AUM

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence.*

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. VI MARCH 1935 No. 3

THE MEANING OF REINCARNATION

In these pages several able men have written on the subject of Reincarnation, and in this number we have pleasure in publishing two further contributions. The first is from the pen of Mr. J. D. Beresford, who is already well known to our readers, the second is by Mr. Michael Kaye, M. A., Ph. D., author of *Human Welfare: The Social and Educational Essentials.* What to the average Oriental is a settled conviction, is a matter of scientific and philosophical discussion to the Westerner. We are not now examining the arguments for or against Reincarnation as presented by these writers. But there is a moral appeal which the doctrine makes. This was given voice to in a lecture delivered in Bombay in 1930, from a stenographic report of which we have been permitted to extract the following:—

The central simple idea underlying Reincarnation is that the Soul in man does not come for the first time into a human body of flesh and blood when it sees the light of day in this life. That Soul was before the birth of the body and it has lived on this earth in other human bodies learning its lessons and garnering its experiences, then at death taking a vacation, a rest, to come back again in a new body and continue its task in this mightiest of all schools. . . . .

Each Soul, as you must see, attracts to itself its natural conditions. There is no misfit; healthy or ill body, beautiful or ugly disposition, a noble or mean character, an easy or difficult environment—all, all are attracted by each one of us according to Karma, our past deeds and words and feelings and thoughts. But we attract all these not in a fatalistic way to be drowned and submerged by them. Why then? So that we may learn through them, grow in purity thus

making our environment pure; controlling all that we attract so that those very desire-elementals, the very devil in us, may be transformed into Spiritual energies, may be raised to the stage of Divinity.

Reincarnation means Justice, unerring justice, that is not human justice but Nature's Justice which acts impersonally and universally, and which therefore is also merciful and compassionate.

Reincarnation means Contentment, for what has come to us has come because of our own deeds of body or speech or mind; whatever condition is ours to-day that condition is exactly what we ourselves desired, a difficult concept but a true one.

Reincarnation means Progress. From savagery we have come to where we now are; the saints and sages of to-day were sinners yesterday; we will become saints and sages to-morrow.

Reincarnation means Effort, for you must have noticed how the Soul goes from one condition to another by self-endeavour. In daily life we see this; he who wants to earn must labour; he who wants to know must learn; he who wants to serve must sacrifice.

Reincarnation means Divinity, for in our innermost nature we are God-like, nay, we are verily Gods, and by effort and knowledge we want the "Father in Heaven" to incarnate fully and wholly in the Temple of the Body. Birth of the body is a miracle, the second birth of the twice-born, the Dwija, is a greater miracle still. By right action, by the true observance of the Law of Fate and Free-Will or Karma, we shall attain to that Second Birth.

A REASONABLE DOCTRINE BUT—!

The recent articles by L. A. G. Strong, Clifford Bax and K. R. Srinivasiengar published in THE ARYAN PATH* have left me as uncertain as ever about the theory of Reincarnation.

I must explain in the first instance that on this question I have never been able to obtain any help whatsoever from my own intuitions of truth; and since this fact has what I regard as a significant relevance in this connection, I will attempt a description of how such intuitions come to me.

The primary essential is that my conscious mind shall be fully occupied, and that the subject with which it is concerned shall have a definite relation to the matter on which I am seeking this inner guidance. I may, for instance, be reading the *Bhagavad-Gita* or *The Voice of the Silence*; I may be engaged in thought on some problem of philosophy, or I may be writing such an article as the one upon which I am now engaged. The important condition is that my conscious attention is oriented

* Vol. V, pp. 483, 421, 425.

in a particular direction and behind it lies the simple desire to know the truth.

To describe the subsequent mental process in detail would occupy far too much space, but the representative phenomenon is the change that sometimes takes place in my thought from induction to deduction. The preliminary conscious mental process is always in the former, more scientific direction. I am attempting to argue *a posteriori* from effect to cause. But when this "inner guidance" manifests itself, it seems as if some one conclusion, out of many perhaps, had been accepted as a premise from which deductions may safely follow.

Now this is in itself a perfectly normal thought process. The mind seeks for a working hypothesis, accepts the most probable, and then tests it by enquiry, *a priori*, from cause to effect. The difference, so far as I am concerned, lies in the manner of the change from one method to the other. When what I recognise as a reliable guiding suggestion comes to me, there is always a hiatus between the two thought processes. I do not deliberately select one of perhaps many possible solutions. It comes to me with an effect of discovery, and I do not recall any instance in which I have been misled. I recognise these intuitions as containing at least the germ of some fundamental truth, though I may err in my subsequent elaboration of it.

Yet, although I have thought long and earnestly on this subject of Reincarnation, I have never received the least hint of "guidance" in connection with it. If I may assume, therefore, that this guidance does, as I believe, spring from some inner fount of wisdom in the self, then I must conclude either that no element in the totality of my consciousness has any knowledge in this connection, or that such knowledge lies too deep to be reached by the kind of process I have described.

I have entered into this rather long explanation, because I wish it to be clearly understood that anything I may have to say on Reincarnation is no more than the expression of intelligent opinion, that I am only weighing the probabilities and have no personal convictions.

My first doubt with regard to this eminently reasonable and just principle of Reincarnation is as to whether the true ego must in the overwhelming majority of cases, return to this earth? Within historical time the population of the world has increased from at most a few millions to approximately two thousand millions; and if we take the latter figure it becomes evident that on the assumption of a period of 1,500 years between re-births, only one-fifth (to take a safe figure) of those who are alive today could have suffered an earlier incarnation in 500 A. D. Nor does the actual period between re-births affect this argument, since the net increase would remain unaccounted for whatever the period between re-births. Wherefore, if we postulate this earth as the

single scene of action, we must infer an enormous number of new souls in each generation, the number increasing in direct ratio to the interval period of reincarnation.

Is it then conceivable to suppose that this earth should not be the only scene of soul progress? In the vast depths of space, there may be countless number of planets upon which similar life-conditions may obtain. And if that be so, all our arithmetical difficulties would be solved by the inference that a right proportion of these planets was in process of depopulation.

If there are, however, theosophical objections to such an explanation as this, we must fall back on the belief that during the historical period a steadily increasing number of young souls has been incarnated, and is now reaching its maximum. So far as I can see this supposition is not incompatible with the principles indicated in Stanza IV of the second volume of *The Secret Doctrine*, nor with the general standard of spiritual development in the world at the present time. But it is not so easily reconcilable with my own belief that we are rapidly approaching an era of new revelation.

The fundamental difficulty here, a difficulty that has other aspects, lies in the concept of individuation. Any theory of reincarnation necessarily posits the development of a differentiated individual progressing towards the stage of perfection at which he will again become merged into the universal spirit. And in the movement through the limitations of space-time, all such individuals must be reckoned as separate integers. This is the inevitable result of our restricted, three-dimensional habit of thought. We think in terms of differences, and those terms are necessary to all our material conceptions. For example, C. E. M. Joad is quoted by K. R. Srinivasiengar, in the article already referred to, as dwelling upon "the sharp distinction between mind and brain, that is, between mind and body, upon which as vitalists we must insist". We have to choose, in fact, between a theory of universal unity or universal duality, and if we adopt the latter we must accept matter as an everlasting element in the universe, a primitive substance that is, in some sort, the antithesis of spirit.

To me that conception has become impossible, but since no intellectual argument can be carried on without postulating that such apparently antithetic concepts as mind and body, organic and inorganic life (or consciousness) and inert matter are different in kind and that a sharp distinction between them must be insisted upon, I accept those terms with the provision that I personally believe all phenomena to be modes of the spirit, and that the distinction between them is not ultimately valid.

Returning now to this question of Reincarnation, I do not find any support for the principle in such reports of supernormal knowledge as that quoted by L. A. G. Strong in his contribution to the August

number of THE ARYAN PATH. I do not dispute the facts. W.B. Yeats's story of the Indian girl who had verifiable knowledge of people and conditions outside her physical experience, does not stand alone. I have heard others of the same kind, and have no reasons to doubt that they are true in their main essentials. But I do not feel inclined to attribute them to soul-memory, that is to say, to memories retained by the true ego of its last or some earlier incarnation.

The objection to this theory, in my opinion, is that it assumes a function of the ego which is not consistent with our general conception of the part it plays in human development. We recognise it as the urgent formative element in character, but below the level of the initiate, the immortal principle is never articulate in the sense that the subconsciousness may be on certain occasions. The true ego represents the non-spatial, non-temporal element in the human being and, until the other elements are integrated by the long discipline of Yoga, cannot speak directly to the conscious mind. Even the great mystics who have travelled so far upon the Way, have not been able to draw upon the inferentially vast experience of earlier lives through the medium of any conscious memory of detail.

A far easier explanation of this apparently supernormal knowledge may be found in the wanderings of the Astral Body. Quoting from W. Q. Judge's *The Ocean of Theosophy*, K. R. Srinivasiengar inclines to impose very definite limits upon its capabilities, and says that it is "devoid of mind and conscience and spirit, . . . has no independent knowledge of its own real state or surroundings to impart". He is here speaking, however, of the capacities of the astral body (the "shell") after the death of the physical body to which it has belonged; and it seems probable that before death, while the liaison of astral and physical is still unbroken, this astral body may have other capabilities.

In deep sleep, for instance, it may become the vehicle of consciousness and obtain "independent knowledge" of conditions beyond the immediate reach of the sleeper's physical senses. William Gerhardi, the novelist, has recently given a detailed account of a personal experience of this kind in his book *Resurrection*,* and from the assurances he has given me in writing as well as from the internal evidence afforded by his description, I accept that account as being true in all essentials. It is but one of many such, and I have had one similar experience myself, though it was a much slighter one. Moreover, I have found nothing in Madame Blavatsky's works that denies the possibility of this phenomenon.

Is it not then credible, at least, that such information as was obtained by the Indian girl in the story referred to, and in parallel cases, may have been obtained in the course of deep sleep or trance?

* *Resurrection.* By WILLIAM GERHARDI. (Cassell and Co., Ltd., London.)

The memory of the experience is not always forgotten on awaking, and even when it is not thus instantly realised remains in the subconsciousness and may be presented, probably in an altered form, when the psychological conditions are favourable. I am inclined to attribute to this agency, also, those dreams of the future which Mr. J. W. Dunne has so carefully and patiently investigated. In its wanderings, the astral body is not subject to the time limitations of three-dimensional space; and there is no reason, *a priori*, why brief, uncertain visions of past, present or future should not be recorded in the form of these fugitive dreams at the moment when the astral resumes its intimate relations with the physical body, and the vehicle of consciousness is re-transferred from the one to the other.

(I apologise for such terms as "vehicle" and "re-transferred" in this connection, but any other spatial metaphor would be equally misleading. We have not yet sufficient knowledge of the modes of consciousness to permit any description in ordinary language of its relation to matter. Moreover, the idealistic monism I have already professed, necessitates the assumption that consciousness or life is the single basis of that illusion of solid substance which hallucinates our physical senses in this state of being.)

Finally, after a careful reconsideration of what I have just written, I realise that nothing I have said offers any valid objection against the principle of Reincarnation as such. I have rejected any argument based upon definite "soul-memories" of a previous incarnation lived only a few years, or for the matter of that, a few centuries, earlier. Such memories may, as I have suggested, be ascribable to another source. Moreover I do not think it likely that any argument based on such physical phenomena can have much weight in this connection. But having used and abandoned that test, I can find nothing in my own philosophy that is not consonant with the belief that the immortal principle should re-enter at various intervals the limitations of a space-time world. Such a belief satisfies the reason, the sense of justice, all those higher faculties of mankind which are inspired by this immortal principle with which we are here concerned. The belief is essential to any comprehension of the Law of Karma. And if I have as yet failed to reach that "inner certainty" of which I have spoken, it may well be because I am still so young in knowledge.

J. D. BERESFORD

A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

The observation is familiar, though to reason none the less astonishing, that in their racial and political life particularly, and in the face of poverty, failure, disease, and death, men and women can with passion embrace the absurd. Their cry is for a faith by which to persist, a hope by which to be glad, and but rarely do they show prejudice in favour of rational evidence and consistency. Therefore the long history, and the wide extent, of the doctrine of reincarnation, cannot be regarded as sufficient in themselves to establish its truth and permanent value. We have to consider its acceptability in the light of philosophical analysis.

I

Yet bias and postulate are inevitable. Descartes, it is agreed, would have done better had he accepted clear and distinct ideas as sufficient authority in themselves, and not attempted their justification by appealing to Veracious God, who could Himself be known only through a clear and distinct idea. We have to accept as in some way referent to reality the whole of the objects presented to us—objects perceivable, imaginable and thinkable—and we cannot do more than to acknowledge as the most certain revelation of reality the harmonisation of these varied presentations to the satisfaction of thought. If we despise our customary convictions even to the point of refusing them consideration, and if in our doubting we are so heroic as to become sceptical of the reality-references of our reason, we shall find reality disappearing and our search for certainty paralysed. We cannot play the game of rigorous Theory of Knowledge except as we are content to analyse our convictions, and to discover the possibility and the limits of their intellectual reconciliation. It is impossible that we should completely reject and transcend our convictions, however much we may affect modesty by calling them postulates and " categories ".

But do I not immediately "enjoy" my own experiencing? Do I not feel inexpugnably that the reality of my activity of experiencing is *sui generis,* definitely distinguishable from the reality of the objects which I experience? My experiencing is indeed not "extended," not "material": it is not to be clutched at; it is to be felt as it is only by myself who am experiencing. This primary certainty with respect to the subjective seems to remain inviolate, notwithstanding any prevailing fashion of concentration on the objective. Our conviction as to the reality of our experiencing does not seem in danger of being shattered by any important proposition or discovery with respect to the physical. Nor is it at all a serious objection here that some people protest a complete lack of such conviction. For the blind are not a refutation of

what others see. The final correction of our convictions can come only from other convictions which are positive, not from such statements as are simply negative. But it is not obvious how there can be anything in our perception or thought of matter which can negative the distinctiveness of our reality as experiencing. Whatever its origin and destiny, whatever in its particular quality its apparent dependence on matter, however much it can be manifest only at a particular stage of organic evolution, our experiencing is indubitable to us as a reality at the moment we do actually experience.

II

But if our experiencing is real once, there are considerations which may seem to suggest its enduring reality.

For there is nothing to convince us that our experiencing, though diversified, is produced by the assembly of bits. It seems to be a unity and a continuity from the start. In any case, since it is not like its perceptual objects extended, how can it be fractured? Nor does this argument completely fail to attract because it is of the old rationalistic kind such as Kant sought to demolish.

But if our experiencing cannot be pulverised and dispersed because it is essentially non-spatial, it may nevertheless cease in so far as it is temporal. Yet we seem to enjoy our experiencing as real not merely momentarily, but continuously. Why, then, in face of its visible continuance, should we infer the probability and even the certainty of its end?

For notwithstanding the common prejudice to the contrary, the actual cessation of experiencing is definitely not apparent. We observe the decomposition of bodies, but not the extinction of the experiencing which we believe to have been associated with them. To observe experiencing actually terminate is one thing; to be interrupted in one's further observation of experiencing which actually continues, is another. But it is not the first which is true of ourselves. And for all we know, experiencing may continue though no longer manifest to us. Clearly it is not the duration of our own experiencing that we certainly experience; it is the conclusion of another's experiencing which we infer because we suppose its dependence on a visibly behaving body, which in fact visibly perishes. Since, then, our own body likewise visibly deteriorates, and seems to be destined like others for certain to crumble into dust, we infer that there must be similarly correlated the cessation of our own experiencing. But this dependence of another's experiencing on that other's behaving body is merely a familiar supposition—which we find convenient to make for some purposes, and to neglect and even to oppose for others; it is by no means a final conviction. It may well be that another's experiencing does in fact continue even though, because it has ceased to be associated with a visibly continuous body, it should no

longer be apparent to us while we are ourselves embodied.

Nor does it follow that because experiencing has been associated with a body for some time, it has to depend for its immortality on being embodied for all time. The body which in some ways may appear to give it scope—as, for example, by seeming to be the condition of its meeting with sensible beauty—may in other ways confine it—as, for example, by distracting it from the clear contemplation of universals and thinkables. It is conceivable that experiencing should continue very well without a body, and that it should even continue better.

Nevertheless, in so far as disembodied experiencing has never for a certainty been observed by us, it is a fair conclusion that if it is indeed the case that experiencing persists notwithstanding the degradation of its associated body, then it seems very probable that, in some way which we can neither observe nor think, it achieves intimacy with another body. But this body, we may suppose, experiencing either finds or fashions, so that we may regard organic evolution as either the independent and antecedent condition of its successive reincarnations, or the effect of its definite and persistent striving for such reincarnations.

But if experiencing does not cease, it may seem rationally an economic and convenient hypothesis that it never commenced. Experiencing, whatsoever its relations with the material, is reality necessary and inexpugnable. If, then, there seems presumption that after the loss of its present body, experiencing will cohere with another, there is similar presumption that it possessed a body prior to its present one. Thus its apparent birth involved its death, as its apparent death will involve its birth. But further, if we may suppose that experiencing can suffer at least two bodily deaths, we have no reason to doubt that it can suffer an indefinite number. Hence future existence seems to involve pre-existence, reincarnation reincarnations, and a succession of reincarnations in the future an indefinite succession in the past.

Yet in so far as in our present bodily life we seem oblivious of our past ones, we have no reason for believing that in our future we shall be mindful of our present. Retention and causation do not imply recollection, and there may be continuity of experiencing without continuity of remembering.

III

This, then, is a theory of reincarnation which seems philosophically possible. Though it has not been empirically or apodictically established, it does not seem such as for certain can be overthrown. But suppose the doctrine to be true: what may be said of its ethical worth?

First, then, we may notice the objection that if in our future bodily lives we shall be unable to remember our present, then to us in the present these future lives can be of no practical significance. But surely this does not follow. For I want to live well at each moment

of my life. Even if each moment be completely isolated from all other moments, it is still true that at each moment I want to live vigorously and joyously. And so, imaginatively, I should be able to appreciate the importance of my trying in the present to make each of my future moments satisfactory, even though at each moment I shall be completely oblivious of all that are past.

Accordingly, my anticipation of successive reincarnations should be sufficient to provide an objective to my present life, and to afford it reason for acquiescence in that protracted discipline and preparation necessary for spiritual achievement and enjoyment. Without longevity or immortality or both, it may seem completely foolish that we should forbear from snatching at those primitive bodily pleasures which are actually within our grasp, for the sake of attaining to those higher spiritual satisfactions which in fact our life will prove too short even to approach. No doubt, very often, the race may seem as exhilarating as the victory, the research as deeply satisfying as the contemplation. But it is not always so. And we have to recognise that for many, if there is no certainty that grammar will be utilised in literature, logic in the synopsis which is beauty, protracted and difficult self-control in the personality-harmony which has become inevitable—the drudgery and the self-sacrifice will seem clearly not worth while, and, if persisted in at all, will be motivated by fear or custom or credulous prejudice, and not at all by rational conviction. Thus without the assurance of prolonged life in the future, though we may find all about us such a sufficiency of lower goods—the goods of appetite and lust, of hatred, but also of spontaneous, though limited affection—as to make us desist from suicide, yet there is the obvious danger that we shall infer the futility of long-distance objectives, of immediate self-sacrifice as a means to remote self-realization. We shall continue life, but without enthusiasm for its maximal nobility. If we dare to reflect on the matter at all, we shall be oppressed by our insight that such nobility is clearly not for us. Precisely in our wisdom, then, we may cease to pursue it; here also, as in relation to anything else that is for certain unattainable, the way of wisdom may seem clearly desire-surrender.

At the same time, as McTaggart has urged in his *Human Immortality and Pre-Existence*—to which this article is as a whole much indebted—there is nothing to suggest that we shall be transformed into spiritual perfection in our very next bodily life. Knowledge, love, harmony, blessedness—all these things which are excellent, are as difficult as they are rare; and if they are so now, we have no reason to infer that they will be otherwise in the future. We would do well to conclude that spiritual achievement must always be rather progressive than catastrophic. If we are to enjoy it, we must struggle for it. Become exhausted by the effort in one

body, we may take it up in another. So the disappointments and the weariness of old age may be forgotten, and may give place once more to the aspirations and the energies of infancy and youth. The essential thing is that in our active waking life we should so conduct ourselves as to ensure that after sleep we shall arise refreshed; we should not make ourselves sodden and bloated and stupefied; we should liberate ourselves from envy, and hate, and fear, and from all such provincialism as makes us forget Reality; and we should remember that our death itself is merely a sleep.

But what if our present life is mean and harassed? May it not be expected that we should now view inevitable immortality with horror, that we should be passionate above all to "escape the wheel of birth"? Yet even so there may spread a faith that even the most debased may rise progressively; the capacity for ultimate nobility may be in all even though for the moment it may be dormant and overlaid. But if beings who experience are indeed immortal, then it may indeed be rational to attempt their gradual transformation into spiritual poise and comprehensiveness.

Nor need the doctrine of reincarnation make for spiritual pride and harshness. On the contrary, we have just seen that it may reinforce those who are ambitious for social reform, and for the universalisation of love and blessedness. For if a man is evil and unhappy now, no doubt this is due to his past. But it is important above all to look to his future. Our concern must be not to blame him, but to help him; not to justify his condemnation, but to effect his regeneration. There is nothing to establish that our life, which is fluent and continuous, is not also incalculably transformable, and that what is too difficult for our present bodily life may not be possible in another. Nor does metaphysical determinism render impossible the empirically unfamiliar. Though it may be certain that the present is as it is because the past was as it was, this does not mean that from our empirical standpoint we can be certain as to the particulars of the future. And this is as well. It means that indeed while there is life there is hope; and that this is true not merely of our present bodily life, but of all our future ones.

Thus if the doctrine of reincarnation is to be welcomed ethically, the reason must be not so much that it may support a theodicy, not that it may be thought to justify a social system which is harsh to sinners and unfortunates; but that it may encourage spiritual ambition, may fortify compassion and charity, and may establish the faith that nobility of life, though difficult and rare, may be progressively and universally possible.

MICHAEL KAYE

CÆDMON

DREAMER AND MONK

[**M. Oldfield Howey** is the author of *The Horse in Magic and Myth, The Encircled Serpent, and The Cat in the Mysteries of Religion and Magic.* This article gives a glimpse of Christianity in seventh-century England.—EDS.]

Cædmon is referred to by the twelfth-century historian, Florence of Worcester, as the celebrated monk of St. Hild's Abbey who had received from Heaven the free gift of poetic inspiration. The description appears to be a just one, and the life story of the earliest Anglo-Saxon poet of whom we have any authentic record has a peculiar appeal to the student of occultism. Though most of its details are obscured by the mists of time, the more salient features are yet discernible and will repay perusal. Our only surviving authority for the personal particulars is the *Ecclesiastical History* of Bæda.

