expressed scarcely veiled contempt for the poetry of Khayyam and even Firdausi, is the most outstanding instance of this human failing this side of the country. Perhaps the Germans are right—in assigning the ability to enter into the spirit of a foreign language and literature to a special aptitude of the mind called "language-sense". For in passing from one language to another,—even when so closely allied as are the Sanskritic vernaculars of India,—one has at it were to "tune in" to a different wave-length. Naturally a far greater effort at adaptation is necessary when the mind turns to a totally foreign culture and literature.

It is natural then if we start upon the appreciation of this bulky volume of highly conventional poems called *haiku* in an utterly foreign language like the Japanese, as upon a perilous adventure in an unknown territory without any of the familiar landmarks that we have learnt to look for in the three or four literatures that we may be tolerably acquainted with. When we turn to the elaborate introduction for guidance, we learn to start with that "the absence of metres and rhyme is what distinguishes Japanese from European verse". This is the first shock to a mind that is familiar with the rich resonances of the best English verse, or with the musical

* *An Anthology of Haiku—Ancient and Modern.* Translated and annotated by Asataro Miyamori (Maruzen Co., Ltd., Tokyo.)

Sanskrit and Persian metres which literally ring themselves. Next we learn that the *haiku* itself is a highly conventional form of verse-writing in this language that has no metre and no rhyme. Every *haiku* must have three lines and seventeen syllables all told, no more and no less; it must have some reference (oftener than not highly conventionalised) to the seasons, e.g., the mention of blossoms or insects or natural phenomena restricted to particular seasons; and it must contain what is called a "cutting word" e.g., *Ya* or *Kana*,—words which have a very important evocative value varying with the context, but a value so elusive that, as the editor puts it rather naïvely, "opinions differ as to their significance," so that "it is often better to ignore the exclamatory sense of *Kana* and *Ya* in translations".

In view of all these restricting rules one can at once agree with the editor, when he says that "pregnancy and suggestiveness, brevity and ellipsis are the soul and life of a *haiku*". The poet actually sees or experiences a seemingly ephemeral natural phenomenon or occurrence, and he puts down, in artistic short-hand so to speak, the bare suggestive notes of the emotion or æsthetic sensation evoked by his transient experience. To turn once more to our trusty guide, "in the *haiku* an objective description is given, . . . and the poet's subjective sentiment is left to the reader's imagination." And that is the final ditch that the unfortunate foreign reader has to face after jumping all these hurdles and obstacles of convention and form and content,—he has to exercise his unaided imagination and interpret as best he can what the poet intends to convey by his short-hand notes. The editor has supplied in scores of cases these imaginative interpretations, but even with such obliging finger-posts a very large number of the 973 *haiku* in this volume leave an uninitiated foreign mind unimpressed or weakly wondering. For after all, one cannot, even with the best of wills, get over conventions of one's own and over

poetical prejudices, instilled by a different usage and by a different æsthetic education of the imagination.

For instance, take the following *haiku* (159) on the cricket's "wail," by the poet Kikaku :

Perchance the cricket is bemoaning
Her husband eaten by a cat.

Now a cricket eaten by a cat is, according to *our* rules of the game, a rather comic subject. So one feels a bit disconcerted to find the editor's note calling it "a touching fantasy". Again in *haiku* (322) the poet's rapturous gaze at a high soaring skylark is cut short by "a sneeze". And one wonders with something like an æsthetic shudder if a sneeze is a proper thing to bring into highly emotional verse. "Nose," again, is another word which is very charily employed by English poets. And starting with such a poetical prejudice, a mere outsider can only wonder if it is a really poetical moment that the famous *haiku* poet Issa has caught and recorded on seeing a swallow flying out of "the nose" of the great Buddha statue at Kamakura. But we Indians at least are on less uncertain ground when we come to fairly numerous references in *haiku* to the frog as almost a beautiful thing and its drone as a positively beautiful sound, though the editor rightly warns Western readers to "remember that all frogs are considered by Japanese poets to be sweet to listen to and beautiful to look at".—Note to (168). For us the monotone of the frog as a profoundly moving sound of nature in the rainy season has for long been an admitted poetic convention, as we find from hundreds of well-known Hindi songs.

Thus we pass from unfamiliar poetic conventions to familiar ones, and from these again to essential poetry that rises above all convention and has its root in the common human love of the beautiful in nature. A large number of *haiku* in this collection contain merely pictorial sketches appealing to the imagination by their objective truth and beauty alone. A solitary crow perched upon a bare branch on an autumn eve, the water-

fowl that "pecks and crushes," the moon reflected on the placid waves, the dragon-fly "flitting after its own reflection in the running water," the water rippling in the evening breeze against the blue heron's legs, the fascinating spring sea that gently heaves and "undulates the whole day long,"—there are scores of such exquisite sketches in this golden treasury of *haiku*. And from such purely pictorial sketches we come to pictures which have also an emotional content; either the vague nostalgia evoked by beautiful sounds and sights and scents, or haunting memories brought back by them, or the essential pathos and melancholy underlying all evanescent glimpses of natural beauty. Thus Basho, the greatest *haiku* writer of Japan, sees "the summer grasses waving" on the historic ruins of a fort, and he adds the haunting cryptic line:—

The warriors' brave deeds were a dream !

The same poet achieves almost mystic rapture in this magnificent picture of a stormy night:—

The sea is wild ! The Milky Way extends
Far over to the island of Sado.

It is the great Basho, again, who gives us unexpected glimpses of mystic symbolism in some of his *haiku*. While worshipping at the most sacred Japanese shrine, he feels that some ineffable grace has passed into him, and he sings:—

I cannot tell what flowers it came from,
But an unnameable fragrance filled me.

But it is not famous poets alone, like Basho and Buson and Issa, that have written great *haiku*. Japan is a land of systematic lovers of nature and poetry, and unknown persons and even children have written beautiful verse. What a world of tragic pathos lies in this simple and anonymous "swan-song" of a prisoner under sentence of death:—

Cuckoo, I'll listen, in the other world,
To the rest of your song.

And how moving in its simple belief in a duplicate spirit world is the cry wrung from a mother's heart on seeing the beautiful dragon-flies flitting about, which her only little boy now dead was so fond of chasing:—

How far may he have gone to-day
My little dragon-fly hunter !

The wistful melancholy which is never far away from the true poetic sensibility in any clime is unmistakably reflected in scores of *haiku* in this collection. Issa sees people "enjoying the evening cool" in summer, and just then the evening bell tolls. So the poet sings mournfully:—

Unaware 'tis their life's curfew,
They enjoy the cool of evening !

Soseki, lying on a sick-bed, hears the wind rustling among autumn leaves, and writes:—

O leaves, ask the wind which of you
Will fall off earliest.

Here we are again on familiar ground. The idea of falling leaves being symbolical of man's mortality is to be found in many literatures; it is evidently part of the poetic currency common to humanity in general.

In our venturesome survey of this strange and unknown poetical domain, we have undoubtedly come across much to baffle and mock our æsthetic and poetical ideas, since it is literally outlandish and foreign to our accepted modes of poetic expression. Our very approach, imaginative approach, differs from that of the intensely artistic but equally intensely concrete Japanese genius. Hence, each one of the 973 *haiku* in this fascinating volume is, first and foremost, the record of a real event, an actual occurrence, something literally seen and experienced by the poet. And what the poet feels, what his imagination sees in and beyond the bare experience, is scarcely even suggested; it is mostly left to the sympathetic imagination of the reader. That is where the *haiku* differs profoundly not only from the western epigram as the editor aptly points out, but also from the Sanskrit *Subhāshita* or the Persian stray "couplet". Japanese *haiku* poetry, with all its strict rules and conventions, is much less conventional than the vast mass of Sanskrit and Persian poetry which almost disdains to record mere facts of phenomenal experience. Thus it is that this

great collection of *haiku* throws open for us as it were a new and strange mansion in the house of Poetry. But much to our delight we have found that everything in this wonderland is not so topsy-turvy as Alice found to her distraction in *hers*. In numerous cases we have come across lovely pictures that we can enjoy for their objective truth and beauty alone. And in the greatest of *haiku* poets we have seen the same spiritual yearning, the same

reaching out for some eternal truth hidden behind the merely actual, and the same realization of the human spirit's tragic loveliness as it voyages through the strange and stormy seas of phenomenal experience, that characterise all great poetry the world over. So does our argument come full circle, and, to quote Shakespeare in the accepted wrong sense, we find that after all

"One touch of nature makes the whole world kin."

J. S.

PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD'S DARSHANA*

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Philosophy in the West, and in the Indian Universities which draw their inspiration from the West, is regarded nowadays largely as an intellectual game, a matter of logic and dialectics. In ancient and mediæval India, philosophy, as its name *darśana* implies, was supposed to provide an insight into the ultimate truth. There was enough of logic and dialectics, but only as a means of guarding the revealed truth against the attacks of heretics and sceptics. This is the prevalent view of philosophy even now among people who are definitely Indian in their outlook. It is interesting to find that so great a Western thinker as Whitehead has come to realise the supreme value of intuition (insight) in philosophy. Whitehead emphasises intuition but does not discard intellectual analysis. Unfortunately he is not an easy writer and it is difficult at times to understand what he actually means. We are convinced he thinks clearly, and that our difficulty to understand him proceeds from the novelty of his thought and the manner of his writing. At any rate so far as the greater portion of his present work is concerned we cannot complain that it suffers from obscurity.

The title of the book is designed to have a double significance. It stands first for the effect of certain ideas in promoting the slow drift of mankind towards civilisation and secondly it expresses the author's "adventure in framing a speculative scheme of ideas which shall be explanatory of the historical adventure". The book is divided into four parts. The first two parts are distinguished by clear writing and penetrating thought. They are devoted to a discussion of ideas about man (sociological) and about nature (cosmological). The author has shown how these have evolved and have influenced civilisation and culture. It is to be noted that Whitehead is concerned with Western civilisation and he has shown how it has progressed from a basis of slavery to its present condition, in which freedom is its fundamental keynote. This has been the work of the Platonic and Christian conceptions of the human soul. Progress in cosmology has consisted in passing from an absolutistic to a relativistic view. In this, as in many other things, the world has progressed by developing the ideas inherent in Platonic philosophy and by discarding

* *Adventures of Ideas*. By ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD. (Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.)

the Aristotelian and Lockian conceptions which ruled common sense and science for centuries.

Part III begins rather abruptly and moves on a different plane. Apparently the story that is told in the first two chapters does not seem to be directly related to the metaphysical scheme developed in this part and continued in the next. It seems we have the adventure of ideas in the first two parts and the author's adventure in developing a scheme of ideas in the last two parts. But the want of connexion between them is only apparent. Broadly speaking the book attempts to interpret history and culture in the light of a metaphysical system. And we cannot understand the interpretation unless we know the system. Thus the philosophical part of the book, in which Whitehead's philosophy is explained, is essentially related to the rest of the book.

