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"Let him not do to another
what is not good for himself."

—*Yājñavalkya Smriti*

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THE ONE AND ONLY CURE

Men cannot all be Occultists, but they can all be Theosophists. Many who have never heard of the Society are Theosophists without knowing it themselves; for the essence of Theosophy is the perfect harmonizing of the divine with the human in man, the adjustment of his god-like qualities and aspirations, and their sway over the terrestrial or animal passions in him. Kindness, absence of every ill feeling or selfishness, charity, good-will to all beings, and perfect justice to others as to one's self, are its chief features. He who teaches Theosophy preaches the gospel of good-will; and the converse of this is true also,—he who preaches the gospel of good-will, teaches Theosophy.—H. P. BLAVATSKY.

No thoughtful person can fail to recognise the universal symptoms of world-sickness referred to in the editorial of last November's ARYAN PATH; but the fact that so many people are conscious of those symptoms is a hopeful sign of the future. It is the sickness that cannot be diagnosed which defeats the physician, and as invisible, painless cancer, hidden deep in the body, is the most deadly of all evils.

In the past history of civilization, the inner sickness has so often been disguised by an outward appearance of health. Wars of conquest, revolutions, the developments of trade, the vast increase of nominal wealth under the credit system, have all been regarded by the majority of mankind as being, in their varying degrees, worthy and splendid achievements. When the symptoms of illness came too near the surface, as, to name but a single example, in the last years of Louis XVI, the attempt to cure it was made by a change of evil. For oppression and starvation of the poor, was substituted the murder of the aristocrat; and, because the poor were in a large

numerical majority, there was a momentary relief from pain, until the abscess began to re-form and suppurate again in another part of the body.

In the prevailing religions, also, the outward appearance of health has deceived mankind into the fond belief that all was right with the world. On the surface all seemed well, but the almost invisible growth of insincerity was slowly paralysing their vitality. For example, Jesus preached simplicity of personal life, but the Cathedrals raised to his honour were devoted to display ; his priests dressed in elaborate and costly robes read aloud to the congregation the command to his disciples " . . . neither take two coats". A similar phenomenon can be observed in other religions.

But at the present time the world sickness cannot be denied even by those who are almost entirely lacking in moral perception ; and the self-appointed physicians are busily advocating their various palliatives—cures in any radical sense they can never be. In America, the latest cure is known as Technocracy, the idolisation of the machine on a new economic basis. In Europe and the British Dominions, the main prescription has taken the form of trying to stimulate internal trade and production by taxing imports, a flagrant form of the common medical error that treats symptoms rather than causes. As a secondary measure, the principal countries of Europe meet together at Geneva, discuss reduction of armaments, and, since each of them is deeply suspicious of his neighbour's good faith, invariably fail to agree.

But these and all the other prescriptions have but a single object in view, to raise the economic standard, whether the rise be achieved by a revival of trade under the present capitalist system, or by a more equitable distribution of the world's wealth. The lessons of history in this connection go for nothing. In the past we have seen a long succession of periods in which various nations have become rich and prosperous, every such period being followed by a corresponding decline. And if we can formulate any law on the basis of historical precedent, it can only be that these alterations are invariable. Very obviously, then, the prescriptions offered by our economists and politicians are nothing but temporary palliatives for the present world-sickness. They cannot prevent the recurrence of the radical disease. The present depression is an unusually severe one, but the next may be severer still.

Let us therefore come to the only cure. It is well known, none better. It has found expression in the mouths of all the Adept-Teachers since the dawn of the present cycle of world-history, as a legacy of the Wisdom-Religion which antedates the Vedas themselves. All the Masters and the Mystics have been living exemplars of their own primary article of Faith. And none but the

blindest of self-seekers doubts the efficacy of this simple cure for all the evils of the world. In its direct and most comprehensible form, it may be stated in the form of the commandment: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."

Now, although it is not difficult to realise why this commandment is honoured only in the letter by the churches, mosques and temples, how are we to account for the failure in the case of so many professing Theosophists? For, however regrettable the fact, it must be confessed that the failure is often in evidence. In some cases it seems that the acceptance of that first principle of Universal Brotherhood has become perfunctory, giving way to a self-centred interest in the theory of spirit-development, to the desire for the exhibition of occult learning, and so to the prestige that may be won as "a teacher of the mysteries". In other cases, and these are in a majority, the profession goes no deeper than lip service. Those who will not go to personal inconvenience, or it may be expense, to serve the needs of a neighbour, can have no realisation whatever of the true intention and meaning of Universal Compassion.

What that intention is may best be illustrated by considering the meaning of love. Those who cheerfully subscribe to the article of the need for Universal Brotherhood must begin by asking themselves whether there is, in fact, any one human being whom they love in the deepest and truest sense of the word? Is there any one for whom they would gladly sacrifice their own happiness without any desire for reward, or even for acknowledgment; any one whose success is dearer than their own; any one whom they would not judge by their own personal standards of conduct or belief? For unless there be such loved ones in our own circle of relations and friends, we are not yet in sight of the path that leads to the portal of Divine Wisdom. "Love with an object" is not a Theosophical pursuit. Love without any thought of response, of reward or of recompense is the first step for the man of the world; he must begin and learn to distinguish between them; the former is fascination, the latter sympathy.

In *The Voice of the Silence* we find a few brief instructions for finding the Real Path, whose first step is Love without an object. The primary injunction, in developing and practising it, is—let not the senses make a playground of the mind. How simple a warning that appears to be; how immensely difficult to follow. For in this connection the word "senses" implies more than those solely concerned with the indulgence of carnal appetites. Lust, greed and indolence may find no place in the thought, and yet the mind may be the playground of desires essentially worldly and self-seeking—that world may be the occult world, and that seeking the mystic quest. We read further that it is necessary to "part the

body from the mind, to dissipate the shadow and to live in the Eternal"—in other words to realise the true Self, recognise the illusion of matter, and penetrate beyond it to a sight of the eternal reality. But they also who are described as "Buddhas of selfishness" act thus.

However, by even a little practice of Love without an object we have passed the limitations of the overwhelming majority of mankind. This preliminary step is formidable but has to be taken by the earnest aspirant who desires to practise self-discipline, so that he may not only win emancipation from embodied existence but also develop the power to renounce it.

If such ambition be too high in our stage of development, it is an ideal that before all others should remain ever-present in the mind—the Ideal of Renunciation as contrasted with that of Emancipation. Keeping then that high ambition always before us as the goal to which we must presently attain if we would retain conscious immortality, we must begin on the lower slopes of the long ascent, by cultivating a greater moderation and gentleness towards mankind as a whole. It serves no good purpose to hate what we regard as evil. Hate, which has its origin in self-love, invariably begets hate in others. We hate because our *amour-propre* is disturbed. It may be by a person whose conversation and acts are at variance with our most cherished principles of thought and conduct. It may be by a foreign nation which has ideals and traditions different from our own. Or it may be by the creed of another religious community, a creed to which we cannot subscribe. But in every case, the genesis of our distaste lies in our revolt against disturbance.

It is not the true Self, the Immortal Principle that is disturbed. There are times when, however faintly, we can feel the reproach of an inner protest against our anger. The self that is offended is the personality we develop for ourselves throughout life. It derives from our heredity and training by the fostering of inborn tendencies, many of them emerging from bodily appetites, others not less delusive, from intellectual tastes and abilities. And, from the balance of these tendencies,—(almost invariably contradictory in some respects, one set or the other in the ascendant, according to the strength or weakness of the controlling will)—we develop the personality we believe to be representative of our real ego. Personality is an ephemeral thing. After death, it will slowly disintegrate, but it is that self, and that alone, which is responsible for the foolish pride that cannot brook contradiction.

Wherefore, in this present condition of world-sickness, it is the duty of all those who know these truths to forsake their pre-occupation in the miracle-clubs, and whole-heartedly prosecute their search for the path that leads to the first gate of the Heart. By

doing that, they will not only serve their own eternal welfare, but the good of mankind. We may begin by learning the inner meaning of love, free from any trace of self-seeking, for another human being, husband, wife, child or friend. From that we may come to feel a greater tolerance for all the world of men. But it is not until, *by these means*, we have come to realise the true Self, that we can exercise that universal Compassion which is the Caste-Mark of the true Mahatma.

The magnetism of pure love is the originator of every created thing, and a man, free from worldly incentives and sensuality may cure the most "incurable" diseases.

And now is the time to begin that great work of cure.

It is well known that the first rule of the Society is to carry out the object of forming the nucleus of a universal brotherhood. The practical working of this rule was explained by those who laid it down, to the following effect:—

"He who does not practise altruism; he who is not prepared to share his last morsel with a weaker or poorer than himself; he who neglects to help his brother man, of whatever race, nation, or creed, whenever and wherever he meets suffering, and who turns a deaf ear to the cry of human misery; he who hears an innocent person slandered, whether a brother Theosophist or not, and does not undertake his defence as he would undertake his own—is no Theosophist."

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Lucifer*, November, 1887

PLATO THE RELIGIOUS SEER

[**D. L. Murray's** philosophical expositions approximate the teachings of Esoteric philosophy as may be seen in his discussion of the Platonic Ideas in this article.—EDS.]

The Editors of THE ARYAN PATH have kindly invited me to elaborate a sentence of mine in a review of Lowes Dickinson's *Plato and his Dialogues* which appeared in their issue for May, 1932. The sentence ran:

> It is less Plato the sociologist or moralist than Plato the religious seer that our day may return to for refreshment and revelation.

I had pointed out in reviewing Lowes Dickinson's book how hard it was to draw really applicable social lessons for a modern State from a writer who had in view the City States of ancient Greece, which, by modern standards, were little more than large villages, in which every citizen knew all the others and the whole body of them formed the Parliament; in which there was no labour problem, since all the manual work was done by slaves without rights; where there was no machinery to complicate production and distribution and no communications to bring the ends of the earth each morning to the harassed statesman's door.

On the other hand there are really no fundamental problems of philosophy and religion that were not explored by the Greek intellect. Accurate physical science, it is true, was impossible so long as experiment and the manipulation of instruments was generally regarded as a toil essentially "slavish". But the restraints of traditional religion had not prevented the restless Hellenic mind from hazarding those generalizations about the ultimate constitution of the Universe which attract the Materialists of our own day. Thales had conjectured that the whole process of the world consisted in modifications of the element of water, Heracleitus that its origin and end were fire —and that, like a flame of fire, all that is must burn away ("Everything passes: nothing remains"). Democritus, with a more scientific insight, achieved that theory of the atom which until very latest times has been the mainstay of modern physics. With such radical scepticism abroad about the meaning and value of Life, it is not surprising that the first figure to appear in the arguments of Plato's great dialogue "The Republic" is a Sophist who maintains, quite in the style of later worshippers of the Will to Power, that what we call Justice is nothing better than the Convenience of the Strong. Then as now philosophers might dispute over their rival dialectics; then as now the hierophants of established creeds might declare that on the impiety of questioning this or that dogma hung the ruin of mankind. To Plato, who saw the

youth around him being corrupted by the worldly opportunism of the Sophists (the Athenian substitute for our lecturers and journalists), just as in our own day it is invited to pin its faith to a "materialist interpretation" of history and a "psycho-analytic" dissolvent of the soul, the question at issue was more fundamental than the controversy of rival metaphysicians or the wrangle over rites and sacred books. It was the question whether there was really nothing in man superior to the appetites of the animals, and nothing (for that matter) more significant in all living creatures than the aimless dance of dead atoms. It was to know, as a famous French religious teacher of our own time has put it, "whether the universe is inert, empty, deaf, without soul, without heart, whether the consciousness of man finds no echo there more real and more true than itself" (Alfred Loisy).

In that day, as in this, Plato might have been invited to accept a historical revelation or to follow a long chain of reasoning from earth to the stars. But it was his genius to perceive that for the foundation of religion (not necessarily for its superstructure) a basis must be found unassailably sunk in the soul of man himself. Like Kant and Hegel in later ages Plato realized that the religion capable of withstanding all assaults must be a religion which man could not deny without denying his own nature. The Divinity of which he could never be robbed must be a Divinity that he affirmed, implicitly at least, in every judgment that he made.

In general terms Plato's answer to this most fundamental of all problems is known to everybody; to understand it in its full detail and implication is a task that has proved beyond the grasp of the profoundest philosophical intellects, beginning with his own disciple Aristotle. Plato approached the question as a problem of logic. How is it that we are able to assert of a number of individuals all differing in a greater and less degree from one another that each is *a man*; of a variety of four-footed creatures that each, despite difference of colour, size and speed is *a horse*; of a cluster of flowers, distinct in shading and petals, that they are all nevertheless *roses*? Who ever saw the *man-in-himself*, the *horse-in-itself*, the *rose-in-itself*? And yet, if we had not somehow knowledge of the pattern, the *ideal*, man or rose, how dare we affirm that this or that individual was truly a specimen of *humanity* or *rosaceousness*? In other words, so long as we keep to the bare particulars that sense presents to us, the world of Materialism, we cannot say anything about them. We can recognize them and reason about them only because in and through them we apprehend the Idea, the Archetype of which they give varied expression. So soon as we have consciousness enough to reason, we are presented immediately with a

world of spiritual realities lying behind the facts which eyes and ears present to us, lying behind them and yet shining through them, in whose light alone the perceptions of sense carry meaning.

Now the difficulties of the Platonic theory of Ideas are obvious. This realm of fixed Forms or Patterns hanging in some supercelestial æther with the still beauty of Greek statuary or Greek temples is a baffling conception. It is baffling too to understand how the Ideas in their serene purity can blend with the transitory flow of our mortal perceptions without defilement. To remove this difficulty, due to the *static* character of Greek thought, later philosophers conceived the Ideas as centres of energy sustaining the process of the universe, and in the sublime system of Hegel the Absolute Idea is a continuous activity that fulfils Itself in and through the contradictions of ordinary experience, which it reconciles in a higher unity. A more simple interpretation of the central feature of the Platonic philosophy is given by Dr. Inge when he writes: "Platonism is essentially a philosophy of values. The famous 'Ideas' are values—not unrealized ideals, but facts understood in their ultimate significance." The necessity under which man feels himself to attach to certain aspects of his experience a *value* which cannot be explained in terms of mere pleasure and pain or as a quality useful in the evolutionary struggle for existence is as certain as the logical necessities of his thinking which with Plato took the first place when he sought to define the Ideal world.

The spiritual values are generally taken to be three—Truth, Goodness and Beauty; and though other classifications can be made in which truth, goodness and beauty all appear as means to some ulterior, comprehensive spiritual satisfaction, for the purposes of the present argument it is enough to maintain that rooted in the nature of man there lies this ineluctable necessity to appreciate his experience not simply in animal terms of gratification and survival, as Hobbes and his successors argue, but in terms of the good and the bad, the ugly and the beautiful. No man denies that he makes these valuations who does not shortly make them without realizing that he is doing so; and no attempt to explain them as matters of physical convenience (the continuous endeavour of historical materialists and of many psycho-analysts) succeeds in anything but distorting their essential character.

But once we recognize with Plato that ideal demands are connatural with material ones in the constitution of man, we are driven to ask whether there is a dualism between man and nature. Has a universe for which goodness and beauty are mere illusions, less important than mist on the mountain side, for the mist has physical effects, has such a universe thrown up in freakishness

a being that at need prefers these ideal values to his own physical existence? In the words of Loisy does the "consciousness of man [his consciousness of values] find no echo there more real and more true than itself"? If so, the cause seems profoundly inadequate to the effect.

It is just here that the mystic or poetic consciousness bears its witness with decisive force. "Mystic or poetic"—for the difference between the two is not one of kind; Plato himself was philosopher, mystic and poet. In the lectures from which quotation has already been made, "The Platonic Tradition in English Thought," Dr. Inge reminds us how many of the leading poets in the English language have been Platonists by nature, or even without realizing the fact—and no doubt the phenomenon is not confined to English literature. It is scarcely necessary to allude to the sense of a spiritual realm interpenetrating and even blotting out the material world which pervades the poetry of India. Less hackneyed by frequent quotation than those passages in which Wordsworth has expressed the Platonic creed may be the following two stanzas from Edmund Spenser's "Hymne in Honour of Beautie".

That wondrous Paterne wheresoere it bee,
Whether in earth layd up in secret store,
Or else in heaven, that no man may it see
With sinfull eyes, for feare it to deflore,
Is perfect Beautie which all men adore,
Whose face and feature doth so much excell
All mortal sence, that none the same may tell.

Thereof as every earthly thing partakes,
Or more or less by influence divine,
So it more faire accordingly it makes,
And the grosse matter of this earthly myne,
Which clotheth it, thereafter doth refyne,
Doing away the drosse which dims the light
Of that faire beame, which therein is empight.

The principle of Platonism is the principle of sacramentalism. No Platonist will for a moment countenance the impoverished dogmatism which holds that the Spirit, the "wondrous Paterne" of the Ideal realm, cannot be mediated to our apprehension through material elements. If to believe that it can is "paganism" so much the better for the pagan religions. The real materialism is that which hands the whole framework of the world of shapes and colours over to spiritual non-significance—which is the Devil. Doubtless the operation of the sacramental principle has been unduly narrowed by those who would claim that only through the rites of their own Church or Temple can the Divine be communicated for the strengthening and refreshment of the human soul. But it is not by denying the efficacy of sacraments there where the great historic religions of East and West testify from agelong experience that it exists that any help will be brought to the spiritual starvation of the modern world. It is by acknowledging it there, and at the same time immensely extending the scope of it, extending it to the whole creation wherever beauty is revealed and to all humanity wherever a noble deed has disclosed the Ideal in action. To the centenary of the Oxford Movement in 1933, which com-

memorates the work of John Keble, the sacramentalist poet, among others, the disciples of Platonism can bring their wreath. For, to a wider extent perhaps than even the most liberal theologians have dreamed, the universe is not "inert, empty, deaf, without soul, without heart," but the revelation throughout of an Eternal Splendour.

D. L. MURRAY

A NOTE ON MISSIONARIES

That "the human side of the mission seems on the whole unduly weak" is the considered opinion of the Appraisal Commission of the Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry, expressed in the fourth instalment of its forthcoming report, which was released for publication on October 13, 1932.

Admitting many noble exceptions to the indictment, the Commission yet finds in the history of missions plentiful examples of mixture of motive.

> With the legitimate motive have been associated such traits as love of adventure, ambition, the impulse to dominate or to impose one's type of mind on others, the "predatory temper," the will to power . . . . .
>
> . . . . The greater number seem to us of limited outlook and capacity; and there are not a few whose vision of the inner meaning of the mission has become obscured by the intricacies, divisions, frictions and details of a task too great for their powers and their hearts.
>
> The human side of the mission seems on the whole unduly weak. For there are two things which we may rightfully demand of the mission personnel. First, that in those services where there is a recognized standard of efficiency, as in teaching or medicine, the mission staff shall stand well. Second, that in the essential service of interpreting Christianity to the Orient, it shall not too far fail of its great theme. In neither of these respects can we speak of the total impression with the high enthusiasm we should like to offer.
>
> As a member of a church, sent out by a church, the missionary is prone to conceive his task as primarily that of promoting this organization. His Board, as a rule, embodies and intensifies this conception; and the missionary is likely to be dominated by the expectations of his Board.
>
> Every human organization has its hunger for influence, funds, membership; tempts its servants into ways of ambition within its ranks, and into a reputed "loyalty" which involves petty competition with other organizations of similar aim. The trail of self-interest within the organization lies like the trail of the serpent over the missions of Asia within our purview . . . .

The statement is frank enough as far as it goes. It is encouraging that a body of prominent American laymen are able so far to surmount their denominational prejudices and their probable bias in favour of the institutions they were sent to the East to evaluate. It is perhaps too much to expect that they could rise wholly above the differences of creed that now separate East from West, to take a world view.

Proselytizing agencies will never attract in numbers the highest type of personnel. But let the task of missionaries be conceived as twofold—as teaching, without proselytizing, the best that Western civilization has to offer and, no less important, as learning and taking back to their people the religious and philosophical treasures of the Orient—and not only will the problem of mission personnel solve itself but the ideal of world unity will be brought appreciably nearer realization.

PH. D.

YOUTH AND CRIME

[**George W. Wickersham**, Attorney-General of U. S. A., from 1909-13 in the cabinet of President Taft, served as Chairman of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement in the U. S. A. The report of the Commission was published a few months ago. Liberty is the title given by " independent " youths to their acts of licence, and disrespect for law often results from a negation of the soul. What is happening on such a large scale in U. S. A. is also happening elsewhere. And Mr. Wickersham's article has a message for every country. We wish he had told us out of his vast experience something about the effects of the " new Morality" of no repression and full expression, especially in sex matters, on crime among the youth.—EDS.]