From Bæda we learn that Cædmon was born in Northumberland, *circa* 620, in the month of February, and during his youth was employed as a cowherd by the *villicus* or bailiff of the property owned by the Monastery of Streaneshalch at Whitby, one of the most famous monasteries of the middle ages. But though so early in contact with ecclesiastical influences, Cædmon was of mature years when he became converted to the Christian faith by the devoted Irish missionaries, who, from Iona and Lindisfarne, carried the gospel to Northern England. Cædmon was soon distinguished by his piety and humility, yet Bæda informs us that at this period of his life he was so ignorant he had not *even* learned any poetry. Possibly this was because the sacred songs of the ancient gods had lost their appeal to him, and he had not mastered those of the newer faith. Be this as it may, when after supper he sat in the common hall, and his comrades each took their turn in entertaining the company with song and harp, Cædmon could make no contribution to the evening festivities, but sat mute and silent, or would rise in embarrassment, and retire to his home. On one such occasion he withdrew to the stables, where it was his turn to spend the night in watch. Being weary, he flung himself down to rest, and immediately fell into a deep sleep, and dreamed that a stranger stood beside him, called him by name, and said "Cædmon sing to me". "I cannot sing," replied the unhappy youth. "It was because I cannot sing that I left the hall." Still the stranger persisted: "Nevertheless thou must sing for me, I am sure thou hast something to sing," he urged. "What must I sing?" asked Cædmon. "Sing of the beginning of created beings (*Principium creaturarum*)," replied his visitor. Thus prompted, Cædmon found verses he had never heard

before rise spontaneously to his lips, in praise and glorification of the Great God who created Heaven and Earth for the sake of the children of men. When at length the song came to an end, and Cædmon awoke, the mysterious stranger had vanished, but the poem recited in his dream in response to his visitor's command remained with him, and now new verses suggested themselves, and enabled him to continue the narrative of which the dream poem proved to be but the exordium. Bæda has recorded for us the general sense of the poem, but explains that his Latin rendering does not give the order of the words which were to the following effect:—

> Now ought we to praise the Founder of the Heavenly Kingdom, the power of the Creator and His wise design; the deeds of the Father of glory; how He, the Eternal God, was the Author of all things wonderful; who first created for the sons of men the heaven for a roof, and afterwards the earth—He the Almighty Guardian of mankind.

Next morning Cædmon related his wonderful experience to the bailiff, who was greatly impressed by the account and conducted him to Saint Hild, the Abbess of Streaneshalch. The lady summoned the monks to hear and judge of the poem that had been so mysteriously inspired, and when Cædmon had recited it, they unanimously pronounced their opinion to be that by the grace of God he had miraculously received the gift of song from Heaven; but to test the matter still further they expounded a Biblical passage to the unlettered herdsman in his native language, and asked him to versify it. Cædmon went home, but returned on the following day with his task duly accomplished. So excellent was his poem that Abbess Hild and her monks were in ecstasies. In response to their earnest entreaties the poet became a monk, and remained in the monastery until he died. He was never able to master the art of reading, but Hild directed her monks to teach him the history of the Old and New Testaments, and all that he learnt he reproduced in harmonious verse so beautiful "that his teachers were glad to become his hearers".

After he became a monk Cædmon lived a tranquil happy life. He is said to have died in the year 680, following an illness of fourteen days, which was so slight that no one but himself expected a fatal termination. On the night when he died he surprised his attendant by asking to be moved into the chamber reserved for those whose speedy passing was anticipated. His request was granted, and he whiled away the time with pleasant conversation and jest. But after midnight he desired to receive the Eucharist. His companions thought it strange that one so cheerful and light-hearted, who showed no signs of approaching death, should make such a request, but again his wish was granted. Next he asked whether those present were in peace and charity toward him and was assured by them that it was so. Replying to a question from his friends, he said, "My mind is in perfect peace towards all the ser-

vants of God." Then he asked how long it was till the hour when the brethren would be summoned to the nocturnal psalms. On being told that the time was nigh, he answered, "It is well; let us await that hour." He then made the sign of the cross, and laying his head down on the pillow sank into a peaceful sleep from which he never awoke on earth. He was buried in the monastery where he had spent so many years employing his leisure time in cultivating his poetical gift.

Certain of Cædmon's works were printed at Amsterdam in 1635 from a MS. presented by Archbishop Usher to the eminent philologist, Francis Dujon, better known as "Junius," who bequeathed it to the Bodleian Library. In 1832 an edition was edited by Thorpe with a literal English translation accompanying the text.

Students of the occult meanings of names may be interested to consider a few suggestions on the significance and derivation of "Cædmon". This has given rise to much discussion, and many widely differing solutions have been put forward. It bears a striking resemblance to certain Hebrew and Chaldee words, but Kadmôn in Hebrew carries a double meaning and may be interpreted as either "eastern" or "ancient". Sir Francis Palgrave therefore inferred (*Archaelogia*, xxiv) that the poet might have been an "Eastern visitor," who had arrived in Britain, but this seems to be a purely fanciful idea without sufficient evidence to support it. With more probability he conjectured that Cædmon might have been so entitled from the Chaldaic name for the Book of Genesis. *Be-Kadmin* (in the beginning) is the first word of the Chaldee Targum on Genesis. Not yet exhausted, he added a third surmise to the effect that the name may have been derived from "Adam Cadmon," the archetypal man of the Kabbalists, who "unites in himself all forms". Although we cannot trace the Kabbalist theorem with any certainty to an earlier period than the ninth century, yet it is possible the word may have been in use in the East at a much earlier time to express a theosophic or philosophic idea. Palgrave will not admit an Anglo-Saxon derivation for the first part of the name, but Sandras and Bouterwek explain *ced* as meaning a boat in Anglo-Saxon, and take the whole word to signify boatman or pirate. Still another authority thinks Cædmon to be an Anglicised form of a common British name *Catumanus* (*catu*—a battle) and says the poet was of Celtic, that is, of Aryan descent.

Among all these possibilities the reader must take his choice, only remembering that names have an esoteric as well as an exoteric interpretation, and that every letter has a numerical value associated by many nations of antiquity with the divination of fate.

M. OLDFIELD HOWEY

THE INFLUENCE OF BUDDHISM

[Below we print two articles on Buddhism as viewed by Westerners. One writes of Buddhist influence on the life of the individual; the other of the light which Buddhist doctrines throw on the present world-chaos. **Lady Hosie, M. A.**, looks at the Buddhist doctrines and ideas through church-made spectacles. Thus the grand concept of the supreme renouncers, the Bodhisattvas and Nirmanakayas, is not fully appreciated by her. A Buddhist might retort: "For one Christ who died and ascended into heaven, there are numerous Bodhisattvas who live on earth and suffer for the sake of mortals, carrying the yoke of embodied existence so that They may serve the race to which They belong." Again, it is a sweeping statement—and a wrong one—which Lady Hosie makes when she claims that Christianity is "the only religion which says that a man can be at one with God, while having a wife, a family," etc. She has only to look at Hindu and Buddhist texts to find out her mistake. She instances Gautama leaving his wife, but once again a Buddhist might point at Jesus's behaviour towards his mother. And Nirvana is not "a blowing-out" but a life in which there is "activity without motion". **A. M. Hocart, M. A.** has had experience of German University life, in addition to Oxford. Since then he has had a varied career which has taken him as far afield as Fiji and Western Polynesia for the purpose of ethnical research. For over ten years he was Archæological Commissioner of Ceylon and now he is Assistant Professor of Sociology in Cairo. He is the author of several books among which are *Kingship* and *Progress of Man.* By reason of his wide travel, his judgment of men and things escapes every tinge of insularity.—EDS.]

I.—WHY I AM NOT A BUDDHIST

IMPRESSIONS OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM

My "Aunt Kung," in Tientsin, now about seventy years of age, showed me one day her scroll depicting a manifestation of Buddha, her incense burner, her praying-mat; she told her rosary for me and repeated the words "Na-mi-to-fo" till she came to the pink bead when she could stop awhile. "Buddha is a saviour, too; your Jesus is not the only one," she told me.

Not long ago, a young Chinese student sat in our drawing-room here in Oxford beside me on the sofa, his big round spectacles making his round pale face a very moon of quiet completed calm.

"I think Buddhism a higher religion than Christianity," he said.

"Tell me in what respect," I asked.

"Your ideas of heaven are so material," he replied, to my great surprise. "We should count a place that depended on harps, thrones, jewels, golden floors, as our eighth heaven. Our ninth—the real 'heaven' is far less gross. We of the Zen School pass beyond that eighth even in meditation here."

This was unexpected; I had to think how to answer it and also how to learn by it.

"You are doing to me," I replied "just what I now realize I have done to you. You are reading our

Book of the Revelations literally, as many of our own people have done and thereby lost its high interpretation."

Nowadays few Christians think very much even about the golden floor and pearly gates. These seem the overflowing of the artistic soul, like the illuminations of our missals of mediæval times. When we sing of "lying prostrate before the Throne of God" or of " casting our crowns before His feet, " we know to-day that we speak in parable and poetry. Heaven to us is, as with the Chinese, a state of the soul and to be begun while here on earth. But I realized through his speech that I also erred in reading Buddhist Scriptures literally. My mind has often wearied with the pages of description in the sutras, of Buddha on the Lion-throne, with trappings of gold, the air full of the rain of scented flowers, and lengthy descriptions of jewels. Now I, too, must humble myself and perceive that these are but parables.

In comparing religions, we are apt to fall into the snare of comparing the ideal of our own with the practice of another. Practice should be compared with practice, ideal with ideal. It is hard to say which of these is the more important. Martin Luther said that Faith and Works are to each other as Fire and Flame. Where there is no Flame, assuredly the Fire is poor and small. Judged by our Works, we have all failed. Of late, people have much criticized Christians because they have taken up arms and fought throughout the centuries—during the Crusades to win back the tomb of their Saviour! But Buddhists must equally face that criticism, for they too are committed to peace by their faith. Everyone knows how combatant are the monks in Burma ; the Buddhists in Japan have fought bitter battles at various times ; and there are many fighting monks in Tibet to-day. We can none of us throw stones at each other for our non-pacificism.

Nobody, least of all a Christian—a Protestant and a woman—can be granted such a privilege as an immersion into the luminous faith and thought of Mahayana Buddhism, and not grow into a deep respect for this great Way of Religious Experience, and learn by it. I speak of my impressions rather than my knowledge, for I can only compare myself with a Buddhist woman who has read portions of the Christian Scriptures, conversed a little with Christian friends, and seen the centuries-old effect of their religion upon a nation.

Modern Chinese youth has little use for Buddhism. I read lately of a temple which has been transformed into a bus-garage.

When my father was in China preaching the gospel of Jesus in Chinese to beginners, he always started them on St. John. " In the beginning was the Word," they would read. And they knew what that meant. He was appealing to what was already present in their minds. The Way, the Truth, the Life,—these are terms which the East possesses already deep in its

experience. "I take refuge in the Law," says the Buddhist; and the Christian too says, "God is my refuge and defence."

Why, then, am I not a Buddhist? It may seem a curious kind of appreciation: yet the more I read Mahayana, the brighter the light that seems to shine in and on Jesus. Gautama was a prince, Jesus a carpenter; and it is Jesus who has taught us to see that it is greater to be a carpenter than a prince. This sets aside for ever the idea inherent in Buddhism that high position, wealth and health are the rewards of karma. It would seem as if the disciples of Jesus had this in mind when they asked, "Which did sin, this man or his parents that he was born blind?" And Jesus asked them if they thought that the men who had been crushed beneath a falling tower were sinners above all men; and denied such an idea of the Creator and Father. Similarly, they were perturbed when He said that it was hard for rich men to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. "But who then can be saved?" they asked, evidently thinking that riches are the sign-manual of accumulated virtue. Seeing that Jesus, our Perfect Example, was betrayed and was crucified, we can hardly think that this was the result of His sins in a former existence. To a Christian, it is impossible that a leper should be thought of as cursed of the gods, as is thought in the East. To a Westerner, especially of to-day, the Eastern idea of reincarnation seems to have no foundation whatever, either in human experience or in reason. We can only surmise that these ideas of reincarnation are a kind of mental preparation for the realities of evolution. These realities are so obvious in the physical world that we feel they are possible, and probable, in the spirit world.

Yet the idea of vicarious suffering is to be found in Mahayana also. The sravakas, like little monkeys, cross the stream of truth swimming quickly on the surface; the pratyeka buddhas swim more deeply in the stream like horses; but the great bodhisattvas, like my lord elephant, walk strongly across the bottom and bear others on their backs. They refuse their Nirvana till they have saved others. These bodhisattvas show great charity for the unfortunate; yet one has a feeling that they are primarily occupied in piling up merits for themselves. Now it is never suggested that Jesus went to the Cross to gain merit for Himself: but only for others.

The reader constantly finds likenesses and comparisons between our two religions. When we come to the great central themes, the same root stories appear, yet bearing such differing blossoms. Gautama went into the wilderness, his soul dismayed at the sight of poverty, disease and death—just as the hearts of the young are wrung to-day, and are rightly in revolt against oppressions. Jesus, too, went out into the desert to think: but He went, surrendered in baptism to the will of God, so He heard a different answer from Gautama. He came

back able to feed the multitude and He never required them to retire from this world of desire and emotion. He called women unto Him and spoke willingly and greatly to them; He did not shun them as leading to evil, or regret that they wished to follow Him as Gautama did and said. For Him, it was God who created man and woman, and therefore marriage was good, even though He was unmarried Himself. He called children and blessed them. For Him, all foods too were good. Indeed, His is the only religion which says that a man can be at one with God while having a wife, a family, and eating three meals a day—including flesh. Little is known of Gautama's life, and it may even be, as modern research says, that he did not institute monasticism; but he certainly left his wife and infant son. To him they were hindrances to perfect living.

Jesus uses the word "yoke," which is kin to the word "yoga". If yoked with Him, we shall be unable to withdraw into the Law and soar only upwards into Visions of transcendent bliss. His religion is wide as well as deep, includes mankind as well as heaven. After He had called men to be yoked with Him, He went into the cornfields, plucked the corn, and tried to enlarge the ideas of Law for the Pharisees; then healed a man with a withered hand, and sat in a boat to teach the multitudes. He gave His heart and life freely to all men, women and children about Him.

So, in the end, every word I read of Buddhism makes Jesus lovelier. The two parables of the prodigal son put it in a nutshell. In the Buddhist version, the father recognizes his erring son, but does not let him know this. He makes him a scavenger—the meaning being that he must scavenge off the trammels of this earthly life and all desire, as if these were bad and unworthy things. It is only when his son is fifty that the father recognises him openly and shares his riches and treasure with him. In Jesus's story, the father runs to meet the son, kisses him though he is in rags, gives him freely a robe and a feast and music, for these are things of a good father's providing and not to be treated as filth. This world to Jesus is a means of grace; He came to assuage and fulfil desire, not to eliminate it, to give us fountains of living water springing up joyously within our souls for ever. The Buddhist seeks invulnerability. Jesus says the Way is through the extreme of vulnerability; the Way is the Cross. The end is not Nirvana, a blowing-out, an Absorption: but Resurrection and fullest living in a Father's home, which is here as well as beyond.

DOROTHEA HOSIE.

II.—THE EXCELLENCE OF BUDDHA'S DOCTRINE IN LONDON I UNDERSTOOD

The glare and business of the day was over. I retired to the cool of my verandah and, picking up an ancient text, began to read :—

What, O monks, is the law of causal genesis? Out of ignorance as cause arise the activities ; out of the activities as cause arises consciousness ; out of consciousness as cause arise spiritual and material qualities; out of spiritual and material qualities as cause arise the six senses; out of the six senses as cause arises contact; out of contact as cause arises sensation ; out of sensation as cause arises desire ; out of desire as cause arises attachment to things; out of attachment to things as cause arises becoming; out of becoming as cause arises birth; out of birth as cause arises old age and death, pain, care, grief, sorrow, and despair. In such a manner does the origin of the whole mass of suffering come into being. This, monks, is called its genesis.*

I put down the book and thought and as I thought my gaze wandered across the lake to where the Northern Tope reared its colossal bulk of brick to the glory of the teacher who had spoken these words. Its spire seemed to point heavenward for hope, not despair. Its reflection in the still waters of the evening lake spoke of peace, not conflict. "Can this fair world be really evil as the teacher says?" I asked.

Past the garden gate in single files straggled pilgrims clad in white. Fathers and mothers carried in their arms babies for whom they had come to seek life at the shrines of him who condemned life as but a round of pain. From holy place to holy place they had trudged all day until they were footsore and weary; yet they endured so that their little ones might grow up, feeling and desiring, to have children of their own, and so perpetuate that round of existence which the sage had taught the way to end.

Were they misguided? Was this lovely world after all but a snare? Were the flaming flowers on the treetops, the flitting birds, the cloudless sky, the rich sunset, and the tinkling temple bells so many fetters binding man to an existence wholly evil?

Night fell and an immense calm pervaded the tropic scene. It felt good to live and to desire. I could not understand.

* * *

"Sir, here are your leave papers." Those foolscap sheets meant green fields, the song of birds, dim northern lights, and blurring mists, and a great desire arose to revisit the old places.

* * *

Home at last. A bustle across the noisy, grimy quay, then off to the great centre of life. I looked out for the green fields. Soon they came into view with their hedges and tall trees and straying cattle. But what are those huge boards punctuating the meadows at intervals and bidding me take Dr. Drug's cure? It is not that Dr. Drug is interested in me and wishes me well ; it is my money he

* Samyutta Nikaya XII, 3.

wants, and to get it he is prepared to blot the landscape with his ceaseless iterations. He is not the only one, for as we near town insistent signs multiply, all seeking to awake a desire for pleasure or a fear of evil. They drip, drip, like a corroding acid, on the joy of homing. But here is London, and to-night a play.

* * *

Piccadilly. A blaze of lights of all colours, flashing, turning, shimmering, and below, the crowd is surging to its pleasures. Here is light and life.

The first rapture over, the morning's pain is renewed. After all, those lights are not the expression of a joy in life. Every one of them has been placed there in chaotic confusion by a cold calculating purpose. Each one is designed to make the gaping crowd desire what they never dreamt of desiring before and what they had been perfectly happy not to desire. It is intended to destroy that happiness and take away from the soul its rest until it has satisfied the newborn desire. And why? In order that the inventors may obtain the object of their own desires, gold.

This is no time to philosophize. The play will soon begin.

* * *

It is good to wake up in an English bed and come down to an English breakfast. I pick up the paper. The first page is wholly filled with suggestions that this lovely country I am so pleased to revisit, " this precious stone set in the silver sea," is a place to fly from, that elsewhere sunshine and romance await me, and all things desirable. I turn over the page and am confronted by a drawing compelling in its hideousness. It is merely set there to decoy my mind into reading how some one's fuel will give me more speed, more miles than I ever had. Next to it an alluring female is posted to divert the eye from matters of state to a suggestion that nature has made women too plump and that they can make themselves look more youthful. Other pictures inspire dreams of more luxurious homes and explain how easily present happiness can be secured by mortgaging the future.

If the reader cannot be enticed he must be scared. Bogies are planted here and there to drive the panic-stricken quarry into the toils of desire; premature wrinkles, uric acid, indigestion, lassitude, night starvation, all the ills that flesh is heir to and many more, are dangled before the eye like spectres.

As I watch desires and fears crowding to this assault on human peace there comes before my mind's eye a scene often illustrated in Buddhist art. The Buddha is sitting on his diamond throne, impassive between terrific forms and alluring females. Both fears and longings assail him to divert him from his fixed purpose of saving the world from their tyranny. But he keeps his course.

But what about the harried millions who have no such army of knowledge against the gadfly of

desire? They are precipitated headlong into a mad chase after the unattainable; because desire is no longer evoked, as in the normal man, by a real need and set at rest by fulfilment: it has become a chronic affliction which even fulfilment cannot still.

Those who are stung cannot keep their madness to themselves. The whole world must be drawn into the vortex, for one man's desires can only be attained by stimulating the desires of others. Since desire has become a bottomless pit it can engulf the whole world, and it would swallow up the moon and the planets if it could. Men must eat more, drink more, and rush about more, not because it is good for them, but because it enriches those who have meat and drink and vehicles to sell. In one column of my paper a business man urges his countrymen to join in making John Chinaman want what they have to sell, not that he loves John Chinaman, but because he loves his own pocket. In another column a savant, discontented with the facts he has spent a lifetime in piling up, thinks he will be happy if he can only get more facts, and wants the world to share his discontent. Here is a politician who appeals for help in disturbing "the pathetic contentment" of Asiatic peasants, and ready to pillory as an inhuman wretch anyone who may wish them to remain contented. Contentment has become a crime, because it opens up no markets for goods or for doctrines. Woe to the man who does not want more fish, more beer, more art, more science, more education, more speed. Trade has no use for him; politics and science abhor him. The man after their own heart is the one who can make two desires grow where only one grew before. What though he throw to the wind the old-fashioned restraints, the time-honoured virtues? What though he stoop to cringing or insolence, to falsehood, even to corruption? He is hailed as a creative artist, because he has created desire.

Ignorance throws the door wide open to all these suggestions, ignorance of nature, ignorance of self. The quack finds it easy to furnish minds vacant of all knowledge with alarming theories. He readily persuades them that their ills are due to a bent spine, to the wear and tear the body suffers during sleep, or to lack of sunshine. Not understanding themselves men lay the blame for their discontent on externals, on the climate, the government, the lack of pleasures, and the lack of money wherewith to buy pleasures. Thus desires and fears born of ignorance lead them into ceaseless and exhausting activities. These stimulate the senses, which in turn demand more and more stimulation. Thus desire goes on growing till it can no longer be satisfied, and so turns to pain, care, grief, sorrow and despair.

Now I understand.

A. M. HOCART

THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE

THE INDIAN VIEW

[**S. V. Viswanatha, M.A.,** describes the relationship between the citizen and the state in Ancient India. That his description is not fancifully Utopian, but pictures an actual, existing state of things is shown by his citation of the old texts. For the builders of the India of to-day, who are not too glamoured by modern Western "progress," this article should be of especial interest—EDS.]

There has been considerable difference of opinion among sociologists in regard to the extent of interference that may be exercised by the modern state in the affairs of its citizens, ranging from the theory of *laissez faire* through the more humane state-socialism, fascism or middle-class Bolshevism, to anarchist Bolshevism. It is of interest, therefore, to note the principles of political and moral obligation which guided the relations of the state and its citizens in ancient India.

The principle of *laissez faire*, which long swayed Western nations in respect of the attitude of the state to its citizens, is not found applicable to any period of the history of Indian society (See, *e.g.*, *Sukraniti*, I, 587–618). It was held that the social and moral order of the state could best be secured not by individuals being let alone, but by their adhering to the *Dharma* or duties of the community or caste to which they belonged. In fact, the individual was nothing; the order to which he belonged determined his position and functions, his rights and responsibilities. The greatest happiness of the greatest number which is, according to Indian lawgivers (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 39), the end of the state, was achieved by the subjects not swerving from the rules of their order; and whoever upheld his duty, ever adhering to the customs of the *Aryas*, and following the rules of the castes and divisions of religious life, was bound to be happy both here and hereafter (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 8).

The interference by a state in the affairs of its citizens may be actuated by various motives. It may use its coercive and supervisory powers only to remove social, political and economic evils, or it may do more constructive work by promoting or fostering what many regard as leading to the general good and happiness of the Commonwealth. In India it was recognised as the duty of the state not only to prevent harm or injury to its citizens, but to enforce discipline and punish breaches thereof, which might lead to the disturbance of the social and moral order of the community. (Government is *Daṇḍanīti*). Generally speaking, the state in ancient India interfered in the social and industrial pursuits of the people in order to regulate and protect them. The initiative in all activities leading to the material prosperity of the com-

munity was taken by the subject-citizens and the state was there to protect them, for "that was the very cream of kingly duties". (*Mahābhārata*, Śānti, 58, 1).

This ideal is evident even in the *Rig Veda* (III, 43. 5) where the king is styled *gopatirjanasya*. The government played the part of the good parent and saw that its activities were so regulated that posterity would thrive better in body and in mind (*Manu*, VII. 80; *Yājnavalkya*, I. 334). This protective principle is in evidence in the great care which was bestowed on agriculture by sovereigns in ancient India (*Puṛananūṛu*, 18). It was looked upon as the duty of the government to provide facilities for irrigation as will be clear from the questions that Nārada put to Yudhishṭhira in the *Mahābhārata* (Sabhā, V. 81).

> Are large tanks and lakes constructed in the country in suitable places and filled with water so that the thirsty fields may not be entirely dependent on the water rained by the heavens?

