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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly, and lost among the host—as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XXII SEPTEMBER 1951 No. 9

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"THUS HAVE I HEARD"—

The Spirit of War is synonymous with the Force of Violence. That Spirit has many expressions but in itself is immortal. That Force manifests in numerous ways but conserves itself ever and always. The source of war and of peace, of violence and of non-violence, of mortality and of immortality is one and the same: "I am death and immortality," says Krishna in the *Bhagavad-Gita* (IX. 19).

Unless lovers of peace comprehend the implications of this philosophic proposition their efforts to wage war against wars will not be wholly successful. We cannot destroy violence without destroying peace. But in what way can the death-forces be used to gain immortality? How can the forces of violence be made to serve the cause of peace and non-violence? It is an alchemical process and true pacifists have to learn the art of this alchemy.

The evil omens of war were apparent even on the day when people were celebrating the advent of peace after the ignominious fall of Hitler. Recent events make the destruction of this civilization by war a graver possibility than it ever was. Lovers of peace everywhere are bestirring themselves to organize for peace; and among them are some followers of Gandhiji, firm and convinced believers in the principle of non-violence.

Gandhiji not only understood with his mind, but also applied with his heart the truth that war and peace make a pair. He comprehended the alchemy referred to above so thoroughly that he proceeded to apply its teachings to mass movements in India; having practised them in his own personal life and having experimented with them publicly in South Africa, he courageously exercised his knowledge and influence in and through events which are now matters of history.

Gandhiji saw that the very forces of ignorance, of moral temerity, of old-fashioned blunderbuss patriotism, have to be transmuted. His was

the rare sense which the common-sense of numerous administrators and politicians and publicists could not appreciate. Gandhiji's appeal to the soul-force of the people was rooted in his faith that men did not possess souls, but *were* souls and possessed mental and moral weaknesses which the powers of the soul could overcome. Therefore he led them to fight with the weapon of non-violence the evils of injustice, exploitation and tyranny. At times he spoke of his "Himalayan blunders" but what were they? The inability of the people to stand firm in the resolve of non-violence. The process of alchemy had gone so far in them and no farther, and so, again and again, he cried halt, took to preaching the doctrine of *satyagraha* and then, once again, launched into experimenting with the force of truth and non-violence in his people. Within his own personal self the spiritual transmutation was so great, so nearly complete, that he became a target for death by foul murder.

Unless this technique is understood in a greater measure by those who call themselves pacifists, their efforts may consist of feverish or even eloquent propaganda, but will not bring forth Peace.

Pacifists must learn to wage war against the warlike and violent forces in their own flesh and blood and brains. Unhappiness, affliction, suffering, consciously experienced become a cleanser and a purifier. This is not the suffering ordinarily experienced by everyone. It is an extraordinary type of affliction which brings the sure consciousness that the soul *is*, that soul-force is available, and that mental anguish, moral suffering, bodily disease are stepping-stones. This higher type of suffering consciously faced brings to birth the new man—the first of the four classes of the righteous ones who are dear to the Divine. Through such conscious evaluation of suffering man transmutes cowardice into courage, ignorance into knowledge, conceit into humility, egotism into altruism.

Unless a few become men of peace after the pattern of Krishna, Buddha and Jesus and follow the example of the 20th-century apostle of peace through truth and non-violence, wars in their destructive character will not cease.

Suffering is upon the whole earth today. It is making for discontent and competition, and leading to national pride and prejudice poisons the international atmosphere. Neither the UNO nor UNESCO will successfully overcome these forces of evil till they plan and create an army, however small, of men and women who study the alchemy of peace by waging the greatest of all wars—the war against their own animalism. The war-beast will prowl the wide world over unless such an Army of Peace-Men face it and help it to overcome its disease by deep heartfelt suffering. Such a reflection gives meaning to a saying in the ancient Mysteries—"Blessed be the Name of the Great God, the Most High, who sends suffering to His devotees so that they may rise to Him in Purity and Beauty." It makes the saying of the ancient occultists a pregnant aphorism: "Woe to those who live without suffering."

SHRAVAKA

World Peace Day, 1951.

POETRY IN SANSKRIT INSCRIPTIONS

[**Dr. Bahadur Chand Chhabra**, Epigraphist to the Government of India, presents here a poetic nosegay culled from a surprising source, Sanskrit inscriptions of antiquity. The embellishment of the chronicle of dry facts with the flowers of poesy is, as he brings out, very characteristic of the Indian genius, which, from ancient times, has often declined to treat prosaically either scientific, philosophical or historical subjects.—ED.]

If one were to cull from Sanskrit inscriptions alone, one could easily produce a handsome anthology of a thousand and one delightful poems.[1] These gems remain scattered and hidden. Their merit is seldom recognized. Rarely indeed does their splendour catch the eye. They are passed by as mere weeds grown over the heaps of raw material—raw material for the construction of a more or less prosaic edifice of history which, until yesterday, meant little more than a controversial narrative of the rise and fall of past empires. The builders of such an edifice, in their anxiety for sound and solid stuff, naturally brush aside the luxuriant overgrowth which, to them, serves no purpose whatsoever. Nay, it often proves a hindrance to their work. Yet, from the point of view of poetry, the finest of the fine arts, this very overgrowth contains pieces of undisputed worth, judged by the standard of the Sanskrit classics. They may be useless as historic evidence but, as a source of pleasure, many of them may be found to compare well with the finest of literary compositions.

Where is the place, one may question in all seriousness, for *belles-lettres* in such matter-of-fact documents as inscriptions chiefly are? These serve history; and history has no room for poetry. This may hold good elsewhere, but not in India. The Indian genius has all along dragged in poetry where poetry is least expected. No matter what the theme—arithmetic or architecture, law or religion, medicine or metaphysics—avenues of elevated expression, at once instructive and entertaining, are sought. In order to drive home a point, an Indian writer or speaker freely employs fancies and hyperboles, similes and metaphors and a host of other figures of speech, that hit the mark and radiate joy into the bargain. How intriguing, for instance, is the physician who, in adverting to the beneficial effects of the use of dry nuts of myrobalan, declares :—

Yasya mātā gṛihe nāsti tasya mātā harītakī |
Kadāchit kupyate mātā nodarasthā harītakī ||

To one who has no mother at home, *harītakī* is mother. Mother may on occasion get angry, but never does *harītakī* in the stomach flare up.

[1] One such is under preparation by the writer.

Let us have another example. We have in the *Bible:* "In all thy ways acknowledge Him, and He shall make straight thy path." (*Proverbs*, III. 6.) This simple and direct advice has been dished up in ornate fashion, independently of course, by an ancient theologian, as follows :—

Yadā charmavad ākāśaṁ veshṭa-yishyanti mānavāḥ |
Tadā devam avijñāya duḥkhasyāntō bhavishyati ||

When people are able to roll up the sky like a parchment, then will it be possible to get rid of misery without acknowledging God!

This indirect and suggestive way of putting a thing is characteristic of Sanskrit rhetoricians. It is supposed to add elegance to emphasis.

When poetry can thrive well in the realms to which it is exotic, so to say, how much more luxuriantly could it not flourish in the fields in which it is more or less indigenous? And Indian epigraphy has surely been one such field. It provided ample scope for *belles-lettres*. In invoking the blessings of his favourite deity, in extolling his patron's ancestry, in recounting the exploits of his hero, in describing a temple built by his master, or in a like situation, a writer with a poetic bent would find sufficient excuse for loosening the reins of his imagination.

Kāśala, the composer of a stone inscription of A.D. 1148, in its introductory part expressly states :—

Kurvantu kīrtanaśatāni, raṇāṅgaṇe-shu
Mathnantu vairinikaraṁ, dhanam utsṛijantu |
Kālāntare tad akhilaṁ prabalāndha-kāra-
Nṛityopamaṁ kavijanair anibadhya-mānam ||

Let them raise monuments, score victories on the battle field and give liberally in charity. All these grand deeds are bound to pass away like dance performances staged in the dark, unless glorified and immortalized by poets.[2]

The authors of *praśastis* on stone and of *śāsanas* on copper were thus not mere recorders of facts. They claimed to be poets, men of æsthetic taste and of varied experience. And mostly such claims are justifiable. This Kāśala, for example, was not only a versatile poet, but also, we are told, a trained warrior, proficient in all sorts of handicrafts, expert in the medical care of elephants, and conversant with various branches of philosophy, including the doctrine of the Buddha. The compositions of such persons deserve to be appraised as poems *cum* records, and not as mere records.

Very few scholars have paid special attention to the æsthetic elements in Sanskrit inscriptions. The first to devote some thought to this was a well-known German Indologist, Dr. Georg Bühler. His lengthy dissertation in English translation, "The Indian Inscriptions and the Antiquity of Indian Artificial Po-

[2] Verse 5 of the Koni stone inscription, *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XXVII, p. 281.

etry," appeared in several instalments in *The Indian Antiquary*, (Vol. XLII, 1913). He was, however, concerned more with the *antiquity* of the poetry than with the poetry itself.

Selections of Sanskrit Inscriptions by D. B. Diskalkar, (Rajkot, 1925) on the other hand, was professedly prepared

more with a view to illustrate passages possessing literary merit than owing to their historical or religious importance.

This work, however, is a booklet of modest size, dealing with merely 15 inscriptions.

The two essays by Dr. D. C. Sircar, "Kāvya Style in the Inscriptions of the Successors of the Sātavāhanas" (first published in *Indian Culture*, Vol. IV, 1937-38, and reproduced in his book, *The Successors of the Sātavāhanas*, Calcutta, 1939) and "Inscriptional Evidence Relating to the Development of Classical Sanskrit" (*The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XV, 1939) are again more in the nature of historical investigation than of æsthetic appraisal.

Before we proceed, one point may be elucidated. Dr. Bühler dubbed the poetry in question "artificial," by which he obviously meant "conventional," having an eye especially on the high-sounding praises showered on petty chiefs. It is true that such eulogies by court poets sound hollow, but that should not be held to detract from their intrinsic value as poetic compositions. In order to enjoy them, the reader has to keep circumstances and personalities in the background. The crowned heads are used as mere pegs on which to hang the strings of poetic pearls. Viewed in this light, the verses will no longer read as disdainful flattery. Besides, there are certain conventionalities that are inseparably bound up with all Oriental poetry; to a European, these do look like touches of artificiality.

Savants like Dr. Franz Kielhorn, when dealing with inscriptions, do take notice of poetic merits wherever they find any. Editing the Aihoḷe inscription of Pulikēśin II, A.D. 634, Dr. Kielhorn remarks :—

Important as this inscription is as an historical document, to myself it seems almost more interesting from a literary point of view. [3]

Proceeding, he gives his estimation of Ravikīrti, its author, as a poet, and draws comparisons between his poem and those of well-known Sanskrit poets.

Sanskrit poets are specially fond of alliteration and *double entente*, which qualities are very much in evidence in the parts of Sanskrit inscriptions that are designed to be poetic, in prose or in verse. They possess in abundance, too, such essentials of good poetry, as diction and style, rhythm and harmony, excellences and embellishments, all of which combine to produce *rasa* or enjoyment, the *raison d'être* of poetry. A handful of illustrations

[3] *Epi. Ind.*, Vol. VI, p. 3.

may demonstrate this.

The simile is supposed to be the quintessence of felicitous phraseology. From this practically all other figures of speech have sprung. A classical example may be found in :—

Śrī Chandraguptasya Mahendrakalpaḥ
Kumāraguptas tanayaḥ samagrām |
Raraksha sādhvīm iva dharmapatnīm
Vīryāgrahastair upaguhya bhūmim ||

Kumāragupta—like unto Mahendra (the great god Indra)—son of the illustrious Chandragupta, by dint of his valour, protected the whole world even as a husband does his wedded wife, chaste and virtuous, clasping her in his mighty arms.[4]

The tenderness that goes with the protection, as well as the solicitude underlying it, is subtly hinted at by the earth being likened to a good wife with Kumāragupta as her lord.

When a copy happens to outshine the model, it is called *Vyatireka* or Transcendence. It may be difficult to find a more apt instance of this than

Apūrvam induṁ pravidhāya vedhāḥ
Sadāsphuratkānti kalaṅkamuktam |
Sampūrṇabimbaṁ vadanaṁ yadīyam
Abhūttarāṁ kaṇṭakitāṅgayashṭiḥ ||

Having created in her face a moon such as was never seen before—a moon of ever sparkling splendour, flawless and full-orbed—the Creator went into raptures even more.[5]

Mark the significance of "even more," in the verse. It lends itself to an inference which is a whole story in itself. The Creator must have gone into raptures over the moon, that paragon of beauty of His own creation, despite her obvious blemishes, such as being bright only by night, having a dark spot in the centre, appearing now a full orb and then reduced to a mere slice. Naturally, therefore, He was much more thrilled when He turned out a second Moon, free from all those blemishes, in the comely face of Somaprabhā, a belle of the Himālayas, the youthful bride of Prince Sātyaki. That is how, at least, the anonymous poet of the Sarāhaṇ *praśasti* fancies the lady in his description.

A near neighbour of *Vyatireka* is another embellishment, wherein the copy and the model interchange places. It is named *Upameyopamā* or Reciprocity. A typical instance of this is provided by Ravikīrti in his graphic description of the Arabian Sea, swarming with the Chālukyan fleet. The description concludes with :—

Jalanidhir iva vyoma vyomnas
samo'bhavad ambudhiḥ ||

The sky was like the sea and the sea resembled the sky.[6]

This line, it may be observed, is an echo of Vālmīki's :—

Sāgaraṁ chāmbaraprakhyam
Ambaraṁ sāgaropamām |

The ocean appeared as the sky and the sky looked like the ocean.[7]

[4] *Ibid.*, Vol. XXVI, p. 117.
[5] J. Ph. Vogel, *Antiquities of Chamba State*, p. 156, verse 5.
[6] *Epi. Ind.*, Vol. VI, p. 6, verse 21.
[7] Valmiki's *Ramayana*, VI, v, 120.