All writers on crime and many official reports on present day social conditions in the American States, emphasize the youth of a large number of offenders against the law. " Any programme for the prevention of crime," said the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, in reporting to President Hoover in 1931, " must begin with the proper treatment of the child offender. The lawless careers of most professional criminals begin in childhood." That report (No. 6), it is true, dealt only with the child offender in the *federal* system of Justice. But it also reviewed the conditions existing in the several States of the Union, the methods which in those jurisdictions had been tried with a view to preventing the delinquent child from becoming a permanent member of the criminal classes, and urged the adoption by the federal authorities of some means of avoiding the prevailing treatment of juvenile offenders in the federal courts with the ponderous machinery of criminal prosecution. Mr. Alfred Bettman of Cincinnati, in reporting to the National Commission (Report No. 4) the results of his study and analysis of twenty or more "surveys," or reports, on the administration of criminal justice in different States of the American Union, expresses the opinion that, " the juvenile offender is the heart of the problem and the instrumentalities devised by society for dealing with him the most important". That the percentage of juvenile to adult offenders is increasing, is indicated by the official reports of the United States government, which show that, whereas in 1923 about 15 per cent of all federal prisoners were under 20 years of age and in 1928 about 28 per cent between the ages of 20 and 24, the percentage of those under 20 had risen in the period 1924 to 1928 to 23 per cent and those between 21 and 24 had fallen to 22 per cent.* Lewis E. Lawes, the famous Warden of Sing Sing Prison, emphasizes the youth of a large proportion of the criminals under his care. He gives some facts which throw a challenging light on the problem. He says:

* U. S. Dep. Com. Rep. Prisoners in State and Fed. Prisons.

The records of Sing Sing show that ninety-seven per cent. of our prisoners were never associated with any boys' club, or any of the other juvenile associations where boys learn how to spend their leisure in wholesome recreation. Seventy-five per cent. of our prisoners are not skilled or learned in the mechanics or trades. Ninety-nine per cent. were not actively interested in church organisations. Seventy-five per cent. came to us with previous institutional experiences. That is true of first as well as fourth offenders. . . . Persons between the ages of fifteen to thirty constitute fifty per cent. of the population of the United States, yet they contribute seventy-three per cent. of our criminals. The problem is, therefore, with the young.*

In another book Mr. Lawes says that it is his firm conviction " that lack of respect for the law and all that pertains to its functioning—legislators, police, judges—explains most of the lawlessness of to-day".†

Mr. Lawes, in common with many other students of crime, expresses the conviction that much of our crime can be prevented.‡ He quotes with hearty approval what Col. Arthur Woods once said, while Police Commissioner of New York.

The preventive policeman is the policeman of the future. Police forces must try to keep crime from claiming its victims, as boards of health try to keep plague and pestilence away.§

Messrs. Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay of the Chicago Research Fund, made a study and report to the National Commission on the Social factors in Juvenile Delinquency.‖ An understanding of the behaviour of the child, they report,

necessitates a knowledge of the world in which he lives. Children always live and act in association with other persons. They live as members of groups, coparticipants in the activities of a dynamic social world ; it is artificial to view them and their behaviour apart from the various social groups of which they are members.¶

The report of Messrs. Shaw and McKay emphasizes the influence of bad environment upon the character of boys and girls. It serves to corroborate the accuracy of Warden Lawes's observations and to strengthen the conclusion that the most urgent problem for our communities is that of the bringing up of our children—removing them from environments that lead to revolt against authority and develop criminal instincts, and substituting practical scope for the expression of healthy physical activity, and wholesome education leading to a realization of the supreme importance in a self-governing community of respect for and obedience to law.

I am not sufficiently familiar with the reports of conditions in other countries to state the facts as they there exist, but the im-

* *Twenty Thousand Years in Sing Sing*, by Lewis E. Lawes p. 356. [A review of this volume by Mr. G. D. H. Cole will appear in an early issue of THE ARYAN PATH.–EDS.]

† *Life and Death in Sing Sing*—Lewis E. Lawes, p. 246.

‡ Op. cit. p. 244.

§ Op. cit. p. 245.

‖ Report No. 13, Natl. Com. on Law Obs. & Enf. Vol II.

¶ Op. cit. p. 3.

pression I derive from general reading is that conditions similar to those above described prevail in many other lands than ours. This is hardly to be wondered at. Everywhere the hold of the authority that used to control youth has been loosened. Parental authority is not as unquestioningly respected as it used to be. The discipline of schools is relaxed. The Church no longer commands obedience to the precepts of the higher law. Organized society everywhere finds itself charged with the responsibility of parent, pastor and instructor of youth. One reads constantly of revolt against authority in every land—generally led by youth, as is natural, for youth is the age of protest and revolution. The State is a poor substitute for the family. No institution of State can worthily fill the place of a good father, nor of a worthy pastor. The State too often functions through bureaus and officials selected with but little regard for fitness. Still, much can be done by the State. Much is yet but imperfectly provided. In the present stage of our social existence the State must at least attempt more than ever before. To begin with, adequate playgrounds should be provided by the public authorities, where healthy opportunity may be furnished to work off youthful spirits. Organizations such as the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts should be encouraged and State aid furnished to supplement private donations whenever necessary to secure adequate scope for the effective organization and functioning of these important agencies for the instruction of youth in wholesome out-of-door recreation and in a knowledge of nature. Without such organizations, city boys and girls grow up with very little to fill their minds and awaken their interests beyond the sordid influences of the crowded conditions amid which they live.

All games, all forms of sport, to be successfully played, must be conducted according to rule. Boys and girls quickly understand and adapt themselves to this fact, and will promptly penalize those who do not observe "the rules of the game". It should be easy to use this fact as a means of convincing them that in life, as in sport, the rules must be observed. Children should be shown that rules of law which they consider unfair to them are necessary for the welfare of all, and that the game of life, especially in crowded communities, requires that the rules be observed in order that they, as well as others, may live and enjoy a reasonable scope for the development of their abilities.

Schoolhouses and appurtenant grounds should be open at all times when not required by the regular courses of instruction, as playgrounds or clubhouses for the young. We spend enormous amounts of money, taken from the taxpayers every year, to build elaborate and extensive schoolhouses, in many cases surrounded with ample grounds. Nothing is more remarkable in any of our

American communities than the number of these palatial buildings which have been erected for school purposes in all parts of the United States during recent years. The cost of these buildings has greatly swelled the amount of public expenditure made under the head of "education". So determined has been our people to secure education for all, that few legislators or administrative officers have had the courage to analyse the "educational" budget, or to question the cost, necessity, or the proper economy in the erection of the educational palaces that have been built during the period of prosperity. With the present depression, however, has come a check in these often unnecessary and unduly extravagant spendings. It is a good time to consider the maximum use to which these costly buildings and ample grounds can be put. "Book instruction" for the children is not enough. Character building should be the objective of education. Learning to read and write and the elements of mathematics and science may be assumed as essential. Instruction in nature in her infinite expressions opens the way to wholesome interests. Physical instruction, with facilities for athletic development, is equally important. The Greek ideal of the harmonious development of mind and body should be the guiding principle of every school. Education is the process of forming habits of mind and body. As a general rule, it is only when there is no scope for the development of good habits that children fall into bad habits and swell the ranks of the criminals.

The theory underlying the establishment of reformatories is sound, but in general the State has lamentably failed to carry out the theory. As a result, *our reformatories too often have become breeding places of crime.* No system of dealing with offenders will work automatically. The increase in the number of young criminals is forcing this fact upon public attention.

Until recently, we in America have allowed our possession of a vast continent of great natural wealth to blind us to the need of economy in any direction. Thirty years ago, President Roosevelt began to preach the gospel of conservation of our natural resources, which, through the reckless waste of the past, had been so exhausted as to challenge attention and demand protection. Only more recently has public attention been directed to the conservation of something infinitely more valuable to the State than our trees, our mineral deposits, or our farms; that is, the lives and the character of our children. To deal effectively with the problems of crime, we must strike at its source. The neglected child is the cell whence springs the disease of crime. Perhaps if the State awakens to the importance of the conservation of child life and character, it may reflect back to the parents, and revive in them a new sense of their privileges and

responsibility for the lives they have brought into the world. To the extent that parents and the State unite in aiding the child to form good habits and develop a sense of the value of upright living, will the problem of crime be successfully controlled. Preventive measures to save children from committing themselves to criminal careers are as important as the prevention of disease. We are beginning to realize this. The Bureau of Crime Prevention, established a year or so ago in the Police Department of the City of New York, is a step in this direction. The growth and number of our great cities, which have drawn to themselves over one-half of our national population, has intensified our crime problem. The natural activities and the adventurous spirit of youth must have some innocent means of expression, or they will find unlawful outlets. Our governments must face this fact. Means of wholesome expression must supplant repression for the large majority, if we would check the increase of crime and conserve our youth for healthful and constructive lives.

GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM

We, Theosophists, say that your vaunted progress and civilization are no better than a host of will-o'-the-wisps, flickering over a marsh which exhales a poisonous and deadly miasma. This, because we see selfishness, crime, immorality, and all the evils imaginable, pouncing upon unfortunate mankind from this Pandora's box which you call an age of progress, and increasing *pari passu* with the growth of your material civilization. . . . . The chief point is, to uproot that most fertile source of all crime and immorality—the belief that it is possible for them to escape the consequences of their own actions. Once teach them that greatest of all laws, *Karma* and *Re-incarnation*, and besides feeling in themselves the true dignity of human nature, they will turn from evil and eschew it as they would a physical danger. . . . . Justice consists in doing no injury to any living being; but justice commands us also never to allow injury to be done to the many, or even to one innocent person, by allowing the guilty one to go unchecked.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Key to Theosophy* (*Ind. Ed.*), pp. 207, 208, 210

SOME ACTUAL EXPERIENCES

[In the last two issues of THE ARYAN PATH we published a narrative of some supernormal experiences and their rationale by Mr. C. E. M. Joad. This month we print some of the experiences of **Mrs. Champion de Crespigny**, widely known both as an English novelist of distinction and as a leader in British Spiritualist circles. She has devoted for many years much of her time to the investigation of psychic phenomena, and given freely of her energy to the cause which she has so much at heart. We append an extract from H. P. Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled*, which bears on the case that Mrs. Champion de Crespigny narrates.—EDS.]

Although interested from early youth in problems connected with the supernormal and speculations about the after-life, I was inclined to look upon "mediums" with considerable doubt, and when a certain amount of persuasion brought me to the point of visiting one, I was very much on the watch for possible trickery, and more especially for anything that a little common sense or logic could not explain on normal lines. There had been so much talk of telepathy and of that over-worked and over-rated beast of burden, the subconscious mind, that I felt it possible, even if the medium did not wilfully deceive, the tortuous paths of human psychology might lead me into a hopeless morass.

So it was in a spirit of caution I first embarked on practical investigation of the truth of possible communication with the "great majority," and found myself convinced of something it was neither reasonable nor possible to set on one side as negligible.

In recording the following examples, I have chosen them as verifiable, or where there were witnesses who can bear testimony to the truth of them—not dependent on my word alone for their accuracy. The first is an account of my first experience with a medium of any sort, with results so remarkable that my interest was immediately aroused.

The medium was of the kind known as "direct-voice"—Mrs. Etta Wriedt of Detroit. I had been introduced to her on a Saturday and "sat" with her for the first time on the following Monday, at her house at Wimbledon. No one was in the room except the medium and myself. There was no furniture to speak of beyond the chairs upon which we sat. It was in complete darkness.

A voice professing to be a brother-in-law was heard almost at once by Mrs. Wriedt and myself. He established his identity in the same way he would have done it on a telephone by referring to incidents in our past lives, calling my husband by a name no one else in the family had used, and certainly unknown to the medium. Finally, he said my husband was waiting to speak and the voice then faded into silence.

A voice claiming to be that of my husband followed and of this interview I will speak briefly. Part of it was very remarkable and quite inexplicable through ordinary experience. But a reference was made—I thought—to flowers placed on his grave, which was incorrect, and I went away unconvinced and uncertain whether in spite of some remarkable evidence I should follow it up.

The following day I received a visit from an acquaintance whom at that time I knew very slightly, and who knew nothing of my past life; he had never met my husband. He told me that during a sitting he had had with a medium that morning a voice had spoken claiming to be that of my husband. The invisible communicator stated that his wife had been there the previous day, had misunderstood something he had said and had gone away with the impression that it had not been he who had spoken. He appeared to be very distressed and begged the sitter to take a message from him to me. The message was to the effect that I had been mistaken when I thought he had referred to his grave—that he had no grave, the ashes had been scattered, (a fact that neither medium nor messenger could conceivably have known), and he then made a definite reference to a ship in which he had served when in the Navy, in a form that *no one* could have sent me except my husband, nor would anyone else have known just what it meant. The bearer repeated it carefully from notes made at the time, without any understanding of its meaning, with a slight mistake in the spelling of the ship's name. My husband had left the Navy thirty or more years before his death, and to have gleaned the information the medium would have had to search in ancient Navy Lists not easily available, and even then would have had no guide as to which ship to select as of special interest.

In this experience all the usual objections are eliminated; thought reading or telepathy, the subconscious mind and ventriloquism. The message was given to a third person who had no idea to what it referred or even if there were any sense in it.

Since then I have had innumerable proofs of another world through my own experience and that of others. One of the most outstanding, although of a different nature, was the following.

Some years ago I was invited to a gathering of ten or twelve persons where a so-called "fire-medium" was to give a demonstration of her powers,—a form of mediumship unknown in this country since the days of D. D. Home. We assembled in an empty house in St. John's Wood where we formed a semicircle opposite a red-hot fire of coal and coke. A representative from a well-known daily paper was present among the sitters and was invited to go down into the cellar and select a log at random from a stack of wood.

This he did; the log was laid on the fire and turned about until red-hot all through.

The medium then went into trance and was controlled—presumably—by a Persian, an ancient fire-worshipper. He talked excitedly in what sounded like a foreign tongue, the only word I could catch resembling "Maseta," but which I have since learnt might have been intended for the name of the Fire-god "Mazda". The medium after a few moments of this walked to the fire and with her bare hands removed the log, red-hot all through. She first approached the newspaper correspondent, offering to him the burning log in her hand, but when at a distance of some inches from him we heard his hair singeing with the heat of it—he mentioned this in his published report the following morning—he shrank away.

She then, for some reason, approached me. I had learnt from a student of occultism of a law presumed to be super-physical, whereby it was asserted that through some method of compressing the ether a sort of sheath protecting objects from certain contacts could be formed. That the entire Cosmos is under the law of cause and effect, operating in various ways and conditions, would I presume be generally accepted nowadays, and that if a physical law was seen to be in suspension, some influence outside the knowledge of physical scientists must be superimposed.

So far as we understand it, human flesh in direct contact with red-hot matter must be burned, though the medium be in trance, asleep or dead. As that law was evidently in abeyance it was reasonable to suppose the super-physical to be in operation, and I argued that as it was obviously not burning the medium's hand it would not burn mine—and held it out. She placed the red-hot log upon it, made the round of the Circle, returned and removed it. There was not so much as a red mark on my hand when she took it off. The man next to me remarked that had it been in normal conditions I should never have been able to use my hand again.

It must be understood that I myself *did nothing*. I do not know how to put the law into operation. I did nothing beyond furnishing the passive conditions necessary for the demonstration. The newspaper correspondent showed *fear*, which neutralised the results of the operator, and his hair was singed. The faith which preserved me from fear was derived from my previous knowledge of a law which I saw operating before me. I was therefore able to offer the entirely passive conditions necessary. My attitude was negative. Fear is said to discharge disturbing vibrations into the aura, which destroy—break up—the protective etheric sheath. It will be remembered there were districts in Palestine where Christ was unable to perform His "miracles" owing to their want of faith.

But no explanation can be more than speculative. I can only record the facts. I have the newspaper report that came out the following day and the signed statement of some of those present.

ROSE CH. DE CRESPIGNY

Camerarius, in his *Horæ Subscecivæ*, narrates that once upon a time there existed a great rivalry of "miracles" between the Austin Friars and the Jesuits. A disputation having taken place between the father-general of the Austin Friars, who was very learned, and the general of the Jesuits, who was very *unlearned*, but full of *magical* knowledge, the latter proposed to settle the question by trying their subordinates, and finding out which of them would be the readiest to obey his superiors. Thereupon, turning to one of his Jesuits, he said: "Brother Mark, our companions are cold; I command you, in virtue of the holy obedience you have sworn to me, to bring here instantly out of the kitchen fire, and in your hands, some burning coals, that they may warm themselves over your hands." Father Mark instantly obeyed, and brought in both his hands a supply of red, burning coals, and held them till the company present had all warmed themselves, after which he took them back to the kitchen hearth. The general of the Austin Friars found himself crestfallen, for none of his subordinates would obey him so far as that. The triumph of the Jesuits was thus accomplished.

If the above is looked upon as an anecdote unworthy of credence, we will inquire of the reader what we must think of some modern "mediums," who perform the same while *entranced*. The testimony of several highly respectable and trustworthy witnesses, such as Lord Adair and Mr. S. C. Hall, is unimpeachable. "Spirits," the spiritualists will argue. Perhaps so, in the case of American and English *fire-proof* mediums; but not so in Thibet and India. In the West a "sensitive" has to be entranced before being rendered invulnerable by the presiding "guides," and we defy any "medium," in his or her normal physical state to bury the arms to the elbows in glowing coals. But in the East, whether the performer be a holy lama or a mercenary sorcerer (the latter class being generally termed "jugglers") he needs no preparation or abnormal state to be able to handle fire, red-hot pieces of iron, or melted lead. We have seen in Southern India these "jugglers" keep their hands in a furnace of burning coals until the latter were reduced to cinders. During the religious ceremony of Siva-Rātri, or the vigil-night of Siva, when the people spend whole nights in watching and praying, some of the Sivaites called in a Tamil juggler, who produced the most wonderful phenomena by simply summoning to his help a spirit whom they call *Kutti-Sâttan*—the little *demon*. But, far from allowing people to think he was *guided* or "controlled" by this gnome—for it was a gnome, if it was anything—the man, while crouching over his fiery pit, proudly rebuked a Catholic missionary, who took his opportunity to inform the bystanders that the miserable sinner "had sold himself to Satan". Without removing his hands and arms from the burning coals within which he was coolly refreshing them, the Tamil only turned his head and gave one arrogant look at the flushed missionary. "My father and my father's father," he said, "had this 'little one' at their command. For two centuries the Kutti is a faithful servant in our home, and now, sir, you would make people believe that *he* is my master! But they know better." After this, he quietly withdrew his hands from the fire, and proceeded with other performances.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. I, pp. 445-446

KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION IN CHINA

[**J. W. T. Mason** who has been travelling in China and Japan sends us the following.—EDS.]

A few years ago, a grave scandal was caused in the political and intellectual circles of China by Professor Hu Shih, head of the department of philosophy and literature at the National University, Peiping, who declared: "Knowledge is difficult; but action is not easy." That seemingly innocent and obvious aphorism gravely compromised Hu Shih and caused suspicion to be directed against him as a possible counter-revolutionist. Only lately has he re-established himself. Hu Shih is the intellectual leader of China, just past forty years of age. It was he who gave the successful impetus to the Chinese movement to use the common language of the people for literary writing.

How did it happen that Hu Shih got into serious difficulties with the ruling powers of China by proclaiming the platitude that "knowledge is difficult; but action is not easy"? To understand is to know something about the mystery of China's attitude toward life. Knowledge and action have always puzzled the Chinese mind. How to reconcile them has been a never ending problem in Chinese philosophy. The Chinese mentality is narrow in the realm of pure thought; and what philosophy exists in China is based on practical considerations. Knowledge, acquired for itself, has had in China the utilitarian value of permitting scholars to pass examinations for government positions and secure possession of the perquisites.

For two thousand years, the philosophic—and practical—dictum that "knowledge is easy; but action is difficult," prevailed in China. This saying was attributed originally to the Chinese classics, dating far back before the Christian era. Hu Shih told me, however, that it is an interpollation, probably inserted about the beginning of the Christian era—doubtless for the purpose of giving full authority to the phrase. Knowledge being considered easy and action difficult, the Chinese sense of the practical caused the general culture of the nation to take the easy way and turn from the difficult way of life. Knowledge, therefore, as an end in itself became the dominant creed, and action was neglected. So, the system of examinations as the test of efficiency controlled the appointments of State officials, and ability in terms of action was regarded as secondary.

When Sun Yat Sen started his revolution which resulted in the establishment of the Chinese republic, he reversed the old saying. He declared: "Knowledge is difficult; but action is easy." He meant by that a very practical thing for a revolutionary leader. He meant that it is difficult for

revolutionary leaders to gain the necessary knowledge to carry the revolution to success; but it is easy for the people to act in ways the leaders direct. Therefore, the people must do what the leaders tell them to do.

Hu Shih, talking to me about Sun Yat Sen's reversal of the ancient creed, said that in some respects it is true. For instance, it is difficult for an engineer to acquire the knowledge necessary to plan a New York skyscraper; but it is easy for the workmen to follow the engineer's directions in building the structure. However, Hu Shih's mind, developed in western schools of thought, began to ponder on this problem more deeply. He found this dilemma: if action is easy and knowledge is difficult, why try to acquire knowledge? Why not take the easy way and concern oneself only with action? Why get knowledge as a preliminary to action, if action is not difficult?

So he wrote a pamphlet, bearing the title: "Knowledge is difficult; but action is not easy"—and consternation followed. The philosopher was charged with trying to overthrow the fundamentals of the republic and with seeking to cast reflections on the reputation of Sun Yat Sen. He had committed an offence almost as grave as a medieval philosopher in Europe might have done by challenging a saying of Christ. For Sun Yat Sen is the modern god of China. He occupies a posthumous position corresponding to that of Lenin in Russia. His portraits are in all public buildings and the leaders of the republic base their actions on his pronouncements.

Furthermore, it is obviously advantageous for the war lords who rule China by personal fiats, to hold fast to the principle that the people should do as they are told. Hu Shih, pointing out that both knowledge and action are difficult, seemed to be giving the people of China dangerous thoughts, and the antagonism directed against him made his position precarious. He is still regarded suspiciously by the Chinese leaders, but during the past year, since the Chinese government lost Manchuria, the Nationalist heads have been on the defensive, and freedom of expression is not suppressed as it formerly was. Hu Shih, therefore, is gaining the victory, and can say what he pleases without personal danger.