Larger schemes of irrigation and public works too ambitious for individual enterprise were undertaken by the state, while the cultivators provided the minor ones which they could easily manage to institute themselves. It was also recognised as a governmental obligation to provide for orphans, the aged, the infirm, the poor, and the helpless (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 47). The state found employment for the unemployed who were willing to work but could not find employment. We read that even prisoners were set to work on crown lands or on the repair of roads (*Sukranīti*, I. 268). Orphans and helpless men were utilized as spies and were given maintenance, in return for the service they rendered to the state (*Arthaśāstrā*, p. 20). Large industrial enterprises corresponding to modern workhouses seem also to have been started by the sovereigns, to give work and afford relief to the able-bodied poor (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 115 f.). Poor-relief was thus a responsibility of the state (*Hitopadeśa* I. 14), but those who preferred to live on alms, though able-bodied, were deemed wicked and, therefore, deserving to be expelled from the state. On this ground strong and sturdy beggars were punished, if they would not earn their living by honest occupation (*Śukranīti*, IV. 1, 105 and 107).

Though the relation of the capitalist and the labourer in industry was ordinarily allowed to be fixed by contract—the agreement governing the wages to be paid (*Śukranīti*, II. 392)—the principle was accepted that the wages of the labourer should at least meet "the compulsory charges" and enable him to lead a respectable life. Low wages were deemed a curse—

> For people that are paid low wages are enemies by nature of law and order; they live a miserable life, play into the hands of others, to plunder others' riches and become a great plague to the community (*Śukraniti*, II. 400).

State interference for the regulation of liquor traffic was actuated by the same principle of paternal

care. It was held generally that over-indulgence in intoxicants is the cause of much suffering and crime. As Kautilya observes (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 328), the effects of drunkenness are loss of wealth, insanity, absence of consciousness, loss of knowledge, life, wealth and friends, desertion by the virtuous, suffering from pain etc. The Indian lawgivers, both religious and secular, like modern statesmen and legislators, apparently discerned that total prohibition might become futile through the impossibility of enforcing it. The dangers of drunkenness are not likely to leave a society unless the consensus of opinion is that drinking, moderate or excessive, is in itself an evil (See *Śukranīti*, I. 116). But the initiative in the direction will have to be taken by the people at large, and especially by those that visit the liquor-shops.

A healthy and happy population is a necessary adjunct of a good state. A commonwealth (*janapada*) should have, among other features, primarily a strong and healthy population of good character. That this was the ideal of ancient India is clear from the great concern which the Indian states seem to have felt for their population. It is in evidence in an institution corresponding to the "census" of modern times in the reign of one of the most remarkable of Indian kings. The third Board of Chandragupta's administrative department was responsible, according to Megasthenes, for the systematic registration of births and deaths, and another department of his administration was allotted to the treatment of foreigners.

> To these they assign lodgings, and keep watch over their modes of life by means of those persons whom they give to them for assistants. They escort them on the way when they leave the country, or in the event of their dying, forward their properties to their relatives. They take care of them when they are sick, and if they die bury them (*Megasthenes*, fr. 34).

Breaches of these regulations were severely dealt with, and officers were taken to task for return of false statements.

The protective interference by the state is in evidence also in the educational activities of the citizens. As regards elementary education, the initiative lay mostly with private enterprise. Education was for the edification of the citizens (*Kuṛal*, 370), and it was the first duty of the latter to undertake the responsibility of elementary and primary education. According to the educational ideas of the Vedic and post-Vedic periods, it was incumbent on the parents to send their children to a teacher variously styled as *Āchārya*, *Guru*, *Upādhyāya*, under whom they sought instruction and were initiated into the arts and sciences. In later times, every Indian village had its own *pāṭhśāla* maintained by the villagers for giving instruction in the three R's. But the state always intervened to give encouragement to scholars, to foster the fine arts (*e. g. Puṛananūṛu*, 69), and to help higher educational enterprise in a variety of ways, besides keeping a general censorial supervision to promote, literacy (*Artha-*

śāstra, p. 125; *Śukranīti*, IV. 3). The academic centres of ancient India, Takshaśila, Nālandā, Kāśī, Ujjain, Vikramaśila, Madura and Kāñchīpura appear to have been the result of private enterprise. The state acted in all cases as the protector, and extended the helping hand. The sovereigns patronised learning and culture with their presents to Pandits and learned men, and with royal endowments for the fostering of fine arts and cultural studies (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 125; *Śukranīti*, I. 367 f.).

The life of the state, and the life of the persons that make it, influence each other, and the sovereign state will be strong and effective only when the citizens are ready to subordinate their private interests and to fall in with the general will for the common good. The citizens that participate in the life of the state have interest of two kinds—their personal interests and those of the state of which they are members. Though sometimes the two may not agree in the political organisation, it is the highest duty of the citizen to do such honorary work or render such voluntary aid as should lead to the smooth and vigorous working of the body politic. In normal times the head of the state in ancient India had the right of taking certain revenues from his subjects for the expenditure of the realm in return for the protection he gave them (*Baudhāyana*, I. 10-1). It was generally understood that the relation of the state and the citizens was of a contractual nature (*Mahābhārata*, Sānti, 71.10). It was the duty of the citizens to help in keeping the public peace and to aid the state police in clearing the roads and highways of thieves and robbers (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 144), to pay taxes to the state for the political and economic security that was assured them, and to observe inviolate the laws and customs laid down in the holy *Śāstras* or proclaimed by the sovereign from time to time. The citizens were taught to keep to the primary rules of sanitation and hygiene.

Whoever throws dirt in the street shall be fined one-eighth of a *paṇa* and whoever causes water or mire to collect in it, one-fourth of a *paṇa*. The same offence committed on the royal road entails double the amount of fine (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 145).

In judicial proceedings, it was incumbent on the subjects to give voluntary aid to help the Judiciary.

That wretch of a person who knowing all did not give evidence was visited by the sin and the punishment of a false witness (*Yājñavalkya*, II.79).

Though persons not formally summoned to give evidence were not bound to appear at the law court, anyone who came to the court by accident but knew about the case, if questioned by the judge was bound to give out the truth (*Gautama*, XIII. 3. f.). Similarly, the penalty was very heavy for conscious dereliction of one's honorary duties.

When a person caused a criminal to be let off or supplied him with food, dress, information or plans of escape the penalty was mutilation or a fine of 900 *paṇas*. (*Arthasāstra* p. 226 f.)

Similarly, in a village where a house was on fire, any house-owner who did not hasten to help to extinguish the fire was fined twelve *paṇas*, and one who had taken a house only for rent (*avakrayi*) not proving to be of use in such a calamity, was to suffer the same penalty (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 145). In times of danger, people who neglected opportunities for rescuing themselves, being indolent and idle, were fined by the state (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 207), and thus made to realise the truth of the good and wholesome maxim "Self-help is the best help."

If, in grave emergencies such as famine, it was the duty of the king to provide his subjects with grain and provisions and with other assistance by a variety of measures (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 208), it was the duty of the citizen to volunteer help to his distressed fellows and to promote the commonweal. People who did public and philanthropic work were appreciated and awarded due honours. Those who, being actuated by motives of public welfare, offered their wealth to the government, were honoured with a special rank at court, a royal umbrella, a precious turban or ornaments in return for their voluntary aid (*Arthaśāstra* p. 244). *Gṛhasthas* (men in family life), who being incapable of braving the battle of life would shake off the shackles of family and belongings to assume the role of ascetics, were discredited by the state and considered to be fit subjects for severe penalties. We meet with the following wholesome rules (*Arthaśastra*, p. 47) : When without making provision for the maintenance of his wife and children, any person embraced asceticism, he was punished for the offence. When a capable man or woman neglected to maintain his or her child, mother, father, minor brothers, sisters and widowed girls, a fine of twelve *paṇas* was levied. Asceticism of women, because they were unable to bear the burden of their family duties though they were strong and capable of earning an honest livelihood, was condemned; and not only were such women fined but also those responsible for their decision to become ascetics (*Śukraniti*, IV. I. 105). Similar rules are found in many Indian works.

S. V. VISWANATHA

AVASTHATRAYA

THE STATES OF WAKING, DREAMING AND SLEEPING

[In the following article **M. A. Venkata Rao** of Mysore University examines the subject of the four states of consciousness from a philosophical point of view. We append an important Note entitled "The Four States and Tabernacles," which deals with them from a psychological angle of vision.—EDS.]

The study of sleep and dreams for purposes of metaphysical interpretation is a special feature of Indian philosophy. Distinct points of view emerge as early as the time of the Upanishads. I propose to indicate briefly the two rival systems of interpretation that hold the stage and to suggest their value.

The *Māndūkya Upanishad* sets forth the nature of Brahman as four-fold (सोऽयमात्मा चतुष्पात्). There are the three aspects of Brahman —Vaiswānara, Taijasa, Prājña, revealed respectively in the states of wakefulness, dream and sleep; and the fourth (Chaturth or Turīya) is Brahman Itself, in Its indivisible integrity. The mystic word AUM sums up the significance of this four-fold truth; its component letters, A, U, M, designate the three conditions and the word as a whole symbolises their underlying unity. Vaiswānara is the waking life of living beings and the theatre of their joys and sorrows. Taijasa is dreaming consciousness, directed inwards, ruminating over impressions left by past experience. Prājña is sleeping consciousness free from the activity of perception and the unrest of desire, both of waking life and of dreams. Consciousness here regathers itself into its pristine oneness—an amorphous mass shot through and through with bliss. But these states are not the final form, which is Brahman. The fourth is the real Brahman whose nature is described in a few pregnant phrases embodying the quintessence of the noblest mysticism in history. That consciousness is neither inward-looking nor outward-looking; it is not a mass of consciousness nor is it unconsciousness; it is imperceptible and indefinable. An integral homogeneous self-consciousness (ऐकात्म्य प्रत्ययसार) is its essence; it connotes the stilling of the multiple world, the peace that passeth all understanding and blessed joy (प्रपञ्चोपशमं).

Buddhism apart, the history of Indian philosophy displays two main streams of interpretation of this ancient and venerable teaching, represented by the Advaita School of Gaudapāda and Śankara on the one hand and the Visishtadvaita and Dvaita Schools of Rāmānuja and Madhva on the other. Prima facie, the Upanishad seems to be a nest of contradictions. If the fourth state is the real, what is the status of the external world and the whole course of human experience and history? The answer of Gaudapāda and Śankara is

decisive. They are unreal. The world of perception is classed with that of dreams and both are dismissed as false imagination. Advaita draws the conclusion that entities that can become objects are unreal, for they vary, and variation is the sign manual of lack of self-dependence and so of unreality. The subject is the sole real. This conclusion is suggested by the variation of wakefulness and dreaming in contrast with the changelessness of deep sleep. Mind is present in waking and dreaming and so is the appearance of multiplicity. The mind is absent in deep sleep and the vision of plurality is likewise absent. "Mind" in Indian thought is not the Self but the inner co-ordinating agency of the same rank as the senses (अन्तःकरण). Whatever is present when something else is present and absent when it is absent, is causally connected with it. Mind is the cause of the appearance of the pluriverse. This is the method of agreement and difference which J. S. Mill claimed to have formulated for the first time as the essence of the scientific method. It has been known for over a thousand years in Indian logic as *anvaya vyatireka.*

By a further application of the same method, the final conclusion is drawn that the Self is the sole reality. It is present in all the three states of waking, dreaming and sleep, while mind and multiplicity are absent in the last. The Self and the world-appearance are not inherently connected and the latter being *sublatable* cannot be real. Hence the ultimate consciousness is integral and one without a second (अद्वितीयम्). The world is *mithyā*, false—not false in the sense of impossible objects like the barren woman's son, rabbit's horns and the lotus growing in the sky; for it appears to consciousness and has a method in its madness, but it is not *true*, for it disappears *totally* on the attainment of *sākshātkāra* or direct vision of the ultimate reality. The basis is Brahman; when we know it, we see that the world we had imagined in it did not exist in the past, does not exist at the moment, and will not exist in the future.

Rāmānuja holds that the world is unreal if regarded as self-existent, but real as an expression of Brahman (ब्रह्मात्मकत्वे). The school of Madhva holds that corresponding to the three states of the *jiva* or individual soul the Deity reveals Itself in *three levels of apprehension.* In the waking state we apprehend the physical universe through which Brahman gives a real glimpse of Its nature. The cosmos is not a part of Its nature but a condition of Its manifestation. In the dream state, strange fantasies are created out of the stuff of the impressions and traces of past experience in accordance with the universal mechanism of which the Deity is the inspirer (प्रेरक). The affective side of dreams is regarded as having a moral incidence and as being a part of the teleological scheme. In the sleeping state, the mind is not destroyed; it only becomes implicit. Further, Madhva questions the Advaitic application

of the method of agreement and difference. The concomitance of mind and multiplicity does not prove that the mind is the creator of multiplicity. It only proves that it is a necessary condition of manifestation. It is a mechanism for the revelation of what is already there. The full value of the mystic experience of the turīya is sought to be preserved in a more inclusive way. It is suggested that Brahman's nature as *ēkatma-pratyayasāra*, unity of self-consciousness, is Its deeper aspect in which It is *akhanda*, impartible, but that It also includes and sustains a real universe of infinite multiplicity as a condition of Its manifestation (अभिव्यक्तिपात्र). The mystic experience is an experience of the circumambient consciousness which is over all. But the Deity limits Itself as a condition of creativity and of the reign of law (नियम). In a word, an experience of the *supremacy* (प्रधान) of the One in the many is the fourth state, which does not *annul* the individual being of the self but carries it into perfection of self-realisation (स्वरूपानन्दाविर्भाव) as in the union of perfect love. Then occurs *prapanchopasamam* indeed—not the destruction of the world but the quiescence of the fret and fever of the world; the world that is usually too much with us is not annihilated but seen in the light of eternity.

It may seem a strange proceeding to draw conclusions of such moment from the common experiences of dreams and sleep. It sounds wrong-headed to infer objective value of the external world through an inspection of inner experience. But the subjective aspect is inescapable, for we cannot think of the external world except through the mechanism of our minds. Indian philosophy makes use of the experience of dreams to point to this inescapable role of the Self in Reality. Dreams reveal the self-luminous creative activity of its character (स्वप्रकाशत्व). For Advaita, the self-luminous self is the sole reality. For Dvaita, it is the supreme reality illumining a subordinate universe steeped in it.*

Further, philosophy requires some kind of verification for its ultimate theories. If the mystic vision (it is also the essence of religion) is to be rendered in a system of symbols, it can only be achieved on the basis of typical experiences of a simpler variety. Absolute Idealists in the West, from Plato and Plotinus to F. H. Bradley, have thought of various symbols for suggesting the mystery of the One and the many. Indian philosophers have unanimously pointed to the experience of sleep for the purpose. Here is a condition of consciousness in which the One and the many are dissolved into a single undifferentiated mass, the same in all dimensions (*ēkarasa*).

Bradley neglects such an obvious example and tries in vain to rehabilitate some vague state of

1 cf. B. Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 312.

immediacy which he calls "feeling". He assumes an unanalysed whole of awareness at the back of all activity of knowing. He wants a unitary state in ordinary life so that the final inclusive unity of the Absolute Experience may be thinkable. Sleep would have served his purpose better. Sleep is the lower immediacy, the oneness before analysis.* Bradley is led to postulate a Higher Immediacy including and transmuting the whole wealth of reality in all its myriad dimensions.† But he wavers in affirming that it also is a matter of immediate experience for us. He plays with the idea of æsthetic emotion but slips back to the conclusion that for us finite individuals a foretaste of that higher integral experience is impossible. Indian philosophers of both the dominant types of Vedanta are agreed that the turīya is such a higher immediacy, *sākshātkāra* or *aparoksha jnāna,* and that it is attainable. This seems to be the philosophic importance of the interpretation of *avasthātraya* which occupies so central a place in Indian philosophy and spiritual culture.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

THE FOUR STATES AND TABERNACLES

A NOTE ON THE ABOVE

[The following is a remarkable and thought-provoking extract taken from *The Dream of Ravan* which originally appeared as a series of articles in *The Dublin University Magazine* of 1853-54. The name of the writer is not disclosed.—EDS.]

In the Tattva Bodha, and many other works, the idea is further expanded: man is there represented as a prismatic trinity, veiling and looked through by a primordial unity of light—gross outward body; subtle internal body or soul; a being neither body nor soul, but absolute self-forgetfulness, called the *cause-body*, because it is the original sin of ignorance of his true nature which precipitates him from the spirit into the life-condition. These three bodies, existing in the waking, dreaming, sleeping states are all known, witnessed

* ". . . In mere feeling, or immediate presentation, we have the experience of a whole. This whole contains diversity, and on the other hand, is not parted by relations . . . But it serves to suggest to us the general idea of a total experience, where will and thought and feeling may all once more be one." *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 159-160 (8th Impression, 1925).

† "It would be experience entire, containing all elements in harmony. Thought would be present as a higher intuition . . . Every flame of passion, chaste or carnal, would still burn in the Absolute unquenched and unabridged, a note absorbed in the harmony of its higher bliss" (*Ibid.*, p. 172).

and watched, by the spirit which standeth behind and apart from them, in the unwinking vigilance of ecstasy, or spirit-waking.

This prepares us for, and conducts us to, the complete and fully-developed view of man as a quaternity, in explaining which we must retread the same ground we have already gone over, but with more care and deliberation.

There are four spheres of existence, one enfolding the other—the inmost sphere of Turya, in which the individualised spirit lives the ecstatic life; the sphere of transition, or Lethe, in which the spirit, plunged in the ocean of Adnyana, or total unconsciousness, and utterly forgetting its real self, undergoes a change of gnostic tendency [polarity ?]; and from not knowing at all, or absolute unconsciousness, emerges on the hither side of that Lethean boundary to a false or reversed knowledge of things (viparita dnyana), under the influence of an illusive Pradnya, or belief in, and tendency to, knowledge outward from itself, in which delusion it thoroughly believes, and now endeavours to realise :—whereas the true knowledge which it had in the state of Turya, or the ecstatic life, was all within itself, in which it intuitively knew and experienced all things. And from the sphere of Pradnya, or out-knowing,—this struggle to reach and recover outside itself all that it once possessed within itself, and lost,—to regain for the lost intuition an objective perception through the senses and understanding,—in which the spirit became an intelligence,—it merges into the third sphere, which is the sphere of dreams, where it believes in a universe of light and shade, and where all existence is in the way of Abhasa, or phantasm. There it imagines itself into the Linga-deha (Psyche), or subtle, semi-material, ethereal soul, composed of a vibrating or knowing pentad, and a breathing or undulating pentad. The vibrating or knowing pentad consists of simple consciousness, radiating into four different forms of knowledge—the egoity or consciousness of self; the ever-changing, devising, wishing mind, imagination, or fancy; the thinking, reflecting, remembering faculty; and the apprehending and determining understanding or judgment. The breathing or undulating pentad contains the five vital auræ—namely, the breath of life, and the four nervous æthers that produce sensation, motion, and the other vital phenomena.

From this subtle personification and phantasmal sphere, in due time, it progresses into the fourth or outermost sphere, where matter and sense are triumphant; where the universe is believed a solid reality; where all things exist in the mode of Akara, or substantial form; and where that, which successively forgot itself from spirit into absolute unconsciousness, and awoke on this side of that boundary of oblivion into an intelligence struggling outward, and from this outward struggling intelligence imagined itself into a

conscious, feeling, breathing nervous soul, prepared for further clothing, now out-realises itself from soul into a body, with five senses or organs of perception, and five organs of action, to suit it for knowing and acting in the external world, which it once held within, but now has wrought out of itself. The first or spiritual state was ecstasy ; and from ecstasy it forgot itself into deep sleep ; from profound sleep it awoke out of unconsciousness, but still within itself, into the internal world of dreams ; from dreaming it passed finally into the thoroughly waking state, and the outer world of sense. Each state has an embodiment of ideas or language of its own. The universal, eternal ever-present intuitions that be eternally with the spirit in the first, are in the second utterly forgotten for a time and then emerge reversed, limited and translated into divided successive intellections, or gropings, rather, of a struggling and yet unorganised intelligence, having reference to place and time, and an external historical world, which it seeks, but cannot all at once realise outside itself. In the third they become pictured by a creative fantasy into phantasms of persons, things, and events, in a world of light and shade within us, which is visible even when the eyes are sealed in dreaming slumber, and is a prophecy and forecast shadow of the solid world which is coming. In the fourth the outforming or objectivity is complete. They are embodied by the senses into hard, external realities in a world without us. That ancient seer [Kavi Purana] which the Gita and the Mahabharata mention as abiding in the breast of each, is first a prophet and poet ; then he falls asleep, and awakes as a blindfold logician and historian, without materials for reasoning, or a world for events, but groping towards them ; next a painter, with an ear for inward phantasmal music too ; at last a sculptor carving out hard, palpable solidities. Hence the events destined to occur in this outer world can never be either foreshown or represented with complete exactitude in the sphere of dreams, but must be translated into its pictorial and fantastical language.

THOREAU AND ORIENTAL ASCETICISM

[**Arthur Christy** is an authority in a special field: he has studied the influence of Oriental thought on American writers. His previous articles on Whittier, Emerson and Sidney Lanier have evoked great interest.—EDS.]

I

To study the rise of Oriental cults in America on the basis of the careers and work of eminent swamis alone is to ignore the previously harrowed ground in which they sowed. There is no better evidence of this fact than even a brief examination of the Orientalism of Henry David Thoreau. American scholarship has been singularly myopic and homekeeping in the past, else how explain the fact that it has been only of late that serious attention was given to such sentences from Thoreau's pen as the following?

> Depend upon it that, rude and careless as I am, I would fain practise the yoga, faithfully .... To some extent and at rare intervals, even I am a yogi.
>
> The "Laws of Manu" are a manual of private devotion, so private and domestic and yet so public and universal a word as is not spoken in the parlour or pulpit in these days .... It goes with us into the yard and into the chamber, and is yet later spoken than the advice of our mother and sisters.

These sentences are only samples of scores like them to be found scattered throughout Thoreau's work. Considering the large number and diversity of his admirers, time need not be given to a defence of the thesis that Thoreau was a potent force in preparing America for the swami who began teaching in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

My purpose in this essay is to present the results of an examination of several hundred pages of unpublished, manuscript material which will indicate how absorbed Thoreau was in Manu's famous work and in Oriental asceticism. This manuscript material is composed largely of commonplace books which William Ellery Channing described in the study of his friend, *Thoreau the Poet-Naturalist*. "His reading," wrote Channing, "was done with a pen in hand: he made what he called 'Fact-books,'—citations which concern his studies." Most of these fact-books are in the Harvard College and the Morgan Libraries.

Perhaps the most significant sentence in a volume entitled *Paragraphs Mostly Original* is the following:—

> If the Roman, the Greek, and the Jew have a character in history—so has the Hindoo. He may help to balance Asia, which is all too one sided with its Palestine.

Here is perhaps the clearest statement of Thoreau's reasons for turning Eastward that can be found. But there were other pregnant passages in the volume, a few of which later found their way into published pages. There were such enthusiastic outbursts as:—

> I cannot read a sentence in the book of the Hindoos without being elevated as upon the table-land of the Ghauts. It has such a rhythm as the winds of

the desert, such a tide as the Ganges, and seems as superior to criticism as the Himmaleh Mounts.

Another unusual sentence was :–

> The Laws of Manu. . . are the laws of you and me, a fragrance wafted down from those old times, and no more to be refuted than the wind.

Some interesting facts may be noted about the twenty-five manuscript pages which contained Thoreau's extracts from Sir William Jones's translation of Manu. Every one of Manu's twelve chapters were quoted from with the exception of the tenth and twelfth, which dealt with the mixed classes and with penance and expiation. The second chapter seems to have received his closest attention, thirty-nine verses culled for the fact-book. It is also interesting to note that with the quotations from the seventh chapter Thoreau wrote :—"A Brahman could not be taxed,"—as though Manu had endorsed his own refusal to be taxed by a corrupt state. And following the long series of extracts from the second chapter appears the following, which I quote in entirety as a significant Thoreauvian commitment :—

> We seem to be dabbling in the very elements of a present conventional, or actual and visible life. Here is a *history* of the *forms* which humanity has in all ages assumed. We forget that our whole outward life is but a convention and it is salutary thus to be reminded of it. The old lawgiver seems to have foreseen all the possible relations of men, and provided that they be maintained with adequate dignity. This book could afford a maxim applicable to any condition in which a man may be found.