We cannot pretend that we have mastered every detail of his system, but there is little doubt as to its main outline. What is ultimately real according to Whitehead is occasions of experience. He accepts the subject-object structure of experience, but the relation of subject and object is not for him the relation of knower and known. Knowledge as conscious discrimination is only an additional factor in the subjective form which is primarily characterised by an effective tone. The basis of experience is not intellectual but emotional. The occasion as subject has merely a "concern" (divested of any suggestion of knowledge) for the object. This concern is expressed by a special activity which is called "prehension". Every occasion enjoys its moment of self-attainment and then perishes into the state of an object for other occasions. Every occasion is big with an urge to go beyond itself. In the initial situation there is a factor of activity which is the reason for the origin of that occasion. The initial situation can be called the actual world relative to that occasion (p. 230). We have thus a process creating itself but no static entities undergoing process. The pro-

cess itself is the actuality. The continuity of the process is guaranteed by the doctrine of the Conformation of Feeling. It means that the subjective forms of the immediate past are continuous with those of the present. When an occasion loses its subjectivity, it becomes an object for the next occasion. If the previous occasion has the subjective form of anger, then it will itself be felt by the next occasion with the subjective form of anger. This continuity of subjective form is the primary ground for the continuity of nature. The past is thus immanent in the present, and efficient causation is a form of this immanence. The future too is something for the present, and the present prescribes the necessities to which the future must conform. So the future is also immanent in a sense in the present. The contemporary occasions are indirectly immanent in one another through the past and the future. There is thus universal immanence. So the reality is organic as well as a process. If we add to it the conception of Eros which is the straining of the world process towards Perfection, we get the main characteristics of Whitehead's philosophy.

Whitehead explains how physical science is an abstraction, because "the notion of physical energy which is at the base of Physics must be conceived as an abstraction from the complex energy, emotional and purposeful, inherent in the subjective form of the final synthesis in which each occasion completes itself." (p. 239) By insisting on a common basis Whitehead may seem to plead for monism, but he expressly favours dualism. "Each occasion," he says, "has its physical inheritance and its mental reaction, which drives it on to its self-completion." (p. 244.) "The Universe is dual because each final actuality is both physical and mental." (p. 245.) Here we have an echo of the Sankhya view of reality according to which in every fact of experience both *puruṣa* (spirit) and *prakṛti* (matter) are present.

By his theory of appearance as the

product of the activity of mind, and especially by his view of sense as primarily "qualitative characters of affective tones inherent in bodily functionings," Whitehead reminds us of the well-known Vedantic doctrines of illusion and *adhyasa*. But in spite of these similarities and his emphasis on intuition, we should be wrong in suggesting that there is any fundamental affinity between Whitehead's philosophy and Upaniṣadic thought. In the first place the dominant note in Upaniṣadic as well as in later Indian thought is subjective, while the point of view of Whitehead is mainly objective. The spiritual realisation in Indian thought is in subjective withdrawal, not in objective unfoldment, as it seems to be in Whitehead. The subordinate place he gives to knowledge, as merely an "additional factor" and not essential to reality, not even to subject-object relation, distinguishes Whitehead's philosophy from Upaniṣadic thought. It is difficult to see how we can understand this relation when all reference to knowledge is eliminated from it. The subjective

"concern" without any suggestion of knowledge seems to be no more than mere physical reaction. True, even Indian philosophy does not assert that knowledge as conscious discrimination is present in all facts of experience. But where such knowledge is not present, some non-discriminate (*nirvikalpa*) knowledge is postulated. We cannot testify to any fact of experience, unless some knowledge is presupposed.

The last part deals with civilisation. A society is civilised when it exhibits the five qualities of Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art, Peace. These are discussed in different chapters. The last two chapters, dealing with adventure and peace, pregnant with highest philosophic wisdom clothed in noble language, beautifully conclude this highly significant work. We may or may not understand or accept the philosophy of Whitehead as a whole, but we can have nothing but admiration for the amazing learning, penetrating insight and breadth of culture, exhibited throughout the book.

RASVIHARI DAS

ABOUT ETHICAL SUPREMACY*

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In view of the fact that ethics so far has been an indiscriminate hotch-potch of categorical imperatives of character, Prof. Hartmann's three volumes must be regarded as a very significant contribution to ethical literature. Indeed, almost for the first time in the History of Ethics has Prof. Hartmann made ethics conscious of the distinctness of the two problems involved in it,—the problem of character or the moral law, and the problem of values or concrete goods. The "goal" of "the New Ethics," he maintains is "to bring man into the conscious possession of his 'moral faculty' and to open to him again the

world (of values) which he has closed against himself". (Vol. I, p. 45). Being fully convinced of the fact that the question of values is the more fundamental, more insistent problem which must be solved before questions of morality can be properly tackled, he devotes the major portion of the three volumes to what may be called the metaphysics of values in general.

When the author is thus prejudiced in favour of moral values in particular, how is it possible for him to escape the warping of his conclusions regarding the larger science of values in any discussion of them within the narrow limits of

* *Ethics*: Vol. I., *Moral Phenomena*; Vol. II. *Moral Values*; Vol. III. *Moral Freedom*—By NICOLAI HARTMANN. Authorized translation by Stanton Coit, with an introduction by Prof. J. H. Muirhead. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London.)

"ethics"? Such a warping does appear in Hartmann's discussions of value, in the theory that values possess an independent objective self-existence. Value as such is intrinsic, it is the good-in-itself which should never be identified with the merely "useful" or "utilitarian". Values are neither subjectively determined by consciousness nor objectively emanated from things; they are "materials," structures which constitute a specific quality of things, relations or persons. They are, like Plato's "ideas," essences, absolute principles, which are discerned *a priori*, not indeed by reason but by sense or intuition ("sensing of value"). Criticising Kant in this respect, Hartmann asserts that the *a priori* of feeling is as universal, necessary, objective and pure as the *a priori* of reason. Values, while holding good only "for" persons are still relative to persons or their needs. And yet while they are real and possess an ideal self-existence, they cannot, as the ontological categories can, exercise an unconditional compulsion over the actual.

Nevertheless, values have a definite categorical conformation or structure whose analysis reveals the interlacing of the finalistic and the causal nexus in a three-fold process of the setting up of the end by the subject, the determination of the means by the end and the actualization of the end through the series of the means. In the first and second process Hartmann sees man exhibiting the divine attributes of providence (foresight) and pre-destination; hence human teleology is considered by him to be the right one. But Cosmic teleology, usually indulged in by religious philosophies, is to be condemned as it implies an abrogation of human freedom, while the postulation of a Divine Being with purposes of His own is to be regarded as a sheer perversion of the facts of human moral agency.

Such is the thesis of the first volume, —decidedly the most metaphysical and difficult of the three volumes. Nevertheless, the thesis that value has no fundamental relation to human interest or desire is essentially a vulnerable one.

If moral values, for example, are in every respect as objective and universal as mathematical and logical laws, (as Hartmann asserts them to be, *ibid*, pp. 124-5), why is there such diversity of belief and practice regarding them? We are not now concerned with the non-perception of value by the ethically uncultured, but only with different valuational estimates of the same moral situation by persons of equal culture and education. Surely no educated person would ever think of contesting the truth of the mathematical judgment $a^2 = (a+b)(a-b) + b^2$, asserted by another? As for our author's contentions regarding teleology, it must be pointed out that he places too great a faith in human possibilities. Man may set up ends and pursue them, but are they not, alas, only too often thwarted and nullified by natural agencies of the causal nexus over which he has no control whatever? This dead-lock is the inevitable product of the obsession of the European mind that man and nature, the finalistic and the causal series always fight against each other (p.297) for conquest and mastery. The thinkers of India, on the other hand try to overcome this difficulty by maintaining that man must seek to conciliate rather than coerce nature and that such conciliation can be brought about only through the recognition and more the realization, of the fundamental unity of man and nature in the self which underlies both, and whose purposes,—freely chosen by man, as his own,—are realized both by man and nature.

The second volume deals with moral values proper, although even here the metaphysics of values continues in several sections in which the problem of gradation of values and the criteria for determining grades, the various kinds of polar opposites that subsist in what is happily called "the valuational space," the several laws of value,—of which the principle of the multiple stratification of the world is the most interesting and novel,—are all discussed in a strikingly original manner. Here again one is struck by the profound

metaphysical insight and interest of the author though he all along professes to be dealing only with "ethics". But a greater part of the interest and importance of this volume should be ascribed to the exhaustive and luminous treatment of the fundamental moral values such as goodness, nobility, purity etc., and of the concrete virtues like justice, love, truthfulness and so forth. It can be safely hazarded that no philosopher since the time of Aristotle, (not forgetting writers like Wundt, Paulsen, Sidgwick), has until now given us such a masterly survey of the concrete virtues of moral life on so vast and comprehensive a scale.

In discussing the apriorism and metaphysic of the "Christian virtue" of brotherly love, Prof. Hartmann refers to Vedantic teaching, (the only reference to Indian thought in all the three volumes), and says that the metaphysical justification offered for it in Vedanta, (admired by Schopenhauer, Max Müller, Deussen and others as the only satisfactory solution of the problem), namely, that you should love your neighbour as yourself because both of you are ultimately one in the unity of primal Being, is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the phenomenon, the mystery of self-transcendence involved in intuitive sympathy, caused by a simple proposition of identity. But he himself does not supply any more adequate basis for it. Things are valuable, says Prof. Hartmann, not on account of

themselves but because they "participate" in value (Vol. I, p. 185). He might as well have converted "value" into the "Atman" of the Upanishads and said that the husband loves the wife and the wife the husband, not because of the wife or the husband, but because of the Atman or the Self.

Little need be said about the third volume which is entirely devoted to the discussion of the metaphysical foundation of moral freedom,—a subject which students of philosophy will find to be of enthralling interest especially as the argument develops through three antinomies instead of only the one (causal) made familiar to us by Kant.

Here again, had Prof. Hartmann been familiar with Indian thought, he would have seen that there is no real difference between human and divine teleology, philosophically considered, for it is the totality of the Karma of Puruṣas or Selves themselves that determines the course as well as the progress of cosmic evolution.

However, we must say that Hartmann belongs to the "Great Tradition" in philosophy. Only Kant's *Critique* and Hegel's *Logic* convey to the reader's mind the same impression of vastness of achievement. Hartmann's thesis is a spirited defence of the ethical supremacy of man as against the non-ethical factors of the world, and who shall say that he is wrong in upholding it whatever one may think of the finality and adequacy of the status assigned to man?

J. M. KUMARAPPA

The Festival of Adonis, Being the XVth Idyll of Theocritus, edited with a revised Greek text, translation and brief notes, by E. H. BLAKENEY; to which is added a rendering in English verse of the "Lament for Adonis" attributed to Bion. (Scholartis Press. 7s. 6d.)

We have been favoured with one of the 240 copies of this handsome edition

printed at the Alcuin Press, Campden, England. Exquisite is the beauty of the original and it is no exaggeration to say that the translation is equally so. We can only refer to its merit as a piece of literature—it is like a joyous, fresh breeze, that exhilarates heart and freshens the mind; for the philosophical and mythological speculations it arouses there is no space here.

O.