Vālmīki, India's primeval poet, has been a source of inspiration to the succeeding generations of poets in this country. And echoes of his epic poem are found in inscriptions as well as in literature. The comparison of clear water to a pure heart or to a serene mind, for instance, originated with him :—

Ramaṇīyaṁ prasannāmbu
Sanmaṇushyamano yathā ||

[The river bank] pleasant, with water as clear as the mind of good people.[8]

It is this very "old wine in new bottles" that Ballāla elaborately puts into Vikramārka's mouth :—

Svachchhaṁ sajjanachittavat.....
............pānīyam ānīyatām ||

Fetch some water as pure as the heart of good people....[9]

The elaboration effected by Ballāla consists of some additional attributes of the water, as sweet as this, as cool as that, scented with this and that, and so forth.

The same idea of Vālmīki has been exploited by various writers of *praśastis* in connection with a well, a tank or the like, the construction of which happens to be the theme of a particular inscription. The Mandasor inscription of Mālava Saṁvat 524 (A.D. 467), for instance, records the construction of a Buddhist *stūpa*, a monastery, a well and a water-stall by a military commander named Dattabhaṭa. Ravila, the author, describes the water of the well as follows :—

Yasmin suhṛitsaṅgamaśītalaṁ cha
Mano munīnām iva nirmalaṁ cha |
Vacho gurūṇām iva chāmbu pathyam
Pepīyamānaḥ sukham eti lokaḥ ||

People derive comfort by frequently drinking its water, cool (refreshing) as the meeting of friends,[10] pure as the mind of sages and wholesome as the words of elders.[11]

Kāśala, whom we have already quoted, some 700 years later than Ravila, is more specific in his portrayal of the tank built by a pious, learned and large-hearted Brāhmaṇa philanthropist, Purushottama by name. He sees in that tank an embodiment of the good heart of Purushottama himself. By inserting words of *double entente*, he has succeeded in heightening the artistic effect :

Gambhīraṁ bahusattvaṁ
Nirmalam atiśobhanaṁ janaiḥ sevyam |
Hṛidayam iva svakam akarod
Ratnapure sāgaraṁ yaś cha ||

And at Ratnapura he constructed a large tank which is deep, is full of aquatic creatures, is clear, is exceedingly beautiful, is worthy of being resorted to by people, and is thus, in every respect, a replica of his own heart, which likewise is profound, very courageous, pure, extremely fine and

[8] *Ibid.*, I, ii, 5.

[9] Ballala's *Bhojaprabandha*, verse 229.

[10] In the cold Occident one talks of a *warm* reception, but in the hot Orient we have a *cool* meeting!

[11] *Epi. Ind.*, Vol. XXVII, p. 16, verse 12.

approachable by one and all.[12]

As already remarked, Sanskrit poets have a great liking for *double entente.* And, as in other languages, so in Sanskrit, too, words having double meanings have been found very handy for various kinds of puns. One of very frequent occurrence is *Virodhābhāsa* or Contradiction. It often revolves on a single word which is construed in two different ways, one evolving a contradiction and the other resolving it, so to say. The following example may make the point clear :—

Satyapi ratnābharaṇe
Jānāno'pi prasādhanaviśesham ।
Yo vahati bhujena sadā
Kuvalayam āścharyakaṁ loke ॥

Though possessing plenty of bejewelled ornaments and knowing full well how and where to wear a particular ornament, why, one wonders, is he always wearing a blue lotus on his arm ?[13]

The person spoken of is a Śilāhāra King, Kṛishṇarāja. The inferential contradiction is that his wearing of a blue lotus on his arm does not assort well with his wealth and his expert knowledge. As a King, he can well afford a gold armlet, bedecked with gems ; that would be a proper ornament for him, not a blue lotus. Even granting that he had taken a fancy to a flower, the one selected is usually used as an ear-pendant (never as an armlet) and that, too, by ladies (and never by such a virile man as a King of his repute is considered to be). This inconsistency is removed by construing differently the word *kuvalaya,* meaning "blue lotus." It can be split into *ku* and *valaya* and then we have the other meaning "globe," "the ball of the earth." In other words, what Kṛishṇarāja is wearing on his arm is not a blue lotus but the whole world, which symbolically signifies that he is ruling over the earth.

The instances so far cited are mostly of what Dr. Bühler calls "artificial poetry." The verses quoted below are of a more natural kind, being descriptive of the Spring. They also illustrate the wedding of sound with sense : the music of words. The occasion is only the dating of an event, to wit, the construction of Devabhaṭa's *stūpa,* etc., mentioned above. Ravila, the poet, instead of mentioning the season by name, indicates it by saying :—

Bhṛiṅgāṅgabhārālasabālapadme
Kāle prapanne ramaṇīyasāle ।
Gatāsu deśāntaritapriyāsu
Priyāsu kāmajvalanāhutitvam ॥

Nātyushṇaśītānilakampiteshu
Pravṛittamattānyabhṛitasvaneshu ।
Priyādharoshṭhāruṇapallaveshu
Navāṁ vahatsūpavaneshu kāntim ॥

At the advent of the time when the tender lotus-flower droops under the weight of the bee, when the sāl tree puts on the most charming appearance, when the young wives whose husbands happen to be away from home are consumed by the fire of love, when groves and gardens are astir with temperate breezes, start resounding with the war-

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 283, verse 31.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 289, verse 12.

blings of the cuckoo and put forth young leaves as ruby-red as the lips of a damsel....[14]

One more citation in closing will prove that ideas are afloat in the air at all times and in all climes. Poets catch and express them, each in his own language. This accounts for the fact that often the same idea occurs to two different poets, far removed from each other both in time and in space. Śiva, whose stanza is quoted below, lived in the fifth century A.D. somewhere in Vindhya Pradesh. In a chaste and innocent young lady he saw a stream of crystal clear water. About 1,300 years later, in England, the poet Cowper caught the same vision. His ode to a young lady is also quoted for the sake of comparison :—

Sphaṭikavimalaśubhraṁ bibhratī śīlatoyam
Yamaniyamataṭāntaprāntaśuddha-pravāham |
Praśamaguṇagaṇormir yā janaṁ pāvayantī
Svayam iha suralokād āgatā Jāhnavīva ||

...who is, as it were, the Ganges herself, from heaven descended, purifying the people here, possessing the water [in the form] of character pure and brilliant as crystal, with its serene flow bounded within the two banks of self-restraint and self-discipline, ripply with many virtues such as equanimity.[15]

To bring in the Ganges, the stream *par excellence,* is Indianism.

TO A YOUNG LADY

Sweet stream, that winds through yonder glade,
Apt emblem of a virtuous maid—
Silent and chaste she steals along,
Far from the world's gay busy throng:
With gentle yet prevailing force,
Intent upon her destined course;
Graceful and useful all she does,
Blessing and blest where'er she goes;
Pure-bosom'd as that watery glass,
And Heaven reflected in her face.[16]

BAHADUR CHAND CHHABRA

A FINE MOVEMENT

The *40th Anniversary Year Book, 1950,* of the National Urban League (1133 Broadway, New York 10, N. Y.) presents an impressive record of service to the democratic ideal. With its motto of "Team Work at Work," the Urban League, composed of white men and women of vision and high standing as well as of Negroes, has worked effectively for equal opportunity for all in work training and job placement and against discriminatory practices in industry. Better housing, health and education for the Negro have also been sought, and the transition from the rural life of the South to living conditions in the great industrial cities has been eased by the Urban League for many migrant families.

That the minority group concerned is not the only sufferer from discriminatory practices is obvious; such practices undermine democracy itself. Defence of the rights of the victims of prejudice, if carried on in the proper spirit, is therefore in the interest of all. That spirit was well defined by one of the founders of the Urban League in the following words, long carried on the League's letter-head :—

Let us work not as coloured people nor as white people for the narrow benefit of any group alone, but together as American citizens for the common good of our common city, our common country.

This slogan requires but the addition of three words to make it a universally valid statement, adoptable by any country, of the objective of ameliorative effort, namely, "our common world."

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 16, verses 14 and 15.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 141, verse 9.

[16] Palgrave's *Golden Treasury*, p. 129.

OXFORD TODAY

[This thoughtful and stimulating article is from the pen of an Oxford undergraduate, **Mr. J. Brittain-Catlin,** the son of Prof. George Catlin, whose massive *History of the Political Philosophers,* the latest of many serious works, has just appeared, and of the equally well-known English writer and Pacifist who writes under her maiden name of Vera Brittain—both graduates of the Oxford of yesterday. Mr. Brittain-Catlin makes a strong plea for mutual tolerance and synthesis and condemns " the spirit of specialization " which is not peculiar to Oxford but is the stumbling-block in the way of progress throughout the world. The fact that some at least of the young people in the world's universities are thinking so constructively as well as so challengingly is full of encouragement for the universities and the world of tomorrow.—ED.]

Oxford is not a unity, but a collection of units. Some are closely connected, but most are isolated from each other. Oxford is provincial: it has no faith to live by, and, apparently, little awareness of world problems. But who, it may well be asked, does have faith; and who can see the nature and the implications of the crises in which they themselves are involved ?

I am not speaking of the Senior Common Rooms of Oxford—I have no experience of them. My impressions, drawn from the undergraduate world, indicate an emphasis on either the importance of a particular group or on pure individualism. There is nothing wrong with individualism or with groups as such. But where individualism is not related to something beyond itself, and where the members of a group cannot see beyond the confines of their own committees, there can be no significant achievement. In breadth there is a danger, but it is nothing compared to the danger of narrowness. In the words of the author of a booklet on The Indian Institute of Culture, " To broaden without deepening results in shallowness; to deepen without broadening may lead to dedication to the pursuit of individual salvation, come what may to others."

Oxford is neither one thing nor another. It is neither concerned with the solution of such international problems as the shortage of raw materials, particularly foodstuffs, nor is it inspired by the faith of the mystic—although the practical religion of the moralist is not absent. But again, in the words of the author quoted above: " The New World Order will not be possible without men and women whose self-education has enabled them to regard themselves as citizens of the world. " The ideas generated at the Round Table in All Souls College by such internationalists as Lionel Curtis and Professor Hanbury do not seem to have reached the Junior Common Rooms of Oxford, even though they

may have reached the rest of the world.

Undergraduates are not citizens if they are partisans; for partisanship is the essence of provinciality. In the political spheres of Oxford there is much life—not a week goes by but there are talks and discussions with Cabinet Ministers, past, present and future. Every week some particular problem is considered by the various study groups organized by the Conservative, Liberal and Socialist Clubs. But the enthusiasm of the budding politician is nurtured in a hot-house of politics alone. The same is true of Oxford's theatrical world. Each term, each of three or four colleges produces its own play, while as a continuous background there are the activities of the University's Dramatic Society, its Experimental Theatre Club and its Opera Club. But how many young Conservatives can speak with knowledge or judgment on the Trinity Term Acting Contest, and how many actors or producers can get up in the Union to debate a point with Mr. Herbert Morrison? Far too few.

But who can be blamed for this lack of integration? Integration is a function of faith, and where there is no faith there is no foundation: all houses are built on sand but each house is built on a different shore. Those who have not the strength to build, do what they are told; those who do have the strength build alone—and for themselves. The situation produced is paradoxical: because they see no rock on which to build, men and women become slaves, cynics, or buccaneers—sailing away from the quicksands of lethargy and doubt, in small ships of their own device, to unknown lands. Of the three, the buccaneer is much to be preferred. At least he has vitality, vision and imagination, even if he lacks a compass and a sense of direction. If he moves for himself alone, at least he moves. And those who move, build. It is on the builders, whether in the things of the spirit, in the arts or sciences of everyday living, that any return to the awareness of the significance of living must depend.

The cynics, the fatalists, the bitter critics are everywhere to be found in Oxford. Despair and a sense of futility are fashionable—almost as fashionable as hysteria conversion, the panacea which cures nothing. Philosophy, that fruitful tree, has withered into a thorny bush called Logical Positivism. A clearing of the dead leaves of confused verbiage was necessary. From Kant to Bradley confusion of expression had become the protective foliage of Western philosophy; but no tree is better for being pruned to the roots and, while we must know what we mean, we must realize that criticism is not an end in itself. As Sir Geoffrey Heyworth, himself a visiting Fellow of Nuffield College, wrote:—

It must be remembered that the function of criticism is firstly to help, and therefore we should criticize only in so far as the criticism is likely to

prove helpful. Can the criticism of the present writer be helpful? The answer is this: In times gone by Oxford provided a rich and varied soil, a period of leisure, a time for experiment. Out of this ground an integrated life could be achieved. The question remaining is this: Does Oxford today, with its emphasis on specialization and its curtailment of leisure, still provide that nourishment? Previously a graduate of Oxford was believed to have lived through a unique experience supplying the ingredients of maturity. If Oxford no longer provides the basis for that 'one-pointedness,' of which the mystics speak, we must see what it does provide, and we must discover why the substitute is inadequate.

T. S. Eliot's song of despair, and Prof. A. J. Ayer's abolition of "Metaphysics," may not have been dreary in themselves, may indeed have been fingers on a spot that needed pointing out, but their plagiarist-followers, young and old, are a depressing collection.

There is too much analysis and too little imagination; oceans of knowledge abound on every side, but more sink than swim, more drown in erudition than cross the deeps with benefit to themselves and others.

Nor is the university concerned with the immediately practical problems of living. I am not referring to the problem of living in England today, but to the problem of living all over the world; and I also mean consideration of accepted values, their possible revaluation and the rejection of standards now found to be inadequate for thinking and doing. The university seems little interested in this type of enquiry—the only kind that ever was, or is, of lasting value. Oxford is too much concerned with mere information, the agglomeration of facts and second-hand interpretation.

The information available, particularly in the natural sciences, is indeed an ocean: a sea of books under the pavements of Oxford, the ever-growing library of the Bodleian. The facts are on every side, but their correlation is missing. Electrical engineer and physiologist, chemist and student of Sanskrit, physicist and theologian may sit next to each other in libraries, but in spirit they are far apart. Not only in spirit, but in language too. Each speaks a language of his own. In many a discussion on psychology which I have attended it has been apparent that the physiologists understood one thing by what the speaker said, and that the philosophers understood something else. It is to be hoped that the physiologists understood each other; likewise the philosophers. Certainly they live in two different worlds, almost as isolated as if they lived on two different planets.