If we assume—and in Thoreau the assumption is justified—that the selection of a passage for preservation in a fact-book meant substantial agreement with Manu, the broad parallels that lay between Thoreauvian Transcendentalism and the Vedanta can be readily indicated. Consider first, then, the essential nature of the universe and its source. From the twelfth chapter Thoreau took three suggestive verses :—

> Let every Brahman [*sic*] with fixed attention consider all nature, both visible and invisible, as existing in the divine spirit; for, when he contemplates the boundless universe existing in the divine spirit, he cannot give his heart to iniquity (XII, 118).
>
> The divine spirit [alone] is the whole assemblage of gods; all worlds are seated in the divine spirit and the divine spirit, no doubt produces, *by a chain of causes and effects consistent with free will*, the connected series of acts performed by imbodied souls (XII, 119).
>
> Thus the man, who perceives in his own soul the supreme soul present in all creatures, acquires equanimity toward them all, and shall be absorbed at last in the highest essence, even that of the Almighty himself (XII, 123).

Thoreau was fundamentally not a metaphysician. Emerson, equally interested in the Vedantic conception of the universe, went on and gave considerable attention to the doctrine of Maya. Not so Thoreau. Very little appears in his writing that can be construed as metaphysical concern with the relations of the noumenon and the phenomenon. He was however interested in the doctrine of Karma and its moral implications. Witness the following extracts from the fourth chapter :—

Iniquity, committed in this world, produces not fruit immediately, *but*, like the earth, *in due season*; and, advancing by little and little, it eradicates the man, who committed it. (IV, 172).

Yes; iniquity, once committed, fails not of producing fruit to him who wrought it . . . (IV, 178).

The doctrine of Karma found adequate expression in Emerson's essay "Compensation". The Transcendentalists preferred it as a doctrine of moral requital to any they had inherited from the Calvinistic tradition.

Thoreau never formulated a complete eschatology. It is difficult, therefore, to state definitely whether he believed in Transmigration. If he did, it was in a very general way. His eschatology is perhaps best suggested by two passages which he culled from the fourth and sixth chapters of Manu:—

Single is each man born; single he dies; single he receives the reward of his good, and single the punishment of his evil deeds (IV, 240).

Let him not wish for death; let him not wish for life; let him expect his appointed time, as a hired servant expects his wages (VI, 45).

Death was for Thoreau a return to the Original Source, a dying down to the roots, as grass dies down in winter. His belief in the diverse mutations of the cycle of rebirth is uncertain. He probably accepted much of the basic Hindu idea, but it must have been tempered by his heritage and environment.

Consider now other extracted passages in the light of the *summum bonum* of life. How different from the usual Yankee concept of success is the following verse:—

Greatness is not conferred by years, not by gray hairs, not by wealth, not by powerful kindred: the divine sages have established this rule: "Whoever has read the *Vedas* and their *Angas*, he among us is great" (ii, 154).

Substitute for the Vedas the concept of nature as the open book of God, and the complete Thoreauvian idea appears.

Despite the profound implications of the foregoing extracts, there are others even more significant. As has already been suggested, Thoreau is not known to posterity for the system of philosophy he developed; he is primarily known for the way he lived; he will ever be the recluse of Walden. His interest in the ascetic life led him to extract numerous passages from Manu which dealt with its practice. These passages are also unique in that they state clearly the reasons for the mystic's way of life. The following are from the second chapter:—

The organs, being strongly attached to sensual delights, cannot so effectually be restrained by avoiding incentives to pleasure, as by constant pursuit of divine knowledge (II, 96).

A Brahman should constantly shun worldly honour, as he would shun poison; and rather constantly seek disrespect, as he would seek nectar (II, 162).

The more specific instructions of the fourth chapter as to space were also noted:—

Alone, in some solitary place, let him constantly meditate on the divine nature of the soul, for by such meditation he will attain happiness (IV, 258).

The rewards of the meditative life were described in chapter six.

Thoreau did not fail to notice them:—

> A Brahman, having shuffled of his body by any of those modes, which great sages practised, and becoming void of sorrow and fear, rises to exaltation in the divine essence (VI, 32).
>
> Thus, having gradually abandoned all earthly attachments, and indifferent to all pairs of opposite things, *as honour and dishonour, and the like,* he remains absorbed in the divine essence (VI. 81).

Thus Thoreau proceeded to balance Asia, too one sided in its Hebraism. The Philistinism against which he revolted had much in common with that denounced by Matthew Arnold. But whereas Arnold turned to Greece for a corrective, Thoreau turned to India. And in belief and practice he followed the injunctions of Manu with amazing fidelity. A closer study of Thoreau's life and writings will convince the most sceptical of this fact.

II

Thoreau's natural asceticism sprang neither from any self-punishing Puritanism, nor from a love of asceticism for its own sake. It was neither the result of conversion to a system of practice, nor the effect of any foreign influence of men or books; it was consistently spontaneous and unaffected. This is true despite the fact that the scriptures of the East formed the bulk of his reading in sacred literature. A close student of Thoreau's mind will come to one conclusion: he read the Orientals because he recognized his spiritual kinship with them. He read the Hindus in particular because in them he found the closest affinity. It is indeed amazing that a shrewd Yankee should have cherished so un-Yankee an objective as the Yoga. Yet Thoreau saw nothing strange in this. "The early and the latter saints are separated by no eternal interval," he wrote in the diary of 1841.

The evidences of Thoreau's interest in Oriental asceticism are to be found throughout his work, published and unpublished.

There is an undertone of Orient-tinged other-worldliness in Thoreau's contributions to the "Ethnical Scriptures" feature of the *Dial.* This is true even of the Confucian extracts. Note these samples: "Perfection (or sincerity) is the way of heaven, and to wish for perfection is the duty of man." "He who offends heaven has none to whom he can pray." But the outstanding illustration will be found in the January, 1844, number which contains ten pages of excerpts from Eugene Burnouf's *Le Lotus de la bonne loi.* The entire selection is in exposition of Buddhist abnegation. Thoreau quoted:—

> Then this man speaks thus to the Sages: What means must I employ, or what good work must I do to acquire an equal wisdom? . . . Then these Sages say thus to the man: If thou desirest wisdom, contemplate the law, seated in the desert, or in the forest, or in the caverns of the mountains, and free thyself from the corruption of evil. Then endowed with purified qualities, thou shalt obtain supernatural knowledge.

The significance of these selections will be more clearly under-

stood when one realizes that the "Ethnical Scriptures" were chosen for the purpose of introducing uninformed Americans to the best in the Oriental bibles.

Were there space for them, scores of comments and quotations from the *Bhagavadgita*, the *Harivansa*, and the *Sankhya Karika* could be offered here in elucidation of Thoreau's idealism and asceticism. These may easily be found in the *Week* and the *Journals*. Our present interest is in the reason they appeared there. "Like some other preachers," Thoreau once wrote in explanation, "I have added my texts—derived from the Chinese and Hindoo scriptures—long after my discourse was written." Since the belatedly selected text so appropriately fits the sermon, there can be but one conclusion regarding the sermon itself.

But our study of Thoreau's Oriental asceticism would be far from complete if we fail to mention revealing passages in his correspondence and diaries. In a letter written to Isaac Hecker on August 14, 1844, appear these sentences :—

> But the fact is, I cannot so decidedly postpone exploring the *Further Indies*, which are to be reached, you know, by other routes and other methods of travel. I mean that I constantly return from every external enterprise with disgust, to fresh faith in a kind of Brahminical, Artesian Inner Temple life. All my experience, as yours probably, proves only this reality.

These words were written less than a year before his ascetic retreat to Walden pond, and yet, so far as I am aware, they are now for the first time advanced as the reason for the gesture which shocked Thoreau's contemporaries and which has puzzled his countrymen ever since.

And if this was the reason he went to his retreat, we have an equally revealing description of his conduct there :—

> Sometimes, in a summer morning, having taken my accustomed bath, I sat in my sunny doorway from sunrise till noon, rapt in revery. . . . in undisturbed solitude and stillness. . . until by the sun falling in at my west window, or the noise of some traveller's wagon on the distant highway, I was reminded of the lapse of time. I grew in those seasons like corn in the night. . . . I realized what the Orientals mean by contemplation and the forsaking of works. . . . This was sheer idleness, to my fellow-townsmen, no doubt; but if the birds and the flowers had tried me by their standard, I should not have been found wanting.

To ask whether Thoreau practised the true Yoga, tutored and with full benefit of rishi, would be to quibble. The fact is he thought he did, following the injunctions of the Oriental sages whose books he read. "I would fain practise the yoga faithfully," he wrote to H. G. O. Blake, his life-long friend and literary executor. Furthermore, as early as June, 1840, Thoreau had written in conscious indication of what he conceived to be the Oriental temper in his retired life :—

> I will have nothing to do; I will tell fortune that I play no game with her; and she may reach me *in my Asia of serenity* and indolence if she can.

Fully aware that his gestures were open to misinterpretation, he never failed to emphasize through

word and conduct that true mystics lived in a "repose without rust". And it may be recalled that James Russel Lowell objected to Thoreau's taste for Oriental philosophy, "which would seem admirably suited to men if men were only oysters". One can distil from Thoreau's writings his effective answer to all such criticism: "Yes, but are men mosquitoes, destined only for an ephemeral and inconsequential buzzing?"

What, then, were the results of Thoreau's ascetic way of life? And if he turned from Occidental modes of reasoning and science in his intellectual life, did he find something to take their place? Here is his answer :—

> Science is often like the grub which, though it may have nestled in the germ of a fruit, has merely blighted and consumed it and never truly tasted it. Only that intellect makes any progress toward conceiving of the essence which at the same time perceives the effluence.

And again :—

> Reason will be but a pale cloud, like the moon, when one ray of divine light comes to illumine the soul.

These sentences assuredly indicate his affinity with the seers who wrote the Upanishads. But the words which reveal most definitely the Oriental results of Thoreau's life are in *Walden*; they describe his passage over invisible boundaries into a region where the most liberal of laws prevail, where one lives with the licence of a higher order of beings, where the universe loses all its complexity, and where "solitude will not be solitude, nor poverty poverty, nor weakness weakness". Nowhere in all Occidental literature will be found words that more appropriately describe the dispelling of the fogs of Maya.

In conclusion, it may be appropriate to take note of Thoreau's penetrating thrust at the materialism of his time. The stricture is even more apposite for the twentieth century.

> We hear a good deal said about moonshine by so-called practical people, and the next day, perchance, we hear of their failure, they having been dealing in fancy stocks; but there really never is any moonshine of this kind in the practice of poets and philosophers; there never are any hard times or failures with them, for they deal with permanent values.

Thus Thoreau's real life was in the ideal world, completely unexplored by the majority of his countrymen. This was the reason they never understood him. They were like the ideal-doubting materialists whom a Chinese sage once castigated as summer insects that denied the existence of ice. Furthermore, they had not transcended the arbitrary distinctions which meant nothing to Thoreau, whose sympathies were catholic and embraced all mystics, both Occidental and Oriental.

ARTHUR CHRISTY

THE FEELING OF INFERIORITY

[**Miss Florence Surfleet**, author of *The Child in Home and School*, has specialized in child psychology and education. The practical problem which she discusses understandingly in the following article, however, is as important to the successful orientation of the adult as of the child. It is a real problem for many who lack the clue to an understanding of man's true nature.—EDS.]

I suppose there is not one of us who has not at some time or other had the inferiority feeling, so from our own experience we know something about the way it works. When we have had to face a difficult interview, we have held the door knob in our hands maybe longer than was necessary for opening the door so that we might screw up our courage to enter, or we may have rushed into the room with an appearance of confidence which strangely belied our true feelings.

We can probably all remember times when the inferiority feeling has made us decline to take responsibility, when it has made us flabby and nervous, causing us to seem more stupid and slow moving than we actually were, and other times when it has made us blurt out our opinions aggressively, in a way quite different from the one we would have chosen.

Another thing about the inferiority feeling which appears contradictory and difficult to understand is that it is so often found in patches. A mother may feel quite capable in every branch of her housekeeping, and yet may have an inferiority feeling in the bringing up of her children which makes it difficult for her to trust her own judgment in anything that concerns them. Sometimes people have just one little patch of diffidence in the daily routine of business or home which may or may not be due to any actual lack of ability. I have known business men who dreaded interviews with awkward clients so much that they would make any excuse to get out of the office to avoid them. I have known others who felt special uneasiness and nervousness in giving instructions to those working under them, and yet who caused a great deal of dissatisfaction amongst the staff because they seemed to be so aggressive and domineering.

I suppose an inferiority feeling is caused either by a real or by an imagined difficulty in doing this or that, in facing this or that; but any actual difficulty is always magnified very much beyond real proportions and the feeling of inferiority is always one which exists entirely in the mind. However handicapped people are, it is always possible for them to get a feeling of achievement in something—witness Helen Keller—and this removes the feeling of inferiority.

Very many of the special difficulties which we experience as adult people we can trace back to childhood, and it is useful to do this because then we can see how very much the difficulty has grown

in our mind, and can often bring ourselves to begin again with a new feeling of hope and confidence in our power as ordinary people to achieve the thing which has caused us trouble for so long. When we realise that we are not different from others, we must admit there is no physical reason why, for example, we cannot swim, no insurmountable difficulty to our learning to swim except in our own minds; and when that has been removed we can set to work with a new determination to do the thing, or else we can decide *not* to do it because it is too much trouble and we don't want to bother, but we cannot any longer screen ourselves behind the thought that we are different from others and it is therefore impossible for us.

In just the same way we must help our children to look at the things that seem to give them special trouble, encouraging them gradually to make a new start. Modern psychology with its insistence on the power of the individual of any age to change, gives hope to every one of us, children and adults alike; for it shows us that by facing the difficulties which have grown up in our minds and by deliberately making a fresh effort to master the problem, we can overcome every kind of inferiority feeling in the course of time.

Since a feeling of inferiority is something which can exist only in the mind, it follows that, by whatever means it has been caused, it can always be removed as soon as the person can begin to gain confidence. Even though the confidence exists first of all in some quite different department of her life, it can gradually spread until it finally gives the person power to get rid even of some deep-seated feeling of inferiority, for she who is achieving does not need to feel inferior, and can eventually prevent herself from doing so.

No arguments, however wise, can remove diffidence or anxiety, though they can demonstrate their unreasonableness and set the person's own thought to work on the problem. It often happens that people think they are being modest when they say they are unable to do this or the other, but in reality they are fostering the inferiority feeling. They can eventually understand that, as the sense of inferiority interferes with achievement, spoils their lives and the lives of their friends, often making them gloomy and pessimistic, it is important that they should try to face it squarely and track it down to its cause. They often feel at first that they cannot change, but they can be helped to understand that change is possible for everybody, and they are often willing then to begin again with a new confidence in their power ultimately to get rid of the inferiority by building up the skill, or the strength, or the courage which has for so long been lacking in that one part of their lives. Otherwise, if that is impossible, for physical reasons, they will get rid of the inferiority by achieving along another line and by accepting their handicap. It is frequently the very people who

feel inadequate and disappointed who are particularly gifted, and by holding back, their gifts are often wasted and the community is the poorer.

We are not complete people if, though we are courageous in physical danger, we cannot bear to face emotional conflict, or if, though we are at ease with our women friends, we feel a sense of diffidence or uneasiness in all our contacts with men, and we must sooner or later seek to adjust these weaknesses in our development.

Our own experience will make us very tolerant of others, even when their diffidence looks like aggressiveness, as it is particularly likely to do, when they are first becoming conscious of its existence and are trying to tackle it. The diffident person, who feels a general sense of inadequacy, a kind of inferiority towards everything in life, is very liable to think she is different from everybody else and may even glory in her differences. Her first awakening to the existence of others with feelings very similar to her own shatters her isolation and separateness, and from being particularly shy and retiring she may become at first bombastically and aggressively certain of herself, of the rightness of her judgments and her ability.

Then as the real skill, judgment and ability gradually come through and find their direction, the person no longer needs the shelter and protection of aggressiveness, and becomes once more quiet and unassuming, but with a big difference in attitude—the difference between uncertainty and certainty, between diffidence and confidence.

FLORENCE M. SURFLEET

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

TWO HEROES—A MAN AND A MAGICIAN*

When the first part of Mr. Arthur Waley's translation of the Lady Murasaki's *Genji Monogatari* was published in 1925 critics were unrestrained in their admiration. They almost tumbled over each other in their eagerness to discover arresting superlatives, glowing phrases of adulation. Something beautiful and exotic had come from Japan. It was written in obsolete Japanese a thousand years ago, and Mr. Waley essayed the task of translating into English a work said to contain 800 characters and over 4,000 pages in the Kogetsusho edition, as if he were endowed with the magic of a Kobo Daishi. There seemed to be no diminution, no clouding effect, in the difficult process of transmutation. The work was so unexpected, so compact of beauty, so distinct from any other translation of oriental literature that it is not surprising that reviewers were delighted and puzzled. Unfortunately, in their excess of joy, they gibbered a little, became "precious" and high faluting. They drove in literary pegs by comparing Murasaki with such varied writers as Shakespeare, Mallory, Jane Austen, Proust, Tolstoy and George Moore. The pegs stood out like tombstones marking the graves of futile criticism. These staggered English critics were probably reading the first novel written by a woman: possibly the first novel in the world, and the opening instalment was so remarkable that it went to their hearts rather than to their heads. Instead of floundering in useless comparisons they would have been better employed if they had studied the Heian period when this romance was written and with which it was concerned. Even a glance at Murasaki's Diary† would have been sufficient to make them realise that while in England during the tenth and eleventh centuries we were in certain respects little better than barbarians, Japanese Court life, with which Murasaki was associated as a lady-in-waiting, had reached a high state of culture and refinement. Rich material was there in abundance to be drawn upon by a skilful writer who was observant, sensitive to beauty and wise in a knowledge of human nature. Murasaki possessed those gifts, and in addition imagination and a fine style. Perhaps her novel is a little too long. There are passages that are tedious, pages, especially in the early part of *The Bridge of Dreams*, where the writer's interest seems to flag, and the reader's also. The Japanese excel in little things: in exquisite poems no longer than it takes a plum petal to flutter to the

* *The Tale of Genji.* By the LADY MURASAKI. Translated by ARTHUR WALEY In six Volumes. (Allen and Unwin, London, 10*s.* 6*d.* each)

† *See Diaries of Court Ladies of Japan.* Translated by Annie Shepley Omory and Kochi Doi.

ground: in sword guards rich with lovely designs. But while admitting faults in *The Tale of Genji*, it will always remain one of the great novels of the world.

The first four parts of *The Tale* are primarily concerned with the adventures, mostly of an amorous kind, of Prince Genji, the Shining One. Let it be said at once that he is a most attractive hero: handsome, chivalrous, brave, tender, accomplished. He certainly possessed an effulgent quality capable of illuminating those with whom he came in contact. He did all things well, whether it was writing many letters and poems, the playing of musical instruments, or in feats of strength and skill. He shone conspicuously wherever he went and in whatever he did with that light of high romance which is considerably brighter than life itself. No Puritan gloom hung over the Japanese Court in those days. To be accomplished and refined: to be able to compose a witty and elegant poem in reply to another no less pleasing: to be able to recognise a perfume: to discover beauty, and in recording add something to its loveliness, almost sufficed for those leisurely and secluded days. There was intricate Court etiquette that must be strictly observed, elaborate religious rituals and a degree of politeness which would have frightened Mr. Turveydrop. Court ladies had their screens of honour, their fans, the pretty painted barriers they set up, with which to conceal their feelings. But human nature was as warm and potent beneath the shadow of an austere Buddha, the majesty of an Emperor, direct descendant of the Japanese Sun Goddess, as in any tale told by Boccaccio or Casanova. We may call it love or lust: what we will. It runs through the whole of *The Tale of Genji*, a laughing and weeping stream that supports the Shining One for a time and for a brief spell Ukifune, the Lady of the Boat. It is not Arthurian, with Round Table humbug, but frankly promiscuous and utilitarian. Murasaki was a Buddhist, and though she had little sympathy with priestcraft, she had the wisdom to perceive the folly of a life devoted to the gratification of the senses. She understood women far more deeply than men, and was sorry for them. She was too great an artist to moralise, but though she described the countless clandestine meetings of Genji, he will be an insensitive reader who fails to perceive the undertone of poignant sorrow that gives to this book a touch of spiritual beauty. In Murasaki's Diary we read: "You feel weary of life; please look into my life, also weary." In *The Tale* there is comic relief, some quickly perceived beauty and flaming passion only polite on the surface. Beneath these things there is the constant suggestion, implied if not always directly stated, that life is sad. More than once it has reminded me of the breaking sea wave of Hokusai.

Prince Genji's main object in life was the pursuit and capture of some woman who took his fancy

and it mattered not whether she was of noble or humble origin, whether she was to be found in the palace of Kioto or in some desolate and dilapidated dwelling. The more elusive the quest the more it fascinated him. On one occasion he was gallant enough to accept the advances of an elderly lady with a red nose as big as an elephant's trunk, but such encounters were happily exceptional. Of the many women he loved, Murasaki ("Purple") was probably his ideal. When she was a child he had taken her on his knee and played with her toys. In a dramatic moment, most vividly described in the first part of this work, he changed from playmate to lover. In *Blue Trousers* there is a description of her death.

> Never, thought Genji, had her beauty seemed so flawless as now, when the eye could rest upon it undistracted by any ripple of sound or motion (p. 316).

At that time his thoughts turned to Amida's Paradise where he desired that " the same lotus would be their throne". He did not long survive the passing of this lady and may be said to have died with a word or two of melancholy poetry and a touch of Buddhist piety, no more, perhaps, than a weary gesture when the fires of earthly love had faded out.

The last two parts, *The Lady of the Boat* and *The Bridge of Dreams*, known as the "Uji chapters," form a pendant to *The Tale of Genji*, and may be read apart from the preceding volumes. They lose considerably in interest and vitality because they no longer portray the Shining One, save in a few stray references to his departed glory. It was Genji who gave perfume to the flower, delight to the song, pleasure to the wooing. Here the main theme is Ukifune and her lovers—Niou and Kaoru—one bold, the other diffident. It ends neither in happiness nor tragedy but in uncertainty and suspense. "The story fades out," writes Mr. Waley, "like a Chinese landscape-roll. The Bridge of Dreams leads nowhere—breaks off like the tattered edge of a cloud."

Lady Murasaki wrote in her *Diary*: " Whenever I hear delightful or interesting things my yearning for a religious life grows stronger." While conscious of the futility of earthly existence, the essential emptiness of Japanese Court life, her longing for things spiritual was fitful and uncertain. It seems to infect her characters, for the Shining One does no more than dally with a religious life. No more than a lock or two were cut from Murasaki's hair and five of the Ten Vows administered, while Ukifune makes but a shifting nun. The book is not, as Mr. Waley points out, "a tale crammed with ogres and divinities". It deals with real men and women who are more moved by material beauty than by a desire to seek and find true wisdom. If there is no deep spiritual insight in this book, it is not entirely free from the supernatural. There is more than one example of possession by evil spirits and attempts to exorcise them by priests and mag-

icians. Particularly interesting is the case of the dying Murasaki. Reference is made to a boy medium who speaks with "the proud passionate voice of Rokujo" in the spirit world. She had been Genji's mistress, and torn by jealousy and anger possessed Genji's wife Murasaki and his previous spouse Aoi. It is a dramatic and moving scene, for the spirit of Rokujo, having made bitter complaint, implores the miracle workers and priests in the room to cease their incantations and pray for her soul's release. Through the voice of the medium she cries : "Back I shall come and back again, till in your liturgies I hear some word of comfort for my own soul. Say masses for me, read them night and day" (Pt. 4. p. 207). Here is a hint of the power of karma. More than that, an awareness, however slight, of the spirit world breaking in upon a life almost entirely concerned with earthly pleasure and polite accomplishment.