PHILOSOPHISM*

[Max Plowman himself a lover of mystical wisdom examines the work of seventeen Doctors of Philosophy and finds most of it dull.—EDS.]

This volume consists of a series of philosophical essays by younger graduates of the University of Chicago and the contributions are offered as a tribute of veneration to four senior doctors of philosophy in the same university: James Hayden Tufts, George Herbert Mead, Addison Webster Moore and Edward Scribner Ames. The interest therefore is necessarily somewhat localised and at times the contributions suggest an effort on the part of junior men to be complimentary to their seniors in the same school of thought rather than the urge of original thought or achieved understanding. Respect and veneration are, of course, admirable qualities, but the realm of philosophy is a very free country where respect for tradition is apt to look like a badge of servitude and where the disciple is likely to receive scant attention if he is not greater than his lord. Moreover it is difficult to convey personal regard through the medium of abstract philosophy, for the thinker necessarily thinks for himself, and whenever he does this it is more by divergence from his preceptor than by accord that he is likely to show his sincerity. So that while we appreciate the fraternal good feeling which prompted this collection, we must not expect to find any very profound or original contributions to thought in it.

It may be accepted as a matter of personal prejudice on the part of the present reviewer that he finds the purely scholastic essays of philosophical thought as among the most uninteresting of contributions to literature, holding as he does that philosophy is without validity except on the basis of experience denied to youth. No doubt it is necessary to serve an apprenticeship and thus to become acquainted with the historic schools of philosophy and

the latest trends of thought, but until these have been assimilated and relegated to the background, the stage is not set for the drama of experience which alone can give the philosopher the means for true addition to the sum of human wisdom, which if philosophy fails to present, it is the merest dust and ashes. Without this experience the study of philosophy tends to become very much what the study of verse-forms is to the versifier—an endless labyrinth of abstraction in which points of difference with past authority become matters of supreme interest and definitions change and disappear in processes of abstraction which lose all touch with reality and finally fade into conflicts in the empyrean between invisible duellists.

The temptations to such abstraction have not been greatly resisted by most of the contributors to this book: the habit is most apparent in the essays which deal with subjects in which a generalisation is put forth as a starting-point to all directions of the compass—a mode of address that inevitably leads to thinking for thinking's sake. The essayist seems to be engaged in covering the ground, and conclusion is attained only by arriving again at the point of departure. Thus Dr. Kate Gordon and Dr. V. M. Ames treating respectively of "Art as Expression" and "Aesthetic Experience" add little to common knowledge of their subjects because they write as those whose mission it is to go "about it and about". Dr. W. K. Wright discussing "The Relation of Morality and Religion" shows that he is a careful, shrewd and consecutive thinker who knows the rules of logic and keeps them, but we have the unavoidable sense that he is "playing the game" within the prescribed rules for lack of any individual urge to serious conviction, when his thinking lands

us in such conclusions as "The fact that progress has been so largely continuous gives us hope that it will go on indefinitely in the future"—a conclusion American history at the moment seems painfully to belie. Dr. Crawford in discussing "Meaning and Reality" keeps himself ably suspended in the realm of pure metaphysics, but adds nothing vital to our conceptions of either Meaning or Reality. And so it is with most of these philosophers: they are obviously exercising their intelligences upon points of philosophic discussion which are removed from practical interest by being elevated to the point of verbal abstraction where terms are of more interest than the matters they represent. Only the great mind can profitably soar to heights of great abstraction, and because our authors are confessedly learners rather than teachers,

their efforts upon high altitudes produce fatigue. Of course in their journeys one has the pleasure of nodding acquaintance with old philosophic friends, but such contact is not enlarging, and at the end of the journey one has the sense of having been far and met little.

The best matter in the book is provided by essayists like Dr. C. H. Hamilton and Dr. J. Wild, the former because he tackles a subject of direct interest in "Buddhistic Idealism in Wei Shih Er Shih Lwen," and the latter because he really makes a personal adventure of his "Grand Strategy of Evolution" and arrives somewhere, even if it be a ground of conclusion that is only temporary; but the book as a whole has not very much of interest to any beside professional scholastic philosophers.

MAX PLOWMAN

The Existence and Immortality of the Soul. By H. T. BUTLER. (Lincoln Williams, London.)

Put briefly, Mr. Butler's main line of argument is that instinct is universal in the animal kingdom, and is infallible; that all, or nearly all, men have an instinctive belief that they possess an "immortal soul"; that God would not endow animals with true instinct and men with false; therefore man *has* an immortal soul.

As to the exact significance of the word "soul," Mr. Butler is somewhat vague; but he seems to regard it as a miraculously produced, eternal, indivisible, separate entity, which comes into existence *pari passu* with the body, but once created, endures for ever. This theory, which is held by most Christians, contrasts with the Eastern belief that the innermost self of man is identical with the ultimate reality of the universe. Moreover the idea that an entity, born in time, could endure eternally, would not be admitted by any serious thinker of East or West.

The most interesting feature of the book is its account of the working of

instinct among animals, although some of the instances given would be more impressive if the author had mentioned his authority for them. The alleged fact is so improbable as to need unimpeachable evidence before one could accept it.

Mr. Butler has an irritating trick of making such doubtful statements as that the Fulani of Northern Nigeria are one of the "lost tribes of Israel," because they, like the ancient Jews, have a law that, when a man dies, his brother should marry the widow! Again that,

Hypnotism, telepathy and the rest prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that there is a part of one's personality that can leave our brains ... that can travel to another individual and enter his body and brain. ... of which singular theory no proof is attempted.

But, despite its doubtful facts and weak logic, Mr. Butler's book contains much interesting information destructive of the materialist theory; and the sentiment with which it concludes is unexceptionable:—

My whole book insists that *man* is not his flesh and blood, but is his inner self.

R. A. V. M.

Psychology of Sex By HAVELock ELLIS (William Heinemann [Medical Books] Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

When one contemplates the fact that the scientific literature on Sex and Sexology emanating from the West ranges from an account of anatomico-physiological details to highly coloured descriptions definitely verging on pornography, it is gratifying to note that Havelock Ellis who has devoted a lifetime to the task of scientification of sex-studies and who is *facile princeps* among those who have made distinctive and highly valued contributions to a systematic study of the problems of sex normal and morbid, has published the volume under notice, setting forth in brief yet bold and clear outlines his considered views on the "psychology of Sex" in the course of eight chapters. The present work although primarily intended for medical readers and students will also make a ready appeal to lay readers, and it does not supplant or supersede the seven volumes of the author's *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*.

Perhaps the most significant and fundamental question is: What is the irreducible and distinctive psychological element in sex-relation? As the orthodox Western Psychologists have refused to admit the existence of any spiritual entity like self or soul, psychology of sex must mean just the Behaviourism of sex. Indian psychology on the other hand not only postulates the existence of a spiritual entity embodied in each nervous or neuro-muscular mechanism but studies the mind or *manas* (*Antah-karana*—internal sense) under the four aspects of *Manas*, *Buddhi*, *Ahamkara*, and *Chitta*. Vathsyayana, the celebrated author of the *Kama-Sutras* isolates the distinctive psychological elements of sex-life. It is no exaggeration to state that anticipations of Havelock Ellis are contained in Vathsyayana.

The sex-problem has a philosophical basis. *Prakriti* is the female principle. *Purusha* is the male principle. Cosmic multiplicity is the outcome of the union between them. Heterosexuality and

reciprocity of sexual attraction are normal features of life. "*Aahara-nidra-bhayamaithunam-cha-samanyametat—pasubhih—naranam*" —Food, sleep, fear, and coitus are shared by animals and humans alike.

In the concluding section of his work, Havelock Ellis speaks of the sublimation of the sex-craving. Violent repressions of the sex-urge result in more violent reactions. A free-lance sex-life results in an ultimate extinction of the organism. The *Gita* recognises this and advocates pursuit of the golden mean. (*Vishayanindriyaischaran . . . atmavasyaih . . . Prasadamadhi-gacchati . . . ii—64.*)

It is on an aspect of the sublimation of the sex-urge that supreme stress is laid by the Yogic discipline. Sex-indulgence is condemned and a sublimation is suggested. The life of systematic sublimation of the sex-urge is not meant for all. But the Yogic discipline involved in the sublimation of the sex-urge opens new lines of investigation which are yet to be followed. Christian Mystics recognised the truth of the said sublimation and tabooed *in toto* all association with Eve.

An average Hindu regards marriage as a sacrament. Not merely that. He should beget a son to save his ancestors. This may sound a strange doctrine in these days of eugenic marriages, birth control, and childless companionate marriages. The cultured and educated Hindu regards his wife as the presiding deity of the house (*Grihesvari* or *Grihalakshmi*) though under the storm and stress of modern conditions of existence wife-beating and actions for restitution of conjugal rights are not unknown.

A purely disinterested psychological study of sex problems must take note of the sublimation indicated by the Yogic discipline. The apparently interminable cycle of births and deaths is due to the contact between the male and female principles—*Purusha* and *Prakriti*. Unless a divorce *a vinculo matrimonii* is effected between *Purusha* and *Prakriti*, it would be impossible to

get rid of the ills of existence. This is the message of the Vedanta, worth contemplating upon. Many of the features of normal and morbid sex-life depicted by Havelock Ellis are embodied with astonishing accuracy of detail

[We are glad to see the following note of protest in *Everyman* for 10th June.

"The obscurantism in regard to sex which Mr. Ellis has fought so valiantly for many years has certainly been a great evil, but we are inclined to think that the 'new freedom' has its dangers too. To promote their own theories the psycho-analysts, for example, have accentuated sex all out of proportion

in the Sanskrit text of the well-known writer on Hindu Erotics—Vathsyana, to which readers of THE ARYAN PATH interested in comparative study must turn.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

to its biological significance.

"Pornography as such is dull, but when promoted under the guise of science it is disgusting. There are scores of books of this type which one can buy at news stalls and elsewhere. In their frankness of detail they are as abnormal and one-sided as were the evasions of past generations."]

An Examination of the Mystic Tendencies in Islam in the Light of the Qur'an and Traditions. By M. M. ZUHURU'D-DIN AHMAD, M.A., L.L.B. (Published by the Author, Pali Road, Bandra, Bombay.)

"The aim of this book," writes Professor Ahmad, "is to explain how mysticism originated and developed in the Islamic world. The author has made an attempt to analyse the chief elements of the so called Islamic mysticism and to show in what way its basic principles are related to the fundamental tenets of Islam. It was necessary for this purpose to give a brief account of the founder of Islam and his companions, and to show how their life could have helped to suggest and develop the chief mystic theories among the Muslims, in the light of the Qur'an and Traditions of the prophet, the two chief sources of knowledge about Islam."