That does not mean, however, that China is now turning to action. Rather, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that acceptance of the Hu Shih principle means neglect of both knowledge and action by China. For, since China has always turned from the difficult way and has sought the easy way, any philosophy that "knowledge is difficult; but action is not easy" points to intellectual and material passivity as the consequence. Indeed, that seems to be the existing trend in China. Whenever attempts are made to stimulate interest in creative action among the Chinese, there is little response.

Wang Yang-ming, one of the very few Chinese interested in action, tried to turn his countrymen towards practical ways of progress, in the sixteenth century, but the fate that overtook his doctrine is characteristic of China's persistent rejection of any philosophy of activism. Wang Yang-ming, soldier, statesman and Confucian scholar, declared that "knowledge and action are the same". He attacked the dominant Shu-shi Confucian school which taught that, before engaging in action, it is necessary to know all about the course to be followed. Such an attitude towards life, however, leads to passivity, for we cannot know the course of action in advance, since creative activity makes its own course as it proceeds. Wang Yang-ming taught that knowledge resides within our inner selves and we should go ahead and act, not waiting to bring our knowledge to the surface. As we act, our knowledge takes the form of action and so both are the same.

For a while the Wang Yang-ming principle was in the ascendant, but soon the Chinese found a debased interpretation of the doctrine to substantiate the national repugnance to action. It was concluded that since knowledge resides in our inner selves, there is no necessity for study; all one needs to do is to trust to the inner self for doing things. Action under such an interpretation becomes scattered and ineffective, and so both knowledge and action tended to decline. The right interpretation of Wang Yang-ming's philosophy is that we must bring the inner knowledge to the surface by study and action at the same time and so increase individual competence. That was the interpretation given to Wang Yang-ming's teaching when it reached Japan in the seventeenth century. The Japanese pronunciation of Wang Yang-ming is Oyomei; and it is well known that the Oyomei philosophy, by emphasizing individual effort, played an important part in overthrowing the Shogunate and establishing constitutional government and modern progress in Japan. Such are the different results the same philosophic doctrine causes in a nation of passivity and a nation of creative action.

Unfortunately for China, Confucius did not emphasise the necessity for action. If he had done so, however, it is improbable he would ever have become the dominating force in China's social evolution. So, one may say, one reason for the hold Confucianism has always had on the Chinese mind is that Confucius showed no persistent interest in teaching the power of creative utilitarianism. The basis of the Confucian code is morality; but morality as a kind of static relationship among individuals and groups. Such, at least, is the way Confucianism has worked out in China.

The belief in morality as a kind of directing force, able of itself to produce progress, still prevails among the Chinese as a Confucian inheritance. As an example one

may take the attitude toward existing conditions of Marshal Wu Pei-fu, the former War Lord of Peiping, now living in Peiping and advocating China's reform on the basis of a return to Confucian principles. For three hours he talked to me about his ideas. Morality, he said, is the impetus behind all progress. If the people are immoral, it is because the rulers are immoral. If the rulers are immoral, the people will become immoral. The world war, he declared, was the result of immorality, and the millions of people killed during the conflict owed their deaths to lack of moral principles. I said to him that in China more people die of famine than were killed in the world war; and I added that if the Chinese were to adopt principles of material progress and learn how to co-ordinate their efforts and use modern ways of agriculture and industry the famine death rate would vanish. He replied :—

> Not at all. The famines in China are sent by Heaven as punishment because the people are not moral.

He refused to agree that mankind has any capacity for creating new ways of progressive action by mental effort. Morality, according to his belief, controls everything. Progress is automatic if the nation is moral. Depression and poverty inevitably follow immoral actions. Heaven has given men knowledge of moral principles for men to follow or not. Obey the inner moral sense, Marshal Wu explained, and prosperity and happiness inevitably result.

It was useless for me to argue that moral men may be inactive. It is not the man who creates activity, but it is morality. Man need not concern himself with developing effort and energy. If he follows the moral way, sufficient activity will come forth. That was Marshal Wu's undeviating argument; and he presented me with a booklet entitled, "The Essentials of New Salvation Religion" in which the principles of morality are defined as "kindness, righteousness, ceremony, wisdom and faith".

No objection can be found to that definition, unless a non-Confucian objects to the inclusion of "ceremony". But, progressive action includes in addition development of technical skill and the expansion of the creative impetus through effort. One may be kind, righteous, ceremonial, wise and faithful and yet lack the impulse to action. Wisdom, in the Chinese sense, as the lives of so many sages testify, does not serve as a spur to action any more than do the other Chinese tenets of morality.

What one sees in the Chinese doctrine of moral principles is rather an escape from the pain and effort that progressive action entails. The responsibility for progress is put on morality instead of on the individual. Knowledge of moral teachings gives knowledge of the way of action by this doctrine, if morality is actually practised. As a matter of common human experience, this is not so. Creative action, plus morality, gives a more advantage-

ous result than if morality were absent. But, many men of intense activity, who have been benefactors of their nations, have not had high standards of morality. To ignore the living, what of Napoleon, who consolidated France after the Revolution and blazed the way for modern democracy on the continent of Europe? Or Rousseau; or Nelson; or a host of others? It is tempting to say that when life has taken a step forward in progress morality comes after and consolidates what has been done, revising it, so to speak.

But, it is not advantageous to progress to teach that morality of itself will impel a nation to develop activity. Confucianism has failed to carry China forward under modern conditions perhaps for this reason. The creative spirit of progress is the outcome of the association of knowledge and action; and until China understands the full meaning of this principle, which Hu Shih is beginning to teach in its primary phase, China must continue to flounder in a morass of misinterpretations of Life.

The new state of Manchukuo has as its Prime Minister a political leader who realises how essential it is to reform Confucianism for China's benefit. He is Cheng Hsiao-hsu, the leading classical poet of China, a foremost calligraphist and Confucian scholar as well as a former judge and military commander. He refused to join the revolutionary movement of Sun Yat Sen and declined high office under the republic, leading a retired life for the past twenty years, until he was called to head the new Manchukuo government. He was one of the tutors of the ex-Emperor of China, Pu-yi, now the Regent of Manchukuo, who by a twist of fate occupies the ruler's seat in Manchuria from where his Manchu ancestors emerged to conquer China, in the seventeenth century.

Cheng Hsiao-hsu, talking to me in Changchun, the capital of Manchukuo, told me that his desire is to start in Manchukuo a neo-Confucian movement, uniting the moral principles of Confucius with modern, scientific progress. He expressed admiration for the teaching of Wang Yang-ming, describing him as the creator of a philosophy of Confucianism for the people, while the Shu-shi school is a philosophy of intellectualism. Cheng Hsiao-hsu desires to co-ordinate knowledge and action, teaching the people to learn how to do things for themselves through their own initiative. If such an outcome results from the new spirit prevailing in Manchukuo, he believes the influence on China will be inevitable and will result in a Chinese renaissance. So may it be.

J. W. T. Mason

IS BUDDHISM A RELIGION?

[**Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids** carries on the examination of the concept of Religion which her illustrious late husband started in 1918.—EDS.]

The question is sometimes raised, whether a given cult, ancient, world-wide and still living, can rightly be called a religion. Can it be so called, when about one tenet or another, which most people would hold to be fundamental in any religion worthy of the name, it appears to teach nothing definite? Or when it even appears to teach rejection of one or more of them. The question was raised in 1918 before the British Academy by Rhys Davids—it was the last piece of critical work he did. He asked it concerning certain great Asian cults, especially of course concerning Buddhism. He tested these by applying to them five features, which Max Müller had decided might fairly be called "the broad foundations on which all religions are built up," namely, "the belief in a divine power, the acknowledgment of sin, the habit of prayer, the desire to offer sacrifice, and the hope of a future life." He judged, having tested, that not one of those Asian cults had any one of these five. "Religions," he adds, "are constantly changing." The term 'religion' in popular usage has also to change "to cover these variations". And he suggests that a word so elastic as to result in much self-contradiction should be superseded.

Now the word religion is a term much younger than are most of the great cults to which it is applied. It would be difficult to find in any of them a word fairly synonymous with religion. And as to that, it is only we of to-day who, in coming to generalize about religion, feel the need of a general term. But we may find approximations to such a general term. Take this: In the 25th Suttanta of the Pali Dīgha Collection* we find, as usual, an ingenious, even eloquent, discourse built up around what is perhaps a very old *mantra*. This is made to take the form of a test question, namely: "What is this —— of the Blessed One in which he trains his disciples, and in which they, trained and having found comfort, confess as 'will is the beginning of the God-life'?"† Now where I have left a blank, we might reasonably put 'religion,' or at least 'religious teaching'. Actually the word is *dhammo*. This, meaning for India the 'ought-in-things,' the what should be, had come, in Buddhistic Scriptures, to be externalized as a body-of-teaching about what should be in man's life. And if it be conceded, that 'religion' would be no inapt

* *Dialogues of the Buddha*, III, pp. 36 ff.

† *Ajjhāsayaṃ ādi-brahmacariyaṃ*. *Ajjhāsayaṃ* is no stronger a word than inclination. There was no good word for 'will'.

rendering here for *dhammo*, we have lit on yet a sixth foundation of what may be so called, and one not rejected by Buddhism.

Are we sure then, that in Max Müller's 'five' we have got deep enough to say: here is religion's true basis? As to that, he lived over a score more of years after putting these forward in his *Lectures on the Science of Religion* (1873, p. 287), and they may very well not have been his last word on the subject. At the same time not one of the five can we afford to waive aside. Can we say Rhys Davids was right in saying that, *e. g.*, Buddhism has not one of those five? But Max Müller was not happy in the way he worded the five. He might have expressed them in such terms that, without sacrificing a single vital truth, he could rightly have shown Buddhism as not to be excluded from his definition of religion. Let me try to show in detail what I mean.

Consider the second of the five fundamentals: acknowledgment of sin. The word 'sin,' a Teutonic, an Anglo-Saxon word, has long been associated with a Hebrew equivalent parallel to the transgressing or the defaulting in respect of a power greater than the individual man, and looked upon as external, whether the power be a code, a community or a higher being or beings. And the making good is in Hebrew bound up with confession, with offerings, which may count both as a fine and as a profession of contrite loyalty. In its verbal form, sin is none of these things; it is connected, I read, with the verb 'to be' and means identification of the sinner as being such: "Thou art the man!" "The guilty man," quotes Skeat, "is he who it was." We see the word lingering, *e.g.*, in the German *sind*, 'are'. The guilty man acknowledges: "It is I." Now in some cults it is not easy to equate the judicial force in the derived meaning of 'sin'. In Buddhism, transgression may be against the fellow-man, against the moral code, against the monastic rule; but not, *e.g.*, in the tribunal after death, so strangely passed over by modern Buddhists, is he judged as sinning against a Deity as externally conceived. On the other hand, he is often depicted as aware of, and as acknowledging unworthy conduct in thought, word, deed. If then we word this fundamental *in terms of the man*, we see that it is not only a feature in Buddhism, but as a fact a very prominent feature. We see also, that it is not only awareness and confession that figures; there is more: the man or self is confronted by a Self, witness of his conduct, making him aware of ill-doing. The phrase: "Does the self accuse the self?", the lines

> *. . . thou scorn'st the noble self,*
> *Thinking to hide the evil self in thee*
> *From self who witnessed it,**

are no mere poetic dramatizing for those who see in original Buddhism as a new shoot in its parent

* *Gradual Sayings*, I, pp. xvii, 132.

stem, Indian religion.

To strengthen this fundamental No. 2, I would reword it as "belief in every man that he is not habitually what he may be, can, should, ought to, be." In a word, recognition of what we now call 'conscience': "this Deity within my bosom".* But since this term is only of the West, I would exclude it with 'sin' from the definition.

The third fundamental, 'habit of prayer' has also its deeper wording. A superficial acquaintance with the Pali scriptures and Commentaries may seem to justify here the exclusion of Buddhism. But if we put aside the exegesis of later values, if we keep in view that the founders of Buddhism were attacking, not the heart of Indian religion, but its overdone externals, if we never forget, that with Deity in that 'heart' become immanent, prayer had become aspiration and righteous conduct, rather than any form of supplication, we hesitate. *The word itself* is never long absent from Sutta pages: the word *brahma*. This underwent cheapening in the hands of exegesists, and under the influence of monasticism. But for ancient Indian religion it was of supreme import. "Starting as 'prayer,' sacred formula, religious act, it becomes the symbol of holy thought and utterance, the outpouring of man in his highest longings. It is the best wish of a spiritually minded people that becomes for a while a personal god, and at last the divine essence of the universe."† We have no word of like power wherewith to equate *brahma*, *brahman*, but this we should do: we should keep in view what the word meant for religion in Gotama's day, and how deep was its significance, in his mandate to teach *brahma-chariya* to all men. Where Divinity has become accepted as immanent; where, as in original Buddhism, That was conceived, not as a Being, but as a Becoming, to be developed by and in the man through his way of living, prayer tends to be yearning and effort to become. The Jew could call the one a 'panting'; the Christian could speak of the other as *laborare*. In the word *bhāvanā*, 'making become,' the Buddhist has a no less fine contribution.

In the fourth, a more fundamental wording is "desire to make vicarious surrender of the self in what the self has, and direct surrender of what the self is". The "Take me! Use me!" of aspiration towards a Highest, Best, Most, is as truly to be called sacrifice (literally a making holy), as is any less direct offering. Outward rite of surrender is more accidental than essential. And here Buddhism proves no defaulter:—

I lay no wood, brahman, for
fires on altars;
Within the self burneth the
fire I kindle.
Ever my fire burns; ever tense
and ardent,

* Shakespeare, *The Tempest*.

† Bloomfield, *Religion of the Veda*, p. 273.

*I worthily live the life that is Brahma.**

So is the Founder shown speaking. Here have we an offering noble in word, made nobler by the long life he led. For me such a fundamental were best worded as Man willing to place himself in the Highest Will.

I come to No. 5, the hope of a future life. Here it is only the word 'hope' that could sanction the exclusion of this feature from Buddhism. Had No. 5 been called 'belief in survival' my husband would have withdrawn to that extent his claim. But even so, it is only for the monastic values emphasized in the Piṭakas, that hope ceased to be true. It was only for the *śramaṇa* who had turned from life in any, even a happier world, that 'becoming,' that is, externally considered, rebirth, appeared undesirable. I cannot see this as true for the first teachers. No phase of Indian religion did more to strengthen and make relatively real a belief in man's life as a matter not of earth only, but of worlds than did original Buddhism. The winning by a worthy life a happy survival in a better world, as one further stage in 'becoming,' was held out from the first (so far as we can know it) down to the message of Asoka's Edicts as a sure and desirable result. The original teaching seems to have seen the man as ever in a state of change, and in this of effort to become. And so long as the materialistic feature of decay, as succeeding to becoming, is held as not applying to the spiritual man, a teaching of a vast hope will necessarily be integral with it. That the material feature did get hold of Indian religion I have shown recently in these pages.

Finally, what of the first fundamental, "belief in a divine power"?

Here once more the wording is unfortunate. The idea of 'power' is important, but it is made to bear too heavy a mission. This and that cult may single out this and that attribute in manhood carried to an infinitely high value, and see in it Divinity. Other cults may differ. But there is one aspect of Divinity which is fundamental, in that it is a corollary from the other four. These four when combined amount to a concept of Man as seeking after and striving towards a More than he knows himself habitually to be:—awareness of shortcoming, aspiration after that More than he yet actually (though not potentially) is, will to identify himself with, to co-operate with that More-in-will, and the belief that, as inherently, not matter, but spirit, he does not perish in process of becoming a More, but goes on to become that More elsewhere or elsewise.

But this More is irrational without a possible culmination in a Most. The living ever 'higher' bears the implication of a life, a being, yea, a becoming that is Highest. The point of consummation is quite beyond the con-

* *Kindred Sayings*, I, p. 212.

ception of the man of earth, and probably for many a stage beyond earth. But he knows he is seeking, is becoming; he believes in a consummation in or with a Most, a Best, a Highest. Here, I believe, is a fundamental feature that neither Buddhism nor any other cult would commit suicide by rejecting.

So long then as we take accidents and partial aspects in religions, we may make out a case for rejecting from 'religion' this or that cult. And this is true also if we seek to equate particular terms from one cult with those in others. But if we take our very man—not body or mind, but the user of these—our man-in-man, and get down to what is bed-rock in his life-quest, we may find that what is really fundamental in that quest is true of every world-religion, and calls for the exclusion from 'religion' of none. For religion reveals to us the man seeking to become, as very man, a More with respect, explicit or implicit, to a Most.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS

What we desire to prove is, that underlying every ancient popular religion was the same ancient wisdom-doctrine, one and identical, professed and practised by the initiates of every country, who alone were aware of its existence and importance. To ascertain its origin, and the precise age in which it was matured, is now beyond human possibility. A single glance, however, is enough to assure one that it could not have attained the marvellous perfection in which we find it pictured to us in the relics of the various esoteric systems, except after a succession of ages. A philosophy so profound, a moral code so ennobling, and practical results so conclusive and so uniformly demonstrable is not the growth of a generation, or even a single epoch. Fact must have been piled upon fact, deduction upon deduction, science have begotten science, and myriads of the brightest human intellects have reflected upon the laws of nature, before this ancient doctrine had taken concrete shape.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. II, p. 99

GOETHE'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL

[**William Harlan Hale** describes himself as "still a fledgling of twenty-two. I was born in New York, lived in London, Berlin and other belligerent capitals during the war; went to public school in Germany and private school in New York; graduated from Yale University, and am now landed at a desk on Vanity Fair. I founded a radical student's publication called the 'Harkness Hoot' at Yale and later wrote a book called *Challenge to Defeat*"— which was reviewed by Mr. G. D. H. Cole in our January number.—EDS.]

The intellectual world in 1932 gathered to celebrate the centennial of the death of one of the greatest figures of western culture. In reconsidering Goethe to-day, what we observe most forcibly about him is the singular universality of his mind; and on second observation we find that he was perhaps the last man in modern history to attain to that universality. Aristotle could reach it, Leonardo certainly achieved it, and many others like Leibniz and Bacon reached toward it; but since Goethe there have been only some spuriously "universal" bookmen like H. G. Wells. Goethe could write lyrics unequalled for their utter simplicity and charm; he could compose the epic *Faust*, a drama that took him from his youthful, individualist passion to the collective philosophy of his old age; he could engage in a hundred functions of state; and beside all this he could become, through his investigations and discussions, one of the leading scientific minds of the era. He could still hold together the threads of art, science, and practical life. But the very era in which his later years moved was marked by unprecedented expansions in the field of science (chemistry, physics, biology); in the field of practical life (industrial revolution, new economics); in the field of art (movements, schools, programmes). Specialization became the necessity for anyone who sought leadership. And it is the necessity to-day. Art and life have grown further apart; the laboratory scientist is utterly removed from broader considerations (and when he returns to them, he is usually untrustworthy); the business man rarely has time for intellectual interests.

This is the basis on which we to-day admire the man Goethe: his position as the last—possibly the greatest—"universal" man.

But what we often ignore is that all this participation, this energy, this crystalline growth, was purely the extension of a sharply central spirit. It was in no sense mental opportunism, versatile changeableness. The wealth of Goethe's many-sided output is all to be explained by his particular philosophy of the soul.

The era of Goethe's maturity witnessed the growth of two philosophic trends that were to become basic to our age. In the art of

Rousseauism and of the Romantic movements came the stress on the ego—on the self against the world, the first-person as superior to all material or social things. The ego was seen by this great intellectual revolt as an unlimited thing with infinite powers of extension. The main duty of the artist was to divorce himself from worldly compromises, and build up that ego—by inspiration through Nature, through solitude and introspection. Side by side with this highly spiritual and æsthetic doctrine was growing up in immense force the rational scientific attitude—the philosophy which was to culminate in the complete materialism of Darwin. The skeptical Encyclopedists had been followed by the hard-headed theorists of the industrial revolution; English thought, cool, pragmatic, "reasonable," was coming to reign over Europe.

Thus the breach between practical life and spiritual life was broadening; and there seemed to be no solution for the individual but that he choose either one or the other. There was an apparently hopeless conflict. Either you followed the completely extraverted, mechanistic thought of a new science and society, or you followed the completely introverted, idealistic imaginings of a new poetical spirit. The totality of existence was splitting up into its parts.

The poet, in other words, was exploring his own ego—but in whose terms? In the terms of his own ego, since he had banished the terms of outside life and the world. The scientist was exploring the material world—but in whose terms? In the terms of the material world alone, since he had banished the non-material soul or ego.

Profound paradox of modern life!

Goethe's early years of manhood were lived totally under the spell of Rousseauism—or of its German counterpart, the *Sturm und Drang* movement. He was Young Werther—all sensibility, and little sense. But his genius lay simply in this: in the very heat of his strain and passion he was developing a philosophy which should make that heat and stress subservient to the needs of the entire organism: to turn the violence of emotion, in other words, away from the disrupting thing it is in *Werther* and form it into a constructive thing, broadening and deepening the spirit. So we find Goethe gradually, with increasing sureness of step, moving toward a path where each emotion, each flight away from the centre, builds into the development of that central soul.