The Tale of Genji is something more than a romance, more than a a crowded pageant of Japanese life during the Heian period. Certain characters, certain incidents, stand out clearly in one's memory and will be slow to fade, but the most abiding quality is its beauty, tenderness, sadness, its sudden revelation of the human heart that seems to defeat life that is leisurely, cultured and refined. And when love is lifted up above the physical and has a fragrance of its own, it lasts no longer than a flower about which some Japanese lady has written a poem. We cannot escape in this work a sense of the futility and impermanence of life. Whether it be due to the presence of the Lord Buddha or to sorrow in Murasaki's heart I do not know. Genji, the Shining One, is less than the Light that seems to stream through this book, touching, but not dispersing, the Wreath of Cloud which is despair and loneliness. Kenko wrote in the *Tsure-dzure-gusa* : "There is no greater pleasure than alone, by the light of a lamp, to make the men of the unseen world our companions." When that book is *The Tale of Genji*, so finely translated by Mr. Arthur Waley, I know of no other romance that has moved me so much by its exquisite beauty.

No such pleasure is to be found in the Gesar Epic,* for in that account of a Tibetan hero we pass from an era of culture and refinement, from a life coloured by romance and adventure as it existed during the Heian period in Japan, to a wonder world of disconcerting violence and fantastic happenings. We pass from a classic, restrained and beautiful, to a Tibetan Saga which, about twelve centuries ago, probably consisted of only two or three songs upon which were based the lengthy versions we know to-day. It is the Kham Saga, recognised in Lhasa and Tibet generally as the official version from which Madame Alexandra David-Neel and the Lama Yongden have

* *The Supernatural Life of Gesar of Ling.* Alexandra David-Neel and the Lama Yongden. (Rider and Co., London. 18*s*.)

prepared the present rendering. It is not known definitely who Gesar was, and until a vast amount of material has been translated and carefully studied, it would be unwise to express an opinion as to his origin. It seems probable that he was an historical character, but whether a king who reigned in China, as Sarat Chandra Dass suggests, or a victorious Tibetan general, none at present can decide.

Genji and Gesar were both heroes, but with so marked a difference between them that an attempt at comparison is hopeless. Genji was a cultured philanderer. He had no magic except the charm of his personality. He was essentially a human being. Gesar was not. He was superhuman. As the " avatar of the divine Thubpa" he was miraculously born. When a child he performed miracles, and he went on performing them until, after a period of meditation and resort to a certain tantric practice, he ascended from a rocky terrace and left his empty robe, "aureoled in light," behind him. He came into the world to conquer those who were opposed to true religion, but his method of conquest would shock a disciple of Buddha. Gesar was often diabolically cruel and repulsively cunning. We can neither like nor respect one who caused a child to be crushed to death beneath a pillar, who on one occasion became a metal that entered and tortured an adversary. His only clemency was that, without exception, he sent the spirits of his enemies to the Paradise of the Great Beatitude.

How can we judge one who is hidden behind interminable legends, who never acts on his own initiative but is constantly helped in times of danger by such divine beings as Padma Sambhava and Manene? Even as a lover he does not remotely resemble Genji. When Gesar lingered so long with slain Lutzen's wife, he did so only as "a magic emanation". When Metog Lha-dze flung herself from an upper window, she " dropped, light as a leaf, on the Hero's knees ". He was hedged about by magic at every turn. We cannot see Gesar for the magician in him.

Although our credulity is taxed, and occasionally our patience, this much is certain: the Tibetans believe in him. To them he was not only a wonder hero who slaughtered Lutzen, the Kings of Hor and Jang, and Shingti of the South, but one who will come again. " For the time being we may rest in peace" said Gesar, " but we shall have to return to this world to preach the Good Law in the Western lands. . . . . The wars that we have undertaken were little wars, the one that will come will be a great war." A Tibetan with whom Madame David-Neel spoke on the subject was convinced that Gesar would be reborn and lead a great army to the West. " Do you believe it? " inquired the Lama. And Madame David-Neel discreetly answered, perhaps with the timidity of many readers of this book: " All is possible. "

HADLAND DAVIS

ANCIENT INDIA THROUGH FRENCH SPECTACLES*

From Indian Histories planned and projected under the urge of national or pseudo-national self-esteem grounded on sentimentalism, and from Indian Histories conceived and constructed under the urge of Imperialistic inspiration of Europeans which prevents a proper reconstruction of the history of ancient Indian Civilization, acting in concert with the belief that a Nation economically, industrially, and politically unprogressive could never have had any brilliant cultural past, it is a pleasure to turn to the work of Paul Masson-Oursel, *Ancient India and Indian Civilization*, in which an honest and sincere attempt is made sympathetically to understand and to present precisely and accurately the cultural achievements of ancient India. A preliminary account of the country and population, a historical sketch from the pre-historic times down to the age of Harsha, 650 A. D., a description of the Indian family life, social, economic, and political structures, a running survey of the spiritual life, religions, and philosophy, a summing up of the literature of that period differentiated into Vedic and post-Vedic, epic, Kavyas, drama, and narrative types and a separate treatment of the Aesthetics and Art of India—form the features of the work under notice.

The pre-eminent purpose of Masson-Oursel has been to isolate and exhibit the *differentium* of the Indian genius, and both Henri Berr who has contributed the Foreword and Masson-Oursel have identified the *differentium* or the distinctive element, the vital constituent of the Indian genius, in the psychological conception of the "Mind" which is so unlike the European. It is a dynamic conception of the mind. I shall cite only two typical remarks. "Life is of consequence only in the mind, by the liberating power of the mind" (Henri Berr, Foreword xxiii.). "The only real slavery in Indian opinion lies in not knowing the true nature of the mind" (p. 211). "The highest faculty is *buddhi*." "The mind only knows by doing, and then it makes itself" (p. 214 Masson-Oursel). I feel happy to admit that Masson-Oursel has with unerring vision proclaimed that the lesson taught by the dynamic psychology of the Mind, *i. e.* the Indian psychology of the Mind, is "to understand better is to free oneself" (p. 214.). This view is as old as the Upanishads. The dynamic conception of the Mind is beautifully and strikingly emphasised by the Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad. The text runs thus. "Kamah —sankalpo—vichikitsa–sraddha—asraddha—dhritih—adhritih—hreeh-dheeh bheeh—iti—etat-sarvam—mana—eva". (1-5-3). Desire, planning and projecting, eagerness to know and discuss, devoted application, indifference, boldness and endurance, cowardice, shyness, knowledge, fear, and all this is simply the Mind. In my contributions to *The Hindu* on "Indian Psychology" some of which are noticed in the "Psychological Abstracts," Princeton, N. J., I have explained and elucidated the fact that while Western Psychology has been coquetting with the concept of consciousness, the peculiarity of Indian Psychology consists in the recognition of the independent entity of the Mind. The Mind is the "Antah-karana". It is differentiated into four aspects, *Manas, Buddhi, Ahamkara*, and *Chitta*. It is the Mind that enslaves, and it is the Mind that enfranchises. Pursuits of the empirical and the transcendental alike are determined, controlled, directed by the Mind. (Man-eva-manushyanam–karanam–bandha–mokshayoh—Manasa—badhyate—jan tuh-manasaiva-vimuchyate.)

* *Ancient India and Indian Civilization*—By PAUL MASSON-OURSEL, HELENA WILLMAN-GRABOWSKA, and PHILIPPE STERN; trs. from the French by M. R. Dobie (Kegan Paul, Trench Trübner & Co., Ltd., London. 21s.)

Provided there is genuine desire to study and understand things in the right perspective, foreigners cannot fail correctly to evaluate the ancient Indian cultural achievements—is the truth best illustrated in Masson-Oursel's acute analysis of the Indian psychology of "Mind," but, at the same time, his account furnishes (the fact has to be stated) incontrovertible evidence in support of the persistent contention that notwithstanding the strongest possible will in the world and the keenest desire withal, an outsider may not feel fully and perfectly the force of the Indian genius. For instance, Masson-Oursel observes "India knows no 'states' of consciousness". (p. 212.) This is hardly accurate. The dynamic nature of the Mind is neither compromised nor stultified by the differentiation of the states of consciousness, each state being assigned psychologically a local habitation and a name. The Mandookya-Upanishad to which Masson-Oursel has made reference is specially devoted to a doctrine of *four* states of consciousness, namely, Jagrat (waking), Svapna (dreaming), Sushupti (dreamless sleeping), and the Tureeya (fourth), while other Upanishadic texts mention a *fifth* as well. The Mahopanishad enumerates *seven* states, Beeja-jagrat, Jagrat, Maha-jagrat, Jagrat-svapna, Svapna, Svapna-jagrat, and Sushupti, a psychological account of which is attempted by me in a paper accepted by the Copenhagen session of the International Congress of Psychology. The states themselves are caught in a perpetual flux and the dynamism of the Mind or mental dynamism does not destroy the psychological independence and individuality of those states. (2) On page 196, "Pramana" which is a "correct" "mode of knowledge" develops into "*a priori* canons" (Pramanas) on page 211, and leads on to certain images of *Pramana* on page 213. In all this Masson-Oursel is employing needlessly mystifying terminology. "Kevala-pramana" and "Anu-pramana" are spoken of. The former is knowledge itself. An object *qua* known becomes *pro tanto* measured as it were. The latter would be means, sources, and guarantors of valid knowledge. (3) Masson-Oursel's account of Monism, complete Monism, is again misleading. Monistic deliverance according to him "consists in seeing the absolute in everything and so far as it is possible, *in being equal to it oneself*" (italics mine). That is exactly what deliverance is *not* in Monism. Deliverance is a realization of the fundamental and foundational *identity* between the seemingly different entities (p. 198). (4) It is further a downright error to say that in the Bhagavadgita, Krishna assumed the "aspect of a devouring monster" (p. 121). If Masson-Oursel refers to the "Visvaroopa," he should know that the Lord exhibited for the benefit of the doubting Thomas—Arjuna—His Cosmic Omnipenetrative Form which includes in its relentlessly comprehensive Immanentism the devouring monster and the surly saints. (5) The second boon asked for by Nachiketas is *not* "to be happy himself". The boon relates to the nature of sacrificial fire (p. 242). The Katha text "Yesha-te-agnih-nachiketa--svargyoyamavrineetha-dviteeyena-varena" (1–19.), makes the character of the second boon perfectly clear. (6) The son of the author of *Kadambari* who completed his father's work was Bhushana. His name is spelt comically on page 338. There are other inaccuracies as well.

But none of these would touch the general excellence and brilliance of the work of Masson-Oursel and his collaborators. Three outstanding facts deserve emphasis by way of conclusion of this notice. (1) Masson-Oursel's historical narrative is up-to-date touching Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro. (2) History is not an assemblage of dry-as-dust details and dates, but the only genuine history is *psychological* history. (3) Indian idiosyncrasies and characteristics were what they were and continue to be what they are on account of the dynamic conception of

Mind developed by Indian Psychology. The Indian Mind operates even when it seeks to know (p. 400.). An impartial commentary and critique of contemporary European and American Civilization would be—"The Mind enslaves." Masson-Oursel's work contains an implicit call "Turn to the Eastern, Indian Philosophy," according to which "the Mind enfranchises". Ancient Indian Civilization through French spectacles looks charming. India should feel grateful to Masson-Oursel for his charming history of her ancient civilization which is also a vindication of the peculiar psychology of the Mind developed by her.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

"LONG, LONG THOUGHTS"*

Mr. Geoffrey West's *Calling All Countries* is a highly symptomatic book. In its general plan or lack of plan, in the broad ground which it covers, and above all in what it denies, it is, I feel, the sort of book which many thousands of men and women less articulate than Mr. West might write if they were capable of writing a book at all. It expresses just that sense of bewilderment in face of a world whose current values seem to have turned to dust and ashes—just that sense that somehow or other a world facing an utterly new situation must find for itself a new set of values that will enable it to seek with some guiding light solutions for its own problems—just that sense that nobody at all seems to have gone any distance towards the discovery of these new values—that mark a good deal of the writing and still more of the talking and thinking of those who have grown up to manhood since the Great War ended in 1918. Mr. West begins by recording frankly his own bewilderment, and his book is a day's Odyssey in the search for light. At the end he seems to think that he has found it: that presumably is why he is able to call his book "A Post-War Credo". But one reader at least must confess to a doubt whether Mr. West is so near to having seen the new light as in the moment of exaltation which he records in his closing chapters he appears to suppose. Perhaps by now when he reads his own book in cold print, he wonders whether that moment of enlightenment that came to him at the end of a crowded day was quite so enlightening as it then seemed.

One reader at least began reading his book with very strong feelings of sympathy, for Mr. West was setting down broadly, though not of course quite in the same perspective, just the same bewilderment as any decent man who has not found comfort in an inescapable dogma is bound to feel in the world of to-day—if he is capable of feeling anything at all. Many people, of course, are not capable of feeling anything about the world as a whole. Many of them have shaken down into a jog-trot of daily routine which involves for them the unquestioning acceptance of a large number of ideas and institutions which make part of their daily environment. They do not so much affirm that these ideas and institutions are good, as treat them as axiomatic and react violently against anyone who proposes that they shall be subjected to critical examination. This state of mind is highly characteristic of older people, who have come to believe that, though the world may change, it is most unlikely to be changed for the better by any conscious striving of mankind. But there is an analogous attitude which arises among younger people too, when, finding that the world presents an appearance of an inextricable tangle

* *Calling All Countries: A Post-War Credo.* By GEOFFREY WEST. (George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London.)

of contradictions and inconsistencies, they simply give up the attempt to make a personal interpretation and decide to live as best they can in their own microcosm without bothering their heads about the larger issues.

Of course there were always plenty of people who refused to be bothered about the major problems of common living, and sought only to reach a tolerable compromise with their own immediate environment. But usually in earlier generations, at any rate in Great Britain, those who took up this attitude accepted passively the current valuations of society upon those matters which fell outside their immediate personal concern. Nowadays, however, this is no longer true. Even those who are most determined to live their own lives and let the rest of the world look after itself are apt to be sceptical about the world's values, and to say not merely that the greater problems did not concern them, but in addition that these greater problems mean nothing at all.

Mr. West belongs to that growing body of people, mostly under forty, who, having felt to the full the impact of contemporary disillusionment, are wholly unable to rest content with a purely negative attitude towards the major problems of society. They feel that the old values have crumbled away, but that there must be a new set of values capable of taking their place, and that the discovery of these new values—which must be social values—is indispensable if the whole civilisation in which we are living is not to go up in smoke. Yet at the same time they feel strongly that the social values which they are seeking must be personal values as well, and that the regeneration of society from its present plight cannot be merely or mainly a matter of devising right social politics for collective action, but must be also a matter of the consciousness of the individual. A man must live himself according to the new values, realising them in his own consciousness and existence, before there can be any hope of his acting with effect towards making them real on the collective plane.

Thus far Mr. West has undoubtedly a "Credo" to offer. He records very frankly his own personal development towards this attitude. In the early stages H. G. Wells influenced him more than anyone else, and the Wells influence is still very apparent in everything that he writes. But he has come to regard Wells as definitely too mechanistic in his ideas, as basing his thought too much on the older mechanistic appeal of science, and as thinking of the problems of world-regeneration too much in terms of cosmopolitan machinery. Mr. West's later development comes far more from D. H. Lawrence *via* John Middleton Murry; and the "Credo" with which his book ends is in effect only a variant upon the doctrines which John Middleton Murry has consistently preached for a good many years past. Murry now puts forward that doctrine in the form of an "ethical Marxism" in which the class action of the Marxian philosophy reappears transmuted into an individual sacrifice. Men are to act for the building of the new society not because they are members of a particular class but because, in sacrificing their individualities and identifying themselves through this sacrifice with the struggle of a class, they can give to their action a validity which it could never possess if it were the mere product of material forces upon the material plane. So much of Middleton Murry's doctrine is clearly expressed in this book of Mr. West's, but what I personally fail to find in it is any advance beyond this expression of a new twentieth-century way of approach towards filling in the affirmation of the need for personal sacrifice with a positive content.

For when we come to consider Mr. West's attitude towards the problems which demand collective action, what he has to tell us is too largely negative. He has a deeply rooted distrust in all forms of dictatorship and violence. He does not believe that anything that is

worth while can be won by the use of force, because he holds that victories won in this way will inevitably turn bad in the hands of those who have won them. He sees in personal regeneration the means of winning all victories without violence or dictatorship. But can this personal regeneration arise out of a repudiation of current values, or must it involve some clear vision of the new values that are to take the place of the old—I mean something more than the mere affirmation that in order to gain his soul a man must lose it ?

I should agree with Mr. West that in the policies of all the political parties and of the major movements of our time there is no sufficient sign of a realisation of the need for new values in life as well as in social organisation, and that these two things are inseparable if social policies are to lead anywhere except into the desert. The Communists in Russia seem naturally enough too much under the spell of machinery, too disposed to believe that everything can be accomplished by turning Russia into an industrialised country under Communist control, and so expanding the standard of living of the Russian people while still preserving the equalitarian basis of Communist society. Our own political parties of the left seem for the most part too much concerned with mere adjustments of the existing order through changes in ownership and control, and too little disposed to question the values upon which this order has been built up. It seems in fact as if the change from Capitalism to Socialism were envisaged by most people rather as a change in the use of the machine and in the forces controlling it than as a change in the fundamental values of living. It is a question rather of redistributing than of altering these values in most people's minds. This, however, is a fatal limitation upon policy ; for projects for the redistribution of values, while they may be capable of commanding support, fail to rouse that enthusiasm of the whole man which comes only as a response to the appeal to live in a new way.

Mr. West retains from his devotion to H. G. Wells at least this faith in a cosmopolitan ideal. There is for him no ultimate stopping-point, or focus of ultimate loyalty, between the individual and all mankind ; and the individual in achieving his personal regeneration does so by an act of identification with the entire cause of humanity. That is where his "Credo" is also, I believe, the credo of a great mass of people in the world to-day, who have so far failed to find in any political movement an effective rallying point. The organised world, the world of parties and societies, of States and associative machinery of every sort, is organised so much and so inevitably into separate national groups that the groping loyalty to mankind as a whole can find no peg on which to hang. Those who feel like Mr. West—and there are many thousands of them—are still left groping. They will discover in his book an expression of their own plight, and a sense of hope and faith that a way of escape from it may be found. But I think that they will turn its last page with a sense perhaps of encouragement to go on hunting more manfully for the means of making their dreams come true, but without any assured confidence that Mr. West will be able to guide them any further along this dark and difficult road than they have travelled already in their own bewildered thought.

G. D. H. Cole

HUMAN ENERGY AND SOCIAL CULTURE *

Social anthropology, the study of human culture, seems to be the only branch of modern science that has retained undisturbed the basic assumption adopted in the nineteenth century. All other departments of research have been radically affected by new experimental knowledge which, for over thirty years, has been slowly disintegrating the theories, working hypotheses and other mental pictures of the ways of Nature formed during the last century. These destructive periods in the cyclic process of scientific progress are inevitable and are an essential prelude to the birth of new generalisations and working hypotheses. But as yet no new idols of the minds have been erected which science unanimously agrees to worship.

In the morphological sciences difficulty arises when increased differentiations of collected specimens put a strain on old systems of classification. To-day anthropologists and ethnologists are as uneasy concerning the physical "descent of man" as some physicists were regarding the "conservation of energy" shortly after radioactivity was discovered. The fallacy of this "law" is now generally acknowledged.

Knowledge is acquired by comparison. Measurement of objective effects is the means of comparison in experimental research. Social anthropology, like academic philosophy, has been neither an experimental nor morphological science. It attempts to record the beliefs and conceptions of primitive and uncivilized peoples, ancient and modern. Its standards of comparison have been subjective, and were erected by the aid of Christian theologians. They were formed by a combination of religious preconceptions and the theory of biological evolution. Human races are said to evolve culturally from some unknown primitive state through various stages of animism and magic.

Until recently the amalgam of this ethnological scientific idol has defied the assaults of iconoclasts. During the past year or two, however, the presumption that Western civilization is to complete the evolution of existing backward races has been challenged from several directions. Problems arising from the effects of modern education on African natives have been discussed for some time by physicians and men of science in scientific journals, and recently became a subject of correspondence in *The Times*. Several books have appeared which dispute the view that human races evolve socially in a straight line from the "primitive state" of a human-like animal through progressive stages of hunters, pastoralists, cultivators, craftsmen. Prof. Daryll Ford's investigations disclose that these are not mutually exclusive types of society and in his *Habitat, Economy and Society* demonstrates the inherent complexity of the most simple of societies. Last year the abstract of Dr. J. D. Unwin's researches, *Sexual Regulations and Human Behaviour*, was published, and now the fuller treatise has been issued.

This work is a study of social science from a new point of view. It is an analysis and classification of cultural states based on objective evidences of social activities. "By their rites we shall know them." Beliefs tell us little beyond our own preconceptions; and perhaps the most valuable section of the book deals with the facile interpretation of native words in anthropological literature, the lack of careful definition of terms, the contradictory connotations and the mistranslations and preconceptions of translators.

As his investigation extended Dr. Unwin was also compelled to reject the assumptions that the evolution of human culture is an orderly progression :—

* *Sex and Culture* by J. D. UNWIN, M. C., Ph. D. (Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford London. 36*s*.)

> Employed in this sense the word "evolution" is the bugbear of social anthropology .. We do not know anything about the culture of primitive man... All we can say definitely is that human culture can be divided into certain patterns. These patterns do not follow one another in any determined order; they merely repeat themselves in history and in uncivilized life. The change from one pattern to another is the result of a change in ideas (p. 86).

Dr. Unwin began his researches ten years ago, not in order to prove a thesis but—

> To test, by a reference to human records, a . . . conjecture of analytical psychologists . . . that, if social regulations forbid direct satisfaction of the sexual impulses, the emotional conflict is expressed in another way, and that what we call "civilization" has always been built up by compulsory sacrifices in the gratification of innate desires (p. vii).

The method adopted, therefore, is comparative statistics. In one set are data of social activities, building, crafts etc; in the other the regulations observed by the same society at the same period regarding pre-nuptial and post-nuptial relations of the sexes.

The section on historical peoples is extremely interesting although brief, since only such records as can be relied on for inductive reasoning were used. Those disquieted by the attitude of present day authorities—scientific, religious and legal—toward "personal rights," "sexual freedom" and artificial birth-control will doubtless find the conclusion satisfactory.

> In the records of history there is no example of a society displaying great energy for any appreciable period unless it has been absolutely monogamous. . . . In the past different societies have risen up in different parts of the earth, flourished greatly, and then declined. In every case the society started its historical career in a state of absolute monagamy, manifested great energy while it preserved its austere regulations, and relaxed after a less vigorous tradition had been inherited by a complete new generation. Moreover, the political organization which it adopted from time to time reflected the relative energy displayed by the various social strata of which it was composed. Each society began as a monarchy; and any subsequent change in the identity of those which possessed the sovereign power was due to the changes in the sexual opportunity of the ruling clan or of its subjects (p. 369).

The bulk of this large volume, however, consists of an examination of the vast mass of field-researches that has been published during the last sixty years or so by anthropologists and travellers amongst existing uncivilized peoples. The results are summarized in two charts where the social and mental activities are shown to increase in accordance with the stringency of regulations relating to sexual behaviour. And Dr. Unwin enunciates his "Primary Law":—

> The cultural condition of any society in any geographical environment is conditioned by its past and present methods of regulating the relations between the sexes (p. 340).