Professor Ahmad considers that Western orientalists are inclined to depict Sufi saints following a path divergent from the way set forth in the Qur'an and Traditions, a path so excellent that it "made amends for the inherent defects of Islam as a theory of life". Are Western scholars wrong in taking such a point of view? They could hardly take any other if love is greater than fear, tolerance of more

account than intolerance. Professor Ahmad is emphatic in stating that Sufism had its origin in the Islam faith, but such a conception is at least debatable. Sufism may have had an independent origin. Something may be said in favour of Aryan reaction or Neo-Platonist origin. Although we cannot deny that Muhammad was a mystic if we attach any importance to his visions, he was a militant type far removed from the quietism of the Sufis. He was so essentially practical that it is not easy to believe in what is known as the "Esoteric Doctrine of the Prophet". There was no "Hidden Treasure," no "Cleave the stone and there am I," in Muhammad's Allah. Though there are a few mystical verses in the Qur'an and more than forty explanations as to the meaning of "certain separate letters outwardly unconnected with the chapters and separate from one another if more than one," careful readers will form the opinion that there was too little of a mystical nature in the Qur'an and Traditions to form more than a most rudimentary beginning of the Sufi cult. Mysticism is almost invariably associated with asceticism in some form or other, and we know definitely that "There is no asceticism in Islam". More than that, the Sufi was primarily concerned with the

soul or spirit in relation to God. It was an intimate relationship, that of lover and the Divine Beloved, and culminated in the extreme ecstasy of union. Nothing of the kind is suggested in the Qur'an or Traditions. Professor Ahmad writes :—

According to Islam the Creator and the creatures remained eternally different realities. Even the apostles, though the most perfect of creatures, ever remained humble slaves to the Creator, content with the humble dignity of prophethood.

It was a meagre conception compared with that of the Sufi who, quickened by love, drew ever nearer toward God and was finally absorbed in Him.

It must be frankly admitted that Professor Ahmad is a staunch and uncompromising upholder of the orthodox Islam faith. For him there is no other that is worth while. He sounds that note repeatedly, and the note is a little strident to those who differ from him. There are other religions and the spirit may be led in many ways. He is wrong in his interpretation of Nirvana and we may question his assertion that "the Christian world has lost all religious consciousness". While admitting that Sufism originated in Islam, it is perfectly clear that he is strongly opposed to the Sufi cult because in its later form it was contrary to the teaching of the Prophet. Professor Ahmad has not written this book from an impartial point of view. While extolling Muhammad and the Muslim faith, he is at pains to discredit what many will consider to be the lofty teaching of Sufism. He uses the ugly word merger in reference to the Divine Union and is not in sympathy with such a conception.

He writes :—

Islam was the only religion that gave a real and comprehensive interpretation of life and used all the facts of life to support

its doctrines of reality and moral reformation. . . . But the Sufis, carried by the flood of reaction against the secular struggle, became supporters of the opposite and pernicious elements of the neighbouring faiths.

"All movements," writes Professor Ahmad, "that claimed to establish a universal religion, or a religion of humanity were nothing but so many less successful imitations of the original example set by Islam." The Sufis had not only strayed from the Islam fold but had been guilty of heresy. They had broken away from the thunder and lightning of the Prophet and dared to conceive an approachable God of Love. But Professor Ahmad does not like them. He writes: "Sufis as a class are no more than parasites living upon the income of Muslims." Rather grudgingly he admits there are some "of real saintly nature." We no sooner welcome this word of praise than our pleasure is shattered by the following amazing reservation :—

It should be remembered, however, that they have achieved all this not by following the mystic practices of the Sufi writers, but by a simple childlike faith in God as Creator, Muhammad as His last apostle and the best guide, and the Qur'an as the last and most complete message of God to humanity.

Students of oriental mysticism will not find in these pages the author's contention that Sufism was closely associated with the chief sources of the Islam faith. Those who are free from religious bias will have good reason for expressing a contrary point of view. There was much that was crude and harsh in Muhammad's message: the upholding of war and slavery, an attitude towards women far removed from that of Buddha's teaching. Perhaps if this book had been a less pious affirmation of Islam it would have dealt a little more fairly with Muslim mystics.

HADLAND DAVIS

The Blavatsky Bibliography. (The Blavatsky Association, London, W. 8. 1s.)

We must congratulate the editors in welcoming the first number of this useful compilation, which we are informed "is not entirely comprehensive of everything that has yet been written; but a commencement has been made"—and it has been well made. The Bibliography has been divided into four sections: (1) Books originally published and correctly reprinted; (2) Re-

prints of books not faithful to the original editions; (3) Miscellaneous writings reprinted in pamphlet or book form, and (4) Biographical data. The editors promise to continue their valuable work every year. "The Bibliography discloses in a manner astonishing even to students familiar with the subject, the enormous interest which Madame Blavatsky aroused during her life-time, and which she must continue to arouse in an ever-growing degree."

B.

Music: Its Secret Influence throughout the Ages. By CYRIL SCOTT. (Rider and Co., London. 7s. 6d.)

The Vision of the Nazarene. Set down by the Author of *The Initiate*. (George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London. 6s.)

Watchers of the Seven Spheres. By H. K. CHALLONER. (George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

Through the Eyes of the Masters. By DAVID ANRIAS. (George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

During these last years there has been a gathering flood of literature which, one supposes, would call itself "occult," although in our opinion the term "psychic" would be more correct. These books are given out as inspired by Spirits and Gods and Angels and Masters, and deal with secrets of initiation in Shambhalla or on Sirius, with past lives of living people, words heard at the feet of Masters, disquisitions on the consciousness of the atom, letters on occult meditation, and the personality of the Absolute, and such like — twaddle. Among them is a series of three on an Initiate by his pupil. This "pupil" who has now published *The Vision of the Nazarene* confesses that "to a certain extent" his "anonymity has already been pierced," but he "has no desire to advertise to the world or to my acquaintances that the Master has done me the great honour to accept me as one of his pupils." Now the writer of the "Initiate" series, whoever he be—and we must respect the anonymity however thinly veil-

ed—is obviously connected with a coterie which contains the well-known musician, Cyril Scott, one David Anrias (a pen name drawn from a character sketch in *The Initiate of the Dark Cycle*) and a Mr. H. K. Challoner. These last three, in conjunction with the shadowy author of *The Initiate* are working in combination.

Let us begin with Cyril Scott's book on *Music: Its Secret Influence throughout the Ages*. We are, alas, no musicians, but Mr. Scott is one, and he should never have provoked a critic of the calibre of Ernest Newman to write a scathing criticism of the inspirer of Mr. Scott, who is given out to have been Pythagoras in a previous incarnation. Mr. Newman's criticism of that inspirer also reflects on the standing of the medium-musician. Mr. Scott's talent is undoubted, but under the influence of his teacher, to whom he dedicates the book, his opinions and inferences are laughable and negligible. He dedicates his book to this inspirer by name, which name by the way has a story of its own, of which Mr. Scott evidently is unaware. This "name" was brought into vogue by the late Mr. A. P. Sinnett, as that of one of the Theosophical Masters, in the days of H. P. Blavatsky, who knew the Personage bearing that name very well. Now, Mr. Scott makes that Personage responsible for the "inspiration" of this travesty, aided by Mr. David Anrias, who, claiming the talent of being psychically impressed, produces pencil portraits which correspond in quality with

the mentality of the text. Mr. Scott has, in our opinion, quite unwittingly but nevertheless certainly, profaned a Personage whom every true Theosophist reverences, and whose writing (in the days of H. P. Blavatsky) as we can see in *The Mahatma Letters to A. P. Sinnett* is that of an eminently sane man, if nothing more.

Quite frankly and unequivocally we disbelieve in the alleged sources of Mr. Scott's inspiration, and see neither art nor cleverness in Mr. Anrias's psychically impressed portraits. The latter's portraits again decorate (?) *The Vision of the Nazarene*, a book which depicts (according to the book-jacket) "Christianity seen, as it were, through the eyes of Christianity's own founder," and which was written inspirationally by the Author of *The Initiate*. The alleged inspirer has obviously suffered in genius since the days of his sojourn in Palestine. The psychically impressed portrait of one whom we hesitate on considerations of blasphemy to term either Jesus or Christ, certainly exhibits signs of degeneration. Mr. Challoner's *Watchers of the Seven Spheres* contains poems, and these are accompanied by coloured plates—the author being the artist also. One of these plates purports to be a Master in Deva form, another the Solar Deva, still another the Builder of Form, etc., etc. They are fantastic in design, and did they not claim to be taken seriously, they would be interesting enough. However, this book should be immune from criticism, for has it not the imprimatur of the Author of *The Initiate* (who writes a preface) and Mr. Challoner expresses in a foreword his "great indebtedness to Cyril Scott and David Anrias"!

The last book we shall note is *Through the Eyes of the Masters*, by David Anrias (with the necessary introduction from the pen of the Author of *The Initiate*). This book contains "nine pencil drawings of the Masters" which were mentally impressed upon the author, who also received telepathically communicated self-descriptive statements from the originals. *The Occult*

Review is quoted on the book jacket as saying that "This volume deserves to be read by all Theosophical students". We must differ, alas, from our well-known contemporary. We have no hesitation in saying that *none* of the volumes under review deserve one moment's serious attention from Theosophical students—unless to guard the unwary from their perusal.

What is the genesis of such volumes?—we ask ourselves.

To us it seems perfectly obvious that Mr. Scott and Mr. Anrias, who have both been—and may still be, as far as we know—connected with the Adyar Theosophical Society, have been much influenced by the stream of psychic literature emanating from that Society during the last twenty years. And not only literature! Mr. Anrias, at least, must have had opportunity of seeing several of the more recent psychically impressed portraits of so-called adepts, manus and chohans, and whether consciously or unconsciously to himself the influence of these has made, it appears to us, a very strong impression on his own psychic nature. The "Deva" influence we think, has its source in the fantastic *Science of the Sacraments*, *Fairies at Work and at Play* and other outcomes of similar parentage. Messrs. Scott, Anrias and Challoner are the natural products of the teaching of pseudo-theosophy with all its psychic accompaniments. With Scientific Sacraments, Cosmic Fire, Solar Initiation, New Christ and World Mother—what else was to be expected?

However, we must do the writers the justice to say that these volumes are not put forth specifically as Theosophy, but the Personalities of more than one of the Adepts mentioned were certainly known to Theosophists in the earliest days of the Movement. This Mr. Scott recognises, for he is kind enough to tell us in *Music* (p. 36) that the appearance of the *Mahatma Letters to A. P. Sinnett* and *Through the Eyes of the Masters* of David Anrias bears testimony that "these mysterious Sages were *not* the invention of the much-maligned occult-

ist, Madame Blavatsky". In such connection the juxtaposition of these two books does little credit, we feel, to Mr. Cyril Scott's intelligence. We may mention in passing that in the bibliography at the end of Mr. Scott's *Music*, not one of the works of Madame Blavatsky is included, but many volumes of pseudo-theosophy find their place there, and have been consulted—a fact we could have well divined without the aid of a bibliography. No student of genuine Theosophy with even a theoretical knowledge of what are devas, who are Masters, what makes a man a Disciple, would entertain the ideas expressed in words or pictures by these three authors. We doubt not that the writers of the books under review feel themselves to have been inspired. Possibly the artists imagine that they were psychically im-

pressed. But where has their discrimination gone? Have they not become the prey of the visions and phantasies of the Astral light, and their own lower nature against which H. P. B. has warned the world? There is, alas, a great danger that many people, uninstructed in the true teaching of the Wisdom-Religion, and attracted by the glitter of psychism and loudness of claims, may fall for these books—and for the supposed wonderful gifts of their writers and illustrators. It is charitable to think that these writers and illustrators believe in themselves and their "inspirers," but it is inevitable to forecast that they will convince in good faith many others. There lies the danger, a danger which only a careful study of the teachings of pure Theosophy can counteract.