It is often said in Oxford that in tackling such subjects as psychology, one must ultimately choose between the physiologist's approach and the philosophers. It is maintained that any view-point which seeks to embrace and embody the approaches of both is doomed to superficiality, to fail to grasp the truth which either

might achieve by itself. I believe that this is a profoundly mistaken view, and that isolationism in thinking and research is as outmoded and as dangerous as in international affairs, If reconciliation between nation and nation is difficult, so is reconciliation of two approaches to one problem. In both cases, the effort must be made, not on grounds of moral obligation but because, just as humanity is above all nations, so is truth a unity on which all roads of knowledge converge. In his book, *Cybernetics*, Prof. Norbert Wiener has presented us with a first essay on the unification of knowledge in the statement, if not the solution, of one particular problem. I would maintain that in all fields of research and speculation an attempt at unification, a gathering together of the threads of different approaches, is our only hope of realizing the implications of what we say we know. If the threads are not gathered together, they will grow together in confusion.

The danger is that each specialist should come to think that if the universe is to be explained at all, it is to be explained by his art or science, and his alone. And what about man? How many psycho-analysts listen to neurologists, or neurologists to endocrinologists? Sociologist, anthropologist, psychologist, philosopher, theologian, Humanist—each is concerned with man, but not with each other. Who since Aristotle has tried to break down the barriers between the arts and the sciences? Now, when we know so much, our information becomes a burden. The spirit of enquiry is shackled. As Professor Einstein has written: "It is nothing short of a miracle that the modern methods of instruction have not entirely strangled the holy curiosity of inquiry." We know so much that we know nothing at all—at least until we abandon what we have been taught and begin to learn for ourselves. "Banish learning," said Lao Tse, "and vexations end."

If the standard of living in the West is to spread round the globe, we do need specialists and technicians; but more than these we need philosopher-kings. Otherwise the rule of the peoples of the earth is left to the technocrats and the Pied Pipers—to those who are gods to themselves and fanatics in the eyes of their neighbours. The warning bell has already been rung many times: George Orwell's novel, *1984*, for instance, or Aldous Huxley's article, "Brave New World," which appeared in *Life* for October 11th, 1948.

Towards the end of his article, Aldous Huxley wrote:—

> We must discover what are the circumstances under which human beings can live most sanely, contentedly and creatively. In the light of such knowledge we can proceed to use advancing technology for the purpose of creating the favourable conditions at the lowest cosmic cost.

But is Oxford concerned with this knowledge, or with its application?

Sometimes it seems as if those who are pursuing knowledge for its own sake, science for its own sake, art for art's sake, are chasing their own tails. They wander off the path. If one keeps one's head in the skies, it is all the more important to keep one's feet on the ground. How often it is that those who are immediately connected with the everyday problems of everyday life, and not those who are in comfortable isolation from humanity, plumb the depths of profound realization! It is the hewers and the doers who seem to grasp the eternal truths and solve the practical problems of living. Plato and Confucius did not spend a pensioned life in a study; neither, in our own time, did Lenin and Gandhi.

No learning is a waste of time, and investigation may be an end in itself, but there is something irresponsible about the student who studies in a vacuum, about the instructor who instructs in an ivory tower. One's own knowledge cannot be fully appreciated until it is seen in relation to what others know, and in relation to the facts. The most beautifully proportioned of logical systems may have an intellectual fascination which makes it an object of enchantment, but what is mathematically satisfying on paper may be very dangerous in application. The world has seen many theories and systems but less presumptuous, and ultimately more valuable, are the jottings in the margin: the Sermon on the Mount, the Analects of Confucius, the Sayings of the Buddha and, in the field of science, the notes of Leonardo da Vinci.

Detachment, yes. The kind of detachment of which the mystics and philosophers have spoken and written; what Lin Yutang has called "the quality of being able to see through life's ambitions and follies and the temptations of fame and wealth." But this is something quite different from supreme indifference to the welfare of other nations and other people. The one is a positive detachment: he who possesses it, is prepared to accept responsibility, take risks, endure condemnation and, at the same time, retains a sense of humour. The other is a negative detachment, an arrogant indifference not limited to Oxford; nor, indeed, is it true of everyone in that great City and greater University.

It is too late now for national snobberies, and it is no longer a mere question of taste whether or not one is concerned with events on the five continents. When the world was larger and communication slower, one nation could afford the luxury of despising another, and co-operation was not then a question of necessity, of life and death. Mutual understanding is not a matter of choice any more; the centuries of pride and prejudice in international affairs are over. But where there is co-operation there must be a contribution. Individuals, like nations, have a right—and a duty—to make the biggest contribution to the

welfare of nations that lies within their power. Service is not subservience, and co-operation, far from being self-stultification, is the highest of achievements.

What is apparent on a world scale, is not so clearly seen on a smaller one. The world has been divided within itself, but now realizes the need for individuality within a wider framework of unity, even if it does not yet act in accordance with what it sees. This realization is required as much in Oxford as in the world at large; but, as I wrote at the beginning, no critical situation is harder to see than one's own. To live and to see oneself living is a difficult combination to attain. Oxford is a microcosm. Like the world it is a whole which is not yet an organism. But this it will have to be if it is to fulfil its function as leaven in the bread of national and international life. To be an organism in which every cell performs its own task, co-ordinated with but not controlled by others, Oxford must have a purpose, and this it cannot have without a faith.

What faith, it will be asked? Something positive must be put forward; but there is no need to put forward a new religion, philosophy, or way of life. All these abound, but they have all been disregarded. The faith of the future is not a new faith, but a return to the essence of the faiths of old. God is One, and all religions are relative to God. The perennial philosophy remains; nations have forsaken it, and in their return lies the hope of their salvation. Only the husks have remained to be wrangled and fought over by the militant from whom the spirit has departed. Where the spirit is no more, too often an institution remains. It is with Oxford as it is with the world outside: indifference between man and man, group and group. In the rejection of one religion by another, of one political ideology by another, there is waste and destruction. There need be no complete agreement between those who differ on principle; sufficient is the recognition that all religions are concerned with man's relationship to God, and all political ideologies with man's relationship to society.

I said at the beginning that Oxford was split up into isolated units. But to damn the ambition to success which creates these units is to damn human energy, intelligence and insight and is to make a psychological mistake. Oxford's task is not to stifle initiative—a process which must create an inevitable reaction among those not crushed by the dead weight of erudition—but to educate for responsibility, to build confidence as well as to develop critical acumen. Such an education neither enslaves the educated to the existing order, nor stirs up resentment. It brings awareness of bigger problems than those of which one had been aware and channels ambition into the finding of a solution of the world's failure to make the best use of what it has.

As long as the understanding of a

different point of view from one's own, another man's religion, philosophy, science, or art is regarded as despicable weakness, the world will continue to cut its own throat. This attitude is the result of too much specialization, a too great narrowness of outlook. I remember Lord David Cecil talking to first-year undergraduates in the Junior Common Room of New College of the necessity for tolerance in the university; but in Oxford the spirit of specialization, the evil genius of technocracy, is growing. In such an atmosphere of self-regarding endeavour, understanding and co-operation cannot flourish. As in Oxford, so in the world. A house in which artist, scientist, philosopher and man of religion are contemptuous of each other is a house divided against itself; it cannot stand. If this is the Oxford of today, let us make sure that it is not the Oxford of tomorrow; for in the present are the seeds of things to come.

J. BRITTAIN-CATLIN

LEADERSHIP IN INDIA

Mr. Julius Stulman, an American business man, who recently got back from India where he had talked with people from ordinary villagers to Members of the Planning Commission, Cabinet Officers and the Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, has summarized in the 14 multigraphed pages of his "India Report" the results of his thinking about how to approach some of the basic problems of India. Convinced of the importance, to all concerned about human freedom and democratic values, of India's proper self-development, Mr. Stulman has thought deeply on how this country, without sacrifice of the good elements in its traditional culture, can bring the knowledge already available in the world effectively to bear upon its pressing practical problems. He does not discount the factors of "money, production 'know-how' and mass education," for dealing with India's problems, but he stresses the need for optimism in "Indians of leadership quality." "The spiritual values around which much of Indian thought revolves" need, he believes, to be supplemented by the confident spirit of "Can do—Will do."

He questions the possibility of India ever catching up with the West of 1950 if it follows all the turns of the road that the West has taken in its industrial evolution, but he envisages bypassing it by emphasis on practical application of the most advanced scientific knowledge. Solar energy development, artificial rain-making, utilizing plant life of the sea for food, he suggests as illustrations of promising lines of adjustment to the coming phases of technical development, and so "leap-frogging ahead of the west."

Specifically Mr. Stulman proposes a non-political, non-governmental Indian Institute, staffed by "some of the best technical and administrative minds in India and Abroad," to integrate "the world's latest knowledge—the emerging science of the Year 2,000—with the particular needs of India." He envisages for its support an initial capital fund to be raised from private sources and its earnings from its service functions. We hope that the ideas of this sincere well-wisher will receive the thoughtful consideration which they merit.

THE "TIRUKKURAL" ON CITIZENSHIP

[**Shri V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar** of the Madras University, the author of several works on Indian history and polity as well as on Tamil literature, here analyzes instructively the teachings of the ancient Tamil sage, Tiruvalluvar, on the duties of the citizen and the State. Anything further removed from the spirit of Machiavelli and *The Prince* could hardly be conceived. The *Tirukkural* has a message for the modern world.—ED.]

If we take a bird's-eye view of the rights and duties of a citizen in modern times, civic rights loom larger than civic duties. The right to vote, the right of equality before the law, the right to religious freedom, the right to protection by the State and the right to private property, have the greatest appeal and every person seems to think that these are natural privileges. But, though citizenship confers such privileges, citizens should not shirk the corresponding duties and responsibilities. One of these duties is to keep the machinery of local and central government in smooth working order by paying punctually the taxes due. There is a tendency to criticize the taxes imposed and to preach economy in administration; this is not quite healthy, inasmuch as both central and local governmental bodies are elected and are the chosen guardians of public welfare.

Citizens should discharge their duty also by co-operating with the government in improving the health of the nation and in developing the talents of its youth.

This modern concept of citizenship is ultimately derived from the older school of thinkers who placed ethical considerations in the foreground of the picture. Such democratic practices as majority rule, party organization and the franchise are matters affecting the citizen deeply; but the character of the citizen and his social obligations are also to be viewed from the moral angle. The State may have an entirely secular character, but no worth-while goal or programme is possible without the conception of right and wrong in human behaviour. Conversely, we cannot imagine any one deeply concerned with moral questions who is not at the same time faced by practical questions of personal contact and social relations.

This inseparability of morals and politics is illustrated in the teachings of Tiruvalluvar. His immortal work, the *Tirukkural,* is a Tamil classic, assigned to the 2nd or the 1st century B. C. It is primarily a secular treatise dealing with three *purusharthas: Dharma, Artha* and *Kama.* In this book the fourth *purushartha, Moksha,* or Salvation, does not find a place. What is relevant to the discharge of a person's duties to himself, his family, and State is emphasized; he who observes his

duties fully, will, without any other effort, attain salvation.

Though the ethical basis of this treatise is undeniable, it could serve today as a purely secular treatise. Its maxims on citizenship show what are the duties, the proper performance of which is of the essence of good citizenship. The book does not assert rights and privileges so much as describe duties and responsibilities in a persuasive and convincing manner.

The following is a *résumé* of the ideas of Tiruvalluver about right conduct for the individual as well as for princes, councillors and public servants. Tiruvalluvar evidently had in mind a settled, highly cultured and peaceful society where all individuals acted appropriately to their station and where everyone was anxious to abide by the rules of right conduct which were universally known and respected. Therefore, his is a more closely integrated and harmonious civil society than we possess today. Yet even now we can realize that a man's conduct as a householder is not separable from his conduct as a citizen and that citizenship is a vast field ranging from the family to the whole universe.

The first part of the *Tirukkural* is devoted to the personal conduct of a citizen. It says at the outset that nothing is higher than *Dharma* or the practice of Righteousness. If one wants to be happy one must follow *Dharma* ; to do good and to avoid evil must be the law of one's being. The householder is described as the mainstay of the other three orders of life.

The grace of any home is the virtue of a dutiful wife and her children are its adornment. Intelligent offspring are an asset, for the wisdom of youth is the delight not only of the parents but also of the world. It is only out of home life that Love springs ; and out of Love grows the inestimable prize of friendship. Humility and loving words may banish vice of any sort, and implant virtue in the minds of all. To make virtue complete a citizen should cultivate impartiality. One should not oppress the ignorant or the cowardly.

Right conduct not only ennobles one's family but also promotes social harmony. One should practise forgiveness. One must cultivate active social intercourse and it should be informed by tolerance and understanding. One *Kural* says that one must preserve one's property but must not covet others' wealth, for out of covetousness evils spring. One must not oppress the weak but be considerate and friendly towards those less fortunate than oneself. Compassion is the most important of all tenets. Truth must be practised in all circumstances, for all the scriptures lay down that there is no greater virtue than truth.

Thus Tiruvalluvar lays down the foundations of excellence in family and social life upon which further personal and social development may rest. But, though citizenship thus begins at home, it is not confined to

the household. Good citizenship implies a good state and a good constitution. These can be realized in a society which is truly democratic. Democracy, the world has learnt by some little experience, is not the absolute rule of the majority. It is orderly government under law; and such a government may have a king at its head. So long as a monarch so conducts himself as to uphold the law and promote the welfare of his subjects, he is a constitutional monarch. In this form of government the social duties of all, the ruler and the ruled, must be studied.

One of the social duties incumbent on a citizen is to pursue knowledge and not to trifle with it. For the wealth of the learned man consists in his learning; to him no country will be alien. A learned man delights others by his company. True learning is not mere learning by rote; it is an entire education. It has been well said that entering an assembly without sufficient knowledge is like playing at dice without knowing the game.