This philosophical course is the whole reason for Goethe's existence. It is the discovery of the most proper and fruitful relation between man and world. The poet Goethe recognizes at the start that we must work from the *inside out:* that the basis of everything is the first-person, the individual, the mystical Self, with all man's separate desires and emotions. The man Goethe re-

cognizes that we can do little if we do not observe closely the world of nature and society : we can express ourselves only when we are in relation to it, we can be fruitful only if we let the outside world work upon us. Our soul, our individuality, realizes itself only as it interacts with what is outside of it. Poetry, for instance, must be related to some distinct object that is outside the self : its origin is " subjective ," its treatment should approach the " objective ".

But what we are concerned with here and to-day is the converse of this philosophy. If our soul wins a real creative meaning only as it comes into an intimate, perceiving relation with the world around us, it follows that that world (in particular, the world of nature) wins a real meaning only as it relates itself to the soul—in other words, when it is perceived by the self.

What we have here is a great refutation of the entire doctrine of scientific mechanism. The natural world, in Goethe's view, is not a cool formula that goes on, logical, complete, and purposeless, through time and space, and upon whose surface, by an accidental shuffling of chemistry, we humans have been tossed. With the sensitivity and intuition of the poet, Goethe was able to see that such a purely mechanistic explanation—perhaps just because of its dead logic and fatal simplicity—would eventually lead into sterility. It had no meaning for man.

" Those things are true," he said, " which are fruitful." That is the summation of his scientific-ethical philosophy. Now do not substitute for " fruitful ," " useful"; then you miss Goethe. By " fruitful " things he means things offering possibilities—the possibility to deepen our participation in the world, to discern the aims of the spirit, and to strive on to some personal goal.

Of course, this is " wishful " thinking. It is unscientific. But the very fact that Goethe was so apparently unscientific made him one of the great scientific minds of the day ! He helped to bring science into relation with other things—especially with man ; and thus he was not bent on discovering *facts* so much as he was on discovering *relationships*, tracing developments, and finding links between apparently separate and therefore fruitless phenomena. Thus Goethe, while an opponent of mechanical theories of evolution, actually led directly to the discovery of the Darwinian theory.

When Goethe was pursuing science, he let the full intuition of his personality play over his facts, and tried to reach a vision of the " totality " of the world-organism ; he let the humanity of his character resolve the world of matter into a cosmos of movement, purpose, of meaning, where the spirit dominated the material.

When Goethe was writing poetry, he let the cool observation, which science had taught him, play over his imaginings, and

tried to make his concepts as concrete, as three-dimensional, and as close to earth, as ever possible.

His co-ordinating intelligence was thus placed squarely between the self and the world. A convinced dualist, he saw that all creation, all being and all movement could only be the result of the mighty interaction of these polar principles. His life was the repeated attempt first to make poetry strong by adding observation (world) to imagination (self); second, to make science true by testing matter (world) upon the needs and qualities of man (self).

A hundred years later, the Goethian philosophy of soul and action is still a living force—and still an unexplored *mysterium*. The world has not been able to dispose of Goethe as a mere classic, because it still has not mastered or even understood his ideal of a humanized science and of a worldly art. Darwinism and symbolism were the answers to Goethe's vision; and Goethe today—or, let us say, the Goethian philosophy—may be the answer to the bankruptcy of Darwinism and the blind alley of symbolist art.

Profoundly mystical and intuitive in his perceptions, Goethe was at the same time the complete pagan. He believed—and in *Faust* expressed—the antithesis to the gospel of Christianity: namely his belief that the salvation of man can take place only through his experience with the present world. Christianity of course holds that experience with this world is primarily evil, and to be avoided as much as possible. Goethe was incapable of such strange belief. He felt that experience and idea cannot be divorced, if a healthy spiritual balance is to be maintained. The earth is not—as Christianity said—sinful; and the soul is not—as science said—a delusion.

Goethe's philosophy of the soul deals, as we can see, not with system but with organism; it is incomplete, and leaves everything to the temper of individualism. But with all its mystical inwardness and its vague pantheism, it has a personal force that can make it become a real social influence. It proves for us again that spiritual life must begin from within, separate, intuitive, "wishful"; that it cannot be imposed from outside, as mere logic or as dogma.

WILLIAM HARLAN HALE

DOES THE "GITA" SUPPORT ORTHODOXY?

[**G. V. Ketkar, B. A., LL. B.,** is one of the two founders of the *Gita* Dharma Mandala, started in Poona in 1924 for the study of the great text and the spread of its teachings. The first part of this interesting article appeared in our last number.—EDS.]

The word *Shâstra* is not anywhere defined in the *Gita*. The word occurs at the end of each chapter in the concluding formula which describes the *Gita* as *Yoga-Shâstra*. There it means "system of knowledge". The word occurs in the last verse of the fifteenth chapter. There too it means "system of knowledge". When however the word *Shâstra* comes with reference to *Vidhi* it means "authoritative texts". It is impossible to conceive that the *Gita* could have included the Puranas and the commentaries on the *Smritis* in the authoritative texts referred to by the word *Shâstra*. Whatever may be the texts, the extant references to *Vidhi* in the *Gita* will show that they are accepted for guidance only for the sake of determining the proper method of performing sacrifices, austerities and devotion (see xvi-17, xvii-5, and ix-23 respectively). The *Gita's* acceptance of the *Shâstras* cannot be stretched beyond that limit.

Then we come to the meaning of *Shraddhâ*. The seventeenth chapter says that the *Shraddhâ* of good people is good but that of bad people is bad. Men with the latter kind of *Shraddhâ* worship ghosts and devils. Men with the good kind of *Shraddhâ* worship the Gods. The 37th verse of the sixth chapter is worth taking into consideration in determining the meaning of *Shraddhâ*. "He whose mind is unsubdued and who has strayed away from Yoga," even he has hopes of further progress in the path if he has *Shraddhâ*. The man with *Shraddhâ* is said to be capable of acquiring knowledge (iv-39). People who worship other gods are described as doing so with a particular kind of *Shraddhâ* (vii-22). We must find a meaning of the word *Shraddhâ* which will fit all these contexts. We shall have to translate it as "sincerity," or, "earnestness". *Shraddhâ* is a general subjective quality and not the acceptance of some particular thing without reasoning. The orthodox define the term as "absolute faith in the Guru and the Vedanta". It is this definition which they often try to apply to *Shraddhâ* in the *Gita*. But there its real meaning is sincerity or earnestness. Anything done without sincerity or earnestness will be of no use, although it is done outwardly in accordance with the prescribed method. On the other hand, anything done with sincerity and earnestness will result in good, even though the traditional method be not followed. This is the real meaning of the passage at the end of the sixteenth chapter. If by *Shraddhâ* the *Gita* meant ab-

solute faith in the Guru or Shāstra, Arjuna would not have argued the whole question with the Guru, and Krishna would have told him only one thing, *viz.*, "The Shastra says that a Kshatriya should fight; you are a Kshatriya and therefore you must fight." The long discourse of the eighteenth chapter is inconsistent with the orthodox meanings of *Shraddhâ* and *Vidhi.*

Another question which may be touched on here is, how far does the *Gita* accept the fourfold division of *Varnas* and the hundredfold division of society into castes? Intermixing of castes is denoted by the word *Samkara* in the speech of Arjuna at the beginning of the *Gita* (i-43). Krishna is silent over this fear of Arjuna about caste-confusion. It is argued by the orthodox people that this silence means an approval of Arjuna's reasoning. But a contrary inference can be drawn from the fact that Krishna uses the word *Samkara* in quite a different sense (iii-24). There it means a confusion of duties and not a confusion of castes. Thereby Krishna suggests that the thing to be avoided is not so much a confusion of castes as the confusion caused by people not doing their duties.

The place given to *Varnas* in the philosophical system of the *Gita* is again limited to that aspect of the system which divides duties according to natural inclinations (xviii-47). References in the *Gita* can be found which mention the then prevailing social divisions. But these have been tolerated there and given sanction only in so far as they provide for the assigning of social duty to everybody in accordance with his natural aptitude.

In the case of devotion and worship the *Gita* does not insist on the form and the materials with which you perform it (ix-26). It enumerates several kinds of sacrifices and tolerates all of them as long as they are selfless and sincere (iv-30). When the spiritual knowledge is the same, it matters not to the *Gita* whether it is described by any method or arrangement (see chapters vii to xvii).

Every one, whatever his traditional social status, is free to practise the way of devotion and can thereby reach the highest goal (ix-32). The man with real knowledge sees the inherent sameness of all life (v-18). These references will show that the *Gita* has in every case looked to the substance and ignored the outward form. This same liberal attitude of tolerance is extended to the prevalent social system of those times and the traditional authoritative texts. It has never insisted on a particular form of doing things. To try to get the *Gita's* support for the strict orthodox view is to narrow its meaning. It will be better if the champions of orthodoxy give up that attempt and find support elsewhere. The *Gita* does not support their narrow views. It is better to leave it alone.

G. V. KETKAR

THE FLUX OF SPIRITUALITY

[**Helen Bryant's** article is founded upon the Law of Periodicity or Cycles which produces the historical phenomenon of the rise and fall of cultures and civilizations. She contends that kings and legislators build more effectively than prophets and poets—and it might be added that the former succeed in proportion as they are inspired by the genius of the latter. The Buddhist Asoka is the most memorable example. The Russian experiment is founded upon, and inspired by, the gross materialism of modern science which already is becoming a thing of the past. Any State which enslaves the individual citizen, or even subordinates his interest to its own, is bound to fail. What the world sorely needs is an Asoka, a Marcus Aurelius, an Akbar; Russia has not produced one. It is interesting to speculate if future India will produce a great statesman inspired by the ideas and labours of M. K. Gandhi.—EDS.]

It would be fascinating though difficult to make a graph of spirituality, to trace its flux through time. The great peaks would surprise us, I suspect, by rarely coinciding with the lives of great religious leaders, for great religious leaders are apt to appear in times of spiritual drouth. Far more likely is it that we should find the highest manifestations of spirituality under great governors, when men's minds turned naturally into noble channels from the mere fact of living under conditions induced by rulers who, like Yao Shun and Yu of ancient China, "believed that government should be based on the purest ethics," yet that such government should be based also upon the popular will. Under the inferior successors of these worthy emperors public morality deteriorated, so that Laotze and Confucius arose in a time of moral indifference, and were poorly successful in reforming their era. Again, it was under the dubious government of such men as Herod and Pilate that the Jews were so far fallen from their previous high-water mark of spiritual sensitiveness that they failed to recognize in Christ the greatest of their prophets, and not only misunderstood but killed the Messiah their earlier prophets had taught them to expect.

Nor are dominations by religious factions eras of undoubted spirituality, for they are too often distorted by politics, intolerance, or greed. The Mohammedans who swept through country after country on a wave of religious zeal, were also animated by lust of conquest, the Crusaders who later opposed them went forth for loot, while the Catholics who persecuted "heretics" curiously interpreted Christ's injunction that men should love one another. . .

Religions, then, and spasms of religious enthusiasm are uncertain measures of spirituality, which continually manifests itself in other forms, such as arts, philosophies, loyalties, causes. The poet moved by the mystery and beauty of earth, the philosopher (and his modern *aide*, the scientist) seeking truth, the hero giving his life

in allegiance, the enlightened man struggling as Voltaire struggled, to sweeten with reason a brutally ignorant world, are all spiritually moved, and must influence our subtle and sensitive graph.

To realise this is to assess more justly the spiritual condition of our own day. For then in our own day, in our own hemisphere, we shall find—along with the decline of spirituality both in form and essence—a new outburst, parallel perhaps to the outburst of Christianity under the Roman emperors. But let us first glance at the evidences of decline.

The easiest way to understand the decline of spirituality in the West (especially in America, the archetype of the West) is to recall the state of Greece at the end of the fifth century B.C. At that time the young Greeks, their faith in their ancient gods already weakened, were finally reft of their superstitious beliefs by Socrates, but their minds were for the most part too undeveloped to replace the loss with the sense of honour, truth and beauty that inspired their teacher. The Greeks were right in saying that Socrates was dangerous to youth. He was—because the ideas he sought to impart were too lofty for easy acceptance. Only fine gold could be shaped by his flame: it irreparably distorted dross. To-day science has enacted the rôle of Socrates. It has destroyed our superstitions, and with our superstitions our fear of a punitive god. Those able to judge and discipline themselves have been freed from much that was hampering, but weaker spirits have simply lost the schoolmaster who kept them in order.

Unfortunately, at the same time, mere physical conditions of modern life have conspired to encourage laxity of ethics. Our life in cities makes us anonymous: we cannot easily supervise each other. Science has taken away our fear of god, cities have taken away our fear of each other. When people were anchored in plain view, so to speak, in villages, they were at pains to preserve their reputations for honesty at least, whatever strange quirks they may have otherwise indulged. But the city dweller breaks his word or harms the property or happiness of his neighbour without even feeling culpable, for he can move into another city or merely another part of the same city and forget what he has done. In consequence millions of people are ceasing to do as they would be done by, are ceasing to attach any value to honesty in even its simplest forms. The Western world which leads in proving to its own critical satisfaction the extraordinary nature of the universe is debasing its ethics as it increases its knowledge. The Western world, that is, all but one country, where an amazing regeneration is apparently taking place.

In one country, Russia, a new religion, a substitute for Christianity, has been found. For Communism is a religion—a religion for which the Russians have forsaken all other gods, including

the seductive Mammon. For Communism they are sacrificing themselves with as much ardour as the early Christians—and with less hope of personal reward, for those martyrs in Roman arenas confidently expected a blissful life-after-death, while these stern Russian zealots, sacrificing individuality, ease and beauty, believe in no such thing. They are sacrificing for their children, and not even for their children, but for the children of others, the future human race.

For they have not rejected the idea of heaven. Their religion promises a Utopia, as all religions promise it, be it a bliss of Nothingness or Plenty. But, a theoretical and absolutist people, they propose to build their heaven on earth. They propose to bring it about by organizing man so that he does not exploit his fellow man. And their efforts to do this have set them ablaze with a dramatic spiritual fire. Whether, when they have struggled and endured and succeeded, they will find the end all they hoped, whether the means they use to eliminate exploitation and inequality may not possibly eliminate a vital mental and spiritual excitement, too, is interesting matter for speculation, but does not detract from the spirituality kindled by their struggle. For the moment, the following of their star is enough. Those of us who have not been to Russia have at least seen movies and pictures of those people. We have seen them filing past the tomb of Lenin, their faces movingly redeemed by fervour. We have perhaps received letters from them, letters admitting hardship, sabotage, the rigorous denial of the individual, but nevertheless alight with enthusiasm.

Perhaps their vision of Utopia is an illusion, perhaps they are a long way from establishing it, perhaps they have furnished no proof that they can ever establish it. But they are the first of the Western peoples really to reconcile modern science with morality, by making science synonymous with the welfare of the State and the welfare of the State synonymous with religion. They have done this, moreover, in a way that catches the imagination and support of the masses. To fuse morality with government is of course no new thing (the Chinese were perhaps the first to effect it, though with a different instrument, that of a benevolent and intelligent monarchy), but since Christ said "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's," earthly and heavenly kingdoms have grown further and further apart. Now the Communists have reconciled them in a way that cannot be upset by man's growing knowledge of the universe, since it embraces all such knowledge.

It cannot be thus upset, but it may, it seems to me, collapse from within. The electric current of enthusiasm galvanizing Communism must one day cease—and what then? Will not the Com-

munists' Utopia then discover itself to be a laboratory Utopia, bearing only such relation to the world as a robot does to a human being? No one, of course, could deny the superiority of a sound State over corrupt one, any more than one could deny the advantages of a sound body to a sound mind. But though the ideal environment will greatly assist in developing the ideal citizen, the citizen must still work out his own salvation—the environment will not do it for him. If his leisure is too highly organised, he will become merely a well treated slave. If it is not highly organised, he must use it according to his lights, and loyalty to the State will hardly prove a sieve fine enough through which to strain the decisions that will most vitally affect his character. He must find another touchstone to which to bring his life, that is, he will be faced, as man has always been faced, with the necessity of believing some spiritual concept greater than a State, a concept that will put the State in its proper place in this vast and mysterious universe, this universe in which the individual is at once so infinitesimal and magnificent. In other words, he must find his way back to the spiritual awe and wonder that makes man truly alive, he must rediscover the eternal flame that is reflected in the mirrors of fugitive religions, mirrors replaced as constantly as they are broken, and all distorting a little as they reflect.

HELEN BRYANT

The revolution of the physical world, according to the ancient doctrine, is attended by a like revolution in the world of intellect—the spiritual evolution of the world proceeding in cycles, like the physical one. Thus we see in history a regular alternation of ebb and flow in the tide of human progress. The great kingdoms and empires of the world, after reaching the culmination of their greatness, descend again, in accordance with the same law by which they ascended; till, having reached the lowest point, humanity reasserts itself and mounts up once more, the height of its attainment being, by this law of ascending progression by cycles, somewhat higher than the point from which it had before descended. The division of the history of mankind into Golden, Silver, Copper and Iron Ages, is not a fiction. We see the same thing in the literature of peoples. An age of great inspiration and unconscious productiveness is invariably followed by an age of criticism and consciousness. The one affords material for the analyzing and critical intellect of the other.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. I, p. 34

MODERN SCIENCE AND THE SECRET DOCTRINE

III.—TIME

[This article is the third of the series which **Dr. Ivor B. Hart, O. B. E.** is contributing, the former two being on " Space " and " Motion ".—EDS.]

We have shown in previous articles how close is the correspondence between Western physics to-day and the broad physical principles moulded into the framework of *The Secret Doctrine* by its distinguished authoress. There is a mistaken impression among many as to the existence of a sense of antagonism in Madame Blavatsky against the teachings of formal Science, and it is but just that this idea should be exploded very definitely and specifically. We may well, indeed, let her speak for herself :—

> However imperfect and incomplete this explanation on " Gods, Monads and Atoms," it is hoped that some students and theosophists, at least, will feel that there may be indeed a close relation between materialistic Science, and Occultism, which is the complement and missing soul of the former. I. p. 634.

There is, then, no attitude of destructive criticism towards science. Instead is a desire to infuse into the teachings and the enquiries of the Western scientist that attribute of life Mme. Blavatsky refers to as the "soul," and which, willy nilly, the cold detachment of attitude of the "man of science" so persistently disregards. The phenomenon of "time" may well afford a case in point. Formal science regards time equally with mass and distance as one of the fundamental concepts.

The first pages of a text-book rarely fail to give us, indeed, the group references to a foot-pound-second system or to a centimetre-gramme-second system as the case may be ; and upon this rock basis is built a whole superstructure of derived units—of velocity, acceleration, energy, power, and so on—the whole constituting a generally accepted " theory of dimensions".

Moreover, the " space-time" continuum of the modern relativitist has really done very little to remove this attitude of materialistic fundamentalism. Yet, ironically enough, it is this very materialistic fundamentalism that must inevitably break down upon the " Maya" of the time factor. Divorce soul as much as he may wish from considerations of space and matter—though goodness knows the folly of such an attitude—the Western scientist cannot evade, if he but faces up to it, the remorseless and relentless fact that in the consideration of the phenomenon of " time " he is dealing with something that is "different". Space and matter you may measure up. There may be just so much of it. Distance may be taken this way or that way. But time has only one way—" forwards," or shall we rather say "onwards". "Backwards" carries us

not to the phenomenon of time, but to memory, as to which we will defer discussion to a later article.

Here, then, is a most interesting situation. The "pure scientist" professes to concern himself exclusively with the material in nature, and he pursues his experimental researches to degrees of laboratory refinements that demand more and more the elimination of what he calls "the personal equation" in the recording of results. The frailties of the human consciousness must be frowned upon as "confusing the issue". Therefore the recording of results must be made more and more mechanical. Yet every record takes time, and every scientific discussion involves the time factor, and the time factor is part and parcel of the human consciousness. So we have an inconsistency that must be faced and recognized.

Mme. Blavatsky deals with the phenomenon of time very early in Book 1 of *The Secret Doctrine*, in her opening discussions on the Seven Stanzas of the "Book of Dzyan". As students of theosophy are aware, the teachings of this work, the original of which is lost, are to be found scattered through innumerable Sanskrit MSS., and are of undoubted authenticity. The Seven Stanzas constitute a Story of Creation, a Theory of Evolution, a System of Cosmogony, or a revelation of the truth regarding the seven great stages of cosmic evolution, (referred to as the Seven Creations in the Puranas, and the Seven "days" of Creation in the Bible), according to one's outlook and beliefs.

It is the Europeanised version of the First Stanza with which we are primarily concerned in this present article. In her commentary upon the second verse of this Stanza ("Time was not, for it lay asleep in the infinite bosom of duration") we read (p. 37) as follows:—

> Time is only an illusion produced by the succession of our states of consciousness as we travel through eternal duration, and it does not exist where no consciousness exists in which the illusion can be produced; but "lies asleep".