B. A. (Oxon)

West-East. By W. J. STEIN. (Anthroposophical Publishing Co., London. 1s.)

In human geography there are four cardinal points but in human history there seem to be only two—East and West, now juxtaposed as conflicting and then as co-operating entities. In history, the north and south points gain occasional publicity as the theatre of adventures in the Arctic or the Antarctic zones, and recently because of scientific polar expeditions. But the East and the West, embracing practically all the important races of mankind, have been pushed almost to the plane of notoriety, as much by cheap mutual vilifications as by pedantic sweeping generalisations. Henri Massis staged a few years ago a spectacular debate on the East and West challenging the interpretation of Spengler in *The Downfall of the West*. Massis, by the law of contra-suggestion, was driven to the other extreme, asserting that the West alone counts and must defend itself from the contamination of the decaying East. The writer of the pamphlet under review belongs to the cult of anthroposophy started

by Rudolf Steiner whose opinions and theories are lavishly quoted in this somewhat hasty "study in national relationship". From the *quantitative* computation of the *nationals* of England and France, Germany and America etc., he comes to a strange sort of *qualitative* evaluation, e. g., soul world passions=Japan; life aether=India; earth=England; sub-earthly forces=America. It is difficult to guess the reaction of the different countries concerned to these supra-psychological complements. The linking up of England and India, of France and China, of America and Japan is suggestive, and here and there are indications of a sincere attempt to make the two historical hemispheres behave in a friendly manner. But neither intellectual nor spiritual justification for considering the West to be the superior and the East to be the inferior partner has been given. We in the Orient would like less of theory and more of practice in fellowship and equality, justice and equity, to build up an abiding bridge of international understanding.

KALIDAS NAG

Calvin. By R. N. CAREW HUNT. (The Centenary Press, London. 10s. 6d.)

Mr. Carew Hunt's biography is learned and painstaking rather than inspiring. Could it, one wonders, have been otherwise? Calvin had, as Mr. Hunt shows, many virtues—courage, devotion, loyalty, integrity, a penetrating intelligence. But his case was anticipated a millennium and a half before his time by St. Paul in a famous passage: "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not love, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal." Misanthrope he may not have been as an individual, but for that profounder, abiding love which was the heart of the teaching of Jesus one looks to him in vain. And he was, by that token, essentially uncreative.

He lived in a period of the sickness of the Catholic Church, when it was ripe either for death or new life. He could bring neither. He led his followers, not out, or back, into the eternal temple of living religion, but only from one sectarian cell to another. Perceptive spiritual imagination died within the cage of his unyielding dogmatism, his stress upon belief and not being, his harsh teaching of "particular redemption"—the salvation of the predestined elect. What do we care to-day for either supralapsarianism or infralapsarianism? We realise truly enough that it is not worth our while even to discover what the terms mean! The root of religion is not in them, nor was it in Calvin himself. He was blind to the personality, the whole

significance of Jesus—his God was Jehovah. He experienced Divine Being not as Love but as Power; he was not a mystic but a theological lawyer—he clung to the letter of the Law (as he read it) like a veritable Sadducee. The harsh Puritanism he fathered upon the world has proved in practice an almost unmitigated evil, based as it was upon physical repression, and denying the truth that all real development is personal and spontaneous. When he lacked power he could hold it as "his deep conviction that the cause of religion could never be advanced by means which were contrary to its spirit, and he always told the Protestants that their only lawful weapons were prayer and patience." But when power was in his hands he used axe and torture and fire against his enemies. Servetus, student of Neoplatonism and the Hermetic writings, he persecuted to death by burning (that "he had tried to secure for the prisoner a less painful death" is not much to the point!), blind to a wisdom deeper and more ancient than any of his own.

Calvin belonged to his day. He was imprisoned within it. He lacked absolutely that insight of real spiritual greatness necessary to lift him above its confining walls. Necessarily he remains a landmark—if an ugly one—in the religious history of Europe (and, through Puritanism, of America), but he has no message for the world to-day. Mr. Carew Hunt, it may be said, hardly tries to persuade us that he has.

GEOFFREY WEST

The Menace in our Midst. By CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS with some criticisms and some comments relevant and irrelevant by R. E. DUMMETT. (Chapman & Hall, Ltd., London. 3s. 6d.)

With ability and sincerity Mr. Humphreys has brought home the alarming increase of criminal violence in England. A son of a prominent Judge, and a practising Barrister, he has been trained in the fine traditions of

law with an equal experience of prosecution and defence; he is well qualified to view the menace of his "crime-ridden" country from the standpoints of the community and of the criminal. He analyses particularly the cases of juvenile raiders and bandits between the ages of 18 and 30 and suggests proper remedies. The array of facts and conclusions justifies his urging of the British public to take immediate steps.

Mr. Humphreys fears that the appalling larceny and licence of youth may stride, with ever-increasing speed, towards the bottomless pit of Chicagoism, and it is his opinion that this state of affairs is attributable in a great measure to the leniency of their courts towards the young and first offenders. Apart from environmental and abnormal factors, the general causes of the making of criminals are after-effects of the war, unrest and uncertainty; communism and revolt; the romantic reaction to machinery; educational systems; and psychism. Special causes are unemployment; books, articles and films that glorify crime; and want of moral sanction in the home, the school and the society. His critic and commentator Mr. Dummett, the Metropolitan Police Magistrate of London, differs from him in the above tabulation of cogent causes, for, to his mind, by far the most serious and effective reasons are environment and opportunity provided by the slackness and complacency of the average citizen which extend an open invitation to crime.

While suggesting preventive and curative measures for prevailing lawlessness and hooliganism, the author criticises the moral flabbiness and irresponsibility of his "conservative" countrymen and exhorts them to make a "sharp-pull-up," to recreate a strong sense of mass morality and to adopt other reformatory means to erase this menace. Besides abnormal types of hardened criminals that need abnormal treatment, he appeals to the Benches to be equal to the occasion and handle the recidivists and their escapades with severe justice free from "fatuous sentimentality," making it clear to

the professional youngsters that their prized profession of crime no longer pays. Then he pleads for the introduction of a modified form of the American system of indeterminate sentences to ameliorate and reclaim the young criminals as faithful citizens.

So far so good. But in attempting "to find out why a man does wrong and make it not worth his while" Mr. Humphreys, who is a professed Buddhist and the president of the Buddhist Lodge of London, should have applied the Indian doctrine of reincarnation. How can prisoners who are also human souls be understood without a basis of their past? As heredity fails to fully explain or to find a remedy, a more philosophical understanding is necessary. What is a prisoner-soul? How does he come into being and why does he persist? Indian doctrines of reincarnation and karma offer a very satisfactory solution. Criminology and penology will become better and more perfect sciences if their principles are formulated in the light of these two doctrines. Then and then only, radical and permanent reform is possible. No human soul is totally incorrigible; only owing to the predominance of some past evil karmas he is what he is. Arouse the dormant samskaras (tendencies) of good karmas and he will grow into righteousness. Who knew that a saint was asleep in the Jean Valjean of Victor Hugo! Let us not forget the glory of human nature and the potential divinity of the human soul. No crime or vice can eternally soil or spoil the divinity of man. When all other methods are proving futile, will the West give a chance to the tried doctrines of the ancient East?

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

Christian Mysticism: With A New Preface. By W. R. INGE, Dean of St. Paul's. (Methuen and Co., London. 7s. 6d.)

Mysticism speaks in terms of direct experience and finds the hidden treasures of the soul. In these days when behav-

iouristic and sex psychology interpret the fine currents of the soul in terms of instincts, a book on Mysticism with the analysis of super-conscious experiences is welcome indeed. The credential of religion is ultimately to be found in the psychology advanced by the mystics;

for they claim to have discovered stretches of consciousness not accessible to all. Philosophy cannot long afford to neglect the experiences of the mystics if it is to fulfil her vocation as the interpreter of experience. It is a unique feature of Indian Philosophy that it has not ignored the deepest experiences of the soul in formulating its schemes of thought.

The conflict between religion and science is absent in some of the Indian systems, for they have long ago dematerialised matter and interpreted creation as the Lila of Brahman. The original energy is polarised into two forces, centripetal and centrifugal; and the entire manifestation including that of the Gods is the resultant of these two forces.

Dr. Inge in his learned chapter on Platonism and Mysticism gives us the impression that he is not much in love with the kinds of mysticism which try to "gain infinity by reducing self and the world to zero". He considers this as the effect of the influence of the oriental philosophy of the Indian type. He is opposed to the doctrine of the "blank" absolute. We may put a question rooted in the very nature of mystical experience—is there not at times a loss and a fall of self even

in love consciousness and is not the soul informed in this height of a unique aspect of our spiritual life? There is in the soul the unfathomable deep where nothing can enter, but what, for that account, cannot be said to be empty or blank. Life oscillates between love and silence; if the Indian mystics have appreciated silence it is only because they find in it the full face of Truth.

The book reproduces in a short space numerous systems. Their treatment at times appears to be sketchy. Among the English poets Wordsworth and Browning have been selected for study. The mysticism of Wordsworth does not appeal to the Dean, because the poet's love for nature was deeper than his love for humanity. Browning's love of life and character perfected "in the stream of the world"—in short "the friction of the active life and the experience of the human love"—has a greater appeal for the author. To him love is "the meaning of life." We feel that a more exhaustive treatment of the mysticism of the English poets and of Carlyle and Emerson would have been more welcome. And what seems to be necessary these days in the study of mysticism is a thorough psychological analysis of the mystical flights of consciousness—and their place in the total setting of life.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

ERRATA

In our June number (p. 413) the name of the London publishers of *Twenty Thousand Years in Sing Sing* had been given; but the American publishers of the same book are Ray Long and Richard Smith.

Also in the same number, (p. 417) only the London Address of the Open Court Publishing Company was given in reference to their publication, *Philosophy of the Present* by George Herbert Mead. Chicago is the head office of the Open Court Publishing Company.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

[A. E. Waite is well known for his many valuable books—veritable flames of old knowledge which are worth an exchange with more than one modern bulb. Every quarter he will give to our readers the benefit of his researches and reading of the many periodicals containing matter of interest.—EDS.]