Nevertheless, psychologists who regard mental energy as a transformation or transmutation of procreative animal energy, will find no scientific proof of their views in this work. The characteristic human energy is specific and is the power to reason, create and reflect upon itself: and the cultural process is "the series of events for which these powers are responsible" (p. 417). Dr. Unwin does not claim to have demonstrated a real causal connection between the limitation of sexual opportunity and culture; merely that the former is the "immediate" cause, an indispensable contributory factor to social energy. He assumes, however, that the "ultimate" cause of mental energy is inherent in the human organism and potential in all human organisms, "although it may be true that some varieties of the human species may not have been so equipped". He finds it remarkable that science has not yet found "where in the organic structure the seat of self-consciousness and reason lies".

There is another point of view. It is probable, on biological grounds, that some human organisms are more highly differentiated in inner states, as yet imperceptible to science, than the majority; that there are human organisms so slightly differentiated or evolved, especially in certain cranial and volitional areas, that the organism

can interact only very slightly to the vibrations of thoughts and ideas; and that the energy for concentration and reasoning is limited by the "capacity" of its organ to induce the necessary will-power.

The most highly developed organically are those through which Genius can function, and doubtless they are those in every age who inaugurate new cycles of civilization and formulate the original Codes and Laws which in all lands are similar in essentials. These social codes are not necessary for animals whose procreative activities are regulated automatically by the periodicities of Nature.

Animal desires constitute the subjective consciousness of animals and are objective to human consciousness which retains its identity amidst sensational and mental activities. And the functioning of the mental power of imagination can interfere with the rhythm of natural instincts. If this essentially human power is exercised socially and practically, the organs of reason and will are developed; if exercised to stimulate animal desires, the organs' involuntary activities in the posterior brain are abnormally developed, and the volitional organs must deteriorate and atrophy in successive generations. The evolution of human races and the evolution of mental beings appear to be interdependent processes.

The origin of civilization is involved with the origin of Genius; and although Dr. Unwin has solved neither enigma, he has made a great clearing for a new hypotheses concerning primitive man and future man.

W. W. L.

The Living Teaching of Vêdanta. By DR. K. C. VARADACHARI. (The Modern Book Mart, Madras. As. 12)

The author of this valuable brochure claims in his preface that "the essay is a thorough-going attempt to view the several systems of Vedanta as forming a synthetic movement of Spirit". Though some may dispute its "thorough-going" character the attempt is certainly creditable. Somehow Dr. Varadachari's synthesis of different Vedantic schools fails to make any emphatic appeal. This may perhaps be due to his extreme preciseness in analysing the conflicting issues, which has thrown too prominently into relief the distinctive outlines. The book therefore does not seem to argue in its own interest.

Some intricate aspects of Vedanta like the three states of consciousness, the inner ruler (*Anatryami*), the monadic urge of the self expressive Spirit, and the fifth state of consciousness (*Turiyateet*) have been lucidly explained. Now and again we also meet with illuminating comparisons between Vedantic and Western thoughts. Other schools of Hindu philosophy like the Sankhya, the Pancharatra, and the Yoga have been relevantly drawn into discussion; in the case of the Sankhya school, however, the author seems a little prejudiced for he calls the Sankhya Absolute (*Kevalatva*), "a state of passivity" and "thinly veiled abstraction". Dr. Varadachari is obviously well informed in Darshanic lore and stands in little need of being told that the Absolute as enunciated by Kapila, of the Sankhya School, if faithfully interpreted, is as dynamic as the Vedantic Parabrahman. In this reference it is necessary to point out that all the six schools of Hindu Philosophy have an underlying, basic unity which synthesizes them all and forms the seventh school of Gupta Vidya—Esoteric Philosophy. The very term Darshana is significant and literally means a particular perspective. Realization of the highest object is possible only when all available perspectives have been unified in a supreme synthesis. This is why any one Darshana is unable by itself to meet all the needs of the aspirant.

D. G. V.

Philosophical Studies. A. E. TAYLOR. (Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London. 15s.)

This is a collection of some eleven papers written at different times. Those which are most likely to interest the general reader are "The Philosophy of Proclus," "St Thomas Acquinas as a Philosopher," "Francis Bacon" and "Is Goodness a Quality?". These papers do not necessarily represent the author's most up-to-date views; still they are instructive.

The author very often presents ancient thought in the light of modern speculation, and makes us feel that a good philosophy never becomes really old. It is ever fresh for those who can enter into its real spirit and recreate for themselves the insight of the original philosopher.

The Neo-Platonic philosophy presented to us in "The Philosophy of Proclus" can be seen to have much in common with Indian thought. Its theory of causality, for example, agrees in many respects with the *Saṁkhya* view on the subject. Creation or emanation is for both a process of descent. The cause must be more real than the effect. "Whatever produces anything other than itself is superior in kind to that which is produced." The cause lends itself to the effect and thereby loses some of its freedom and so causality. Lastly, the emanation is not itself a temporal process; for the causal relation is not a relation between events, but a relation between substantial entities; what is produced is a real something, and not a shadow.

Neo-Platonism has also something in common with the Vedanta in its conception of the One or the Absolute. The One represents the highest value and is therefore called the Supreme Good; and because it is what all beings strive to obtain, it must transcend being. It is also simple. No categories can be predicated of it. Its perfections are not its distinct qualities. Each expresses the whole being of God. Thus the being of God *is* its Goodness. This reminds us of the Vedantic view that Brahman is being, intelligence and bliss all at once, and that these are not its distinct attributes. It is also interesting in this connection to note that there is an agnostic side to the Neo-Platonic doctrine. The higher is not fully fathomable by anything that stands lower in the universal hierarchy than itself. It is something of a mystery to the latter. Thus in a sense, the One is unknowable. The mind can only know feebly by the reflection which the One has stamped upon it of itself. It differs from Vedanta principally in its account of creation and in the supposition that the finite individual ever remains finite. On this matter, it agrees with Christianity.

In the essay on "Francis Bacon," Prof. Taylor criticises the Kinematic view of modern science, according to which "the sensible qualities of bodies, ... all that is of primary importance for the life of animal organisms, must be simply unreal, fabricated by the mind as an unauthorised comment on nature's text" (p. 275). This view of nature is clearly inapplicable when we proceed to the organic sciences. The mechanistic view falls down in biology. He therefore suggests that a true philosophy of nature must be sought by trying to follow the categories of the organic sciences downward into the realm of the inorganic, not *vice versa.* While this is true, it is evidently not the business of science to construct a philosophy of nature. The subject-matter of science precludes all mere speculation. The exact sciences, by their very nature, have to sacrifice everything which is uncertain, incapable of measurement, and quite personal. The sensible qualities of things fall within this sphere. Science therefore cannot take note of them. Science is bound to mathematise nature. It is for philosophy to take a wider view of things, and interpret them in all their concreteness as facts of experience of an intelligent self, having an ultimate meaning that does not change.

Philosophy goes beyond all empirical and non-empirical sciences. The author has truly shown that the material

of its interpretation is supplied not only by these, but also and principally by the whole history of man with his ideals, hopes, fears etc. "It is a response of thought to the full concrete reality in which our life is set." What, however, defines this response is not merely the wide field of its material. It is rather the higher standpoint from which this material is regarded. While each special science is concerned to study the data as they present themselves to us and without any reference to the self to which they are presented, philosophy deals with the data only in this reference. It is thus that we can take a final and comprehensive view of things that is not at the mercy of every new scientific theory or change of method. A true metaphysic is only possible when we have freed ourselves from the engrossments of the merely given, and risen to a standpoint from where we can contemplate everything with reference to our self and its ultimate meaning for us. Prof. Taylor therefore rightly says in his paper on "Hume and the Miraculous."—"Specialism is an obstacle. If some great social and economic change should simplify this intellectual problem by leading to the destruction of the masses of accumulated mis-applied erudition which are our nightmare," we should contemplate reality more serenely in the true philosophical spirit.

There are many interesting points which the author has brought out, such as that all knowledge which is not mere belief is of the nature of vision or direct intuition, that God knows everything but does not think, that in so far as all created things "mean to be" something which they never quite succeed in being they are never identical with their own goodness, that God alone *is* His own goodness, etc. The book touches upon various subjects of different character and shows the author's wide range of interest.

G. R. MALKANI

Orphism. By J. R. WATMOUGH. (Cambridge University Press. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

Yesterday is never far removed from to-day. We may delight to delude ourselves into believing that things are different now from what they have been, that the thought of yesterday differs from that of now, but there comes every now and then a forceful reminder of the truth of the old saying, "the old is new; the new is old".

Mr. Watmough's brief study, *Orphism*, is a case in point. Its purpose is to demonstrate—firstly, that the tradition of mysticism, reform and subjective morality associated with the name of Orpheus is no less characteristic of Greek thought than is the cult of the Olympian gods; secondly, to draw the analogy between ancient Orphism and modern Protestantism.

The place of Orpheus in history has been always the matter of speculation. Some scholars, notably Miss J. Harrison, have set out to show that he was a reformer who lived in Thrace in the sixth century B. C., and who sought to sublimate the barbarism of Bacchic revelry. Payne Knight says:—

> The history of Orpheus is so confused and so obscured by fable that it is impossible to obtain any certain information regarding him. He appears to have been a a Thracian, and to have introduced philosophy and religion into Greece; the plurality of worlds, and the true solar system. Nor could he have gained this knowledge from any people of which history has preserved any memorial; for we know of none among whom science had made such a progress, that a truth so remote from common observation and so contradictory to the evidence of unimproved science, would not have been rejected, as it was by all Greek philosophers, except the Pythagoreans, who rather revered it as an article of faith, than understood it as a discovery of science. Thrace was certainly inhabited by a civilised nation, at some remote period; for when Philip of Macedon opened the gold mines in that country, he found that they had been worked before with great expense and in-

genuity by a people well versed in mechanics of whom no memorials are extant.

Other scholars have rejected the historical idea and have asserted that Orpheus was but a semi-mythical figure and that the Orphic movement was not the outcome of the mission of a historical person but a spontaneous and indigenous growth in religious evolution.

It is to this view that Mr Watmough is himself inclined. He considers it a waste of time and energy to debate whether Orpheus was a historical personality. His chief concern is with the teachings associated with the name. In this connection, Mr. Watmough is similarly not too impressed with the arguments that because of similarity of customs and religious beliefs in various countries, it may be presumed that in almost prehistoric times a cult of religious reform and mysticism should have been communicated from a single source over a wide area as Thrace in the North, Crete and Egypt in the South and India in the extreme East. He does not deny it, but he finds it difficult to acquiesce in this view.

All the same, to theosophists and other students of comparative religion it is in this direction that the study of Orphism has the major interest and what such writers as Payne Knight, Godfrey Higgins, Madame Blavatsky, Sir James Frazer, and others have written on this subject cannot be quickly dismissed.

Orphism was essentially a movement of reform. Its adherents asserted that religion was a relation between the individual soul and God, an escaping from this world's things to the things of eternity. They regarded the establishment of a religious brotherhood as the essential means of achieving this, and not the State. Thus they organised their communities like to the monastic houses of the Brahmins.

Mr. Watmough draws interesting analogies between Orphism and modern Protestantism. He discovers that the Protestant Fundamentalist and the Salvation Army have their counterpart in Ancient Greece. Now, as then, he argues that movements of reform appeal to three types of mind; to the philosophic, because reform leads mankind near to truth, because it leads from darkness to the light; to the middle classes, because of their love of respectability and because there is always something respectable about reform movements; and to the poor and simple folk who are captivated by talk of the golden age.

Mr. Watmough opens up other avenues of thought and draws parallels between the thought of yesterday and to-day. In his final remarks he comes to the question "What profit is there in a religion dead and gone" ?—"What relation can it conceivably have to the ever changing stream of modern thought ?"

One might quarrel with him here and urge that no religion is dead and gone. That *religious idealism has been similar through all ages and that in fact there is but one religion.* One might wonder too whether there is such a thing as "new thought" ? But to do this would be to open up fields of discussion which, while being interesting and important, would only lead away from the subject of the present book. This much must be admitted, whatever our other views may be: within the teachings of Orpheus there is much that is worthy of preservation just as there is much worthy of preservation in all religious teachings. Our task is to seek for the best and to give to others even as we receive. Mr. Watmough's little book, which won the Cromer Essay Prize, is useful because of the searchlight it sheds on ancient Greek philosophy and will open up a field of interesting study for all into whose hands it may come.

W. ARTHUR PEACOCK

Freedom and Organisation 1814–1914. By BERTRAND RUSSELL. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 15*s.*)

Bertrand Russell is beyond doubt one of the most impressive intellects in the West now. Perhaps that is his misfortune; he is unaware of the point beyond which intellect cannot pass. D. H. Lawrence said of him, in 1915:—

> I do want him to work in the knowledge of the Absolute, in the knowledge of eternity. He *will*—apart from philosophical mathematics—be so temporal, so immediate. He won't let go, he won't act in the eternal things, when it comes to men and life.

And that verdict remains broadly true: Bertrand Russell's logic is clean, hard, penetrating, but this new book, for all its breadth and power, concludes, tamely enough, only that "It is not by pacifist sentiment, but by world-wide economic organisation that civilised mankind is to be saved from collective suicide." Which is doubtless true, as such comprehensive generalisations go; but it is certain that a great deal of sentiment, pacifist and other, will need to be leashed and brought into operation before any "world-wide economic organisation" is made possible. And only then will intellect be sufficient.

By this very intellectualism, indeed, Bertrand Russell is found impaled on a dilemma before his thesis is properly begun. After announcing that "This book is an attempt to trace the main causes of political change during the hundred years from 1814 to 1914," and after declaring that these causes are of three kinds—"economic technique, political theory, and important individuals"—he reaches, on his second page, the conclusion that "History, in short, is not yet a science and can only be made to seem scientific by falsification and omission". Which, again, is doubtless as true as any such comprehensive generalisation can be; but it is impossible, surely, to preach, in that knowledge, a purely scientific issue to History's present phase! And it is, I think, precisely out of the dimly understood discomfort of the author's position on this dilemma that *Freedom and Organisation* proceeds.

For it is a bitter book. There is a tartness and a crudity of tone in it which are not found in Bertrand Russell's previous work. The chapter on Malthus, for instance, begins thus:—

> Thinking is not one of the natural activities of man; it is a product of disease, like a high temperature in illness. In France before the Revolution, and in England in the early nineteenth century, the disease in the body politic caused certain men to think important thoughts, which developed into the science of political economy . . . . They were a curious set of man; rather uninteresting, quite without what is called "vision," prudent, rational, arguing carefully from premises which were largely false to conclusions which were in harmony with the interests of the middle class.

And though this is resolute incisive prose, one feels that it is just a little too clever, too glib, that it is the utterance of a man turning in hate from habits of thought which he has once loved. Bertrand Russell himself has been notably "prudent, rational, arguing carefully . . . to conclusions which were in harmony with"—what?

For the moment, Bertrand Russell himself does not seem to know; the motive force of his book is largely disillusion. With a rare learning and a rare logic he attacks every phase of thought and life (on the basic social plane) during his chosen hundred years and, slashing vigorously to right and left, leaves nobody unquelled, except perhaps Bismarck. Metternich, on the one hand, a great statesman when all is said and one who might have earned commendation from Bertrand Russell for resisting that bourgeois upsurge which he himself abominates, is dismissed with a "special brand of pompous priggery". And Marx, at the other extreme, is considered invalidated by the fact that Bertrand Russell can neither accept the labour theory of value (inherited from Ricardo) nor be sure that the primacy

of matter is absolutely proven! Our author might read in his copy of Keats's letters that "Axioms in philosophy are not axioms until they are proved upon our pulses." And there are many millions of pulses on which the truth of Marx's axioms is daily proved.

But the fact that I personally find it impossible to agree with the bulk of its major conclusions should not be allowed to suggest that *Freedom and Organisation* is anything other than a brilliant, suggestive and profoundly stimulating piece of work. It is history and political philosophy of a quality seldom met; and it is precisely the strength and provocative coherence of the book that make it worth such violent disagreement.

RAYNER HEPPENSTALL

The Śāktas. By ERNEST A. PAYNE. (Religious Life of India Series. Humphrey Milford, London, Calcutta. Rs. 3 8 As.)

This book is a curious combination of History, Philosophy and Mysticism. It is a book on the Tantras. The author is evidently anxious to educate the Westerns in Tantricism, to which Europe has been attracted ever since the labours of Sir John Woodroffe in the field. The book is written to combat Woodroffe's ideas regarding Tantricism and to convey the impression that the Tantras, whatever their philosophy and spirituality may be, go in for questionable religious ceremonies and more often excite sex impulses. The author finds fault with the Tantric method of invocation of spiritual powers and considers that the elements of terror and destruction are symbolised in Kali-worship, quoting Swami Vivekananda to illustrate his points (Hymn of Death, p. 110).

The author has singularly failed in understanding Tantricism, which is neither Vedanta nor Samkhya, though it may contain elements of both these systems, for want of intellectual and intuitive sympathy which is greatly needed properly to evaluate the concepts and the ideas of a different race. The author is intellectually and spiritually incapable of properly envisaging the dignity of Tantric symbolism and discipline. The Western mind is so much habituated to the "gentler" conceptions of spiritual life that it simply shudders at the image of Kali with all its fierceness. But need it be pointed out that Kali represents the symbol of God as Wisdom, God as Love, and God as Power? The Hindu is accustomed to see the Divine in the rhythm of creation as well as in the confusion of death. There is a music in Kali's dance of death which the heroic soul untouched by the earthly ties can feel and enjoy. The too-much emphasis on personality really confines our spiritual outlook to the joys of creation, but a relaxation from it can alone open to us the unfathomable delight hidden in the impersonal divine.

The author says "The *yoga* practice is built up on what seems to a Westerner a phantastic physiology" (p. 20). Evidently he attacks the *Sat-chakra* system. The Tantras take the man in his complete physical, vital, intellectual and spiritual make-up and boldly point out that before the vital and the physical claims or insistences are satisfied, the aspirant cannot hope to enjoy the graces of the Soul.

The Tantric discipline divines our nature, not by refusing the vital aspect of our being, but by gradually spiritualising it. And this spiritualising of the vital nature is the most interesting part of the Tantric discipline. Practical Tantricism is most interesting, and modern psychology can be enriched if the method of localisation taught can be fully utilised.

The author exhibits lamentable ignorance of the scientific importance of the system in its theoretical and practical aspects.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

The Book of Chilam Balam of Chumayel. By RALPH L. ROYS. (Carnegie Institution of Washington, Publication No. 438.)

The word *chilam*, or *chilan*, we are told by the author of this volume, signifies "mouth-piece or interpreter of the gods. Balam means jaguar, but it is also a common family name in Yucatan, so the title of the present work could well be translated as the Book of the Prophet Balam." Down to the nineteenth century many towns and villages of Northern Yucatan possessed Books of Chilam Balam, the title in each case being supplemented by the name of the town to which the book belonged. "Thus the Book of Chilam Balam of Chumayel is named for a village in the district of Tekax, a short distance northwest of the well-known town of Teabo."

The volume under review is a translation from a photographic reproduction of the original, now extinct, Book of Chilam Balam of Chumayel. The original manuscript, actually a compilation from various earlier works, dates from the year 1782, though the prophet Balam lived not later than the first decade of the sixteenth century. Consequently, what comes down to us to-day as the Book of Chilam Balam of Chumayel is a re-interpreted work, weighted unavoidably with intrusive European material, interpolations, and textual corruptions. These factors, augmented by the obsoleteness of many of the Mayan words and phrases used (the manuscript, however, being written in European script*), render the task of clear and accurate translation a difficult one indeed. Yet Dr. Roys' production is manifestly an achievement in scholarship of the first rank, and is a worthy associate of the other unfailingly praiseworthy, scholarly publications of the Carnegie Institution.

This book, like the others of Chilam Balam, contains an almost bewildering variety of material. In addition to the numerous prophecies it contains sketchy historical narratives, chronicles, brief accounts of Mayan mythology, ritual and religion, and a number of discourses on astronomy, native government, and other fields, as well as some resentful reference to the Spanish conquerors. All in all, it constitutes an unpretty portrait of a race long past its zenith. Accounts of superstitious beliefs and rites, of internal struggles, of priestcraft abound in the pages of *Chilam Balam.* Here and there, however, one perceives glimmers of ancient wisdom—as, for example, the belief of the Maya in the four cardinal points of the universe, with "four gods" presiding over them, and their belief in the deluge and in the idea that "the present order was preceded by other worlds which had been destroyed"—but these are almost wholly obscured by a melange of superstition, both Mayan and Christian, and unintelligible symbolism. As the author indicates, the chief value of such a work is that it supplies a record of the reactions of the native mind to the European culture and contains much of what the Indians remembered of their old culture after the Spanish conquest. This reaction is interestingly illustrated by the Mayan religion which, as shown by *Chilam Balam*, fused with Romanism to produce a most curious admixture, aptly termed the Americanization of Christianity.

Abundantly annotated, completely indexed, and supplemented with illuminating appendices and a full bibliography, the book is admirably suited to the needs of the specialist and the research worker in the field of Mayan ethnology, philology, or history.

DAVID B. ROSENBERG

*"The ability of the Maya to write their own language in Euroscript was due," the translator points out (p. 4) "to the educational policy of the Spanish missionaries .... The Indians had a great reverence for their hieroglyphic writing which was permeated with the symbols of their old religion, and the friars felt that if they could wipe out this knowledge and substitute for it the European system of writing, it would be an effective means for the complete Christianization of the native population."

Mysticism and Poetry, By A. ALLEN BROCKINGTON, M. A., Ph. D., with a Foreword by Sir A. Eddington, F. R. S. (Chapman and Hall, Ltd., London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

This book is more a series of notes than a definite work on Mysticism and Poetry.

> I began this piece of writing with the notion that there was a mystical element of poetry and that this element could be studied adequately in some English poems.

That is the first sentence of the book and—in phrasing and atmosphere—it is representative of the whole. In fact, it would be difficult to state the essential theme of this book with any precision though, possibly, this difficulty is magnified by the author's choice of words. The use of the word, "notion," in the sentence quoted above, is one example. Another is furnished by the following statement which appears on page 204. "When we come to the supreme experience we find men returning to the childish way." It may seem a splitting of hairs but, to one reader, the use of the word "childish," instead of "child-like," robs the statement of any significance. Also to refer to Blake's :—

> God appears and God is light
> To those poor Souls who dwell in Night,
> But does a Human Form display
> To those who Dwell in Realms of day—

as a "great thing" somehow destroys the effect of the quotation.

But if the fundamental theme is difficult to discover, the form of the book is definite. The Introduction records certain of the author's experiences: the effect created by listening to a reading of Coleridge's *Ancient Mariner*; a Vision seen when kneeling at the altar rail; the Hearing of Voices, notably during the battle of the Somme.

The author's "inquiry" is based on these experiences. The second section of the book is headed Vision and contains an account of the visions seen by a number of English mystics and poets. Section III is headed The Spiritual Imperative, which is the author's phrase for the Hearing of Voices, and narrates the experiences of St. Joan of Arc, George Fox, Marshal Foch, William Blake, etc. Section IV deals with Intuition, and consists almost entirely of quotations. The remaining sections are entitled The Traditional View of Mysticism and The Mystical Outlook.

Dr. Brockington sums up the result of his inquiry as follows (after an "urgent reminder" that Intuition is complementary to whatever is properly called "common sense" in religion and life).

1. The mode of apprehension necessary to the mystical life is Intuition, of which Vision and the Spiritual Imperative are more or less supernormal forms.

2. Mysticism, in the traditional view, is a way of praying, and the mystical experience is the intuition of God as present.

3. Mysticism, considered as an outlook, is a way of seeing the great things in the small things, and the "mystical experience" is the intuitive knowledge of the Great Thing.

4. There is a mystical element of poetry, though the poet, as such, is not a mystic, in the traditional sense. In that sense he is, as Bremond calls him, a *mystique manqué*. The true poet, however, has always the mystical outlook; and so has everyone who recognizes the poetry of existence.