In another *Kural* it is said: "To be one with the world is wisdom." True wisdom is not blind following of ancient precepts found in the sacred texts, but is the product of careful study of the environment and of the prevailing climate of opinion among cultivated people. A wise man must move freely in society, free from pride, from wrath and from lust. It is only the wise who can secure the friendship of virtuous men and appreciate the company of the noble. Good company is the source of strength.

The *Kural* gives its due to administrative wisdom. All schemes must be well thought out and well organized and must have the support of the many. The State's need for expert efficiency as well as for whole-hearted popular support is frequently stressed. Speaking of the organization of government, Tiruvalluvar says that public servants should be of good family, vast learning and unblemished character. The merits and the defects of a person must be examined and his character judged accordingly. The choosing of people for public service, it is said, must be done with care; but once the choice is made, the person chosen should be wholly trusted. He is said to be a true servant who is watchful and can guard against any loss.

In the choice of public servants one must not be guided by their efficiency alone. They must also have noble characters and be endowed with love, wisdom and clear vision and be free from covetousness. To guard against the tendency of people in power to become corrupt, untried people should be avoided and only such persons should be chosen as public functionaries as can be trusted not to swerve from the right path.

That the State must be ruled justly and impartially is emphasized. The Ruler should be solicitous for the welfare of his subjects; victory is won not by the spear but by

administering impartial justice. In dispensing justice, the King should not be partial though it be his kinsman or even his own son who is on trial. Before judgment is delivered there must be strict enquiry and, on the strength of the evidence, the judgment must be given. Where crime is properly punished the State becomes more enduring, seasonal rains will not fail and the cows will yield abundantly. Tyranny is condemned as subversive to the well-being of society and of the State. Says Tiruvalluvar :—

> No burden is harder for the earth to bear than the cruel sceptre wielded by the unwise.

He alone is considered to be one with the world who follows his *swadharma* and is courteous and kindly. This will be possible in a society which is truly democratic and which is ruled by those of high moral character.

Tiruvalluvar attaches special importance to the Council of Ministers. An important duty of a Minister is to study an act deliberately and then carry it out decisively, thoroughly to complete a task begun and not to leave it unfinished. But in acting firmly a Councillor must act in conformity with world opinion, for this righteous conformity will preclude any form of dictatorship.

To be a good Councillor, one must be a good speaker. Inability to speak well may result in the ruin of a cause; and a speaker who would win the approval of the public must speak without fear or favour. Only cogent reasoning and soft speech will convert people to the speaker's views. So what is wanted in giving counsel is good and convincing speech that promotes virtue and produces fame. Tiruvalluvar is aware of the value of persuasion in the democratic process. But before superiors and the wise the humility to maintain silence is said to be the best of qualities.

While it is often insisted that a decision should be taken after due deliberation, and that action once begun should not be delayed on any account, it is also advised to adopt a cautious policy. Deliberation, it is said, must be based upon five points : the nature of the deed, the resources, the means, the time and the place. While arriving at any decision one should examine deeply his aim, the hindrances to it, and the final gain to be sought. Also the manner in which a thing should be done should be determined after consulting an expert.

The State has to provide the citizen with an honest means of livelihood, but no citizen may err on the side of luxury so as to incur the displeasure of his fellow citizens. The State should protect the citizen from excessive hunger, serious disease or destructive enemies, but the citizens must see that there are no disloyal associations, internal dissensions or disturbing chieftains.

In a very interesting *Kural*, Tiruvalluvar depicts the havoc which faction wreaks in the body politic and deems it the greatest evil which

the State can suffer. Again, five things are said to be the ornaments of any kingdom: wealth, fertility, happiness, security and absence of disease. There must also be harmony between the Ruler and the ruled. A State to be independent must have wealth, but this wealth must be accumulated justly for that will foster mercy and quell the enemy's pride. Real honour prefers death to dishonour.

Like the Stoics, Tiruvalluvar extols friendship; friendship removes suffering and prevents harmful deeds. There should be no discord among men; it is the joy of joys to bury hatred, the evil of evils. If one wants really to enjoy freedom and prosperity, Love must be cultivated and hatred of every kind must be eschewed. Good conduct—love, modesty, impartiality, sympathy and truthfulness—are the strength of the great.

Mother Earth is said to laugh to scorn those who plead poverty, and agriculture is extolled by Tiruvalluvar who says that a toiling peasant never begs but gives. So one's land must be jealously guarded and not be neglected on any account. A flourishing land can support a just State and good citizens.

Thus the *Tirukkural* not only propounds a lofty ethic but also describes a healthy national life in its pithy references to health, education and character. It is a fundamental treatise on citizenship and the true democratic spirit.

V. R. RAMACHANDRA DIKSHITAR

COLOURED WORKERS IN LIVERPOOL

The conclusions of Mr. Anthony H. Richmond as a result of his study of "Economic Insecurity and Stereotypes as Factors in Colour Prejudice" (*The Sociological Review*, Vol. XLII, Section 8, 1950) are instructive. His study of the assimilation and adjustment of West Indian technicians and trainees remaining in England after the last war was confined chiefly to Liverpool and the surrounding districts. He found a part played in colour prejudice not only by the obvious physiological distinction of skin colour but also by the creation of false stereotyped ideas concerning the "out-group," which prevented good personal relationships between members of the two groups. More important than either, however, in the aggravation of colour prejudice was found to be the sense of economic insecurity. This confirms observations on the part played by economic rivalry in race relations in the Southern United States.

Resentment is the instinctive response of man or animal to any thwarting of effort or to rival claimants to an object of desire. It is a confession of moral immaturity. Sound economic measures can doubtless lessen tension by relieving fears of unemployment, but a radical cure demands abstention from judging a group by the shortcomings, real or imaginary, of individuals and, conversely, from condemning other individuals for the defects thus arbitrarily ascribed to his racial or other group. The acceptance of the criterion of individual merit, irrespective of adventitious distinctions, is indispensable to a working universal brotherhood of man.

THE BUDDHIST SUNYATA AND KARUNA

[**Dr. Herbert V. Guenther** brings out in this article several considerations which help to free the Buddhist teaching from the arid abstractions to which scholarly theorists have sought to reduce it. He brings out that Enlightenment is not an intellectual formulation but an immediate experience, transcending the ratiocinating mind; as also the valuable point of the intimate relation between Wisdom and Compassion, which has been insufficiently stressed.—ED.]

Its phraseology belonging to speculative philosophy and science has led many scholars, East and West, to see in Buddhism but another speculative philosophical, socio-ethical or moral system. But to concentrate on the theoretical presentation is to misrepresent Buddhism and to falsify its message. What the Buddha preached was a personal experience, an actual insight into the nature of things, not concepts which bring no practical results in spiritual life. Only when we go beyond the limits set by the intellect, to experience for ourselves what is presented in the language of philosophy, will it be possible for us to understand the practical importance which Buddhism has had for so many centuries and which it can have in the present age.

That which made Buddhism vital and inspiring is expressed thus in the *Ḍākinīvajrapañjara*:—

> When an attitude is cultivated in which *śūnyatā* and *karuṇā* are not separate, then you have the teaching of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha.[1]

To know what this commingling means is to experience it with immediacy. Such terms as *śūnyatā* and *karuṇā* are bits of emotionally toned shorthand summarizing man's experience in life and, at the same time, guide-posts to similar experiences for those who take the hint and the time to contemplate, in addition to reading and listening. If these terms are taken as denoting something not directly apprehended but deductively formulated, they become meaningless; we have not the slightest comprehension of these experiences and why they should have had such a tremendous effect on the whole life of the individual.

Śūnyatā is usually translated "the Void." But this Void is "nothingness," just because it is nothing to which we can apply the rigid laws of reasoning. In the experience of *śūnyatā* there is nothing on which the mind might stop to build abstractions and, by thus limiting itself and renouncing its freedom, throw us into an abyss of suffering.

This mind of ours can go only a little distance, being limited by unwarranted assumptions. By establishing false ideas to account for the facts of nature and the causes for

[1] Quoted in *Advayavajrasamgraha*, p. 26, 42.

human woe and weal it prevents consciousness from discovering the paths that lead toward a wider reality. Ever and again we have to admit ourselves "at our wits' end." Thinking of ourselves as more unique and separate than we are, we create unbridgeable gulfs between ourselves and others. Our ignorance about what lies beyond the walls of ego-centredness and our adherence to out-dated beliefs as well as to self-righteousness deliver us up to frustration. Abundance is before us—though not to be used egotistically—but we do not see it and fear to dismantle the fortress of our ego, the delusion of absolute sovereignty which constantly begets new delusions.

Actually, *śūnyatā* is an inexhaustible source of abundance, just because it is unlimitedness; it is reality itself waiting to be realized; it is that which gives whatever sense there is to everything that happens around us. *Śūnyatā* is the ineffable, inexhaustible infiniteness, in the experience of which all limitations fade away. *Śūnyatā* is the all-embracing, emotionally moving, ineffable *quale* which every man has and is in himself, which is in all things in the universe and which he can experience with immediacy in the beauty of a sunlit landscape or in the tenderness of love without postulating external objects or mental selves. Do you not feel the love of your mother before you recognize her as a human being with certain anatomical characteristics? Do you not sense the beauty of a star before you analyze that beauty? And do you not dim the brilliant light and kill all that you sense and love with any idea that one can selfishly possess that which is greater than self?

It is precisely this ineffable, this intangible and luminous—which we have in every experience and without which we could not be aware of ourselves as knowers and of the world around us as the known (though in it there is no duality)—that has been termed *śūnyatā*. When we try to derive the totality of an immediately apprehended fact from the summation of the transitory distinct parts which stand out sharply in our consciousness, we impoverish ourselves by losing the awareness of the sacredness and glory of all that is. We have lost what alone can give us spiritual sustenance—*śūnyatā*.

Before we analyze *karuṇā* let us see that, exactly as *śūnyatā* and *karuṇā* form an indivisible and unique whole, so also *prajñā* and *upāya* are inseparable. In fact, *prajñopāya* is but another expression for *śūnyatā-karuṇā*, and Advayavajra expressly states that "*prajñā* is also called *śūnyatā*."[2] *Prajñā* was the principle that made possible enlightenment, the key-note of Buddhism. The intellect can never comprehend what is beyond its self-imposed limits. It is due to *prajñā* that we can lift ourselves above the dualism of matter and spirit, of ignorance

[2] *Advayavajrasamgraha*, p. 51.

and knowledge, of passionate addictedness and non-attachment. Just as *śūnyatā* is more than our rigidly limited world of the ego, so also *prajñā* is more than the abstractions forged by the intellect. *Prajñā* enables us to see into the nature of things, to realize in our inner consciousness the ultimate truth of the world and of ourselves. Therefore *prajñā* is not mere knowledge that can be imparted in words; it comprises also experience and the feeling of ultimateness. It is Wisdom. Wisdom alone transcends the intellect and is able to answer those questions which the intellect may raise but cannot by itself solve.

By comparison with our common-sense knowledge, wisdom has a quality of transcendency, like everything that is not an ego-acquisition. Mere intellectual knowledge is satisfied with the rationalizations and restrictions of other men's experiences, and hence makes us move in superficial and artificial concepts; but wisdom sets us free. When wisdom sheds its light, ignorance is wiped out. Now the concept of the ego as a self-contained, absolute reality has its basis in ignorance, *i.e.*, in the inability to grasp spiritual truths, which involves one inextricably in the net of intellection. A wise man is the least egotistic person in the world. Wisdom confers bliss, mere intellectual knowledge, frustration; wisdom elevates man and lets him partake in a world of beauty, love, and freedom, but intellectual knowledge alone condemns him to self-imposed limitations and penalties. In actual life the heart is just as necessary as the brain. The heart removes all ugliness and strife and fear, not because it excludes the objects associated in our minds with these, as the ruthless action of the intellect would do, but because it surrounds them with a halo of friendliness and kindness so that we feel happy and safe, because nothing can bring us harm.

The primacy and, as it were, the creativity of the *śūnyatā* or *prajñā* are often referred to as the female principle, divine in its own rights. "The goddess Prajñā,"[3] she has been styled in various texts. It must be pointed out in this connection that "creativity" and "non-creativity" are abstractions or, at best, secondary elaborations, which only lead away from immediacy of experience. The *śūnyatā* as inexhaustible richness or the *prajñā* as inspiring wisdom, revealing everything in its natural beauty, its true nature, may be considered, by a mind still toiling through the lower spheres of intellection, as the source out of which the transitory differentiations come and into which they return. The *śūnyatā* or *prajñā* is, however, in the words of the famous Tantrik teacher Nāropa, "for ever unoriginated, because it is tranquil from the very beginning"[4]; hence no such ideas as

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 62 ff.; *Sadhanamala*, p. 321, etc.

[4] *Sekoddesatika*, p. 71.

creation or destruction can apply to it. And since everything is made up in part of this ineffable and irreducible, everything is of its nature in so far as it is experienced with immediacy.

It is only the male counterpart, *karuṇā* or *upāya*, which, "because it is experienced within ourselves, is constantly active."[5] That is to say, the more our ego-centred mind expands, acquiring a wider field of action, a "third eye" is acquired by which we see the spiritual and the ultimate—the stuff that beauty, love and insight are made of. Our flitting ego-consciousness can see clearly one point only at a time, the wider context being hidden from view. But to the consciousness where no egotistic reflections, no limited manifestations obtain, everything stands out clearly in its true nature. Here we deal with facts and not with ideas about them. It is as if the veil has been removed and only a brilliant and warming light shines forth. But this light can only be felt and in this feeling we see. In this overwhelming experience all shackles fall off, all the limiting, distracting, thought-constructions have disappeared. With the Tantrik Master Tillopa we may say that

> Out of the multitude of worldly abstractions the (ineffable) body and the (ineffable) wisdom of the Victorious One have risen. Unoriginated by nature is the unfathomableness of the Mother: unobstructedly shining is the infiniteness of the Father.[6]

Turning to the other factor, called *karuṇā* or *upāya*, without which enlightenment would be impossible, we are informed by Indrabhūti that "*karuṇā* means the firm resolve to place all beings in this princely knowledge (*i.e.*, wisdom) and to endow them with all the implements of bliss,"[7] and that "*upāya* is said by the Enlightened Ones to start with *karuṇā*."[8] Anangavajra states:—

> Since it protects the beings who are distressed by the flood of suffering, rising from various causes, kindness (*kṛpā=karuṇā*) is sung of as love (rāga).
>
> Since like a boat it brings all beings to the favourable shore, it is for this reason that it is called skilful activity (*upāya*).[9]

Furthermore, Sthiramati as well as Nāropa explain *karuṇā* in the following way: "*ka* is another term for bliss, but since (this bliss) is stopped (*ruṇaddhi*, to wither away in self-complacency) one speaks of *karuṇā*. He who is genuinely compassionate (*kāruṇika*) suffers with the suffering of other beings."[10]

Now this explanation of *karuṇā*—whatever its philological drawbacks—and the statement that it is in-

5 *Idem*.