It is said that Mr. H. G. Wells, in the course of a recent "broadcast talk," affirmed his belief that "the race goes on but the individual is blotted out". On the other hand, Dean Inge—who regards Spiritism (1) as "the cult of Necromancy"; (2) as "Spurious Mysticism"; and (3) as confined to the "masses of the half-educated"—contrives to believe in a life to come for humanity, Mr. Wells notwithstanding. He maintains, however, that the "popular notion" of progress or "further probation in a future state" is equally unsupported by the New Testament and by "traditional Christian teaching".* One of our contemporaries calls this "doleful theology,"† remembering perhaps that it comes from him who was once denominated "the gloomy Dean," but forgetting that after all the preacher of St. Paul's Cathedral was concerned with a point of fact. The New Testament assuredly offers no prospect of evolution in the scale of being for surviving souls of men. As regards "traditional Christian teaching," we know that "the common people heard Him gladly"—meaning the teaching Christ

—and we may infer that others who came after, "masses of the half-educated" included, knew and could conceive little about disembodied souls. But the resurrection of the body was a clear and intelligible issue on which they might pin their faith, as well as on a life everlasting to follow therein. So also the doctrinal picture of a Risen and Ascended Christ, seated "at the right hand of God the Father Almighty," yet destined to return quickly and "judge the quick and the dead," was an image in their own likeness, however changed, and a tangible ground on which to base their hopes. That which was glorified in Him was to be glorified also in them and was either to ascend with Him or in the millennium of a transfigured earth the men of redemption would meet with the Son of Man "in a kindly life and free". These are the dreams that took shape in the Apostles' Creed and pledged the Church, *ab origine*, not to a "shadowed home"—whatever the fabled "light beyond"; not to a world of the departed; not to a "serene and solemn Spirit Land" of Greek Mysteries; but to one of

* *The Daily Telegraph*, May 12, 1933.

† *Light*, May 26, 1933, p. 328.

embodied life, led in perpetuity, when all enemies should be overcome and death itself be dead. It happens in consequence that no Creed of the Church has anything to tell us of discarnate states. Outside such formularies, it was held in all simplicity that those who "die in the Lord" are blessed, while Sheol and perdition are the part of the wicked and of unbelievers, as the worst of these. The Church has no escape from these doctrines, and what part therefore has it in the revelations of Spiritism, veridic or not? The latter has searched its Summer Land, and all adjoining spheres, but has found neither the Paradise of Dante and its rapture of the Blessed Vision nor the bottomless pit of orthodox Theology.

To understand the logical position of priests and ministers who think it possible to reconcile spiritistic "news from the invisible world" with the faith "delivered to the saints" is therefore difficult, though it happens to be a point of importance for current speculations on the hither and further hereafters of supposed disembodied life, and for the desired recognition of their claims at the hands of Churches. Some seventy years since, Dr. Eugene Crowell wrote two serious volumes on the "Identity of Primitive Christianity and Modern Spiritualism". He did not prove it then and no one has proved it later—least of all the amiable Mr. Vale Owen,

with his realms on the "Highlands of Heaven," its "Outlands" and the "Life beyond the Veil". Primitive Christianity is the Pauline hypothesis of Atonement by Blood and no salvation otherwise; but it is to be questioned whether one "spirit message" has testified hereunto since Rochester knockings crossed "the edge of the etheric". The truth is that no reconciliation is seriously in view on either side. The Rev. A. F. Webling,* having become a "convinced Spiritualist," would adjust the Church and its teachings to the new evidences by (1) "a simplification of religion" (2) the release of fundamental Christian truths from the "grave-clothes" of doctrines enshrined in Church formularies. He is followed by the Rev. G. Maurice Elliott,† for whom the Church's attitude towards psychic phenomena seems to pass into the limbus of things that carry no consequence, though the Church itself is recommended to pursue their investigation with reverent and patient care because the New Testament abounds therein. But the fact remains that the after-life of Spiritism, on the faith of all its findings, bears no relation to Christian teaching, either on the state of the departed or the so-called fundamental truths of Church teaching. It can find Church acceptance only at the expense of these. The loose thinking of lay people and incautious clergy may fail to realise this; but there

* *Light*, April 14, 1933, pp. 225, 226.

† *Ibid.*, p. 260.

is logic enough at the Anglican headships—at Canterbury and York—for the issues to be unmistakable there. Were it otherwise, there is the great dominating centre at Rome, fortified by unflinching and exclusive claims as the one divinely appointed teaching authority on all the things of Religion. What chance of toleration would be granted there to the witness of a new revelation? Indubitably, believers in Spiritism are wasting time on their ever-recurring appeals to Christian Churches: it is a foregone conclusion that the cause is lost.

There is meanwhile that other aspiration of the several psychic communities which court recognition by authorised science; and it is not to be denied that some progress is being made in this direction: witness, for example, the latest contribution of Sir Oliver Lodge to the links between physical science and the survival of the soul of man. *My Philosophy* has been called epoch-making by one of the lay reviewers and is the considered testimony of an expert who, after investigations prolonged through fifty years, affirms that “we are spirits incarnated in matter”; (2) that “our existence does not depend on the material body”; (3) that our permanent part is spirit; and (4) that a spiritual world interpenetrates this which is called physical.

Turning to current events, there is a tempered satisfaction in learning from the American

Society of Psychical Research that its report on the “Margery” charges in respect of finger-prints is now on the eve of publication, and that it will be issued as a volume of “Proceedings” and not in the Society’s “Journal”. An end is therefore in sight for the prolonged period of suspended judgment commended and practised by leading psychological periodicals in England. Dr. W. F. Prince, however—who is Research Officer of the Boston S. P. R. and a former President of the parent Society which has worked so long among us in this country—has by no means followed the counsel and has contributed recently to the “Scientific American” his version of “the Case against Margery,* namely, that it is she and no other who secured from a living man the impression of his thumb on wax and that the subsequent prints obtained at her Séances “were fraudulently reproduced from this original by means of dies”. We are no longer dealing therefore with the fantastic suggestion that there was trickery on the part of an alleged control who passed off as his own the prints of a living person, but with a formal charge against the famous medium herself. On a later occasion, Dr. Prince comments on the “paralysis” which has befallen the Crandon case.

It is otherwise with that of Rudi Schneider; the exculpation of whom from the accusations of Mr. Harry Price has been the

* Cf. *The Two Worlds*, May 5, 1933, p. 350.

chief feature of the psychical press during the last three months. There may be noted successively (1) that six Council Members of the "National Laboratory," who were present at the Rudi Séances, disassociated themselves emphatically from the Price report and its charges; (2) that Lord Charles Hope, another and prominent Member, resigned from the Council; (3) that Dr. Osty, President of the Paris Metapsychical Institute, issued a very critical pamphlet which challenged the conclusions drawn by Mr. Price from the "automatic photographs"; (4) that Dr. W. F. Prince has issued another challenge,* proposing a supplementary Report which should furnish answers to 44 questions arising out of Mr. Price's original statement of his case. Lastly, and of all most recent, the English S. P. R. has published a Report by Lord Charles Hope and others on "a series of experimental sittings held with Rudi Schneider in London" between October and December, 1932.† Being subsequent to those out of which the impeachment originated, they are mentioned here because Lord Charles Hope reviews Mr. Price's "Account" and things connected with or arising therefrom. It must be said that it contains a grave indictment on points of fact and of method. The conclusion reached is that neither the evidence ad-

duced nor its presentation is such as to make the charges "count for anything against a medium with Rudi's record". An addendum by Mr. Theodore Besterman, officially connected with the Society, expresses cordial agreement, adding that in his opinion Mr. Price's Report appears "quite worthless as an exposure".

The Land of Psyche at the moment is more especially a Land of Debate, resounding also with other feuds than those mentioned here; and it cannot be said that direct voices come to us from the Land of Nous; but there are casual echoes to remind us of that desirable realm. When Sir Arthur Eddington, F. R. S., suggests that, "so far as is known, our future is not wholly prearranged by physical law," he is not opening a vista into mystical regions that some of us long to travel: he is moving in another direction.‡ And yet the far-off rumour stirs the heart. Mr. Gilbert Thomas, writing on George Herbert, awakens intimations deeper than those on the surface when he quotes a confession of the seventeenth-century poet concerning "many spiritual conflicts that have passed betwixt God and my soul," and the testimony that it had at last found "perfect freedom" in doing the will of the Master.§ Principal A. W. Harrison, in his examination of an affirmed "borderland country between Romant-

* See Bulletin XX of the Boston S. P. R.

† *Proceedings* of the S. P. R., Vol. XLI, June, 1933, pp. 255-330.

‡ See "Physics and Determinism," *Nineteenth Century*, June, 1933, p. 723.

§ *The Contemporary Review*, June, 1933, p. 709.

icism and Religion," proffers an unlikely subject for our purpose; but he tells of the Wesleys and of the epoch marked by their great religious revival.* We might do well to know more of those 34 "lay preachers" who lived and walked in the Wesley light and whose memorials are in certain "Lives," full of "rich material" and "deep experience of religion". A Yorkshire clothier relates how his heart "melted into the hands of God". A burly stonemason was so filled with "the manna of redeeming love" that he had no need for "the bread which per-

ishes". A third testifies that "my every meal was a kind of sacrament," bringing "life to my soul as well as marrow to my bones". Here too was no fever of a moment, for these men and the others "worked by night and by day for periods of thirty, forty, even fifty years". Principal Harrison says, a little coldly, that they "seemed to have discovered reality through their religion". The truth is that they had opened a way of approach towards the deep centre behind all forms of faith, and the abiding reality of the Presence.

A. E. WAITE

SIR HERBERT SAMUEL AND SIR SARVAPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN

[B. K. Mallik, M.A., B.Sc. (Oxon.) is a metaphysician who examines western points of view by the light of eastern canons.—EDS.]

The Editors of THE ARYAN PATH have invited me to examine a review of Sir S. Radhakrishnan's *An Idealist View of Life* in *John O'London Weekly* by the Rt. Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel who is keen on a free interchange of ideas and views between Eastern and Western thinkers. Nobody could be more generous in his praise of Sir Radhakrishnan:—

We have long had writers in Europe and America who have interpreted to the West the thoughts of the East; and writers in Asia who have interpreted to the East the thoughts of the West. Now there comes from India a philosopher who surveys the two and combines them.

Sir Herbert details the grounds on which his judgment is based:—

The writer takes, indeed, all thought as his province not only eastern and western, but ancient and modern, scientific and philosophic; and he has the learning that qualifies him even for so wide a range.

But this high praise is followed by an

earnest criticism which is mainly directed to two important topics that Radhakrishnan discusses: (1) Determinism and Freewill, (2) Intellect and Intuition. As regards the first, Sir Herbert is positive that Radhakrishnan has failed to give the quietus to the problem of freewill:—

He leaves us puzzled as to his own conclusion. He does not seek, where it can best be found, the reconciliation between the fact of the human power of choice, and the fact that all events are determined by prior causes. That reconciliation can surely be discovered in the doctrine that each human personality, as such, chooses freely; but that the personality itself—with its physical nature, and its mental characteristics, its will, its power of choice, and the kind of choice it will make—is itself determined by prior causes. Or, as Schopenhauer expressed it, "A man can surely do what he wills to do, but he cannot determine what he wills."

He states categorically that "undetermined beginnings, upstart events are impossible, either in the physical or human world." Yet he is tolerant of the opposite view, for he adds,

* *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1933, pp. 582-594.