What seems lacking in that summary, and in the book, is the *implications* of the mysteries discussed. Vision . . . the Hearing of Voices . . . . Intuition . . . . Are these intimations of the spiritual world—hints of Reality? Blake defines vision as a representation of what actually exists, really and unchangeably. Well, that tells us something. It tells us that Vision is a glimpse of Reality, and, by implication, it tells us that the "common sense" world is illusory. But what, exactly, does it tell us about Vision when it is defined as a more or less supernormal form of Intuition? And is "traditional" mysticism no more than "a way of praying"? Is that phrase an adequate description of Swedenborg or Boehme.

(But perhaps they are not "traditional" mystics). And can mysticism be regarded as an "outlook"? Is not a mystic one who is in love with God?

Also, even in the "traditional" sense, is every poet a *mystique manqué*? The phrase is an illuminating one when applied, say, to Baudelaire, but, surely, it is wholly inapplicable to Shakespeare. It is the *order* of imagination which determines the category to which a poet belongs. Dante is the superlative example of a mystical poet because his imagination lives, moves, and has its being in the spiritual world. Shakespeare's does not. His imagination illuminates the natural world not the spiritual. He was not a mystic in any sense of that celebrated word. The interest of this book is twofold:—It is based on personal experience, and it contains a number of illuminating quotations,

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

Kabir and the Bhagti Movement. By MOHAN SINGH, M.A., Ph. D., D. Litt. (Atma Ram & Sons, Lahore. Rs. 2.)

This is an "attempt to re-create and re-interpret Kabir along desirable lines of historical exactness and analytical and comparative study". The author would have us think of Kabir, as not an extraordinary man though an independent thinker who had evolved his own philosophy of life. The legends of Kabir's virgin birth, his reputed discipleship under Ramanand, his attributed influence over Guru Nanak of the Sikhs, the legendary character of the poet's death, etc., are all stripped of their symbolic value and laid bare upon the author's surgical table. But the scalpel, be it never so keen, will not reveal the soul which formerly animated the lifeless form.

The book's value lies in the useful amount of material which the author's scholarship makes available in condensed form, and not in the conclusions and inferences drawn. Considerable space, for instance, is devoted to showing that Kabir had no personal *Guru*, and the following quite remarkable axiom is laid down: "We must, therefore conclude that where there is no mention of a name as that of the Guru, we are to take that fact as the non-existence of a personal teacher." Even in India, the need for secrecy in spiritual matters has almost been forgotten, but surely the relationship between Guru and disciple is nothing if not a spiritual tie. Silence upon the subject does not prove that no such tie exists.

The author intends to bring out in 1937 two additional volumes on Kabir. They will cover an appraisement of the language and the poetic graces, and a comparative study of the esoteric teachings of Kabir. He asks for a frank and full opinion of the present work and so we venture to suggest that a comparative study of religions and their Founders' teachings would be useful for the future work in hand. Reference is made to the similarity between the legends surrounding the lives of Jesus and Kabir—for example, the virgin birth of both. Similar legends surround the lives of other Teachers of mankind, and long anterior records can be found in Egypt, in Greece and even in the far off Mexico. Under the garb of myth and symbol, spiritual truths are taught by poets and sages. If he is honest and earnest in his pursuit of Truth our author will realize that throughout the world there have appeared from time to time teachers of varying degree who have preached and practised the same eternal truths in a phraseology and by a method best suited to impress the generation to which they came. Then let him return to his task of translation and interpretation with the humbleness required to understand the grandeur of simplicity, and the figure of Kabir should become more living and more real.

B. T.

Shintoism: The Indigenous Religion of Japan. By A. C. UNDERWOOD, M.A., D. D. (Great Religions of the East Series. The Epworth Press, London. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

After living for fifteen years in Japan I have not the least doubt that the power and prestige of the people, as contrasted with their charm and humanity, are greatly owing to Shinto, a cult of intense sincerity and solemnity, alike a concentration and a consecration.

But it is not the Shinto of this admirably compiled *résumé* of existing works, significantly entitled Shintoism, a thing which never existed of course, being a mere abstraction for the sake of convenience, the result of which would be that any one reading this book before visiting Japan would know a good deal about what students of Comparative Religion have written about Shinto, but very little about the veherable thing itself.

As one who has visited hundreds of shrines in Japan, with Japanese of the highest and the lowest social rank, and been a spectator of rites and treasures and many human experiences of deeply moving kinds, I cannot help feeling that, however desirable and interesting such books as this of Dr. Underwood are, far more desirable are personal utterances from the inside. In the case of Japan they would be difficult to obtain, of course, for a Japanese can only speak to us in our own language, in which, since the days of Cynewulf, there has been so little of emotional reaction to the sterner aspects of Nature.

The power of Shinto and largely that of Japan, lies in the common people, with their simple devotion. The solemn rites, even those of military dedication, are incalculably strengthened by the ancestral sense of oneness with Nature. I have never known such strange depths of feeling as those induced by the loneliness of Shinto shrines, most of which are in very solitary mountain glens,—a feeling that is entirely unrelieved by personal utterances of choral singing such as we are familiar with in Christian or Buddhist ritual.

It is in this entirely emotional transformation,—the translation of a soul to a state of the deepest self-realization as one with the deeper self of all life,—that the essence and meaning of Shinto lie.

Shinto cannot be understood in any way but by participation, which means a stay of some length in Japan, isolation from Western influence, and a knowledge of the Japanese language. It is only a very dim shadow of Shinto we can experience by association out of Japan with scholarly Japanese.

Shinto has preserved, by its association with wild Nature, something that civilization has thrown back into oblivion. It has nothing whatever to do with scholastic formulation, and little intrinsically with political or national propaganda in Japan of the last century. It cannot be classified. If we are to view things and write of them in relation to the developing consciousness of man and its selective tendencies, then we can say that *thought about Shinto* shows an advance from animism to monotheism; but a statement of this kind is merely scholastic, representing an incurable tendency to draw alien things into our own favourite circle of ideas.

It is really gratuitous to speak of inherent defects of Ancient Shinto, or as Revon is here quoted: "What the text never mentions is the intimate individual prayer in the inner chamber which the Gospel recommends." And particularly uncalled for are such criticisms as this of Dr. Underwood:—

> It is noteworthy that the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* has not been able to include articles on Shinto's contribution to such doctrines as Salvation, Righteousness, Grace-Atonement. The positive defects of Shinto are as glaring as its deficiencies.

Shinto is not a religion of doctrines, and intellectual treatment of it entirely fails to give us the poetry of Japanese life, by which I mean the relation of the human spirit to the Nature around,

Japanese pluralism—forgive the term—always resents the approach to being swallowed up in any monotheism, or any "ism" whatever, and is intimately associated with Japanese common sense and dislike of abstraction.

To take part in the simple ceremonies of Shinto along with the true-hearted people of Japan is to wash away the hot bed-sickness of thought and to reach levels of something the world, with its feverish love of publicity, is losing, to its irretrievable misfortune.

Dr. Underwood earns our gratitude for his longest quotation, one from Prof. G. W. Knox, in which these wise and true words occur:—

> Shinto will survive—not in its dates, nor its genealogies, nor its theory of the descent of its sovereign from Amaterasu, nor in its legends and cosmology, but in the affections of the people, their trust in the national powers and destiny, and their confidence that there is a something more than their present strength and wisdom which directs and aids and on which they may rely. The "something more" may receive new names, but the faith will abide while Japan works out a future greater and more glorious than the fabled Age of the Gods.

In a new edition it would be well to have the long vowel ō indicated—in such words as Shintō, Kōbō, Shōtoku. This is a more important matter than it may seem. Also Aston's spelling of certain Japanese syllables should not be followed. It is pedantic and deceptive. It is not *Oho-harahi* or *Susa no wo* or *toriwi* that Japanese people say, but *O-harai*, *Susa-no-o* and *torü*.

E. E. SPEIGHT.

Russian Sociology. By J. F. HECKER, Ph. D. (Chapman and Hall, Ltd., London. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

"Sociology," Dr. Hecker remarks, "in common with all other social sciences, is not a pure science; it is a generalisation largely conditioned by the social struggles under which it develops." He has sought to show how sociological theory in Russia has been moulded by the economic, social, and political conditions of the country. It is a learned and painstaking work, but as Mr. Sidney Webb has pointed out in his introduction, the title is slightly misleading, since "Sociology must include also the objective study of the phenomena themselves of which it deals, the grouping of men which we call social institution."

After sketching briefly the socio-political background against which sociological theory has developed in Russia, the author reviews the leading doctrines of the several schools of thought, starting with the Slavophils and closing with the theories that have supplied the "working hypothesis for the making of a new social type" being evolved at the present time.

The reaction of the theory to the social environment has been sometimes acquiescent and apologetic, at other times critical and rebellious. The Slavophils represent the first type of reaction. In their anxiety to discover "something peculiarly Russian upon which they could establish the new type of civilisation which was to redeem humanity," they glorified the Greek Orthodox Church, the Autocracy, and the Land Commune of the peasantry. The first was a "living organism of life and truth". "The Russian Autocracy was created by the free will of its citizens . . . . . the sovereign wishes but the good of the people, and this makes parliamentary rule superfluous." The Land-commune was "the corner-stone of all Russian institutions," and realised "the Utopian dreams of Western Socialists". That way lay the path of reactionaries, the most famous of whom, Pobyedonoscev, influenced the policies of Government in the early years of the present century, and watched with bitter contempt the rise of the Duma.

While the reactionaries were holding the fortress of authority and buttressing it with comforting theories, the forces of revolution were organising

themselves underground. As industrialisatoin went on in Russia, an industrial proletariat made its appearance, and its importance for the future was soon realised by the Socialist school of thought. Thinkers like Plekhanov and Lenin " advocated the idea of the hegemony of the working class, in which the revolutionary intellectuals and the peasants should be an important but still an auxiliary part". They wanted to overthrow not merely Tsarism but also the bourgeoisie. How they struggled and with what success they met are described in the great work of Trotsky. Communist Sociology is not only a revolt in thought from the social and political implications of Tsarist regime, but its protagonists have also seized the reins of power, and with the civilised world for spectators, are busy reconstructing Russia.

N. S. SUBBA RAO

The White Monk of Timbuctoo. By WILLIAM SEABROOK. (George G. Harrap and Co., Ltd., London. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

Mr. Seabrook gave a short account of Père Yakouba in *Jungle Ways.* Having now devoted a whole book to him he wholly succeeds in convincing us that it wasn't worth it. A paragraph, or a few pages on him—by a real writer—would certainly be worth while; but a rambling book by a journalist who obviously found the material too difficult to mould into any sort of shape, has no reason for existence. The following are the facts about Yakouba. Born of French peasant parents he was made a Catholic priest against his will, but his passions were too strong for him to conform with the requirements of the Church. He became a missionary monk and followed the first French military column which penetrated to Timbuctoo in 1895. For several years, as Superior, he did great service for the Church and for the French Government, making long journeys to distant parts of the Sahara and the Niger valley. His prestige among the natives was such that he was marked for appointment as Bishop of the Sudan. But he did not want to be bishop, and one day he abandoned his robes and threw off European customs. He married a black woman and became the father of a small tribe—thirty children; and he is now Director of Schools, chief Agent of native affairs, interpreter-general, and in fact a highly important official in Africa. " The inside story of his life," we are told, " is one of conflict, leading to his tremendous decision to renounce the honours of Western Civilisation and 'go native".

It sounds not uninteresting, but Mr. Seabrook manages to make it tedious and flat. He may not be wholly to blame. It is hard to see how anything much could be made out of the priest. He was a clever man but without nobility, wisdom, or spirituality. His tremendous decision to renounce Western Civilisation and " go native " does not hold our attention, for he did not renounce anything really except celibacy. Great acts of renunciation and great gospels of back to nature such as come from men like Tolstoy and Rousseau have a strange fascination for us. But the lusty priest Yakouba going native in order to satisfy his extreme sexuality and be quit of pontificating prelates, has nothing in it. One feels more interested in the author, Mr. Seabrook, than in the man he vainly tries to bring to life, and in the American nation he represents which, while liking to make everything snappy, does not object to unparalleled slowness of speech, to newspapers of incredible bulk, and to rambling biographies that have no particular point, but include photographs of the hero's

marriage license. But I should add that Mr. Seabrook gives a good description of Timbuctoo on page seventy, a good story of a boy who wouldn't stop stealing unless he was whipped, and a good remark made by Yakouba —"The Holy Ghost knows where to build its nest." Though it is open to doubt whether the residence to which Yakouba was referring was ever thus favoured.

J. S. COLLIS

The Mahabharata: As It Was, Is and Shall Be. By PROMATHA NATH MULLICK. (The Pioneer Press, Allahabad and 27 Chancery Lane, London. Rs. 6.)

Cultivated Europeans, for the most part, know precisely nothing of the Indian epics. They know the *Bhagavadgita*, possibly, but not the fact that it comes from the *Mahabharata's* sixth book. For the rest, their awareness of the mere existence of Indian literature is confined to (and that dimly) certain Vedas and Upanishads, possibly the *Sakuntala* of Kalidasa and the translations of Rabindranath, while the *Mahabharata*, the *Ramayana*—let alone the wealth of minor works—might, for anything they know to the contrary, be the names of fruits or provinces.

Which is lamentable, indeed, but no less real on that account. For an Englishman, therefore, assessing, in the light of his own cultural tradition, the value of works of Indian scholarship in English, the first question to be asked is: Does this or that particular work fulfil any need of our own culture? And, in the case of an historical, interpretative and critical work, like this of Mr. P. N. Mullick, that question at once divides up into three: Is the Matter under treatment of cultural importance to the West? Is the manner of its presentation likely to be pleasing—or at least acceptable—to English readers? And are the writer's Critical Conclusions sensitively adapted to Western habits of thought?

In answer to the first of these three questions—Is the Matter under treatment of cultural importance to the West?—nobody, probably, would hesitate to reply with a complete affirmative. Western culture is weary, disintegrated: it has never been more necessary to attempt its re-invigoration with transfusions of fresh blood from alien cultures. And the *Mahabharata* is one of the fullest and most powerful expressions of a culture that has probably more than any other to offer of precisely those qualities which are needed for the regeneration of the West.

> As butter to all other foods; as Brahmans to all other men . . . .; as the ocean to a pool of water; as the cow to all other quadrupeds; so is the *Mahabharata* to all other histories. . . . He who listens attentively to the couplets of the *Mahabharata*, and has faith in them, enjoys long life and great reputation in this world, and eternal heavenly life in the next.

Thus the epic ends; and though the man of to-day will hardly acquiesce in such lordly claims, yet the poem is indeed a piece of man's work which the West can only lose by neglecting. Apart from any other consideration, its length (amounting, with the many additions and corruptions of text accruing in the Buddhistic age, to some 220,000 lines) is greater than the total of the Homeric epics! And some of the episodes—that of Satyavan and Savitri, for instance, still celebrated in the annual festival of Savitrivrata—are of amazing loveliness.

But there are two further questions to be answered: Is Mr. Mullick's manner of presenting his material likely to be pleasing—or even acceptable—to English readers? And are his critical conclusions sensitively adapted to Western habits of thought? Unfortunately, it is impossible to answer either of these questions affirmatively.

Mr. Mullick is not, of course, writing for a wide audience: he is addressing

the learned world only, and his breadth of information is quite impressive. But it is doubtful whether the most eager Orientalist could find his style other than unnecessarily digressive or his arrangement of facts other than diffuse and without cumulative logical effect. Mr. Mullick's whole use of the English language, indeed, is uncomfortable, cumbrous and rather naïve.

And this same looseness of language naturally flaws whatever the book may claim of critical conclusions also. Mr. Mullick, indeed, has not concerned himself in the least with the poetic values of the *Mahabharata:* he has used it as a source of moral teaching exclusively and concludes almost every paragraph with fervent but platitudinous exhortations to purity and discipline—for which, in any case, it is difficult to feel great enthusiasm, since they are bodied in a style which is itself devoid of either of these virtues, being voluptuously smothered with a quite astonishing weight of florid clichés and prodigally mixed dead or dying metaphors.

RAYNER HEPPENSTALL

My Confessional. By HAVELOCK ELLIS. (The Bodley Head Ltd., London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

"Confessional" is not here used with any thought of calling up the ecclesiastical associations of the term, or even the modernised form of it sometimes supposed to be psycho-analytic. There are not only confessions of "sin," demanding penitence and absolution, but also confessions of "faith". The confessions that come to me are of both kinds, and . . . . . are frequently of still another class which I may call self-affirmation.

This explanation from the far-famed author of the volume should be kept in mind. Within this small volume no less than seventy topics of widely diversified nature have been treated, and the wide range of subjects traversed reveals the many-sided interests of the versatile author. His early training in scientific preoccupation with "facts" and the statistical method, matured by the mellowed experience of "years that bring the philosophic mind," has invested all his pronouncements, short and crisp as they are, with persuasiveness. It is not, however, possible to do adequate justice to the rich variety of topics handled by our author; all that we can do within the small compass of this review, is to select a few typical utterances. At the very outset, we are treated to an excursus on Eugenics wherein Mr. Havelock Ellis refers, with approbation, to an opponent of Eugenics who declares that "the problem may be clear, but not its solution, and if eugenics is directed to eliminating the stupid people it will be robbing us of a valuable and necessary part of the community," and makes the somewhat startling announcement "I don't believe in eugenics" (pp. 5-6).

On the subject "What is the Worth of Education?"—the author is asked several questions by an Indian correspondent who "is an M. A. and professor in a college," and observes:—

It makes me sad that any one should ask them, or even desire any answer save his own . . . . It makes one sad because one feels that it has everywhere happened all over India. No doubt it was a noble ideal to bring European methods of intellectual training to India and to lay the fruits of our traditions at the feet of an alien race. The European traditions may be all right—though even about that one may sometimes have one's doubts—for us who have our ancestral roots in Europe, but it seems unreasonable to expect them to be right for a people of another race, of a totally different clime, a different hereditary endowment, who have grown into a social and religious structure as unlike ours as possible. That is a question the Indians themselves are now beginning to ask. And perhaps too late (pp. 91, 92.).

This is a statement so true as to pass for a truism. Comment is needless; what is needed is unqualified endorsement.

SAROJ KUMAR DAS

Crime: Its Cause and Treatment. By CLARENCE DARROW. (C. A. Watts and Co., Ltd., London. 2*s.* 6*d.*)

Clarence Darrow is one of the most famous figures at the American Bar, and when he places his forty years' experience at the disposal of those who study this difficult and ever-present problem, his views should receive attention. It is therefore not surprising that this volume of short chapters on the various aspects of the enquiry should have proved so popular that it is now reprinted in a cheaper form.

One must accept the proposition that in any large community crime is inevitable, using the term to cover those anti-social acts whose gravity demands that some communal action be taken against the offender. Such men for the most part are those who lag behind in racial evolution, being unable through inherent weakness of character to keep to the standard of behaviour which the community requires. They are unable to adjust themselves to their environment, and as such should receive the helpful consideration of all who love their fellow men. As the author points out, the key to the problem is the attitude which the community adopts towards these weaker brothers, and unfortunately that attitude is still primarily one of revenge. In the ideal one should try to educate them to become useful citizens, but such a course needs time, skill, and, last but not least, money, a commodity which few nations are prepared to spend lavishly on those who war against their interests. Society must be protected from further depredations, and a happy mean must be reached between segregation and regeneration. Meanwhile we punish the criminal. Have we any right to do so?—asks Mr. Darrow, who proves that the sole basis of punishment is revenge, for its reforming influence is nil and its deterrent influence very doubtful. Moreover at least four other persons suffer for every one who is punished for his crime. Herein lies the value of the American experiment of the indeterminate sentence, the idea being that the prisoner knows his maximum sentence, but also knows that he may be released so soon as he can satisfy a visiting committee that, given a fair start in life, he will genuinely attempt to become a law-abiding citizen. In Mr. Darrow's opinion the system is excellent in theory but difficult to apply with fairness and good results.

It is when he comes to consider the causes of crime that the author betrays his limitations. Apparently a disciple of behaviourism, he considers that all criminals are the sole product of heredity and environment, and therefore irresponsible. Add to this that he considers chance a tremendous factor in the making of criminals, and that he holds no hopes for the ultimate regeneration of mankind, and it follows that his treatment of the problem is as materialistic as his views. It is true that he sees the need of regarding crime as a disease, to be treated as such, with a cure as a necessary preliminary to letting the "patient" back among his friends, but here above all is a social problem which can never be solved until the community at large appreciates that the causes of crime lie in the mind of the criminal, and that those causes date from previous lives. Heredity and environment must be viewed as the self-chosen field of action in which to work out past errors, and to learn from experience the nature of the laws by which alone one may go forward to happiness and self-enlightenment. Meanwhile, the voice of Mr. Darrow is the voice of all men of goodwill when at the end of his book, he says :—

> As long as men collectively impose their will upon the individual units, they should consider that this imposition calls for intelligence, kindliness, tolerance, and a large degree of sympathy and understanding.

CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS

CONTEMPORARY INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

[**Dr. D. M. Datta,** Professor of Philosophy at Patna College, reviews here the progress of philosophical thinking in India, as he says that " retrospection acts both as a stimulus and a corrective ".—EDS.]

" Philosophy in modern India," observed Sir Radhakrishnan once, "is an infant industry that needs protection". In spite of her rich philosophical heritage India can claim very little in the way of new contribution to modern philosophy. Yet it is not altogether fruitless to review the little progress that it can be said to have made.

When the indigenous philosophical systems ceased to function academically and came to be deserted either through indifference or through positive neglect, European philosophy was imported into the new educational institutions. This exotic plant took rather deep root in the minds of those Indians who took to Western education. The early teachers of philosophy were mostly Christian missionaries, and philosophy, as taught then, was more or less tinged with Christian theology. The ideas of Indian philosophy, which were too intimately bound up with the religious beliefs of the land to be altogether lost, were driven almost into the subconscious mind of the educated Indians placed under the censorship of Western ideas and Christian theology. Indian philosophy had no place in the new programme of liberal education imparted by the universities, and its only use in academic circles was perhaps to supply examples of exploded, fantastic thoughts.

This state of things continued for a long time until some talented Orientalists of Europe began to take a dispassionate view of our ancient literature and to marvel at its rich stock of lofty philosophical writings. This admiration reacted on the minds of the educated Indians, and the desire to know the past began to return slowly.

It was during the earlier part of the last quarter of last century that the study of Indian philosophy was undertaken at the premier Indian universities, and since then it has been gradually spreading throughout the country. There are very few universities now that have not recognised the importance of the study of Indian philosophy.

To understand fully the mind of a modern Indian student of philosophy it is necessary to remember these vicissitudes through which that mind has passed; and to estimate correctly the scope and quality of philosophical research in modern India, one has to recognise the conflicts and difficulties which beset this task.

When a modern Indian mind tries to think philosophically, it is faced by two conflicting duties :— first, the demand to do justice to the inherited undercurrent of native ideas which cannot be ignored without repression, and

secondly, the demand to do justice to the stock of modern Western ideas which are superimposed on the indigenous ones and are in actual possession of the focus of consciousness.

I. Some Indian thinkers have successfully ignored and repressed the claim of indigenous ideas and have devoted their undivided attention to the problems of Western philosophy.

II. Others have addressed themselves wholly to Indian philosophy, without attempting to interpret Indian ideas in the light of Western ones.

III. A few have tried to compare and contrast the two systems and to arrive at conclusions by giving each its due.

These are the three broad lines along which philosophical speculation has advanced in recent times.

I. Three Indian writers can be counted among the more eminent philosophers of the first line. The earliest of these, and one whose academic record in the British universities has scarcely been surpassed by any other Indian, was the late Professor P. K. Ray, D. Sc. (London and Edinburgh). Thoroughly trained in Western science and philosophy at Western seats of learning and absolutely honest and unostentatious as scholar and thinker, Dr. Ray applied his rare philosophical talents to the unambitious work of writing text-books on Deductive and Inductive Logic. These works contain well-knit, precise, solid thinking and easily attained the rank of classical text-books on the subject. Eminent European logicians like Keynes, Welton, and Read quote his views with respect.