Here at once we get to the pith of the matter—a frank recognition that, in the language of Western mathematics, time is a function of consciousness. It cannot be divorced from life. That it is indeed "Maya" is a different point that does not affect the argument; but whether it be illusion or reality, it is a function of conscious life. But let us continue the quotation from Mme. Blavatsky a little further:

> The present is only a mathematical line which divides that part of eternal duration which we call the future, from that part which we call the past. Nothing on earth has real duration, for nothing remains without change—or the same—for the billionth part of a second; and the sensation we have of the actuality of the division of "time" known as the present, comes from the blurring of that momentary glimpse, or succession of glimpses, of things that our senses give us, as those things pass from the region of ideals which we call the future, to the region of memories that we name the past. In the same way we experience a sensation of duration in the case of

the instantaneous electric spark, by reason of the blurred and continuing impression on the retina. The real person or thing does not consist solely of what is seen at any particular moment, but is composed of the sum of all its various and changing conditions from its appearance in the material form to its disappearance from the earth. It is these "sum-totals" that exist from eternity in the "future," and pass by degrees through matter, to exist for eternity in the "past". No one could say that a bar of metal dropped into the sea came into existence as it left the air, and ceased to exist as it entered the water, and that the bar itself consisted only of that cross-section thereof which at any given moment coincided with the mathematical plane that separates, and, at the same time, joins, the atmosphere and the ocean. Even so of persons and things, which, dropping out of the to-be into the has-been, out of the future into the past—present momentarily to our senses a cross-section, as it were, of their total selves, *as they pass through time and space (as matter) on their way from one eternity to another*: [Italics mine] and these two constitute that "duration" in which alone anything has true existence, were our senses but able to cognize it there.

We have quoted this important passage from *The Secret Doctrine in extenso* because, having regard to what has been said in the earlier part of this article, the simplicity of its language leaves no doubt as to its meaning, and its meaning is fully in accord with the teachings of modern science.

Note in particular the passage "As they pass through time and space on their way from one eternity to another"—an affirmation of the link between two fundamentals—time and space—that finds its modern mathematical expression in the space-time continuum of twentieth-century physics. But if there is a difference between the Science of the Secret Doctrine and that of Western Europe it is indeed in the addition by the former to the latter of a "soul". And that is always worth while.

IVOR B. HART

In the words of a Sage, known only to a few Occultists:—"The Present is the Child of the Past; the Future, the begotten of the Present. And yet, O present moment! Knowest thou not that thou hast no parent, nor canst thou have a child; that thou art ever begetting but thyself? Before thou hast even begun to say 'I am the progeny of the departed moment, the child of the past,' thou hast become that past itself. Before thou utterest the last syllable, behold! thou art no more the Present but verily that Future. Thus, are the Past, the Present, and the Future, the ever-living trinity in one—the Mahamaya of the Absolute IS."

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. II, p. 446

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

UNITY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION*

[**Max Plowman** is the author of *An Introduction to the Study of Blake* and of other volumes about the Mystic. During the War he served on the Western front, but later resigned his commission, was court-martialled and wrote his apology, *War and Creative Impulse*, which acknowledges its indebtedness to *Nationalism* by Rabindranath Tagore.—EDS.]

This is a fascinating book, a history, a work of humane learning and religious insight, a valuable commentary and a masterly arrangement of a vast subject. Professor Hiriyanna, formerly professor of Sanskrit at the Mysore University, has put into a single volume the salient features of all the available knowledge of Indian philosophy, and to this he has added interpretation and criticism which give unity to the work as a whole. The gentle and lucid commentary persuades the reader that he is in touch with a wise and humane scholar whose thesis is also his deepest personal concern. The book is thus redeemed from the air of oracular pronouncement so common to learned history, and its most abstruse themes are drawn into the circle of intimate subjectivity.

One cannot help contrasting these Outlines with the popular scientific "Outlines" recently published in England, though the comparison is anything but flattering to the West. It is perhaps significant that whereas the latest of these baldly omitted its own religion from its history, Professor Hiriyanna's book—or indeed any book dealing with Indian philosophy—simply could not be written by a person indifferent to religion. The fact involves the whole question of what is understood by knowledge. Professor Hiriyanna treats of knowledge that is inseparable from understanding. Our Western "Outlines" treat of knowledge almost as if its irrelevance to the soul of man were the test of its validity. If they were not really pathetic there would be something amusing about these childish attempts to collect the innumerable facts of human existence and serve them up as one huge dish, one vast Christmas pudding of information which the reader must "take" at a meal in the fond belief that he is adding to himself anything beside mental indigestion and abnormal powers of extroversion. But behind all such compendiums lies a false idea of knowledge, the idea that it may become synthetic by being made general. And that is a cardinal error; for true knowledge is always particular knowledge—the understanding in detail of some one

* *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*. By M. HIRIYANNA, M. A. (Allen & Unwin, London. 15*s*.)

thing. And such knowledge is truly synthetic, because by it the mind increases its dynamic capacity and in the microcosm sees the macrocosm, whereas the mind fed on generalities is the mind destroying its own dynamism.

The knowledge of which Professor Hiriyanna treats is knowledge that has been assimilated by human consciousness. What is certain is that this knowledge must always take precedence over empirical learning. Man according to science is man as an acquisitive animal prowling the universe in search of the new. Man according to philosophy is man endeavouring to form a living body of understanding out of his own experience. These activities are only wrongly exclusive of one another. A due appreciation of them leads us to perceive that they should be as alternate as breathing, as perfectly balanced as the systole and diastole of the human heart. Man should not lose his animal faculties for the sake of understanding (and all science is an effort to extend the animal faculties); on the other hand, man should not lose his power of understanding in the effort to reach the unknown. Yet the danger in the first direction has, in some measure, always beset the East, while the danger in the opposite direction has always lain in wait for the West. "East is East and West is West" and the marriage of the two contraries will one day unify the world. What appears to be now of supreme importance to the human race is that, without derogation to either party, the wisdom of the East shall become the dowry of the West, and the knowledge of the West the marriage-settlement of the East.

Rightly applied, this book would help to serve that great purpose. It would teach Westerners what they are now so sorely in need of learning—the true inwardness of religion: it would show the true Christian the universality of his Christianity, just as it would reveal to the orthodox authoritarian the hollowness of his dependence upon dogma. Without removing one traditional stone, it would emphasise and explain the truth William Blake proclaimed to deaf ears a hundred years ago: "All Religions are One." The trouble is that such a book is left to languish as "a text-book for students". To me that is a grim irony; for as I am sure it is an invaluable book for the experienced thoughtful Westerner, I am equally convinced that philosophy is indigestible meat for babes. Young people should be rigorously debarred from the study of philosophy; for without the background of experience what does it become but theoretical and intellectual speculation? Prematurely acquired, it becomes a school of "isms," inevitably without vital meaning, that may actually serve as a defensive barrier to the very realizations of experience upon which living philosophy depends. And this criticism applies with special force to Indian philosophy whose

preëminent glory it is never to have been sundered from religion. Logic may be a useful hack for the young mind's exercise, and the logic that masquerades as philosophy in the West does it small harm; but who shall teach religion to inexperience, who shall deliver the mystery to the unready and the unprepared? What can such religion be but vague idealistic dogma which religious experience can only shatter?

The engrossing story of India's philosophic history brings home to us the gulf between Eastern and Western thought. In the West man has attempted to regard himself as part of pure phenomena: he has striven to draw conclusions upon the nature of things from the standpoint of absolute disinterestedness. But disinterestedness, apart from the love of something, is nihilistic, the creation of a void, the "non-entity" of William Blake. This void has, however, been the ideal habitation of the Western philosopher. And from this region religion had necessarily to be expelled; for religion betrays an emotional concern for the meaning of existence, and emotional concern is inconsonant with absolute disinterestedness. Therefore it had to go. The result is Kant, Schopenhauer, Hume and Voltaire. Thus the aridity of pure intellectual speculation supervenes upon and displaces the natural and human impulsion of consciousness. And this is inevitable once we delude ourselves into believing it possible for man to be disinterested about life; for life itself is interest, and where there is no interest there is no life. Thus disinterestedness apart from love (the heart of religion) is a delusion of abstraction. True philosophy can only begin when we have taken sides to the extent of believing that there is no such thing as disinterestedness apart from the disinterestedness that is religious to the core.

Therein lies the inherent weakness of Western philosophy. Forsaking religion, it becomes intellectual abstraction—"Abstract Philosophy warring in enmity against Imagination," as Blake said. Man cannot know himself as phenomena. "Know thyself" is sage counsel, but regarded in the absolute and not in the relative sense it is pure nonsense, nonsense of the very kind to which Western philosophy has too often fallen a prey. It is the attempt of the self to beget the self upon itself.

By its recognition of the inherent nature of religion Indian philosophy has been saved from this futile attempt. In its most abstract moods it has yet kept touch with life. In the direction of abstraction Buddhism seems to be as far as it has gone; but even here we are poles apart from pure intellectualism, for Buddhism retains its body of doctrine: it never becomes pure metaphysic. The Buddha himself was no mere intellectual speculator among intellectual possibilities, but a human sufferer seeking the clue to his own and all men's pain.

Reflecting upon this age-long record of spiritual achievement, one is struck again and again by the fact that every great school of Indian philosophy has come into being as a direct result of an individual mystical experience. By no effort of ponderous thought could the great principles of the Vedas have been laid down. Nothing but illumination—that joyous apprehension of the truth which liberates the Self from the self—will account for the sublime appreciation of eternal truths revealed in the Upanishads, the divine socialism of the *Gita*, the self-denials of the Buddha, or the spiritual liberalism of Jainism. They are all revelations—examples which teach us what poetry is in essence—expressions of what Blake calls "the Poetic Genius". Since the "Age of the Systems" there has been decline and insistence on the subordinate to the neglect of the primary, but the heritage is indestructible, and it is India's highest title to the world's regard to-day that she is still the living witness to the inalienable unity of philosophy and religion.

MAX PLOWMAN

NEW MORALITY AND OLD*

[**Prof. G. R. Malkani** is the Editor of *The Philosophical Quarterly*, the combined organ of The Indian Institute of Philosophy and of the Indian Philosophical Congress. He examines the answer of the Master of Selwyn to Bertrand Russell in the light of Aryan Philosophy.—EDS.]

Mr. Newsom examines here the case for the New Morality as propounded by Bertrand Russell in *Marriage and Morals*. That case rests on certain views as to the biological aspect of life, the study of the primitive man and his society, the psychology of human nature, the needs of modern civilisation and an estimate of social values. The new morality is clear on each of these points. The essence of its argument is that "uninhibited civilised people, both men and women, are generally polygamous in their instincts"; and it adds that there is nothing wrong in this, and that the exercise of sexual freedom is both right and just. This naturally brings it in conflict with the institution of the family with its restraints and responsibilities. The new morality therefore will have nothing of the family and will allow it to disintegrate, and leave the duties of procreation and the rearing of the young to be paid for and controlled by the State on a scientific basis and in the interests of the community and the nation.

Its logic is very simple. Sexual appetite is no better and no worse than the appetite for food; and yet no one dreams of putting any

**The New Morality*. By G. E. NEWSOM. (Nicholson and Watson, London. 6*s*.)

moral restrictions regarding its satisfaction. The natural requirements of health and of good manners alone must govern this satisfaction. The fact that sexual freedom will lead to the break-up of the family need hold no terror; for the family is already breaking up under the pressure of economic needs, the transfer of certain duties of the father of the family to the State in the form of social services, the newly-won freedom of women, and the inner instability of the family as at present constituted.

Mr. Newsom attacks this position vigorously. He holds that "the voice of Nature is clear for the monogamous family and not for sexual freedom". The polygamous herd and the social order of the hive are not patterns of social life that can be copied with any profit by man with his niceties of emotional behaviour, and his social and spiritual needs. He defends the view that the family is the great repository of everything that is valuable in the social and the spiritual life of man. Mr. Newsom is very emphatic that the sex-life of man must be harmonised with a high social purpose, so that it may lead to a greater integration of the character of man and the subordination of the lower to the higher in the scale of values.

No one who has the interests of the human community and human fellowship at heart can fail to sympathise with this view. As the ideas of men change, social order also is bound to change. The formulation of a social philosophy as that of the new morality is itself a symptom of the time. But any re-organisation of the social order must be based on a proper appreciation of values. That there are people for whom sex-life has an attraction in itself, while the responsibilities and the duties of family-life have an equally great repulsion, may be admitted. Such men will find their ends fulfilled in a social order which allows free play to their amorous instincts with the least possible interference from without. But the question of importance is whether the individual himself can find lasting satisfaction in this, and whether the soul of the community is normally so constituted as to acquiesce in an order which is professedly no order and which subserves no higher end than sensuous gratification. Love may be an anarchic force; but is there no value higher than sexual love?

No State-organised agency can be a substitute for the agency of Nature herself. The family is a natural group. Its disintegration will not only adversely affect the State, but even more so the individual. Without the natural affections and the sense of belonging permanently each to the other found in a family-group, sex-life will have no attraction for the more stable-minded. What is needed is a harmonisation of sex-life with the whole of life, so that emotions do not conflict with intellectual, ethical and spiritual needs. It is by the stabilization of sex-life alone that man can be truly free in other and higher spheres

demanding mental peace and repose. With this object in view certain sections of Hindu society have gone so far as to condemn divorce in every form. The union once made must be a union for life whatever happens. Indeed certain unions may turn out to be unhappy. But the very fact that they are permanent inclines each partner to a spirit of accommodation, good-will and mutual helpfulness. The unhappiness of a married life due to psychological causes is thus reduced to a minimum, while that due to natural causes is borne in a spirit of resignation and sympathy. This is a view that is more in harmony with the ultimate values of life.

There is another respect in which modern western civilisation might well take a leaf from the older Indian culture. Life is divided into four different periods or *āshramās*. Every one must pass through them and do duties appropriate to those periods of life. In the first period a person must observe strict continence and devote all energies to physical and mental culture as a preparation for the more arduous duties of the second period. In that he must, if he is normally constituted, marry and do the duties appropriate to the life of a house-holder. In the two last periods, he must gradually draw himself away from the bonds and obligations of social existence and realise a greater freedom. In such a scheme of life the body and its needs are neither wholly ignored nor unduly propitiated. The body is made to subserve a higher purpose of life, that of self-control, self-knowledge and self-illumination. Physical and æsthetic pleasure may be good in itself; but it has its own place assigned to it. Man is not a mere creature of desire. He has a greater destiny. The achievements of science too must be made subservient to a high moral purpose. They must be controlled in the interests of a more harmonious life and not allowed to be a disintegrating force both for society and the life of the individual.

The great conception which Hinduism offers with respect to the philosophy of life is the conception of *dharma* or duty. Life without duty, or without any restriction on self-indulgence is not human life and will not satisfy a normal human being. Freedom there must be, but it must not lead to anarchy. It must be exercised in the interests of the higher man, and it can only be so exercised when the traditional restraints have been recognised and the social conscience which we have inherited respected. Indeed there is no community which is perfect and free from maladjustments or social injustice. But all advance must be from within. We must accept certain duties and obligations before we can work for a purer and a nobler state. We must utilise our heritage in order to lift ourselves and, through ourselves, society. All social progress must ultimately rest on an ethical advance of the individual. In this

connection, one thing that is absolutely certain is that nothing really lifts human life above the life of an animal except a sense of duty and of obligation to others; without this, man is just a wayward animal. Mr. Newsom rightly challenges the new moralists to show whether the disintegration of the family in the interests of sexual freedom will at all conduce to greater harmony and happiness which is the desideratum of each individual, and whether it will give him that sense of responsibility and purpose in life through which alone man can realise his greatest good. We strongly recommend this book to all those who are interested in saner although old-fashioned views on sex and family.

G. R. MALKANI

A DESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS*

Father Knox has a flair for arresting titles. But the title of his new book is a little misleading. It suggests a criticism of wireless talks, when in fact it is a destructive analysis of certain books written by Professor Julian Huxley, Bertrand Russell, Mr. Gerald Heard, Mr. Mencken, Mr. Langdon-Davies, and Mr. H. G. Wells. It is true that these writers, with the exception of Mr. Mencken, have talked more or less frequently on the wireless, but I question whether their attitude to life is as predominant in the counsels and the policy of the B. B. C. as Father Knox in his opening essay on "Broadcast-mindedness" suggests. Doubtless it is convenient to use the microphone "as the symbol of a certain type of mentality". But it is an arbitrary symbol. For the wireless includes amongst its speakers many others besides the experts and semi-experts who tell us that we live in a scientific age, and must therefore revise our views, not merely of nature, but of human life. And if we listen with particular attention to these, it is not the wireless which predisposes us to do so, but the scientific, or, if you like, the materialistic temper of the age. So far as Father Knox means by "broadcast-mindedness" the habit of taking over from self-constituted mentors "a ready-made, standardised philosophy of life," I admit the danger he foresees. But Broadcasting House is not alone in threatening a dictatorship by experts. And some have even been so perverse as to complain that the Church to which Father Knox belongs has encouraged men to "acquiesce in that general will, which is formed by a governing class of experts". But the "Broadcast Mind" which he assails in this book is not the standardised, but the anti-religious mind, or rather, half-a-dozen particular minds which reject the traditional religion and culture of Christendom. His destructive analysis of the six books which he has chosen to attack is as brilliantly and pungently effective as his previous dissection, in *Caliban in Grub Street*, of certain professions of religion in the popular press. Yet, curiously enough, at the end of both books I have found myself sympathising more with the victims of his attack than with the religious expert who has exposed their illogicality and penetrated their guard; and this although I share to the full his impatience towards such popular fallacies as that the higher can, and must, be explained in terms of the lower, that reality is limited to the measurable and confined to the physical, or that metaphysics belongs to the "world of make-believe".

How is it, then, that a critic who

* *Broadcast Minds*. By RONALD KNOX (Sheed and Ward, London. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

scores devastatingly all along the line, yet leaves one questioning the positive value of his triumph? It is not merely, I think, the temper of his attack which is at fault, although there is an element of personal and professional conceit which occasionally alienates. The cause of dissatisfaction lies deeper than this. In one place he writes that—

> The habit, fortunately moribund in this island, of continually harping on the negative side of a religious creed, is one which Professor Huxley is evidently determined to emulate.

And he himself has fallen into the same habit in his treatment of scientific creeds, if he will forgive a phrase which for him perhaps will be meaningless. And this is due, I cannot but feel, to an imaginative deficiency in himself. Truth for him is too much a matter of logic, of expert dialectic. I do not deny the necessity of logic, but reality cannot be caught within the neat framework of the syllogism, and the captious controversialist differs from the man of true understanding in his conscious or unconscious assumption that it can be. He fails, in short, to meet the real issues, as, I cannot help feeling, Father Knox constantly does. For the revolt against Christian orthodoxy which he deplores is not the fruit of mere muddle-headedness or scientific arrogance. It has its roots in a conviction that Religion in the past has imposed a false dualism upon life.

The most obvious expression of this dualism is to be found in the separation of the Supernatural from the Natural, reflected, for example, in Father Knox's remark that "the religious notion attaches itself in the first instance to supernatural things, and only comes to be applied to natural things by *false analogy*". But it can be traced in the moral as well as the metaphysical teaching of the Church. Admittedly, Science in its reaction against Supernaturalism has fallen into Materialism. In denying the Supernatural, it has denied, too, the reality of Spirit. It has affirmed the unity of life, but at the cost of suppressing the eternal principle of which all life is the expression. Its monism is therefore only apparent. For the material world is no less separated from the spiritual when the latter is denied than when it is falsely conceived. Nevertheless, the reaction against a theological dualism, even if it has led to materialism, has a significance and necessity of which Father Knox takes no account, and it is becoming the more significant as science penetrates further into the elusive nature of matter. Consequently, when Bertrand Russell writes that "the dualism of mind and matter is out of date," or Mr. Langdon-Davies that happiness involves "the establishment and exploration of a united kingdom of the mind," or even when Mr. Heard conceives that man was "raised from his slumber within the group, and henceforward he must go on until he can rise even further and see himself and that group, from a higher standpoint, made one," they may not be arguing "in syllogisms which can be answered with *concedo* and *nego*," but they are affirming the necessity of a kind of wholeness which transcends that opposition of subject and object of which Father Knox is so tenaciously and expertly aware.

Of course, it is easy, and up to a point profitable, to expose the superficiality of Professor Huxley's conception of religion without a God, or of Bertrand Russell's light-hearted assumption that all sense of sin can be dismissed as a psychological aberration. And Father Knox does it very wittily. But he himself in his insistence upon God as a personality betrays in more than one place just that limited self-consciousness which projected the anthropomorphic God in whom the modern mind has ceased to believe, and not only the modern but such inspired minds of the past as the authors of the *Upanishads* who conceived in its integrity, as few other seers or philosophers have done, both the transcendent and the immanent nature of God. But for Father Knox who suggests that the East can only offer a "philosophy of religion without God," Sankara, it would seem, compared at least with St. Thomas Aquinas, was a godless pagan.

And his book fails as a creative piece of reasoning because it is the work of a man more expert in logic than profound in experience, a man who lacks that deeper unity of being by which vital truth is divined beyond the conflict of thesis and antithesis, and even as taking shape amid the confusions of mental error.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

Hindu Monism and Pluralism. By MAX HUNTER HARRISON. (Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press.)

The same consideration which makes the works of Professors Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta so valuable in the eyes of the specialist—*viz.* their exhaustive discussion of every point arising from and pertaining to the history of Indian philosophy—renders them unsuitable for the beginner who would gain a clear idea of the main problems which have exercised Indian thinkers. This is not a preface to the statement that Mr. Harrison's book is "elementary". Indeed, based on extensive knowledge, the monograph is in some parts highly technical. But it effectively concentrates attention on what is perhaps the central metaphysical issue, and the different answers it has evoked from different schools of Indian thought. It thus forms an admirable, if by no means easy, introduction to a subject of which the principal outlines are apt to be blurred in more massive treatises.