6 From the Tibetan text of Tillopa's *Acintyamahamudra*.

7 *Jnanasiddhi*, p. 76.

8 *Ibid.*, 88.

9 *Prajnopayaviniscayasiddhi*, I. 17.

10 Commentary on Vasabandhu's *Trimsika*, p. 28; *Sekoddesatika*, p. 5.

separably one with *prajñā* : "This commingling of both which is like the mixture of water and milk, in a state of non-duality is called *prajñopāya,*"[11] is of utmost importance. It means that *karuṇā* is not sentimentality, emotion that does not know its effects, but that, actually partaking in the needs and sorrows of others, it knows the right means (*prajñā* and *upāya*) to end misery and despair.

Prajñā creates out of its inner force all that is good and beautiful. It produces *karuṇā* (love or compassion) and with her co-operation achieves the emancipation of all sentient beings from selfishness, greed and ignorance.

This creation of *karuṇā* or this transmutation of Wisdom into action is not by conscious individual effort which would have a taint of artificiality. *Karuṇā* may be said to evolve by itself from *prajñā*, understood not as a merely contemplative state but as something full of vigour. It is in this unimpeded activity, inspired and supported by unselfish knowledge, that we feel bliss—"called Great Bliss, because it is unending bliss."[12]

When action is inseparably united with wisdom, the combination in its purity and unselfishness comprises the universe. Only then will no frustration ever dim our feeling of bliss. We have not run away from the world and built a cloud land which painfully breaks down when misery knocks at our door; nor have we lost ourselves in meaningless actions which, though claimed to be of universal character, serve only to enhance the feeling of our own importance and end in bullying. As the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra* states,

> Action which is without wisdom is a fetter. Wisdom which cannot be expressed in action is a barren abstraction. Action combined with wisdom is freedom: wisdom combined with action is freedom.[13]

With its teachings of *śūnyatā-karuṇā* and *prajñā-upāya*, then, Buddhism has an important message —that personal paradises are withdrawals from reality, that attempts to protect ourselves against the often bitter truths of life prove vain. It teaches us non-attachment and renunciation, but not in the sense of running away from the world or of self-deceiving indifference. Non-attachment means not to be attached to the illusion that one object is more important or better than another; and renunciation means giving up the play of our ego-centred mind, distorting the true nature of man and of the world.

HERBERT V. GUENTHER

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[11] *Prajnopayaviniscayasiddhi*, I. 17.

[12] *Ibid.*, I. 27.

[13] Quoted in *Advayavajrasamgraha*, p. 2.

LONDON VOYAGE TO REALITY

[**Mr. R. M. Fox** needs no introduction to our readers. His last article "The Writer on the Anvil" which appeared in the February 1951 issue was fully discussed by Shri J. C. Kumarappa and Shri K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar. He is intimately connected with numerous progressive activities in Ireland, and has written several books on modern Irish history. His volume entitled *The Triumphant Machine* has been greatly appreciated by competent critics. His book *James Connolly: The Forerunner*, reviewed in *The Aryan Path* for July 1947, should be of special interest to Indian readers. In the following article he gives a thoughtful sketch of the British Festival now in progress.—ED.]

Once it was the fashion for literary critics to dismiss the books they did not like as "mere escapism," an easy but unsatisfactory phrase for it dodged the question of what they were escaping from or to. Few people would really condemn a prisoner for escaping to freedom.

Dreams are the usual form of escape and sometimes these can be powerful urges to action as when Napoleon regarded himself as the Man of Destiny. Even the most matter-of-fact men have their dreams. Their lives would be intolerable without them. To know a man you must first know his dream. A banker, one feels, should have a golden dream; a trader his vision of ships laden with ivory, apes and peacocks; a good craftsman should see his finished work in the lump of metal, stone or wood with which he starts, as I am sure Michael Angelo did in a block of marble. When we know what these men dream about we can understand their activities. Emerson expressed this truth when he said that matter is fluid to thought.

Not only does each man treasure his individual dream as he jostles through the crowded city streets but the nations, too, have collective dreams which most of their citizens share. This dream may have the character of hallucination so it is well to check accomplishments periodically to see if the reality corresponds with the vision. The dream to which Britain has surrendered—born out of the uncertainty of the war years—is that of social security and the Welfare State.

From this standpoint I found a recent visit to the Festival of Britain a fascinating experience. Not only does the Festival express current ideas and ideals but its declared purpose is to show the rate and the direction of National progress since the Great Exhibition of 1851. Throughout the whole of the twenty-seven acres of pavilions and grounds, bordering the curve of the Thames, one idea is emphasised. This is that immense progress has been made in production, in transport, in all the manifold Arts of Peace. Industry and knowledge have thrown open

this Aladdin's Cave to the millions who, formerly, knew only insecurity and want.

If a proud place is claimed for Britain it is not stated in terms of military conquest. The Crystal Palace in 1851 epitomized the Victorian Era with its Kiplingesque condescension to "lesser breeds" and its conscious "dominion over palm and pine." But the modern aluminium Dome of Discovery presents the story of intrepid explorers who fought their way across frozen wastes to enlarge the boundary of human knowledge. Scientists and inventors find a place here. We can follow their story to the South Kensington Museum where Rutherford, the Curies and Einstein will speak to us from the screen and invite us to share their Atomic dreams.

Turning to the shipping section, I noted that it is not the ships of war which get prominence but the trading vessels and even the smaller ships used in the fishing industry. Utility above all. This Exhibition turns a blind eye upon Nelson and naval glory. A big ship stands ready for the youth of Britain to enter. They can come up to the chart room and the bridge, enter the conning tower and learn how to steer a course while a picture on the screen changes every few seconds to describe the ship's journey from London to Antwerp.

The first object which caught my attention on entering the Festival grounds was a row of flaming torches rising out of the water while the spray from a row of tumbling fountains broke over them. Fire and water have been pressed into the service of man. This is a fitting memorial to all those Unknown Warriors of Industry on whose work this Festival has been built. It stands like a Pillar of Fire by night and a cluster of weird shapes by day. Charoux's massive piece of sculpture "*The Islanders*" towers above the little people who swarm round it. This represents the Mass Man, all the strength, perseverance and doggedness of the burden bearers of our generation who make roads across deserts, and deserts of cities, who build the mansions and live in "pre-fabs." I missed the gleam of spiritual understanding which might make those burden bearers into the kingly men and women of whom A. E. wrote :—

> And deep beneath his rustic garb
> The herdsman finds himself a king.

The time has not yet come for the kingly revelation to burdened humanity. So the sculptor has probably done well to give his group the cruder and rougher touch. Yet when I joined the stream of men, women and children who, in holiday mood, moved through the Pavilion of Construction I noticed the interest they all had in useful work. Here were iron workers blowing sparks from their forge and beating white-hot metal on the anvils till it took strange and intricate shapes. These men stripped to the waist—for it was a hot day—were talking and laughing among themselves, quite

unselfconscious and oblivious of the wondering human stream that passed by. Not far away spectacled craftsmen bent over their precision instruments as they tested these for drawing, gauging and measuring. Silversmiths were putting finishing touches to gleaming examples of their art. Here were dishes, salvers, cutlery, spoons, some embossed with leaves or figures, others with the dark, plain surface of deep shining water. Sheets of pure white paper were falling like gigantic snowflakes on a rising heap. They were made from shreds of pulped rag by the thousand year old Chinese formula. It seemed as though nothing that could be written on this paper could convey the worth of good workmanship so much as when it was left undefiled.

Skilled work has its dignity which was sensed by the spectators. But not all the work was skilled. In the centre of one pavilion I saw a huge oven fed with pails of floury mixture. Out of this, at the other end, in a constant stream, came sheets of crisp, thin wafer to be cut up, counted and packed in tins by girls who acted and moved like automatons. Proceeding down an incline into a gloomy cavern I saw the dull gleam of coal on every side, held up by pit props. This was an amazingly exact replica of a coal mine and—talking in broad north-country speech—a miner with a pit-lamp on his cap conducted us from one stall to another and explained the development of mining machinery from the humble pick and shovel to the coal-cutter, like a mechanical plough, which tumbles the coal straight on to the conveyor belt. Time was when women and children almost naked, bent double and harnessed with chains, pulled the tubs of coal through narrow passages. Later sturdy little ponies were taken down from the sunlight to the darkness and given the same task. Slowly human savagery is rolled away like a stone from the sepulchre.

This section of the Festival of Britain is part of the miracle of modern industry. But even more miraculous is the fact that tens of thousands drawn from every social strata are going to this exhibition and seeing the actual processes concerned with wealth-making in Britain today. They move on to other pavilions and see what this can mean in terms of schools, of school equipment, of better homes, of travel, thought and cultivated leisure. The material is there and the vision is there too because these things are being shown and demonstrated every day. The doubtful element is the human material. People are still being thwarted and debased. They are not allowed to develop to the point where they could make the best use of all the splendid technical possibilities at their command.

For the Londoner and for the stranger within the city gates this Festival has brought a touch of fairyland to ordinary life. But its chief strength is that it has never abandoned the everyday realities of life

and work. Every night thousands gaze from the Embankment or from the bridges with a fascinated awe at this strange splendour. The Skylon is like a huge golden cigar hanging in the sky. They see the Albert Bridge draped in golden beads of light. I heard people asking why must this spectacle come to an end, for no one likes to relinquish a dream.

The Festival is not only an area; it is an impetus and an influence. Everywhere people who had accepted as a sad truth that the post-war years must be drab and depressing —an aftermath of callousness, cruelty, conscription and cant—have realized that the world is also a place for peaceful industry and care-free laughter. Walking through London I was struck by the difference in the spirit and appearance of the city since I saw it a year ago.

Britain is fumbling with the idea that there is a glamour in the creation of things of beauty and utility, that the present age has its own precious values. It is escaping from the belief that glamour belongs of right only to those who can destroy and smash, though Red Eye the Atavism stills stalks the world with an atom bomb in one hand and a bribe in the other. Up till now all the bugles and the flags have been used to honour the destroyers. It is a strange portent—of largely unintentional significance—that in the heart of London there is a gigantic parade of production in which many skilled workers take a share. People are looking at this and escaping for a moment to reality. Why shouldn't they follow this road?

R. M. Fox

A PATTERN FOR RURAL WORK

Mr. G. Duncan Mitchell discusses in *The Sociological Review*, Journal of the Institute of Sociology (The Le Play House Press, Ledbury, Herefordshire) "The Relevance of Group Dynamics to Rural Planning Problems." His thesis is that the type of village has to be taken into account in planning for rural areas, *i.e.*, whether a village is relatively stable though diverse in its sub-groups, comparable to a suburban society but more self-sufficient; or self-contained and with a rigid social structure; or, again, with little integration and correspondingly little group check on social behaviour; or decadent, the traditional culture threatened by external influences and the village handicapped by the lack of local leadership, due often to depopulation.

His study of villages in Devonshire affords suggestions for the planners for rural welfare in India to consider, human nature being much the same everywhere and the forms of human society in different parts of the world displaying a tendency to follow comparable patterns.

He urges the need for the keying of the planners' approach to the type of village, seeking to gain the co-operation of the local or group leaders, and, where change is feared, restricting the changes proposed to what the groups can assimilate.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

In the East My Pleasure Lies: An Esoteric Interpretation of Some Plays of Shakespeare. By BERYL POGSON (Stuart and Richards, London. 120 pp. 1950. 9s.)

The "Shakespeare Industry," somebody said derisively; but it is an industry that enjoys a perpetual boom on the literary stock exchange. Like Valmiki, Homer and Dante, Shakespeare too is inexhaustible. Myriad-minded, he appeals to the millions in a million different ways. We ask and ask, and he is still "out-topping knowledge." There was witnessed 25 years ago a violent reaction against excessive liberty of interpretation which, in its turn, evoked a spirited protest from the late Lascelles Abercrombie. The textual critic, the conscientious editor, the painstaking annotator—their utility is beyond question. But is there no scope for the critic who, Coleridge-like, picks up a new psychological scent or even out-Bradleys the great Bradley himself? Mrs. Pogson's thesis proves that there is still a place for the imaginative critic of Shakespeare's plays.

The thesis can be summarized as follows: Shakespeare's plays are no doubt grand entertainment to the many; they have their place in British social and political histories; and their extrinsic meaning and excellent art are worth the serious study of students of literature. But tarry a little, says Mrs. Pogson; there is something else as well. These plays have an esoteric meaning which is meant for the awakened soul forging its way to the Golden Threshold of its true destiny. In other words, behind the material story is the spiritual story; and, indeed, the central characters of Shakespeare are in effect apocalyptic visions of spiritual realities. Man is in the making. Completed man is both Purusha the male and Prakriti the female. Self-forged karma holds man in thrall; the magic of maya in a thousand different forms—war, jealousy, ambition, pride, self-love, ratiocination, etc.—creates the web that enmeshes and all but destroys man's immortal soul. Having fallen away from Bliss, man seeks to recover the lost heritage. The powers of Good and Evil fight their battles on the Kurukshetra that is his soul. Woman—mother, wife, sister, or daughter—is the warrior's true *shakti*, his staff of support, and to reject the staff is to postpone the date of his deliverance. The lower life is karmic life, and the aim of life is to escape the prison-house of karma and to soar into the regions of the spirit which stretch into the far horizons of the future.