Professor H. Haldar, who retired a few years ago from the George V Chair of the Calcutta University, is another eminent writer of this time. By undivided attention to Hegelian philosophy, Dr. Haldar has set an example of what intensive cultivation of a small area can yield. Those of us who fritter away our energy in the fruitless attempt to master everything have much to learn from Dr. Haldar, whose one-pointed devotion to Hegel has given him a place of authority in that field. His work on Neo-Hegelianism has been held in high esteem by eminent European experts. The third writer is Professor S. Z. Hasan of Aligarh. Trained in England and Germany, and possessed of an extensive grasp of contemporary philosophical literature, Dr. Hasan has written his book on "Realism," which has been recognised as a standard work on the subject.

II. Contrasted with these is the group of workers along the second line indicated above, the most important among whom are Dr. Ganganath Jha, Dr. S. C. Vidyabhusan, Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, Dr. Belvalkar, and Professor Ranade. Translation of technical philosophical literature from Sanskrit into English requires patient understanding of texts as well as skilful treatment. By translating a stupendous number of abstruse philosophical texts Dr. Jha has placed students and writers of Indian philosophy, in India and abroad, under a deep debt. The

late Dr. S. C. Vidyabhusan (Principal, Sanskrit College) also did valuable work in this direction by translating some classical texts and especially by writing *The History of Indian Logic*. Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, the worthy successor of Dr. Vidyabhusan, has established his position also in this field by writing single-handed his encyclopædic *History of Indian Philosophy*, the first two volumes of which already published have engaged the attention of all interested scholars throughout the world. His aim has been to present a faithful account of Indian systems of all kinds and he has always attempted to be faithful to the original texts. Professor Ranade's more ambitious scheme of completing an exhaustive encyclopædia of Indian Philosophy and Religion in several volumes, which raised much expectation, has been partially worked out with the help of Dr. Belvalkar, and more fruitful work still is awaited with interest. In addition to these workers who have been long in the field, some other competent scholars like Mr. S. Suryanarayan Shastri (Reader, Madras University), Pandit Kokileswar Shastri (Calcutta University), Mr. Kuppu Swamy Shastri, and Mr. M. Hiriyanna have been doing valuable work in the translation and presentation of Indian philosophy in English. Dr. Mahendranath Sirkar (of the Presidency College, Calcutta) distinguished himself very recently by his able exposition of Vedantic philosophy and Indian culture in Italy. His writings have a marked mystic flavour and appeal most to those who seek spiritual nourishment in the study of philosophy.

III. Work along the third line consists of (A) Critical and comparative study of Indian and Western philosophy and (B) independent contributions arising out of the assimilation of Indian and Western ideas.

Work of the first kind has been done in recent times by a good many scholars who have either defended the various systems or critically evaluated them. The chief among these works is Sir Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy*, which is up to now the only attempt to give a systematic, critical and comparative exposition of the important Indian systems. It marks a new epoch in the history of modern Indian philosophy. It has been an inspiring source of information for the whole world, and has raised the status of Indian philosophy in the minds of Western thinkers. Many of the theses submitted for Doctorate degrees by Indian scholars in the Indian Universities and abroad have taken this line of comparative research. One of the most eminent Indian teachers of Philosophy, who was also one of the earliest to guide students in this field, is Sir B. N. Seal whose name must be mentioned in this connection. While he was the George V Professor of the Calcutta University many ambitious scholars worked in different branches of knowledge under the guidance and encouragement of this great genius, whose talents, versatility and pro-

found assimilation of Indian and Western thought know no parallel in modern times. Comparative study is being encouraged to a great extent also by the infant institution of the Indian Philosophical Congress and some valuable papers are being read and published by it every year.

Their independent contribution to philosophy has been too poor to entitle Indians to any recognition in the modern philosophical world. As we have indicated above, this kind of work is made difficult by the conflicting traditions which face every Indian with modern Western education. In addition to the many existing philosophical theories, Western and Indian, which every Indian thinker has to assimilate before he reacts independently, there are the daily increasing theories of modern science which at least some thinkers try to understand in order to make use of scientific truths in the construction of their own theories. Difficulties of this nature stood in the way of original work even in the case of such a scholar and thinker as Sir B. N. Seal. He had always the ambition, as he himself once stated, to form his own views after reading every important thing about Western philosophy, Indian philosophy and the modern sciences. It was only late in life that this ambition was near fulfilment and he could begin to think out his own philosophy which would do justice to what he had learned. But before he could write down his thoughts there came the Einsteinian revolution in science, and his synthetic philosophy required revision. By the time this modification was achieved, a paralytic stroke put an end to his literary activities.

The institution of the Philosophical Congress has been a source of encouragement to original thinking. Appointments to presidential positions have forced some otherwise silent thinkers to formulate their views and have sometimes artificially stimulated even some listless scholars to attempt something original. The symposia and the papers also have been the vehicles of free thinking on smaller scales.

The Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner (Bombay), the only research institution for philosophy in this country, which owes its existence to the munificence of the philosopher-merchant Mr. Pratap Seth, has been an active centre for philosophical activities for the last few years. Professors G. R. Malkani and R. Das along with some other able younger colleagues like Mr. T. R. V. Murti have created therein an atmosphere for free philosophical thinking in the light of Indian and up-to-date Western thought.

The idealistic views of Prof. Malkani and the realistic ones of Dr. Das have found expression in papers regularly published in the *Proceedings* of the Philosophical Congress and its organ, *The Philosophical Quarterly*. The efficiency of the institution has been very greatly increased recently by the appointment of Professor K. C. Bhattacharya as its Director.

In contemporary Indian philosophy, the two outstanding persons who have constructed comprehensive views of their own out of the assimilation of both Indian and Western systems of thought are undoubtedly Sir S. Radhakrishnan and Professor K. C. Bhattacharya.

But of them and their work on another occasion.

D. M. DATTA

SOCIAL SERVICE

Attention of our readers may be drawn to a recent reprint of Madame Blavatsky's "*Let Every Man Prove His Own Work*," which analyses human suffering and shows the reasons why our efforts to relieve it largely fail. The poulticing of surface misery goes on apace, and causes multiply while diagnosis waits upon perfection of technique for dealing with results. Public and private charity essay in vain to stop the swelling flood. The public social services in many lands have fended off, admittedly, extremes of destitution, but it cannot be gainsaid that they have sown new evils in the shape of pauperism, lessened responsibility and weakened family ties. England and New Zealand may be named as instances of countries which have shown a marked revulsion of feeling against such services, which once were hailed as panaceas for most human suffering. The beneficent results of even so impersonal and well meant an effort as slum clearance have been seriously called in question.

Personal sympathy and exertion for others outvalue public charity, but giving blindly may be quite unwise. The Director of Public Information of the Welfare Council of New York City, writing in *To-day*, of August 1934, describes the New York Beggars Clinic which up to that time had analysed 1,000 cases and had proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that he who gives to beggars in New York is harming both them and society.

Comes now this pamphlet which reprints an article that first appeared in 1887 but seems, if anything, more apposite to present-day conditions. "More mischief has been done by emotional charity than sentimentalists care to face," declares Madame Blavatsky. She does not acquiesce in the unbrotherly neglect of the poor and wretched by those in comfortable circumstances, but denies that men can be made good or happy by betterment of physical surroundings. She points to the way out of the apparent impasse, a way that may not lead to quick results, but holds a promise for the days to come :—

> Mere physical philanthropy, apart from the infusion of new influences and ennobling conceptions of life into the minds of the masses, is worthless. The gradual assimilation by mankind of great spiritual truths will alone revolutionize the face of civilization, and ultimately result in a far more effective panacea for evil, than the mere tinkering of superficial misery.

And she tells those who long to help their fellow men, to fit themselves to serve :—

> It is not the spirit of self-sacrifice, or of devotion, or of desire to help that is lacking, but the strength to acquire knowledge and power and intuition, so that the deeds done shall really be worthy of the "Buddha-Christ" spirit. . . Therefore is the double activity of learning and doing most necessary ; we have to do good, and we have to do it *rightly*, with knowledge.

PH. D.

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

Spiritists are Not Scientists—Titles of Knowledge and their Jurisdiction—Dr. Urquhart thinks like a Church Missionary.

There is an unfailing custom on the part of exponents of Spiritism to look back on "the year that has gone" and take stock of progress made, not infrequently omitting reference to setbacks and disastrous events. The best of all possible movements in the best of all possible worlds pays attention to the felicitous side and to that alone. Now there is a British College of Psychic Science which has flourished for a number of years. It does not seem to hold classes, arrange an official curriculum or issue diplomas. It is a College notwithstanding; and its present Principal is well known among us as an expositor of "Survival" and otherwise as a novelist of repute. We refer to Mrs. Champion de Crespigny, who has published a retrospect of the kind in question.* It affirms (1) "a noticeable expansion" of Psychical Research—apart, however, from particulars; (2) "a rise in the level of mentalities" concerned with investigation, but apart from names; (3) unprecedented attention to the subject given by the Press; (4) "definite attempts" to convince scientists; (5) a "steady influx of new books" and so forth. Assuredly the growth of the movement is made evident by these details; but as it is difficult to conceive a College without a curriculum and without graduates, so if Spiritism belongs to Science it is hard to comprehend how it profits by conversions, why it depends on the popular Press, and why the growth of books thereon demands such gratified notice. Other sciences do not compute with pride those who believe therein, nor do they wax zealous over space occupied in the public journals. It follows that Spiritists do not behave like Scientists, although they appeal to these. Their position is not easy to define; but it seems that more especially of an eschatological sect, warranted by a group of alleged facts, demonstrating personal survival after bodily death and a posthumous state in manifest opposition to Christian orthodox doctrine. As such, it is futile to invoke Science, which has no concern therein and no office of judgment. But Spiritism is not a religion, though it may have religious consequences. Religion is the Science of Union between the Soul and Deity and no more postulates personal survival than it postulates man on earth as personally embodied in flesh. It presupposes both and learns nothing from the dead testifying, as all post mortem utterances are from the "hither hereafter" and not from souls in union. Moreover, the eschatological side of Spiritism remains unverified testimony, be-

* *Light*, December 27, 1934, pp. 793, 794.

yond our power to check.* Finally, the record under notice has not one word of reference to that cloud on the sanctuary of Psychical Research created by the "Margery" case, the acrimonious debate of which has been succeeded by ominous silence: We hear no more of the distinguished lady-medium or even of her critics. The significant Report of the English S. P. R. on a further investigation of the Rudi Schneider mediumship is also passed over. It was undertaken by the Research Officer, firstly in conjunction with the *Institut Métapsychique* of Paris; secondly at Braunau, the medium's former home; thirdly at Weyer in Upper Austria, where Schneider now lives, five Researchers being present; and lastly in the Society's séance-room. The results were throughout negative, or occasional seemingly paranormal phenomena were obtained under non-evidential conditions.

———

Seeing that Mr. Bertrand Russell did not in point of fact discover "that objects exist everywhere except where they are and nowhere except where they are not," it seems desirable to correct a misstatement to this effect before it spreads further. It seems uncertain also that the affirmation was made casually in the seventies of the last century by the Rev. M. Baxter, when he demonstrated that Napoleon III was Antichrist. Supposing, however, that we are wrong on the important point, we shall remain anxious to dissuade inquirers from inferring that such findings of science have a real bearing on the question whether there is an open path of the Soul to God. There are at least a few of us who have loved discovery for its own sake, even when it leads nowhere; so it is good to hear the scientists when they talk "about it and about" or of that and this, within their own domain. Now it has chanced that Dr. Robert Clark † has cautioned people generally to beware of Mr. Bertrand Russell when he speaks of matters philosophical; but that which is said of one familiar name of the moment will apply obviously to all the roll of current science. Within their own measures, but not beyond: it is we, however, who tend to put them on pinnacles where they do not happen to belong, investing them with a semi-divine authority over matters general instead of particular matters. I have discovered, for example, that a certain super-unknown, denominated X *pro forma*, is governed in behaviour by Z, which is met with daily at most street corners, and is therefore in relation A to Thingumbob=B; and I become hereby a fit and proper person to decide whether Sludge hocusssed a certain circle at his last dark séance.

* It is therefore a form of faith, the acceptance as verdict of witness borne from the unseen. Here it is interesting to compare Prof. R. B. Perry, writing on "the meaning of death" in the *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1935, pp. 161-178, as if he had never heard of Psychical Research. He comes forward "empty handed," but would "like to *justify* the *desire* for immortality" (p. 162) and ends by suggesting that "it is possible to hope for a more doubtful life hereafter" (p. 177).

† *Proceedings*, October, 1934, pp, 251-285.

My titles remain, the fact notwithstanding that I am notoriously unable to see my own spectacles lying on the table before me or to remember whether an old friend happens to be bald or hirsute. *Per contra*, as a consequence of forty years spent on Psychical Research, I am President of a Society engaged therein, yet all my experiments and conclusions count for nothing, because I cling to the old fallacy that most objects tend to be present where they are and to be absent where they are not. Assuredly some titles of knowledge are well earned, but their jurisdiction needs revision.

In this connection, there is a credit on open account due to Dr. Clark for refreshing reminders on several findings which seem to be held authentic, amidst the flux of thought around us. They may be gathered into a group as follows: (1) That axioms are by no means necessary truths; (2) That "the age of deduction is going," even in the mathematician's realm; (3) That the syllogism is going also, and with these there folds up its tents, like the Arab, our "last hope of proving anything"; (4) That Nature provides us with no premises, and hence it is impossible to draw any certain conclusion; (5) That amidst universal nescience, it seems possible, however, to regard a critical attitude as often "the greatest barrier to truth"; (6) That "an absolutely valid ground of belief in God" has passed with the failure of Kant's doctrine of ethics; and (7) That, according to Galt's applied statistics, baptised boys—otherwise the children of God—"the members of Christ and inheritors of the kingdom of heaven," are no more spiritually minded than the children of the world and the devil.

The question arises: What therefore remains? It is not asked in the monograph under notice and yet an answer is given. After citing that which seems cogent to Dr. Clark we shall venture to append our own, on other warrants than his. The alleged failure of Nature to provide premises compels us to seek elsewhere for a way of reaching conclusions, and we are counselled to remember that experience is "the only reasonable starting-point," meaning that "we must observe Nature and then guess what might have caused the observed events". This is induction. It does not emerge that we come to much good in the practice, since "a guess may always be wrong," while "various ways of testing its correctness are none of them fool-proof". In this pickle we are left apparently, but with a casual reminder that thoughtful people "naturally regard religious faith as a form of induction".* It cannot be obtained while the mind is critical; but it may lift up a "shining light which survives and is strengthened by criticism. It may not prove God or Christianity; but it justifies St. Paul in affirming that God has made foolish the wisdom of this world, which knew not God, and

* *Ibid.*, p. 705.

has saved them that believe. At this point, presumably, Dr. Clark had more to say and might have surprised his readers; but his discourse seems left intentionally at a loose end.

We recur therefore to that which he proclaims dogmatically. For him who would reach conclusions experience is the starting-point: there is none other in the known reason of things. But experience is a mode of mind, and there is hence an attainable state of our inward being "which can reach certitude".* Be it observed that in the matter of direction there is no attempt to qualify. Observation may be directed to Nature, the study of the world without; it may be turned upon the world within, the processes of human mind; but in either case we acquire that experience from which it is postulated that we can draw certain conclusions. It is not by deduction because "the age of deduction is going"; it is not in virtue of premises because they exist no longer; the "argument from analogy" may land us in a vicious circle; "what is known as correlation" may institute false connections; but *experientia docet*—God knows how, if you like; but that which is taught is that which sees within us, that which can come to know, not by debate about it but in virtue of experience. We thank our essayist, who has given us all things back, or has shewn us rather that they remain unaffected utterly. He has illustrated only the several ways in which the logical mind is disqualified by its own processes. The lesson of experience abides. It has given us all the science that we have of the outward world, all of the world within—be it much or little in most cases; and above these, for some of us—few or many—there is that which the great of old, there is that which we in our measures have learned of the Life in God, the Quest of Reality, the State of Unity, beyond the Blessed Vision and St. Monica's "union there". *Experientia docet*: it gives even "the clue" of that "single Aleph" which leads not only "to the treasure house," but "peradventure to the Master too".

The Principal of the Scottish Church College, Calcutta, Dr. W. S. Urquhart, asks whether the Indian identity relation between the Soul and God "can provide us with religious satisfaction," and suggests that, notwithstanding its beauty and attractiveness, "it does not seem to reach the possible heights of the religious relationship". The alternative and better way of "satisfying our religious aspirations" is surely that of "communion," for it is on such a basis alone that "true worship is possible". It is recognised that this is a reversion to the "subject-object relationship," regarded as the simplest of all. In Christian symbolism, it is the Blessed Vision

* Compare Prof. J. S. Moore, offering a new definition, that "Philosophy is a rational inquiry into the meaning of experience". It implies, as he points out, that "we can know *something* at least of the meaning of the things". See *Philosophy*, January, 1935, pp. 64, 65.

of Dante in place of the absorption of the unity. It is recognised further as the "sense of duality," not only admitted as the one authentic ground of communion between man and the Divine but beatified as the Way, the Truth and the Life, when raised within us to "the religious level through the conception of love". Dr. Urquhart is of course a Christian missionary in India and thinks as such. Christianity for him makes actual that which is possible for us all—to "become the Sons of God," instead of "disappearing phantoms in a dream-like world". Presumably he has never known what French *Theosophia* has called *la soif de l'unité* or that inmost "orbicular wound" which comes from the dread of separation eternalised. Does Dr. Urquhart imagine that a man can lose anything when he attains the All?

A. R. WAITE

THE CRUELTY OF FURS

The steel trap is undoubtedly the cause of the greatest animal suffering. Women cause most of the suffering to wild animals, usually through ignorance, but some do not want to know, and prefer adorning themselves with skins, because it is the fashion.

From 8 to 10 beavers are killed for one coat, about eighty mink skins make one wrap. Practically all animals with paws undergo hellish tortures in the steel trap, which also induces an intense thirst that cannot be slaked. There are also countless mothers of the wild among these poor tortured things, whose young are left to starve.

Many a foot caught in a steel trap has been gnawed off; sometimes an animal is found caught by its only remaining foot, the other three having been lost in former traps. The law that a trapper must visit his traps very frequently is often broken, on account of weather conditions.

Here is some of the testimony of former trappers:—

"Every animal suffers excruciatingly from the moment when its leg is caught between the steel jaws of the trap, which lacerates and breaks it."

"My last bear I heard for many days, before suspecting what the sounds were. I found the half-grown animal half-dead with its foot gangrened and stinking. Its teeth were broken with trying to sever the steel jaws of the enormous trap. . . . The bear's other leg was mutilated by its own agonised and frantic biting."

Humane steel traps, like those invented by Mr. Vernon Bailey, the well-known naturalist, and awarded the American Humane Society's prize, should cut the toll of suffering. Even now furs are obtainable from animals humanely killed, *e. g.*, those from hoofed animals (excluding broadtail), silver and black fox skins and other furs from fur farms sold with a guarantee of their source, moles, fancy rabbits, shorn lamb and imitated skins such as nutria-lamb, seal-coney, etc. Even better are the fabrics of silk and wool which look like fur. The artificial Persian Lamb, Karakul, Nutria and Pony skin are particularly attractive. A day in the rain does not affect them. Best of all, no animal has died a lingering and miserable death to make them available. Leaflets telling where humanely are available on request from Major C. Van der Byl, Wappenham House, Towcester, Northants, organiser of the Fur Crusade and Humane Trapping Campaign.

E. H.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"————————*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS.

In the January *Fortnightly* a Calcutta Britisher reflects on "The Changed Mood of India" caused by the decisions of the Bombay session of the National Congress, at which Gandhiji withdrew from political life. Malcolm Muggeridge asks:—

How has this change affected the position of the ordinary European in India? There is undoubtedly less antagonism directed against him as a European. He is not made to feel, as he was some years ago, that he is an enemy surrounded by enemies. On the surface of things, his position is much securer than it was, his prestige higher. Yet I doubt if it is really higher. I cannot shake off a queer feeling that he is more easily tolerated than he was because he is less feared. It seems to me that the myth of his innate superiority has been so exploded now that it does not even need to be refuted, but is taken for granted. As I walk about the streets of Calcutta, trying to understand, to tune myself to their ebb and flow, the movement of stealthy chattering people, with mutilated beggars whining from the road-side and the air full of dust and stale fragrance, it is constantly borne in on me that, quite apart from whether there is to be this or that measure of constitutional advance, even any constitutional advance at all, something is petering out—is it an Empire?—leaving behind fragments of itself, mostly paltry, but soon to be no more.

As far as the Europeans themselves are concerned, they seem very much the same. They have as little to do with India as they can; and perhaps they are right in so doing, because thereby they save themselves from being perpetually reminded of the precariousness of their situation, of the whole unreality of their relationship with the country wherein they live, and the people amongst whom they live.

A European who does not do something of the sort cannot but be vaguely unhappy, uneasy, most of his time. What is to be the end of it all? he wonders, sensing beneath the sound and fury of political agitation a deeper reality, a deeper antagonism—racial antagonism. This is the key to the situation; as long as it exists, no mere constitutional change, however far-reaching, will quieten discontent and bring peace, for racial antagonism means a perpetual state of tension, of morbid sensitiveness, of craven emulation or hysterical assertiveness, of bullying and acceptance of bullying. Probably hysterical assertiveness is better than craven emulation; but the former makes sworn enemies of Government, and the latter the only material available for Indian officials and Ministers. That is to say, generally speaking, the best men waste their energies and deteriorate in the negativeness of unending opposition, while the most inferior only are available for Government service and constitutional co-operation.

Here are some correct but misunderstood perceptions. The acute observations are wrongly interpreted. It is true that the innate superiority of the Westerner is an exploded myth; the Indian people know well that

Europeans and Americans are the same as themselves—both possess moral blemishes, mental limitations, unhygienic customs, insanitary habits, however different these may be. The same with virtues and capacities. If Indians suffer from the much talked of inferiority complex, the Westerners suffer from the equally objectionable superiority complex. Prides and prejudices die hard, in East and West alike. If even a fairly large number of Europeans in India would be as frank and truthful as Mr. Muggeridge and admit that their racial superiority is but empty talk, much ground would be cleared and their present position remarked upon in the above extract would improve. The English in India have blundered in the past and have lost the opportunity to shake the hand of real friendship with the native; to-day they may be willing to let by-gones be by-gones but their old Karma meets them in the shape of distrust, the cold shoulder and utter lack of respect on the part of the Indian.

But need mutual distrust verging on hatred continue? Cannot the English do something towards removing "the precariousness of their situation, of the whole unreality of their relationship with the country wherein they live"? Mr. Muggeridge is right. "Beneath the sound and fury of political agitation a deeper reality" exists and it *is* "racial antagonism".

We are not among those who minimize the difficulties caused by the clash of cultures in India. But what a small group of friends have achieved, that a large number of people can achieve. In the work of which THE ARYAN PATH is a spokesman, Westerners and Indians, both men and women, are engaged and they labour for the Cause they love—rising above the racial prides and sectarian prejudices. In this venture are Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, Europeans and Americans and there have arisen no questions of who is who.

They do not live in a colony in socialistic fashion, nor have they formed themselves into a religious order with set rules and commandments. Each fulfils his or her many obligations in the ordinary walks of life. Some of them not only earn their own livelihood but also earn to support this journal and cognate activities. Common ideals and aspirations, the same aims and purposes, bind them, and all of these converge towards a Vision of the Brotherhood of Humanity without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste or colour. They form a united band for they realize the truth of the aphorism—The Way to Unite is to Unite; Nothing prevents if that is the Desire.

Are there sufficient Britons and Indians who desire to unite, ready to sink their sectarianism, to practise Brotherhood?