It is in the conflict between Monism and Pluralism that the root of the divergence between the great systems of Indian philosophy must be sought. What is the relation between the One and the Many? To Shankara, the single and supreme Reality being the *Atman*, the apprehension of the Many was but error. In the Sankhya system, on the contrary, Reality was conceived not as a homogeneous substance, but a compound of *Purusha* and the attributes of *Prakriti*. And between these two poles we have the modified *Advaitism* of Ramanuja which postulates simultaneously the Reality of the One and the Many. "The one Reality is not pure unity without difference, but a complex whole inclusive of infinite diversity of parts and relationships. The material world and the world of souls are thus in one sense separated from, and in another sense, united with Brahma."

The religious aspect of this metaphysical problem is the method of release or salvation. How can the individual soul attain *Moksha*? It is well known that the Vedantists of Shankara's school answered: By overcoming the illusion of separateness and multiplicity. Knowledge is the key; *Avidya* is the obstacle. In the Sankhya system, too, knowledge is the desideratum, but knowledge not of union with the *Atman*, but of distinction between Self and Matter. Similarly, Ramanuja also retained the concept of *Vidya* or Knowledge, but it was interpreted by him not in metaphysical but personal, moral, and emotional terms; it was viewed in the light of the teaching of the *Gita*. Ignorance in Hindu thought thus appears as the counterpart of Sin in Christianity, and Knowledge takes the place of Faith and Works.

The special value of Mr. Harrison's book is that he compares the views of the three main schools on all these points, with a concise summary of the criticisms directed by each of them against the other, and at the same time traces back to the *Upanishads* the origin of their distinctive features. He has thus produced a comparatively brief but excellent account of the dominant ideas of the Hindu tradition. True, some of his conclusions, such as that Indian speculation has been determined not by a disinterested love of truth but a practical religious aim, betray, in my opinion, a certain confusion of thought, but it would be ungrateful to dwell on them in the midst of so much that is sound and cogent.

K. S. SHELVANKAR

Everyman's Talmud. By the Rev. Dr. A. COHEN. (J. M. Dent, London. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

This is the day of the handbook: "a manual of reference for travellers," as the dictionary puts it. The plain man grows busier, the output of literature increases; a handbook is all that he has time for. Travelling through the forest of modern information, he can rarely see the wood for trees. Too often he is led astray.

A subject on which he will necessarily demand to be informed, is the history of the Jews. He sees them round him in every sphere of human action; he cannot but be aware of their influence, for good or for ill, in all international affairs. He may dislike them, but, if he is honest with himself, he will be forced, however reluctantly, to agree with George Eliot:—

> One of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of this scattered people is that they have come out of it rivalling the nations of all European countries in healthiness and beauty of physique, in practical ability, in scientific and artistic aptitude, and in some forms of ethical value. (*Theophrastus Such*)

Normally one associates Jews with the Bible, with the more unpleasant features of the Old Testament perhaps, forgetting possible advances since ancient times. Of their other literature the plain man knows nothing. It is here that Dr. Cohen renders him signal service. His *Everyman's Talmud* embraces those six centuries of rabbinical teaching after the exile, upon which further progress in Jewish culture is based. It is most excellently prepared, and provides a summary of Talmudic teaching (with apt and frequent quotation) on religion, ethics, folklore, and the hereafter. Especially interesting is an exposition of the evolution of Jewish thought with regard to the incorporeality and transcendence of God, and the relation of the Deity to the universe.

This *Talmud*, a sacred landmark in Jewry, an influence incalculably powerful in history, deserves of us some study. At a time when the English were still savages and the Americans unborn, Rabbis, by means of the *Talmud*, were instructing a people of ancient lineage in laws and traditions which, it is not too much to say, alone kept the exiled Jews from destruction as a nation, engulfed, as they were, in vast hordes of alien blood.

R. A. L. ARMSTRONG

[It will interest our Hindu readers to know that the Jews make a division of sacred texts very similar to their own: *Pentateuch*, the Written Law is like *Shruti*, while *Talmud*, Oral Law, like *Smriti*.—EDS.]

Leap-home and Gentle-brawn, A Tale of the Hanuman Monkeys. By FRIEDA HAUSWIRTH DAS. (J. M. Dent & Sons, London. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

"It is all a question of approach; the 'mysterious East' turns very humanly confiding eyes to anyone seeking it in simple direct kindly contact free from religious, race, or imperial bias." Thus Frieda Hauswirth Das who belongs to the band of Westerners, who through a sympathetic understanding have attempted to contact Indian life, free from prejudice and any sense of superiority.

The book appears to be written with many objects in view. First and foremost it brings out most forcibly the characteristics of the monkey tribe. Besides the tendencies of greed, hatred, and jealousy, with which we are sometime wont to connect animal life, it opens to our view nobler and higher instinctive qualities, such as love, a sense of responsibility, faithfulness and loyalty, which also exist in the animal kingdom.

In tracing the course of these Hanuman monkeys, Mrs. Das gives us an insight every now and then into Indian life. The stark poverty of "the sixty million human beings in India who from birth to death never know what it is to eat enough"; their religious instinct, coupled with the reverence they hold towards all animal life, especially that of the Hanuman; the picture of a Westernised Indian; the humanising touch given to the white man in India—all tend to make

the book more natural and true to reality. It is interesting because of its simplicity and humorous touches. It is founded on deep observation, and yet is free from long tedious descriptions.

But the best chapters are perhaps the last chapters where the "Yogi" of India is brought in. The astonishing powers developed through patience and perseverance by the "heathen" of India carry their own message. Unknown and unrecognised, an individual here and there determines to tread "the Path". Following with persistence the necessary rules, he sees his undreamt and unheard of faculties slowly unfold. True it is, that such "renouncers" may be found here and there in other countries—but if any place can claim to possess the greatest number, surely it is India, the land of religion and philosophy.

F. K.

South American Meditations. By COUNT HERMANN KEYSERLING. (Jonathan Cape, London. 18*s.*)

In these meditations Count Keyserling again addresses himself to the championing of Spirit as the power that lies within us by which we may, if we choose, overcome the Facts of all the world. The author sees the World Process in terms of Gana *versus* Spirit. By Gana he means Primordial Life, the Netherworld, Blind Urge, the fatal flowing of everlasting libido, as opposed to a life determined by Spirit. He sees Man who "frets, pines, and despairs in the coils of Gana, of serfdom, of blind fate" but who yet divines that "these chains do not fetter him beyond hope of escape. Something drives him to step forth out of his captivity and to rise beyond it." Very often he appears to be speaking in the language of dualism and to deprecate monism. Yet apparently this is not really so for he writes :—

> Everywhere the very first relationship to Spirit was prayer, because, at first, Spirit was experienced as something outside self. And if withal there awoke the presentiment that Spirit nevertheless represents the deepest Self, then the meaning of all prayer corresponded to that of the ancient orison of the Hindus:
>
> From the Unreal lead me to the Real,
> From Darkness lead me to Light,
> From Death lead me to Immortality.

Without regarding the process in any evolutionary light Count Keyserling emphasises the event which he calls "the in-break of Spirit". There came a time when something novel appeared —the faculty of Imagination through which Spirit works. The working of Spirit is the thing that engages and has always chiefly engaged the attention of Count Keyserling. For this is where he finds Man's salvation—in the power to give Facts their significance. Take two Facts, supposedly hard and almighty—Sex and Gold. Sex may be made, as it has been, a fountain of happiness and joy—Dionysus. Or it may be made, as it has been made, Satanic, the source of evil and ugliness. It remains always the same fact, but its whole significance and therefore actual effect is determined by the spirit of man. A piece of gold may be worthless to a primitive and a bank-balance to a modern : it is the same piece of gold, the same fact, but its working reality is determined by the spirit of man. Man literally creates the facts, Keyserling keeps repeating. It is upon this power that he lays all the stress ; for if Facts on any occasion are not the last resort but bend before Spirit, then on every occasion this is true, and man does indeed possess the power to overcome the world.

Such, I believe, is the main drift of *South American Meditations*, some four hundred pages long. It is similar to the drift of Keyserling's other work and does not say anything much that he has not said before. Nor does he say it better. The long words and the long wind are even more abundant than usual, his lack of artistry more evident. But he possesses the power of compelling the reader to go on, because at any moment one may come upon a strongly eloquent passage full of substance.

J. S. COLLIS

The Shakespearian Tempest. By G. WILSON KNIGHT. (Oxford University Press. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

From time to time plasterings are removed from the walls of ancient churches revealing the original frescoes beneath—often of surpassing beauty. Sometimes, in the process of cleaning a portrait, another is revealed beneath it. So, it would seem, Shakespeare is hidden behind a veil of commentary: as with the picture, so with the national poet of England, a restorer would be in due place.

Never was one more needed than to-day. Recent Shakespearian scholarship has given us nothing but a chaos of irrelevant suggestions. After three centuries, we are still without a "credible" portrait, to say nothing of the authentic picture.

This alluring task has been accepted by Professor G. Wilson Knight, a writer who was eminently fitted to undertake it. The result is a book of great interest, uniting wide scholarship with sensitive poetic apprehension. *The Shakespearian Tempest* is a work to read and meditate on.

Mr. Knight has sought to penetrate the web of Shakespearian phantasy: his method is not that of the scalpel but that of intuition. He attempts to show that the plays under Shakespeare's name exhibit a constructive unity and an enlarging vision. And the evidence he adduces is most impressive.

From this conclusion many scholars will frankly dissent. Personally, I am inclined to accept the author's contention, though I fail to see any incompatibility between borrowing and independence. It is seldom realised that creation and appreciation are *fundamentally* the same. He who appreciates, creates. Shakespeare, as I see him, was intent on the vision, not on the materials of his craft. Indeed, an artist absorbed in the creation of a flower may pick his petals where he will; it is the *new unity* that ultimately counts.

Now, the unity of Shakespeare's work is not mechanical but organic. However the plays may differ, they are the offspring of one mind and soul. This is my feeling, and I should have been grateful for confirmation or refutation. Mr. Knight, to my thinking, leaves me just where I was. His terms "tempest" and "music," though they occur frequently in the plays of Shakespeare, do not seem helpful in the present reference. The poet may have been penetrated with a thought such as the author ascribes to him. I do not think, however, that it amounted quite to a doctrinal position about human life and death, though it probably meant more than such mere play of fancy as Milton speaks of in a passage of *Lycidas*:

> For so, to interpose a little ease,
> Let our frail thoughts dally with false surmise.

And then, Mr. Knight tends to see too much in the reconciliation-pieces. I cannot ignore their historical origins. But of course the same forms can be used to different purposes: even the same kind of stanza can be employed to produce different rhythmical effects. But my point is, that Shakespeare in his later mood chose to indulge himself in that kind of imagination, but that he cannot be said to have reached anything and revised his view of life. He probably did not think he had a solution: his sombre Northern genius was powerless to pierce the veil of Maya to the Eternal Ethos. No wonder the final plays remain pseudo-harmonies. We do not find in them the "calm of mind, all passions spent" of a Sophocles or a Milton.

The unity of Shakespeare's plays is of a different order: I think I have found it in separating the picture from the frame in his work. Mr. Knight envisages Shakespeare solely in the "singing robe". There is the playwright to be considered too.

But whether we agree or disagree with the author's findings, his is none the less a work to be reckoned with. And the writing throughout is that of a poet. This is a book that every lover of Shakespeare should possess and ponder.

RANJEE G. SHAHANI

Alexandrine Teachings on the Universe. Four Lectures by R. B. TOLLINGTON, D. D., D. Litt. (George Allen & Unwin, London. 5s.)

The so-called Catechetical School of Alexandria was a remarkable group of scholars and philosophers of peculiar interest to the modern thinker. Their period was, roughly, the 1st century B.C. to the 3rd century A. D., when Alexandria was the cosmopolis of the world, and with unusual freedom and tolerance for expression of every shade of opinion. And the philosophers of this era, Philo, Clement, Plotinus, Origen and others, had a boldness and depth of thought that contrasts strikingly with modern materialistic theories of the universe.

This book consists of lectures given at Cambridge by a specialist in the Alexandrian school of speculative thought. Dr. Tollington's main object is to find so far as possible the common ground of opinion among the distinguished teachers of the period. As a secondary object he endeavours to show where, in his own view, modern thought harmonises with, excels or falls short of Alexandrine thought. And it is only in this latter respect that one would have any quarrel with his scholarly yet concise and readable survey.

The most striking instance of modern thought veering towards that held so long ago in Alexandria is not so much in recent scientific theories as in the philosophy of Karl Barth. Barth thinks of God as not merely immanent in man but also "beyond". He has re-captured the idea of the Divine Transcendence. Yet this idea of the human nature of man being transcended by the divine nature was insisted on by Clement and others nearly 1700 years before Barth. It is an idea highly characteristic of the Alexandrine mind, and reaches an extreme in Plotinus the mystic, whose transcendence has even been attributed to oriental influence. Dr. Tollington prefers to look on Plotinus as an extreme Platonist, but he produces no positive reason why Eastern thought should not have played its part in him.

In view of his general philosophy and of the fact that Porphyry tells us that "Plotinus was interested in Eastern thought," we cannot agree with Dr. Tollington that the Eastern visit under the Emperor Gordian is not of "much importance," nor do we consider it a legitimate inference that because "he went on military service and was there only a year" that he "probably had little opportunity for enquiring into Persian and Indian Philosophies". (p. 35). Of the teaching of Plotinus H. P. Blavatsky writes (*Theosophical Glossary*, p. 256):—

> He taught a doctrine identical with that of the Vedantins, namely, that the Spirit-Soul emanating from the One deific principle was, after its pilgrimage, re-united to It.

The difficulty of the Western mind in grasping the Eastern view of a "deific principle" is great. But the general study of the philosophy of the Alexandrians is clarified by a study of Indian philosophy. The root ideas are the same though clothed in different language; and when one is dealing with a confessedly abstract subject such as the transcendence or immanence of God, one is often apt, quite erroneously, to fall somewhat into the conception of an etherealised Personal Deity—instead of a Principle. A Theosophical Master once wrote:—

> The Hindu mind is pre-eminently open to the quick and clear perception of the most transcendental, the most abstruse metaphysical truths. Some of the most unlettered ones will seize at a glance that which would often escape the best Western metaphysician. You may be, and most assuredly are our superiors in every branch of physical knowledge; in spiritual sciences we were, are and always will be your—MASTERS.

Dr. Tollington does justice to the theories of "mediation" of the ancients of Alexandria. He sees where they gain over modern scientifically based ideas. "From Plato to Plotinus," he says, "the supreme power is good." Yet he cannot quite reconcile himself to the idea of the descent from spirit to matter, to the attitude that represents life symbolically as a tree with its roots upwards. "The recoil from material things, a recoil which seems to be excessive, involves," he claims, "a

lowered estimate of the world of sense." Even if true, is this too high a price to pay for a heightened estimate of the world of spirit?

G. W. WHITEMAN

A Buddhist Bible. Edited by DWIGHT GODDARD. (Thetford, Vermont, U.S.A. $ 2.)

Mr. Dwight Goddard, the author of *The Buddha's Golden Path*—a manual of practical Zen Buddhism, has now produced this admirable collection of the favourite sutras of the Zen sect. The work contains an essay by the editor on the Ch'an (Zen) School of Buddhism in China before the time of the Sixth Patriarch (Hui Neng), an easy-reading version of the *Lankavatara Sutra* based on the translation recently published by Professor Suzuki, a rearrangement of Gemmell's translation of the *Diamond Sutra* (*Vajracchedika*), Max Müller's version of the *Sutra of Transcendental Wisdom* and the famous *Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch* edited from the recent translation by Wong Mou Lam.

Mr. Goddard in his essay on Zen in China is chiefly concerned with the influence of the Taoist teachings on the development of the cult; he points out that the difference between Taoism and Buddhism lies in the *laissez-faire* attitude of the former as contrasted with the more dynamic and austere principles of the latter. While the Taoist was somewhat inclined towards congenial company, wine and poetry, the Buddhist sage found that these things interfered with the perpetual concentration required for Realisation. There are interesting paragraphs on the difference between Tao and Nirvana, and he comes to the conclusion that Tao is the active aspect of Reality (analogous to the Sanskrit *Prajna*) and Nirvana the passive, yet this view would hardly seem compatible with the *laissez-faire* attitude.

The *Lankavatara, Diamond* and *Transcendental Wisdom Sutras* are based on the Mahayana doctrine of *sunyata* or "no-thing-ness," which teaches that all things are of the nature of *maya* (illusion) *as* things, and have separate existence only in our own minds. But as aspects of Reality their true nature is No-thing—that which is unconditioned by separateness and is the universal and inscrutable Norm of Existence. Things "are not independent of each other; they are only different aspects of the same things, they are terms of relation not of reality. Conditions of existence are not of a mutually exclusive character; in essence things are not two but one."

The Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch is the only work which has received the title of "sutra" which is not attributed to the Buddha or to a famous Bodhisattva, and it is indeed worthy of this honour. It is the finest and most intelligible exposition of the teachings of Zen and has the virtue of being free from the ceaseless repetitions and metaphysical dissertations which mar so many of the Sanskrit sutras. The sutra was originally written in Chinese by Fat Hoi who was one of the Patriarch's disciples and this translation of it was done by Wong Mou Lam in 1930. The teaching presented is that of the *Lankavatara* simplified; it sets out to teach realisation of the essence of mind—that is, the inward awakening of the intuition to Reality:

> Essence of mind is intrinsically pure; the reason we become perturbed is simply because we allow ourselves to be carried away by the circumstances we are under. He who is able to keep his mind serene, irrespective of circumstances, has attained true Samadhi.

The book will interest students of Far Eastern philosophy and mysticism, and is one which cannot fail to bring a great light to all treaders of the Path.

ALAN WATTS

Adventures in Philosophy and Religion. By JAMES BISSETT PRATT. (The Macmillan Company, New York).

This is a volume of dialogues, in the Platonic manner, dealing with philosophic and religious subjects. The device has the advantage of hitting straight at the heart of the matter in dispute, but where the author himself is the advocate of a definite theory, the defects of his position are apt to be glossed over. Mr. Pratt frankly admits the weakness of the method. As a critical weapon, however, it is unsurpassed, and can lay open with precision and economy the weak points in any doctrine to which it is applied.

Two of the discussions are conducted by missionaries, one old-fashioned and the other modern, a hustling American business man, and two Buddhist monks. The object, apparently, is to estimate the value of Christianity to China and, incidentally, to determine its relation to Buddhism. It is clear that Mr. Pratt himself believes that the two faiths are not exclusive, and contain much that could be shared with mutual benefit. The third dialogue, between philosophers who discover that death has not annihilated their personalities, is concerned with their attempts to reconcile their various metaphysical doctrines with the indubitable fact of their individual survival. In a fourth dialogue, Mr. Pratt considers the pass to which religion has come in Western lands, and exhibits the inadequacy of both orthodoxy and humanism.

The most substantial portion of the book, however, is the long dialogue on metaphysics and epistemology. The participants are Socrates on the one hand, and representatives of different contemporary philosophical and pseudo-philosophical schools, ranging from the followers of Hegel to the followers of Dr. Watson. Socrates (or Mr. Pratt) finds one feature common to them—a strong determination to destroy the notion of a "subjective" entity, to reject the reality of the self, and to explain all the phenomena of life and nature in one uniform, "objective," impersonal terminology. In this respect, at any rate, idealism and naturalism are at one. They are monistic; they are in revolt against dualism. Socrates's own position may be indicated by a brief quotation:

> And when philosophers shall have abandoned the attempt to interpret the psychical in terms of the physical or the physical in terms of the psychical, when they shall have returned to the inevitable human belief that individual selves are real and that the spiritual life means more than logical implication, there will be some hope of attacking with a fair chance of success the great problems of philosophy.

But no quotation can do justice to the simple and effective manner in which he exposes the absurdities involved in Pragmatism, Idealism, Behaviourism and other –isms.

K. S. SHELVANKAR

The Faiths and Heresies of a Poet and Scientist. By R. CAMPBELL MACFIE. (Williams & Norgate, London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

This is a posthumous volume embodying "the honest, thoughtful conclusions of a noble soul facing the eternal verities". Dr. Macfie combines in himself the talents of a poet and a scientist and his aim has been to "assert eternal Providence, and justify the ways of God to man". For this he has brought to bear on his scientific searchings and conclusions his poetic intuition and vision.

The author in keeping with the modern developments in physics, etc., concludes that the reality behind the world is really "Mind purposively arranging facts and relations, or material causes". The scientific exegesis of the cosmos, on the whole, *suggests* to him a theistic interpretation. While this is true of the lower order of nature, it is more so in the case of the higher, *i.e.* the organic. The author refutes *in toto* the orthodox belief of science in a mechanistic or a noumenal theory of life. Life is to him a special creation on the part of the Deity, a doctrine advocated in the book of Genesis which, though

now despised equally by science and the Church, seems to him to deserve reconsideration. The author here advocates an emergent theory of evolution in his own way. Mento-volition alone as the noumenal activity manifested in life satisfies his causal instinct. Science which thus suggests a biophilic aim or purpose gives him the right to reject the mechanistic creed and believe in a God whose Will and Hand are at work in the dynamic structure of the universe. But by this science does not give much encouragement to believe in personal immortality, which also he is anxious to justify as a necessary part of his theism. In this the author finds a right to appeal to a philosophical interpretation of the sort that sees no Cause but God whose Will is manifested in our consciousness. Such a philosophy, though only an approximation to truth, seems to satisfy his incorrigible craving for a causal explanation of himself and the cosmos. Reason and intuition inform him that our consciousness, being a part of the Infinite Consciousness, cannot end, as that would imply a deicide.