It is an impressive argument, and its connection with the perennial wisdom of the ancients is duly noticed by Mrs. Pogson. Her studies of the five great tragedies, and of *Cymbeline*, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, and *Timon of Athens* are enlightening, but one is not sure whether she is not at times reading too much between the lines. Nevertheless, study opens new pathways of inquiry in Shakespeare criticism, and it will at any rate provoke the reader to think a little on his own.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

Introduction to a Science of Mythology : The Myth of the Divine Child and the Mysteries of Eleusis. By C. G. JUNG and C. KERENYI ; translated by R. F. C. HULL. (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London. 289 pp. 1951. 25*s.*)

All of us, I imagine, read with respect anything which Professor Jung writes ; but " a Science of Mythology " is a very slippery theme. The translator, who has done well indeed, must have had a thousand difficulties.

The book is, in fact, stiff reading but it will reward any psychological practitioner or student. I found Mr. Kerényi somewhat repetitive. Jung (as usual) writes as lucidly as his deep material allows : for, after all, it is easier to be sure of Halley's Comet than of the contents of our own " unconscious. " The authors are chiefly concerned with the recurrent myth of the wonder-child, as, for example, Hercules, who, even in his cradle, strangled serpents.

The Professor can explain his beliefs far better than I can :—

> The primitive mentality does not invent *myths*, it *experiences* them. Myths are original revelations of the pre-conscious psyche, involuntary statements about unconscious psychic happenings, and anything but allegories of physical processes.

Again he says : " ...a tribe's mythology is its living religion, whose loss is always and everywhere, even among the civilized, a moral catastrophe. " And yet again,

> Religious observances, *i. e.*, retelling and ritual repetition of the mythical event, consequently serve the purpose of bringing the image of the child, and everything connected with it, again and again before the eyes of the conscious mind so that the link with the original condition may not be broken.

Here then, is a book for the specialist in psychology and psychotherapy. For him it should be of considerable value. The layman, I surmise, may find it intricate and not easy to digest. The difficulties are not due to the translator.

CLIFFORD BAX

William James : A Selection from His Writings on Psychology. Edited with a Commentary by MARGARET KNIGHT. (Pelican Books A 229, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex. 248 pp. 1950. 1*s.* 6*d.*)

The new series of Psychological Pelicans opens with the great American, William James, whose name is associated with the theory of Pragmatism. This theory seeks to evaluate truth in terms of utility and expediency mainly through empirical methods :—

> The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief and good too for definite assignable reasons.

Thus truth is reduced to something that furthers one's purpose or gives one emotional satisfaction. But even before the publication of his treatise on Pragmatism with its ministerings to "human complacency," William James had won his laurels by his *Principles of Psychology*, which, thanks to its modernistic outlook and its emphasis on social environment as a factor in the development of the individual and on the intimate connection between psychology and physiology, holds its place even now among the standard works on the subject. The essential charm of the *Principles*, and indeed of all his writings, lies in the fluidity of expression and the clarity of thoughts that come as a welcome relief to " the amount of confusion and even conceal-

ment" which, according to the late G. K. Chesterton, generally characterize works on psychology. All this stylistic beauty, however, was no child's play but the result of "ceaseless toil in re-writing." He said that he forged his works "with blood and sweat, and groans and lamentations to heaven."

The editor has offered to us a selection from William James's works, including his views on Mysticism, Education, and Religion. "The mystic is, in short, *invulnerable*, and must be left, whether we relish it or not, in undisturbed enjoyment of his creed," he says. Of teaching: "*Soft* pedagogics have taken the place of the old steep and rocky path to learning." The succinct Foreword, and the scholarly Introduction, with its biographic details and critical estimate, serve as welcome invitations to the sumptuous feast that follows.

R. BANGARUSWAMI

Liberties of the Mind. By CHARLES MORGAN. (Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London. 252 pp. 1951. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

We have here a collection of essays and addresses written and delivered by Mr. Charles Morgan during the past few years. In all there are 19 of these, together with one lengthy new contribution. The author says at the beginning that the essays

> were not written in any expectation that they would find themselves between the covers of a volume with the present title. Their unity, in my own mind at any rate, is the closer for that reason. They seem to have selected themselves and to have indicated my book's subject by their convergence upon it.

Anyone unfamiliar with the complacency of prominent publicists may be led astray by this and become disappointed in the book, and I would advise the reader to take each essay on its own merits and make what he can of it without struggling to bring it into line with the idea of liberty. He can count upon finding good things in all these essays. And with regard to the declared theme of mental liberty he will find some very interesting reflections in the first chapter, hitherto unpublished, on the nature of the Russian Trials, and also a sinister account of how in America some well-meaning scientists seem to think that they may find their way towards conditioning people's minds in a direct operational manner.

His best chapter is on Montesquieu, the 18th-century author of the *Esprit des Lois*, and he has related that wonderful book to our own times. "When you train an animal," says Montesquieu, "you take good care not to let him change his master, his lesson or his pace. You strike his brain with two or three movements and no more." I quote the first few words of Mr. Morgan's comment:—

> The means of striking the brain with two or three movements are more powerful than they were in Montesquieu's time. They may be employed, as never before, against the mind itself. Let us beware of them when they come bearing the gifts of cheapness, of entertainment, of instruction, of expediency...."

JOHN STEWART COLLIS

The Uncurtained Throne. By WARNER ALLEN. (Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 217 pp. 1951. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Mystical experience is a state of mind or spirit undergone by a diversity of individuals but almost inexpressible in words.

The scientist may achieve it in the successful fulfilment of his research, the priest receives it at the altar, the artist and the poet in some blinding flash of beauty. Any attempt to pin down this experience or to dissect it by words seems, to me, something far better left alone.

The Uncurtained Throne, last of a triology by Warner Allen, is written with the aim of explaining a mystical experience that the author underwent between "two demi-semi-quavers in Beethoven's Seventh Symphony."

I feel that the "timeless moment of pure consciousness" experienced by Mr. Allen and many others throughout the whole of human history is apt to become bogged in phrases and I agree with him that "the language of the Spirit can neither be spoken nor written."

This is not to say that this book is not extremely interesting and does not show a wide knowledge of psychology and modern psychological work. I must, however, take issue with Mr. Allen on his conclusions that the experiments of the American psychologist Dr. Rhine and his colleagues are evidence of the presence of some Power in the Universe which reaches its fullest in spiritual experience.

The Rhine tests are received coldly in the light of modern scientific methods and scientists will require more detailed evidence before they are willing to accept the conclusions reached by Dr. Rhine regarding extra-sensory perception, more popularly termed E.S.P.

Rhine conducted thousands of tests with cards, dice and other games of chance. Persons were asked to try to identify the order of cards or the numbers on dice screened from view of both the tested and the tester. The results of these tests, which, it is stated, have proved to be unexplainable by the mathematics of chance, led Dr. Rhine to claim that "E.S.P. exerts an influence on matter unexplainable by any factor of energy known to physics."

Mr. Allen urges readers to study Dr. Rhine's books. It is his considered belief that many of the coincidences of everyday life which we disregard are made intelligible in the light of extra-sensory perception; the power, he believes, which is behind all life in this universe.

He has over a period of many years sought confirmation of his own mystical experience in the writings of mystics and others from whom he quotes. His book cannot be dismissed lightly, but it is too much a mixture of unproved so-called "scientific" tests and spiritual belief. It has taken him a long way to reach the conclusion that the Power that rules and moves the Universe is Love. Surely this has been the key-pin of the Christian religion since the Resurrection ?

A. M. LOW

Modern Philosophers: Western Thought Since Kant. By HOWARD C. McELROY. (Russell F. Moore Co., New York. 268 pp. 1950. $4.00)

The book is divided into four chapters, dealing with four groups of philosophers. The first chapter is entitled "God and Good Society"; the second, "Science and Saintless"; the third, "Fact and Fancy" and the fourth, "Reason in Retreat." These different titles, except the last, do not seem to provide any reliable or easily intelligible clue to the characters of the philosophers treated in the respective chapters. The author himself recognizes that "many of the thinkers could have been classified otherwise."

Dr. McElroy has cast his net wide. Although there are a few notable exceptions, most of the important thinkers of the 19th and the present century have some place in his book. The result has not been quite happy, as many could be considered only summarily. The distribution of space, too, has been rather uneven. Woodbridge, who has probably had little influence outside of America, gets nearly ten pages while a much greater philosopher, Husserl, gets less than three. Generally the American philosophers have been treated more generously. James, Peirce and Dewey have been dealt with at some length.

But in every case the treatment is clear and it is occasionally enlivened by biographical details. Sometimes Dr. McElroy tries to explain an aspect of a philosopher's theory by reference to a circumstance in his life or his heredity. It is interesting to know how the philosophy of Royce was influenced by his mother and that of James by his father. But one wonders whether Russell's marriage out of his class or his divorce has really "limited his social effectiveness."

Though the philosophers represented here seem to have been considered important mainly because of their influence on American thought, a careful reader of this book will have a fair idea of the main tendencies of philosophical thought in the West in general, from the time of Hegel to the present. One may even learn much about Plato and Aristotle as well as mediæval philosophy.

Wherever possible, Dr. McElroy tries to bring out the social significance of philosophical ideas, and in a subscript he calls upon philosophers to make their contributions toward the solution of the problems posed by the crisis in modern life and thus help to save the world from impending dangers.

The book bears some marks of hasty production. A whole line has been misplaced at the bottom of page 34; Kant's famous dictum about intuition and concept appears as "Percepts without knowledge are blind, and concepts without percepts are empty" (p. 4). We should have "concepts" in the place of "knowledge." Also Russell's book *Religion and Science* is misnamed *Religion and Reason* (p. 248).

R. DAS

The Changing Map of Asia: A Political Geography. Edited by W. GORDON EAST and O. H. K. SPATE, (Methuen and Co., Ltd., London. 414 pp. 1950. 25s.)

This book deals with the permanent

aspects of political and revolutionary change against the background of the physical environment, the prevailing social and cultural trends, and the economic and strategic problems of Asia.

The editors reject the possibility of either regionalism or unity in Asia. For purposes of analysis, however, the problems of Southwest Asia, India and Pakistan, Southeast Asia, the Far East, Soviet Asia and High Asia are separately considered here by different authorities. The eastern flank of Asiatic Asia and the western and northern rim of Southwest Asia are pronounced vulnerable; on the one hand they are too weak to stand alone or to defend themselves, while, on the other, proffered Western assistance in any form will be construed by the nationalists as "imperialist interference." Hence, stability and reasonable prosperity are not foreseen in Asia for some time to come, though it is suggested that, after a considerable time, some form of violent revolution will set right Asia's menacing problems.

The book deals exhaustively with Asian Geopolitics. The editors refer to the acquisition of bases by the U.S.A., which has assumed "the principal rôle in the Far Eastern theatre," but remark that

> a large share in the maritime defence of Australasia and the dominions of India, Pakistan and Ceylon must continue to fall on the United Kingdom, whose naval bases remain intact.

On the problem of security for the new states of Southern Asia they observe:—

> On the landward flanks they appear reasonably secure...the preoccupation of China in its internal political problems, as indeed its usually friendly relations with India, should make for temporary stability.

Though the above observation is made with caution it is clear enough that there is no danger of Communist attack on Southern and Eastern Asia; no need for the Western bases and Britain's lead in the maritime defence of the new Dominions. Besides, the mere existence of Western bases in Asia, apart from their utility or military value, most certainly will create conflict rather than stability.

But it seems that the intention to establish "Western bases" is for reasons other than genuine defence. To quote again from the Introduction:—

> ...The Indian Ocean would appear to remain a British Lake, from which can be undertaken the maritime defence also of Southwest Asia and of Africa, to which increasing strategical interest now attaches. The other European states which still uneasily retain territorial emplacements in Southeast Asia—France, the Netherlands and Portugal—are not strong enough to affect the broad pattern of maritime control wielded by the United States and the United Kingdom.

From this one cannot but note that the editors' formula for fighting Communism in Asia is to prolong the Western, and more particularly the British, interests in Asia, at least till Communism vanishes from that part of the world.

The conclusions offered in this book are likely to be resented by the Asian people. The elaborate marshalling and presentation of facts, however, make it a remarkable and first-class research work. It provides much information which is not easily accessible, especially on Soviet Asia. Students of international politics and military science cannot afford to miss this book.

K. V. SHAH

War and Civilization. Selected by ALBERT VANN FOWLER from *A Study of History* by ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. (Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 165 pp. 1951. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

Toynbee's monumental *Study of History*, of which six volumes have so far appeared, is like a quarry from which book manufacturers can carve their raw materials. D. C. Somervell's abridgment has been a best seller. Now comes Mr. Fowler with a collection of passages bearing on the most urgent problem of our time—how to prevent war from destroying the civilization which has been built up on Greek and Roman foundations during the past 2500 years.

There would, if this happened (as I suggested not long ago in these pages) arise other civilizations, probably in Asia and Africa; but the disappearance of Western culture would affect the whole world, because all parts of the world share to some extent in the results of that culture. If Western civilization died slowly and quietly—in its bed, so to speak—many of those results could be fitted into the fabric of a new one. If it should perish violently, the shock might plunge mankind into fresh Dark Ages. So the problem is one that perplexes and must distress us all.

What help does Professor Toynbee offer towards solving it? Very little, I am sorry to say. He attributes to war the collapse of all earlier civilizations, a score or so by his reckoning. "Social breakdown is a tragedy with a plot which has the institution of war for its key." War, he suggests, may have been a child of civilization, destined in all known cases to murder its parent. With equal clearness he sees that war has never had any but disastrous effects on human societies. We may hope to alter this, "to use the sword to such good purpose that it may have eventually no more work to do." But that hope, he tells us, is a mirage. "The swordsman's belief in a conclusive victory is an illusion," and this judgment he supports by recalling the fate of Sparta, of Assyria, and of many other States and conquerors throughout history, which demonstrates "the ultimate failure of all attempts to win salvation by the sword."