"life is a growth and a growth is undetermined in a measure If there is no indetermination, then human consciousness is an unnecessary luxury".

We sympathise with Sir Herbert in his failure to understand these statements. If "undetermined beginnings" are inconceivable, if events and existents must necessarily be determined, how then could "human consciousness" be an exception to this rule? No doubt Sir Radhakrishnan suggests a departure from this Law only in the case of human consciousness; but this is practically suggesting two incompatible laws for the self-same reality, because human consciousness belongs to the same reality as the non-human. Besides, for the idealist at any rate, there is nothing essentially discrete or plural in the nature of Reality. Reality must be a systematic whole, an Absolute which is all comprehensive, so that if the law of Determination is to prevail, it must prevail for good and all. Only if Radhakrishnan split up the Absolute in a mood of philosophic anarchy, might he provide for both the laws operating successfully in two different spheres of existence, Human and non-Human. But that would be killing the goose for its eggs; and Sir Herbert evidently was more for the goose than for the eggs. But Radhakrishnan probably was not interested in solving the problem of indeterminacy; he was stating the position the problem occupied in our philosophical world. He was dramatising as a historian of philosophical problems rather than attempting to solve the difficulties. It is a queer position, for we cannot decide: we cannot choose, between alternatives, which is indeterminacy; we cannot deny that the law of necessity rules the events, which is determination. We always end up in these inquiries with a problem on our hands as if experience was destined to finish up with a doubt.

Sir Herbert's point in his criticism of Radhakrishnan's enigmatic position incredibly suffers, as he chooses to overlay it with an attempted solution of his own. For what he offers as a solution,

viz., the notion of personality, is really only another name for the human consciousness on whose behalf Radhakrishnan was prepared to commit even a logical breach of peace! If freedom can be secured and preserved within the range of human personality, why not apply the doctrine to "human consciousness" as well? For, after all, personality is only a phase of that consciousness. Besides, even if one granted a distinction between willing and doing, that is to say, between choosing and carrying out a choice, one has still to face the danger of allowing two incompatible laws (1. Indeterminacy and 2. Determination) to rule what, after all, were phases of the same personality. You have either to split up your personality or create a situation of alternatives each of which must be equally fatal to its integrity.

Turning to his criticism of intellect and intuition, we run into the same kind of difficulty. He writes:—

The eastern element in Radhakrishnan exalts intuition, and the western element insists upon intellect.

The one assumes that intuition is to be regarded as above reason, the other argues that it must reconcile itself with reason.

We wonder if Radhakrishnan relishes such a crisis in his career—a dissociation of personalities! In the age in which he saw the light of philosophy and which helped him so magnificently to nourish his ideas, a queer mixture of both the Western and the Eastern traditions prevailed. Sir Herbert, however, suggests that while Radhakrishnan's career as a thinker was moulded by both the Western and Eastern traditions, it was the Western alone which ultimately dominated his maturity; as evidence he suggests the fact of Radhakrishnan inclining more towards the intellect than intuition.

The religious intuition, he says, requires to be reconciled with the scientific account of the universe. And again, it is essential that we should subject religious beliefs to the scrutiny of reason. He condemns "confused irrationalism and irresponsible mysticism". Great

intuitions, he says in a noteworthy phrase, "arise out of a matrix of rationality". This gives Sir Herbert an occasion for rejoicing; for he pointedly traces all the troubles in the human order to the pernicious influence of "intuition" on the human mind.

The world has suffered too much through all its history from "confused irrationalism and irresponsible mysticism". A great part of the antagonisms, conflicts, wars, which make up so much of the annals of mankind, and have brought untold miseries to countless millions through long ages, is due to nothing else than to the clash of opposite ideas, faiths and loyalties. Each claims supreme authority by virtue of the intuitions of its founders and prophets, and so long as these are held to be unchallengeable there can be no finish. The intuitions of a Mahomet contradict those of a Buddha or of the authors of the Vedas. Each are held to be valid in their own right. The outcome is seen in the antipathies between Moslems and Hindus; and the philosophic doctrine of the supremacy of intuition ultimately finds concrete expression in the lootings, burnings, and murders of the religious riots of Cawnpore.

All this is perfectly true; but Sir Herbert overlooks the fact that the world which runs on straight logical lines is hardly less wild if not more erratic at times. There is nothing in the rational procedure which provides for security or stability or universal agreement as a matter of course, any more than there is inevitable peace and understanding in the intuitional way. No doubt the clash of intuitions takes the form of the clash of authorities, or burning faiths; but it is a mistake to conceive the intellectual procedure as unauthoritative and equalitarian. When philosophers argue, they are supposed to do so within the strict limits of definite assumptions, namely, all that goes to establish the universe of discourse. But when a Protestant argues with a Roman Catholic or a Hindu with a Mohammedan, there appears to be no universe of discourse, but only one of discord. In strict logical terms the religious combatants behave like "absolute differentials" seeking to demolish each other ruthlessly, while the philosophers are mere rivals with a good deal of common seeking to persuade each

other. But this is certainly not the whole story about the philosopher any more than it is a fair account of the religious people. It is not a fact that the Hindu and the Muslim meet only to quarrel and fight to the finish, precisely because they agree possibly as many times as they differ. Similarly the philosophers have been known to differ as often as not when their universe of discourse tumbles down and they are left as naked swords clashing. A clash is a clash and it makes no difference whether it is the intuitions that supply its terms or the logical certainties. What determines its course and procedure is not its constituent but the nature and claim of the conflict itself. What it is and how it arises is another story; but it is a traditional misconception to claim for the rational procedure that it invariably produced order and agreement in the human economy rather than disagreement and disorder. If we are really prepared to go a little deeper into the discussion we may add that the rational procedure may well be supposed to begin with a prejudice and the intuitional method with a superstition. A discussion on rational lines invariably suffers from the deficiency of the major premise. In seeking to remove the differences between two competing positions, it only eliminates the differences or immolates them in the previous agreements. Its total output is only a discovery of the deviation or its absence in the competing positions from the original assumptions. And if it is liable to be prejudiced, it is because it has to make a fetish of either universals or fixed standards which necessarily cut out the alternatives and push back the course of thought to its foundations. What results is not a discovery of truth capable of removing the differences and disagreements but a smothering of them by what one may call a logical strategy. Then the disagreements revive perhaps with redoubled force, and we get not a discussion but a clash of competing views, a very different phase of the rational procedure. The original assumptions are sought to be disowned, and

issues are joined without qualms of conscience or associations or traditions. It is difficult to distinguish the rational procedure in this phase from the intuitional, unless we choose to emphasise their technique and constituents. A clash of intuitions is a clash of *ex-cathedra* claims while a clash of opinions is a clash of judgments and theories. In the one case, the opponent is the devil-incarnate without any rights and privileges at all, while in the other he is politely conceded the claims of a rival who still may be persuaded to see the mistake of his ways. Besides, the Divinity and the Supernormal Dignitaries are not invoked by the intellectualist as they invariably are by the intuitionist, though the laws or the mysterious impersonalities called universals which are put in their place are hardly less formidable. And further, when actually they finish up, they finish up with an impasse: and it makes no difference whether it is one of doubt or of suspense of activity altogether.

But we do not mean to suggest that Sir Herbert is not aware of the distinction between the common assumptions and agreements which seem to underlie all disagreements and the disagreements themselves. He writes:—

It is possible indeed to pick out points of fundamental agreement among all creeds. That is the essential purpose of the Bahai religion, the foundation and growth of which is one of the most striking movements that have proceeded from the East in recent generations.

Sir Herbert is appreciative of the Bahai religion, a fresh mark of his sincere anxiety for peace and goodwill among men. But he is equally alive to the fact that "the creeds also contain doctrines which are mutually incompatible". And he is frankly anxious for their elimination. And naturally the whole of his almost innate prejudice against Intuition returns as soon as he seriously faces that need. He is positive that the "ultimate world-harmony of religious belief" cannot be reached if we assume that "Intuition is . . . supreme".

He is right. If the question is entirely

one of eliminating the incompatible doctrines instead of solving the difficulties they have raised, it is most unlikely that intuition will be of any use to us. On the contrary it is the intuition alone which is responsible both for the discovery of the competing claims and a steady insistence on them. It implies a frank departure from the universals or the agreements which preceded the origin of their claims. Here is a stand for the unique, the novel and the original in spite of the fact that the novel never comes to its own except in the throes of a conflict of incompatibilities.

But Sir Herbert must be equally aware that a considerable body of opinion will not be satisfied with a mere elimination of the incompatible doctrines. What it most emphatically wants is a solution of the difficulties they have raised. And if it so happens that they could not be solved, they would much rather dwell in the abode of the irrational or the incompatible than seek a false security or artificial peace in the land of the rational. Here is a clash of objectives which Sir Herbert cannot overlook. And it is not mere "atavism" as he suggests that is responsible for the reluctance of Radhakrishnan to abandon the doctrine of intuition altogether. Not that we entirely disagree with him when he says that Radhakrishnan sounded rather ambiguous when he discussed the doctrine of Intuition in its relation to Reason. But is it not better to leave with a note of a frank enquiry and an open mind when a steady light of co-ordinated reasoning is absent than to persuade people into a mood of certainty and faith? If Sir Herbert chose to go deeply into the real position of the Hindu which Radhakrishnan has been all the time imperceptibly building up, Radhakrishnan would have enjoyed even a sounder appreciation at his hands. For what Radhakrishnan advocates all the time is not either Intuition or Reason, nor Freewill or Determinism, but what is known as the doctrine of toleration or degrees of reality. We had already an

occasion to suggest that he was a dramatising historian in the garb of a Philosopher while he was seeking to unite the incompatibles of thought; we may go one step further and suggest that he was stating the problem instead of foreclosing it with a positive solution. He was upholding that the incompatibles were not compatible; they were degrees of reality. Intuition and Reason are not really antagonistic to each other essentially. If properly understood they are complementary and harmonious. And if we descend from these logical heights to the more concrete issues of life, for instance, religious faiths, social customs, racial claims, etc., we would come across exactly the same kind of relationship amongst them. A Hindu and a Muslim, a European and an Asiatic are essentially and fundamentally unique and independent. So that if differences arise among them, we need not consider them as at all incompatible but must take them as differences of degrees which under no circumstances should be allowed to interfere with their uniqueness. The question is not one of smothering the differences by tracing them to the fundamental assumptions or agreements. That way lies the Intellect which Sir Herbert, true to the old Greek tradition, upholds. The real issue is one of setting the differences against the background of individuality. The Protestant and the Catholic, for instance, may differ and quarrel as much as they like; but no differences that might arise between them need impair or embarrass the uniqueness of their individuality, so that if they have to quarrel they have to

do so within strict limits. In other words, they might compete with one another but not behave as combatants do in warfare. And it is this method of dealing with differences that is called by the name of toleration, a concept which has been systematically misunderstood by the European except in stray instances of deeper appreciation. Even Sir Herbert did not quite succeed in escaping the wholesale misunderstanding; for his very first note of criticism appeared in the shape of a complaint that Radhakrishnan was not always clear enough in his statements and assertions though he frankly appreciated his style as extraordinarily lucid and vivid. We shall quote:—

But the one criticism of the book which I would make, so far as presentation is concerned, is that the reader is often left uncertain whether a particular passage is the author's expression of his own view or his summary of the views of the school he is discussing. There has always been an eclecticism about Indian thought, an easy tolerance of varying doctrines, which has been a strength to Hinduism as a popular religion; and it is this disposition, I suspect, which has led Radhakrishnan, bred in that atmosphere, not to mark too clearly any definite frontiers between his own conclusions and those of the several schools whose tenets he examines.