In fact, the belief in a God rooted in intuition and encouraged by scientific inference becomes for him the basis of a theistic faith as well as of a hope for immortality. Such beliefs, though not of a conventional type, are yet of a saving type. The treatise may not appeal to rationalist, but it should to religious, minds for whom it may prove a source of some inspiration. The book ought to possess an index.

J. K. MAJUMDAR

Meister Eckhart's Sermons. Translated by CLAUD FIELD. (Allenson.)

Mysticism and vagueness are to some minds synonymous terms. A reading of Mr. Field's beautiful translation of Eckhart's Sermons will dispel that illusion. For in clear and trenchant prose, the search even for that vague something which is ordinarily declared to lie beyond the categories of thought assumes the lucidity of a logical exposition.

Most of Eckhart's positions are truly remarkable for their affinity with the views of other thinkers, considering they are the outcome of an experience, highly individual and independent of any conspicuous outside influences. The central doctrine of his philosophy is a belief in an Absolute Reality which as against the conventional Deity of European idealist tradition, is not contrasted to appearance, but is All-Comprehending, All-Enveloping, Ever-Present in the pantheistic sense of those words. But although his God differs from the general idealist God in that He is not a kind of Newtonian space holding together a world of inter-related appearances but vast and free and moving, He is *apparently* differentiated in the concrete ego; He is *apparently* bounded by the barriers of body, time and number, like the God of the Vedanta, for instance, which is surrounded by the *koshas* or sheaths of sense, energy and intellect. How then, the question arises, can the soul know God?

Eckhart's answer is that we realise God through the eternal generation of His Son in us; or as the Hindus would say by the sudden flashing of a vision across the mind of the sage, when deep insight comes and all things become apparent to him, when he perceives the cause of sorrow and the path of knowledge, in the manner in which the Buddha reached at last the exhaustless source of Truth.

This private vision may be natural or acquired. In Eckhart's own life it may have been natural. But he lays down a deductive system for the benefit of those who have to travel up from the actual perceptions of the senses, through the subtle analysis of rational discourse to the realisation of the beatific vision,—a system which calls for self-effacement, for the cultivation of detachment, utter detachment and selflessness:

> I would have you know that to be empty of creatures is to be full of God, to be full of creatures is to be empty of God.

MULK RAJ ANAND

The Secret of the West. By DMITRI MEREJKOWSKI, translated into English by JOHN COURNOS. (Brewer, Warren and Putnam, New York. $7·50.)

The "Secret of the West" is the lost continent of Atlantis, destroyed on account of the sins of its inhabitants, and especially, according to Merejkowski, for their indulgence in war. The book will be of considerable interest, not only to students of Mme. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine*, in which some of the esoteric traditions about the lost continents were given out, but also to the increasing number of people whose attention and interest have been drawn to the rapidly accumulating body of scientific evidence, which goes to prove that the story of Atlantis, so long regarded as the invention of Plato, is in fact nothing less than a fragment of sober history.

Merejkowski claims to have discovered very full confirmation of Plato's narrative in the *Book of Enoch*, though in the latter the story is veiled in mythical form. He has ransacked an immense range of writings classical, biblical and modern to find support for his thesis of the historicity of Atlantis; and has made an extremely interesting collection of ethnographical and other scientific data, as well as legends and myths bearing on the subject. But Merejkowski is not content to be an impressionist historian, and a very brilliant one: he must needs be a prophet too, a rôle that does not fit him quite so well. As prophet, he very properly denounces the wickedness of war, and warns the modern world lest it destroy itself in fratricidal conflict, and so perish off the face of the earth as did the Atlanteans.

It is superfluous to say of Merejkowski that he writes with vividness and power; but his genius is marred by a streak of eccentric fanaticism that runs through it, like a bar-sinister on a shield, and keeps cropping up all through the present book. At the back of his mind, and, as it were, in an isolated compartment of its own, is a curiously warped belief in some of the crudest forms of exoteric Christian salvationism and second-adventism. He says, for example:—

> It may be said that Plato, like all pagan antiquity, died from thirst and hunger—the thirst of true Blood and the hunger of true Flesh: the flesh and blood in the Dionysian, Osirian, Tammuzian, and other mysteries do not assuage because they are visionary.
>
> The end of the first world is in the West—such is the meaning of Atlantis. But the meaning of Christianity is: the end of the second world shall unite the East and the West: "For as the lightning cometh out of the East, and shineth even unto the West; so shall also the coming of the Son of man be."

Of Buddhism, he says:—

> The devil has already seduced one half of the world, the East, by Buddhistic pity; and now he desires to seduce the other half, the West; he wants to kill God, love with pity.

The cloudy bigotry of such passages contrasts strangely with the insight displayed in the following admirable account of the working of the law of Karma in history:—

> *If* at the end of the glacial period, there existed a huge island continent in the Atlantic Ocean, and *if* it perished from one sudden or several gradual geological revolutions, as is confirmed by the memory of the earth and all its creatures, then it is likely that this physical destruction was no accidental, senseless circumstance, but was pre-determined by something in the perished beings themselves, and was a punishment for something.

Which is almost an exact paraphrase of the esoteric teaching as set forth in *The Secret Doctrine*.

R. A. V. M.

The Buddha and the Christ: The Bampton Lectures for 1932. By Canon B. H. STREETER. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London. *7s. 6d.*)

Canon Streeter is a learned and respected Divine and the well-known author of about a dozen books on theology. This volume is an attempt to work out a practical philosophy of life and to probe the meaning of the universe from the standpoint of modern thought. Though the title suggests a comparative study of the teachings of the Buddha and the Christ, the author betrays predi-

lection for his own creed, and evinces prejudice against Eastern and Indian viewpoints. He concludes that Anglican Christianity alone possesses the remedy for modern ills.

According to this author Buddha is original and most himself in his moral teachings, and there he resembles Christ; but he differs fundamentally from Christ by reason of his inheritance and acceptance of the doctrines of Karma and Maya. Though the author professes himself not competent enough to expound and criticize the subtle tenets of Indian religion yet he condemns its polytheism "as luxuriant as the native jungle". He forgets that Max Müller defined Indian polytheism as being in reality "henotheism," and he also overlooks that Christianity too has abundant polytheism only in a different and cruder form.

The author's assumption that the Absolute of Indian religion is "static" and "dead" and excludes a "living and loving God" is not correct. A "living God" is a phantom unless He is metaphysically the Absolute Reality. The doctrine of Divine Incarnations is an important key to the understanding of this mystery of Indian philosophy. Divinity assumes human shape whenever spirituality subsides and materialism prevails, and so Hinduism never sets a limit to the number of saviours as does Christianity, but believes in Christ, in Mahomed, in Zoroaster as saviours of mankind along with Krishna and Buddha. Love of God is not "impossible," as the author concludes, because It is conceived as an Impersonal Reality whose "stuff" or *svabhava* (Nature) is *Anandam* or Absolute Bliss and Compassion. Canon Streeter is under delusion when he remarks that Krishna is "an apotheosis or a docetic Incarnation" and that Kali and Krishna are "inferior images of the Divine" so it is "inwardly idolatrous" to worship them. It is a gross misreading of Indian religion. His remarks "India has lacked men like Luther so it is sunk in trivial and debasing superstition" and that the "Hindu temple is more often an example of moral corruption" expose the superficiality of his knowledge of India. The author accepts the doctrine of immortality in the form of eternal life as a necessary deduction from a belief in God but fails to understand the inner significance and the logical strength of our doctrines of Karma and Reincarnation. These do not frustrate the purpose of life as he makes out; but on the contrary reveal life to be consistent as Law itself.

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

The Light of Asia. By Sir EDWIN ARNOLD, illustrated by WILLY POGANY (David McKay Company, Philadelphia.)

Countless men and women regard *The Light of Asia* as the book *par excellence* of devotion. It is no ordinary epic: it is a sacred song chanted in Nature's wordless voice audible but to the heart of the devotee. Human dialects obscure rather than clarify such language. Yet being human we must resort to speech if that be our medium of communication. To the lover of this poem the Buddha has come to be the soul's ideal. And how shall another enter our heart that he may depict our conception satisfactorily? Mr. Pogany has contributed clever illustrations, two or three of which are beautiful though more sensuous than symbolic, Blake's influence to the contrary notwithstanding. They make this an excellent "gift book" thus spreading the soul-satisfying message of that Man of men, Gautama the Buddha. But the spiritual message of Asia is not for illustration. No drawings will stir those hearts in which Siddhartha is no sensuously beautiful Prince nor an emaciated ascetic, but the essence of human perfection out of time and space, the ideal of evolution through the ages—the lover and the guide without whom life loses its meaning and we resign ourselves to despair.

C. T

Magic and Mind. By E. J. D. RADCLYFFE. (A. & C. Black Ltd., London. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

"I will point out the greatest, the chief cause of nearly two-thirds of the evils that pursue humanity . . . it is religion . . the sacerdotal caste, the priesthood and the churches." We may adapt this as the *motif* of Mr. Radclyffe's argument. Magic, he says, is wholly based on ignorance. He does not recognize the MAGIC of the ancients; his data being limited to the medieval witch-doctors and priests, forgetting that the counterfeit coin proves the real. The science of *mantra* (sound), talismans, and the use of nature's elemental powers is denied because so ludicrously conceived, while scientists adopt the rôle of the priests whom they have condemned and shout "Anathema"! Were Mr. Radclyffe to study Madame Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled*, he would find much to amend in this volume. But the *motif* is sound, echoing the Greek Oracle—"Man Know Thyself."

Our ideas on education, politics, ethics, want purifying in the ascetic fire of devotion if knowledge of our essential divinity and inherent magical powers is to spring up spontaneously from within. Further Mr. Radclyffe emphasizes the lethal poison of *other*-dependence, stressing the necessity of freedom. Like many others he seems to identify freedom with materialistic denial of things spiritual. Yet this volume must be gratifying to all who would have man recognize himself as the only god (or devil) there is and have done with ceremonial magic disguised in the sacred name of Religion by bogus magicians styled priests—of church . . . yes and of scientific laboratories.

T. C.

Henry Vaughan and the Hermetic Philosophy. By ELIZABETH HOLMES, M.A., B. Litt. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 4*s.* 6*d.*)

Miss Holmes has made an exhaustive study of the Hermetic poets of the seventeenth century. With this as a basis, supported by her knowledge of Hermetic teachings, she has given us what should serve as an introduction and incentive to further study of a subject not even to be outlined in a small book.

Henry Vaughan, like his brother Thomas, Jacob Böehme, Donne and others quoted in this essay, intuitively grasped fundamental laws of Nature, glimpsing the esotericism lying at the heart of religious philosophies. Theosophists will agree with Miss Holmes's contention that these were vouchsafed by the "subconscious" (or as they would put it, superconscious) mind of the poet, for such flashes of Genius, the Ancients taught, come from the super-, not the sub-conscious realms (*vide* Mme. Blavatsky's "Genius" *Lucifer*, Nov. 1889). The idea of microcosm and macrocosm, evolution through incessant rebirth (physical and spiritual), the doctrine of emanations and the immanence of deity as propounded by Spinoza and the "seers" of every age, are among the teachings woven into Vaughan's poetry. This is significant, not coincidental. Students of Theosophy must feel grateful to Miss Holmes for her labours in emphasizing the existence of this ancient system of knowledge forgotten or denied by the majority. What J. Middleton Murry is doing for Blake in THE ARYAN PATH (November 1932) and in his essays and books, that Miss Holmes is doing for the Hermetic poets. Such work must hasten the day when the Light which shone in the East shall illuminate the world.

C. D.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE ORIGIN OF INDIAN CASTES

[In response to a request we have received several communications on the views of the late Mr. Charles Johnston concerning the origin and development of the Hindu Castes. Below we print views of two of our esteemed contributors.—EDS.]

I

I have been asked by the Editors of THE ARYAN PATH to comment upon the remarks of the late Mr. Charles Johnston in his Introduction to the *Bhagavad Gita* on the Indian castes—remarks to which attention was drawn by Mr. R. A. V. Morris in the January issue of this journal. It requires no great scholarship to see that, in the passages quoted by Mr. Morris, Mr. Johnston was merely indulging in some fancies of his own rather than drawing conclusions from established facts. There is no evidence for the belief that the Vaisyas belonged to a yellow race. There is no evidence for the assumption that the Kshatriyas and the Rajputs were always identical. There is again no evidence for the conclusion that the gods of the Vaisyas and the Kshatriyas were different from those of the Brahmans. And, lastly, there is no conclusive evidence for the assumption —which is often repeated by some interested critics, as if it were an established fact—that the Atma-Vidya of the Upanishads was a purely Kshatriya and not a Brahminical achievement; on the other hand, as Deussen says, the earliest form of the Upanishadic doctrine is to be found in the discourses of the Brahman sage Yagñavalkya in the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*.

The origins of the Indian Castes are lost in obscurity. However there seems to be little doubt that, as Senart has pointed out, in its early stages the Hindu Caste system had some points of resemblance to the Greek and Roman social systems. Just as all the Indo-Germanic tribes had a common parent-language which developed on different lines in the different lands which they came to occupy after their dispersion, so they had common social institutions which developed in different ways in the different kinds of environment in which their lot was cast. The ancestors of the ancient Greeks and Romans reached Greece and Italy and created the City-State, while their kinsmen who wandered to the East and reached Hindustan created the caste system. The seed was common, which in different soils gave rise to different growths. The Indian *Kula*, *Gotra* and *Jati* correspond more or less to the Roman *Gens*, *Curia* and *Tribus* and to the Greek *Genos*, *Phratria* and *Phyle*. And the rule of exogamous marriage for the smaller group and of endogamous marriage for the larger group were common both to the Eastern and the Western Aryans. So also were the commensal regulations observed during religious repasts. The latter, being the external symbols of family unions, were confined to the persons of the same blood, like the Hindu funeral banquets even to-day. Thus the class or the caste, as well as the older tribe and the clan, was originally only the Aryan family writ large. Whatever names they may take in different countries, says Senart, they are no more than an expansion of the family, the organization of which they copy and extend. This primitive organization was subjected to different influences in the different lands to which the Aryan tribes penetrated.

In India the first and foremost influence was the presence of a large and overwhelming dark-skinned native population with their own customs and

manners, their own gods and goddesses and their own languages and institutions. The contrast between the fair-skinned Aryan and the dark-skinned Dasyu gave rise to the concept of Varna or the colour bar which afterwards came to signify caste. And the long centuries of struggle between the two races resulted ultimately, not only in the subjection of the darker race, but also in the stratification of the conquering tribes. The sacerdotal and the military classes came to be distinguished by division of labour from the common people, who, alongside of the subjugated natives, tilled the soil, tended the cattle and carried on trade. The stratification was the price which the conquerors had to pay for their conquest. Thus almost at the inception of the Caste system we have in operation both the principles of racial subjection and class hierarchy. In Greece and Rome civil and political ideas centring round a City-State gradually loosened the old narrow bonds of clan and tribe. But in India, where cities took no root and the immigrants were scattered over an immense area and came to live in small self-sufficient village communities, all the primitive ideas of exclusiveness gained strength and became firmly entrenched.

Secondly, when we come to historical times, we see after the fall of the Mauryan Empire a series of foreign invasions leaving their inevitable traces on the Indian social system. The Indian frontiers were continually harassed by the Bactrian Greeks, the Parthians, the Sakas, the Kusanas and later by the terrible Huns. All these alien races were gradually assimilated and given a more or less honourable place in the social structure. Almost all modern scholars are of opinion that the Rajput and the Ghurjara kingdoms that established themselves in medieval India were the results of foreign invasions. The conquering tribes were Hinduized, and a new Kshatriya chivalry arose out of the ashes of the old. It is apparently only after the Muslim conquest and the religious persecutions that India lost her powers of assimilation and her castes became hardened in self-defence into little cast-iron cells.

Thirdly, apart from invasions, wars and conquests, the normal civil life of the people and their daily occupations cut across all class and racial divisions and produced those powerful trade guilds of which we hear so much in the Buddhist *Jataka Tales*. "These guilds," says Mr. Blunt in his *Caste System of Northern India*, "were purely occupational bodies; persons following a particular profession, of whatever social class they might be, belonged to them." These corporations must have given a strong impetus to the formation of the innumerable, hereditary, functional castes—of potters, barbers, washermen, fishermen, shepherds, blacksmiths etc. —with which the Indian social system is honeycombed even to the present day. We should not forget the fact that originally even the Brahmans and the Kshatriyas were distinguished from the rest of the community only as occupational castes, which in course of time became hereditary, and their example must have been copied below by the bulk of the population. And there is evidence to show that even the castes at the top of the social ladder, though they were largely hereditary, were by no means always homogeneous in character. For instance, it is believed that the Saivite temple priests in Southern India are recruits taken into the Brahman class from lower ranks, and we have already seen how the Hinduized alien conquerors of Northern India became neo-Kshatriyas.

Fourthly, in religious schisms and the formation of sects we have another force cutting across class divisions and eventually producing new groups, which in their turn by means of endogamous marriages and commensal regulations—the twin pillars of the caste system —developed in course of time into sub-castes. Buddhism and Jainism, no doubt, never intended to upset the caste system, as was once believed. But in the changing fortunes of these faiths and the ultimate victory of the Puranic Hinduism, resulting inevitably in the recon-

version of large groups, a considerable intermingling of classes must have taken place in the social system. We are on surer ground when we come to the innumerable sects introduced by Vaishnavism, Saivism, and Saktism.

So far we have mentioned only the most important natural forces that have shaped the Indian caste system through the ages. There were numerous other influences like excommunications, mixed marriages, cross-breedings colonisations and distant migrations which contributed their own quota to the complexities of caste. We may pass over these and come to the great artificial force which in a subtle but very effective way created the atmosphere of ideas from which this complex organism derived a large part of its sustenance—*viz.*, the force of education.

Mr. H. G. Wells in his *Work, Wealth and Happiness* has an interesting chapter on "Why people work," which throws some light on the stratification and growth of the Indian social system. Taking Jung's concept of *persona* which means "a man's guiding and satisfying idea of himself," he applies it to the psychology of European society and discovers three types of *persona*—the peasant, the nomad or adventurer and the priest.

> There is the peasant tradition with its exaltation of toil and its desperate clutch upon property, its fear, its political submissiveness and its great power of passive resistance. There is the nomad tradition with its rapacity and handsome spending. There is the priestly tradition, the tradition of the trained and educated man with its repudiation of mercenariness, its conceptions of service and disinterestedness. How these strands interwove and interacted to constitute medieval society is a matter of history . . . . . All these traditions still mingle in us and about us. Out of them we build our *personas*, our conceit of ourselves, our conception of our rôles and of what becomes us.

We have the same strands in Indian society also, only the interweaving is checked by the principle of heredity. Mr. Wells goes on to observe "that the modern *persona* is being steadily modified by education in the direction of substituting . . . . . co-operative service for the pure acquisitiveness and desire for dominance of the traditional scheme." This is again exactly what was done for the Indian society by the great Hindu nation-builders from the anonymous author of the Purusha-Sukta in the *Rig-Veda*, where we have the first mention of the four-fold caste, down to Sankara and Ramanuja. The authors of the two Epics, the codes of Law and the Puranas, in fact almost all Hindu writers of any authority, so persistently maintained this theocratic ideal of *Çāturvarnya* that, in spite of all the transformations that society was undergoing before their very eyes, people looked upon the four-fold caste as the ideal norm of society to which they had to conform, if they wanted to save their souls. They created the *persona* of the priest and the prince, the merchant and the peasant. Not only were the four castes conceived as the creation of God, but also they were supposed to have a cosmic significance by being connected with the three eternal qualities of *Sattva Rajas* and *Tamas* of Nature itself and their permutations and combinations. Furthermore, they were adduced as part of the evidence of the inviolable law of Karma, the good actions of this life resulting in a promotion for the agent in the social hierarchy in the next life. Thus on all sides the ideal society was rounded off, and its various parts were supposed to work into one another with beautiful harmony like the parts of the Solar system. And a perfect social organism it would, perhaps, have been, if only India had been the universe and if dreams of men could at any time become realities.

But meanwhile what were the facts apart from ideals? There is no historical evidence to show that at any time in the history of India the society presented the neat horizontal straight lines so easily taken for granted in the theocratic system. The relation between the various castes and subcastes, as they existed in actuality, could not really be represented by a simple diagram of four straight lines, any more than the relations between the various dialects of Prakrit could be represented by a

neat genealogical table. Even a complicated system of intersecting curves would fail to do justice to the reality. But the simple artificial diagram, which was so indelibly impressed on the national imagination by the Hindu writers that an Indian peasant to-day questions it no more than he does the sun and the stars, served a great educational purpose. During the long centuries when a strong central government was either non-existent or was frequently changing hands, it was the theocratic ideal of caste system that saved society from disruption. What the Indian governing class failed to do, the sacerdotal class did after its own fashion. The Kshatriyas failed to build an enduring State which would prove a solvent for class jealousies and antagonisms, and ward off foreign invaders. The Brahmans built instead the caste system which for a long time mitigated class antagonisms and harmonised communities occupying varying levels of culture into one social unit, and which acted as a cohesive force in spite of the foreign invader. The caste system did not, of course, make for progress, but it maintained order. If the Hindus have not gone the way of the Greeks and Romans they have to thank the caste system. But whether life is worth living at any cost—at the cost of honour, independence, progress and freedom—is another matter.