Well, what does all this lead up to? Not to Pacifism, for pacifist peoples would be at the mercy of warlike States. All he can suggest is that peace-loving peoples shall practise the militarist technique which he has been condemning and which in his view has always failed. They must make their combination so strong that attack on it would be hopeless, and the combine must also be "sufficiently just and wise in the use of its power to avoid provoking any challenge to its authority." He thus subscribes to the old adage *Si vis pacem, para bellum.* Peace can only be secured by preparing for war! Yet he himself has proved that this has never happened and shown that it is most unlikely to happen, for, as he says, once the sword has been drawn, it is found impossible to sheathe it. It must guard what it has won.

At the risk of appearing impertinent, in view of the immense weight of Professor Toynbee's learning, I would beg him to think again.

HAMILTON FYFE

THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF CULTURE

[The lectures and discussions on papers and books continue at the Institute. During June Dr. Chris De Young, Dean of the Graduate School of Normal University, Normal, U.S.A., spoke on "Recent Trends in American Education"; Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan on "Philosophy as Darsana"; Mr. S. C. G. Bach, O. B. E., of the British Council, Madras, on "The Influence of the Greek and Latin Classics on English Literature." In July Dr. Holden Furber of the University of Pennsylvania spoke on "The Study of Modern Indian History" and also on "Asian Studies in the United States"; Dr. M. Hafiz Syed on "The Indian Ideal of Freedom of Thought"; and a very interesting discussion took place on "The Common People must Meet to Build One World—The Part of the U. S. A. and of India," led by Dr. Ruth C. Wright and Prof. Alfred Fisk who are the Directors of the American Students' Travelling Study Tour of India.

Below we print the first half of a revised and enlarged paper specially prepared and read by **Dr. Bernard Phillips,** Head of the Department of Philosophy of the Delaware University, on the 29th of May 1951. It is a thoughtful, reasoned and provocative thesis on a subject of vital practical value to every person in every land.—Ed.]

PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICINE

That Philosophy and Medicine should be proceeding today wholly oblivious of each other and unconscious of any natural mutual affinity follows inevitably from the traits and characteristic outlooks which each has developed in modern times. Philosophy on its side has lost its existential orientation; it has ceased to be a way of life and has become only a doctrine or rather a juggling of doctrines. It has ceased to be practical for it has become preoccupied, in the words of Professor Dewey, with "the problems of philosophers" rather than with "the problems of men." It is now for the most part a cerebral exercise, a kind of intellectual chess game, interesting perhaps to those who are playing it, but having little bearing on life in general or on Medicine in particular.

Moreover, Philosophy has lately become extremely diffident *vis-à-vis* the sciences. As a result of the startling and unceasing achievements of the sciences, many philosophers have come to regard knowledge as synonymous with Science, and are reluctant to claim that there is any mode of knowing other than the scientific one. This equation of knowledge with Science has an embarrassing consequence for the philosopher for, if valid, it deprives him of his livelihood. He must either close shop and turn scientist, or eke out a precarious living by attaching himself parasitically to the sciences and becoming a hawker or herald of their virtues.

Even those philosophers who have not sold out altogether to the sciences have yet aped the scientists in becoming specialists. Few philosophers in the world today attempt, in the words of Matthew Arnold, "to see life steadily and see it whole." Few philosophers exhibit that largeness of vision which is supposed to be the generic trait of their calling. Instead, they are to be found concentrating on this area or that, on semantics or epistemology, on value theory or symbolic logic, and

each specialist tends to develop a technical jargon incomprehensible to the rest. In this situation Philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom has few devotees —for wisdom can come only from integral vision. Those philosophers who are fond of poking fun at the psychologists because modern Psychology has lost its *psyche* would do well to remember that, in similar fashion, modern Philosophy has been deprived of its *sophia*.

A philosophy, then, which is impractical, overly specialized and lacking confidence in itself can hardly be expected to commend itself to such hardheaded practicalists as are the men of Medicine; it is small wonder that the latter have hardly been influenced by philosophical consideration.

Moreover, on its own side, modern Medicine is characterized by attributes and attitudes which further conduce to its alienation from Philosophy. There is, for instance, the increasing trend toward specialization rendered inevitable by the expansion of medical knowledge. This naturally produces a myopic concentration on a smaller and smaller area and renders the specialist more and more impervious to the general presuppositions of his calling. He becomes increasingly a technician who is neither by training nor by temperament prone to consider the larger ramifications of his speciality. We must recognize that there is a certain psychological security which results from shutting out of one's mind the broader implications of one's efforts, and it is but natural that the specialist should respond with irritation to any suggestion that he disturb the tidiness and precision which he has introduced into his limited field by an attempt to bring in broader considerations.

The typical medical man, moreover, will hardly be persuaded of the relevance of Philosophy to Medicine because he deems it his task merely to collect and order empirical phenomena. Medical Science he would regard as a purely empirical discipline, its business being with the facts of health and disease, and its mission to discover and devise ways and means for alleviating the ills to which the flesh is heir. Such a theory we may label *Medical Positivism*. It is a widely prevalent point of view, and is only the particular expression within the field of Medicine of that positivistic mentality which has pervaded all branches of modern learning and of the anti-metaphysical bias which has characterized modern Science from its inception.

In fulfilment of Comte's Law of the Three Stages, Theological, Metaphysical and Positive, the approach to Medicine, once dominated by religious or metaphysical categories is now purely empirical and naturalistic. And, the Medical Positivist would argue, the dazzling achievements of modern Medicine began precisely when doctors abandoned religio-metaphysical conceptions for the empirical correlation of phenomenal sequences. Under the circumstances, it is hardly likely that medical men will desire to involve themselves in the intangible and entangling speculation of philosophers.

Finally, we may note, our doctors have not bothered about Philosophy because most of them have already adopted a working philosophy which guides their theory and practice. Their philosophical commitment is already made to some species of materialism, though more often by secret treaty than by open alliance. The majority

opinion in the history of modern Medicine—at least until quite recently, has been that the nature, cause and cure of disease is to be found within the province of the physical. Naturally, once persuaded that health and disease depend on the physics and chemistry of the body, it is upon this bedrock that the doctor will lay the foundations of his system of Medicine. Once he has decided that the controlling factors in human well-being are exclusively of this nature, he will concentrate wholly on unravelling these, dispensing with further philosophical considerations.

With Medicine and Philosophy exhibiting such respective traits and tendencies, it is hardly matter for wonder that they should be so little concerned with one another. So conceiving their respective fields and so pursuing their efforts, it would rather be surprising if they had taken any notice of each other and if, to the question "What have Philosophy and Medicine to do with one another as a matter of fact and as of today?" It were possible to give any other reply than "Hardly anything at all." But then we are left faced with a second question—"Does the working state of affairs conform with the true conception of Philosophy and Medicine and of their relationship to each other? Would a Philosophy which was vital and a Medicine which was integral exhibit this same indifference each towards the other?"

Take the matter of Philosophy's impracticality. This is a charge which cannot be gainsaid. Every conscientious philosopher is bound to take the indictment to heart and to recognize that it is largely a just one. But, having uttered his *mea culpa*, he must go on to ask himself whether the accusation is directed at Philosophy in its essential nature or at the degeneration of Philosophy, whether it tells against Philosophy in principle or only against that which currently passes under the name. It will then quickly become apparent that the charge of impracticality is valid only of the latter and not of the former, and that for the impracticality of contemporary Philosophy there is an obvious reason. It is impractical because it is nowhere practised: philosophers have transformed themselves into professors who profess but do not practise, and Philosophy has become a mere "profession" in the pejorative sense. Philosophy today, in other words, may justly be accused of impracticality only because it has ceased to be a praxis and has become pure theory.

It has not always been the case that Philosophy has been construed as a purely intellectual discipline with no practical bearing on life. The major pre-modern traditions of both Eastern and Western Philosophy are pragmatic in the best sense. With Pythagoras as with Chuang-tse, with Plato and Shankara, with Spinoza and Patanjali, Philosophy is not merely an intellectual construction but a guide to life; and not merely a guide to life but a way of life. It is not merely a theory, but a therapy, a psycho-therapy, if you please, in the root and literal meaning of that term, for its ultimate concern is with the health of the soul and with the ultimate well-being of man. The separation between Philosophy and Medicine, seen in this light, will be perceived to be unnatural and detrimental to both.

Similarly, I should mention that

Philosophy's obsequiousness and servility to Science bear witness to Philosophy's abdication. Science is not wisdom, and the development of Science has made the need for Philosophy more imperative than ever. It becomes daily more clear that Science does not generate the principles required either for its ultimate intelligibility or for its proper use. The perfection of technology without commensurate attention to ultimate principles makes not for the liberation of man but for his dehumanization and barbarization. Our world suffers not from any dearth of technical skill but from a shortage of seers and men of wisdom. As knowledge has increased, wisdom has diminished, and the tragedy of modern man is that, having been made lord over vast domains of knowledge, he has become a pauper in wisdom. In a thousand ways it is driven home to us that "where there is no vision, the people perish."

Our lives are given over to multiplicity; we are becoming ever more fractionated in being and divided in purpose in a world which seems to have got out of control. The almost infinite elaboration of means and their pursuit with a relentless disregard of ultimate ends have brought man to the brink of psychological disaster. How many of the ills of body and soul which plague our contemporaries may not be ultimately traced to the loss of all sense of the significance of life? Would it be an exaggeration to say that what modern man needs more desperately than anything else, as he expends and disperses his being amidst the inordinate complexities of a scientific civilization, is some unifying vision which shall rightly order things? Only through the love and pursuit of wisdom is there any hope of bringing into play the centripetal, unifying forces to counteract the centrifugal forces unleashed by science, which are pulling the world apart. In these circumstances, the philosopher who claims that Science is the all-sufficient mode of knowing and who abandons his ancient calling, which is the quest for wisdom, to strive instead to gain a derivative prestige by composing hymns of praise to Science is betraying not only Philosophy but mankind as well.

Lastly, as regards over-specialization in contemporary Philosophy, this is a temptation to which the true philosopher will not succumb, for he will ever be mindful of his proper concern being not with the parts but with the whole, of Philosophy ever being the antidote to specialization, and of the need to strive to measure up to Plato's description of him as "the spectator of all time and all existence." His final concern will be with the nature and destiny of man, with the ultimate goals of human life and how they may best be achieved.

Whatever else he does must be subservient to that final purpose, which is to gain some sense of the whole, to relate man to the whole, to help man to become whole. We shall do well not to forget that the etymological connection between "whole," "wholesome," "holy" and "healthy" is significant of a deep essential relationship and that "healing" means literally "restoring to wholeness." And, if there can be no health without wholeness and integration, and no wholeness and integration without the integral vision and the effort to relate oneself to the whole, then it is clear that genuine

Philosophy belongs with the healing arts.

In similar fashion, when the characteristics of modern Medicine noted above are examined in the light of an adequately comprehensive and integral ideal of Medicine, then the deficiencies of the prevailing conception of Medicine are easily perceived, and its proper relation to Philosophy becomes evident.

Ponder, for example, the positivistic view of Medicine as merely empirical fact-finding and ask how far it is genuinely adequate, and it will be discovered that, where Medicine has dispensed with explicit philosophizing, it has been able to do so only through its implicit prior allegiance to a particular philosophy. One inevitably has a philosophy. The only question is whether that philosophy is consciously thought out, is coherent and has some measure of soundness, or whether it has been unconsciously adopted or surreptitiously smuggled in and is likely, therefore, in the words of Bertrand Russell, to be "vague, cocksure and self-contradictory." As we have some choice of the kind of air we shall breathe, whether that of the country or the city, of the mountains or the plains, but no choice at all as to whether we shall breathe or not, so long as we remain in life, likewise, so long as there is mental life there must be Philosophy and, while we may have some choice as between philosophies, we have not the option of choosing between Philosophy and no Philosophy.

And so it is that modern Medicine, despite its disavowals, cannot really dispense with philosophical categories and presuppositions. Both its theory and its concrete therapeutics are guided by the wider conceptions which it holds of the ultimate nature of reality and of man, and of the kind of factors which have real efficacy. The nature of the living organism, the nature of the relation between mind and body, the nature and power of man's will and of his moral conscience, man's basic needs and his ultimate satisfactions and the ultimate source of man's inquietude—these are but a few of the philosophical issues on which every doctor must have taken some stand.

Any serious discussion of the nature of disease must take place against the wider background of the controversy between realism and nominalism. Any attempt to define with precision the relation of disease and symptom will quickly bring one to the wider problem of substance and accident. Any genuine desire to understand the perplexities of the ætiology of disease will involve one in a consideration of the general metaphysical problem of causality. The basic ideas of health and disease are not simple descriptive or empirical concepts; they have a normative component and cannot be defined save in the light of a normative frame of reference. Illness or bad health connotes deviation from a standard to which man is expected to conform. To pronounce an individual unhealthy is to judge that he is not as he ought to be, and that inevitably prompts the questions—"How ought he to be?" "Whence do you derive the standards in the light of which you judge of his condition?" "Are these standards arbitrary, as the Nominalists would maintain, or have they real intrinsic validity?"

A purely empirical definition of health presents similar difficulties. It obvi-

ously will not do to define health negatively as freedom from disease, or even as freedom from pain. Shall we then define it quantitatively and make longevity the criterion? Obviously, quality is at least as important as quantity, but what qualities are relevant? Let us say: "Those which enable a man to live a full life and to discharge the tasks of a human being." Yes, but what constitutes a full life, and what precisely is a man's mission in life, failing to discharge which he is pronounced unhealthy?

There is no replying to this question save on the basis of same conception of life's total significance. Here is one who is fit only for sleeping. His vegetative functions are unimpaired, but we shall hardly call him healthy, for evidently man is not meant for passing his days in stupor. Here is another who is able to lead a vigorous animal life but has no capacity for anything more. Shall we regard him as of sound health? Here is a man endowed with perfect sight and hearing but wholly lacking in æsthetic discrimination. Does he require treatment? And what of the person who is deficient in the sense of moral responsibility?