We have no space here to discuss Hinduism, but we may just point out, that what appeared to be "Eclecticism" to him was after all a very systematic and consistent position, and if only Sir Herbert cared to acquaint himself with the doctrine of the degrees of reality, he would not have found Radhakrishnan vague and ambiguous, much less Hinduism an abode of the contradictories.

Calcutta

B. K. MALLIK

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"———ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

It is a coincidence (we prefer to call it Karma) that just as we finished reading the MS. of the preceding contribution which examines the criticisms of Sir Herbert Samuel of the oriental points of view of Sir Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, we received the latest pronouncement of the same British philosopher and politician. *The Tree of Good and Evil* (Peter Davies, London. 2s. 6d.) is Sir Herbert's Presidential Address to the British Institute of Philosophy. It is a fine piece of optimism which recognizes that evil and suffering are co-eval with good and joy and that the former are the necessary bases for the manifestation of the latter. "There is no 'Problem of Evil'; there are problems of evils," says Sir Herbert. He shows that "there is no such thing as a principle of Evil"; "Death is a condition of birth. . . . We can conceive a world with neither; but there cannot be birth without death any more than there could be death without birth." Sir Herbert's address may be described as an excellent commentary on the Avesta conception of Good and Evil, as a pair "one the maker of life, the other to mar it, and thus they shall be unto the last." (Yasna XXX—3-4) He voices truly the pure Zoroastrian view

when he affirms :—

Evil conditions, like all else, are to be regarded, not only as what they are, but also as what they may be in course of becoming. The stream of time carries them along with the rest, out of the past into the future; they may be changed or stopped as they pass.

Not only in the individual, attaining control and perfection but more particularly in corporate endeavour, national and international, Sir Herbert sees "the gradual improvement and transformation of society". But in the process of becoming "new evils will arise"—what of that! Sir Herbert pictures Time as a youth with a spade and a basket of seed rather than an ancient with a scythe, and he concludes :—

We may believe that those whose ears are really in tune with the chant of Nature can hear a music swelling from her innumerable voices which is not a dirge, but a pæan, a song of life abounding and triumphant. And if in our world there are vales of tears, there are hillsides also of joy and laughter, and peaks of splendour shining in the sun.

While we are glad to see a reiteration of the teaching that good and evil in nature, egoism and altruism in man, work the miracle of progress, we must say that not only the why of the problem, but also the how of the problem remain unexplained. Even a little

familiarity with the true and ancient Eastern views would fill the gap in Sir Herbert's popular exposition which no doubt will cheer up many in these hard times. Our readers will find that the following extracts from the luminous *Secret Doctrine* of H.P. Blavatsky not only further explain the main propositions of Sir Herbert Samuel, but also make the treatment more, if not wholly, complete.

Good and Evil are twins, the progeny of Space and Time, under the sway of Maya. . . . Neither exists *per se*, since each has to be generated and created out of the other, in order to come into being; both must be known and appreciated before becoming objects of perception, hence, in mortal mind, they must be divided. (II, 96).

Demon est Deus inversus, is a very old adage. Indeed, evil is but an antagonizing blind force in nature; it is *reaction*, *opposition*, and *contrast*,—evil for some, good for others. There is no *malum in se*: only the shadow of light, without which light could have no existence, even in our perceptions. If evil disappeared, good would disappear along with it from Earth. (I, 413.)

A thing can only exist through its opposite—Hegel teaches us. . . . The Magians accounted for the origin of evil in their exoteric teachings in this way. "Light can produce nothing but light, and can never be the origin of evil"; how then was the evil produced, since there was nothing co-equal or like the Light in its production? Light, say they, produced several Beings, all of them spiritual, luminous, and powerful. But a GREAT ONE (the "Great Asura," Ahriman, Lucifer, etc., etc.) had an *evil thought*, contrary to the Light. He doubted, and by that doubt he became dark.

This is a little nearer to the truth, but still wide of the mark. There was

no "EVIL thought" that originated the opposing Power, but simply THOUGHT *per se*; something which, being cognitive, and containing design and purpose, is therefore finite, and must thus find itself naturally in opposition to pure quiescence, the as natural state of absolute Spirituality and Perfection. It was simply the law of Evolution that asserted itself; the progress of mental unfolding, differentiated from spirit, involved and entangled already with matter, into which it is irresistibly drawn. Ideas, in their very nature and essence, as conceptions bearing relation to objects, whether true or imaginary, are opposed to absolute THOUGHT, that unknowable ALL of whose mysterious operations Mr. Spencer predicates that nothing can be said, but that "it has no kinship of nature with Evolution"—which it certainly has not. (II, 490).

In human nature, evil denotes only the polarity of matter and Spirit, a struggle for life between the two manifested Principles in Space and Time, which principles are one *per se*, inasmuch they are rooted in the Absolute. In Kosmos, the equilibrium must be preserved. The operations of the two contraries produce harmony, like the centripetal and centrifugal forces, which are necessary to each other—mutually inter-dependent—"in order that both should live." If one is arrested, the action of the other will become immediately self-destructive. (I, 416).

Lucifer, or "Light-Bearer" is in us: it is our *Mind*—our tempter and Redeemer, our intelligent liberator and Saviour from pure animalism. Without this principle—the emanation of the very essence of the pure divine principle *Mahat* (Intelligence), which radiates direct from the *Divine mind*—we would be surely no better than animals. (II, 513)

We produce CAUSES, and these awaken the corresponding powers in the sidereal world; which powers are magnetically and irresistibly attracted to—and react upon—those who produced these causes; whether such persons are

practically the evil-doers, or simply Thinkers who brood mischief. (I, 124).

Karma-Nemesis is the synonym of PROVIDENCE, minus *design*, goodness, and every other *finite* attribute and qualification, so unphilosophically attributed to the latter. An Occultist or a philosopher will not speak of the goodness or cruelty of Providence; but, identifying it with Karma-Nemesis, he will teach that nevertheless it guards the good and watches over them in this, as in future lives; and that it punishes the evil-doer—aye, even to his seventh rebirth. So long, in short, as the effect of his having thrown into perturbation even the smallest atom in the Infinite World of harmony, has not been finally readjusted. For the only decree of Karma—an eternal and immutable decree—is absolute Harmony in the world of matter as it is in the world of Spirit. It is not, therefore, Karma that rewards or punishes, but it is we, who reward or punish ourselves according to whether we work with, through and along with nature, abiding by the laws on which that Harmony depends, or—break them. (I, 643)

According to the views of the Gnostics, these two principles are immutable Light and Shadow, Good and Evil being virtually one and having existed through all eternity, as they will ever continue to exist so long as there are manifested worlds....Shadow is not evil, but is the necessary indispensable corollary which completes Light or Good: *it is its creator on Earth.*

As a Unity, Ennoia and Ophis are the *Logos*. When separated, one is the Tree of Life (spiritual), the other, the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil...

The serpent, the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, and the Tree of Life, are all symbols transplanted from the soil of India. The Arasa-Maram, the banyan tree, so sacred with the Hindus (since Vishnu during one of his incarnations, reposed under its mighty shade and there taught human philosophy and sciences), is called the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Life. Under the

protecting foliage of this king of the forests, the Gurus teach their pupils their first lessons on immortality and initiate them into the mysteries of life and death. (II, 214-15)

Professor A. R. Wadia who is not unknown to our readers arrives at the same conclusion as Sir Herbert Samuel in his *Civilisation as a Co-operative Adventure* (The Principal Miller Lectures for 1932). As an idealist he "seeks to fathom the one increasing purpose in human history"—there is persistence with which good overcomes evil in the world-process and makes progress inevitable. We have space to quote only his creed and his conclusion, which reveal the basis and the culmination of his thesis, both of which are Theosophical:—

Reality is spiritual and in the world of our experience this spirituality expresses itself best in the world of human souls. Men may differ from one another in the range of their capacities, but it is the birthright of each human soul to realise itself, and a human society is good or bad to the degree to which it enables each constituent member of it to fulfil his humanity. This is democracy in its broadest sense. It is not a mere matter of political machinery, of votes and electorates, but of the conditions under which man can become what he has it in him to become. That is why under an Asoka or an Akbar, under a Napoleon or a Mussolini men may be enjoying real liberty more than under a corrupt and mediocre political democracy.

Wherever they are born, men must learn from one another, or else go under. The highest goods of life: beauty in art, truth in thought, goodness in life are human, not national possessions. They know no East and West. Their home is in the limitless depths of human heart,

Professor Wadia is outspoken about the religious and social weaknesses of India as of the West. Here there is orthodoxy and hypocrisy, demoralizing fatalism, and the need of "that zest for social service which scorns individual peace of mind when there is a cry of suffering near by". In the West there is worship of money, judgment by mere appearances, empty round of pleasures, a void as to the deeper meaning of life. Let East and West get together, to fulfil the purpose underlying their history, for "co-operation is the basis of life; it can be international and not merely national". But how? There must be similarity of aim and of principles of life and action. Perhaps these can be evolved out of the following words of Professor Wadia:—

The East with its age-long conservative traditions is more cautious, perhaps too cautious, and suspicious of any change, but to its credit it must be admitted that behind its conservatism there is an abiding consciousness that the life of wealth and giddy pleasures does not bring out the best in man, that life is too serious to be reduced to a round of hectic pleasures, and that money cannot measure the depths of life. This consciousness is inborn in India and is the most relieving feature of Hindu civilization.

The tempting devil of Egoism is not only present in the life of hectic pleasures; but there he is even in the life of service prompted by altruism. Mr. John Middleton Murry describes him in *The Adelphi* for July thus:—

Individualism is good; but economic individualism is the devil. Marxism is good; but rigid Marxism is the devil—it makes for supine superiority or insensate fanaticism. Parliamentary democracy is good; but the parliamentary game is the devil. And all these devils are forms of the devil of egoism. Of how many nominal Socialists to-day is it true that it is far more important to them that they personally should be in Parliament or in office than that the cause of Socialism should prevail? Of how many rigid Marxists is it true that their creed flatters their own vanity, by enabling them to dream of themselves as "dictators of the proletariat," or, more subtly, to believe that they have been through everything? Of how many liberal individuals is it true that their high valuation of "individualism" derives from their unconscious determination to justify their own position of privilege?

Mr. Murry would exorcise the devil from the socialistic body he is labouring for. But egoism is the raging disease which has to be purged out from every sphere of life. It has poisoned and weakened not only religious, political and social spheres of action, but also those labelled spiritual.