Dr. Ananda Coomaraswamy says somewhere that a perfection that has been is not the perfection for us. Wisdom lies in striving after a new kind of perfection in a new set of circumstances. The caste system has had its day. It is in ruins now. But those who condemn it as an illustration of priestcraft are as blind as those who still believe that it is a special creation of God. It is no more priestcraft than, say, the medieval Christian edifice of salvation. The builders of both were perfectly honest and sincere, and imagined they were building for all time.

Madras D. S. SARMA

II

Mr. Johnston's observations have some support in the *Mahabharata*. In the 188th chapter of the "Santi-Parva" it is said that "originally Brahma created Brahmins . . . . . The colour of Brahmins is white, of Kshatriyas ruddy, of Vaisyas yellow, and of Sudras black." The *Mahabharata* proceeds to observe that there occurred sometime in the past a fall from the exalted ideal of all belonging to one and the same caste.

There is no doubt that the caste differences which are now noticed in contemporary society are concomitant with a state of affairs brought about by the fall from the exalted ideal.

Modern India has produced many reformers who have endeavoured their utmost to eradicate caste evils and prejudices. Their endeavours, however well-meaning and idealistic, have resulted in the substitution of class-differences and class-conflicts, which are more reprehensible than castes. The old Aladdin's lamp of castes need not be exchanged for the new one of class-distinctions offered by modern magicians.

As the observations of Mr. Johnston occur in his introduction to a translation of the *Gita*, it would be very legitimate to investigate if his remarks find support in the *Gita* itself. Not only in Chapter IV, stanza 13 but, in the concluding chapter as well, (stanzas 41 to 44) the inevitability of caste distinctions is emphasized.

I do not see anything in Mr. Johnston's remarks which would be seriously challenged by orthodox upholders of the doctrines of the *Gita*. Heterodoxy raises its head in all attempts to interpret ancient Indian texts in the light of modern scientific investigations. Some of Mr. Johnston's statements are fanciful. The struggle between the Pandavas and the Kauravas is not responsible for the continued dominance of sacerdotal Brahmins. Even before the war, Brahmin dominance had

reached perfection inasmuch as Brahmins were accorded special treatment and privileges.

Of course, the *Gita* makes it perfectly plain that from a philosophical standpoint like the one which a *Sthitaprajnya* is expected to climb up to, caste conflicts and class differences cease to have any value. One who can maintain mental equipoise or equilibrium when confronted with the play and interplay of the values of existence which owe their origin to the permutations and combinations of the effects of the three Gunas so ably championed by the Sankhyas, and incorporated into their own teachings by the Vedantins, will not have anything to do with caste-differences and class-conflicts. Class-pride, caste-pride, civilisation-pride and other prides have been purged out of his mind. It is this aspect of the problem which European critics of the Indian caste system fail to understand consciously or otherwise. In a press interview at Bombay, Bernard Shaw is reported to have observed that there was enough of English untouchability, and that he had no time to think of Indian untouchability.

The existence of deep-rooted class-prejudices and class-conflicts is a common spectacle even in the most democratic of modern countries, and if these are not merely tolerated but even passionately vindicated, there is no reason why Indian caste distinctions may not be similarly tolerated and vindicated. On the contrary, tendencies directed to undermining caste distinctions as they obtain in India are clearly visible.

For purposes of a sociological division of labour, caste distinctions are doubtless necessary and inevitable so long as human nature continues to be what it is, but, according to the *Gita* and ideals of Vedanta proclaimed by other texts, there is hardly any place for caste-arrogance or caste-pride.

Under modern conditions of existence in India, membership of a particular caste involves or may involve one in a sort of disadvantage, but, if one only understands the real import of the call of the *Gita*, he would perform his duties attaching to his caste and office or station in life with philosophical disregard of consequences pleasant and unpleasant, and in a sky-lark spirit of fullness and cheerfulness. The issue has always been the divine origin of castes or their human origin. The former is the orthodox, and the latter the heterodox view. Mr. Johnston's analysis has some textual sanction as I have already indicated, and the element of heterodoxy appears only in his anthropological approach to the problem of Indian castes. To students of religion and philosophy, however, it is the philosophical approach that matters. I may add in conclusion that the attitude, which while applauding class distinctions condemns only Indian castes, strongly savours of — ?

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Kumbhakonam

THINKING—A FACULTY

"All the world," wrote Emerson, "is at hazard when God lets loose a thinker." This leads us to suppose that there are not many thinkers in the world! The greatest asset to a nation or a race is its finely organized, balanced minds capable of real thought.

King of the land, the water, and the air, man has yet to conquer the domain of his own mind. Voice circles the planet, pictures in the ether already presage undreamed of possibilities, inventions of all kinds draw man ever closer and closer to the door of the invisible, yet he has not yet become acquainted with himself.

People believe that because they are human beings, they know how to think. "Such nonsense," a person declares, "of course I know how to think! Did I not go to school, and have I not a university degree!" The mind to grow must receive continuous education. And the man who leads the fullest life is the man who continues to learn. Plotinus said:

Knowledge has three degrees, opinions, science, and illumination. The last is absolute knowledge founded upon the identity of the knowing mind with the known subject.

Modern education is to blame for our mental laziness, for it requires comparatively little exercise of the elements of original thought. We are taught this and that is so, but never *why* it is so. In the end, we acquire a fair knowledge of things as they seem to be, not as they are. We grasp the effects of things, but rarely the causes. Consequently we are without knowledge of how to improve conditions or ourselves.

The ancients considered the most important thing in life was that man be *trained* to think, and all preliminary education in the Mystery Schools was concerned with this problem of building the thinking faculty.

The question was never how long does it take to train a mind to think, but how well is it accomplished! They considered that even to build one faculty was the labour of a lifetime. It has been said that man's brain is his youngest vehicle. He has had a physical body much longer than he has had a mind, and his thinking faculty takes time to build. Thinking is a process in mind. Every individual is now using the power of thought, but in what way? We think, it is true, but how do we think—beautifully and constructively, or do we merely suppose that we think?

In the school of Pythagoras the student was compelled to devote a certain time exclusively to the reception of knowledge. He had to remain silent for a period of five years, as well. Pythagoras considered that this silence fostered the art of self-control, a very necessary thing in the training of the mind. Indeed, so beautiful a jewel in man's list of faculties was self-control, that many of the ancients spoke of it as an art. In this school was taught mathematics, from which was gained exactness. Music was taught the student as well, from which was gained rhythm, and astronomy from which was gained realization of cosmic immensities.

All the great teachers have taught that the mind was man's real world, and that his thoughts were the tools with which he carved his life story. In choosing his thoughts man chooses *results*.

Students of the ancient schools were taught to ask themselves: "Does my thinking travel in circles, or do I arrive somewhere? Is it tolerant thinking, plastic enough to admit of new thoughts and new ideas, or is it incapable of expansion? Do I think with proportion and above all with consistency? To-day we do well to ask ourselves these questions, and if we cannot answer them rightly, we must tear apart our thinking apparatus and build a new one.

Progress in thinking constructively is measured by capacity. People suffer from a kind of mental indigestion. That is because they start out trying to assimilate thoughts too big for their present mental equipment. We build capacity slowly, increase it gradually. People often do not realize that the mind is an instrument capable of fatigue, and for every period of intense effort, the mind must be given a similar period of rest and relaxation. Also it is to be remembered that it is not involvedness of thought that develops the mind, but the simplicity of thought.

Concentration is an aid to mind training, and has to do with the training and unfolding of the brain. We have no time to-day for concentration, for we can never do only one thing at a time! In our civilization we must do several things and all at once. We pick up a book and turn on the radio. We believe we know how to concentrate; we believe, too, that we are mentally alert the whole time we are awake, but very often we are not thinking at all! Consider how a crisis causes our mind to rise to organized, executive ability. But when the crisis is over, think of the resultant mental exhaustion! Training, however, will enable the thinking faculty to engage in prolonged, orderly thought.

To learn to think intelligently requires more time and effort than any other profession in the world. And it is only acquired through the most exacting dis-

cipline. People say to-day that life is so short, its problems so numerous and complex that time does not permit of complicated studies regarding spiritual and mental things. This is inconsistent. He who does not start to learn about himself and the true purposes of life because he feels he will not have time to finish, will never start no matter how much time he may have! When we look upon the future as an ever-diminishing thing, we forget that nothing we ever learn and build into ourselves is lost. Courage and effort are all that are needed.

There is no excuse for ignorance, and he who is really ignorant of the purpose of life is truly ignorant, no matter what his book learning or intellectual attainments. To-day the floodgates of thought have opened, and a great river of knowledge is rolling over the world. There is no excuse for man not making an attempt to improve his thinking organism, no excuse for not strengthening the mind. We improve the quality of the body by refining the process of our living, why not our thinking apparatus by the refining of our thinking?

However, merely training the intellect alone will never produce a true thinker. Intellect argues; Spirit takes of the deep things of Nature and reveals. A thinker is one who has built into himself those spiritual and ethical qualities that develop the higher nature. Such a man is permeated with realization and understanding of the natural order of things. He is conscious, too, of what he is and his place in the plan.

Wisdom is not the property of a chosen few. It is universal. But it is never revealed to those who have not earned the right to comprehend it or built the faculties necessary to lay hold of it. Beauty and grace of thought, harmonious and peaceful living, result from the familiarity with the true elements of thought. It has been said that man never really learns anything from without. Socrates maintained that he never taught anyone anything. He merely taught his disciples to bring knowledge forth from themselves. True wisdom comes forth from within, when the mind has been trained to orderly thinking. The words of the wise are a lamp to the feet, and a light on the way. We must read the wise, however, but think for our ourselves. One thought of our own, worked out even with great labour and striving, is better for the student, more of value to the individual life than a thousand brilliant thoughts voiced by another. Within the mind are gifts, treasures, abilities. To make the mind yield these lovely things, we must cultivate it.

To the philosopher to live is to think. We need philosophers to-day. We can unform our thoughts, and reform them. We are entering a wonderful era. But before man can truly live he must become master of himself and ruler of his own mind. All that man knows, he owes to the thoughts of some departed race. And he is the Builder of To-morrow.

San Francisco ISABEL STRADLEY

THE WOODCRAFT FOLK

During the Great War, the Scout Movement, a very military organisation in its early days, became most closely identified with the military machine in Great Britain (and not there alone). Scouts were "mobilised" for many home services and Scout Training was regarded as a fine preliminary to overseas service; and the success, from a military point of view, of its activities was considered complete justification of the claims it had made before the war. Throughout the war no one whispered that the slaughter was in any way inconsistent with pre-war professions of international brotherhood, and the ideal of service to one's country in its hour of danger was preached through every means open to the movement. "Service," alas, meant "slaughter," and there came a time when men wearied of it and peace ensued. A miserable, neurotic peace—but that is by the way. Among the millions of demobilised soldiers and sailors who returned to the country

were thousands of ex-Scouts, whose conception of "patriotism" and "service" was less naïve than it once had been. These ex-service Scouts formed the basis of a "pacifist" protest within the official Scout Movement. They believed that the Scout Movement had belied its own ideals in identifying itself so closely with the war machine and demanded the revision of its official attitude towards military and imperial questions and, virtually, the expulsion of the "old gang" of generals, admirals, aristocrats and clergymen who too long had, from their executive armchairs, urged youth to the annihilation of itself.

The revolt came to nought, as so many revolts did in those days, its leaders were expelled from the movement, and the rank and file were pacified by the lip-service of the "old gang" to peace and internationalism. A great deal of the blatant militarism of the movement was thrown overboard. The Scout Movement was never seriously in danger, however, for its authoritarian structure enabled it to silence criticism.

As a result of the rebellion the Kibbo Kift Movement was formed, which took the irreconcilables from the Scout Movement. Kibbo Kift claimed to get down to fundamentals. It proclaimed itself pacifist and internationalist and wanted to direct its educational work to the building up of a new world order. Its educational work had a more primitive basis than that of the Scout Movement. It dissociated itself from churches, religion and "service" to one's country (where this meant enmity to another's), and it used the appeal of primitive things—taught its members to love the unspoilt earth, preached a new physical hardihood, indulged in primitive crafts and pursuits, used crude and effective symbols and a mystic ceremonial.

Kibbo Kift had no real basis, however, and fell foul of its own members. It could not make up its mind whether it had anything in common with radical doctrines or required the co-operation of socialists and other progressives. Cranks assaulted it and it swung from one protesting doctrine to another. How ephemeral its doctrine was may be judged from the fact that it has now abandoned all its early teachings and methods and has emerged into a timid Fascism with the Douglas Credit Theory as its new war-cry. Thus it has run the full circle, for the new Kibbo Kift protests its patriotism more vociferously than did the old Scout Movement.

It is only important to this article because it threw off, in its early days, an organisation known as The Woodcraft Folk (The Federation of Co-operative Woodcraft Fellowships). The Woodcraft Folk was never in doubt for a moment about militarism and imperialism. Against every type and manifestation of these it has set its face. More, it believed that one was either for the old order or for the new. There could be no neutrality. So it allied itself with radical organisations and co-operative societies and set itself the task of building a "Scout" Movement for the working classes. However there are differences in method. The Woodcraft Folk is co-educational. It is bravely idealist, it believes in colour, song and festival and the appeal of primitive things—camping, fires, totems, and the adventurous open air life. It tries to make its members mentally and physically whole, for only with whole minds and bodies can they be fit to serve their fellow men, and it strives to liberate the pent-up creative powers in the spiritually starved children of the great cities and to build through them a cultural life for the new world it hopes to usher in.

Intensely creative though it is, it does not ignore science and it strives to equip children and young people with a knowledge of evolution and world history that they may put their own lives in perspective.

As to all its methods and achievements a full account of them must be sought in the movement's many publications. Suffice to say that it has now emerged as the largest of the new movements for children and young people.

I conclude by quoting its affirmation ;

The Woodcraft Folk is a working-class movement. It is democratic in structure, free in educational method, and wide in appeal. It seeks to enlist the enthusiasm and energy of youth for the great task of our generation, the building out of our inequal and disorderly age a civilisation worthy of mankind.

It believes that any attempt to establish a new, world-wide economic order is dependent upon the training of youth in the science of our age and the deliberate cultivation of a world outlook in children and young people. To achieve this end the Folk seeks to forge a powerful educational instrument which shall inculcate those habits of mind and body necessary to bring man to devotion to world peace and a new world order.

The Folk welcomes all who are young under its banner. It asks that all who sign the charter and accept its laws shall give more than moral support; shall turn all their energy and determination to the service of the Folk, since its work is for all men and all time.

LESLIE ALLEN PAUL

[**Leslie Allen Paul** founded The Woodcraft Folk in 1925. He was successively butcher boy, hospital orderly, clerk, newspaper representative, Editor of *The Open Road*, lobby correspondent, free lance journalist, and lecturer in social subjects. He acted as the Chairman of Co-operative Delegation U. S. S. R., 1931. He is the author of *Pipes of Pan* (poems); *The Ashen Stave* (Songs); *The Folk Trail*; *The Child and the Race*; *Russia, 1931*; *Fugitive Morning* (novel).—EDS.]

MYSTICAL MATERIALISM

Mr. Middleton Murry in his review in your January issue refers (on p. 67) to an imaginative Marxism as a "mystical materialism".

May I be allowed to point out that this phrase which represents the root of much of the very loose thought now prevalent, is really a contradiction in terms?

Mysticism holds that a spiritual significance or reality is hidden in or underlies phenomena.

Materialism asserts that only the material is real.

In so far as Materialism becomes mystical it ceases to be materialism.

Moreover in so far as our idealists—Communist or other—take on a materialistic outlook they stultify themselves, since that view places a disproportionate emphasis on mundane things and makes their very ideals appear unreal.

Colchester FRANCIS ENGLEHEART

MODERN TALISMANS

I read not long ago in a newspaper of a new device for keeping influenza away. This takes the form of lockets, brooches or buttons, the making of which, it appears, keeps a certain pottery firm working night and day. These charms contain iodine. Dr. J. A. Goodfellow of Chesterfield explains that Iodine is capable of giving off a vapour which lodges in the throat and nose and thus strengthens the resistance of the breather to germs. The doctor has discovered by experiment a method by which Iodine can be controlled and made to give off any quantity of vapour. Hence the "charms" are simply Iodine distributors. It is claimed, incidentally, that Chesterfield has suffered less from the epidemic of influenza than any of the neighbouring towns.

No one doubts that Iodine has curative powers, but since I have read about Dr. Goodfellow, I have wondered whether ancient amulets and talismans, made by the wise men of old, had not still more potent powers, although their nature was unknown often to their users. Give one of Dr. Goodfellow's brooches to a person ignorant of the properties of Iodine, and the charm would still work.

The great magician, Apollonius of Tyana is said to have known the secret virtues latent in precious stones, and to have imparted them to his disciples. His talismans, according to Justin Martyr, "prevent, as we see, the fury of the waves, the violence of the winds, and the attacks of wild beasts". May there not be then in the traditions of the older peoples a real basis for some beliefs which are now considered superstitions.

London H. J.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"————————*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

Professor Max Planck, the doyen of international physicists, makes a clear statement about free will and determinacy in his recent book. Many people have been puzzled because Professor Planck holds to the belief in determinacy in Nature while declaring himself in favour of human free will. Our esoteric philosophy teaches the same dual doctrine, but more fully explaining the numerous puzzles of this "inconsistency". The Sanskrit term Karma covers the field both of determinacy and of free will. It is too vast a subject to be thoroughly examined in these columns, and we will revert to it a little later contenting ourselves by quoting four apposite aphorisms:—

Karma is an undeviating and unerring tendency in the Universe to restore equilibrium, and it operates incessantly.

There is no Karma unless there is a being to make it or feel its effects.

Karmic causes already set in motion must be allowed to sweep on until exhausted, but this permits no man to refuse to help his fellows and every sentient being.

Measures taken by an Ego to repress tendency, eliminate defects, and to counteract by setting up different causes, will alter the sway of Karmic tendency and shorten its influence in accordance with the strength or weakness of the efforts expended in carrying out the measures adopted.

On the eve of constitutional changes of a far-reaching character it is but meet and proper that our countrymen should direct their attention to the economic condition of the country. Political freedom should go hand in hand with economic progress and both are naturally interdependent. At the present day even the free nations of the world are in the grip of economic distress, and our country which is backward in industry and commerce cannot escape it but is bound to share the consequences of this world condition in the most acute and severe form.

Thus spoke Acharya P. C. Ray at Allahabad (*The Leader* 3rd March 1933). Judging by the standards of the machine age India is a backward country. Compensatingly it is less affected than Europe and the U.S.A. by the havoc wrought by the industrial revolution. In the latter territory the triumph of the machine has been the greatest. That "triumph" has a moral and a lesson for backward countries. Indian masses suffer, it is said, because the machine is non-existent; people of the U. S. A. suffer certainly, because there the machine is omnipresent. Mr. Howard Scott states :—

The technologist has succeeded to such an extent that he is to-day capable of building and operating engines of energy conversion that have nine million times the output capacity of the average single human being working an eight hour day.

Below we quote a few figures which give for the principal American industries the change in volume of output and in the employment of wage earners between 1923 and 1927:—

Industry	*Change in output.*	*Change in employment.*
Oil: Petroleum Refining	84% more	5% less
Tobacco	53% more	13% less
Meat: Slaughtering, Packing	20% more	19% less
Railroads, 1922–26 ...	30% more	1% less
Construction, Ohio Only	11% more	15% less
Automobiles, 1922–26 ...	69% more	48% more
Rubber Tyres	28% more	7% more
Bituminous Coal ...	4% more	15% less
Electricity, 1922–27 ...	70% more	52% more
Steel	8% more	9% less
Cotton Mills	3% more	13% less
Electrical Equipment ...	10% more	6% less
Agriculture, 1920–25 ...	10% more	5% less
Lumber	6% less	21% less
Men's Clothing ...	1% more	7% less
Paper	0%	7% less
Shoes	7% less	12% less

The U. S. A. problem is described by Archibald MacLeish in an article "Obsolete Men" reprinted in the *New English Weekly* (2nd February), from which also the above figures are taken:—

The sum and substance of the problem is this: from the purely productive point of view, a part of the human race is already obsolete and a further part is obsolescent. But from the consuming point of view, no human being is obsolete: on the contrary, an ever-increasing human consumption is not only desirable but necessary. These are the hard and pointed horns of the dilemma of our time.

Now what should India do? —Go ahead and build factories and instal machines?

The New English Weekly is edited not only with ability, but with religious fervour for his cause, by Mr. A. R. Orage who wrote in THE ARYAN PATH for February 1930 on "The Next Renaissance"; concluding that article, he said:—

What Greek and Roman culture did for the dark ages, I believe the *Mahabharata* may do for our own benighted age—more, in fact, because it springs from a higher source.

Another of our esteemed contributors, Mr. T. R. Venkatarama Sastri, delivering the Valedictory address of the Madras Presidency College Sanskrit Association (*The Hindu*, 2nd March) stressed the importance of the study of the *Mahabharata*.

There was no department of life which they could not find not treated in the great epic and there was vast scope for students to make a detailed study. Statecraft, war, law, sociology, international law, were some of the topics which could profitably be taken up and studied . . . To him a study of the Mahabharata was more interesting than a study of the other great epic, the Ramayana. The characters in the Mahabharata seemed to him to be more real than the characters given in the Ramayana. The treatment and description of characters were more life-like. The speaker considered that the most tragic character in the whole epic was that of Karna. In him they had a complete illustration of what might be called "Tejovadha." In the epic the clash between two cultures had been well brought out and the lessons they could draw from it were many. The speaker therefore appealed to the students of Sanskrit to get themselves imbued with a true university spirit and study the Mahabharata in a critical spirit.