We should agree to judge him to be in poor health who is unable to enjoy some of the simple creature comforts; can we similarly agree that he is not in sound health who has no capacity for religious experience? Shall we show the same concern over spiritual anæsthesia as over tactual anæsthesia? If human life is an affair of more than one level, then fullness of life will mean adequacy on all its levels, and in that case our concept of illness must be widened to include the idea of impairment of function on any level.

I would call attention also to the difficulties in which Psychiatry is today entangled in its efforts at defining such key concepts as normality, adjustment and integration. These difficulties arise from attempting what is inherently impossible, namely, to define normative concepts without a consideration of norms. By what final criterion can the sane be distinguished from the insane? Is it merely that we on the outside are numerically the stronger? To equate the normal with the statistical average is only to exalt the *status quo*, to lump the genius with the imbecile, the religious prophet with the paranoiac. The psychiatrist is endeavouring to remould his patients; whence come the standards in conformity with which he would shape his charges? Are these standards arbitrary or real, *i.e.*, in accordance with the nature of things? Are they his private predilections or those of his patient or of society? Because of its failure to face such questions modern Psychiatry must be charged with concentration on technique with no attention to final goals, in other words, with concern with the proximate to the neglect of the ultimate.

Again, the psychiatrist aims at turning out well-integrated persons, but what are the constituents of human nature that are to be composed into a harmonious unity? Is man an affair of molecules only and is the problem of achieving inner balance in the last analysis a problem of attaining physico-chemical equilibrium? Is the problem largely one of bringing instinctive urges into harmony with society's dictates, as the Freudians would insist, or of making peace between reason and the passions? Are man's deepest needs

exclusively biological and are his higher activities but sublimations of these, or does he have profound needs unconnected with the preservation and enhancement of his bodily life, *e.g.*, ethical, æsthetic, spiritual needs. Is it possible that one may be suffering from spiritual as well as from vitamin deficiency, or may we neglect spiritual factors as *unreal* and regard only the physico-biological factors as ætiologically significant?

The psychiatrist seeks to produce a man who is well adjusted—but to what? What is man's ultimate environment, to which he is called upon to adjust himself? Is it to the world of matter alone, or the world of life, of mind, of society—or are there also spiritual realities of which he must take account and to which he must adjust himself if he would be whole and healthy? These are questions which few if any psychiatrists today are asking themselves. One has only to raise these questions to realize how lacking in subtlety is the approach of the majority of them to the human situation.

These questions, and many others like them, depend for their answers on one's antecedent metaphysical principles. What is believed to be finally *real?* Every attempt to specify the *real* involves one inexorably in metaphysics, and every doctor, every psychiatrist, makes some assumptions in regard to what is finally real and effective in human life and what factors, in the last analysis, are responsible for health and disease.

Judgements of physical or mental health can be made only in the light of a criterion of what is real. Physical and mental abnormality can be defined properly only in relation to the capacity to respond to the demands which the real world makes upon us. For ordinary purposes it is not necessary to be very subtle about such matters; we customarily regard a man as being of sound health if he conducts himself with a fair degree of competence in relation to the tangibles of life. But such rough and ready criteria will not provide us with any systematic principles or be of much use in relation to the subtler problems that are bound to arise.

Thus, for example, in ordinary life we should judge as insane a man who made repeated efforts to walk through a stone-wall. If challenged to defend the charge we should point to his failure to recognize and to respond to what is really there. Similarly we should regard as mentally unhinged a person who lived as though he were in the presence of elves and fairies and, in this instance, we should base our judgment on the fact of his responding to the unreal as though it were real. Sanity consists, then, in being in touch with reality; insanity consists of a condition in which the unreal is taken to be real or *vice versa*.

We experience little difficulty in applying this criterion so long as we are dealing with stone-walls, elves or fairies. But suppose we are confronted with a man who has oriented his life in accordance with his belief that there is a Divine Consciousness at the heart of things. Shall we, in the light of our criterion, pronounce him sane or insane? Freud would have no hesitation in calling the religious man a kind of psychoneurotic. His book, *The Future of an Illusion*, is designed to prove that religion is an illusion and

that it has no future. I have no desire to argue this question here but it is relevant to note that Freud begs the fundamental question at issue. Whether the religious man is sane or insane depends on whether the Divine does or does not exist, in other words, on the nature of ultimate reality, and this is a question of fact, to determine which is not within the province of Psychiatry. It is only by begging the question in favour of a crude philosophical naturalism that Freud can get his argument under way at all. In the light of the criterion of sanity as the capacity for response to the real, however, we see that matters are not quite so simple as Freud would have them. If God does not exist, then we must concede that the spiritual seeker is running after unrealities. But if there is an ultimate reality, a realm of spirit, then what shall we have to say of the individual who tries to live as though there were none? Shall we not have to admit him to the class of those who are unable or unwilling to recognize the reality of a stone-wall?

In the next place, we may note that the hitherto widely prevailing mechanistic materialism which we noted as characteristic of a good deal of modern Medicine is now being subverted from within the field itself. The progress of Psycho-somatic Medicine has shown incontrovertibly, not only that many illnesses previously deemed to be of a purely physical ætiology are in fact of psychological origin, but also, and more generally, that all disease has an important psychological component. When it is demonstrated that worry or suppressed anger can eventuate in symptoms so "physical" as a stomach ulcer or high blood pressure, then it is hardly possible to go on considering a human being as essentially a physico-chemical system and claiming that mind or personality is merely an epiphenomenal execrescence which does not affect the laws of physiological chemistry.

To regard man in his psycho-somatic integrity is to realize that the so-called "laws" of physiology and of physiological chemistry represent abstractions from a concrete totality. They describe the processes in the body when these are not being affected by intervention from the personality, but they cannot tell you what will happen when the personality does intervene. The laws of chemistry hold good on the chemical level but, when other dimensions of man's being exert their force, then the final resultant is not the product of the chemical processes alone.

Thus, purely from the point of view of physiological chemistry, morphine operates sedatively. But let a man in a hypnotic condition be given a dose of morphine, with the suggestion that he is being given a strong laxative, and the morphine will have a laxative and not a sedative effect upon his physical constitution. Are we to conclude that the laws of chemistry have been suspended or the chemical properties of morphine metamorphosed? Not at all. Morphine has its chemical properties but now, instead of operating as the sole factor, they are to be taken in conjunction with a mental suggestion which, in this case, is able to neutralize those properties. It seems, then, that, while there is an undeniable physico-chemical factor in life, there is also another factor of quite a different order which Medicine needs to consider, namely, the influence of the psyche.

It may be true that, so far as we are creatures of mechanism and habit, we do not enter actively into the workings of our bodies; still there is abundant evidence of the power of the psyche to intervene, and it is not unreasonable to hope that our lives may come increasingly to be governed more by the psyche than by the physico-chemical.

The psycho-somatic emphasis in Medicine has two other corollaries of particular interest in this context. If the condition of the personality is recognized as a crucial factor in health and disease, then we shall have to admit that education, which in the broadest sense is the shaping of personality, is a form of preventive medicine. What goes into the mind is, in the long run, of as great importance as what goes into the body and the building up of a sound sense of values is as important to the individual's health as the building up of strong bones and muscles. Man acts in accordance with the conceptions of his own nature which he entertains and a man's philosophy must count as a factor relevant to his health. If this seems fanciful, it is only because of the continuing bondage to materialistic categories in Medicine and failure to take seriously the implications of the psycho-somatic approach.

This approach, which deals with persons and not with diseases, makes it plain also that the specialist is dealing with fragments and not with the whole, with abstractions and not with concrete totalities. Necessary and valuable as may be his contributions, they cannot be guiding principles. Man is not a mere assemblage of parts, and hence the conclusions of the specialist are generally liable to correction when viewed in the light of the whole person. Thus, for instance, from a purely optical point of view a defect in vision may be correctable through the use of spectacles, which the ordinary eye-specialist would generally prescribe. But suppose the defect in vision comes from muscular tension of the eye-ball, due ultimately to an improper mode of life or frame of mind? In that case, prescribing glasses might transform a temporary and curable impairment of vision into a permanent disability.

Physical symptoms often being, as the psychiatrist tells us, a kind of language of the body, the specialist's endeavour to suppress the local symptom does nothing to remedy the real internal situation, which is trying to express itself through the symptoms. The less we emphasize the physical as such, the less applicable is the specialist's analytical approach. The more concerned we are with organic wholes, with living human beings, the more necessary is the synoptic and integrative approach—the greater, in other words, is the need to view matters philosophically. It is perhaps something of this sort that Whitehead had in mind when he referred to Philosophy as the welding of imagination and common-sense into a restraint upon specialists.

This insistence on the inseparability of vision and technique is, I believe, fully in line with traditional wisdom and the spirit of the *shastras*, of both East and West. It is a *leitmotif* in Charaka who says:—

> A physician who does not enter into the inner soul of man cannot diagnose and treat disease of the person.

Similarly Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates in *The Charmides*:—

> For this is the great mistake of the physicians of our day, that they treat the body without treating the soul.

(To be Concluded)

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"______________ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

Sir Mirza Ismail, who left a distinguished record of public service behind him when he went from India to Indonesia as the Resident Technical Assistance Representative of the United Nations, inaugurated in Bali on July 26th a Regional nine-nation Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations. The Indian Institute of Culture was invited to be represented at that Conference, but could not, unfortunately do so. Sir Mirza brought out in his address not only the vast field covered by the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, from the promotion of economic development and social welfare to the provision of expert guidance in economic, industrial and financial problems; he also indicated the need for a corresponding effort on the part of the countries benefited. The evidence of a change of orientation from one of every nation for itself to one of shared responsibility for equality of opportunity, is most encouraging; real friendship and co-operation have indeed been given, but efforts *for* must be matched by efforts *of* the beneficiaries. Helping people to help themselves is the soundest policy for international assistance as for private charity, lest the withdrawal of assistance leave the protégé, nation or individual, with weakened stamina for meeting the difficulties only too likely to arise again.

Especially important was Sir Mirza's stress on the need for strengthening the United Nations to make it the powerful body that it needs to be for the adequate discharge of the duties expected of it. This demands, as he showed, educating the people of each country in what the United Nations is and seeks to do.

The United Nations and its Specialized Agencies are committed to the task defined by Sir Mirza, on July 25th in his address of welcome at the United Nations Exhibition at Bandung, Indonesia, as "building a richer life in a better world." Part of that effort involves promoting the tolerance without which a united and peaceful world cannot exist. Letting different peoples make their own experiments in the business of living, as Sir Mirza brought out at Bali, is conducive to discoveries that might benefit all.

> The world . . . is wide enough for communism and capitalism, socialism or any other brand of ideology to exist side by side without mutual antipathy. The world will accept all or any of these so long as they do not imperil the existence of those who take a different view, and so long as they do not interfere with one another's way of life.

Nothing could strengthen more the hands of the United Nations than the general acceptance of that point of view.

In his forthright volume, *Peace Can Be Won* (Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, N. Y.), Mr. Paul G. Hoffman, former Administrator of the Economic Co-operation Administration and now Director of the Ford Foundation, addresses primarily his countrymen. Much of what he writes, however, is of significance for all believers

in democracy who recognize the necessity of "waging the peace" with vigour on all fronts if totalitarian propaganda and tactics are to be effectively met. A concern with peace today, he believes, is not wishful thinking but something requiring to be worked at day in and day out, on the economic and psychological fronts as well as on the political and, if necessary, the military ones. But it is heartening to read this great American leader's proclamation of loyalty to the moral law:—

> ...to begin a preventive war, no matter the provocation, is an act of aggression; and if aggression is morally wrong for everybody else, it is also morally wrong for us. We cannot afford a double standard of morality in peace or in war....we can retain our own moral self-respect only so long as what we do can be approved by our own conscience and that of mankind.

He is convinced that "the only way to make democracy work is through the ways of democracy." But a campaign of accurate information and promulgation of the principles of democracy he sees as indispensable to counteract Marxist propaganda. The clearly defined, however much distorted interpretation of history by Marx and Engels, though denied by Communists in practice, serves them well for propaganda purposes. The democracies require, Mr. Hoffman writes, the crystallization of "a free world doctrine which reflects the ideals and strivings of free men around the globe." Then, he says, it has to be expressed, in "words that will, as Kipling put it, 'walk up and down in the hearts of men.'"

A valuable and timely recent publication of Unesco is *Vagrant Children*, which analyzes the problem, its causes and extent, and suggests tried methods of social rehabilitation of maladjusted children. It was reviewed by Dr. M. V. Govindaswamy at a meeting of the Book Discussion Group of the Indian Institute of Culture at Bangalore on the 26th of July. The reports cover five countries, Austria, France, Germany, Greece and Italy, but the problem is almost world-wide. The dislocation and distress incident to war and its aftermath have intensified the problem in many countries, but, in practically all, the vagrant child, eking out a wretched existence on the streets, is a standing witness to the failure of family and society to furnish the background of stability and harmony so necessary for individual adjustment to environment.

In Germany, the problem was rendered more acute by the crash of all that Nazi-dominated children had believed in. The "adolescent romanticism" fostered by Nazism was in many cases transformed into vagrancy and an antisocial attitude, but in a country like India, the wide-spread poverty must doubtless bear a large share of the blame.

A particularly valuable feature of this brochure is the recommendations of the International Conference of Experts and Directors of Children's Communities, which was held at Charleroi under Unesco auspices in 1949. These emphasize, among preventive measures, not only education and apprenticeship opportunities, but the improving of the family background through general social and economic amelioration of conditions; and also that self-discipline and normal development of the vagrant children be fostered by re-education in a happy emotional environment. A world movement of "Friends of Childhood in Danger" is also recommended, to bring together professional workers and people of good-will in all countries, so that adults may be made aware of their educational responsibilities towards the child and so that close co-operation of government in preventive and educational work may be obtained.

The maladjusted child of today is the potential antisocial man or woman of tomorrow; any country which does not face this problem squarely is not only evading its obvious responsibility but is asking for the trouble in the future which, in a universe of law, it is certain to receive.